Wednesday 27th April 2022
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberJudicial Review and Courts Act 2022 View all Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 151-I Marshalled list for Consideration of Commons Amendment and Reasons - (27 Apr 2022)
16:58 - Division on Motion C1 - Ayes: 219 / Noes: 229 - Motion C1 (as an amendment to Motion C) disagreed.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton
That this House do not insist on its Amendments 1, 2 and 3, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reasons 1A, 2A and 3A.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Stewart of Dirleton) (Con)
My Lords, with the leave of the House, in moving Motion A, I will also speak to Motions B and C. A number of changes were made to this Bill in the House of Commons. I will cover both those changes and the amendments tabled to the Bill today.
Turning first to the Motions on judicial review, the Government have listened to the varied concerns, and the Bill that returns to us puts forward a compromise. The presumption, which was the issue of most concern to your Lordships, is gone, making use of the new remedies entirely discretionary. However, the other changes that your Lordships made to the JR measures, such as removing the ability to limit the retrospective effect of quashing orders and addressing the judgment in the Eba and Cart cases, have been undone in the other place. I will therefore set out again the Government’s reasoning for these measures.
Starting with prospective-only quashing, the aim of Clause 1 is to provide courts with flexibility in remedies, allowing them to respond effectively to the case before them. Conventional retrospective quashing can be a blunt tool, which sometimes does not allow complex circumstances adequately to be addressed in a remedy. My noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and others have already set out persuasively circumstances where limiting or removing the retrospective effect of a quashing order would be in the interests of justice. The counter-arguments, I submit, have not really disputed this, but rather raised hypothetical circumstances where such a remedy would likely be inappropriate.
My view is that we should trust our courts to determine when these powers should and should not be used, with help from the skilled advocates who appear before them, who will no doubt address remedies when they make submissions. That there are circumstances where they would not be appropriate is an argument against this power only if you do not trust courts to use it properly.
We have substantial evidence that judges can and do use these remedies to good effect. Canada, another common-law jurisdiction, has made use of these remedies for decades. There, a court will use such a remedy if its ruling involves a substantial change in the law and if issuing a suspended or prospective order will not be unfair to the plaintiffs. Canadian jurisprudence shows a nuanced approach where fairness and harm are consistently considered alongside other factors, such as the proper remit of the court and separation of powers. For example, in the Canadian Supreme Court case of Hislop, the court said:
“The key question becomes the nature and effect of the legal change at issue in order to determine whether a prospective remedy is appropriate. The legitimacy of its use turns on the answer to this question.”
After considering various factors, it went on to say:
“They may include reasonable or in good faith reliance by governments … or the fairness of the limitation of the retroactivity of the remedy to the litigants.”
Finally, the court considered the effects on others, aside from the litigants, drawing on an earlier judgment in the case of Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v New Brunswick in which the court held that taxes collected pursuant to an ultra vires regulation are recoverable by the taxpayer. A similar question was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, at an earlier stage of this Bill. The Supreme Court of Canada’s view was expressed trenchantly:
“Where the government has collected taxes in violation of the Constitution, there can be only one possible remedy: restitution to the taxpayer.”
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, I have listened to submissions from your Lordships in the course of this short debate at the ping-pong stage. I think the House and those who spoke were united in the warm words for my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, who is indeed, as your Lordships said, a grievous loss to the Front Bench. That loss is offset only by his arrival on the Back Benches, where I am sure he will contribute his wisdom, his ready wit and his good sense to our debates going forward. As to the matter of car parking at the chambers of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and those of my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier, I regret that that matter lies outwith the power of the Government to seek to resolve.
On the point just taken from the Opposition Front Bench by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, I reiterate my point. I accept all that he said about the impact of inquest proceedings on families and the well-expressed and carefully considered arguments advanced by family groups and pressure groups, and in this House and in the other place. However, I return to the central point, which is that in light of the review procedure put forward by the Government—a review published on 15 March that is to be followed by a full consultation, after which the Government hope to publish a consultation response in autumn 2022—I urge the House to take the view that the amendment the noble Lord proposed from the Front Bench is premature.
On the point taken by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, I am happy to reiterate what I said about the nature of the ouster clause in these proceedings, in the manner in which it has been formulated, in the hope that what I have said from the Dispatch Box indicates that the Government treat this as a particularly focused instrument.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, speaking as he does with particular knowledge of these matters, having sat in the Cart hearing itself. I accept and adopt respectfully his confidence in the ability of our judiciary properly to use the tool in the judicial toolbox—the club in the judicial golf bag—which the Bill seeks to give.
In those circumstances, I return to my invitation to the House to accept the Bill as received from the Commons. I express my gratitude to all noble Lords who have contributed today, who have courteously and thoughtfully engaged with me and, for that matter, the Minister in the other place. On behalf of my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, who of course carried out the bulk of work on this measure, I thank noble Lords for their thoughtful engagement with him, in the course of his stewardship of the Bill in your Lordships’ House.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)
My Lords, I would like to say something about the proposal in relation to the coroners’ court. The problem in the coroners’ court is that well-heeled litigants are allowed to participate in the coroners’ inquest when the people with real interest, namely the relatives of the deceased whose death is being inquired into, are not able to afford any protection at all. The well-heeled litigants are able to use litigation experts—counsel, senior counsel maybe—and leave the relatives of the deceased without anything at all in the way of legal assistance.
This point arose in this House in connection with the Liverpool situation some years ago. The suggestion was that these well-heeled people should not be allowed to participate in the inquest, unless they were prepared to make available to the relatives legal advice and help to exactly the same limit that the well-heeled people were proposing. That applies to those well heeled by the taxpayer, and applies to those who are well heeled in other ways. It is much more general than legal aid.
Therefore, it seems to me that the inquiry that the Government are proposing would be well added to by taking account of this possibility, which we certainly advocated here. I think I am right in saying that my noble friend Lord Hailsham was also involved on that occasion. At that time, it seemed to be a Home Office responsibility, because it was the Home Office that was responding to the report from Liverpool. It was said that we would get an answer to this very obvious way of dealing with this and making it fair in due course. “Due course” is a very flexible expression. I would think it highly likely that it should be involved in this inquiry. Just restricting it to legal aid seems to make it impossible to really get adequate representation. It is much better that the representation should be equal and level on both sides.
Of course, in some of these inquests, there may be more than one well-heeled participant. Therefore, it should be made a condition of them being allowed to participate, if it is joint and several or if it is just one, that they are prepared to make resources available to the relatives of an equal standard to the resources that they wish to use. That seems abundantly fair; it is not a charge on a public interest or the public purse, except in the case where the well-heeled people are supported by the taxpayer. The taxpayer will have to pay what they seek to put out for their lawyers. I cannot see why dividing this between themselves and the other parties is not a fair way of dealing with it. It does not in any way increase the responsibility of the public purse.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 5, and do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 5A to the words restored to the Bill by the Commons’ disagreement to Lords Amendment 5.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion B. I beg to move.
Motion B agreed.
Motion C
Lord Stewart of Dirleton
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 11, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 11A.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion C. I beg to move.
Motion C1 (as an amendment to Motion C)