Rule of Law

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 26th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, this has been a very important debate on the rule of law. We have been very fortunate to be able to have it, and it has been a great credit to this House. It has also been a great privilege and pleasure to hear two fine maiden speeches. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Smith of Cluny, delivered a maiden speech that has been unanimously acclaimed as a tour de force. She spoke clearly for the House and the Government, but also for Scotland, the devolution settlement and the Scotland Act. She also spoke movingly, if I may say so, about her family, her mother and her daughter Ella. In her new role, her dedicated commitment to our international obligations and the European Convention on Human Rights these Benches unstintingly support.

The noble Baroness, Lady Laing of Elderslie, another distinguished lawyer from Scotland, also gave us a brilliant maiden speech. She is a distinguished constitutionalist and parliamentarian of note, “with the customs and procedures of the House of Commons running through her veins”, as she put it. She reminded us of how democratic argument in Parliament also requires the honest and impartial application of a system of rules, another aspect of the rule of law, which is important in any democracy. Along with the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, and the one that we are about to hear from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, we are reminded of the importance of Scotland’s distinctive voice in this House on legal issues and the discussion of the devolution settlement and constitutional affairs in the United Kingdom.

As might have been expected, a majority of our speakers have been lawyers, but the voice of non-lawyers has also been important and significant in today’s debate. I found in particular the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, really helpful on equality before the law and making the rule of law real. Significantly, last week also saw the 103rd plenary meeting of the European Committee on Legal Co-operation, which approved a draft convention for the protection of the profession of lawyer. At a time when both the rule of law and lawyers’ independence are under threat, international co-operation to enable lawyers freely and independently to represent their clients is a vital component of the rule of law. As the Bar Council’s Manifesto for Justice put it:

“Recent and repeated public attacks on the legal profession and on the independence of the judiciary by politicians, coupled with negative rhetoric, has undermined the trust and confidence in our justice system—both at home and abroad”.


I ask the Minister and the Government for a commitment that the United Kingdom will take steps to ensure that this country plays its full part and signs up to this convention. That would recognise the importance of lawyers to the rule of law, stressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy.

However, we can be too defensive—and I say that for two reasons. The first is the positive. Our outstanding judges and our legal system as a whole maintain the highest reputation for independence, integrity, incorruptibility and impartiality—but increasing diversity is also crucial, as the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, argued. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, reminded us of Fuller’s principle:

“Be ye never so high, the law is above you”.


That is a principle that underlies all that we say. The result has been that our civil justice system enjoys an unparalleled reputation, particularly in the commercial world, as the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, said, and our international standing and the earnings that it brings to this country are very high indeed.

In this connection, I mention the success of international arbitration; the passing of the Arbitration Bill through this House after an unwarranted glitch in the wash-up has advanced that cause. I ask the Government now to turn their attention to passing legislation on litigation funding to reverse the PACCAR decision, as was to have been done before the election, with all-party support, leaving the acknowledged need for regulation of funders to be considered by the Civil Justice Council later.

The second reason we can be too defensive is negative. Much of what has gone wrong in the fields of criminal justice, our penal system, access to justice and public respect for the law is our fault—the fault not just of lawyers but of politicians and government. I depart from those who maintain that a commitment to the rule of law does not extend to those political and societal features of our national life that generate the confidence of the public that the law is there for them and that the law will be fairly administered. I regard it as central that the concept of the rule of law is close to the theme of government by consent. That means trust in the police, the courts and the penal system, and trust that Governments and government agencies will apply the law fairly. It is about maintaining the compact between government and governed that keeps trust alive. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton put it, it is about our laws “enjoying the confidence of the governed”. Regrettably, I suggest that that confidence and that trust has been breaking down.

The rule of law on our streets and in our communities is not just about policing. In the criminal context, or the quasi-criminal context, the failure of the system over recent years to address increasing violence against women and girls has been lamentable. I welcome the commitment of the Government to halve violence against women and girls, and I welcome the 16 days of activism against gender-based violence that is currently under way. The public commitment to ending domestic abuse in particular has improved beyond recognition, but the real-life plight of women and children in their homes, at risk from those they live with, remains a sad reflection on the unreality of the rule of law for millions.

On the police, we in this House, and in politics in general—I suspect because of there being different Ministries—tend to separate out issues of criminal justice and policing. A mistake, I suggest. We cannot sort out issues of policing unless we sort out issues of criminal justice, and vice versa. The rule of law demands that we address the inability of police to tackle low-level crime; the ability of street gangs to operate unchecked in our communities; poor community relations and often still outright hostility between black communities and police; the courts’ inability to handle their case load, discussed by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven; and the crisis in our prisons and probation service.

The rule of law is imperilled by a lack of public confidence that the law will be followed and enforced by the agents of the law. Certainly, much of the difficulty in maintaining trust in policing on our streets and in our communities, in our criminal justice system and in our prison and probation services stems from lack of resources.

Part of the challenge is to maintain and rebuild trust in the face of shortage of resources, but more is to restore the levels of funding that the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, rightly argued the case for a little earlier. With all these resourcing issues, we need to persuade the Treasury to take a fresh and far less bunkered approach. Reoffending costs this country £18 billion a year and that is just the direct cost of reoffending. It does not cover the costs across the rest of national and local government: social services, education, housing, and lost tax revenues. The Treasury needs to work on developing a cross-government strategy on spend to save, and it is miles away from it yet.

I suggest that it is uncontroversial that the health and working of the courts and justice system are central to the rule of law. Continuing court backlogs are disgraceful. We have too few criminal courts that are working. We have a shortage of judges. That could be solved, partially, at least, by recruiting more assistant recorders and by increasing sitting hours and sitting days. It is wrong that there is an imposed cap on sitting days: 105,000 this year, down from 107,700 last year. There is a shortage of lawyers, caused in large part by a shortage of resources, because criminal barristers are unhappily unwilling—by which I mean they are unwilling, but that is because they cannot afford to be willing to accept the work.

The rule of law suffers real damage from delays, as well as from miscarriages of justice, as those tied up with cases that have not come on have their lives put on hold, as cases are abandoned, as witnesses withdraw their evidence, and as recollections inevitably dim. The main issue, again, is lack of resources. A secondary issue, though, is reluctance to innovate. We need smarter use of technology and cleverer ways of listing cases and ensuring that resources are properly used.

In the civil justice system, lack of accessibility is a central issue. The damage to access to justice and the availability of legal aid discussed by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, who has been a tireless campaigner for access to justice for many years, has been incalculable. The increase in access to justice for all our citizens is essential across the board. Legal aid is hardly available for housing cases, debt cases, social security cases, education, immigration or the interface between government and system, and where it is available, it is inadequate. The restriction of legal aid has largely destroyed access to justice, a case that has been eloquently argued by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Etherton and Lord Stewart of Dirleton, and the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. Protection of the most vulnerable was the paramount theme of the speech of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Norwich.

In all courts, we need to welcome innovation. I mentioned the greater use of technology, but we need to reduce unnecessary hearings and delays and lawyers must be astute not to be Luddite about this. We have also considered in this debate the ways in which our lawmaking here in Parliament and in government affects the rule of law. The noble and learned Baroness the Advocate-General spoke of the balance between the Executive and the legislature. I suggest that we need two major changes. First, there must be an end to skeleton Bills full of powers for Ministers to make law by secondary legislation. In this House, we had the pleasure and the privilege of hearing frequently from the late Lord Judge on the excessive grant of Henry VIII powers, as mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan.

Secondly, we need more pre-legislative scrutiny. I was a member of the committee that heard the pre-legislative scrutiny of the Defamation Act and, more recently, the Arbitration Bill, as well as the Special Committee. Those were Law Commission Bills, and the Law Commission does very thorough work. It has the benefit of a mass of expert input into proposals before any draft legislation is introduced, and the legislation that is introduced as a result of Law Commission work is generally the better for it. A wide range of Bills that come to this House receive thorough consultation, but I am afraid that many do not. That is an important point: when we are asked to legislate on Bills that come to us, frankly, half-digested, we cannot do a proper job.

A further point of great importance to the rule of law relates to the balance between the legislature and the Executive. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, pointed out, the law must sustain a balance between officials and citizens. That means a clear commitment to the law being able to hold, and actually holding, government, local and national, to account. In this country, much of this has been guaranteed by judicial review—it may be no surprise that I do not necessarily agree with everything that fell from the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, on this. That goes particularly for human rights, the subject of the speech by the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker. Yet under the last Government, we were frequently given the impression that they saw judges as getting in the way of democracy and that judicial review was a nuisance that ought to be curbed.

There is always a tendency in government to dislike judicial interference, and one can understand why there is a natural tension there. The account by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, of his experience as a Minister was instructive, and although he and I do not always agree on the limits of judicial intervention, his account was, I suggest, balanced. Nevertheless, my view of judicial review is that it is one of the most important developments of the law over the last half-century. From these Benches, we will see this new Government’s approach to judicial review as a litmus test of their commitment to the rule of law.

Internationally, our standing depends on our respect for the rule of law. The last Government’s willingness to flout our international commitments relating to Northern Ireland and the Rwanda legislation, now thankfully abandoned, were lamentable departures from the rule of law and threats to our international reputation and standing, as argued by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford and the noble Lady Baroness, Lady O’Loan. On these Benches, we are strongly encouraged by the noble and learned Baroness’s commitment to the Government’s compliance with our international obligations. In the wider context, respect for the rule of law at home is reflected on the world stage by our international commitments and our honouring those commitments, and we should never forget it.

Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill [HL]

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 29th April 2024 Grand Committee

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Stewart of Dirleton) (Con)]

My Lords, I will address Amendment 1 alongside government Amendment 2 in one moment. I need not repeat in detail why this Bill is important, as we debated it so recently, just two weeks ago at Second Reading, but I want to address some of the points raised. I wrote to noble Lords—and to noble and learned Lords—but thought it important to put those matters on record here as well.

Clause 1 makes it clear that the Bill will have retrospective effect. The Government have carefully considered the point and decided that the Bill should have retrospective effect, meaning it will apply to litigation funding agreements in place before the PACCAR judgment and to any that may have been made between the judgment and the Bill becoming law. I thank noble Lords for their contributions, particularly my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, King’s Counsel, who is not in his place today.

There were concerns about the possibility of claimants who negotiated new funding agreements following the PACCAR decision, having believed their first agreement to be unenforceable, facing the prospect of two funding agreements that could be enforced once the Bill comes into effect. In addition, reference was made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, King’s Counsel, to a suggestion that the Bill’s retrospective effect may interfere with the Government’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. That was raised in the context of the opinion of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, King’s Counsel, which was shared among noble Lords ahead of Second Reading. On behalf of the Lord Chancellor, I thank noble Lords for raising this issue and assure them that the Government are looking into the questions raised and hope to provide a further update on Report.

I regret that I cannot say much more than that at this stage, to allow the Government to review the matter, but I welcome the continued engagement from across the House, of which this Committee is a part.

I should also like briefly to mention the forthcoming Civil Justice Council review of third-party litigation funding, which was discussed by a number of noble Lords, and to address particularly the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, KC, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, who raised a series of important questions on potential regulation of the market and limits on funders’ returns. As the Committee may be aware, since Second Reading, the Civil Justice Council published its terms of reference for the review on 23 April, which provide further detail on scope and timing. I thank noble Lords for their interest. If any noble Lords have further material they wish to share, I encourage them to contact the Civil Justice Council directly, which will doubtless welcome their contributions and expertise.

With those points addressed, I turn to the amendments. The Bill contains two clauses. Clause 1 amends Section 58AA of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990. Its subsection (2) amends the definition of a damages-based agreement to provide that an agreement

“to the extent that it is a litigation funding agreement … is not a damages-based agreement”

—a DBA. Subsection (3) defines an LFA for the purposes of Section 58AA. Subsection (4) provides that the amendments are to be

“treated as always having had effect”.

The amendment addresses only the Supreme Court’s finding that certain LFAs are DBAs and does not seek to reverse the finding that litigation funders provide claims management services.

The Government have tabled two amendments to this clause. Amendment 1 remedies a perceived gap in the current draft definition of a litigation funding agreement, or LFA. As drafted, the definition of an LFA does not include reference to an agreement to pay the expenses of unrepresented litigants, which may occur where, for example, an unrepresented litigant receives funding for an expert report—a report from a skilled witness. Since the expert would not be providing “advocacy or litigation services” within the meaning of the legislation, an agreement to provide funding in this instance would not qualify as an LFA within the current draft definition.

The Government therefore believe that this should be addressed by bringing a small technical amendment to the Bill. This amendment will ensure that an LFA of the type rendered unenforceable by PACCAR, which is used to fund items of expenditure where the litigant is unrepresented, will be enforceable between the funder and the litigant. This reflects the policy objective of the Bill, which is to restore the position to that which existed before the Supreme Court ruling in July 2023, so that those LFAs of the type affected by the judgment are enforceable.

The second amendment tabled by the Government also addresses an ambiguity in the draft definition of a litigation funding agreement. As currently drafted, the definition of an LFA includes an agreement for

“the payment of costs that the litigant may be required to pay to another person by virtue of a costs order”.

However, there is a legitimate concern whether the expression

“by virtue of a costs order”,

may be interpreted too narrowly, and therefore be a source of litigation around its meaning regarding LFAs which neither specifically fund court or tribunal proceedings or envisage the issue of costs being determined by the court.

This amendment, which is, again, a small technical change, is designed to make it clear that the payment of adverse costs the litigant may be required to pay to another party, which would be funded under an LFA, includes the payment of costs following court, tribunal or arbitration proceedings, or as part of a settlement.

Clause 2 explains the extent, commencement and short title of the Bill, as I specified at Second Reading. I hope that noble Lords, and noble and learned Lords, will support these technical amendments, and I beg to move.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak now because I have tabled the only non-government amendment before the Committee. It is a probing amendment.

The Minister, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, mentioned briefly the discussion about this Bill since the Second Reading debate—mostly in the context of the letter that he and the Secretary of State helpfully circulated—and the publication of the terms of reference for the review. That has been part of a wider discussion, and questions have been asked by a number of briefings. The briefing process for this Bill in relation to members of the public and interested or affected parties has been late; that has been a feature of the discussion, which has centred largely around questions on the need for regulation of the litigation funding market generally and on the issue of retrospectivity for the principal provision of the Bill, which the Minister mentioned.

I hope I will be forgiven for running through some of the arguments that were canvassed at Second Reading, largely in the light of the lateness of the briefings that we have had and the expressions of concern that there have been. A powerful argument has been advanced by some clients of litigation funders. They make the point—I foreshadowed it at Second Reading—that, in an unregulated market, litigation funders can effectively impose their terms on clients. This can mean that successful clients end up with only a very small part of the damages awarded to them, with the litigation funders taking the lion’s share; indeed, in one case that was brought to my attention and that of other noble Lords, funders have been in a position, following a case that they have funded, under their contracts of not only retaining all the damages awarded to the claimants but actively pursuing those claimants—their clients, in effect—for substantial costs that they incurred over and above the damages that were recovered. The clients say that that is most unfair; one can see their point.

The same people point to the DBA regulations—the Damages-Based Agreements Regulations 2013—and say, again with considerable force, that lawyers who enter into DBAs with their clients may not retain for themselves more than a prescribed proportion of the damages awarded, and that such lawyers are bound by other prescriptive regulations as to what they can set for their clients or in the contracts between them and their clients, the litigation funders having the upper hand in any negotiations of such agreements. They ask: why should similar restrictions as are imposed on lawyers in damages-based agreements not be imposed on litigation funders? They also say that, in any event, lawyers are already limited in the terms of what they can agree and are subject to comprehensive professional regulation, whereas litigation funders are not.

Noble Lords may remember that, at Second Reading, I said that, in the absence of regulation, there was

“a bit of a jungle out there”,—[Official Report, 15/4/24; col. 818.]

and that that should not be permitted to persist. Those expressing these concerns call for regulation of the litigation funders’ market generally, the primary purpose being to ensure more of a level playing field between funders and clients and the argument being that, if regulation of DBAs is appropriate for lawyers, why is it not for litigation funders?

As is well known to this Committee, the PACCAR decision gave legal effect to the essentially political argument that litigation funders should be subject to the DBA regulations. As we all know, this was because the Supreme Court decided that, if LFAs did not comply with the DBA regulations, which they generally would not, they would be unenforceable because LFAs involve the provision of case management services.

--- Later in debate ---

Against that background of timings and the view that much of what the noble Lord seeks is foreshadowed by the CJC in its terms of reference, I respectfully submit that his amendment is not necessary and will duplicate efforts, so I urge him not to press it at this stage.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I have seldom had such pleasure in not pressing an amendment. As the noble and learned Lord said, the CJC review is precisely what we were looking for. Having looked at who is concerned and how they will deal with it, I have no doubt at all that it will be thorough, and we have had some very helpful remarks from everybody this afternoon, so I will not press my amendment.

Amendment 1 agreed.

Litigation Funding Agreements (Enforceability) Bill [HL]

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 15th April 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, rather repetitively, I suspect, I too declare an interest as a practising commercial barrister. I agree entirely with the observation of the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, that litigation funding now forms part of the landscape of civil litigation both domestically and internationally.

I also pass on an apology from my noble friend Lady Brinton. She is not just my noble friend, but a non-lawyer, whose contribution would have been very welcome for that reason. Unfortunately, she has had to withdraw from the debate due to a family illness.

Like others, I broadly support the Bill and applaud the speed with which it has been introduced. That is because the unexpected decision of the Supreme Court—unexpected, I say, while hesitating to use the word “surprising” suggested and then withdrawn by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson—in PACCAR has left us in an unsatisfactory position, with nearly all LFAs unenforceable on the basis that they generally do not comply with the DBA regulations applicable to damage-based agreements, as we have heard. The regulations date from 2013.

The Secretary of State’s Written Ministerial Statement of 4 March, announcing the intention to introduce this legislation, made a number of points—points which were also made and expanded upon in opening by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart. The fundamental point made is that:

“Third-party litigation funding enables people to get funding to bring big and complex claims against bigger, better-resourced corporations”


than the claimants, which those claimants

“could not otherwise afford”.—[Official Report, Commons, 4/3/24; col. 31WS.]

I agree that this is the fundamental advantage of LFAs. I also agree with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, that LFAs add to the attractiveness of the United Kingdom as an international centre for commercial litigation and arbitration. It is highly significant that the legal sector brings in, on one estimate, £34 billion a year.

Where I slightly diverge from the Government’s position is where the noble and learned Lord made the point that the sub-postmasters’ claim was possible only with the backing of a litigation funder, without at the same time qualifying that statement by pointing out that the vast majority of the damages in that case went to the litigation funder and the lawyers. For many members of the public, that fact is bordering on the offensive. It is, however, certainly right that the postmasters were able to bring their case to court only because of the availability of litigation funding. I join with others in commending the endeavours of the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, for the postmasters, and the success of those endeavours, for which they owe him a great deal. It was also made absolutely clear in the ITV programme “Mr Bates vs The Post Office” that the availability of litigation funding was crucial.

I also agree with the points made not only by the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, but also by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, as to the magnitude of the risk regularly taken by litigation funders. One of the issues that we need to address, I suggest, is how to consider that risk without that risk and its effects damaging the actual recovery of the claimants in these cases.

The truth, as this debate has exposed, is that unregulated litigation funding leaves us caught in a bit of a jungle out there. We know that the Lord Chancellor shares that view. In his press release, also issued with the MoJ and the Courts & Tribunals Service, he said that the Government were

“considering options for a wider review of the sector and how third-party litigation funding is carried out”,

and it is entirely welcome that he has now initiated the process of such a review. The Minister has explained that the review of the whole litigation funding market has been ordered. That review could consider the need for increased regulation and for safeguards for people bringing claims to court, particularly given the growth of the sector over the last decade. For my part, I do not see why we should be left with uncertainty for long. I completely agree that we need a review, but there are some principles that we may be able to address now and in the later stages of the Bill—not necessarily by amendment, but by discussion and by formulating something approaching a way forward.

The traditional rules against champerty were founded on a distrust of investors, in effect, gambling on other people’s litigation. Despite the growth of litigation funding, the grounds for that distrust have not been entirely extinguished. On the other hand, they have to be balanced against the need to enable access to justice—a point that has been made. That is a need that, I suggest, can be met by a well-regulated and fully functioning system of private sector legal funding alongside a fully functioning legal aid system. I do not share the pessimism of the noble Lord, Lord Trevethin and Oaksey, that there is no future for legal aid. There are a number of areas where LFAs simply cannot replace legal aid; they are not suitable for a great deal of the litigation that used to be handled with the benefit of legal aid, but for which it is no longer available.

A great deal has been made of the 2013 DBA regulations. As the noble Lords, Lord Meston and Lord Trevethin and Oaksey, have reminded us, those regulations did not represent the finest hour of parliamentary draftsmen. Nevertheless, they sought to introduce—and did introduce—some controls and limits on what might be arranged between clients and, generally, their lawyers. That included: a definition of the circumstances in which the funder would be paid; definitions of the reasons for payment being transparent; excluding some classes of claims from such agreements; and, most importantly, limiting the overall percentages of damages that might be payable to funders. Those areas are important, and those regulations and the feelings behind them teach us some lessons. I was interested in the proposals apparently put forward by Nicholas Bacon KC for the proposed new regulations and to hear the description from the noble Lord, Trevethin and Oaksey, of those proposals.

But what we will have now, with this Bill, is no such helpful restrictions. Litigation funders have long argued, for reasons that they plainly find attractive, that the DBA restrictions do not apply to LFAs. That argument was rejected by the majority in the PACCAR case in the Supreme Court—undoubtedly doing, in effect, great damage to the structure of the whole sector in this country—but what we are left with has other weaknesses. Not only are there no limits on the percentages of overall recovery to be received by the funders, but there are no or very limited incentives, in a case in which the client is likely to win, for the funders to hold down the amount of costs and other fees that can be charged to the client’s account and very little control for the clients over the costs to which they might, ultimately, be exposed. That point was not made directly by the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn, but he alluded to similar points about the lack of control for clients over litigation funding.

Because of the requirements in Clause 1(4) that the provisions of the Bill are to be

“treated as always having had effect”,

there is the full retrospectivity alluded to by a number of speakers. That means that the avenues for challenging existing LFAs, where they exist, would probably be largely closed. I understand the Minister’s argument for retrospectivity—that it will restore the status quo pre-PACCAR—but it may, at the same time, undermine potential challenges that might have been made to existing LFAs.

The noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, raised what the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, might have called the “niche issue” about the interesting problem of litigants with overlapping LFAs. I see his point. It remains to be seen whether it would arise in practice.

I agree overwhelmingly with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. The whole issue of retrospectivity and its effect will need to be carefully considered in Committee.

There are tricky areas in this Bill. It is interesting that the Competition Appeal Tribunal has developed a practical and flexible scheme for considering litigation funding agreements in assessing the ability of clients to fund costs of their own and meet potential adverse costs orders. There is much to be said for consideration of that scheme.

It would be wise to consider what amendments, if any, might improve this legislation. The need for regulation seems clear and I suggest that the overall balance of opinion in this Chamber today has been to the same effect.

I have some questions for the Minister about the review. I have no wish to pre-empt it by asking questions and seeking answers that might ultimately prove embarrassing for the Government. It would be interesting to know what areas the noble and learned Lord regards as important for the review to consider. What proposals for regulation would he see as being possible? What type of regulation would he consider to be within the review’s ambit? What limits, if any, would he foresee on the reward of litigation funders and how might they operate? When will we see the terms of reference of any review? Will it be open to consider alternatives to litigation funding, as has been suggested, particularly in cases against the Government where claimants face what has been called the “bottomless purse” of the taxpayer?

Prisons and Probation: Foreign National Offenders

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Wednesday 13th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, prisoners will now be released not 18 days early, but up to 60 days early. No other Government have ever found themselves having to do that on such a scale. It is nearly three times the number of days on licence seen under any previous scheme. I have some questions for the Minister.

How many prisoners have been released early under the scheme to date? Which prisons are using the early release scheme? Which types of offenders are being released early under the scheme? Are domestic abusers and stalkers eligible for release under the scheme? Why has the scheme been expanded to early release of up to 60 days? Why has the scheme been activated indefinitely? Will the Minister commit to publishing all the relevant statistics about the early release scheme on the same basis that prison data is published—that is, on a weekly rather than an annual basis?

The Government tell us that they will free up more spaces in our prisons by cracking down on the number of foreign national offenders taking up space that we can ill afford to spare, when they have no right to be in this country. The Government reported that 4,000 criminals from prison and the community were deported in 2023. This number is significantly lower than the number they inherited in 2010 when the Labour Government left office; 5,383 foreign national offenders were deported back then.

Meanwhile, thousands of foreign national offenders are living in the community post release for several years without being removed. We welcome any improvement the Government intend to make on this poor record. But, if the public are to believe that any of these measures will make the necessary difference, the Secretary of State needs a more credible plan, such as a new returns and enforcement unit with up to 1,000 new staff— more than double the 400 new staff announced.

I turn to the extra spending the Government have announced for the Ministry of Justice in the Budget and in yesterday’s Statement. The Budget—I quote from the Red Book—committed

“£170 million to deliver a justice system fit for the modern era. This includes £55 million for the Family Courts … £100 million into prisons to support rehabilitative activities … and £15 million to introduce digital solutions … in the courts”.

In yesterday’s Statement they mentioned £53 million to extend the bail information service and £22 million for community accommodation. The Statement also mentioned the £155 million per year first mentioned in 2021, three years ago, for the Probation Service. What it did not mention was any extra money for probation, with all this extra work that the Probation Service is likely to inherit as more prisoners are released on licence.

My real question is on the overall budget for justice. The Red Book says in table 2.1 that the department expenditure limits for justice for 2022-23 were £9.3 billion; that is the actual outturn. In 2023-24 it is £10.5 billion, which is the planned outturn, and in 2024-25 it is £10 billion, which means there is £0.5 billion less money for the justice system in the next two-year period. This is a cut. The Government are keen to trumpet their spending increases, but where will these cuts come from in the justice system if the Government are to stick to their budget?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, this 11-page Statement contains a series of self-congratulatory assertions from the MoJ on everything from falling crime, longer sentences, new offences and deporting foreign national offenders to the response to the pandemic. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, has pointed out the weaknesses in some of those assertions. But there is one thing in this Statement that is new. Buried on page 9 is the obscure passage:

“We will also extend the existing end-of-custody supervised licence measure to around 35 to 60 days. We will enable that to happen for a time-limited period and work with the police, prisons and probation leaders to make further adjustments as required”.


What a masterpiece of obfuscation.

On 16 October last, the Government announced their plan to allow up to 18 days’ early release, for a limited period, to meet what they called “acute and exceptional demand”. That period has now been extended indefinitely and, subject to further adjustment in future, to allow for early release between 35 and 60 days before scheduled release dates. This announcement betrays the panic in government that it has simply run out of prison spaces—and the crisis is going to get worse.

We now have a prison population of 88,220 on last Friday’s figures, against a maximum operational capacity of around 85,000 men and 3,300 women. The Daily Telegraph reports that there are just 238 male and 118 women’s places unfilled. Those figures exceed a far lower design capacity of 79,507, less than the MoJ’s certified normal accommodation of 80,000. Furthermore, the few unfilled places are dotted around the prison estate, so prisoners are shuffled from prison to prison, impacting on education and training, community contacts, family visits and relationships with staff and other prisoners. Can the Minister provide figures for the extra prison transfers caused by place shortages since last October’s Statement?

Then we have other harmful measures, such as the use of police cells for holding prisoners in custody. Will the Minister write to us with the statistics for the use of police cells for prisoners since the October Statement? Then there are the temporary prefab extra cells. Will he say what extra facilities for exercise, training, education and even eating have been provided for the increased numbers in the affected prisons? Then there are inevitably unexpected disasters, such as the discovery of radioactive gas at Dartmoor and the enforced closure of 184 cells between November and February.

The 10,000 new places by next year and 20,000 new places long term have been on the table for ages but, even if they all work out, they hardly scratch the surface. Increased sentences and increasing time served, loudly trumpeted in this Statement, serve only to increase the prison population, which is predicted to rise by March 2028 to a central estimate of 105,800, an increase of roughly 17,000. Will the Minister explain the maths?

Five Wells and Fosse Way, with a total capacity of 3,600, are already open and so are included in present capacity. Are they double-counted as part of the 10,000 due this year, mentioned in the Statement? Millsike in Yorkshire will open later this year and will have a capacity of 1,500. As to the remaining 10,000 places, not a brick has been laid and none is likely to be available until some time between 2027 and 2030. Gartree in Leicestershire, with a capacity of 1,700-odd, has outline planning permission but the detail has yet to be approved. Grendon in Buckinghamshire, with a capacity of 1,500-odd, has only just been approved by the Levelling Up Secretary. In Lancashire, the new prison in Chorley for 1,700 is the subject of a planning appeal which has not even commenced.

There was a consultation in 2021 about two possible new prisons at Wethersfield, near Braintree in Essex, but the MoJ says that no decision has yet been taken. Please will the Minister tell us more about the planning progress for these prisons? When is building predicted to commence? When might they open, and with how many places? Where is the budget? Have I left anything out? Again, will he please explain the maths and the figure of 20,000 for the promised new places?

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Stewart of Dirleton) (Con)]

My Lords, in order to respond to the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, it is as well that the House reminds itself of the background against which the Government are acting: the unprecedented circumstances of the Covid pandemic. During that time, extraordinary pressure was placed on our justice system and the Government took certain difficult—but, as it turned out, wise—decisions in relation thereto.

Recognising the importance to our judicial system, to our system of justice, of jury trials, we did not suspend them. Recognising the importance of custody as one of the tools in our penal system, we did not introduce wholesale release of prisoners, as happened in other states, such as France, where 12,000 people were released from prison, I believe. Factor into that the action taken by members of the Bar in relation to their salaries, and we are in a situation where we have unprecedented strain on the system, which the Government are now seeking to work through.

That is the background to the steps that the Government are taking, bearing in mind at all times their principal desire to protect the public and to cut crime by taking dangerous criminals off the streets. That is the Government’s intention, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, in reference to the Statement, quoted the figure of 20,000 additional prison places. The figures are indeed stark, as both noble Lords pointed out to the House. As a result of the factors that I have mentioned, both the remand population and the recall population in prisons in England and Wales have risen.

The Government’s response to this has been to push ahead with a programme amounting to the largest expansion of the prison estate since Victorian times, with 10,000 of the additional places to be delivered by the end of 2025—of which 5,900 have already been delivered. In addition—again, I recognise the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, about facilities for prisoners—short-term measures have been put in place across the prison estate to expand capacity by the equivalent of around 2,000 places since September 2022. That has involved measures that would otherwise be considered undesirable, such as the doubling up of cells and the delay of non-urgent maintenance work, but the point is that these have been taken as temporary measures in relation to these unprecedented circumstances.

Noble Lords from both Front Benches referred to foreign national offenders. As the House has heard, last October, and again with a subsequent announcement this month, a series of measures has been announced to ease the pressure, including deporting more foreign national offenders and moving some lower-level offenders on to supervised licence up to 18 days before their automatic release date. In addition, our Sentencing Bill will help cut reoffending rates by creating a presumption that custodial sentences of less than 12 months will be suspended.

The work the Government will carry out includes tabling an amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill to extend conditional cautions to foreign national offenders with limited leave to remain; amending deportation policy so that foreign national offenders given suspended sentences of six months or more, up from the current 12 months, can be deported; expediting prisoner transfers with priority countries such as Albania, the country with the largest individual component within the 10,000-plus foreign national offenders currently in our prisons; concluding new transfer agreements with partner countries such as Italy; radically changing the way in which foreign national offenders’ cases are processed, creating a new task force and allocating 400 more caseworkers to prioritise these cases and streamline the process of removal.

I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Marks, once again, who referred to the end-of-custody supervised licence provisions. I have a number of observations to make on that. It is clear, in my submission, that further action is needed in the short term, and in order to do that, as the House has heard, there has been a programme to increase the number of days some lower-level offenders could be moved from prison and on to licensed conditions in the community before their automatic release date. As the House has heard, this will be increased to around 35 to 60 days. This will take place for a limited period, again recognising the current extraordinarily acute pressures on the system. We will work with the police, the prisons and probation leaders to made adjustments as they are needed.

I emphasise that this remains a temporary, targeted measure aimed at anyone convicted of serious crimes, such as crimes of a sexual nature. By “serious”, I do not necessarily confine myself to seriousness in terms of sentence; there is seriousness in terms of impact. I am looking also at people convicted of stalking offences and at domestic abuse cases, not just their seriousness to individual victims but to the community at large. These will not be affected, and those who break the rules imposed will face a return to jail.

We are conscious also of the impact our changes may have on probation, so on top of the extra £155 million a year being put into the Probation Service, from April we will reset probation so that practitioners prioritise early engagement, at the point at which offenders are most likely to breach their licence conditions, allowing front-line staff to maximise supervision of the most serious offenders. In many ways, this will simply instrumentalise a process that already happens quite naturally: if a person appears to be making good progress and satisfies those responsible for his management that that is the case, it is right and proper, I submit, that their attention should be focused on persons more in need of support, rather than having support spread out across the full period of somebody’s licence. That, I submit, will permit the maximisation of supervision and the most effective use of resources and time.

Reference was made to the use of police accommodation under a system known as Operation Safeguard, which is a matter of permitting police cells and other accommodation of that nature to be used in order to address acute capacity pressures caused by the barristers’ strike, building upon the pandemic. Across the country, 163 cells were available under Operation Safeguard, and His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service has the authority to activate a further 200. The background to that is in relation to custody of persons being moved from location to location in order to attend court.

Other developments in hand include the rolling out of a national scheme to consider bail applications and to consider the balance as to whether bail or remand is the appropriate disposal in relation to somebody awaiting trial.

A question was posed as to the change in the point of release from 18 days up to between 35 and 60. As the House has heard, a similar scheme was operated in 2007. That scheme was different, and the early ECSL—end-of-custody supervised licence—scheme that is being introduced has a range of safeguards. The scheme operating between 2007 and 2010 released some people straight into the community without any supervision and led to the early release of some prisoners convicted of terror offences. Naturally, it is appropriate that fresh provisions look to such lessons as might be learned from previous schemes, and seek to build upon and correct them. I submit that the ECSL scheme that has been announced is different. Everyone is being moved on to supervised licence with strict conditions, including tags and curfews where necessary. The 2007 to 2010 scheme led to more than 80,000 prisoners being released; by contrast, the ECSL scheme is talking about a small proportion of people who are being moved on to supervised licence. Reflecting the concerns that I know are shared across the House about the impact on victims, complainers in crime who are perhaps affected or concerned by the possibility of release, if they have signed up to the victim contact scheme, they will be notified about an offender’s release where that takes place under the ECSL scheme.

In addition, I will say something about the resources being invested. As I think the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, some 400 probation officers have applied—that exceeds the recruitment target the Government had in place over the years 2020-21 and 2022-23. I submit that that is a significant number. In addition, a sum of £53 million will fund more than 200 new bail information officers who will support the courts in reaching decisions as to bail and remand.

I think mention was made of the bail accommodation scheme, which provides temporary accommodation for individuals released from prison on home detention curfew, and provides a secure community-based alternative to remanding an individual in custody. I can speak from professional experience of the dreadful consequences that can follow from a person being released unexpectedly from custody into liberty where inadequate provisions are made for that person’s readmission into society by way of accommodation and support, or where no steps have been taken to prepare that individual, or to provide for him or her the physical needs of accommodation, food and money.

In those circumstances, each of the buildings in the bail estate houses up to four people, and residents are supported by visits to provide support and to address any wider issues. There is female-only accommodation, supported by CCTV, and funding is available that will be expanded across the remainder of the estate over the next six months.

The overall intention of the Government is to address this backlog that has grown up—this increasing strain on the resources of our criminal justice system—by additional cash, an increase in resources and, by that, an increase in the number of prison places to be made available over the next few years. As I say, the ambition is 10,000 new places—of which 5,900 are already in place—by 2025.

I was asked a number of very specific questions by both noble Lords who have opened for the Front Benches. I am very conscious of the fact that I have not provided detailed, specific, numerical answers to certain of the questions put to me, but officials are in the Box. If noble Lords are content, I will either correspond myself or, more likely, my noble and learned colleague Lord Bellamy, who is the Minister in the Ministry of Justice, will correspond with noble Lords, in an endeavour to give them answers which they will consider satisfactory to the questions they posed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for clarifying certain of the remarks that he made initially and putting them down into two specific questions. I regret to say that they fall within the category of information which I have sought but do not readily have available. So, with the noble Lord’s leave, I will correspond with him on that matter.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, may I clarify one point? First, I am very grateful for the indication that we will have in writing the specific answers to the specific questions we asked, but I make it clear that we regard it as of great importance to clarify the numbers of prison places against the projected increase in the prison population, on the Government’s own figures and in light of the measures that have been introduced, increasing time served and sentences. The significance of that is to test whether the places on tap will be enough to match the increase in the projected prison population. If those answers could be given specifically, I would be very grateful.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I hear what the noble Lord has said. He makes a series of good points and we will write to him on those. I will ensure that those specific matters feature in the letter.

Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 4) Rules 2023

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 6th February 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, in what is plainly a crowded Committee, I shall be brief. The Minister referred to STPIMs. I shall also refer to Part 2 notices, in acknowledgement of the fact that the Explanatory Note uses that phrase, while the Explanatory Memorandum uses the STPIMs formula. I say at the outset that we are delighted to hear that Jonathan Hall KC has been appointed the reviewer of STPIMs. His work in this field is well known and widely admired, and it is very welcome that he is going to take on this burden as well.

The Minister explained the nature of STPIMs and of the conditions on which they are to be implemented, and that this SI in effect amends Part 80 of the CPR to enable rules concerning hearings relating to TPIMs to be applied with all necessary changes to Part 2 notices concerning STPIMs. It is plainly sensible that that should be done. I have read Part 80 and there is no material need for any distinction between the procedures applicable for hearings relating to TPIMs and the new hearings relating to Part 2 notices.

That said, I have a couple of questions. Broadly speaking, this statutory instrument plainly follows the need for a statutory instrument to introduce a procedure for the new orders. This is the right procedure, so we welcome the statutory instrument to that extent. Of course, in a volatile world and volatile conditions relating to terrorism, I cannot at this stage ask the Minister to predict how often STPIMs will be necessary because we cannot tell, but my questions concern the use of the urgent procedure under Schedule 8 to the National Security Act, which provides that the Secretary of State may impose STPIMs in urgent cases without court permission. The Minister referred to court permission being required in the general case. We hope that that is the general case and that it is only cases of real urgency that will give rise to the imposition of these measures.

The schedule gives power for the Secretary of State to impose the measures without permission if he or she thinks that the urgency of the case so requires. In such a case, the Secretary of State must then refer the case to the court for confirmation of the measures after they have been imposed, first for a directions hearing within seven days and then for substantive review. I therefore ask the Minister to indicate, in so far as he is able to do so, how often he would expect the urgent cases procedure to be used as a proportion of the overall number of STPIMs. That is important in the context of orders that have no warning, effectively, whereas when the application for permission is made the person against whom they are going to be made knows something about them.

I also seek an answer from the Minister, as far as he is able to give it, as to how long he would expect confirmation proceedings to take after the directions hearing. We recognise that closed proceedings will very often be involved and that the use of a special advocate, which is envisaged in the Act and the statutory instrument, carries with it its own complications in respect of the late appointment of a special advocate to represent the interests—in so far as he does so—of the person against whom the measures are to be taken. If the Minister can give us some indication of how he would expect a Secretary of State to approach those issues, and how he would expect a court to respond, it would be helpful. Apart from that, we welcome the instrument.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, for introducing this SI. We support it, as we did in the House of Commons. I open by noting the sad irony that the Minister who introduced it in the other place has signalled he will stand down from Parliament in due course. I know he is currently still a Minister, but he is standing down for fears for his personal safety.

Prisons: Suicides

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Wednesday 31st January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the right reverend Prelate for that question. IPP prisoners are a matter of concern to many noble Lords. It remains a priority for the Government that all those on IPP sentences receive the support they need to progress towards safe release from custody. The Government continue to focus on the rehabilitation of IPP prisoners through a refreshed and updated action plan, published in April 2023, providing a robust and effective sentence plan tailored to individual needs and recognising the difficulties, of which the right reverend Prelate is aware, of persons facing a very long period of incarceration and the attendant difficulties that that causes them emotionally.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the House will understand the answers given by the noble and learned Lord in relation to the training of individual officers, but that does not deal with the problem of increasing suicides attributable to really serious staff shortages. Increased numbers of staff have to be taken alongside increasing prisoner populations. So what is being done to improve the detection and diagnosis of mental ill-health of prisoners and, crucially, what steps are being taken to improve or reduce waiting times for psychiatric treatment and placement of prisoners in hospitals where hospital placements are needed for mentally ill prisoners?

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, most prisoners with mental health needs are able to receive the care and treatment that they need within prison. The group to which the noble Lord refers, those with acute problems requiring treatment in hospital, have to be referred, assessed and transferred to hospital under the Mental Health Act. We are determined to ensure that these transfers take place in a timely manner. We are working with health and justice partners and will continue to work to provide a non-statutory independent role designed to improve oversight and to monitor delivery of the 28-day time limit for transfers set out in NHS England’s good practice guidance. There is also a pilot health and justice hub in the north-east of England, improving the way in which courts, health services and prisons work together at local levels better to support those with severe mental illness, with a view to smoothing their pathway into the correct treatment.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Wednesday 27th April 2022 Lords Chamber

Motion A1 (as an amendment to Motion A)

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

Moved by

At end insert “and do propose Amendment 1B in lieu—

1B: Page 2, line 23, at the end insert—“provided that the court should seek to avoid exercising the power under subsection (1)(b) in such a way as to deprive a remedy from any persons who would have been entitled to seek a remedy by reason of the unlawfulness of the impugned act but who had not themselves been party to the application for the quashing order.””

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for the careful and comprehensive way in which he opened this debate. Nevertheless, I regret the fact that the House of Commons rejected our Amendments 1 to 3 on prospective-only quashing orders. However, I greatly welcome the acceptance by the other place of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, removing the presumption that the court must generally exercise the new powers unless it sees good reason not to do so.

That presumption was by far the most offensive part of the Bill. It was rightly opposed across the House by lawyer and non-lawyer Peers alike. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is to be congratulated on the success of the amendment and I am grateful to the Government for accepting it. What we now have is an unfettered judicial discretion, circumscribed only by the requirement to consider the factors listed in Clause 1(8).

I have made it very clear that I oppose prospective-only quashing orders in principle. I do so first on the basis that their effect is to give retrospective validation to actions or decisions previously taken or regulations passed by government that the court finds unlawful and merit a quashing order. They breach the principle that it is for Parliament, not the courts, to change the law.

The second main reason for my opposition to such orders is that they do not protect those disadvantaged by unlawful government action taken before a quashing order takes effect. Where such an order is made, therefore, persons who are not before the court to present their cases are left with no remedy in respect of the unlawful action so they lose out against the well-funded, well-represented litigant who secured the prospective-only quashing order and the Government do not have to remedy the wrong for those affected before that order takes effect. That is a serious breach of the principle that proven wrongs should carry a remedy.

I pointed out on Report that this involves us or may involve us in breaching our international obligations, in particular in environmental cases, under Article 9 of the Aarhus convention, the obligation to provide an adequate and effective remedy to all affected by a breach by public authorities in environmental law, and in ECHR cases under Article 13 to ensure provision of an effective remedy for breach of the convention. I believe those principles outweigh any possible usefulness of the availability of a tool in the judicial toolbox to relieve government of the effects of unlawfulness.

It is said that unlawfulness may have worked to the benefit of some who relied on the law as they erroneously, as it turned out, believed it to be. For such unusual cases, any unfairness can be cured by administrative action or by suspended quashing orders with conditions to which we have not taken objection and/or by changing the law if Parliament sees fit to do so.

That said, the elected House has rejected our amendments, so my amendment in lieu is tabled to bring into sharp focus only the second factor that I have outlined—the lack of a remedy for all those adversely affected by previous government unlawful action if a prospective-only quashing order is made. My amendment in lieu would require the court to seek to avoid making such an order in cases where a person who would have been entitled to seek a remedy because of the unlawfulness in question would be deprived of a remedy by the fact that the quashing order was prospective-only. The amendment would address the point I have been making and would keep us in line with our international obligations.

I would like the Minister to accept it but if he cannot do so, as he indicated from the Dispatch Box in opening, then in line with the confidence that he expressed that it is intended that the courts should exercise the discretion, now thankfully presumption-free, with a view to avoiding the deprivation of a remedy that my amendment seeks to address, I would like to hear that assurance repeated and clarified.

I should add that I have been very grateful to the Minister and to this colleague in the other place, Minister Cartlidge, for engaging with me on this issue in two meetings and to the Bill team for the helpful pack it has put together relating to the principles applied by the Canadian courts addressing the question of prospective-only quashing orders. Those cases in Canada have, of course, persuasive authority in this jurisdiction and it is clear that the Canadian courts have exercised the discretion with great care. They have worked on the basis that before a prospective-only quashing order may be justified, first, the court’s decision on unlawfulness must represent a substantial change in the law and, secondly, the interests of all litigants and potential litigants must be carefully considered and balanced. I point out that without the removal of the presumption, those principles would not be applied in this jurisdiction. They are, however, principles that I endorse and which underlie my amendment in lieu. I await the Minister’s further response with interest.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, may I make one observation about Motion C1, which I am minded to support? It will bring a clear recommendation to Parliament within a year. This seems to be a very strong recommendation for it.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I thank everybody who has spoken in this short debate. I also thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, for the spirit of what they said on the legal aid point. I thank the noble and learned Lord for his helpful suggestion. I am also grateful to the Minister for the way in which he opened this debate and for his careful response. I add my warm thanks for the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, during his time as Minister, and for his engagement with all of us on the Bill and on many others, going back to last year and to what is now the Domestic Abuse Act.

I will not press Motion A1 to the vote. I maintain my opposition to prospective-only quashing orders. I have read and appreciated the contribution of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, to the Times newspaper on this point. I understand his point of view. He puts it as eloquently and as highly as it can be put. Nevertheless, there are two arguments.

At this stage, we should recognise the importance of the Government’s withdrawal of the presumption which would effectively have fettered the discretion of the judges. I will seek leave to withdraw this Motion on the basis of the description of the discretion as given by the Minister. I do so with confidence that the Government will apply the principles applied in the Canadian courts and develop the jurisprudence in a way that secures protection for all parties or potential parties before the courts. I beg leave to withdraw Motion A1.

Motion A1 (as an amendment to Motion A) withdrawn.

Motion A agreed.

Motion B

Moved by

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 22nd November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Berkeley of Knighton (CB)]

I wholeheartedly endorse my noble friend’s amendment, having seen on a couple of occasions interpreters who I seriously thought could barely speak English. Imagine the confusion when the interpreter translated “car” as “cow”. The judge became pretty exasperated at this point. However, there is one obstacle to this that I see. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, mentioned one obstacle, but the other might be that it is very difficult at the moment for courts to find interpreters at all. I seriously worry that there is going to be a shortage of interpreters, although I still feel that we should get the standard up, whatever happens. Perhaps we need to have courses for interpreters with proper qualifications making it a career in which people who could become interpreters could find some sort of vocation.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I have put my name to this amendment for all the reasons put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, in opening. She has campaigned for this change for a long time and has a great deal of knowledge and experience on the subject. We have also heard from the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds, the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and my noble friend Lord Thomas, who still supports this reform despite the success of his experience with the Polish testator. I will therefore add little.

There is an answer to the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, about the availability of interpreters and the need for speed in getting them to court, and by the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley of Knighton, about there being enough registered interpreters. I accept, as I expect would the noble Baroness, that there would be a need to transition the introduction of these proposals and to take steps to ensure that there were enough registered interpreters. We also have to consider the availability of interpretation in the very unusual languages that she mentioned.

This amendment is important. The duty of an interpreter in courts and tribunals is limited and specific. It is a duty to act as a conduit and only as a conduit; accurately to convey the meaning of the court’s proceedings to the non-English speaker; then, if and when that non-English speaker gives evidence, to convey the court’s and counsel’s questions to that non-English speaker; and lastly, and most importantly, to convey the non-English-speaking witness’s evidence to the court. That all demands accuracy, and to provide that accuracy requires a great deal of skill.

However, it is a duty to act as a conduit only, the aim being to overcome the language barrier. It is decidedly not to render assistance of a more general kind to the non-English-speaking participant in legal proceedings, still less to provide some kind of informal independent advice service. Yet, in spite of those very clear principles, many of us who have practised in courts and tribunals have seen how interpreters, often motivated by the best of intentions, can fail in their task. The inadequacies have been extensively and well highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins.

There are two main reasons for such a failure. The first is that some set out to act as interpreters when they lack the necessary linguistic skills and they simply get the translation wrong. Sometimes the inaccuracy is noticed by someone in court who understands and speaks the language concerned who can then ensure that the witness’s meaning is further explored, but on other occasions it is not, and when it is not then injustices occur.

The second problem is that some interpreters overreach themselves. Again, often they are not motivated by an improper wish to intervene in the proceedings with ideas of their own, yet they do precisely that. They discuss evidence with the witness and act as assistants and advisers as well as interpreters. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, pointed out that on some occasions the integrity of the witness and of the proceedings is called into question. That is wrong, and it subverts the proceedings of the court or tribunal concerned. The way in which we must deal with these issues is quite simply by training and minimum standards, and that is exactly what the amendment seeks to achieve.

I add this final point: I hope that, in order to maintain registration, it would be necessary to have adequate programmes of continuing education. Interpretation is a difficult skill that requires specialist and professional training and needs constant maintaining. I hope the Government will bring a positive response to this amendment.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been a very interesting debate and I thank the noble Baroness for moving her amendment; in general terms we support it. The question marks would be about the standards, which she dealt with very fully, whether emergencies could be covered, and the potential costs. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, there needs to be a transition to harmonising and raising standards in general.

I want to pick up a couple of points made by noble Lords. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe expressed surprise that there was not already a common standard and I was surprised as well. He went on to talk about there being written records in courts, but that is not the case in magistrates’ courts; they are not a court of record. As a sitting magistrate, I regularly have interpreters in court. In the 14 years I have been a magistrate I can think of three or four occasions when the magistrate colleagues I have been sitting with have told me that the interpretation was wrong. They knew the language and were able to inform us, and we were able to deal with the situation. But, as other noble Lords have pointed out, that will not always be the case. It is not that unusual for interpretations to be wrong.

I want to make a more serious point, which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, also made, about interpreters overreaching themselves. As I mentioned in an earlier group, I regularly sit in the domestic abuse court and I have done various bits of training on that. One of the points the training makes is that you have to be careful with interpreters and translators when dealing with domestic abuse cases in minority languages. It has been recorded that the interpreters overreach themselves and what the witness or the victim is saying in court will get back to that minority group. It is something that the court needs to be very aware of and handle sensitively to prevent that happening—and it does happen. Nevertheless, in general terms, we support this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

I turn to the question posed by the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, who proposed this amendment, as to the point about obligations under contract regulations, which might tell against her amendment. When procuring services from external suppliers, the Ministry of Justice must comply with the Public Contracts Regulations 2015. By mandating the exclusive use of the NRPSI register, or setting a single qualification standard to cover the vast majority of our requirements, we would likely be in breach of those regulations. They prohibit contracting authorities from artificially narrowing the market and from creating unnecessary barriers to entry to bidding for government contracts, and require specific standards or processes which characterise the services provided by a specific supplier. In mandating the exclusive use of the National Register of Public Service Interpreters, or setting a single qualification standard to cover the vast range of our requirements, the Ministry of Justice would, as I say, likely be in breach of all three public contract regulation requirements and could be subjected to legal challenge from—

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I take it the Minister would accept that legislation could quite easily disapply those regulations in the case of the use of registered interpreters, if that legislation were correctly worded and addressed to do so.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

Hypothetically, yes, but I hesitate to give the noble Lord a definite commitment on that, as my information on these points is substantially in answer to the point raised by the noble Baroness. But, if the noble Lord will permit me, in exploring these important points, I will make sure that the Ministry of Justice writes to him and that there is a meeting with the noble Baroness, as she sought, to discuss with her the future of this amendment. I hope that that answer will satisfy both the noble Baroness and the noble Lord.

Just to continue on that point, it is important to bear in mind that we are reviewing and engaging in consultation with various bodies. But we need to take into account the broad-ranging needs of the Ministry of Justice and to ensure that we have a service appropriate for the wide range of circumstances and the various commissioning bodies to which I have made reference. There are concerns that mandatory NRPSI membership may give unnecessary control over the supply chain, and the police interpretation contract does not require interpreters to be NRPSI registered. We need to complete a full and objective assessment of MoJ needs across the board and not to introduce NRPSI standards when we do not know what impact they might have on the overall justice system.

The Ministry of Justice is looking constantly to improve the service for users and to work collaboratively with interpreter membership organisations and language service providers to ensure that the short, medium and long-term service needs of the criminal justice system are met. Her Majesty’s Courts & Tribunals Service is starting up a language services future pipeline working group, which will focus on the issue of securing suitably qualified interpreters in the long term.

I will develop that point. As the single biggest public sector user of language services, we believe it is important for the Government to encourage new entrants into the interpreting profession and to provide them with appropriate opportunities to build up their experience levels and to maintain standards of excellence. We have an independent quality assurance supplier, which has recently developed a subsidised trainee scheme, encouraging qualification in languages that are in high demand in our courts. We will continue to work with it, and with other organisations, to improve our service and to ensure it provides access to suitably qualified interpreters in the future. The arrangements that we have in place are designed specifically to ensure that our courts and tribunals are supported by high-quality language service interpretation that meets the needs of all our court users, both now and in the future.

I turn now to some of the submissions made by your Lordships in Committee. I fully accept the point made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds on the distinction between translation and interpreting. But on the submission made by the right reverend Prelate and the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Hogan-Howe, I return to the point that there is a wide range of functions which interpreting has to carry out. With the greatest of respect, each of those noble Lords answering on this point predicated their submission on the fact that we were talking about translation at the very highest level—at the most important level of translating a potentially complex criminal trial.

In response to point made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, again I accept that the single function of an interpreter in these circumstances is to act as a conduit by which English may be rendered into a foreign language and the foreign language rendered as accurately as it may be into English in order to assist the court. Again, that is at the very top end of the spectrum. Lower down, in simpler and more straightforward functions that I identified—the most elementary part of the range of needs that I discussed—it may well be that some well-meaning attempt to intervene and to assist, such as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, discussed, might be appropriate. I am thinking of the simple telephone inquiry that I referred to.

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Report stage & Lords Hansard
Wednesday 3rd March 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 8, at end insert—
“(aa) after subsection (1) insert—“(1A) The court may not assume that an offence has a terrorist connection for the purpose of this section unless—(a) the defendant has admitted in person and in open court that the offence has such a terrorist connection, or(b) where the defendant does not make such an admission, the court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt upon a trial of the issue that the offence has a terrorist connection.(1B) A trial held pursuant to subsection (1A)(b) above must be determined by a jury unless the court determines that the interests of justice would be better served by a trial by a judge alone upon evidence admissible in a criminal court.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require a trial of the issue as to whether or not there is a terrorist connection in relation to an aggravated offence.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I argued in Committee that Clause 1 should not stand part of the Bill because it would create a whole raft of new aggravated offences, for which offenders would be sentenced on the basis that the offences had a terrorist connection without the question of whether they had such a connection ever having been tried by a jury or a judge or even tried on the basis of admissible evidence.

For the purpose of Section 69 of the Sentencing Act, which is to be amended by this clause, an offence has a terrorist connection if it is, or takes place in the course of, an act of terrorism or is committed for the purposes of terrorism. The principal point I made in Committee was that the decision that the offence had a terrorist connection was not made by the jury before the offender was convicted but was reserved to the judge at the sentencing stage. A defendant might be convicted by a jury of the basic offence, for which the appropriate penalty might be a short term of imprisonment, but sentenced on the basis of a decision taken by a judge alone, without hearing any evidence, that the offence had a terrorist connection and merited a sentence of a long term of imprisonment. I said then and repeat now that that feature would cut across the principle of our criminal law that no one should be convicted of an offence except upon admissible evidence, open to challenge in a trial and, if in the Crown Court, heard by a jury.

Prior to this Bill, offences with a terrorist connection that would act as an aggravating factor in sentencing comprised a relatively limited range of very serious offences which might often be expected to have a terrorist connection, such as murder, a number of explosives offences, hijacking, hostage-taking and serious aviation offences. They were listed in Schedule 2 to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 and would all normally merit long terms of imprisonment.

For that reason, the effect of aggravating the sentence was less objectionable than it is to be as a result of Clause 1 of this Bill. That is because this Bill broadens the range of offences that may be treated as aggravated by a terrorist connection to include any offence that carries a sentence of imprisonment of more than two years. An offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, for example, carries a maximum sentence of seven years’ imprisonment, even though the violence involved can be relatively minor and the harm caused can be restricted to bruising or pulled muscles. The basic offence might merit a fine or a short term of imprisonment, but the offence committed with a terrorist connection might attract the maximum sentence. While the offender’s guilt of the basic offence would be determined by a jury, the terrorist connection would be a matter for the judge alone at the sentencing stage.

The finding that an offence has a terrorist connection does not simply increase the likely sentence; it also has the effect of activating the notification requirements for terrorist offences, thus classing the offender as a terrorist, with lifelong consequences, and the further effect of activating a number of forfeiture provisions. In addition, the increased sentence is subject to the restriction on early release under the so-called TORA Act, the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020 that we passed as emergency legislation last year. Not only would the sentence be longer, but the proportion served in custody would be greater. In short, the consequences of a finding of a terrorist connection are devastating for the offender.

It was the fact that those consequences could be imposed without a trial of the fact of the terrorist connection that led us in Committee to oppose Clause 1 standing part of the Bill, despite our complete acceptance of the central proposition of this Bill that terrorist offences call to be treated with the greatest severity, for the protection of the public as well as the punishment of the offenders.

Amendment 1 is far more targeted than the opposition to the clause standing part. I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, and the noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General for discussing this amendment with me at a meeting yesterday. Importantly, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, reminded us that in Scotland the different charging arrangements and arrangements for jury verdicts would enable verdicts to be given making it clear whether a terrorist connection was proved or not.

Not being a Scottish or Northern Irish lawyer, I had not attempted to formulate amendments that would apply in Scotland and Northern Ireland. At the suggestion of the Public Bill Office, I have confined my amendment to England and Wales in the hope that, if it is agreed, the Government will draft and bring back suitable amendments for Scotland and Northern Ireland. However, it is to be noted that Section 31 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, which applies to Scotland and is also to be amended by this Bill—although not materially for this purpose—requires that, before an offender in Scotland can be sentenced for the aggravated offence,

“(a) it is libelled in an indictment, and


(b) proved”.


Only then does the court take into account the aggravation of the offence. This was, no doubt, what the noble and learned Lord had in mind, proving once again to this Englishman how often Scotland is more enlightened than England and Wales on justice issues.

In the short debate in Committee on 26 January, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford raised the possibility of a Newton hearing—a hearing to determine a question of fact relevant to sentence—as a way of determining whether an offence had the necessary terrorist connection to justify treating it as aggravated. That point was also hinted at by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton.

The applicable legislation does not provide for such a hearing. Section 30 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 provides only that the court must determine whether the offence has or may have a terrorist connection. Under subsection (3):

“For that purpose the court may hear evidence, and must take account of any representations made by the prosecution and the defence, as in the case of any other matter relevant for the purposes of sentence.”


That provision is entirely unsatisfactory for the wide range of aggravated offences now proposed, many of them not of the greatest seriousness in the absence of the aggravating factor.

Our amendment would require that before an offence is taken to have a terrorist connection, either the defendant must admit

“in person and in open court that the offence has such a … connection”

—in much the same way as a plea of guilty would entitle the court to pass sentence—or there must be a trial of the issue. That trial would be by a jury

“unless the court determines that the interests of justice would be better served by a trial by a judge alone”.

At the trial of the issue, evidence admissible in a criminal court would be adduced and the court could proceed on the basis that the offence had a terrorist connection only if satisfied of that fact beyond reasonable doubt.

I suggest that this amendment strikes a proper and important balance between the public interest in securing severe punishment for offences with a proved terrorist connection and the public interest—also of great significance—in ensuring that sentences are imposed for offences that are properly proved before the court upon admissible evidence. That is the way our criminal law has generally proceeded, and that is the way it should proceed. I will wish to test the opinion of the House if the Government do not accept the amendment. I also wish to record the fact that I would like my voice to be heard when the voices are counted. I beg to move.

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP) [V]]

My Lords, I strongly support the Bill, and welcome its extension to Northern Ireland. It is absolutely right that we have a unified approach to the sentencing and release of offenders across our United Kingdom. Although I share the desire expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, to uphold the principles of our criminal justice system and defend everyone’s right to a fair trial, I believe that the concerns underlying Amendment 1 have been overstated.

At present the courts are expressly required to consider whether there is a terrorist connection at the point of sentencing, for a defined list of non-terrorism offences. Clause 1 would extend that requirement to all non-terrorism offences with a maximum penalty of more than two years. Importantly, for the aggravating factor to be applied, the offence would have to be committed in the course of an act of terrorism or for the purposes of terrorism. I see no compelling argument that consideration of those issues at the point of sentencing represents a disproportionate burden on a defendant or restricts their rights. Judges already have discretion in many cases, including for the offence of murder, to increase or reduce a sentence in accordance with their view of the evidence.

The key factor in this case, therefore, is the need for effective guidance relating to the threshold for an aggravated offence, and its fair application. Only if there is enough evidence to satisfy the criminal standard of proof that there is a terrorism connection should the judge apply an aggravation. We have to remember, especially in an ever more digital and connected world, that terrorist offending can take many forms, so it is appropriate that the range of routine offences that can come under the scope of counterterrorism legislation is being extended. Ultimately, this process will help identify offenders who might otherwise have fallen through the cracks, and will ensure that they are registered, monitored and subject to notification requirements.

I make these points not because I am not committed to due process, or to respecting the fundamental rights of defendants, but because I believe that we must take a strong but balanced approach to enhanced sentencing and release provisions in such hearings.

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[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who spoke in this short debate. The amendment would require a trial of the issue as to whether there is a terrorist connection to an aggravated offence. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for the way in which he set out his amendment, but I am afraid we feel that it would represent a fundamental departure from existing processes—a significant divergence from practice within the wider criminal justice system—and it is therefore not an amendment that the Government consider necessary or appropriate.

It may be helpful if I first briefly recapitulate why the Government are making the changes that we propose in the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord McCrea, gave a good summary. Clause 1 will expressly require the courts, in cases where it appears that any non-terrorism offence with a maximum penalty of more than two years was committed in the course of an act of terrorism, or for the purposes of terrorism, actively to consider whether the offence was committed with a terrorist connection and should be aggravated as such. At present only specified offences can be so considered. Closing this loophole will make for more effective and flexible legislation, reflecting the fact that terrorist offending takes a wide variety of forms.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, gave some examples of offences that are and are not covered. It might be helpful to include further examples. Various offences under the Firearms Act 1968 are not currently covered, including possessing a firearm with an intent to endanger life; as are offences under the Criminal Damage Act 1971, including destroying or damaging property with an intent to endanger life, and arson. There are many more, but I hope that provides an illustration of some of the offences that we think ought to be considered, if needed.

These changes will also ensure that the consequences of a terrorist connection are applied consistently to all offenders. The identification of a terrorist connection by the courts has a wide-ranging impact, as the noble Lord noted. It must be treated as an aggravating factor when sentencing, helping to ensure that terrorist offenders receive punishment befitting the severity of their offending and the risk that they pose to public safety. It will also result in offenders being subject to the registered terrorist offender notification requirements following their release from prison, which supports the police to manage their risk more effectively.

Finally, under the Bill, these offenders will be subject to a minimum of 12 months on licence following their release and will be eligible to have certain licence conditions imposed on them to assist in the effective management of their risk. I emphasise that both the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, and the Crown Prosecution Service expressed their strong support for this change. In fact, Mr Hall stated in his oral evidence to the Public Bill Committee in another place that this change, out of all the measures in the Bill, would make the most substantial difference to public safety.

Having set out the background, I will address the substance of the noble Lord’s amendment, which proposes a significant change to the process by which the courts in England and Wales, and in Northern Ireland, determine a terrorist connection at the point of sentencing. This process is well-established, having been in successful operation for more than a decade since the provisions of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 came into force. It is also consistent with the wider criminal justice system.

Under the existing process, courts are required to apply the criminal standard of proof—beyond reasonable doubt—when determining whether an offence has a terrorist connection. The court will make this determination on the basis of the usual information before it for the purposes of sentencing—that is, the trial evidence or evidence heard at a Newton hearing, if necessary, following a guilty plea—and take into account any representations by the prosecution or defence, as well as any evidence heard.

Furthermore, in England and Wales, and in Northern Ireland, it is the standard approach for the judge, rather than the jury, to determine the presence of aggravating factors as part of the sentencing function. To provide one example, Section 66 of the Sentencing Act 2020 requires the court to aggravate a sentence for an offence if it was motivated by hostility based on certain protected characteristics, such as race or sexual orientation. The judge will determine such a finding as part of the sentencing. The terrorist connection provision works in exactly the same way. This very issue was debated by your Lordships’ House in 2008, when the terrorist connection provisions were first enacted. It was concluded then that the existing process is appropriate and the reasons that I will now outline still stand.

During the passage of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, the then Government set out that, as part of their consultation on that Bill, they considered whether the determination of a terrorist connection should be made by the jury, rather than the judge at sentencing. That included discussing the option with experienced prosecutors in this area. It was concluded, however, that there were significant practical issues in taking that approach. For example, having to prove the terrorist connection as part of the trial would lead to lengthy diversions, were the defence to argue that the action of the suspect did not fall within the definition of terrorism. Such an approach would divert the prosecution from its primary aim to secure swift justice for the substantive offence—that is to say, securing a conviction or freeing the individual on trial—and would unnecessarily create significantly longer terrorism trials.

Alternatively, if the jury were to be responsible for determining whether there was a terrorist connection as part of a sentencing exercise after the trial, it would have to be summoned to make such a determination following a guilty plea. This would be entirely novel and run counter to well-established sentencing procedure. We therefore strongly believe that it would not be right to put it in the Bill. It was concluded then, as we maintain now, that sentencing is properly a function for the judge.

That is why the Government cannot accept the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Marks: it would impose unusual requirements on the finding of a terrorist connection, deviate significantly from well-established practice and, in doing so, put that process out of kilter with the courts’ considerations of other similar aggravating factors. The current system provides adequate safeguards against the erroneous finding of a terrorist connection. A judge who has determined that the offence was committed with a terrorist connection is required to state in open court that that is the case. That determination is capable of being appealed to the Court of Appeal. For the reasons outlined, despite the noble Lord being minded to do otherwise, I hope that he will see fit to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I heard what the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, said, and he seemed to accept that the aggravating factor should be proved to a court, on admissible evidence, to the criminal standard of proof. He did not answer the point that there ought to be a trial of the issue.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, had sympathy for the principles behind our amendment. He preferred the idea of a Newton hearing before a judge to the possibility of jury trial to determine a terrorist connection. That is a compromise position that is allowed for in my amendment, where the interests of justice require that there should not be a jury trial. The important thing is that this issue should be tried on evidence, not simply permission for there to be evidence, if the judge deciding the issue decides to have evidence; or, otherwise, that the court must listen to representations—that is submissions, which are necessarily partial.

The reason our amendment is framed in the way it is is that we believe in trial by jury. Since the aggravation of having a terrorist connection changes the whole nature of the offence, to have that issue tried by jury is, we say, consonant with our way of doing criminal justice and consonant with the way we have always conducted criminal trials.

The Minister suggested that this amendment represented a significant divergence from the criminal justice system. Most of his speech was, with respect, devoted to establishing that point. However, the Bill and much of the counterterrorist legislation of the last few years have involved such divergence. What is unique about the Bill is that the aggravating factor can raise a pretty commonplace offence into an offence of terrorism, with very severe consequences. I have heard nothing to answer the point that establishing that terrorist connection in a trial, on admissible evidence, before a jury or, in suitable cases, a judge, should be the way to proceed.

Nothing that I have heard from the Minister or the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, allowed for the possibility that an offender guilty of only the basic offence, but not guilty of committing an offence with a terrorist connection, would nevertheless be sentenced following a judge who heard only representations on the basis of the aggravated offence, with all the consequences that that would have. That is what runs counter to our criminal justice system.

Our point is limited and principled. The Government have made no concession to our principle at all. We say that there has to be a trial of the issue, not at the same time as the trial of the basic offence, but afterwards. To establish that principle, I wish to test the opinion of the House and have my voice heard when the voices are counted.

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[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I should like at the outset to acknowledge the assistance that I have received from the Bingham Centre in preparing the amendment and the courtesy of Ministers in this House and their staff in discussing it. I will briefly give my reasons for the amendment.

First, I am clear in my belief, which is shared by many others, that some men and women imprisoned for terrorist offences—I repeat, some—represent a threat to public safety and national security beyond the length of their sentences, and that the consequences of that risk may be the death of innocent citizens. Some examples of such people can easily be identified and are well known, but it is clear that others who present such a risk are much more difficult to identify.

It is to be noted that the recidivism rate for terrorist offences is extremely low compared with that for most other offences—under 3%, on the most recent figure that I have seen—and that a fraction of the recidivism rate therefore applies to terrorist offences. Their recidivism rate is a fraction of that for other offences, including serious offences such as armed robbery. So far, at least, projects in prisons to achieve deradicalisation or even recognition of the wrongness of the acts taken as radicals have been difficult to assess. It is extremely difficult to know whether prisoners are deradicalised and such efforts to assess prisoners have suffered significant failures. The room for erroneous judgments is high. I shall give only one of several examples, that of Usman Khan, the Fishmongers’ Hall terrorist.

As part of the effort to identify whether prisoners remain a serious risk to the public, I support the use of polygraphs but only as one instrument of assessment—one component only in such determinations. It has been proved in other areas—for example, in relation to sexual offences and in the context of some immigration matters—that polygraphs can provide useful corroboration, though one should be careful not to use them as primary evidence.

A great deal of work has been done to enable terrorist prisoners to be assessed because it is known that, to date, the evidential analysis of such prisoners has proved fragile. It has been extremely difficult to assess the threat that they may present on release. Where has most of the work been done in relation to making judgments about such prisoners? I emphasise that we are talking about judgments. It has been done by the Parole Board and it is about its potential role that I am mainly speaking.

The Parole Board in its ordinary duties deals at present with people who have been sentenced for terrorist offences and, indeed, with prisoners who have become radicalised in prison, though not sentenced for terrorist offences. To deal with that, the Parole Board embarked on an extensive and detailed training programme so that its members—chairs and lay members—could fulfil empirically their existing role with that cohort of prisoners. The board is recognised as offering a fair procedure that is legal and justiciable in a way that is familiar to prisoners and their legal advisers, and is understandable to commentators and us parliamentarians.

I have met the argument that it would be a mistake to extend the role of the Parole Board beyond its present functions. However, given what I have said about the training that it has given to its members in relation to terrorism offences, and looking at what the board does in a more rounded way, I suggest that it is entirely fitted to have its range of responsibilities broadened to deal with wider issues. They could properly include a possible extension of sentences within appropriate statutory limits. Those decisions may not be made by the Parole Board if the Government or others do not find that acceptable, although, in my view, the board is well suited to making such decisions about the possible extension of sentences. For example, it could refer certain cases to the Court of Appeal Criminal Division or the Senior Presiding Judge for England and Wales, so that if a sentence was to be extended beyond its temporal determination, that could be done by a senior judge or judges.

Given the very serious risk posed by a small percentage of terrorist prisoners, there is a danger that the majority who have been reformed may become the victims of the 3% or so who are unreformed. That should be avoided if at all possible, for I am sure that we would agree that what may seem like a failure to recognise that a prisoner truly is reformed and remorseful may create the very opposite effect and leave them to become reradicalised.

The aim of my amendment is to attempt to persuade Her Majesty’s Government to change the architecture of the process of extended sentences in relation to terrorism offences. I accept that the amendment does not complete the task, which is why I will not press it to a Division. However, I hope that it will be possible to discuss this matter further with Ministers before we reach the end of the procedures of the Bill.

I suggest that the changed architecture, as I have called it, should allow, first, the sentencing judge to inform and warn a defendant at the time of sentence—no ifs, no buts—that at the time when otherwise they may or should be released, they will be subject to assessment by the Parole Board and that that assessment will be based on whether they represent a serious and continuing risk to the public. It should be clearly said by the judge at the time of sentencing in accordance with the discretion of judges, who as has been said earlier, not least by the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, are used to dealing with sentencing scenarios.

Further, I suggest that the changed architecture should allow the following: if a prisoner presents a serious and continuing risk to the public, the ensuing procedure, founded on comprehensive evidence from both sides, as happens at Parole Board hearings, could result in the sentence being extended further, and possibly on more than one occasion. In my view, such an architecture would provide for a fair process that is clearly understood by a prisoner at the time he or she is sentenced. I suggest, therefore, that such a procedure would be fairer and certainly more capable of review before the courts, and safer for the small cohort of very dangerous prisoners envisaged by this Bill.

I also invite the Minister to confirm in his reply that the Parole Board has been consulted about any additional roles it might take, either along the lines that I have described or in the general context of this Bill. I would, as I have said, welcome further discussions with Ministers.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]]

My Lords, it is a great privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, particularly given his deep and long experience in counterterrorism and the legislation in this area, along with his wide experience of the workings of the Parole Board.

Clause 27 was the subject of considerable controversy in Committee because as it stands, it would remove the role of the Parole Board from the determination of whether, and at what stage, a terrorist offender should be released from custody. Without wishing to repeat the arguments that were canvassed in the debate on the clause at that stage, many of us felt then and continue to feel strongly that the Parole Board has had, and should continue to have, an important part to play in determining whether and at what stage even dangerous terrorist offenders should be released on licence.

The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, refers to prisoners who are serving extended sentences and applies after they have completed their custodial term, thus changing the architecture of extended sentences, as he has put it. Such prisoners’ release would be contemplated only after the custodial term, at which stage their cases would be referred to the Parole Board for consideration, as they then would on every further anniversary of the completion of that custodial term.

As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has explained, before the board could direct release, it would have to be satisfied that two important conditions had been met: first, the prisoner did not represent a grave risk to the public, and secondly, it was no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined. We would have preferred that the amendment went further and applied more widely for the reasons that we expressed in Committee, but we regard the work of the Parole Board, whose members are specialists in the field, as extremely valuable. We are firmly of the view that a full hearing before the Parole Board is the best way to determine whether a prisoner should be released after a suitable minimum custodial term, having regard to the elimination of the threat that the prisoner posed to public safety and to such progress as might have been made in the prisoner’s deradicalisation, rehabilitation and reform.

I should emphasise that throughout our approach to this Bill, we have maintained the position that hope of rehabilitation should always be part of the process of punishment, even in severe terrorist cases, and that sentences which offer no hope are counterproductive. We recognise that all prisoners are likely to be released one day and that rehabilitation is more achievable in the context of a release on licence than it is in the context of continued incarceration. That is a position that was rightly taken and recognised by the experts who briefed a number of Peers at the Joint Extremism Unit drop-in session that was arranged for us by the Ministry of Justice. Those who attended found it to be interesting and informative, and we are all very grateful. For my part, however, I confess to remaining perplexed that the Government have decided to cut the role of the Parole Board in the way set out in Clause 27. This amendment would reduce the impact of that particular cutting axe, and I therefore support it.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, Amendment 2 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, sets out an alternative possible architecture for assessing terrorists and the possibility of extending sentences. In speaking to the amendment, the noble Lord and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, expressed their faith in the Parole Board and the view that it should play a much fuller role in assessing terrorist prisoners who are coming towards the end of their sentences. I too joined in the very useful expert panel held last week with presentations from Home Office experts as well as senior psychologists who have an overview of this work.

The probation service itself employs around 350 psychologists, some of whom are specialists in this work. The message I got from that meeting last week is that it is very complicated work and there is no guarantee of success. However, that does not mean that there should not be efforts—indeed, very strenuous efforts—made to try to rehabilitate these offenders.

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Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

12: After Clause 31, insert the following new Clause—
“Review of sections 1 to 31
(1) The Secretary of State must arrange for an independent review of the impact of sections 1 to 31 of this Act to be carried out in relation to the initial one-year period.(2) The Secretary of State must, after consultation with the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, appoint a person with professional experience relating to imprisonment for offences of terrorism to conduct the review.(3) The review under subsection (1) must consider but is not limited to considering any evidence as to any effects of this Act—(a) by the imposition of longer prison sentences upon the reform or rehabilitation of those offenders on whom they are imposed;(b) upon the reform or rehabilitation of those offenders required to serve a greater proportion of their sentences in prison and a correspondingly smaller proportion on licence; (c) upon the radicalisation of prisoners other than those upon whom longer prison sentences are imposed or who are required to serve a greater proportion of their sentences in prison;(d) on the degree to which those prisoners upon whom a serious terrorist sentence is imposed are segregated from other prisoners.(4) The review must be completed as soon as practicable after the end of the initial one-year period.(5) As soon as practicable after a person has carried out the review in relation to a particular period, the person must—(a) produce a report of the outcome of the review, and(b) send a copy of the report to the Secretary of State.(6) The Secretary of State must lay before each House of Parliament a copy of the report under subsection (5)(b) within one month of receiving the report.(7) In this section, “initial one-year period” means the period of one year beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.”Member’s explanatory statement
This Clause would require an independent review of the impact of sections 1 to 31 of the Act after one year, with particular attention to radicalisation in prisons and the effects of longer periods of imprisonment on reform and rehabilitation and radicalisation in prisons and of segregating serious terrorist offenders.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]]

My Lords, Amendment 12 echoes the amendment calling for a review which we proposed in Committee. The purpose of the amendment is to enable the noble and learned Lord—or another Minister—to update the House on the Government’s proposals for reviewing the impact of the first 31 sections of this Act, as it will then be. During my speech in Committee, I spent some time setting out in detail why we contend that the review called for by our amendment is necessary. I will not trespass for long on the House’s time this afternoon.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee will speak to Amendment 13, in the name of my noble friend Lord Paddick, about polygraphs. We broadly support Amendment 24 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Amendment 25 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb.

We are concerned, first, to ensure that the Government keep under review and report on the impact on prisoners of longer terms of imprisonment and consequently proportionately shorter periods on licence. To answer a point made in Committee on behalf of the Government, in our view it is not premature to ask for such a review at an early stage. It is not necessary to await the release of such prisoners in many years to come before reviewing the working of this part of the Bill. The impact of very long sentences on, for example, prisoners’ behaviour in prison—a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede—their prospects of rehabilitation and their continued contact with their families and friends outside prison can be assessed from an early stage.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, I assure the noble Baroness that that suggestion has lodged in my skull and will have been noted by others, and we will come back to it in due course. On her specific question on whether the post-legislative scrutiny of the Bill is distinct from the review of polygraph testing, I am happy to confirm that that is the case.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]]

My Lords, this has been a helpful debate as it has moved forward the process of keeping these new provisions under parliamentary scrutiny. I am very grateful, as I expect all noble Lords are, to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, for the comprehensive and careful way in which he set out the work of evaluation and research into the evidence concerning the treatment and punishment of terrorist offenders, and the arrangements for them within the prison estate.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, expressed the need for constant review. She warned us of the possible dangers of long-term imprisonment and the risk of radicalisation. As well as making a number of points and raising questions about polygraphs, my noble friend Lady Hamwee stressed the distinction between the “talk tough” language of the Government and the more considered, balanced and careful language of officials and Ministers that we hear in private. My noble friend called it “nuanced”. I add that the careful and cautious language she spoke of is also the language of nearly all the professionals in the system to whom we speak, be they in the Prison Service, probation service, inspectorates or elsewhere.

The important point is that longer sentences, while they may be necessary, are neither the only answer nor a complete answer. The “talk tougher” approach, leapt upon with enthusiasm by the press, has struck many of us as having had too little consideration. In his response, the Minister demonstrated that he certainly is determined to take an evidence-based and cautious approach to the issues raised by the Bill, including polygraph testing.

I accept the Minister’s point that the inclusion of these amendments in the Bill is not essential to provide that the work, which he described to us in some detail, is consistently explained to parliamentarians in both Houses. The important point about reviews, which I invite him and others to bear in mind—though not to lodge in their skulls—is that reviews which report to Parliament enable noble Lords here and MPs in the other place to consider and weigh up the evidence as it becomes available.

The Minister was completely right that there is no simple cure, but it is an important part of the role of Parliament to consider the evidence as it develops. The Bill puts before us a set of new and radical measures of particular severity. They need to be kept under constant attention. On the basis that they will get that attention because of work done by the Government and promulgated to Parliament, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 12 withdrawn.

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments & Ping Pong (Hansard) & Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 19th November 2020 Lords Chamber

The noble and learned Lord has done so much for us; the key thing from this side of the House’s point of view is that our quality as a country in this area should continue. There is no politics in this; it is just about getting the right result. I hope that he will reflect and give some assurances that might make the position easier.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I add my welcome of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, to his place in taking over this technical but difficult Bill, one that raises issues of principle.

I welcome the government amendments, which have the power to act as safeguards on the power reinserted into the Bill by the Commons amendments. I agree with the summary by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, of the Government’s amendments as sensible and constructive. But I share the disappointment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, that the Commons amendments reinstate the delegated power that this House so comprehensively rejected.

I also agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, that outlawing the power to create offences punishable by imprisonment is of particular importance. I welcome the fact that the principle of a sunset clause has been accepted, although, for all the reasons mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, it should be meaningful and not liable to be endlessly renewed. It is also important that the Government have introduced a requirement for consultation before regulations are made. On that, in particular, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for the time he and the Bill team have spent with me and others discussing the government amendments to the Commons amendments and considering suggested changes.

For my part, I support the amendment on the sunset clause in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, for all the reasons he gave. I understand the Government’s concern to ensure that there is sufficient time to bring new private international law agreements into UK law, and I accept that there may possibly, on occasion, be a need for more than five years to achieve that. However, I simply cannot see the need for further extensions beyond 10 years. It is in the nature of these international agreements that they take a long time to be finalised. However, the point about the first five years is that there are a number of international agreements, notably the Lugano Convention 2007, to which the Government wish to accede, which may need to be brought into law in the reasonably short term, and there are others on the horizon that may need more than five years. The problem with allowing for extensions beyond 10 years—that is, more than one extension—is that such a long sunset period may involve permitting the Government to implement in the UK international agreements that are currently unforeseen and unforeseeable. It was partly to address that issue that this House took the view that primary legislation should be required before implementing such agreements in domestic law.

I appreciate that this issue is addressed, in part at least, by the requirement for consultation before regulations are made implementing further private international law agreements. That requirement is, indeed, a welcome safeguard. My amendment to government Amendment 4B is designed to ensure that such consultations are both objective and impartial and seen to be so. The shortcoming of the present proposal is that the choice of those to be consulted lies entirely, in England and Wales, with the Secretary of State and, in Scotland and Northern Ireland, with Scottish Ministers, the relevant Northern Ireland department or the Secretary of State acting with their consent. That means that the power to choose who is to be consulted lies entirely with the Executive.

Of course, we accept that many Ministers can be confidently relied on to exercise that power dispassionately, but that confidence cannot always be assumed, and it has not always been justified by Secretaries of State. The change in the role of the Lord Chancellor may also have had an impact. I understand the Government’s concern to ensure that there is flexibility in the choice of those to be consulted. It goes without saying that, for example, a convention concerned with family law matters may call for different experts to be consulted than would a convention concerned with commercial law or contractual matters. That is why my amendment does not seek to impose on the Secretary of State a list of those who must be consulted. It lies behind what the noble and learned Lord said about the Government’s reasons for not setting out such a list, but I and others are also concerned to ensure not only that the choice of those to be consulted is clearly objective, impartial and apolitical but that the organisation, management and follow-up of the consultations are thorough and meaningful.

Accordingly, I understood the noble and learned Lord to be offering, on behalf of the Government, assurances to the House in that connection. I invite him to confirm, first, that consultation on the implementation of a private international law agreement will generally be in public, and that the Government will announce their intention to consult and invite people to offer their views. Secondly, will he confirm that if the Government decide that such a consultation will not be in public they will publicly explain that decision and the reasons behind it? Thirdly, will he confirm that the Government will report on the outcome of such consultations, if not in a separate report, then, as he envisaged, in or in a document accompanying the Explanatory Memorandum that comes with any proposed regulations made under the powers in the Bill? Finally, I understood the Minister to be offering an undertaking, which I ask him to confirm, to ensure that the explanations in or accompanying such explanatory memoranda will be thorough and detailed, setting out whom the Government have consulted and a fair and balanced summary of the views expressed in any such consultation.

Such assurances and undertakings, if confirmed in the terms I have set out, would offer reassurance to those of us who are concerned that all such consultations will be the genuine safeguards we need them to be. I beg to move.

[The Deputy Speaker (The Earl of Kinnoull) (Non-Afl)]

The following Members in the Chamber have indicated that they wish to speak: the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Berkeley. I therefore call the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.