Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill [HL]
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateMonday 24th June 2019
(5 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberCourts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill [HL] 2017-19 View all Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill [HL] 2017-19 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 183-I(a) Manuscript amendment for Report, supplementary to the marshalled list (PDF) - (24 Jun 2019)
16:52 - Division on Amendment 12 - Ayes: 132 / Noes: 219 - Amendment 12 disagreed.
17:09 - Division on Amendment 22 - Ayes: 226 / Noes: 182 - Amendment 22 agreed.
Lord Keen of Elie
“(3A) For the purposes of subsection (3)(a), regard must be had to the needs of those who require technical support in order to initiate, conduct, progress or participate in proceedings by electronic means.”
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, I begin by thanking noble Lords for attending this debate. I extend my thanks to those noble Lords who have engaged with me on the Bill through its last stages,
The amendments in this first group are all about access to justice under the new online procedure, an important topic that I know we all wish to get right. I shall open with the government Amendments 1, 4 and 18, which appear in my name. I believe that we are united in seeking to ensure that we get this right, particularly in our steps to ensure that unrepresented litigants have the right levels of support for this procedure.
On Amendments 1 and 18, as I indicated, we are committed to accessibility and to providing support to help many people to use the online services where otherwise they would find it difficult. Amendments 1 and 18 provide that, when making rules, the Online Procedure Rule Committee must try to ensure that the procedures are accessible and fair. They also require the committee to have regard to the needs of those who require technical support to engage with the online procedure.
I am, however, aware that the responsibility for making rules does not reside only with the committee. The Lord Chancellor must also allow the rules for them to come into force. Therefore, as an additional safeguard, Amendment 18 provides that, when allowing or disallowing the rules, the appropriate Minister must have regard,
“to the needs of those who require technical support in order to initiate, conduct, progress or participate in proceedings by electronic means”.
The amendments effectively cover support for those people who cannot easily access our digital services due to a lack of digital skills, a lack of confidence, perhaps, or a lack of tools.
I think it is clear from this that, throughout the rule-making process, our focus is firmly on the needs of litigants, from when the Online Procedure Rule Committee develops rules to the end of the process when the appropriate Minister decides whether to allow them. I consider that these amendments are comprehensive and wide-ranging enough to ensure that the system will be accessible and fit for purpose. In developing the amendments, we have listened to, and sought to address, the concerns expressed by noble Lords about the provision of support to unrepresented litigants. It is in these circumstances that I shall press Amendments 1 and 18.
The House has heard commitments from us, in Committee and at Second Reading, to the fact that paper channels will remain available for all litigants in person. We understand the importance of access to justice and recognise that, no matter how user-friendly our IT services are, some people will not have the ability or the confidence to use them. In the Committee debate, there was a strong feeling that, despite our reassurances, the Bill was not clear enough on the matter of a paper route. We have considered the points raised in that debate and, although it has always been our intention to provide a paper channel for users, I recognise that noble Lords wanted that commitment to be reflected in the Bill. Accordingly, the Government’s Amendment 4 clarifies that litigants can submit their online applications by non-electronic means, which of course includes the use of paper. It is in these circumstances that I will be moving government Amendment 4. I beg to move.
Amendment 2 (to Amendment 1)
Lord Beecham (Lab)
My Lords, I declare my interest, as in the register, as an unpaid consultant with my former legal firm.
It is unusual for me to extend congratulations to the Minister, with whom it is usually an enjoyable conflict of arms over the Dispatch Box, but he has made it very clear in his approach to the Bill that the Government are seeking to secure improvements to the legislation. He has tabled nearly half the amendments that we are discussing on Report, which is an unusually high proportion. That says a great deal for his interest in securing support for and improvement of the legislation, and for that he is to be highly commended. I welcome Amendments 1 and 18, and the acknowledgement of the need to have regard to those involved in the justice system who will require support to engage in an unfamiliar process.
Amendment 7, in my name, does not appear to have attracted a great deal of support around the House. It is designed to ensure that either party may choose whether proceedings will be online or offline rather than restricting the choice to the claimant, which is the present position under the Bill. It would allow the relevant judicial officeholder to decide which rules are to be followed where the parties are not in agreement. I am frankly puzzled by the criticism on this occasion from noble and learned Lords with a rather higher status in the legal profession than I ever aspired to or achieved. But since the Bill itself provides under Clause 3(1) that the Minister may,
“by regulations, provide for circumstances in which the person initiating proceedings, or an aspect of proceedings, may … choose”,
one side of the case can choose. However, there seems to be an objection to the other party being able to make a choice with the ultimate decision made, if necessary—if there is conflict on that—by a judicial officeholder.
I understand that the suggestion I have made would make both sides able to opt for a decision—I remind noble Lords that they cannot concur on the decision to be made—by an officer of the court. This is consistent with the European Convention on Human Rights and is strongly supported by the Law Society. I hope that it may be looked at again, in either this Chamber or another place. It seems only equitable for both sides, if any is to have a choice in proceedings, to give an indication and provide for a system where an independent party could, if necessary and by way of being a judicial officeholder, decide which rules would apply.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. I propose to address Amendment 5, which touches upon government Amendment 4, and then go on to look at manuscript Amendment 9A and thereafter Amendment 7. I will also touch upon the two technical amendments, as they were termed by the noble Lord, Lord Marks.
On Amendment 5, the use of the word “initiate” was intended to capture all engagement with online services throughout the proceedings, as I indicated on a previous occasion—in other words, “initiate” was taken as a synonym for “engagement”, not “commence”—but I appreciate the uncertainty that is in the minds of some noble Lords with regard to that matter. The noble Baroness, Lady Drake, made the point about comparing the terms of an earlier clause with this clause, where it refers only to “initiate”. I intend to look further at that matter before Third Reading so that we can arrive at a conclusion as to the appropriate wording, because I believe we are as one on the appropriate outcome on that point. In these circumstances, I hope that the noble Lord may see fit not to press his amendment at this stage so that we can proceed with Amendment 4 and address that point further in due course.
Lord Beith
I thank the Minister for that indication. I will not seek to move the amendment at this stage.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am most obliged to the noble Lord for that.
Perhaps I may turn to manuscript Amendment 9A, as distinct from Amendment 9, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks. Again, I thank him for his extensive engagement with me and the Bill team over the last few days to address these matters. As I have sought to underline, we are committed to providing support to those people who cannot easily access online services. We share the observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and others about the importance of this issue. In these circumstances, we are prepared to accept manuscript Amendment 9A, as tabled by the noble Lord. However, it has an impact on the two other amendments that were tabled; first, in the use of the words “providing for”. If we accept manuscript Amendment 9A, it appears we are making explicit provision—indeed, we will have an explicit duty to provide—for these services. It therefore appears unnecessary to move that further amendment in these circumstances.
I have discussed the removal of the word “technical” with the noble Lord, Lord Marks. At this stage, I am not in a position to accept that amendment. Again, I would like an opportunity to discuss further what to do with the precise wording, in the light of our accepting manuscript Amendment 9A. It is in that context that I would like to resolve the matter, because we are concerned about the width of the obligation in those circumstances. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Marks, appreciates that and understands that, in accepting manuscript Amendment 9A, it is necessary for me to give further consideration to the two minor amendments he referred to. I understand where he is coming from and am content to address with him how we can ensure that the width of that provision is appropriate and sufficient as we go forward to Third Reading.
I am also content to commit on the Floor of the House that the Government will lay in Parliament a report on the provision of support, every two years. That report will be on the levels of assisted digital support being provided, and will give noble Lords the opportunity to request a debate on the topic and test the availability of support. Again, I had the opportunity to discuss that matter with the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I hope he accepts that that commitment meets the further concerns he had about the implementation of these provisions.
I turn to Amendment 7, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. I am obliged to him for his remarks and observations. We do not feel able to accept the amendment. I notice the reference to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights but, as the noble Lord is well aware—as is the Law Society, no doubt—there is an established common-law right of access to the courts and to a fair public hearing. More recently, that was included in Article 6 of the convention, which is part of our domestic law by virtue of the Human Rights Act. The effect is that these matters are already available and in train. We do not see that it is necessary to make explicit reference in the Bill to those established and fundamental rights. To make a specific reference to Article 6 of the convention without making reference to, for example, the common-law right of access to justice could simply sow the seeds of uncertainty or confusion.
The second part of Amendment 7 would remove, from the appropriate Minister, the power to determine the circumstances in which proceedings should not be governed by the Online Procedure Rules. It would instead leave the matter to be determined by a court or tribunal in cases where the parties to the proceedings disagree. We consider that not to be appropriate at present. The present balance, as indicated in Committee by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, is the appropriate way forward in these circumstances. I therefore invite the noble Lord to not move Amendment 7.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I will briefly address the Minister’s comments on my amendments. I had understood that Amendments 2 and 3 were accepted, but that discussion was before my Amendment 9A was drafted or accepted. I can see the point that having “providing for” in Amendment 1 may be rendered otiose by the acceptance of Amendment 9A. However, I will discuss it between now and Third Reading with the noble and learned Lord, as he suggests. However, I take the view that the word “technical” is important, for precisely the reason given by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, so I will be urging that on him in our discussions.
I should also say, which I did not mention in opening, that the agreement to have a biennial review and have that report laid in the way the noble and learned Lord said is very welcome and, I suggest, important for ensuring that digitally excluded people are always receiving the assistance to which they are entitled. As I said, I intend not to move Amendment 9 and to move Amendment 9A when the time comes. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 2.
Lord Keen of Elie
“(4A) The provision made under subsection (1)(a) must include provision for proceedings initiated at a court or tribunal by non-electronic means to be treated as initiated by electronic means, where the proceedings are processed by the court or tribunal by electronic means.”
Lord Keen of Elie
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, the amendments in this group deal with the issue of concurrence. Again, I thank noble Lords for their contributions on this topic at Second Reading and in Committee, and for their continued engagement on the matter outside the Chamber. We listened to the points made in these discussions and sought to address some of the concerns raised. I have tabled a range of amendments which I hope will provide suitable assurances for noble Lords. The amendments in this group deal specifically with the matter of concurrence in Clauses 2, 3 and 12. That is because I am now persuaded that the question of which proceedings fall under the auspices of the new Online Procedure Rule Committee should be a matter for agreement between the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice. Therefore, these amendments make the necessary changes to Clauses 2, 3 and 12 to provide for this.
The amendment to Clause 12 also allows the Lord Chief Justice to delegate agreement to other members of the senior judiciary, which is purely a matter of practicality. I hope the amendments will be welcomed by noble Lords. They provide an important safeguard for the operation of the new committee. In particular, they address the concerns expressed by noble Lords at previous stages that the future expansion of the role of the committee should be subject to appropriate scrutiny and that in such matters the right relationship with the Lord Chief Justice and Senior President of Tribunals is one of concurrence. On reflection, this is a position which the Government now accept, and in these circumstances, I beg to move.
Lord Judge
My Lords, the Government have come a long way and I am now addressing not only the amendments put forward by the Government but Amendments 22 and 23. I begin by thanking the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for kindly listening to what we had to say and for acting on it, and the Bill team for helping him get the wording right. It means that the Government have come a long way towards understanding the implications of the constitutional changes in 2005, which changed the relationship between the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice and placed on the Lord Chief Justice responsibilities that once attached to the Lord Chancellor. The Lord Chief Justice now has personal responsibility for the arrangements by which litigation is conducted. To the extent that this relates to tribunals, the Senior President of Tribunals has the same responsibility. I welcome Amendment 12 and government Amendments 6, 8, 25, 26, 27 and 28, and shall welcome government Amendments 10 and 15 in the next group.
The difference between being consulted and requiring concurrence needs no emphasis. If you are consulted, what you say can be totally disregarded; concurrence means what it says. Despite all that I have said, I am sad to say that although the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, has taken his car a long way down the road of logic and constitutional sense, his vehicle has run out of fuel and failed to reach its logical conclusion.
The position can be summarised very briefly. Amendments 22 and 23 to Clauses 8 and 9, respectively, concern two clauses which, as drafted, give exceptionally wide powers to a Minister. Indeed, Clauses 8 and 9, I am afraid, are in the sadly standard form of donating, handing over or retaining power to the Executive which we now find in just about every Bill that comes before us.
The first six clauses, whatever other comments may be made about them, recognise that the government amendments in group three address the constitutional responsibilities. That is fine. Clause 7(3) gives the Minister an unconditional power to,
“allow or disallow Online Procedure Rules made by the Committee”,
provided that written reasons are given for doing so. In other words, he does not have to consult the Lord Chief Justice if he thinks that the rules put forward are not sensible or appropriate, or that they would cost too much money. That prevents the committee going off on a frolic of its own—or, indeed, putting forward rules with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice which, for example, involve unreasonable expenditure. That is very sensible. I do not cavil at the idea incorporated in Clause 7(3) and the individual responsibility of the Lord Chancellor in that regard.
However, taken together, Clauses 8 and 9 unbalance the relationship. The Lord Chief Justice falls out of Clause 8 altogether—he does not get a mention. He is reduced or left to the consultation process in Clause 9, which is entirely inconsistent with the provisions in the Bill that the Government amended to allow for concurrence rather than consultation. Under Clause 8, the Minister has power to direct that the rule committee shall include provisions to achieve the Minister’s purposes and that, when such a direction is given, the committee has no option but to comply within a reasonable time. It is that stark; the power is vested directly in the Minister.
It is one thing—and perfectly sensible—to protect the Lord Chancellor from some wild or absurd rule committee proposal. It is, with great respect, quite another for him to have an unconstrained power to give it directions: in effect, to tell it what to do. The Minister may, by Clause 9(2), also don the tarnished crown of King Henry VIII, who is not, of course, King Henry VIII to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen; I am not sure what he is to Scottish history—probably nothing. Would it not be wonderful to have a history in which Henry VIII counted for nothing? It would certainly be a convenience to this House if he did not count for very much.
So, if he wishes, the Minister may don this tarnished crown if he considers it necessary or desirable to facilitate the making of the rules. On closer examination, if you put these two clauses together, this arguably means that the Minister may overrule the very rules which were made with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice or his predecessor.
The Bill should be logical. The Lord Chief Justice’s concurrence to the exercise of these powers is elementary. The Bill and the government amendments now recognise it; the Minister has his safeguards in Clause 7(3); Amendments 22 and 23 make similar safeguards available to the Lord Chief Justice. I invite the Minister to refuel his car and keep right on to the end of the road.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I welcome the Minister’s acceptance of the need for the Lord Chief Justice to concur with the creation of rules rather than merely to be consulted. However, Amendments 16 and 19 look to enhance parliamentary scrutiny by requiring the affirmative process. The increasing reliance on the negative procedure has already roused concern in your Lordships’ House, and many Members are further concerned about its application to this sensitive area. The Law Society strongly endorses the amendments prescribing the affirmative procedure on the basis that it would secure further parliamentary scrutiny of the regulations.
Amendments 20 and 21, which are in my name, would empower the committee to decline a government request—in effect, an instruction—to create certain rules, which is really the issue that my noble friend Lady Drake has just referred to. If there is to be a really meaningful role for that committee, to my mind we need an amendment along the lines of Amendments 20 and 21.
Finally, we will certainly support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, if he seeks to take the opinion of the House on the two amendments in his name.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I begin with two general observations. First, I am not conscious of having run out of fuel, but I leave that to others to judge. Secondly, it occurs to me that the Henrician view of executive power does not differ in any practical respect from the Stuart view of the divine right of kings.
Perhaps I should begin by making this point. Under the structure of the Bill, it will be necessary, pursuant to Clauses 2 and 3, to identify proceedings of a specified kind that may be subject to the Online Procedure Rules. In the light of the Government’s amendments, that can be done only with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice, as indicated, and subject to the affirmative procedure.
It is not open to the Online Procedure Rule Committee to make Online Procedure Rules in respect of procedures that are not of a specified kind—that would simply be ultra vires. There is scope the other way, for the Online Procedure Rule Committee to provide that certain proceedings that are of a specified kind are not to be governed by the rules; that is pursuant to Clause 1(6). So the point I seek to emphasise at the outset is that the definition of specified procedures—the specified kind of procedures—sets out the framework within which the Online Procedure Rule Committee can operate. If the Minister were at any time to direct the Online Procedure Rule Committee, pursuant to Clause 8, to make rules in respect of proceedings that were not of a specified kind, that would be ultra vires; that is quite clear. He can direct them to make rules only in respect of proceedings of a specified kind pursuant to Clauses 2 and 3.
It is not possible to utilise the Clause 8 power in order to run roughshod over the provisions in Clauses 2 and 3, which clearly set out the need for the Lord Chief Justice to give concurrence to the proceedings that will be subject to the rules. Perhaps I am stating the obvious, but it occurred to me that one or two observations made in the course of this debate were inclined to suggest otherwise. I do not accept that. One has to look at the entire structure of the Bill and have proper regard to the way in which Clauses 2 and 3 will operate in that respect.
Lord Pannick
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. It may be obvious to him, but not necessarily to others, that there is this implied limitation in what appears a very broad power being conferred on Clause 8. I suggest to him that a possible way forward would be for him to introduce at Third Reading an amendment to Clause 8 that makes it clear in the Bill that it has the limitation that he tells the House it has.
Lord Keen of Elie
With great respect to the noble Lord, I do not consider that I am dealing with an implied limitation. If one construes the Bill as a whole, one begins with Clauses 2 and 3, which set out the framework within which the Online Procedure Rule Committee will be able to operate. That framework is subject to the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice; that is quite clear. To read Clause 8 as though it stands entirely alone and independently of the rest of the Bill is not, I submit, at all appropriate. The circumstances in which Clause 8 directions may be given clearly apply to the rule-making power of the committee. The committee has no rule-making power except in respect of proceedings of a specified kind as provided for by Clauses 2 and 3. I do not suggest that an implication is necessary there; it is simply a matter of statutory construction. I hear what the noble Lord says and will give further consideration to the point he makes in light of it, but that is my position at present.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
Accepting what the Minister says about the framework, there is nothing in Clause 8 as I read it—he will no doubt correct me if I am wrong—that prevents the Lord Chancellor giving a Clause 8 direction in the context of rules already within specified proceedings, where the rules required to be made by the Lord Chancellor’s direction are offensive to the Lord Chief Justice.
Lord Keen of Elie
If they were offensive to the Lord Chief Justice, that would emerge in the course of consultation. I am glad that the noble Lord accepts my point about the proper construction of the statutory provisions as between Clauses 2 and 3 and Clause 8. What he is concerned about is an entirely distinct issue: that the Minister gives a direction for the making of rules in respect of proceedings of a specified kind, pursuant to Clauses 2 and 3, which the Lord Chief Justice might not like. If he does not like it, he can express that view during the consultation. If he is deeply disturbed by what is proposed, he can have recourse to Section 5(2) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 to make a report to Parliament, but that will not arise. One has to see these powers in their proper context.
I would add that, in the course of looking at the proposed amendments to the Bill, we have engaged with the Judicial Office to try to ensure that the Bill reflects constitutional arrangements consistent with those of the existing civil committees. That is precisely what Clauses 8 and 9 do and I am not aware of any objection from that source to the way in which those committees already operate, and in which it is intended that this committee should operate in respect of the same matter. I will come on to explain why, constitutionally as well as with reference to precedent, we consider that appropriate. I underline the point that the existing proposal in Clause 8 in no way takes away from or abrogates the provisions in Clauses 2 and 3, which establish quite clearly those proceedings, and only those proceedings, in respect of which the committee itself can make rules. It cannot make rules for something else entirely.
Lord Keen of Elie
Lord Keen of Elie
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, this group of amendments, beginning with Amendment 10, concerns the composition of the committee. I will therefore address Amendments 10, 15 and 17. The purpose of the amendments is fourfold: first, to increase the number of judicial members of the Online Procedure Rule Committee; secondly, to enable the Lord Chief Justice to appoint one judicial member as chair of the committee; thirdly, to provide that, when making rules, the majority of the committee must sign the rules, rather than the current requirement that they be signed by three members; and fourthly, to ensure that, where the committee is tied on the making of one or more rules, the chair’s signature will act as a casting vote.
These amendments, alongside our proposed amendment on concurrence in Clause 2, seek to ensure sufficient safeguards in the Bill to balance the role of Ministers on the one hand and the judiciary on the other in the making of online rules. The amendments aim to achieve a balance of nominees of the Lord Chief Justice and of the Lord Chancellor, such that each would have three nominees to the committee. In addition, one of these judicial nominees will now be designated by the Lord Chief Justice as the chair of the committee and will have the casting vote should the committee be tied on the making of any rule.
On the issue of committee members signing rules, the previous iteration of the Bill simply stated “three” as that would have been a majority of the five committee members. However, having considered the observations of noble Lords, and having made a small change to ensure that in future the committee increases in size, a simple majority of members will always be required to make rules. In this instance, where there are six members, should the committee be tied, the chair, as I said, would have the deciding vote. The consequence would be that the judicially appointed members of the committee would in such circumstances always have the majority on the committee. It is in these circumstances that I commend Amendments 10, 15 and 17 to your noble Lordships.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I rise to speak to the amendments in my name, Amendments 11, 12, 13 and 14.
Amendment 11 seeks to enlarge the Online Procedure Rule Committee to include members covering the legal profession and the magistracy, all of whom should be familiar with the difficulties experienced by people unused to the digital process. Importantly, Amendments 12 and 13 amend the provision of Clause 4(2)(d), under which two persons are added to the list of the committee members, one of whom must have experience in the advice sector, and the other two of whom must have IT experience and knowledge of end-users’ experience of internet portals. The amendment would add a third member with experience in representing the views of people who are digitally excluded. We regard this as imperative, not least in the light of the appalling experience of universal credit, which the organisation Mind cites as an example of “digital by default”, whereby 25% of people with long-term health conditions could not make claims online. Mind also cites a case, LH Bishop Electrical Co Ltd v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, in which the First-tier Tribunal ruled that requirements to file VAT returns online discriminated against disabled people, older people and people living too remotely for digital access.
Mind, while supporting increasing the choice for core users and making the system easier to navigate, rightly avers that it is essential to make sure that there are safeguards to ensure that people who are digitally excluded are not locked out of the justice system. It goes on to suggest that the Online Procedure Rule Committee’s powers should be limited so that it cannot require that proceedings be initiated online without providing an alternative that is clearly advertised and provides for each stage of the proceedings. This reinforces the case with an approach that does not leave the decision as to whether proceedings should be online with one party. This is consistent with the view expressed in Lord Briggs’s report, which sought to include non-lawyers with the requisite skills. These amendments are supported by the Law Society.
Finally, Amendment 14 seeks to promote and ensure gender balance in the membership of the committee and invites further work by the Government to achieve that.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, regarding Amendments 11 and 12, let me restate the point I sought to outline in Committee. In his final review of the civil justice system in 2016, Lord Briggs—or Lord Justice Briggs as he then was—anticipated a committee of experts from across various disciplines that would reflect the needs of users. Amendments 11 and 12 seek to increase the size of the committee to include respectively four more legal members and one additional other member. Combined with Amendment 13, which has the effect of adding a further member who must have experience of representing the views of people who are digitally excluded, this would add four members to the committee.
We have been clear all along that we want an Online Procedure Rule Committee that is small and agile. This will mean that it has the flexibility to make and adapt rules quickly to meet circumstances that might change rapidly. As Clause 7 makes clear, before making or amending rules the committee must consult such persons as they consider appropriate. The committee will therefore be able to benefit from the contributions of people with expertise relevant to specific matters, rules and proceedings as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. This would include people with specific legal experience in a particular area, such as that of the disabled.
One consequence of adopting these amendments would be creating not only a much larger committee, but a much greater imbalance in the number of members appointed by the Lord Chancellor in comparison to the number appointed by the Lord Chief Justice. It would therefore defeat the very purpose of the amendments we have sought to move. At present, we have a committee of six on which there are three judicial appointees made by the Lord Chief Justice, one of whom is the chair. In the event of a rule being signed off by a majority, with three judicial appointees wishing to sign off the rule, the chair would have what is in effect a casting vote. These amendments would therefore take away entirely from the very force of the amendments the Government are moving.
Amendment 13 would add a member of the rule committee capable of representing the views of people who are digitally excluded. As I have already sought to explain, we consider that there are significant advantages in a small committee. Where it requires expert input, it has the power to seek that. Since we have brought forward amendments to ensure that all members of the committee always consider the needs of those who struggle to engage digitally—the amendments we dealt with earlier—and while I fully agree that digital support for those who want to access online services is absolutely paramount to the effectiveness of this system, we do not consider it necessary to achieve those objectives to have this addition to the committee. It is also important to remember that Clause 6 provides a power to vary the membership of the committee as and when required.
Finally, on Amendment 14 and the matter of gender balance, as I sought to emphasise in Committee, the Government of course support the wider aim of ensuring diversity among senior appointees to public bodies. When appointing members to the committee, the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice are already bound by guidelines and statute relating to matters of diversity. Appointments to various procedure rule committees are governed by the Governance Code on Public Appointments, which sets out the principles that underpin public appointments, including openness, ministerial responsibility and integrity. It also includes a commitment to diversity:
“Public appointments should reflect the diversity of the society in which we live, and appointments should be made taking account of the need to appoint boards which include a balance of skills and backgrounds”.
Additionally, public appointments are regulated by the Commissioner for Public Appointments. He or she, in turn, may make audits of departments to see that they are complying with the principles.
Furthermore, Ministers are subject to the public sector equality duty set out in the Equality Act 2010. We therefore consider the matter of diversity to be well dealt with. It does not have to be brought within the four walls of this Bill; it is already addressed in statute and by other means. Also, as I have mentioned before, applying this specific statutory duty to this committee would differentiate it from the other civil committees—the Tribunal Procedure Committee, the Family Procedure Committee and the Civil Procedure Committee—and there is no compelling reason to do so. In these circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendments.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
Can the Minister clarify a point he made in relation to Amendments 11 to 13? Having regard to the amendments which have already been accepted, the balance of the committee at the moment is three judicial appointments and three appointed by the Lord Chancellor, with the Lord Chief Justice having the power to appoint the chairman from the judicial appointments, and that chairman having a casting vote. The Minister commented on the effect of the proposed Amendments 11 to 13 on that balance. Is that right?
Lord Keen of Elie
The noble Lord is entirely correct in his summary of the position if we apply the government amendments that have been moved. The result is that, in light of the government amendments, we will have a committee constituted as he indicated. That balance would be removed by the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham.
Lord Keen of Elie
“(6A) The Lord Chief Justice may appoint one of the persons appointed under subsection (2)(a) or (b) to be the chair of the Online Procedure Rule Committee.”
Lord Keen of Elie
(i) at least half of the members of the Committee, where one of the signatories is the chair, or(ii) a majority of the members of the Committee, in any other case, and”
Lord Keen of Elie
“(3A) In deciding whether to allow or disallow rules, the appropriate Minister must have regard to the needs of those who require technical support in order to initiate, conduct, progress or participate in proceedings by electronic means.”
Lord Keen of Elie
Amendment 24 is consequential on Amendment 23 and therefore we accept it.
Lord Keen of Elie