Food Import Requirements

Lord Lexden Excerpts

Wednesday 14th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Douglas-Miller (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for his question. It is important to differentiate between what is happening at the port of Dover and what is happening at Sevington. If you go to Sevington, you follow a system by completing the new electronic IPAFFS, which is designed for commercial imports. What is checked at Dover by Border Force is illegal imports. Now, you are not going to be sent to Sevington if you are illegally importing something; you go to Sevington only if you are following the Government’s designated procedures.

[Lord Lexden (Con)]

My Lords, has Brexit given any kind of boost to the production of apples in our country —those wonderful varieties Coxes, Pippins, Beauty of Bath and so on? I must say that I have not noticed any change since 2020.

[Lord Douglas-Miller (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for the question. I am afraid I am not an expert on apple varieties across the UK, but I know that there has been quite a lot of emphasis in government policy of late to widen the breadth of our different types of seeds and trees. I am sure that apples will be on the list; I will check for him.

Official Controls (Northern Ireland) Regulations 2023

Lord Lexden Excerpts

Wednesday 1st March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bruce of Bennachie (LD)]

My Lords, in many ways this Motion, as the noble Lord will acknowledge, has been somewhat overtaken by events, but he is commenting on the events. It was clear from the outset that Boris Johnson’s oven-ready deal was anything but; we know that now. The claim that there would be no restrictions or paperwork on goods between Great Britain and Northern Ireland has never been true, as the Government’s website clearly showed on the day that Boris Johnson made his preposterous speech during the 2019 election.

I say to the noble Lord that I understand the way unionists see the friction he has outlined, the limitations on movements and transactions, as undermining their sense of identity. I understand that, but I do not understand why the DUP was so adamant in its determination to secure Brexit, when the EU had actually created an umbrella that allowed freedom of movement all ways. To leave the EU and expect there to be no paperwork, which is what I think the DUP wants, was never achievable. I have said that on a number of occasions in debates on this House: it was always possible, right from the outset, to secure reduced friction—the noble Lord has acknowledged that the agreement has done that—and the idea of green and red channels was in the frame from the beginning; it has been discussed for several years.

What was not on offer was trust and good will. What we were subjected to was just cheap, xenophobic rhetoric. Ursula von der Leyen’s relationship with “Dear Rishi” shows how the atmosphere has changed, and a change in the atmosphere is somewhat crucial. I welcome that. I am pleased that the way is now open to secure the UK’s associate membership of Horizon and to begin to explore, I hope, how the trade and co-operation agreement can also be renegotiated, in a similar way, to smooth the way for reduced friction for trade between the rest of the UK and the EU. It was, after all, astonishing and revealing that the Government were boasting yesterday of the privileged position of Northern Ireland as being in both the UK and the EU single markets, something that many people in the rest of the UK wish they had on offer.

It is undeniable that the protocol came about from a mess of the UK’s—specifically, Boris Johnson’s—own making. The ideology that has seized this Conservative Government has caused them to inflict more damage in more ways and in a shorter time than probably any Government in history. That said, I ask the DUP to consider carefully what it does next. The noble Lord, Lord Dodds, has been open in his criticism but careful not to say what he will do next.

All politics is surely about compromise; I would say that Irish politics is especially so. You can claim that playing hardball got us here, but I would refute that. Playing hardball stalled progress and engagement. There is a clear indication that the protocol Bill, far from pressurising a deal, stood in the way of it, and its abandonment is a victory for common sense. Whatever its reservations about the agreement, I suggest that the DUP should admit, privately if not publicly, that it is far better than it would have expected, even if it is not happy with it. The Prime Minister has said that it cannot be renegotiated, though there may be room for clarification here and there. I believe that the majority of people in Northern Ireland, although they may care little for the detail, will welcome an end to the deadlock that has plagued them.

I also suggest to the DUP that, over time, when this agreement is implemented, businesses with interests in Northern Ireland and the public of Northern Ireland will see that the removal of uncertainty creates economic space and a better climate. If that goes ahead and is demonstrated, the DUP will be exposed as people who opposed that improvement in circumstances in the Province. It may find that there is a price to pay.

On the restoration of the Assembly and the Executive, I have contested that there has never been a justification for the DUP withdrawal, any more than there was for the Sinn Féin withdrawal on a previous occasion. Two wrongs do not make a right. The people of Northern Ireland have voted and the DUP did not win. It is entitled to stand up vigorously for its supporters, and it does, but it is not democracy to deny the majority of citizens the right to be represented and to see government tackle the manifold challenges we all face. The protocol and certainly this new agreement pale into insignificance compared with the challenges that most people face in their everyday lives.

It has also been pointed out that one of the safeguards in this deal is the Stormont brake, but that requires the existence of an Assembly and Executive. I am hearing rather mixed messages about what different parties think about it, but I believe it was put in precisely for the benefit of the concerns that the DUP had expressed. If it is not very happy with it, maybe the easiest thing to do is remove it.

The noble Lord, Lord Dodds, referred to the Scottish border, which is of some concern to me—I cross it very regularly. In reality, Brexit has created a problem for the DUP—although by campaigning for Brexit it somewhat brought that on itself—but it has also created a problem for Scottish nationalists. Their ambition was an independent Scotland somehow rejoining Europe, which we all know would be long drawn out, difficult and on unknown terms and would inevitably lead to a hard border between Scotland and the rest of the UK. All these things suggest that the way forward for the UK is to recognise that this first step is the beginning of an improvement in relations with the EU and sets the potential for us to rebuild practical relations—Brexit excepted—that enable the minimum friction, not just between Great Britain and Northern Ireland but between the United Kingdom and the European Union, and uncertainty to be removed and businesses to flourish.

While I understand the reason for this Motion, the DUP should reflect very carefully. If it remains recalcitrant, the danger for it is that the rules in Northern Ireland may have to change, and the mood may change too. The DUP may be very confident of its base, but it should remember and respect that it is not a majority. There are no majorities in Northern Ireland. The only way that Northern Ireland will progress is if people are prepared to accept compromise. The DUP has made its tough stand; now is the time to recognise that compromise needs to be secured.

[Lord Lexden (Con)]

My Lords, that was an interesting speech on the Windsor Framework, but I did not hear any comments on the very serious specific issues that were raised by the noble Lord, Lord Dodds? Have the Liberal Democrats nothing to say about those extremely serious points?

Household Waste Recycling

Lord Lexden Excerpts

Thursday 7th July 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Benyon (Con)]

I would like to recycle the Scottish Green seats into good blue ones.

[Lord Lexden (Con)]

My Lords, towards the end of 1834, the Duke of Wellington ran the Government single-handedly for some 24 days. I wonder whether there is a case for suggesting that his highly respected successor the current noble Duke, with his well-known environmental interests, be invited to assume the position of Prime Minister on a caretaker basis to improve recycling and clean up our rivers.

[Lord Benyon (Con)]

That is a very good suggestion. I will put it to my honourable friends in the other place. Having a duke in No. 10 is probably long overdue.

Environmental Land Management Schemes

Lord Lexden Excerpts

Thursday 16th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Benyon (Con)]

My noble friend is absolutely right. One reason why we have done this iterative process, with tests and trials and piloting these different schemes, is because we want to make sure that they are brought in in as effective a way as possible. We have already reduced, with the sustainable farming incentive, the amount of guidance to make it as simple and clear as possible. Farmers should not be paying land agents huge amounts of money to do those schemes; they can do it themselves.

[Lord Lexden (Con)]

My Lords, in this season of good will, should we not congratulate my noble friend the Minister on his wonderful passion for the countryside and express the hope that he is able in the new year to extend that passion ever more widely?

[Lord Benyon (Con)]

I do not know what I can say in answer to such a generous question, expect to say a very happy Christmas to my noble friend and everybody else.

Animal Welfare (Sentience) Bill [HL]

Lord Lexden Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th July 2021 Grand Committee

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

The noble Lord, Lord Howard of Rising, has withdrawn so I call the noble Lord, Lord Benyon.

[Lord Benyon (Con)]

I thank my noble friend Lord Moylan for his Amendments 28 and 42. Members of the animal sentience committee will be appointed through a rigorous procedure of fair and open competition. As I have said previously, the committee will be comprised of experts who will be best placed to decide what the committee’s priorities should be, although they will of course be able to consult others.

Peer-reviewed evidence from academic journals will have a role in informing the committee’s work. While we do not propose to dictate to the committee how it should set out its reports, it is usual for expert committees such as this to present well-reasoned reports that show their working. The Scottish Animal Welfare Commission, for example, publishes its reports online and includes its reasoning and references. However, I do not believe that it is necessary for the committee’s reports themselves to be published in academic journals. To require the committee’s recommendations to undergo a full academic peer-review process would be impractical and inappropriate, and would risk creating a process that would slow down the publication of the committee’s views and delay the opportunity for Parliament to hold Ministers to account.

It is key that the committee should be able to advise on policies while they are being developed. This amendment would severely compromise its role. The committee will publish reports, so it will naturally have an open way of working. I believe that this will provide transparency about its work. If a Minister felt that a report of the committee identified a need for further evidence or assessment, they would be free to highlight this in their response to the report.

Nothing would please me more than to spend time talking about the philosophy behind what we are talking about. We could even, if we had time, discuss Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, in which he said that animals possess life

“nobler than any merely corporeal grade of being”.

However, in terms of how we approach this Bill, the definition of sentience is important. Our scientific understanding of sentience has come a long way in recent years and will continue to evolve. The Bill does not therefore have a fixed definition of sentience. It is not necessary to define sentience in statute for this Bill to work. We can all recognise that animals are sentient and that their welfare should be considered in decision-making; there is no need to make it more complicated than that.

Our GB-wide Farm Animal Welfare Committee issued a definition of sentience in 2019. The Scottish Animal Welfare Commission recently published a statement on sentience. There are some differences; this shows the importance of adopting a flexible approach that can evolve. It is worth noting that neither definition is set out in statute. The Scottish Animal Welfare Commission’s definition is one that it has adopted for its own purposes; similarly, if the animal sentience committee considers it expedient to adopt a working definition of sentience, it would of course be free to do so, but that is a discussion for its members to have.

I hope that this reassures my noble friend and that he will withdraw his amendment.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

My Lords, I have received one request to speak after the Minister. I call the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville.

[Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)]

My Lords, I just want to refer to the contribution made by the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Epsom. He said that he hoped that vegans and vegetarians will not be on the committee as they might sway its decisions. Can the Minister confirm that the appointment of members to the committee will not be prejudiced against those of religious persuasions or other protected characteristics?

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

My Lords, there is a Division in the Chamber. The Committee stands adjourned for five minutes.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

My Lords, it is time to resume. Perhaps the Minister might like to say a word in reply to the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell.

[Lord Benyon (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her question. It would not be our intention to edit the committee’s membership by their eating habits or by any other habits or disciplines. We want a balanced committee that draws together a wide range of expertise across the whole field of animal welfare.

--- Later in debate ---

Amendments 29 to 35 not moved.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

My Lords, we now come to the group consisting of Amendment 35A.

Amendment 35A

Moved by

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

I have received two requests to speak after the Minister from the noble Lords, Lord Hamilton of Epsom and Lord Moylan. I call the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom (Con)]

My noble friend Lord Caithness mentioned the predation of badgers, which of course do not come under pest control; they are protected. He did not mention that badgers very much like eating hedgehogs. They are skilled at rolling them over and disembowelling them. When we worry about the decline in hedgehog numbers, very rarely does anybody mention that perhaps badgers are responsible for this.

Another protected species is the sparrowhawk. If you shoot a sparrowhawk you get fined £1,000 because all hawks are protected, but 34 songbirds every week account for their diet. We have to bear in mind that in nature, almost all species are predated on by others. We just want to get all this into perspective.

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Clause 4 agreed.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 48.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, there are four amendments in this group in my name, Amendments 48, 52, 53 and 57. I will come in a moment to say exactly what they would do, but I shall make some preliminary remarks that arise from something my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering said and which has not been sufficiently discussed. This is the famous metaphysical bit that the Minister has been worried about, although I hope to get through this while skirting Descartes—or anybody difficult or foreign, for that matter.

The difficulty we have is that we are asked to assess to what extent, in a meaningful way, we think that animals can feel pain. That requires us to think a little about what pain and feeling are. My noble friend Lady McIntosh brought up insects as an example of this, but it relates to other creatures as well. Pain itself, of course, is not just an interior experience; it is, to some extent, a social concept. Pain is an abnormality, but we learn from others that it is an abnormality that is expressive of something that requires a response. So, we learn as children, “Don’t put your hands on the coal. If you do put your hands on the coal, that is what we call pain; learn not to do it again.” There is a social element to it, and it is not by any means clear that that can be translated to animal experience. This is the problem of operating on a non-behavioural scientific basis.

We humans also have coping strategies for dealing with pain. When I know I am going to have an injection in my arm, I always make sure that I look the other way; that is a very small example of a coping strategy. That illustrates another thing about the human experience of pain, which is that very often it is worse in anticipation than in the experience itself. All of this is tied up with what we understand by pain: for humans, it is not simply a neurological experience that can be tracked by chemicals and electrons, although it has all those aspects to it.

It is very difficult to know how one can map that across the bulk of animals. It is easiest to do so, of course, in the case of mammals, because there we have a closer link with ourselves in terms of DNA composition and so forth. To map it to fish and birds is extremely difficult. Indeed, it is scientifically quite challenging to understand how the very limited neural capacity, or brain capacity, of fish and birds could accommodate that range of complex experiences of pain characteristic of humans and, perhaps, of primates and other higher mammals.

There is also a similar question about what it is to feel something. In ordinary English, “feel” has two aspects: I can feel a table—that is a physical sensation—but I can also feel love, disdain and other emotions. Nobody doubts at all that the vertebrates we are discussing can feel in the former sense but, simply as a matter of their neural and brain capacity, the notion that they even have the ability to feel love, affection, fear and complex emotions such as those is a very challenging one.

We really need to understand that sort of background before we do what the Bill does, which is to cast an extremely wide net. It includes all vertebrates, but it goes beyond that: it gives the Secretary of State the power, which I think is completely unprecedented, to decide that any invertebrate, including the insects referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, are in fact sentient. That is the power given to him which, as I say, is almost incredible.

I turn to the detail of what my amendments seek to do. They would cut the thing in different ways. First, Amendment 48 suggests we “leave out ‘vertebrate’” and limit the scope of the Bill to mammals. This would make it much easier for the public, and for many members of this Committee and your Lordships’ House, to accept the Bill. It could be regarded as a first stage; there would be nothing to prevent the Government coming back subsequently and saying, “Having won over opinion on the question of mammals, we could now extend it to the broader class of vertebrates.” Amendment 52 explicitly invites the removal of fish—it is playing the same tune—and Amendment 53 proposes the removal of birds. These are all different ways of coming at the same thing.

Amendment 57 is slightly different, because I still cannot get over my outrage that Parliament is proposing to give the Secretary of State the power to designate any invertebrate as sentient. Here, simply for the sake of modesty and respectability, this amendment would limit that power to “cephalopods and decapod crustaceans”, simply because one knows from conversation and debate that that is the category of animals most likely to come within scope of this unprecedented power. It should none the less, in my view, be limited.

That is the purpose of these amendments and it is important that we explore them, because I do not accept that it is easy to map notions of feeling and pain on to these classes. Perhaps I may briefly refer to—

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

My Lords, there is a Division in the Chamber. The Committee stands adjourned for five minutes.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

My Lords, we shall resume. The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, may complete his speech and move his amendment.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I had just finished commenting on my own amendments when we were interrupted, so it was a convenient break, but before I conclude I shall comment on a few other amendments in this group.

Amendment 50, in the name of my noble friend Lord Robathan, would exclude the actions of wild animals upon other animals from the scope of the committee’s activities, and I think that must be sensible.

Amendment 56, from my noble friend Lord Trenchard, to leave out the power to designate invertebrates is in keeping with my amendment, and I support it.

My noble friend Lord Mancroft’s Amendment 59, which would require a scientific report that a being is sentient before it is redesignated as such by the Secretary of State under this very broad power, is an absolute minimum requirement and one that is very much in keeping with my comments on the previous group.

Finally, Amendment 49, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, concerns cephalopods and decapods. As the same words are used in a different order it might easily be confused with my amendment, but on careful examination it has a very different effect. My proposal at least puts some decency on this unprecedented power so that it is confined to the most likely class of animals. I understand—and I am sure I can be corrected—that Amendment 49 effectively takes the decision for the Secretary of State and includes cephalopod and decapod crustaceans as sentient beings on the face of the Bill. That is quite different from what I am proposing, if I have understood the amendment correctly, and I do not think that without proper and rigorous scientific reports, as indicated by my noble friend Lord Mancroft, this august Committee is quite the place in which to make such a radical transformation in our understanding of the natural world. I beg to move.

[Lord Robathan (Con)]

My Lords, I shall confine myself to speaking to my Amendment 50 for reasons of brevity. The more astute Members of the Committee will have realised that this refers to Section 2 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006, but this seems to me, to a certain extent, the nub of the Bill. It concentrates on what we, as people, are responsible for.

As a slight side-issue, I was asked to change the language because, of course, these days parliamentary language should be gender-neutral. However, surely everyone—however ill-educated—knows that the term “mankind”, or “man” in this context, has always included all human beings, all humanity, of whatever gender. I mention that because language is important, and this is legislation. To have been not specific about “mankind” might have been an example of lack of clarity, of which I fear this Bill is also an example.

On the substance, if I am responsible for an animal, I have responsibilities and duties to that creature, be it my dog, my rather foolish hens—which are not laying eggs at the moment—a cow or, indeed, a pheasant. However, I am surely not responsible for the rats we all live with, nor the squirrels destroying the trees I have planted, nor if my dog catches a rat—it is a terrier, and that is what terriers do. We then come on to fish in a river. Is the owner of a particular stretch of river responsible for a fish moving up and down it? Fish have backbones and are indeed sentient beings. Or is a fishing club responsible? Am I responsible if I run over a squirrel or hit a bird in the road, which I try pretty hard not to do?

I regard myself as a conservationist. The noble Lord, Lord Randall, referred to himself as such in a previous debate. However, unlike him, I see the way this Bill is phrased as paving the way for interference in anything and everything. It has been suggested that it is a Trojan horse and that there will be mission creep. I think it will be an activists’ charter. My noble friend Lord Herbert said in another debate that we need clarity.

The Minister, for whom I have a very high regard—we go back quite a long way and he called me, I think, a “denizen” of the last Chamber we served in—said earlier today that there is a very specific role for the committee. What is that role? It is not clear to me, and I am afraid that the debates so far have not clarified the situation. I hope this amendment may go some way towards clarifying the situation: that we are responsible for those animals for which we are responsible and not responsible for those which we cannot be responsible for.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

My Lords, the next three speakers—the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, and the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean—have all withdrawn, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft.

[Lord Mancroft (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 59 in this group. Clause 5(2) gives the Secretary of State the power to bring any invertebrate of any description within the meaning of “animal” and thus within the scope of the Bill—thus declaring them sentient in law. My noble friend Lord Moylan has already drawn attention to the extraordinary breadth of this new power. At Second Reading, he said:

“The clause that strikes me as most extravagant, however, is the one that gives the Secretary of State the unfettered power to declare, should he wish, that an earthworm is a sentient being. This is a power greater than that given by God to Adam in the Garden of Eden, which, as I recall, was restricted to the power to naming animals. Here, we are giving the Secretary of State the power to reclassify them almost without check.”—[Official Report, 16/6/21; col. 1921.]


I do not feel qualified to comment on the powers that God gave to Adam, so I will, if noble Lords forgive me, confine myself to this Bill.

Many noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Randall, the noble Lord, Lord Trees, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, called for decapod crustaceans, including lobsters, crabs and crayfish, and cephalopods, including octopus, squid and cuttlefish, to be included in the scope of the Bill. Some argued this point on the basis of a film called “My Octopus Teacher” and were advised to have tissues on hand to watch it. However, the evidence contained in a tearjerker does not seem to be the best foundation for the law of the land. The law should be based on hard evidence—hard science and sound evidence—and that is where the problems on animal sentience start and lie.

While everyone agrees that animals are sentient, philosophers and scientists are still arguing about what that means. Does a dog, for example, have the same feelings as a crab, or a crayfish the same feelings as a cow? Perhaps that is why there is no definition of sentience in the Bill. Scientists are not agreed, despite the fact that in the previous debate the Minister gave us two separate definitions of sentience, although neither of them are included in the sentience Bill, which strikes me as a bit odd. So how will a committee opine on something that is neither defined and on which there is no widespread agreement, in fact, on which there is widespread disagreement?

The Government have commissioned an independent review of the sentience of decapod crustaceans and cephalopods. This amendment would require only that where the Secretary of State declares an invertebrate sentient, the scientific evidence on which the declaration is based should be published. It seems unarguable that such transparency on the science must be good, and I cannot imagine any arguments for hiding the evidence and not publishing it. If the Minister rejects the amendments, perhaps he can enlighten the Committee about why the science and the evidence should be hidden away.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

The noble Lord, Lord Howard of Rising, whose name is next on the list, has withdrawn, so I call the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville.

[Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)]

My Lords, the last group of amendments is quite long and seeks to limit the scope of the Bill and the groups of animals considered to be sentient.

The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, has spoken in favour of Amendment 48, which would remove vertebrates in favour of mammals, Amendment 52, which would add fish, Amendment 53, which would add birds, and Amendment 57, which would limit the classification of invertebrates to cephalopods and decapods. The noble Lord makes a claim that animals are capable of feeling pain but not other emotions, such as pleasure. I fear I do not agree. A family pet dog is very capable of showing pleasure. When I get home after a week in London, our collie is overjoyed to see me, and there is no mistaking his enthusiasm. As regards the scope of sentience, we should be led by the science available for each group of animals.

Amendment 50, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Robathan, is to apply to domesticated animals in the British Isles,

“under the control of man”

and not living wild. I am certain that he would have been supported by the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, if he had not withdrawn. I support the noble Lord, Lord Robathan, in not changing the wording of proposed new subsection (1)(b). He is correct: we all understand what is meant by mankind, and I am not personally offended by the use of that word. While I sympathise with these amendments, I am not sure why it is necessary to limit the group of animals to be included or excluded. It is likely that by adopting Amendment 50 in particular, some animals which are being farmed and also live wild, such as deer—not really cute ones—are likely to be treated differently depending on their status. That is likely to cause unnecessary confusion.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, put her name to Amendment 51, which we support. I am speaking in particular to Amendment 48 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, to which the noble Lord, Lord Randall of Uxbridge, and I have also added our names. At Second Reading, reference was made to the evidence on decapod crustaceans and cephalopods being sentient beings. I am not naturally squeamish, but I found the deliberate shocking of shore crabs to see whether they were capable of feeling and remembering pain somewhat unpleasant. The experiment having been conducted during trials, the result is conclusively that they are sentient and have some advanced cognition. Similarly, the octopus is capable of feeling and remembering pain, so I believe both groups should be included in the Bill rather than being left to be added at some later stage.

The noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Epsom, has raised some interesting publicity on the fate of lobsters and how those destined for the restaurant trade should meet their end. Given that the vast majority of lobsters reach restaurants in a live condition, I cannot see that the Bridlington lobster trade will be adversely affected by how lobsters are prepared for the table.

I can also see that some will think that the Bill is a back door to banning angling and the shooting of game birds. I believe that we are a long way from reaching that conclusion; I would not support it if that were the case.

I fully support moves to include decapod crustaceans and cephalopods in the classification of sentient creatures. I will listen carefully to the arguments in favour of the rest of the amendments in this group and the outcomes their tablers are looking to achieve.

In response to a question on the first group, the Minister gave the impression that the inclusion of these groups is something for another Minister. I hope he can confirm that the classification of animals included in this Bill should be widened at this stage and not at some date in the future.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Epsom, whose name is next on the list, has withdrawn.

[The Earl of Caithness (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Robathan’s Amendment 50 and have added my name to it. It would be a sensible and logical addition to the Bill. It is absolutely right that where men and women are in charge of an animal they are responsible for it being treated in the most humane way possible, but if that same animal is running free and is wild, then it cannot possibly be under the control of a human being. Therefore, the words that my noble friend wishes to include in the Bill would make the position absolutely clear. I support him on that basis.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Randall of Uxbridge, who is next on the list, has withdrawn.

[Lord Trees (CB)]

My Lords, a crucial aspect of the Bill is determining which animals within the vast animal kingdom are sentient. Crucially, of course, that depends on how sentience is defined. The Bill does not attempt to define sentience, and various expert opinions, which I respect, have suggested that that is sensible. But we can be sure that, if and when the Bill becomes law, there will be those who will start to question the limit currently in the Bill or that proposed in Amendment 57, which I support. It is almost certain that at least some scientific opinion will be arguable and credible to propose further extending the range of animals included.

Current definitions of sentience include capacity to have feelings. I know of no way of determining what animals feel, but we know that many lifeforms sense and avoid potentially harmful stimuli, which we do, of course. Although we would sense pain on that occasion, we can only guess at the feeling the animal has, but presumably it is not a pleasurable sensation. Of course it is important to consider the science, but extremely respected scientists can and do differ even when confronted with the same data.

The frontiers of what sentience is will likely shift. I listened yesterday to the evidence given to the EFRA Committee in the other place by Jonathan Birch of the London School of Economics. He is the lead author of the LSE report referred to on the first day of Committee, which has yet to be published but has been carefully considering whether to include cephalopods and decapod crustaceans as sentient beings. Professor Birch commented yesterday with respect to the definition of sentience that the science is evolving. Indeed, the Minister commented in much the same way today.

Clearly it would raise huge issues were more and more animal taxa credibly—and, indeed, scientifically—argued to be sentient. So, although I accept that Amendments 59 and 60 are improvements on the current Bill, I feel that the range of animals included in the Bill should be a political decision determined by the Secretary of State and with the complete and full consideration of Parliament, where the cost-benefit considerations can be properly weighed—taking scientific opinion into account, of course, but not being bound by it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Fookes (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise to the Committee for not being here earlier in the afternoon when noble Lords debated amendments to which I added my name. Unfortunately, there was an additional meeting of the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, meeting on a different day and at a different time. However, I am here now. I will speak to Amendment 51 in particular; in that connection, I have been asked by my noble friend Lord Randall of Uxbridge and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, to say that they fully support the remarks I intend to make about it.

I make no apology for wishing to see cephalopods and decapods included in the realms of sentience and not left until some future date. I am aware that the Minister is awaiting the LSE report to which the noble Lord, Lord Trees, referred. I would be interested to know from the Minister when we might expect to see that report and whether it is likely to be in time to make a decision about including these creatures in the Bill before it reaches its final stages. For my part, I believe that there is already sufficient hard evidence to make it perfectly acceptable to include them here and now.

It is interesting that, way back in 2005, the European Food Safety Authority’s Scientific Panel on Animal Health and Welfare considered these animals sufficiently sentient to be included. Since then, a lot of work has been done by Professor Robert Elwood of Queen’s University; I believe that he has provided good scientific evidence. I am happy to accept scientific evidence. I think mention was made earlier of one experiment where hermit crabs, which like to retreat to quiet places, were given an electric shock if they entered one refuge but not if they entered another. It soon became evident that they knew which one to choose and that they remembered it. Shortness of time forbids me from giving any further examples, but I firmly believe that there are good examples that give hard evidence. We know, too, that a number of other countries are ahead of us on this issue. They include, for example, New Zealand, some of the Australian states, Austria and even, surprisingly, Italy.

The final point I want to make is that I commend to the Minister the precautionary principle. Great publicity was given to it in the Environment Bill as one of five principles. It was given a good boost. I suggest that the precautionary principle is one to adopt here and now. As I understand it, it means that, if there is some evidence, you do not have to wait until something is proved to the hilt before you take action. On that basis, I have no hope that the Minister will accept Amendment 51 as it stands, but I hope for better things before the Bill reaches the statute book.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

The noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, whose name is next on the list, has withdrawn.

[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

I am speaking to Amendment 49 in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Randall of Uxbridge, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville. I thank them for their support. Before I move on, I assure the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, that he has understood the purpose of my amendment completely correctly. We also support Amendment 51 in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Fookes.

Clause 5 currently defines “animal” as any vertebrate other than homo sapiens. Amendments 52 and 53 talk about adding “fish” and “birds” to the scope of the Bill. I know that they are probing amendments, but they are vertebrates—

Animal Welfare (Sentience) Bill [HL]

Lord Lexden Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 16th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Hannan of Kingsclere, asks what the purpose of the Bill is. We all know what the purpose of the Bill is: it is to advance the agenda of people who believe in the existence of animal rights and to embed them at the heart of government, bossing everybody about. It is a bad Bill, not simply for that reason, but more importantly, as I will explore in a moment, because it changes the moral basis on which we have habitually treated animals well in this country. I will come back to that in a moment, because I am going to leave to others—some who have already spoken—comments on the practical difficulties of putting this Bill into effect and the problems it is likely to give rise to. I always thought that it was the responsibility of this Parliament to hold Ministers to account, but we are now to have a committee roaming around Whitehall doing the job for us, it seems.

The clause that strikes me as most extravagant, however, is the one that gives the Secretary of State the unfettered power to declare, should he wish, that an earthworm is a sentient being. This is a power greater than that given by God to Adam in the Garden of Eden, which, as I recall, was restricted to the power to naming animals. Here, we are giving the Secretary of State the power to reclassify them almost without check.

I come back to my point about the moral basis on which we treat animals well. I have always loved this quotation from Lord Keynes:

“Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.”


Of course, I do not mean to refer in any sense to my noble friend on the Front Bench in that regard, but the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, put his finger on who the academic scribbler is. I well remember, in my first year as an undergraduate, walking past Blackwell’s and seeing prominently displayed in the front window a copy of Professor Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation. He had, in 1975, as a young man, undergone a sort of convulsive conversion to vegetarianism, and this was his attempt to work out some rationale for what he was doing.

There were three points, essentially. First, people are not better or superior to animals. Secondly, what we have in common is that we sit on a spectrum of sentience. This puts us on the same level as the animals. The third point, as indicated by my noble friend Lord Herbert of South Downs, was a sort of crude utilitarianism which makes no distinction between humans and animals. Now, 45 years on, this book has spread throughout the world and become a text for all those who wish to promote the rights of animals. The logical consequence is that we are driven in the direction of veganism and the consumption solely of non-sentient plants.

I could not have asked for a more convenient introduction, in that sense, to what I was about to say, than the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Sarfraz, who, with consummate commercial skill, pointed us entirely in the direction of that veganism—and not only veganism but behaviour which respects and prevents harm to any sentient creature. That goes well beyond what we eat, as other noble Lords have said.

That is all okay: if Members of the House of Lords want to drive the country, without asking, in the direction of veganism, which we are told is hugely popular, although I do not know where the evidence for that comes from, on such a basis, and on the basis of some movie I have not yet seen about an improbable friendship between a scientist and an octopus—I am sure it is a tearjerker—that is absolutely fine. The House of Lords is free to do that, but what worries me is that we have cited here in the House a whole swathe of humanitarian legislation going back 200 years protecting animals. Contrary to what Singer and those people would say about the abolition of the distinction between humans and animals, all that legislation has been based on our moral obligations as human beings, rational and endowed with conscience. It is why it is called humanitarian legislation. It is not based on some assumed rights of animals.

All that—not the legislation but the moral basis for the legislation—is now to be swept away by a Government embedding at the heart of our legislation the notion of sentience as the driver of how we should treat animals. The whole moral basis is being changed and replaced by this calculus of sentience. This is a very bad step. It reduces our obligations as people to something that will be the subject of endless judicial review and footling arguments about rules and laws, whether ganglions are the same as brains, and whatever else might come up in the course of these discussions.

I am really very concerned about the Bill. It does nothing at all good for animals, but it does a great disservice to the moral foundation of our society.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, has withdrawn, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Sheikh.

[Lord Sheikh (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I welcome this Bill as I have always believed that animals are sentient beings and that they feel emotions and experience pains. I was brought up in east Africa in a house with a large garden. We had a dog, cats, chickens, ducks and rabbits, and we became very fond of them and got to know them. I noticed that they had emotions and felt pain, and I shall give one example. When my mother died, I was very upset and the cat we had at that time would not stop mewing and wanted to sit on my lap. I feel that the Bill is necessary, as we need to ensure that we look after their well-being and care for all animals, whether they are pets, on a farm or in the wild.

The Bill will apply to vertebrates other than homo sapiens, but the Secretary of State may by regulation include invertebrates of any description. I agree with what has been stated.

With regard to animals which produce something we consume or use, I feel that by caring for them, we will have better milk, meat, eggs, leather, wool, et cetera. The intention of the Bill is to ensure that all animals continue to have adequate recognitions and protections now that we have left the European Union. This must be ensured by appropriate domestic legislation. We were previously subject to Article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which stated that

“administrative provisions and customs of the Member States”

must respect the

“religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage”

of their citizens.

I ask your Lordships to note the words “religious rites”.

I am a practising Muslim and I eat halal meat. There are nearly 1.9 billion Muslims in the world and over 3.4 million Muslims in the UK, and we make up over 5% of the British population. A number of Muslims, including me, will eat only halal meat, and their beliefs need to be respected. Animal welfare is very important in Islam. The Holy Koran and Hadith state that we must recognise animals as being sentient, and we are provided with guidance regarding how to care for, handle and farm them. In addition, we are told how they should be slaughtered for food. Islam forbids mistreatment of animals and their welfare is enshrined in Muslim beliefs. The Prophet Muhammad—peace be upon him—said:

“A good deed done to an animal is like a good deed done to a human being, while an act of cruelty to an animal is as bad as cruelty to a human being.”


Islam permits slaughter of animals for food but dictates that such slaughter must be exercised humanely.

There has never been conclusive scientific evidence to suggest that religious slaughter is less humane than conventional methods. In halal slaughter, the animal ceases to feel pain due to the brain immediately being starved of oxygenated blood. For the first few seconds after the incision is made, the animal does not feel any pain. This is followed by a few seconds of deep unconsciousness as a large quantity of blood is drained from the body. Thereafter, EEG readings indicate no pain at all.

I have spoken previously in your Lordships’ House about halal slaughter, and had discussions with then Defra Minister and corresponded with David Cameron, the then Prime Minister. Will the terms of reference of the committee to be appointed under the Bill include looking at the religious practices of halal and shechita? If this is to happen, I suggest that a person or persons who have a very good knowledge of these practices should be appointed. This will enable the matter to be looked into comprehensively and thoroughly. Furthermore, I suggest that the committee holds full consultations with the communities and appropriate organisations to take account of the feelings of the people. I add that I would like to see the committee being independent.

I ask my noble friend the Minister to comment on the points I have raised, particularly those relating to religious slaughter. Leaders and members of the Muslim community have approached me to speak on the Bill today and raised the points which I have made.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Gardner of Parkes, who is next on the speakers’ list, has withdrawn. I call the noble Lord, Lord Trees.

Genetically Modified Food

Lord Lexden Excerpts

Monday 8th February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Gardiner of Kimble (Con) [V]]

My Lords, my noble friend has made a very important point: we have to feed the world’s increasing population. We think that, particularly in the area of gene editing crops, there are potentially very strong advantages in sustaining and improving the natural environment while improving the hugely important ingredient of soil health with reduced nutrient additions and chemical pesticides.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

My Lords, the time allowed for this Question has now elapsed.

Heritage Organisations: Coal Supplies

Lord Lexden Excerpts

Thursday 21st January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Gardiner of Kimble (Con) [V]]

My Lords, that is absolutely what we are working on with the heritage sector because we want a viable future for these great heritage assets of our country. However, I go back to the fact that this is legislation reducing and changing our requirements for domestic consumption. I fear that some noble Lords are misinterpreting that. We are working with the heritage sector because we want a long-term, viable future for it.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

My Lords, the time allowed for this Question has elapsed. I apologise to those noble Lords I was unable to call. We now come to the third Oral Question.

Fisheries Bill [HL]

Lord Lexden Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments & Ping Pong (Hansard) & Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords & Ping Pong (Minutes of Proceedings): House of Lords
Thursday 12th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD) [V]]

I am grateful to the Minister for his careful explanation, and for dwelling on some of the constitutional aspects of the matter, but I am still moving Motion 22A, in my name, that this House disagrees with Commons Amendment 22, introducing, as it does, a power for Ministers to apply sections of the Fisheries Bill to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man without their consent.

It came as an unpleasant surprise when the new clause appeared at such a late stage in the Bill’s progress. As the Minister indicated, my interest in such matters dates from work I did on the 2010 and 2014 Justice Committee reports on the Crown dependencies, which analysed, assessed and promoted the modern relationship between the UK and the dependencies. In every relevant respect, that 2010 report was accepted by the Government of the day.

The report set out a relationship that respected the legislative autonomy of the dependencies, which would not normally be the subject of Westminster legislation unless they wished to be. Along with that went a policy of increasing entrustment, enabling the dependencies to develop their relations with the wider world, including, in the case of the Channel Islands, their very close neighbours in France.

The UK, of which the Crown dependencies are not, and never have been, a part, remains responsible for international treaty obligations of the dependencies. The framework agreements were put in to ensure that this could be done effectively, while respecting their autonomy. I shall quote from the Guernsey agreement of 2006, but the other dependencies have similar agreements. Paragraph 13 of that agreement says:

“Guernsey has an international identity which is different from that of the UK.”


The agreement continues:

“The UK recognises that Guernsey is a long-standing, small democracy and supports the principle of Guernsey further developing its international identity … The UK has a role to play in assisting the development of Guernsey’s international identity. The role is one of support not interference … Guernsey and the UK commit themselves to open, effective and meaningful dialogue with each other on any issue that may come to affect the constitutional relationship … International identity is developed effectively through meeting international standards and obligations which are important components of Guernsey’s international identity … The UK will clearly identify its priorities for delivery of its international obligations and agreements so that these are understood, and can be taken into account by Guernsey developing its own position.”


A key question for the Minister is: do the present UK Government stand by that agreement? The clause suggests otherwise. It represents a threat to impose Westminster legislation when there are adequate means available to resolve differences when they arise. The best way is bilateral discussion, in which the UK is clearly in a strong position, given its size and resources. In any case, the islands themselves have a strong commitment to maintain their British identity, and their international reputation for good government and good faith.

Alongside all that is the requirement that island legislation requires Royal Assent, and therefore is considered at Privy Council level in the UK. That is a mechanism by which the UK seeks to make sure that international obligations are satisfied. The processes have worked, and they have resolved issues. I am not aware of any significant outstanding issues that the process has not coped with.

However, the clause says, “We’re not sure we can trust you, and if we think it’s necessary we will, without your consent, legislate from Westminster to override your legislative jurisdiction.” The Government may say—indeed, they have said, and they are saying it again today—that this is extremely unlikely, but the possibility has already been noticed by the French media, and that could undermine the Bailiwick of Guernsey, or Jersey, in their discussions with their close neighbours.

The Minister quoted the Constitution Committee. Its report, which is critical of the clause, states:

“We are not persuaded of the necessity of Commons amendment 22.”


The Minister’s letter said that the Government

“do not currently have any specific concerns which we would envisage using”,

the clause to address. The committee then stated in response that the Government,

“should seek powers only when they are necessary and their use is anticipated.”

The Minister also quoted that. The Committee in paragraph 9 states that the Commons amendment,

“undermines the domestic autonomy of the Crown Dependencies and is contrary to long-standing practice.”

We are left with a clause that the Government say they have no plans to use but hold as a threat. That reverses the trend towards greater recognition of the dependencies’ autonomy and entrustment in their international relations.

My final questions are these: is there intended to be a change of constitutional policy towards the Crown dependencies such that a power to extend Westminster legislation without consent will become a feature in more UK legislation and, if so, why are the Government not more interested in a wider discussion of such a fundamental change in policy and the constitutional relationship? Or have they stumbled into an unnecessary row because someone somewhere in Defra, who has always wanted the department to have that power, got it out of the drawer and into this legislation? I have a strong suspicion the latter might be the reason.

I note the Government’s proposal for a mechanism for discussions in the context of marine management with the dependencies. Welcome though they might be, they do not make any difference to the fundamental constitutional issue. The Government surely have enough problems to tackle without picking an unnecessary quarrel with our loyal friends in the Channel Islands. I know that the Minister who is responding today, the noble Lord, Lord Gardiner, is not one for picking quarrels. He should see what he can do to bring this quarrel to an end.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

The following Members in the Chamber have indicated that they wish to speak: the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord Faulkner of Worcester, the noble Baroness, Lady Couttie, and the noble Lords, Lord Northbrook and Lord Pannick. I will call them in order.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

As a serving member of the Courts of Appeal of Guernsey and of Jersey, I do not normally speak on Channel Islands matters, at least if there is any possibility that it might disqualify me from sitting on some future appeal. This permissive extent clause, most unusually not consented to by either Guernsey or Jersey, merits a departure from that general rule.

There is no need to speculate as to why the Government insist so strongly at this time on a power to implement international fisheries agreements in the Channel Islands. The Minister has, after all, told the Constitution Committee that,

“we do not currently have any specific concerns which we would envisage using the PEC to address.”

I accept that formulation, while noting the care with which it is drafted. I shall, however, speak as someone with a little understanding of the legal systems of the Channel Islands on the constitutional consequences that are feared in the islands were this clause, said by the Minister to support the Crown dependencies, to be activated.

There was no hint in what we heard from the Minister that Orders in Council issued under the clause would be anything other than automatically binding in the Channel Islands. The point I want to get across is that under the laws of Jersey and Guernsey, it is at least doubtful that such a clause would even allow the United Kingdom Government to legislate in future for the bailiwicks without their consent. The States of Jersey Law 2005, like the Code of 1771 that preceded it, assumes that the UK Parliament may legislate for Jersey but places an important fetter on that power. Discussed by the Royal Court in the terrorist asset-freezing case of 2011, Section 31 of that law appears to signify that any Order in Council to extend the provisions of the Fisheries Bill to Jersey would need to be approved by Jersey’s legislature, the States Assembly, before it could be registered.

The States of Deliberation has a similar function in Guernsey under Article 72A of the Reform (Guernsey) Law 1948, as amended. Does the Minister accept that an Order in Council providing for the implementation of international obligations in the Channel Islands could take effect there only with the consent of the States Assembly and the States of Deliberation? If he cannot agree—I suspect that his instructions may be that he cannot—we enter into dangerous and heavily disputed waters.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I agree with the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and other speeches which have been highly critical—justifiably so—of Commons Amendment 22. Like the noble Lord, Lord Beith, I am a member of the Constitution Committee. As noble Lords have heard, we reported on 9 November that Amendment 22 raises issues of constitutional importance. It is the long-standing practice of Parliament that it does not legislate for the Crown dependencies without their consent. As your Lordships have heard, Amendment 22 has caused considerable concern in the Channel Islands, and understandably so.

It is particularly regrettable that the Government introduced the permissive extent clause at so late a stage of the passage of this Bill through Parliament. The amendment was tabled on 9 October, four days prior to Report and Third Reading stages in the House of Commons. The Bill had its First Reading in this House as long ago as 29 January. The 11th-hour tabling of the new provision has deprived this House of any opportunity to debate this amendment prior to today. It gave the House of Commons very little opportunity to consider the amendment. On a matter of constitutional importance, that is inexcusable.

It is particularly inexcusable when the hybrid procedures of this House prevent noble Lords, with very limited exceptions, participating remotely at this stage of a Bill. It means that those noble Lords who are unable to travel here to protect their health are simply deprived of a voice. On 12 October, when the Senior Deputy Speaker introduced the report explaining the hybrid procedure for Lords consideration of Commons Amendments, the noble Lord said by way of justification for limiting remote participation at this stage:

“By the time a Bill reaches these late stages, the issues have already been well debated”.—[Official Report, 12/10/20; col. 880.]


On this important provision, they have not been. That is another reason it is simply inexcusable for the Government to introduce a matter of constitutional importance so late in the Bill. I suggest that the Procedure Committee reconsider the hybrid procedure on ping-pong—the procedure that prevents remote participation apart from for a person moving a Motion—when, as in this case, a provision has not been previously considered by the House.

That would all be bad enough, but the introduction of a provision of constitutional importance so late in the passage of the Bill is especially objectionable when the Government do not even suggest that there is any urgent need to act on the powers they now wish the House to confer on them. On the contrary, the Minister was clear this afternoon, and in correspondence, that it was “highly unlikely” that these powers would ever be exercised.

The Minister was equally candid in his letter to the esteemed chair of the Constitution Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton. He said—it has already been quoted but it is so extraordinary that it bears repetition:

“To be clear, we do not currently have any specific concerns which we would envisage using the PEC to address.”


Moreover, in that same letter, the Minister assured the committee he accepted that

“the Crown Dependencies take their international obligations extremely seriously; and I am confident that they would meet any required commitments, legislating domestically if required, in any normal circumstances.”

The position is clear. Even the Government do not suggest that there is any current or anticipated need for this extraordinary provision. They would simply like to have the powers in case something unexpected were to turn up.

When the provision was debated in the House of Commons, Sir Robert Neill, chairman of the Justice Committee, accurately described it as a

“‘break glass in emergency’ clause”,

and simply not good enough to justify what he described as

“trespassing on the constitutional integrity of the Crown dependencies”.—[Official Report, Commons, 13/10/20; col. 308.]

I agree, except that I would say “trampling all over”, rather than “trespassing on”. We should not break constitutional conventions because there is a remote possibility of a need to exercise powers in the future. Far less should we be doing so by way of a provision introduced so late in the passage of a Bill that it has not received the detailed consideration which it deserves.

Commons Amendment 22 is indefensible, except on the basis that any legislation for Jersey and Guernsey without the consent of the Channel Islands would have no legal effect there, for the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. I look forward to being briefed to argue the point before Mr Justice Anderson in the courts of appeal in Jersey and Guernsey, but for the obvious conflicts of interests that we would both have.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

Does any other noble Lord in the Chamber wish to speak? No. In which case, I turn to those listed for the debate and call the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville.

[Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Motion 22A, tabled by my noble friend Lord Beith, which would leave out Clause 52, deals with the PEC, or permissive extent clause, which affects the Crown dependencies in unusual circumstances and protects the UK against any part of it breaking international law, which would affect the whole of the UK. Other noble Lords have spoken very eloquently about this. My noble friend Lord Beith has set out extremely well the case for deleting Clause 52, and we have also heard from other noble Lords on this subject. It would seem extremely high-handed of the Government to introduce the PEC against the wishes of the Crown dependencies of Guernsey and Jersey.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, has spoken from his personal knowledge of the law of the bailiwicks of Jersey and Guernsey, and other Peers have also spoken knowledgeably to Motion 22A. The Bailiwick of Jersey has written to Peers stating that the use of the PEC in relation to the Crown dependencies is extremely rare and fundamentally based on the established principle of prior consent. In this instance, both Jersey and Guernsey have consistently made it plain to the UK Government the islands’ position that the PEC is an unnecessary, unwanted and disproportionate measure.

The Bailiwick of Jersey does not consider that the UK Government have yet put forward a credible argument as to why the PEC is necessary in Jersey’s case, and I very much agree. Jersey already possesses the ability, under the Sea Fisheries (Jersey) Law 1994, to give effect to any legal obligations related to fisheries management within its waters. The UK Government have not been able to provide any previous precedent or reasonable scenarios in which Jersey’s current regime could be considered insufficient.

In their letter to the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, on 2 November, the Government state that they have been trying to reach an agreement over the last 10 months. Not to have reached an agreement over this period is no excuse to impose the PEC on reluctant Crown dependencies.

The Channel Islands All-Party Group has also written expressing considerable concerns about this matter. My noble friend Lord Chidgey, who cannot be present this afternoon to make his own contribution, is similarly concerned about the legal implications of the UK imposing the PEC on Guernsey and Jersey.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his explanation of this new clause, and the noble Lord, Lord Beith, for raising his concerns, with which we have considerable sympathy. As ever, it is unfortunate that this issue has come before us at such a late stage. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, raised some very important procedural issues around the consequences which arise from that, and the lack of scrutiny that we can therefore give to the proposals.

We have all read the exchange of correspondence with the Constitution Committee, and the Minister will know that its latest report says that it is

“not persuaded of the necessity”

of the government amendment on the permissive extent clause, and that what is being proposed is “contrary to long-standing practice”, in which differences of view are

“dealt with in bilateral discussion rather than by … imposition … from Westminster.”

Clearly, the Constitution Committee speaks with great authority. We should take its advice seriously. It is a great shame that events have come to this, particularly since the circumstances in which the permissive extent clause would be used seem so obscure and unlikely. It feels as though the lawyers in Defra have got carried away anticipating events that are never going to happen, a point made by a number of noble Lords.

When we spoke to the Secretary of State and the Minister, Victoria Prentis, earlier this week, we were told that further discussions with the Channel Islands would take place this week, and that it was hoped that the outstanding issues would be resolved. We were optimistic. However, having spoken to Guernsey’s Minister of External Relations yesterday, and heard the voices from around the Chamber today, I gather that, despite further discussions, concerns remain. The Minister also told me that this was damaging relations with their French neighbours and playing badly in the French media, a point confirmed in the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Beith. I agree with the quote from my noble friend Lady Pitkeathley, that this is an issue about trust, and that it is a great shame that the strong relationship and trust that have existed in the past are now being undermined.

I am sorry that we are debating this issue and that it remains unresolved. There must be further bilateral discussions to resolve the matter. At a minimum, I hope that the Minister will commit to continuing discussions with the Crown dependencies on this issue, not only in a committee, but on a more urgent basis. These matters surely must be resolved now, well in advance of any conflict, rather than potentially in the middle of any crisis which might provoke the use of a PEC.

Secondly, I hope the Minister can be explicit about the very narrow circumstances in which he envisages these powers being used, because that is a mystery to many of us. I think all noble Lords would like to understand the type of event that would provoke the imposition of a PEC.

Lastly, I hope the Minister can acknowledge the issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and others. The legal position is that, where an international instrument is to be applied to a Crown dependency, it will need to be enacted by the dependency’s own legislature rather than being imposed on it. If that is the case, then it needs the legislature’s consent in the first place, which rather negates the existence of a PEC.

I hope the Minister is hearing the voices from around the Chamber on all this. It is a great pity that we are ending our consideration of the Bill on such a note of discord. I hope he can come forward with a way through. As this is my last appearance on the Bill, I add my considerable thanks to the Minister and the noble Baroness for their considerable patience and courtesy throughout this process; they went much further than many in making sure that we were properly briefed and had access to the best possible advice. On that note, which I am sorry we have ended on, I hope the Minister is able to come back with something constructive. I look forward to his response.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

I call on the noble Lord, Lord Gardiner of Kimble, to reply to this important debate.

[Lord Gardiner of Kimble (Con)]

My Lords, this is an extremely important debate. I am grateful for this challenge; it is rather like playing tennis with someone much better than oneself, and one hopes that that raises one’s game. When lawyers are about, I get a shade nervous. I am also nervous as I am second to none in my regard and indeed affection for the noble Baroness, Lady Pitkeathley. I am reminded here of the reference to Winston Churchill and the reference to two of the Crown dependencies and their history with the Crown.

Not only for me personally but for the Government, the essential nature of working with the three Crown dependencies is the warmth and positivity of that relationship as we are all part of the British family. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Beith, that I am grateful to him for his opening remarks, because we stand by the framework agreements, recognising the Channel Islands’ international identities. That is different from the UK ensuring that we can meet our international obligations. This is an area where I, not being the Fisheries Minister but having to attend to this matter, have tried to get my head around how this clause comes into our international obligations and why I am going to endeavour to persuade your Lordships that this is solely about how it relates to the UK’s international obligations. Indeed, that is why it is in Clause 36; it is defined because it is about all of us adhering to obligations that, as I said in my opening remarks, play out for everyone in the British family. There is therefore that last resort, that safety valve, of having provisions that enable adherence to international obligations that would have adverse impacts.

To the remarks of my noble friend Lady Couttie, I say that our preference, indeed our expectation, is that the Crown dependencies will implement the necessary legislation to meet international requirements that apply to them. As I have said, the clause provides protection for the British family on the international stage, but obviously we hope we will not have to use it.

I was struck by what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said. My view is that, when I take out an insurance policy, I am dearly hoping that my house does not burn down but I have a backstop. I have given very lay consideration to the issue of responsibility in this new adventure as an independent marine state, given the international obligations that we as the British Government will have. I think it is rather important, when I am seeking to persuade, to say that I personally see merit in this, but we do not in any sense want to have difficulties with the Crown dependencies.

I hope noble Lords will appreciate the requirement for the UK Government to be able to ensure that they meet international obligations for the protection of all parts of the UK—and indeed the Crown dependencies, which is the crux of the matter. That is a responsible international-facing Government ensuring that we can continue to meet our international obligations on sustainable fishing. We will of course continue to work very closely with the Crown dependencies at all levels but of course particularly at official and ministerial level.

I say to a number of noble Lords, including my noble friends Lady Couttie and Lord Northbrook, the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner of Worcester, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, that, having worked with my honourable friend Victoria Prentis, the Fisheries Minister, I am sure she is determined to ensure that, in the setting up of a committee with the Crown dependencies—as I have said, within the possible structure of the fisheries management agreements—to consider and assess how the implementation of the international obligations is going to be worked through. That is what we will want to do.

I agree with the sentiments that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, has expressed about the importance of dialogue and continuing discussion. There is continuing work to be done on this matter with this Bill and with the responsibilities that the Government now have as an independent maritime state. I want to put on the record and re-emphasise that, through the committee or through other work, it is vital that the communications and collaborative working with the Crown dependencies are designed to ensure that we may not ever need to use this last-resort measure. That is the whole purpose of dialogue and good friendship in protecting, as I have said, the British family. I say publicly that I understand the sentiments that the noble Baroness has expressed.

I shall repeat this so it is on the record: the committee could deal with issues that may lead to the activation of the permissive extent clause. It is not intended that this clause and the regulation-making power that it relates to would be used to legislate for the Crown dependencies without their consent, unless it were to become necessary to implement an international obligation that applied to them. I emphasise again that that would only ever be as a last resort, after full consultation and the exhaustion of all other options.

I shall answer some of the questions that were asked. I looked at the Ministry of Justice guidance on this matter. I say to the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord Pannick, that the MoJ advises that although consultation and consent should be sought in all circumstances, PECs can be included in Bills without the prior agreement of the Crown dependencies in exceptional circumstances and where a Bill engages the UK’s constitutional responsibilities for defence and international relations. This position is reflected in the Fact Sheet on the UK’s Relationship with the Crown Dependencies that was published by the MoJ in February this year. I will look at what both noble Lords, with their legal advantage over me, have said. I have referred to the MoJ guidance and that is the best that I can do on the matter, but it is available for further consideration.

I would also say to the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner—and to all noble Lords—that working with Crown dependency officials and Ministers will clearly be very essential. We raised the idea of this clause before the Bill was introduced in January, then discussions took place at official level aiming to narrow the scope of the clause to what is required to protect the British family and other Crown dependencies. We consulted on them formally later this year. As I say, this is why the discussions for this Bill are specifically about Clause 36 and our international obligations. I should also say to the noble Lord that this clause does not legislate for the Crown dependencies before activating the PEC. We would consult and seek to achieve the same results through other options—for instance, of course, Crown dependency domestic legislation.

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I am very mindful and, because I am chastened, I will obviously take back to my ministerial colleagues all the points that have been made. However, I respectfully beg to move because I think that the UK Government must have a mechanism of last resort.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

My Lords, I have received a request to ask a short question from the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner of Worcester.

[Lord Faulkner of Worcester (Lab)]

My Lords, I express my appreciation to the Minister for the considerate and thoughtful way in which he responded to the debate. I would just like clarification on that very last point. He has drawn attention, quite rightly, to the constitutional history between the United Kingdom Government and the Channel Islands. Does he not accept that the way in which harmony can be restored is by just saying “yes” to this question: if the Channel Islands do not consent to the use of the PEC, will the Government not insist on it?

Agriculture Bill

Lord Lexden Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Tuesday 15th September 2020 Lords Chamber

Amendment 35 agreed.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 36. I remind noble Lords that Members other than the mover of the amendment and the Minister may only speak once and that short questions of elucidation are discouraged. Anyone wishing to press this amendment or anything else in this group to a Division should make that clear in debate.

Clause 8: The agricultural transition period for England and the termination of relevant payments

Amendment 36

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