(4 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise to support the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. I have been doing this work for 40 years. If the amendment is successful, people will file quicker: they know they will have to wait 20 weeks, or however many weeks, so they will put in their petition sooner. When a marriage has broken down, it is necessary to sort it out cleanly and without blame and delay. Delay causes grief. Uncertainty causes grief. Children get destroyed by uncertainty, which is why I have jointly tabled an amendment related to finance.
In relation to the breakdown of a marriage, I agree with the noble Baroness that it is patronising. It is not a charter for petitioners but a mutual charter to let people get divorced without the blame and shame of naming the person who is more at fault. For most marriages, it is not as simple as one party being 90% at fault and the other being 10% at fault, or one party being 100% at fault. There is mutual blame, so to suggest that that one party has to take the responsibility for being, effectively, the aggressor, causes grief. It causes grief to people who cannot operate on their own. Some people have the luxury of going to solicitors, but I really object to the suggestion that this is a solicitors’ or a lawyers’ charter to make money. When it is done online, it will be a great deal cheaper. There is a nice little industry in colluding with the solicitor on the other side to try to dream up grounds that neither party finds objectionable so that it can go through unopposed—but unfortunately, those grounds now have to be sufficiently serious to get past the very high bar that is being imposed, which means that blame has to be made. I do not see any benefit at all when one party—generally both parties—wants to get out of marriage in there being any further delays, so I do not support this amendment.
My Lords, I was not wishing to push myself forward too soon, but one has to look quite closely at the wording of this amendment, which says:
“The divorce process under subsection (1) consists of three stages and must be accompanied by … for the first stage, a statement by the applicant or applicants, if a joint application, on the filing of the application for a divorce order that they think that the marriage may have broken down irretrievably.”
The general rule is that one applicant is sufficient, and therefore there is no question of a requirement that they should agree that the marriage has broken down irretrievably at that stage.
I have not been a family judge for 40 years, but I have been concerned with this matter for even longer than that. As I said at Second Reading, I was concerned with cases where there were long debates and proofs about who was responsible for the breakdown of the marriage. I never found them to be of any practical use: they did not reconcile people—very much the reverse—and they were absolutely useless.
I am as strong supporter of the institution of marriage as I can be, and I have made that plain. Indeed, so plain was it when I introduced the corresponding Bill 20 years ago that I was invited to be interviewed on the “Today” programme—Ministers went in those days—by no less a person than John Humphrys. One of the first questions that he asked was whether I would care to be called the “Minister for Marriage” instead of Lord Chancellor. That suggested pretty plainly that he thought that I was trying to support the ordinance of marriage as far as practicable.
The situation here is that you are asking for a divorce, not applying for a consideration of something else. What is a divorce? It is an order that finds that the marriage has broken down irretrievably. Therefore, if you are going to ask for that, you must ask for it. There is no sense in saying, “I’m considering whether I should apply.” You either do or do not apply. If you apply, the process starts. However, of course I am all in favour of the idea that during that process people might come together. That happens, and there is nothing in the Bill that I know of to discourage it, except possibly the length of time involved. As I understand it, the result of the consultation process was that it should be a year, but a period of six months was chosen for the Bill. When my Bill went forward, I chose a year and Parliament increased it to 18 months. So it is not the first time that an attempt has been made to lengthen that period—something that will be considered later. However, the amendment does not appear to me to be right. If you are asking for a divorce order, the statement must state the ground on which the law allows a divorce.
Sadly, I agree entirely with what the noble and learned Baroness said about the children. Over the years, my experience in talking about and dealing with this issue in various ways is that, generally speaking, the children are devoted to both parents. They love them both, and when the parents separate in life or in the way that they treat one another, it tears the heart of the children, which is a terrible result. It is important that, before parents get involved in divorce proceedings, they think seriously about the effect on their children. On the other hand, there is nothing worse for children than being in a situation where their parents are continually at loggerheads. Sadly, the institution of marriage is such that it requires the loyalty of both parents all the time. If that stops, the result is, sadly, inevitable.
I entirely accept that my noble friend Lord McColl and those who support him would like to see reconciliation. I am entirely in favour of that, but I think that reconciliation is sometimes assisted when the parties see that what is required is an answer to the situation—when the marriage has broken down irretrievably and they are prepared to reach a conciliation. That does happen and there is every reason to support it happening during the divorce procedure, but I do not think that you can start the divorce procedure on the basis that it is going to happen.
My Lords, leaving aside the fundamental principle behind this amendment, there seems to me to be a real weakness in the wording of the proposed new subsection (2)(a), which says that,
“they think that the marriage may have broken down irretrievably”.
That seems so vague and unsatisfactory. Does the noble Lord think that this amendment would be improved and be worth further serious discussion if it instead said that they “intend to apply for an order on the grounds that the marriage has broken down”—in other words, that the first application would be a statement of intent?
My Lords, the unfortunate thing about that is that it is the application: once you have applied, you have carried out the intent. It is an application for a divorce, and the divorce procedure lays out what has to happen before the divorce is granted. When you apply, you are applying for a divorce. I cannot see any other possible way of proceeding. It does not seem to make sense to say, “I was thinking of applying—I was thinking of suing you—but I am still considering the matter.” If you want an order, you have to ask for it. That is essentially why I think this amendment has grammatical difficulties but also an enormous underlying theoretical difficulty.
My Lords, I support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord McColl, and the remarks of my noble friend Lord Morrow.
I have never been a judge to grant people a divorce, but I have been a minister for over 50 years, marrying people and endeavouring to keep families together. I am delighted that, over those years, people have come to me with the intention of divorce but made another decision on reflection. To this day, they are very happy families. After reflection, speaking to me and receiving advice, they were able to make another decision and heal the breach in the relationship.
The Government were elected on a promise to strengthen families and acknowledge that a strong society needs strong families. To the best of my knowledge, there was no mention in the manifesto of the no-fault divorce. I believe that time for reflection would be helpful. I would like this Committee and the Government to consider the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord McColl, has brought before us.
My Lords, I support Amendments 2 and 4. First, I would like to say how much I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton, when she talks about education, because I too have been an advocate and supporter of education on marriage, parenting and relationships for many years. I believe that it would make such a difference to the outcome of the pain and suffering that too many people go through, and which directly affects children.
However, in all our debates on the Bill we must not forget children. They are innocent parties in family break-ups, and everything we decide in this House, or in the other place, must not neglect their interests. So much of our family policy is built on the principle of what is in the best interests of the child. But when it comes to divorce, which can be devastating for children, the focus is too often solely on the interests of adults. This is why I am supporting these amendments.
The stated aim of the Bill is to reduce acrimony in divorce proceedings. The former Minister of Justice stated in the Government’s response to the consultation in April 2019 that this will
“support better outcomes for children.”—[Official Report, Commons, 9/4/19; col. 8WS.]
Supporters of the Bill claim that children of married parents who argue will be better off if their parents can divorce more easily, without having to allege fault. The logic is that parents continuing their marriage is more damaging to children than simply ending the relationship. The truth is that children need not be involved in any consideration of fault, but they are necessarily involved in the fact of divorce. It is the fact of divorce, not the process, that is harmful to children.
The Exeter Family Study found that divorce does not usually reduce conflict for the children. In fact, the opposite is true. The study says that
“the experience of most children whose parents have divorced is of increased conflict over an extended period, with the child involved to an extent that may not have been the case while the marriage lasted.”
Once parents have officially split, the door is open to children being the subject of disagreements in a way they never were before. These findings are corroborated by a US study that shows that children suffer negative consequences even if their parents divorce amicably. The authors express concern that
“some parents are lulled into believing”
that a good divorce will mean
“that their children are adequately protected from all of the potential risks of union disruption.”
There are of course exceptions, where divorce is the only and best alternative, especially when it comes to domestic violence and abuse. However, there is so much research that shows the benefits for children of living with their married parents, and the harm the divorce does to children. For example, having married parents increases the chances of getting a university degree. It is better for teenagers’ mental health and increases a person’s chances of getting married themselves. Young people whose parents separate are much more likely to become homeless and get into trouble with the law. Behavioural and emotional problems are also more likely to be found in children from broken homes.
There have been studies suggesting that children suffer more from divorce than from the death of a parent, and that this continues long term. Various reasons are offered for this. One is that divorce is seen as a choice. From a child’s perspective, their parent chooses to leave them, resulting in a sense of deliberate abandonment. There is also the ongoing yearning for reconciliation, while death is final. Children often cling for many years to the hope of their parents reconciling, causing reoccurring disappointment. I state all this to emphasise the importance of children’s interests in these debates. They should be front and centre in decisions about divorce, including in the court’s consideration of a divorce application.
I fear that this Bill will make divorce quicker and easier, leaving less time and motivation to compromise or attempt to reconcile—and children will suffer. I believe that these amendments help to focus on these innocent victims—because, remember, childhood lasts a lifetime.
My Lords, I need no conviction that children are better when their parents continue together, undivorced. I am strongly in favour of helping people who run into difficulties in their marriage. Various things can happen that require help. One of the amendments today refers to part of the 1996 Act that is still in force, providing money to help people to overcome these difficulties.
I need no conviction that divorce is bad for children, but I do need conviction that, if the parents are determined to divorce, nothing can be done to make it better for the children. That is where the arrangements under the Children Act are important. I believe that they are as good as can be achieved, but the important thing is that I would much prefer no divorce at all. We must concentrate on trying to keep parents together and keep the marriage going as a marriage and not in any other way.
I cannot see that the court can say, “This divorce is not good for the children” or “This divorce is good for the children”. Can noble Lords imagine a judge having to decide whether a divorce is good for the children? The answer is no in every case I know of: it is not a good thing for children that their parents have reached the conclusion that they have to divorce, as I said earlier. It is like tearing the children apart, because they love both parents and are very upset when anything happens to part them—but, sadly, the responsibility for staying together is with the parents. I strongly believe that doing everything that can be done to help them to stay together is the best help for the children.
My Lords, as I said, it has taken decades of distinguished professional experience for some noble Lords to make the contributions they are making to this debate. However, I have no doubt that it has taken a mountain of courage and not a small amount of eloquence and self-possession for the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, to make her contribution—for which I am sure we all thank her. I thank her and the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, for giving us the opportunity to talk about children with what I hope will prove to be a probing amendment that puts the interests of children into this discussion.
However, for the reasons stated by other noble and learned Lords, the place and moment for a court to consider the best interests of the child—for example, under the Children Act—should be in matters of contact and finance. At the risk of sounding like a broken record, I say once more that the place for your Lordships’ House to consider what we should do ought to be in putting back legal aid for such contested family matters.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 21, which is grouped with Amendment 3. It is also about marriage counselling once the application for divorce has been made. My amendment requires the Government to offer relationship and marriage counselling before and during the divorce procedure.
Marriage is the specific relationship form being directly affected by the Bill so it should be the focus of additional support. Much weight has been put on the evidence from research at the University of Exeter funded by the Nuffield Foundation, Finding Fault? It describes itself as the first empirical study since the 1980s of how the divorce law in England and Wales is operating. It is a piece of grey literature—that is, it has not been peer reviewed. The Government very rarely act on single studies, especially those that have not been peer reviewed by academics from other universities, which often challenge the conclusions of whichever study it is. The reliance of the Government and noble Lords on this research is surprising, to say the least. In reality, it is one study with 81 interviews and an analysis of 300 divorces. There was a survey in which around half the participants were divorcees and the other half were nationally representative: 71% of them supported retaining fault, which was ignored. I put that at the beginning of what I am saying because, in the Government’s argument, an awful lot of weight is being put on this research.
In the early 2000s, there was a healthy marriage initiative in the United States. Many of the programmes were focused on unmarried couples. It taught them the basics of commitment and how to resolve conflict and brought many to a point where they perhaps knew enough to separate because they realised the relationship did not have a future, or where both partners felt able to make the formal commitment of marriage. I notice a right reverend Prelate is in his place. The Church of England and many other churches run good marriage preparation courses which go into gritty detail of the problems that marriages can present.
Much has been said about the need to avoid the complexity of the Family Law Act. My amendment does not reintroduce information meetings, but makes it more likely that a couple who see no alternative to divorce, perhaps because both sides of the family have been through it, will, by going through counselling, have their eyes opened to the possibility that times can get better if you stick together. It allows people to reflect on the possible implications of what they are doing. Wealthy people can often access divorce consultants who dispassionately lay out the implications of staying together or splitting up. Many people pull back when they have someone dispassionately explain to them, for example, what has been termed the indissolubility of parenthood—that their relationships with their children, which the vast majority are absolutely determined to maintain, will require them to have ongoing relations with their ex-spouse not only to ensure the smooth running of day-to-day contact arrangements, but to negotiate every future major family event.
Professor Janet Walker led the evaluations of the pilots following the passage of the Family Law Act 1996. She interviewed more than 6,000 people. She commented that funding for relationship services was identified as a necessary part of divorce reform during the passage of the Family Law Bill and remains necessary today. She goes on to say that knowledge and understanding of what works in supporting relationships at times of change, challenge and crisis has also grown, and it is apparent that early intervention to support relationships increases opportunities for relationship ruptures to be repaired and for partnerships to thrive and endure. Therefore, we need to be sure that the opportunity to seek support is provided when relationships begin to deteriorate as well as in the period after an application for divorce is made, when the focus is likely to be on helping couples to reduce conflict and to focus on the ways in which they will continue to parent in a life apart. Relationship support, she says, must be accessible, affordable and available when it is first needed and at any time when families are seeking to repair or manage difficult relationships. In a follow-up study, which involved over 1,500 people, she found that, two years on from divorce, many people wished they had been warned beforehand of the harsh realities of post-separation life. If they had been forewarned, they might have sought reconciliation. They now have to work harder than ever to get on with their ex, given the need to maintain harmonious arrangements around finances and children.
US researchers, in the early 2000s, found that people who are unhappy in their marriage are more likely to be happy five years later if they did not divorce than if they did. Two out of three who were unhappily married but avoided divorce ended up happily married after five years. The problem is that, in our society, it is still stigmatised to ask for help with one’s couple relationship. When he was on “Desert Island Discs”, the American ambassador to the UK, Matthew Barzun, was very up front about the ongoing relationship counselling he and his wife had to maintain a good status quo in their relationship. Let us hope he is an early adopter, but the broad culture is not there yet. Marriage support and counselling can create a context where the root of the conflict can be addressed and terminated, rather than the relationship itself.
My Lords, I support both amendments. I want to look at Amendment 21 first; it contains a reference to Section 22 of the Family Law Act 1996 and one of the provisions supported by Professor Walker in the passage that my noble friend quoted. I regard it as absolutely essential that the Government should support families in difficulties. There are plenty of reasons for difficulty in family relationships, perhaps more than there were. But in any case, whether that is so or not, there are still difficulties, and help in overcoming these is essential as early as possible. Amendment 21 deals with Section 22 and the need for counselling in relation to the later stage.
I also support the provisions in Amendment 3, which are a last resort. It is so important that people really consider what is happening and get what help they can before it happens. The idea that it is always too late is not quite right. Sometimes reconciliation can come quite late—and better late than never—which is what Amendment 3 supports. The noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, was Bishop of Oxford when the 1996 Act was considered and ultimately passed. I think it was he who put this amendment in form first. The Government fully supported it, as I do now. I also support its continuation, which is in the amendment.
There are some quite interesting amendments. Section 22 of the Act says:
“The Lord Chancellor may, with the approval of the Treasury”.
I am not sure why I had to put that text in the Bill, but it must have been part of the price I paid for getting that section into it, which remains law. The amount provided for it now has fallen. I would like to press on Her Majesty’s Government that one of the most important things for the present is that our family life is preserved and strengthened. I am sure that, as was said on earlier amendments, a good deal of difficulty has arisen from the failure to support family life in the way that the Government should. Therefore, I am very much in favour of Amendments 3 and 21.
My Lords, I am pleased to support Amendment 21 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, which focuses on marriage support services. It requires the Secretary of State to make grants for marriage support services
“before and during a marriage.”
The public policy benefits of marriage are such that this is a very appropriate use of public funds. Indeed, in terms of the public finances, investment in relationships is good value for money. The estimated cost of family breakdown to the public purse is £51 billion a year. In January 2018, the Government said in another place that between April 2015 and March 2017 they had invested £17.5 million in relationship support services. That is a very small sum, given the scale of the costs of family breakdown. It is estimated that Relate’s couple counselling work delivers £11.40 of benefits for every £1 spent. Surely this should make the Chancellor consider upping the Government’s investment in supporting married couples and those in civil partnerships.
(4 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberI have some difficulty in understanding what exactly the amendment is trying to achieve. I have the greatest respect for all four noble Lords who have tabled the amendment, but to take the point on Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, I do not think that the amendment meets the terms of the article. It seeks to address the position when the sentence was imposed, whereas Article 7 refers to the situation at the time when the act that gave rise to the criminal offence was committed. It is worded in such a way that the individual should have been aware at the time of his conduct what sentence he was likely to receive. The amendment does not address that, as it is not addressed to that point in time. On Article 7, it misses the point, and does not achieve anything.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said that the convention was a sideshow. That brings me to the other point, which I think I do understand, on the value of retaining the Parole Board at halfway through the sentence, partly for the reason that changing the system for those who have already been sentenced seems instinctively rather unfair to them. It also has a value in getting the Parole Board in as early as possible, because the longer it has to assess the element of risk, the greater the possibility that it can achieve something useful at the end. To shorten it, which seems to be the effect of the Government’s amendment, reduces the opportunity for the board to get into the depths of the mind of the individual and to see what it can do about the risk. If that is the purpose of the amendment, why not have the same rule for everybody? It is accepting the Government’s amendment for the newcomers—those who have not yet been sentenced. It would be more logical to apply the same rule throughout.
That goes back to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, when he asked what the change from a half to two-thirds would achieve, given that the Parole Board will be involved anyway. If it comes in halfway through, there is no question of the prisoner being released until it is safe for them to be released, which could well be right up until the end of the sentence imposed by the judge. Logically, it would be sensible to have the same rule for everybody, rather than split it up. The other point, which is worth emphasising, and perhaps an answer to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, is that a great deal has been said about automatic release, but it is not unconditional release. This point was made very effectively by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, when describing the deficiencies of the Parole Board system.
When the original scheme was devised with release subject to conditions, it was understood that these conditions meant something. I remember cases in which I was involved where people were returned to custody because they had breached their conditions. It was not just a day in custody; they were in for a substantial time until it was regarded as appropriate for them to be released again. In the case of life prisoners, sometimes they went backwards and forwards because they had breached conditions, and they went back in again. This is what we have lost, I am afraid. It bears thinking about that the release halfway through is not unconditional; it is a conditional release subject to the licence terms. That has a bearing on whether this is something that attracts the Article 7 attack in any event. For the reasons I have indicated, I am slightly puzzled by the amendment, and I am not sure that I would support it.
My Lords, I will not apologise to your Lordships for not speaking at Second Reading. It is, rather, a matter for congratulation—noble Lords have not had to listen to me twice.
The situation is one of severe crisis in respect of the damage that has occurred as a result of the release of persons described in this Bill. That is a matter of the utmost importance for Her Majesty’s Government, because if any human right is vital it is people’s right to be protected against danger, by their Government. That danger has been illustrated vividly by these two incidents.
I do not imagine for one minute that anyone thought that the man involved in the London Bridge incident was going to do anything like that. One of the people murdered was doing his best to look after him and to bring him into ordinary life in a good way, yet that man was struck down. I do not believe it is possible to discern who is dangerous and who is not, because the problem with this type of danger is that it is not necessarily there when the man or woman is originally sentenced. It is danger that, to a great extent, seems to have arisen as a result of the experience in prison, and that is most unfortunate.
On the other hand, if you had an opportunity to ask somebody to change his mind, you may find it difficult if he has a religious persuasion. The people trying to get rid of this danger in prison are finding that it is very difficult to succeed and mightily difficult to know when, if at all, the attempt has succeeded. The concentration therefore has to be on the circumstances in which one of these people is released. One way of dealing with that, to get a bit of time, is to postpone the release. That is what is done in the move from half to two-thirds. Of course, there is still a third of the sentence left.
The second point that has been made clear is that there is a substantial number of convicted prisoners up for release quite soon. The Parole Board’s investigations are quite substantial, and I do not believe it would be possible for the board to deal with a large number of these satisfactorily in a very short time. We have to remember the decision the board is going to take. Personally, I would not like to be a member of the Parole Board taking that responsibility. I am glad to say that there are people who do that and who have the skills to do it properly. On the whole, the Parole Board’s decisions have been pretty well received. One or two—I remember one in particular—have been by no means well received, but generally they have been. So it is important that it gets a proper opportunity to carry out its task.
The rule is to be that when the two-thirds is up, the prisoner is released or not according to whether the Parole Board is satisfied that it is safe for the person to be released. That seems the best possible solution to a mighty difficult problem. However, it is only a temporary solution, because when the sentence is fully served, the person is to be released in any case, without anything from the Parole Board. That matter must be dealt with in the Bill that is to come. In the meantime, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, I cannot see any justification for dividing up the original division with this amendment. The Bill would be better without the amendment.
(4 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it gives me the greatest possible pleasure to follow the excellent maiden speech of the noble and learned Baroness—which, of course, having known her for some time, I expected to be of the highest quality.
This Bill forms part of the extremely valuable consolidation procedure. For a short time, I had the honour of being the chairman of the consolidation committee, but I was saved from continuing in the role by being appointed Lord Chancellor. I discovered that, of all the committees which serve Members of both this House and the other place, the difficulty of convening a quorum for the consolidation committee was the probably the highest. That suggests to me that the process of consolidation is not as precious, or perhaps as fully understood, as it should be. That is because, unless we have reasonable consolidation, our statute book will become less and less intelligible.
I had the honour of being a member of the Scottish Law Commission for a time, and like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, I was the Minister for the Law Commission during my time as Lord Chancellor. I think that it was a marvellous institution which was set up by Lord Gardiner, with a certain amount of query from some lawyers, as is usually the case if you make an improvement, and the result has been absolutely excellent. One of the features of the Law Commission as I knew it was that it usually had the services of a parliamentary counsel, then detached from the ordinary office in Whitehall. I suspect that the parliamentary counsel involved in this Bill was seconded to the Law Commission.
In the past I have had a little experience of the relationship between the Law Commission and Her Majesty’s Government. One of the features of the criminal law of England and Wales is that it is principally statutory law and not all of it is absolutely at the peak of modernity. In fact, it is extraordinary how old some of the essential provisions that are in day-to-day use are. When I was concerned in these matters, there was a move to codify the criminal law. A certain office of state had responsibility for the criminal law and was reluctant to see anything of the kind happen—but somehow the Law Commission managed to start a procedure for codifying the criminal law. It was eventually able to excise a bit that seemed reasonably attractive to the office in question—but, so far as I know, it never got any further.
We have here an example of modifying and modernising the process for sentencing, as has been pointed out. We are not able today to give effect to my noble friend Lord Bates’s sentiments, which I very much share. It is not part of this Bill, which is concerned only with the sentencing process. It deals with it in a very effective way; it could not possibly do it simply by a consolidation Bill. This pre-consolidation Bill is able to make the corrections that, when fitted in, will bring in a sentencing code that will be absolutely excellent. I hope—I feel certain this will be the case—that there will be many fewer unlawful judgments from now on. Even judges can make mistakes, but the chances of mistakes in this situation are very much reduced.
The noble and learned Baroness pointed out in her maiden speech how much she values the judiciary of this country. As it happens, I was coming from Inverness last night on a plane that was a little later than it might have been if the weather had been different, and I was talking to a gentlemen who was much in business and somehow knew my line of life. He began to talk about the judiciary and said, “I have had experience of many countries and of employment law in many countries. The unique feature of the United Kingdom is the absolute honesty of the judiciary.” It is an extremely precious quality, and I honestly am not absolutely certain that it is fully appreciated in every quarter as it should be.
It is extremely important that the status and remuneration of the judiciary, including pensions, should match that very big quality. It is not that they are paid for honesty, but they are employed and continue to be employed because they are honest. Sometimes some statutory instrument comes along and their termination appears, but it is nothing at all to do with any fault in them. It is simply what some mistaken people in the past have brought in as the ultimate age for service. This is an extremely important matter. I certainly believe that that quality is in a way preserved by this Bill, which will help honest judges get the answer that is right.
(4 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in view of my having introduced the Family Law Act in its previous form, it will not surprise your Lordships that I entirely support this Bill.
I think that I understand the nature of marriage and in my long-ago youthful days I took part in quite a number of defended divorce cases. The idea that these were conducive to saving marriage, elevating its status or anything of that kind is absolute nonsense. I was involved in one divorce case that attracted a great deal of notoriety at the time: the Duke of Argyll against the Duchess. Those of your Lordships who are old enough will remember that it was anything but helpful to the cause of marriage.
It is important to realise, as is obvious, that marriage involves two people and that their continued working together is essential for the continuation of the marriage. The idea that a marriage can continue when one party has lost interest in it is a complete fallacy. The marriage stops, in effect, if one of the parties acts in such a way that they no longer perform the marital obligations. As I have said, the idea that anything can come out of a defended divorce seems extraordinary; I shall be very interested to hear if anybody taking part in this debate is able to say that they have been involved in a defended divorce which, in the result, had good effects for the parties to the marriage and for any children.
It is essential that some detail of this Bill should be looked at in Committee; it is not my purpose today to do that, because this is Second Reading, which deals with the principles of the Bill. I could not be otherwise than in favour of removing the idea that divorce is based upon fault—it is a completely superfluous idea, really, in the present situation. There have been very few, if any, judicial adjudications on that subject in recent years. One was a very unproductive case that I think has in some ways stimulated the need for this Bill. There should be time for both parties to know what is going on. The question of when the case starts is therefore quite important. There is no full definition in the Bill and, as has been pointed out, that service could be quite late is a somewhat dangerous aspect, which can easily be changed in Committee.
Another general point, which is also a subject for Committee, is that marriage in our generation—I am talking about those who are younger as well as the generation to which I belong—is subject to severe stresses, or very severe stresses in some cases. One of the most common is finance, though there are others also: interest in other people and all that kind of thing. These things can bring about problems in marriage. I think that very few people who have been long in marriage can say that there has never been any problem of any sort whatever. It is important, therefore, that the state provides help in that situation. The Bill that I put forward in the past, which became an Act of Parliament, provided for state help. Most of the provisions are still in place and can therefore be utilised.
Something that I think may be dealt with later in more detail is that, although at the very last minute it can look pretty hopeless—my experience has been that if it gets to almost the last minute, it is very difficult to save the situation—the statistics show that about 10% of the cases in which a petition has been lodged never go forward to completion. That suggests that about 10% of these are settled in some way. It is important to use every possible opportunity to try to save a marriage, and therefore it would be very useful, for example, to look to introduce knowledge and information about that at the very last stage and of course before. They should not give up until the last minute.
That is really all I want to say. I should mention that the Christian Institute sent me a kind letter explaining its attitude to this Bill and that it was sending it to me knowing that I did not agree with what it was saying. I expect we will hear some of that later, but the real point is that scripture, with which I am reasonably familiar, requires a code of conduct for those who observe it but also provides for civil law which may deal with another situation. Moses was dealing with a particular situation, our Lord said, in relation to the problems of divorce in his day. We have a duty to do that, whatever our view may be of the sanctity of marriage, which I strongly believe in. I also strongly believe that it is best for all of us if we can observe it and keep it. I have the great blessing, due to the long-suffering nature of my spouse, of having been married happily for 62 years.
It is also my privilege not to stand any longer in the way of the maiden speech to which we are all looking forward.
(4 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, would like to speak first, I would welcome that.
I do not particularly wish to speak first, but in view of the noble and learned Lord’s invitation, I will make my brief contribution. Unlike the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, I have a fair amount of experience in this area of European law and the modification of existing judgments—I sat in the House of Lords when it set aside a previous judgment. It is extremely important that we consider the principle that has to lie behind this. The present situation is that EU retained law has been made part of the law of the United Kingdom unless and until it is modified by Parliament in due course. When passing the previous withdrawal Act, we placed a number of restrictions on that power for Ministers in various areas relating to human rights and so on.
From what I read in the newspapers as these things developed, my impression was that the Government were anxious that the power to modify or depart from EU judgments would be better given to a wider set of courts than the Supreme Court, and the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland on criminal matters, as had been done in the withdrawal Act. I can see that it may be part of overall policy that it should be rather wider than the present law would permit. However, it is important that whatever method is used, it is one that will prevail across the whole of the United Kingdom. Therefore, to give the power to do this to, for example, the Inner House of the Court of Session, would have the effect that it would apply in Scotland but not in England and Wales directly, nor in Northern Ireland. There would be a degree of difficulty in that. That is why, in my view, this power should be in the Supreme Court. As we all know, when the Supreme Court gives a judgment, it is a judgment for the whole of the United Kingdom. It is important to emphasise that the name of the court is the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom.
If it is desired to give the power to a wider section of the courts, the way to do so is to specify which courts they are. The example given by my noble and learned friend is one possibility, but it is for the Government to decide how wide they wish to be. However, it is important that the courts should not have the power to ultimately decide; it should be required to refer the matter to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court can modify the burden that that would involve by a lead process, leaving it free to dismiss a case where it was thought there was nothing in it. One possible line is for the lower court to give a judgment which might ultimately help the Supreme Court, but I do not know whether that would always be necessary. The important thing is that any court that has this power would have it only as a way of referring the matter to the Supreme Court.
I was thinking of putting forward an amendment to this effect, but I thought it probably better to leave it until we have had a chance to discuss it. I have reached the conclusion that, as a practical matter, if we in this House can persuade the Government to change, it is likely to be effective; whereas if we do not persuade the Government to change, it may not be effective, with results that we may not altogether approve of. My main effort in this is to try to persuade the Government that a system along the lines I have proposed would be perfectly acceptable and workable, and would embrace all the courts that it needs to embrace.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for preceding me because he is in a unique position to give advice to the House on this issue. I only intervene to add to what has already been said because I want to stress the importance of the issue. There is an old saying that hard cases can make bad law. This may be a hard situation for the Government but they are in danger of making very bad law indeed. Why they are in danger and why they would be wise to think very carefully again before they ask for this to be implemented is apparent from the careful steps that were taken back in 2005 when I was still one of the chief justices—to whom the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, referred—who are present before your Lordships.
At that time, changes were being made which went to the root of the constitution, and the courts were concerned that they could be severely damaging to our unwritten constitution. As a consequence, the then Lord Chancellor and I—then Lord Chief Justice—came together to make a concordat to try to deal with those difficulties. It was recognised that one of the underlying principles of our common law and constitution was the separation of powers, and what was being done in 2005—which affected the position of the Lord Chancellor in relation to the courts—was trespassing on the principles that had existed hitherto. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, was well aware of these principles when he was Lord Chancellor and a member of the Government. The role that the Lord Chancellor played at that time was to ensure that the important balance—which explained how we managed to continue without a written constitution—succeeded, which it did remarkably well.
As I see the situation, what my noble and learned friends and my noble friend Lord Anderson have been saying to your Lordships is that this proposes a change in our law that would undermine the proper observation of the rule of law in a most critical way. I suggest that for this House to allow that to happen without protesting in the clearest way would be very undesirable indeed. I feel confident that if the Government look at this matter again and bear in mind the speeches made to this House today, they will see how it can be dealt with. However important Brexit is, it must not be allowed to create a precedent that could be followed hereafter, as has been suggested, which would damage our situation.
I hope we will always be able to continue in this country without a written constitution. However, if we let what is proposed go through with saying it should be amended, we will create a situation where that will not be possible. We should pause before doing so.
It is not a question of having policy areas in mind. We want to take forward a consultation process that will enable us to arrive at an appropriate conclusion as to how we should look at EU case law as a part of retained EU law after the implementation period has expired.
My Lords, I understand that the first part of the amendment may be reasonably accommodated within the answer given to the previous question about separation of powers. I cannot see how the second part can be accommodated—formulating the question the court has to decide in deciding whether the previous decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union should be followed.
With respect to the noble and learned Lord, we seek to consult on the appropriate test to be applied in taking this matter forward. We intend to do that in consultation with the senior judiciary.
(5 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, was here on Monday, for reasons that I am sure we all understand. The message then was exactly what he says: we are moving inexorably towards direct rule.
I want to make one point to the people of Northern Ireland. They are being served incredibly well in your Lordships’ House by the noble Lord, as well as by the noble Lord, Lord Empey, and my noble friend Lord Trimble, a winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. They are active in your Lordships’ House after all the distinguished service they have given, and continue to give, in Northern Ireland. I hope that that will send a reassuring message.
I hope, above all, that their unity on the subject of devolution will spur on our colleagues from the DUP and others to redouble their efforts to get the Assembly meeting and an Executive formed. If we have to wait a little time, as the noble Lord has said, and many of us have said, time and again, can we please have the Assembly meeting, its committees meeting? That, at least, is something. I very much hope that long before any of the dates in this Bill come, we will at least see that happen.
My Lords, I strongly support the view that what we need is a devolved Government in Northern Ireland. Paying attention to items that separate us is very detrimental to making progress. On the items that the noble Lord, Lord Empey, has cited, perhaps reliable legislation is not quite so important as the others, but all the others are vital for day-to-day life in Northern Ireland. I sincerely hope that the Northern Irish parties, all elected to the Assembly with the responsibility that they have, can come together on such items to get things done. Otherwise, if we have a progress report on implementation, what is it going to tell us? That nothing has happened. That is absolutely useless.
What we really need is to do our level best to get the Executive into action. I understand that there are some matters that divide the principal parties in Northern Ireland. In fact, there are things that divide people continually, but having a Government who can carry out the essential matters referred to in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Empey, is an urgent matter, and the responsibility primarily lies with those who have been elected to the Assembly. I hope that the Government will do the best they can on these items, but surely the main message is that those responsible, elected by the people to serve in the Assembly, should come together and form an Executive to carry these things out.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Empey, for bringing forward these amendments. There seems to be a consensus in the House on the importance of forming an Executive as soon as possible. The noble Lord serves that cause by illustrating the serious issues that have not been processed. We are 100% behind the re-forming of the Executive, and we hope that the people and the politicians of Northern Ireland see the wisdom of that. The amendments are interesting and useful, and I hope that the Government will be saying appropriate warm words.
My Lords, given that the noble Lord, Lord Elton, has raised the question of whether people from this side of the water ought to be ruling on what happens in Northern Ireland, I will say something as somebody whose accent betrays them as coming from Northern Ireland.
First, it is absolutely clear from the voting record of Members of the Northern Ireland Assembly that attitudes on this question have changed definitively. When the Northern Ireland Assembly was meeting, it passed, in 2015, by a majority, its wish for same-sex marriage. But this was blocked by the procedural device of a petition of concern—a device not put in place for these kinds of issues, and which in fact has been so overused that it is now being questioned altogether. We must understand that, had that device not been used, we would not be debating the issue now because it would already have been passed by the Northern Ireland Assembly.
Secondly, as I listened to the debate in Committee, a number of noble Lords said—it has been repeated again this evening—that we have to be terribly careful that we are not seen as people from this side of the water imposing a view on people in Northern Ireland, particularly, the sentiment was, on nationalists and republicans; it is quite difficult for Unionists to complain terribly about it. We need to understand how much the situation in Ireland has changed, not over the last five or 20 years, but over the last two, three or four years. There have now been referenda in the Republic of Ireland on both the abortion and same-sex marriage questions. Both have been passed and the legislation has been changed. We now have a Taoiseach in the Republic of Ireland in a same-sex relationship. It is not an issue any more.
Sinn Féin’s response, after the referendum was passed, was to say that this should now happen in the north. So, while folk here might say, “We are talking about harmonisation with the rest of the United Kingdom”, Sinn Féin will say, “We are looking at harmonisation with the rest of the island”. It has been clear that that is what it wants to see. On lots of issues that the party does not agree with it will use a different analogy, but this is clearly party policy and something Sinn Féin wants to deliver. So, I think it highly unlikely that there will be the difficulty that Members suggest—particularly that it might in some way create a degree of instability for the peace process or attitudes to the Good Friday agreement. That might have been the case five, 10 or 20 years ago; I do not believe it is now, at all, because the situation in Ireland as a whole has changed dramatically. We could go into why it has changed. It has changed because the position of the Churches and religious establishments has dramatically collapsed, north and south of the border, for reasons not totally dissociated from this element of human behaviour.
Having said that, an important case has been put by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow: that, because there are anxieties, there has to be a degree of confidence that the position of those in religious organisations, whether celebrants or members, will be protected. Whatever the legalities of the permissive use of the word “may”, there is a case for ensuring that the word “must” is used to give a degree of confidence to those who are anxious about the changes that have taken place. So, I do not have any anxiety that passing this in this Parliament will somehow create a great problem in the relationship with nationalists and republicans; they were keen to vote for it in 2015 and even more so now, post-2018. But there is a case for addressing the anxieties of those who feel that a mere “may” is not a sufficient protection for their concerns; I acknowledge and support that.
My Lords, I also very much support that, as well as what the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, said. It is not so much a matter of particular legal qualification, but it is a fact that this is a very important aspect of how people feel about the legislation. As the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, said, it has worked well here, and I hope the noble Lord, Lord Hayward, will find it possible to overcome the difficulties of lawyers and do what is necessary to secure this.
I also believe it would be proper for this sort of regulation-making power to be subject to consultation in Northern Ireland. If, as we have just heard, the position is that people there wish for this, consultation will show that. It is extremely important that what is proposed has the merit of being supported by consultation in Northern Ireland itself.
My Lords, I have no doubt whatever of the sincerity of the noble Lord, Lord Hayward, or of anyone else who has spoken in support of his amendment. I trust he will acknowledge that there is no lack of sincerity among those who speak on behalf of the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Morrow. He said that the world is changing. A number of Members of your Lordships’ House have had a religious vocation in life. When it comes to my religious belief, while we say that the world is changing, the word of God on which I base my belief says that although,
“Heaven and earth will pass away … my words will never pass away”.
It does not change with the passing of time.
The point that my noble friend Lord Morrow has brought before the House is very serious. I see the clear wording in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Hayward, and I come back again to the word “may”. When I was in public life, as a councillor for 37 and a half years, and as an elected representative in the other House for 25 years, a lot of emphasis was placed on putting “shall” and “must” into legislation. When “may” was put in, it was drawn to the attention of the governing party in those years that this did not create certainty. The amendment says that the Secretary of State “may” make a provision that the Secretary of State considers “appropriate”; in other words, “may” at the whim of the Secretary of State. If the Secretary of State, irrespective of who it is, decides not to give that protection, there is no protection, according to this legislation, should it be passed by your Lordships’ House this evening.
That is a very serious matter with serious implications because it gives the idea that this is discretionary, not mandatory. I therefore honestly have to say that many of my colleagues would have no confidence in the manner in which this has been presented at this time. I have listened carefully to what other Members of this House have said and I believe they acknowledge that there is a problem here. Acknowledging the problem is one thing, but if it goes into legislation and the wording is not changed, that is what we are left with. Then, of course, it goes to a court. What did Members of the other House really mean when they put down the word “may”? Did they simply leave it to the discretion of the Secretary of State or did they say that it went deeper than that?
Protecting religious freedom and religious belief in the United Kingdom is vital. We cannot lose our religious freedom, our civil and religious liberty, which was fought for and which people died for. I do not believe we should hand it away. Therefore, I make a solemn appeal to Members of your Lordships’ House. Forget about who tabled the amendment; forget that it is my noble friend Lord Morrow. Think carefully about what it means. I appeal to the House to accept that what he says is a protection that must be given to people of religious belief in Northern Ireland.
My Lords, I have put my name to Amendment 16 with a good deal of consideration. First, when the Bill was introduced by the Government, it was absolutely plain that its scope did not embrace either same-sex marriage or the abortion provisions. In that situation, it was also introduced as a Bill that required dealing with by a very quick procedure.
We have already dealt with same-sex marriage, which was already passed by the Assembly at Stormont, but this provision is quite different because it was dealt with by the Assembly at Stormont and voted against. Our friends from Northern Ireland—the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, for example—have assured us that things are different. I was honoured to be a Minister in Northern Ireland for 10 years, but that was rather a long time ago. I have no doubt that things have changed quite a lot in a number of ways, including the fact that I no longer have any responsibility for it.
May I ask my noble and learned friend, if a majority of Members of the Assembly are against the proposed reforms in the consultation, should that then halt the change?
I sincerely hope that that will not happen: that is the reason we have put it on the basis of the majority being in favour of the change. If we were to ask them and they were against it, that would be a real slap in the face for devolution. I have enough confidence in the Government’s consultations, and I believe the result would be so reasonable, that I expect the majority of the already elected Members of the Assembly to support this. Otherwise, it creates quite a difficult situation so far as devolution is concerned. We still have devolution—devolution to Northern Ireland is there at the present moment, it has not been withdrawn—so I think it is right to acknowledge and hope that the result of the negotiations and the regulation will be acceptable to the Members of the Northern Ireland Assembly.
My Lords, throughout this evening, in all our debates and the important decisions that have been taken according to our custom and the way we work, there has been, like in a theatre, a backcloth to everything we have done. I believe that even at this late stage, referring to the words of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, we need to put on record what has been clearly exposed tonight: that we have been rushing through matters of supreme importance to the country from which I come. Our representatives feel very deeply that the questions being asked tonight, although they cover very important issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage, were not what we were really questioning. What we were really questioning tonight was the theory of devolution, which from its infancy was geared to give us, within the United Kingdom, the local relevance and integrity that we hoped would emerge. So, in supporting the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, at this late stage, I suggest to the long-suffering Minister that he take back that which I refer to as the tapestry, which in fact surrounds everything we have experienced in the Chamber today. What is being asked about devolution, and how can we correct it?
My Lords, I find this disappointing. I thought that the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, was the subject of the previous amendment but, never mind, we occasionally stray from one amendment to another.
Let me deal with the substance of it. If we were talking, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, has on previous occasions—although not tonight—about making use of Members of the Assembly to make general comments about policies in Northern Ireland, we would be in a different place. However, what we see today, under the pretext of giving the Assembly a new lease of life, is the picking out of one issue in the Bill and saying, “That is the way in which we should move forward”. If we want Members of the Assembly to be consulted, they should be consulted over the whole range of policies, rather than us picking the one policy which noble Lords do not like and saying, “We will proceed on that basis”. This is the wrong way to go about it and the principle of consulting the Assembly is negated by wishing to do it only in this partial sense.
We have already discussed the previous amendment and voted on it. I understand that feelings are strong—I respect them even if I do not agree with them—but it is quite inappropriate at this stage to deal with this sort of amendment. If Members of this House want to bring the Assembly back in some form another, let us talk about it—let us do it properly—not pick on abortion as being the pretext for doing it.
The noble Lord will of course have in mind that the Assembly voted in favour of same-sex marriage. However, that is singled out, simply because the Assembly voted against it before. Therefore, if we are to respect devolution, in view of the suggestions that things have changed completely, it should be given a chance to say so.
(5 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I took some part in previous discussions of these matters in relation to the powers of the Lord Chief Justice and the fact that he—or she, if it happens to be so—is now the head of the judiciary and the Lord Chancellor is not. I am inclined to remember—I may be wrong, and I hope that my noble and learned friend will correct me if I am—that a provision of exactly this type was made in relation to the other procedural committees that currently exist. It is a considerable time since that provision was made, and as far as I know, no trouble has emerged. That is because I would expect the Minister to exercise great care in this matter. I think I am right in saying that that was not altered in the Constitutional Reform Act, as it is called, which changed the responsibility of head of the judiciary.
I am therefore inclined to want to hear a bit more about this before we come to a decision. When so much agreement has been reached, it is a pity if we fall from agreement at the last minute, particularly if to do so would produce a very strange anomaly between the existing law relating to either of the other procedural committees and this rather more technical committee.
I do not think Clause 9 has to do with the procedure rules. It has to do with the possible obstruction to those rules which may exist in legislation already passed as part of our law. The Lord Chancellor is entitled to make regulations to amend the Acts of Parliament which interfere with the proposals being accepted as Online Procedure Rules. The rules may well have an impact on old statutory provisions—for example, those which have an impact on whether or not you can have online procedures—most of which, I imagine, did not envisage that. It may be that they can be interpreted to include considerations of that kind, but that is the nature of the problem in relation to Clause 9.
After thinking this through as best I can, I would not care for the Lord Chief Justice to have to be involved in the regulation-making aspect of this business. If regulations are required, they should be made by the person with the appropriate political responsibility. I therefore have doubts about the relevance of the rules in relation to Clause 9.
As to Clause 8, as far as I know, existing law was left unchanged by the Constitutional Reform Act. As to Clause 9, I wonder whether it is appropriate for the Lord Chief Justice to get himself involved in the nitty-gritty of political regulation.
The noble and learned Lord says that it is not appropriate for the Lord Chief Justice to be involved in Clause 9 matters—that he is not relevant to that—but the clause makes him involved. It gives him a role because he has to be consulted, so he is not irrelevant at all.
Exactly. He is doing exactly what I think is required. If the person who has the responsibility finds out that it is okay with the Lord Chief Justice—at least that is what I hope would happen—that person then goes on and does it. Therefore, consultation is probably the right balance at that stage. I am rather against the idea of involving the Lord Chief Justice in any form of political work. I thought the Constitutional Reform Act sought to achieve separation between the judiciary and the legislature, so that the acting judiciary were no longer part of the legislature.
My Lords, I do not want to spread dissension where none is required or even helpful, but I am persuaded by the first three noble—and noble and learned—Lords who have spoken in this debate. I am always persuaded by what my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay says, and we need clarification. Although I fully accept what my noble and learned friend has just said in relation to the political angle, there are provisions in Clause 9 which, although they refer to amending, revoking or repealing an Act, or a provision made under an Act, at heart deal with the mechanics of the procedure to be operated under the Online Procedure Rule.
We need to think more carefully before rushing into this. I take my noble and learned friend’s point about the possible inconsistency between this legislation, if it is to be amended, and earlier provisions. However, sometimes consistency runs in the wrong way. If the current amendment points out something that would then become inconsistent, it may be that the earlier provision also needs to be amended. In any event, I am utterly convinced that my noble and learned friend on the Front Bench will be able to persuade me that what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has said, supported as he is by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Beith, will enable us to move forward in a spirit of complete concurrence.
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, has reminded me that perhaps I should make the same declaration—so I do so now.
We support Amendments 22 to 24, not only for the reasons given by my noble friend Lord Beith but for those given earlier in the debate, in particular by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. We regard it as very important that these rules should ensure a proper balance between the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice: between the Executive and the legislature. I also take the two points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay. First, there are of course equivalent provisions in the existing rules, but I agree entirely with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, who pointed out that that should not be treated as a precedent, and that if there is anything wrong with the earlier rules, perhaps they should be changed. If the 2005 Act overlooked those changes, perhaps it should not have done so, because that was the point at which the changes should have been made; that is, when the balance between the Lord Chancellor and the administration of justice changed.
I also suggest that what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, said was telling. He said that the difference between consultation and concurrence is that where you have consultation, the Lord Chancellor will go to the Lord Chief Justice and check that the change in the rules is okay with him—or that is what he hopes he would do—and then he would go back to make the rule. However, it seems to me that the need for concurrence in these rules is dependent on the Lord Chancellor finding out that the rules are okay with the Lord Chief Justice and the requirement for concurrence is to determine the position where they are not okay with the Lord Chief Justice, and that is why we have the concurrence requirement. I will give way to the noble and learned Lord.
We are talking about Clause 9, which is to do with regulations, not the making of the rules. It is the effect of existing law in relation to the rules that has to be dealt with.
(5 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Government’s view was expressed at Second Reading, but Amendment 1 seems to strike at the heart of what is required. Clause 1 states,
“may authorise or require the parties”.
to use electronic means at hearings. That suggests the possibility of compulsion that would not exclude any section of the community. The amendment I find slightly difficult is Amendment 3, which states,
“may be filed by electronic means or on paper or a combination of both at the choice of the party”.
I would have thought that it should be one thing or the other. I imagine that it might cause confusion if you have an electronic bit and then a bit on paper stuck in, unless there is a clear way of showing in the electronic bit that there is another bit to follow. It is that part of the amendment that I find slightly difficult.
My Lords, I am reminded that these provisions will apply to family law procedures. Of course, it may improve the resolution of family issues, which will benefit the children involved, but there is a concern that it may make resolution more difficult and thus adversely affect the children in those families. Has the family test been applied to the Bill? I do not see that in the accompanying notes and perhaps it is not appropriate to apply the family test to it. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell me whether the family test has been applied.
If every time we legislated we decided to guarantee everything from A to Z, we would end up with very long Bills. The position is this: there is the ability to proceed by way of the paper process. Nothing prohibits it, there is no inhibition on that process, and there is no intention to introduce such an inhibition.
Turning to Amendments 10 and 11—
Before my noble and learned friend leaves Amendment 3, I understood him to say he would accept it, so that it would go into the Bill—although without, I hope, the choice of the combination.
No, I do not accept the amendment. What I say is that there are existing means by which we can assure people that they can proceed by way of a digital portal or by way of a written claim, which will be scanned and taken into the online procedure process once it is up and running.
My Lords, before that happens, I express my apologies for not being able to take part at Second Reading. I thank the Minister for asking his office to contact me and I am sorry that I delayed replying until Friday. I just want to comment on the family test. This was introduced in 2014 to be applied to Bills and involved a number of questions such as, “What kind of impact might the policy have on family formation?” and “What kind of impact might it have on stability in the family?” Although the test is not mandatory, this seems an appropriate Bill to have had it applied to, and I simply express the wish that in the future it might be applied to Bills similar to this one.
My Lords, I have some difficulty with Amendment 1 and the answer that my noble and learned friend has given. As I understand it, the amendment deals with rules. It is not judicial discretion but rules that may require the parties to participate in the hearing by means of electronic devices. Therefore, it is not a question of the judge in charge of the case making that decision; the preliminary rules will require it, and the judge will be bound by that. He will say that he is sorry to whoever comes along with a bit of paper and explain that they are not able to do that because the rules dictate that it has to be done by electronic means, so they will have to get themselves a computer.
With respect to my noble and learned friend, my understanding of the position is that the rules will require that certain forms of action—for example, small debt action—should be commenced under the simplified Online Procedure Rules by way of the digital portal, whether you go through electronically or, as I mentioned before, by way of a paper application. However, once that process is in train, there will be a retained judicial discretion to decide whether the case should remain under the simplified online procedure or whether it would be more appropriate for it to be removed from that procedure and to proceed under the ordinary Civil Procedure Rules to an oral hearing.
My Lords, I am supportive of Amendments 5 and 13, which outline the sort of assistance that is very much required. For Amendment 13, my preference is that the particular agency should be in some way connected with the Courts & Tribunals Service so that judicial supervision is available in respect of it. One institution that strikes me as very useful in this connection is the law centres, which were recipients of legal aid in my time. They are an economic way of providing legal assistance—much more economic than the expensive lawyers to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, referred. Of course, it is not very good to have recourse to the inexpensive and cheap lawyers, because you are apt to spend more in the end. This is an excellent idea and requires the Minister to think quite hard about how it should be done.
This brings me to my Amendment 14, which is a slightly different matter. There are various skills available in electronic matters. You may have recourse to the internet and yet not be very sure what you have reached when you get there. There is a risk—it may not be large, but there is a risk—that if there is a court portal for certain things, you may find yourself on a website which is supposed to be the court portal but is actually run by people with a more private interest in litigation than the courts would have. I suggest Amendment 14 for consideration, which would require the Lord Chancellor to make arrangements to try to secure as far as possible that this does not happen to the rather inexpert people who may be using the internet, of which I regard myself as one.
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord has reminded me that it is well known that the application system for the US ESTA visa waiver scheme has a number of such sites which exact charges, to which people are not liable because of the very modest charge on the official site itself. I will simply point out that HM Courts & Tribunals Service is already working on this sort of thing. There are 18 locations in which it is providing face-to-face digital support, or at least is said to be providing it. The Government have been working this up on the pilot schemes, so it seems to me another ideal opportunity, which the Minister should not neglect, to accept that the Government are actually on the right lines on this.
It would be rather more reassuring if the Bill contained some obligation to provide this kind of support. If it is not there, the Bill will be open to the charge from many people that it is creating a new system without ensuring that people can use it. The means are beginning to be developed by the Government, so I hope that they provide some statutory basis for them.
My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Beith, I have added my name to the amendment tabled by my noble and learned friend Lord Judge to ensure that the powers which are being conferred on the Lord Chancellor can be exercised only with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice. My reason for doing so is essentially the same as that of the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and my noble and learned friend Lord Judge: the powers conferred by the Bill are exceptionally broad and there need to be adequate controls.
The Minister’s response before this afternoon essentially amount to, “Don’t worry—there are sufficient means through committees that will ensure that these powers are never used inappropriately, far less abused”, but as my noble and learned friend Lord Judge mentioned, the Lord Chancellor has the power to appoint the majority of the committee. The most effective means of ensuring that these powers are used only in an appropriate manner is to ensure that they may be exercised only with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice. As the Minister indicated during one of our earlier debates this afternoon, to amend the Bill in this way would considerably help to resolve many of the other defects in it which we have been debating.
My noble and learned friend Lord Judge made a point that is so important that it needs to be repeated: there is nothing novel about legislation requiring the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor. This very Bill, at Clause 6(2), states that the Lord Chancellor’s powers to make regulations relating to the committee may be exercised only,
“with the concurrence of … the Lord Chief Justice and … the Senior President of Tribunals”.
Therefore, I suggest to the Committee that the question is not whether in principle ministerial powers should ever be constrained by a need to obtain the concurrence of the Lord Chief justice but whether that restriction is appropriate in relation to these powers. In my view, such is the breadth of the powers that we are conferring and so intimately do they address the fair administration of justice, which is after all the business of the Lord Chief Justice, that his or her agreement should be needed for their exercise.
Whether it was a blandishment or otherwise, I was very pleased earlier to hear the Minister give a commitment to consider this issue actively before Report. I very much hope that, on Report, the Minister will feel able to table an amendment or amendments to address this issue or, at the very least, to support amendments in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Judge.
Having had the honour of holding the office of Lord Chancellor when the Lord Chancellor was the head of the judiciary, I think it is right for me to say a word or two about the present position.
It is very important to remember that our constitution recognises three arms: the legislature, the Executive and the judiciary. The judiciary is a distinct arm from the Executive. The Executive have responsibilities in relation to the judiciary, and of course the judiciary has responsibilities in relation to the people of this country in a way that is unique. If somebody else is entitled to say, without getting the ultimate agreement of the Lord Chief Justice, “We’re going to alter your procedures in the court. We’ll tell you about it and we’ll consult you but, if you don’t like it, we’ll do it all the same”, that seems to subvert the idea that the Lord Chief Justice is the head of the judiciary. The judiciary must act according to procedures and, if you alter the rules or procedures without his agreement, it seems to me that you subvert his position as the head of the judiciary as distinct from the Executive and the legislature.
Incidentally, I cannot help remarking at this stage that the judiciary has been silenced from having any part in the legislature. I regard that as an extraordinarily retrograde step. I hope that some day it will be put right by a responsible Government and that we will have the very great advantage of hearing in the House of Lords not just all past Lord Chief Justices but the present one as well.
The Lord Chief Justice’s agreement seems to me absolutely essential. Indeed, I would like to feel that he would be the initiator of changes in procedure as a result of committee recommendations. His responsibilities will be encroached upon if these procedures do not work.
My only other remark is that the reference to the Secretary of State in Clause 6(2) is probably to the Secretary of States for Wales, the language of Wales being important in this connection.
My Lords, I hope it will not be inappropriate, in view of the elegant and powerful speeches already made, for me to say these few words. I was a party to the concordat, the importance of which was that it established the new relationship between the arms of government, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, referred, until the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. I hope it will suffice to say that everything said in support of this amendment seems four-square with what was said in the concordat, indicating when the consent of the Lord Chancellor or that of the Lord Chief Justice would be required. These were heavy burdens that my successors as Lord Chief Justice had to carry in consequence of, first, the concordat and then the Constitutional Reform Act. It would be so easy to allow legislation of this sort to undermine the spirit of the concordat and the provisions of that Act by creating a precedent, which could be pointed to subsequently, indicating that the clear distinctions of relevant situations where the consent of the Lord Chief Justice should be required are not as they were previously understood to be.
(5 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I put my name down to speak in this debate when it was a two-and-a-half hour debate and I had intended to go by plane to Inverness later today, at a time that would have allowed me to be here until the very end of the debate and after. Unfortunately, for some reason a strike has taken place at Inverness Airport and my flight was cancelled. I have therefore had to make alternative arrangements to fly to Edinburgh and get the train, which as your Lordships can imagine is a slightly longer procedure. I may therefore have to leave before the end of this debate. I am extremely sorry about that and I shall attend as long as I possibly can—but I gather that the Jubilee line is not perfect today, which is another difficulty.
I want to look at this issue in a general way, and do not propose to deal with a particular case. The right of free speech in Parliament is well-established and has been ever since the present arrangements of Parliament came into being. There are two difficulties with that. One is that Parliament might seek to affect a judgment in a case before the courts—the so-called rule of sub judice. On the other hand, Parliament has free speech when there is no current case and, as mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, when there is a decided case about a matter. My understanding of the law on this is that that right to speak freely is to be exercised responsibly by Members of Parliament.
That is the general rule. The rule for sub judice is different because here, there is a perceived conflict on the final decision between the court—which has been set up to decide these matters as part of our constitution —and Parliament, if it has stepped in to alter the judgment or make it instead of the court. That is a special problem that, over the years, Parliament has thought needs to be dealt with. Parliament has no desire, as a corporate body, to replace the courts of law, which are independent and set up for that purpose, with severe oaths affecting the judges and so on.
That issue has been thoroughly discussed in this House. A committee, under the distinguished chairmanship of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, came up with a resolution that Parliament adopted, at page 60 of the volume of the Companion to the Standing Orders that we all have. That sets out what a sub judice case is and the attitude that Members of Parliament should have to it. A Member of Parliament who seeks to make a statement that may, in some way, affect a judgment or resolution still to be made, should give notice to the Lord Speaker in our House. In the House of Commons, a similar resolution was passed to give notice to the Speaker. The Lord Speaker here has the discretion to see whether the statement proposed by the Member is likely to interfere with the course of the judgment. Even if it refers to it, as long as it does not seek to interfere with the course of the judgment, it might be allowed at the Lord Speaker’s discretion. That seems an entirely satisfactory arrangement and I have no reason to seek to change it.
This is fundamental to the more general aspect referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown. Strictly speaking, if you analyse it properly, the courts have no jurisdiction to restrict the speech of a Member in Parliament. It is not part of their jurisdiction. Therefore, if somebody in Parliament makes a statement that conflicts with a decision of the court, because the court’s jurisdiction does not extend to Parliament, it is not a breach of the order. On the other hand, it could give rise to confusion. The rule, therefore, which seems general and appropriate, is to exercise these rights responsibly, as for every other right we have. That includes consideration of the effect of what you are doing on the general position in the country for which we are responsible.
(5 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am not in a position to comment on all surveys because that may embrace ones of which we are not aware. The Government have always taken the view that this is a matter of individual conscience and for Parliament to decide, rather than one of government policy.
My Lords, noble Lords will remember that I chaired a committee of the House on this issue many years ago. Is it possible to take account of the suffering that may be experienced by vulnerable people, surrounded in their weakness by relatives whose interests may not be completely in the best interests of the vulnerable person? That is a serious risk to be taken into account. On the other hand, the Director of Public Prosecutions has issued very clear guidelines on these matters, in accordance with a requirement from what was then the Supreme Court, in his jurisdiction.
The noble and learned Lord is entirely right. The Director of Public Prosecutions has issued very clear guidelines, which address not only the evidential test but the public interest test that arises in such a complex and difficult area. That is why we see the need for a careful and balanced approach to what is, at the end of the day, an issue of conscience.