Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill [HL] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
Main Page: Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames's debates with the Scotland Office
(5 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak to all the amendments in this group that I have anything to do with. I welcome the Government’s Amendment 1 requiring that, in the context of making the rules accessible and fair,
“regard must be had to the needs of those who require technical support in order to initiate, conduct, progress or participate in proceedings by electronic means”.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for the time that he and his Bill team have spent and the trouble that they have taken to incorporate provisions in the Bill to assist those who may find it difficult to access online proceedings, and to discuss with me and others the amendments that we proposed. Our original amendments, proposed in Committee, went further than the provisions now agreed by the Government, but we are satisfied that the needs of the so-called digitally excluded will be protected by the new provisions, with the benefit of the amendments tabled in this group, which are, as I understand it, largely agreed by the Government.
I am most obliged to the noble Lord for that.
Perhaps I may turn to manuscript Amendment 9A, as distinct from Amendment 9, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks. Again, I thank him for his extensive engagement with me and the Bill team over the last few days to address these matters. As I have sought to underline, we are committed to providing support to those people who cannot easily access online services. We share the observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and others about the importance of this issue. In these circumstances, we are prepared to accept manuscript Amendment 9A, as tabled by the noble Lord. However, it has an impact on the two other amendments that were tabled; first, in the use of the words “providing for”. If we accept manuscript Amendment 9A, it appears we are making explicit provision—indeed, we will have an explicit duty to provide—for these services. It therefore appears unnecessary to move that further amendment in these circumstances.
I have discussed the removal of the word “technical” with the noble Lord, Lord Marks. At this stage, I am not in a position to accept that amendment. Again, I would like an opportunity to discuss further what to do with the precise wording, in the light of our accepting manuscript Amendment 9A. It is in that context that I would like to resolve the matter, because we are concerned about the width of the obligation in those circumstances. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Marks, appreciates that and understands that, in accepting manuscript Amendment 9A, it is necessary for me to give further consideration to the two minor amendments he referred to. I understand where he is coming from and am content to address with him how we can ensure that the width of that provision is appropriate and sufficient as we go forward to Third Reading.
I am also content to commit on the Floor of the House that the Government will lay in Parliament a report on the provision of support, every two years. That report will be on the levels of assisted digital support being provided, and will give noble Lords the opportunity to request a debate on the topic and test the availability of support. Again, I had the opportunity to discuss that matter with the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I hope he accepts that that commitment meets the further concerns he had about the implementation of these provisions.
I turn to Amendment 7, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. I am obliged to him for his remarks and observations. We do not feel able to accept the amendment. I notice the reference to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights but, as the noble Lord is well aware—as is the Law Society, no doubt—there is an established common-law right of access to the courts and to a fair public hearing. More recently, that was included in Article 6 of the convention, which is part of our domestic law by virtue of the Human Rights Act. The effect is that these matters are already available and in train. We do not see that it is necessary to make explicit reference in the Bill to those established and fundamental rights. To make a specific reference to Article 6 of the convention without making reference to, for example, the common-law right of access to justice could simply sow the seeds of uncertainty or confusion.
The second part of Amendment 7 would remove, from the appropriate Minister, the power to determine the circumstances in which proceedings should not be governed by the Online Procedure Rules. It would instead leave the matter to be determined by a court or tribunal in cases where the parties to the proceedings disagree. We consider that not to be appropriate at present. The present balance, as indicated in Committee by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, is the appropriate way forward in these circumstances. I therefore invite the noble Lord to not move Amendment 7.
My Lords, I will briefly address the Minister’s comments on my amendments. I had understood that Amendments 2 and 3 were accepted, but that discussion was before my Amendment 9A was drafted or accepted. I can see the point that having “providing for” in Amendment 1 may be rendered otiose by the acceptance of Amendment 9A. However, I will discuss it between now and Third Reading with the noble and learned Lord, as he suggests. However, I take the view that the word “technical” is important, for precisely the reason given by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, so I will be urging that on him in our discussions.
I should also say, which I did not mention in opening, that the agreement to have a biennial review and have that report laid in the way the noble and learned Lord said is very welcome and, I suggest, important for ensuring that digitally excluded people are always receiving the assistance to which they are entitled. As I said, I intend not to move Amendment 9 and to move Amendment 9A when the time comes. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 2.
My noble friend has reminded me that I should have declared an interest as a practising barrister, given that that may not always be clear.
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, has reminded me that perhaps I should make the same declaration—so I do so now.
We support Amendments 22 to 24, not only for the reasons given by my noble friend Lord Beith but for those given earlier in the debate, in particular by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. We regard it as very important that these rules should ensure a proper balance between the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice: between the Executive and the legislature. I also take the two points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay. First, there are of course equivalent provisions in the existing rules, but I agree entirely with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, who pointed out that that should not be treated as a precedent, and that if there is anything wrong with the earlier rules, perhaps they should be changed. If the 2005 Act overlooked those changes, perhaps it should not have done so, because that was the point at which the changes should have been made; that is, when the balance between the Lord Chancellor and the administration of justice changed.
I also suggest that what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, said was telling. He said that the difference between consultation and concurrence is that where you have consultation, the Lord Chancellor will go to the Lord Chief Justice and check that the change in the rules is okay with him—or that is what he hopes he would do—and then he would go back to make the rule. However, it seems to me that the need for concurrence in these rules is dependent on the Lord Chancellor finding out that the rules are okay with the Lord Chief Justice and the requirement for concurrence is to determine the position where they are not okay with the Lord Chief Justice, and that is why we have the concurrence requirement. I will give way to the noble and learned Lord.
We are talking about Clause 9, which is to do with regulations, not the making of the rules. It is the effect of existing law in relation to the rules that has to be dealt with.
Again, I am not sure about that. I do not accept what I understand to be the Government’s argument against the amendments.
Clause 8 includes a rule-requiring power, and Clause 9 allows for the amendment or revocation of provisions made under an Act, which include the rules. Overall, it seems that Clauses 8 and 9 give the Government a rule-making or rule-requiring power. As I understand it, the Government’s argument is that Amendment 6 to Clause 2 and Amendment 8 to Clause 3 remove the need for a concurrence requirement in respect of Clauses 8 and 9; they also argue that, through those amendments, the concurrence requirement will govern the designation of proceedings of a specified kind and, similarly, will govern whether the Online Procedure Rules or conventional rules will govern proceedings which are of a specified kind. They go on to argue that, therefore, Clauses 8 and 9 will operate within that framework, and the concurrence requirement is therefore unnecessary in relation to the powers requiring rules to be made or requiring amendments to the rules. I disagree; I simply do not see the nexus.
Under Clauses 8 and 9, any number of rules—or changes or amendments to existing rules—might be made or required within the framework of the Online Procedure Rules. Such rules or amendments might well offend against the principles that the Lord Chief Justice would wish to impose on them. That could occur even in the context of existing designated specified proceedings. It follows that the concurrence requirement should be applicable to the rule-requiring, rule-amending or rule-repealing powers under Clauses 8 and 9—perhaps only as a safeguard and possibly in the hope that they will not be needed—and that the consultation preceding the concurrence requirement should be effective but, against the danger that it is not, I suggest that the amendments are required. We support them.
My Lords, I support Amendment 22 to Clause 8. I will steer clear of debate on Clause 9, being neither a judge nor a barrister or solicitor.
In Committee, deep concerns were expressed about the extent of the ministerial powers in the Bill, which could result in rules that set digital engagement and participation in online courts as compulsory conditions for access to justice in civil proceedings. In effect, the ministerial powers in the Bill have the potential to require people to choose between online proceedings or not pursuing legal claims. The Constitution Committee shared those concerns. The Minister sought to mitigate those concerns by giving assurances as to the Government’s intentions. In Committee, in response to my noble friend Lady Corston, the Minister commented:
“We intend to appoint a committee of experts to formulate these rules, including judicial members. They will have regard to the need for access to justice. Certainly, we have confidence in the ability of such a committee to formulate rules that reflect the need for all members of the community to have access, not only those who are perhaps more digitally alert and astute than the minority. We lay our confidence in the fact that there will be such a committee, that it will make regulations and that it will do it under the aegis of not only the Executive but the judiciary, and the Lord Chief Justice in particular”.
However, Clause 8 explicitly allows Ministers to both instruct and overrule that committee of experts.
On a further occasion, the Minister gave an assurance that,
“judicial discretion … ultimately, is paramount, and nothing in the Bill or that we would anticipate in the regulations to be made pursuant to the powers under the Bill would undermine that judicial discretion, which ultimately has be exercised in the interests of justice”.
However, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, so acutely observed in Committee:
“It is not judicial discretion but rules that may require the parties to participate in the hearing by means of electronic devices. Therefore, it is not a question of the judge in charge of the case making that decision; the preliminary rules will require it, and the judge will be bound by that”.—[Official Report, 10/6/19; cols. 287-89.]
In summary, notwithstanding ministerial assurances, Clause 8 confers powers on Ministers to require specific provisions to be included in the Online Procedure Rules which the Online Procedure Rule Committee must comply with. Clause 8 also requires that the rules that the committee is required to make must be in accordance with Clause 7, but that clause gives the Minister explicit powers to disallow rules made by the Online Procedure Rule Committee of experts. Clause 8 gives Ministers considerable scope but fails to frame those powers in a way that ensures access to justice and does not give rise to the potential of a person having to choose between online court proceedings or not pursuing their case.
There are real concerns across the House about the potential of the powers given to Ministers in Clause 7, and I will not replay them here, but the case for Amendment 22, which introduces a degree of control over the exercise of those powers by requiring the Minister to secure the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice, who is the head of the judiciary and is ultimately responsible for the delivery of justice, is, I believe, compelling.
With great respect to the noble Lord, I do not consider that I am dealing with an implied limitation. If one construes the Bill as a whole, one begins with Clauses 2 and 3, which set out the framework within which the Online Procedure Rule Committee will be able to operate. That framework is subject to the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice; that is quite clear. To read Clause 8 as though it stands entirely alone and independently of the rest of the Bill is not, I submit, at all appropriate. The circumstances in which Clause 8 directions may be given clearly apply to the rule-making power of the committee. The committee has no rule-making power except in respect of proceedings of a specified kind as provided for by Clauses 2 and 3. I do not suggest that an implication is necessary there; it is simply a matter of statutory construction. I hear what the noble Lord says and will give further consideration to the point he makes in light of it, but that is my position at present.
Accepting what the Minister says about the framework, there is nothing in Clause 8 as I read it—he will no doubt correct me if I am wrong—that prevents the Lord Chancellor giving a Clause 8 direction in the context of rules already within specified proceedings, where the rules required to be made by the Lord Chancellor’s direction are offensive to the Lord Chief Justice.
If they were offensive to the Lord Chief Justice, that would emerge in the course of consultation. I am glad that the noble Lord accepts my point about the proper construction of the statutory provisions as between Clauses 2 and 3 and Clause 8. What he is concerned about is an entirely distinct issue: that the Minister gives a direction for the making of rules in respect of proceedings of a specified kind, pursuant to Clauses 2 and 3, which the Lord Chief Justice might not like. If he does not like it, he can express that view during the consultation. If he is deeply disturbed by what is proposed, he can have recourse to Section 5(2) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 to make a report to Parliament, but that will not arise. One has to see these powers in their proper context.
I would add that, in the course of looking at the proposed amendments to the Bill, we have engaged with the Judicial Office to try to ensure that the Bill reflects constitutional arrangements consistent with those of the existing civil committees. That is precisely what Clauses 8 and 9 do and I am not aware of any objection from that source to the way in which those committees already operate, and in which it is intended that this committee should operate in respect of the same matter. I will come on to explain why, constitutionally as well as with reference to precedent, we consider that appropriate. I underline the point that the existing proposal in Clause 8 in no way takes away from or abrogates the provisions in Clauses 2 and 3, which establish quite clearly those proceedings, and only those proceedings, in respect of which the committee itself can make rules. It cannot make rules for something else entirely.
My Lords, regarding Amendments 11 and 12, let me restate the point I sought to outline in Committee. In his final review of the civil justice system in 2016, Lord Briggs—or Lord Justice Briggs as he then was—anticipated a committee of experts from across various disciplines that would reflect the needs of users. Amendments 11 and 12 seek to increase the size of the committee to include respectively four more legal members and one additional other member. Combined with Amendment 13, which has the effect of adding a further member who must have experience of representing the views of people who are digitally excluded, this would add four members to the committee.
We have been clear all along that we want an Online Procedure Rule Committee that is small and agile. This will mean that it has the flexibility to make and adapt rules quickly to meet circumstances that might change rapidly. As Clause 7 makes clear, before making or amending rules the committee must consult such persons as they consider appropriate. The committee will therefore be able to benefit from the contributions of people with expertise relevant to specific matters, rules and proceedings as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. This would include people with specific legal experience in a particular area, such as that of the disabled.
One consequence of adopting these amendments would be creating not only a much larger committee, but a much greater imbalance in the number of members appointed by the Lord Chancellor in comparison to the number appointed by the Lord Chief Justice. It would therefore defeat the very purpose of the amendments we have sought to move. At present, we have a committee of six on which there are three judicial appointees made by the Lord Chief Justice, one of whom is the chair. In the event of a rule being signed off by a majority, with three judicial appointees wishing to sign off the rule, the chair would have what is in effect a casting vote. These amendments would therefore take away entirely from the very force of the amendments the Government are moving.
Amendment 13 would add a member of the rule committee capable of representing the views of people who are digitally excluded. As I have already sought to explain, we consider that there are significant advantages in a small committee. Where it requires expert input, it has the power to seek that. Since we have brought forward amendments to ensure that all members of the committee always consider the needs of those who struggle to engage digitally—the amendments we dealt with earlier—and while I fully agree that digital support for those who want to access online services is absolutely paramount to the effectiveness of this system, we do not consider it necessary to achieve those objectives to have this addition to the committee. It is also important to remember that Clause 6 provides a power to vary the membership of the committee as and when required.
Finally, on Amendment 14 and the matter of gender balance, as I sought to emphasise in Committee, the Government of course support the wider aim of ensuring diversity among senior appointees to public bodies. When appointing members to the committee, the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice are already bound by guidelines and statute relating to matters of diversity. Appointments to various procedure rule committees are governed by the Governance Code on Public Appointments, which sets out the principles that underpin public appointments, including openness, ministerial responsibility and integrity. It also includes a commitment to diversity:
“Public appointments should reflect the diversity of the society in which we live, and appointments should be made taking account of the need to appoint boards which include a balance of skills and backgrounds”.
Additionally, public appointments are regulated by the Commissioner for Public Appointments. He or she, in turn, may make audits of departments to see that they are complying with the principles.
Furthermore, Ministers are subject to the public sector equality duty set out in the Equality Act 2010. We therefore consider the matter of diversity to be well dealt with. It does not have to be brought within the four walls of this Bill; it is already addressed in statute and by other means. Also, as I have mentioned before, applying this specific statutory duty to this committee would differentiate it from the other civil committees—the Tribunal Procedure Committee, the Family Procedure Committee and the Civil Procedure Committee—and there is no compelling reason to do so. In these circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendments.
Can the Minister clarify a point he made in relation to Amendments 11 to 13? Having regard to the amendments which have already been accepted, the balance of the committee at the moment is three judicial appointments and three appointed by the Lord Chancellor, with the Lord Chief Justice having the power to appoint the chairman from the judicial appointments, and that chairman having a casting vote. The Minister commented on the effect of the proposed Amendments 11 to 13 on that balance. Is that right?
The noble Lord is entirely correct in his summary of the position if we apply the government amendments that have been moved. The result is that, in light of the government amendments, we will have a committee constituted as he indicated. That balance would be removed by the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham.