Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill [HL] Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Beecham
Main Page: Lord Beecham (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Beecham's debates with the Scotland Office
(5 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I declare my interest, as in the register, as an unpaid consultant with my former legal firm.
It is unusual for me to extend congratulations to the Minister, with whom it is usually an enjoyable conflict of arms over the Dispatch Box, but he has made it very clear in his approach to the Bill that the Government are seeking to secure improvements to the legislation. He has tabled nearly half the amendments that we are discussing on Report, which is an unusually high proportion. That says a great deal for his interest in securing support for and improvement of the legislation, and for that he is to be highly commended. I welcome Amendments 1 and 18, and the acknowledgement of the need to have regard to those involved in the justice system who will require support to engage in an unfamiliar process.
Amendment 7, in my name, does not appear to have attracted a great deal of support around the House. It is designed to ensure that either party may choose whether proceedings will be online or offline rather than restricting the choice to the claimant, which is the present position under the Bill. It would allow the relevant judicial officeholder to decide which rules are to be followed where the parties are not in agreement. I am frankly puzzled by the criticism on this occasion from noble and learned Lords with a rather higher status in the legal profession than I ever aspired to or achieved. But since the Bill itself provides under Clause 3(1) that the Minister may,
“by regulations, provide for circumstances in which the person initiating proceedings, or an aspect of proceedings, may … choose”,
one side of the case can choose. However, there seems to be an objection to the other party being able to make a choice with the ultimate decision made, if necessary—if there is conflict on that—by a judicial officeholder.
I understand that the suggestion I have made would make both sides able to opt for a decision—I remind noble Lords that they cannot concur on the decision to be made—by an officer of the court. This is consistent with the European Convention on Human Rights and is strongly supported by the Law Society. I hope that it may be looked at again, in either this Chamber or another place. It seems only equitable for both sides, if any is to have a choice in proceedings, to give an indication and provide for a system where an independent party could, if necessary and by way of being a judicial officeholder, decide which rules would apply.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. I propose to address Amendment 5, which touches upon government Amendment 4, and then go on to look at manuscript Amendment 9A and thereafter Amendment 7. I will also touch upon the two technical amendments, as they were termed by the noble Lord, Lord Marks.
On Amendment 5, the use of the word “initiate” was intended to capture all engagement with online services throughout the proceedings, as I indicated on a previous occasion—in other words, “initiate” was taken as a synonym for “engagement”, not “commence”—but I appreciate the uncertainty that is in the minds of some noble Lords with regard to that matter. The noble Baroness, Lady Drake, made the point about comparing the terms of an earlier clause with this clause, where it refers only to “initiate”. I intend to look further at that matter before Third Reading so that we can arrive at a conclusion as to the appropriate wording, because I believe we are as one on the appropriate outcome on that point. In these circumstances, I hope that the noble Lord may see fit not to press his amendment at this stage so that we can proceed with Amendment 4 and address that point further in due course.
My Lords, I support Amendment 22 to Clause 8. I will steer clear of debate on Clause 9, being neither a judge nor a barrister or solicitor.
In Committee, deep concerns were expressed about the extent of the ministerial powers in the Bill, which could result in rules that set digital engagement and participation in online courts as compulsory conditions for access to justice in civil proceedings. In effect, the ministerial powers in the Bill have the potential to require people to choose between online proceedings or not pursuing legal claims. The Constitution Committee shared those concerns. The Minister sought to mitigate those concerns by giving assurances as to the Government’s intentions. In Committee, in response to my noble friend Lady Corston, the Minister commented:
“We intend to appoint a committee of experts to formulate these rules, including judicial members. They will have regard to the need for access to justice. Certainly, we have confidence in the ability of such a committee to formulate rules that reflect the need for all members of the community to have access, not only those who are perhaps more digitally alert and astute than the minority. We lay our confidence in the fact that there will be such a committee, that it will make regulations and that it will do it under the aegis of not only the Executive but the judiciary, and the Lord Chief Justice in particular”.
However, Clause 8 explicitly allows Ministers to both instruct and overrule that committee of experts.
On a further occasion, the Minister gave an assurance that,
“judicial discretion … ultimately, is paramount, and nothing in the Bill or that we would anticipate in the regulations to be made pursuant to the powers under the Bill would undermine that judicial discretion, which ultimately has be exercised in the interests of justice”.
However, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, so acutely observed in Committee:
“It is not judicial discretion but rules that may require the parties to participate in the hearing by means of electronic devices. Therefore, it is not a question of the judge in charge of the case making that decision; the preliminary rules will require it, and the judge will be bound by that”.—[Official Report, 10/6/19; cols. 287-89.]
In summary, notwithstanding ministerial assurances, Clause 8 confers powers on Ministers to require specific provisions to be included in the Online Procedure Rules which the Online Procedure Rule Committee must comply with. Clause 8 also requires that the rules that the committee is required to make must be in accordance with Clause 7, but that clause gives the Minister explicit powers to disallow rules made by the Online Procedure Rule Committee of experts. Clause 8 gives Ministers considerable scope but fails to frame those powers in a way that ensures access to justice and does not give rise to the potential of a person having to choose between online court proceedings or not pursuing their case.
There are real concerns across the House about the potential of the powers given to Ministers in Clause 7, and I will not replay them here, but the case for Amendment 22, which introduces a degree of control over the exercise of those powers by requiring the Minister to secure the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice, who is the head of the judiciary and is ultimately responsible for the delivery of justice, is, I believe, compelling.
My Lords, I welcome the Minister’s acceptance of the need for the Lord Chief Justice to concur with the creation of rules rather than merely to be consulted. However, Amendments 16 and 19 look to enhance parliamentary scrutiny by requiring the affirmative process. The increasing reliance on the negative procedure has already roused concern in your Lordships’ House, and many Members are further concerned about its application to this sensitive area. The Law Society strongly endorses the amendments prescribing the affirmative procedure on the basis that it would secure further parliamentary scrutiny of the regulations.
Amendments 20 and 21, which are in my name, would empower the committee to decline a government request—in effect, an instruction—to create certain rules, which is really the issue that my noble friend Lady Drake has just referred to. If there is to be a really meaningful role for that committee, to my mind we need an amendment along the lines of Amendments 20 and 21.
Finally, we will certainly support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, if he seeks to take the opinion of the House on the two amendments in his name.
My Lords, I begin with two general observations. First, I am not conscious of having run out of fuel, but I leave that to others to judge. Secondly, it occurs to me that the Henrician view of executive power does not differ in any practical respect from the Stuart view of the divine right of kings.
Perhaps I should begin by making this point. Under the structure of the Bill, it will be necessary, pursuant to Clauses 2 and 3, to identify proceedings of a specified kind that may be subject to the Online Procedure Rules. In the light of the Government’s amendments, that can be done only with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice, as indicated, and subject to the affirmative procedure.
It is not open to the Online Procedure Rule Committee to make Online Procedure Rules in respect of procedures that are not of a specified kind—that would simply be ultra vires. There is scope the other way, for the Online Procedure Rule Committee to provide that certain proceedings that are of a specified kind are not to be governed by the rules; that is pursuant to Clause 1(6). So the point I seek to emphasise at the outset is that the definition of specified procedures—the specified kind of procedures—sets out the framework within which the Online Procedure Rule Committee can operate. If the Minister were at any time to direct the Online Procedure Rule Committee, pursuant to Clause 8, to make rules in respect of proceedings that were not of a specified kind, that would be ultra vires; that is quite clear. He can direct them to make rules only in respect of proceedings of a specified kind pursuant to Clauses 2 and 3.
It is not possible to utilise the Clause 8 power in order to run roughshod over the provisions in Clauses 2 and 3, which clearly set out the need for the Lord Chief Justice to give concurrence to the proceedings that will be subject to the rules. Perhaps I am stating the obvious, but it occurred to me that one or two observations made in the course of this debate were inclined to suggest otherwise. I do not accept that. One has to look at the entire structure of the Bill and have proper regard to the way in which Clauses 2 and 3 will operate in that respect.
My Lords, this group of amendments, beginning with Amendment 10, concerns the composition of the committee. I will therefore address Amendments 10, 15 and 17. The purpose of the amendments is fourfold: first, to increase the number of judicial members of the Online Procedure Rule Committee; secondly, to enable the Lord Chief Justice to appoint one judicial member as chair of the committee; thirdly, to provide that, when making rules, the majority of the committee must sign the rules, rather than the current requirement that they be signed by three members; and fourthly, to ensure that, where the committee is tied on the making of one or more rules, the chair’s signature will act as a casting vote.
These amendments, alongside our proposed amendment on concurrence in Clause 2, seek to ensure sufficient safeguards in the Bill to balance the role of Ministers on the one hand and the judiciary on the other in the making of online rules. The amendments aim to achieve a balance of nominees of the Lord Chief Justice and of the Lord Chancellor, such that each would have three nominees to the committee. In addition, one of these judicial nominees will now be designated by the Lord Chief Justice as the chair of the committee and will have the casting vote should the committee be tied on the making of any rule.
On the issue of committee members signing rules, the previous iteration of the Bill simply stated “three” as that would have been a majority of the five committee members. However, having considered the observations of noble Lords, and having made a small change to ensure that in future the committee increases in size, a simple majority of members will always be required to make rules. In this instance, where there are six members, should the committee be tied, the chair, as I said, would have the deciding vote. The consequence would be that the judicially appointed members of the committee would in such circumstances always have the majority on the committee. It is in these circumstances that I commend Amendments 10, 15 and 17 to your noble Lordships.
My Lords, I rise to speak to the amendments in my name, Amendments 11, 12, 13 and 14.
Amendment 11 seeks to enlarge the Online Procedure Rule Committee to include members covering the legal profession and the magistracy, all of whom should be familiar with the difficulties experienced by people unused to the digital process. Importantly, Amendments 12 and 13 amend the provision of Clause 4(2)(d), under which two persons are added to the list of the committee members, one of whom must have experience in the advice sector, and the other two of whom must have IT experience and knowledge of end-users’ experience of internet portals. The amendment would add a third member with experience in representing the views of people who are digitally excluded. We regard this as imperative, not least in the light of the appalling experience of universal credit, which the organisation Mind cites as an example of “digital by default”, whereby 25% of people with long-term health conditions could not make claims online. Mind also cites a case, LH Bishop Electrical Co Ltd v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, in which the First-tier Tribunal ruled that requirements to file VAT returns online discriminated against disabled people, older people and people living too remotely for digital access.
Mind, while supporting increasing the choice for core users and making the system easier to navigate, rightly avers that it is essential to make sure that there are safeguards to ensure that people who are digitally excluded are not locked out of the justice system. It goes on to suggest that the Online Procedure Rule Committee’s powers should be limited so that it cannot require that proceedings be initiated online without providing an alternative that is clearly advertised and provides for each stage of the proceedings. This reinforces the case with an approach that does not leave the decision as to whether proceedings should be online with one party. This is consistent with the view expressed in Lord Briggs’s report, which sought to include non-lawyers with the requisite skills. These amendments are supported by the Law Society.
Finally, Amendment 14 seeks to promote and ensure gender balance in the membership of the committee and invites further work by the Government to achieve that.