Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Hannan of Kingsclere Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

My Lords, I rise in relation to this group. Picking up the remarks, first of all, of the noble Lord, Lord Jay, I will say that, yes, there is not, perhaps, a single unified position of every single Chagossian. Perhaps we should not be surprised at that. Can we identify an issue in the United Kingdom on which there is a single view which every citizen of the United Kingdom holds? We may indeed have great difficulty in finding many issues within this House on which every single one of us is on exactly the same page. Of course, there would be a way to test that, which is the case of democratic self-determination. That would have been the way to see where the majority of opinion lay within the Chagossian community. It would not be beyond the wit of any Government to do that.

Turning to the amendments in this group, I want to particularly address my Amendments 38C and 55. I have also co-signed a number of my noble friend Lord Hay’s amendments. The thread that very much runs through the amendments in this group, both in content and spirit, is an attempt to actually do something practical, even at this late hour, to support the Chagossian people.

For example, the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, look at employment rights; my noble friend Lord Hay’s amendments look to both employment rights and making some level of provision in terms of flights to the Chagos Islands, and Amendment 50A, from the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, looks at birthright and identification, so that the Chagossians do not become some sort of 21st-century Trotsky, who will suddenly be erased, with their identity being erased from all photographs. They will simply become some sort of non-people. All the amendments are very much in the spirit of trying to provide support to the Chagossian people.

It seems that there are objectively three ways in which the United Kingdom can support the Chagossian people. It is undoubtedly the case. I think it has been acknowledged in earlier parts of this debate, from all sides of the House, that, whatever our views on the present treaty, and whatever our views on a wide range of issues, there does seem to be a common agreement and an acknowledgement that we have had over half a century of poor and shameful treatment of the Chagossian people. Successive Governments of whatever political persuasion have let down the Chagossian people. We cannot turn back the clock to prevent what happened in the late 1960s or the 1970s, or what happened subsequent to then. But what we can try to do is ameliorate the situation.

Again, I would highlight three areas which we could look at. The first is the issue of democracy and self-determination, which was the subject of an earlier debate. The second area, which I think is the principal focus of this group of amendments, is how we can provide financial and practical support for the Chagossians. The third issue is the rights of resettlement of Chagossians. My two amendments deal specifically with the latter two.

Turning first to Amendment 38C, this highlights to the Government that there was an alternative way forward. The KPMG report that was produced in 2015, commissioned by a former Labour Prime Minister, put forward a potential pathway of progress as regards the Chagos Islands. My amendment, in the spirit of trying to be practical in terms of help, does not seek to go fully down that pathway or to reinstate the KPMG report. That is clearly something that the Government would reject, but there were a range of proposals within that report dealing with resettlement.

The cost highlighted in 2015 for implementing that report would, I think, have been about £400 million. Sadly, at that stage, the Government rejected that as being far too expensive. Whatever arguments we may have had at an earlier stage over the broader financial cost of this settlement, it seems to me that a solution which cost £400 million would have been very cheap compared with what we face in practice, no matter what figures we belie.

So it strikes me that, while we still have that sovereignty and control of the Chagos Islands, we should be facilitating that resettlement, because it is clear that the treaty agreement that we have reached does not give a right of resettlement to the Chagossians; it hands that lock, stock and barrel to the Mauritius Government. As I said at an earlier stage, I suspect that those who make the right noises towards the Mauritian Government may be able to resettle, while those who are deemed the “awkward squad” will not be able to go back to their homeland. It seems that the very least we can do is to make that provision while we still can for the resettlement of the Chagossian people.

Finally, Amendment 55 is, again, a probing amendment. We have rehearsed the broader financial position. It is clear that, in stark figures, £101 million will be paid per year to the Mauritius Government. We know that the disparity in terms of what that equates to as a total will vary between the Government’s assessment, using one particular calculation of £3.4 billion, and the main Opposition’s figure of £35 billion, but we know that vast sums will go directly to the Mauritian Government. Where we owe a duty of care in particular is to the Chagos Islanders: they should be our top priority when it comes to finance, but this amendment does not even go quite as far as that. We are simply saying that, financially, we want to ensure that there is at least a determination that what is provided is fair and equal towards the Chagos Islanders compared with Mauritius.

I have to say that there is deep concern over the £40 million trust fund. No doubt the Government will say that it is very well intended to provide direct support to the Chagossian people. However, by providing it in such a way that it is entirely within the Mauritian Government’s control, while Chagossians appear to have no particular leverage as to how it is spent, we do not know on what projects or on whom it will be spent. This is one opportunity, at least, to probe the Government on what actions are going to be taken to at least try to ensure equality of provision on that basis.

I look forward to the Minister’s summing up to see what practical measures the Government can take. For instance, will they accept that we monitor the situation closely through an equality assessment, or ensure that there are Chagossians put on any board that deals with the distribution of the money? The noble Baroness, Lady Foster, has suggested that there should be a reference group of Chagossians who could at least monitor this. If it simply becomes, effectively, a slush fund for the Mauritian Government to indulge whatever pet projects they want, under the guise of providing for the Chagossian people, without any direct input or control from them, we will simply have repeated the mistakes of history and let down the Chagossian people again.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 78 and in support of the amendments of the noble Lords, Lord Hay and Lord Weir, the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and my noble friend Lord Callanan. The crux of this debate is about ending the dream of return for most British Chagossians. As long as they were British citizens, there was always the possibility of resettlement, but we know that Mauritius denies their nationality, treats them as so many Mauritian citizens and is certain not to allow a general right of return to the Chagossian population.

One or two Chagossians who have said all the right things, as the noble Lord, Lord Weir, says, may be allowed back as part of that general migration, but we can be pretty certain that they will not be our fellow subjects watching now from the Gallery, stoical and silent, ignored and overlooked in a grisly symbol of these past five decades.

My amendment deals specifically with the rights of employment at the base, but I want to widen it a little to what would make an economically viable community in the Chagos Islands. The Minister has said several times at the Dispatch Box that our priority is maintaining the base and that by implication, therefore, we cannot do the right thing by the Chagossian population. I do not believe there is a contradiction. Maintaining sovereignty would meet both our strategic and our moral obligations of stewardship as the sovereign power and the focus of loyalty of the Chagossian population, and it is economically viable. We heard in our last debate that it could not happen because it was too far away, too distant and too expensive, but as we have just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Weir, it is a fraction of what we are paying in direct transfers to Mauritius, let alone any associated costs. We can take the Minister’s figures and say that it is six times more expensive to hand the archipelago away, or we can take my noble friend Lady Noakes’s figures and say that it is more like 60 times as expensive. Either way, it is extraordinary that we are not considering the option of resettlement.

I want to explore how that would work. I mentioned last week that the Falklands War was, paradoxically, the beginning of the economic revival of that archipelago because the regular link to the UK and the impact on the economy, as well as our readiness to start exploiting some of the resources, made an island that until then had been suffering from emigration viable and hugely attractive. It has nearly doubled its population since. At the moment we are flying in civilian contractors for all the non-military jobs on an occasional flight from Singapore. These contractors come from the Philippines, Sri Lanka or India, and they do the many non-military jobs on a base of that size—the construction, cooking, cleaning and so on. There is no reason why those jobs could not be done by local people. It would make sense both economically and in security terms, as well as giving a viable economic option to the British Chagossians who return.

But I would not want to leave your Lordships with the thought that this would be a population wholly dependent on the existence of the military base. That is not a position that anyone wants in the long term. It is not a position that the Falkland Islands would want to be in. We will come on to our other overseas territories in a later group, but the economy of Gibraltar has been transformed since the 1980s. Having been almost completely dependent for GDP on our naval base there, it has now become a hugely successful territory through private enterprise. There are lots of other things. What would those other things be? I have said before in this House that it is not for politicians to second-guess the private sector and I am conscious of sitting next to my noble friend Lord Moynihan, who has written a wonderful book making this point at greater length, but here are some ideas off the top of my head after conversations with British Chagossians who had been kicking around a couple of these ideas. Here are seven or eight ideas. Maybe one or two of them might be viable. That is all you would need.

First is the extraordinary marine resource. What about establishing a marine and oceanographic university on Peros Banhos? There has been a lot of interest from academic institutions here and elsewhere. Lancaster University, the University of Exeter, the University of Western Australia in Perth and Dalhousie in Canada have all been involved in ecological and maritime projects around the archipelago. Is it so unthinkable to have a permanent base there that in time could take visiting students and have accommodation for them?

Secondly, the obvious one is tourism. People put a great premium on both novelty and isolation. Here is the last undiscovered tourist archipelago. It can be reached by seaplane from the Maldives which, it is worth reminding ourselves, is closer to the Chagos Archipelago than either the Seychelles or Mauritius. It is perfectly feasible to see snorkelling, birdwatching, scuba-diving and exploration of the marine fauna becoming viable. There are wealthy people who would spend a great deal of money for the additional seclusion and the new frontier.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

This is all very fascinating. I hope we get back to Heligoland soon, and maybe the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, but I have to ask the noble Lord: where was he when his Government decided that the straightforward thing to do was to go for the cession of sovereignty?

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

I was a Member of the European Parliament, and I spoke out quite strongly against that Government. I hope the noble Lord knows me well enough to know that I was never a party line man. I thought it was an appalling thing to do then, and I still think it is an appalling thing to do.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

Yes, the previous Government set out to give sovereignty to Mauritius across the archipelago, but not necessarily on the sovereign base. In fact, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, has made it very clear that one of his red lines was protecting the sovereign base in perpetuity, as in Cyprus. That would have been a very plausible and popular decision.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

That was my understanding, but even that was too much for me. Even if we had been able to get continued sovereignty on the base and some kind of shared sovereignty on the outer atolls, that would still have been exchanging a freehold for a leasehold. It is a preposterous thing to do when we are being told to do it by a court that has expressly been denied jurisdiction in cases between Commonwealth states. We would be doing it, setting a terrible precedent, to satisfy a tribunal that has no authority.

I was very critical of the previous Government for countenancing these changes. I have told the people involved what I think of it. I am equally critical of this Government, as I suspect are quite a lot of the people on the Labour Benches. I look at the expressions of some noble Lords opposite. I know they are decent patriots and democrats, and I know they feel a sense of obligation to our dispossessed Chagossian colleagues. Of course, they have to do their duty, such is the essence of politics.

I finish by holding out the prospect—just the vision—of people coming back: of civilian and military life coming back; of stories told again by grandmothers under newly thatched roofs, their voices stitched with salt and memory; of footsteps remembering the pale coral paths; and of the islands themselves remembering their old inhabitants, as the tides remember the moon.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 31 standing in my name. I want to place on record my appreciation for the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, stepping in last week during the difficult situation I had back home. It again demonstrates clearly that, when you throw an awkward ball to a good player, he will pick it up, make you look good and carry on as if nothing has happened, but I appreciate his assistance in that instance.

I was about to say three lines on this amendment, but then I thought I was perhaps being too presumptuous, because I hoped that the Government, just by reading the amendment, would simply have said that there was no reason why they could not support it. I hope that that is exactly what they will say at the end of the debate, but I think I had better say more than just one or two lines in relation to it before sitting down.

Even if one accepted that it was just £101 million every year for 99 years and considered the proposition in its own terms, without regard for the preceding history, the contrast between this and a one-off payment of £40 million to the Chagossians conveys the message that, while the Mauritians are important and worthy of respect, the Chagossians are, by contrast, worthy only of a few crumbs from the table, relatively speaking, which is deeply hurtful and insulting.

Secondly, to really understand the injustice presented by the arrangement, it obviously needs to be seen in the context of history. The Chagossians do not, for the most part, regard themselves as Mauritian.

I have heard what the noble Lords, Lord Weir and Lord Jay, have said. As the noble Lord, Lord Weir, rightly said, across the United Kingdom there is a multiplicity of views on many issues, so it is difficult to get a concise, exact and single supporting view on this, but I will say these things anyway. In this context, the decision to also pay Mauritius a fantastically large sum of money for the use of just one of the Chagos Islands, while the Chagossians are afforded just £40 million, compounds the present injustice.

To appreciate the menacing nature of the way this monetary injustice greatly compounds the underlying injustice, one must point out that the monies for resettlement set out in the KPMG report are significantly less than the monies it is now proposed the Republic of Mauritius be paid for the UK to lease just one of the Chagos Islands.

Finally, the funding for the Chagossians is also important. Article 11 of the treaty undermines the UK Government’s argument for it by addressing the Chagossians apart from the Mauritians. They are, in effect, saying that it is right to return the islands to the Republic of Mauritius because the pre-8 November 1965 boundaries of the colony express the self-determination of the people of the territory, which implies that everyone, at least from a civic perspective, can be happily Mauritian. However, in that context, there would be no need to address the Chagossians separately and allocate payment to them. In addressing the Chagossians separately, the treaty, in effect, hoists itself with its own petard.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

I do not think that data is published anywhere, I am afraid. If it is, I shall provide it to the noble Lord.

I very much enjoyed the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, as I always do, but it is unjustifiable to define Chagossians as only those holding British Overseas Territories citizenship. I think that is what he was getting at. There are many Chagossians living in Mauritius, the Seychelles and beyond, and this would also exclude anyone who holds British citizenship, but not British Overseas Territories citizenship.

Amendment 20 from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, which is one of many that would require the Government to seek something from Mauritius, is not needed. We have already committed to making a Statement to Parliament—and I think it is right that we do this—on the modalities of the Chagossian trust fund and eligibility for resettlement. That is in large part a response to the considerable interest that there has been from noble Lords across the House in making sure that the trust fund is run properly and fairly.

Taking this together with Amendment 38A from the noble Lord, Lord Hay, on air travel to Diego Garcia, I say that, as we have said numerous times, the UK is taking forward planning for a programme of heritage visits for Chagossians to the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. These were paused in 2019 because of Covid, but we are working hard to reinstate them as soon as possible. Now, as then, these visits would include visits to key heritage sites. Specifically on the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Hay, there are no commercial flights to Diego Garcia, and nor would they be practical, as it is a working military base that is highly sensitive. Allowing commercial flights would interfere with the operational use of the base. Heritage visits in the past have often involved the use of charter aircraft and this may be the case for future visits also, but there is nothing in the treaty that would prevent this.

On Amendment 20C, noble Lords will recall that we debated the environmental impacts of the treaty and the marine protected area around the Chagos Archipelago last week. Both the UK and Mauritius are committed to protecting the unique environment around the islands. Noble Lords will be aware that on 2 November Mauritius issued a statement announcing the creation of a marine protected area once the treaty enters into force. No commercial fishing whatever will be allowed in any part of the MPA. Low levels of artisanal fishing, compatible with nature conservation or for subsistence of the Chagossian community, would be allowed in certain limited areas.

The noble Lord’s amendment seeks to delay the implementation of the Bill and the entry into force of the treaty. The treaty has already been reviewed by two Select Committees of this House. They have reported their findings and agreed that the treaty allows for positive environmental work, with the IAC welcoming

“the Government’s assurance that it will work closely with the Mauritian Government to establish a well-resourced and patrolled Marine Protected Area”.

Amendment 38C, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Weir, would require the Government to implement the resettlement recommendations of the 2015 KPMG study. The KPMG report, commissioned by the Conservative Government, concluded that resettling a civilian population permanently on BIOT would entail substantial and open-ended costs. The then Government ruled out resettlement, acknowledging the acute challenges and costs of developing anything equivalent to modern public services on remote and low-lying islands.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

Will the Minister confirm that there were three different options for how many people you would resettle, and the costs of all of them were substantially lower than the transfer payments that we are making to Mauritius alone under the current deal?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

That is correct, but those payments would not have paid for a legally secure operation of the base alongside our United States allies. Whatever legal geniuses we have opposite us today, those in the White House differed on the analysis now being put forward by the Conservative Party, which is clearly different from what they put forward in the not-so-distant past.

The agreement gives Mauritius the opportunity to develop a programme of resettlement on its own terms, without requiring the UK taxpayer to pick up the bill.

On Amendment 81G from the noble Lord, Lord Kempsell, as I and other Ministers have said on numerous occasions, it will be for Mauritius to establish a programme of resettlement once the treaty comes into force. I am very sympathetic to the way he put his case on this, but it would not be a good use of taxpayers’ money to keep reporting on something that is not in our gift to achieve. The Government are increasing their support to Chagossians living in the UK through new and existing projects. These include Chagossian-led community projects in Crawley and beyond, as well as education and English language support, and have involved the creation of a number of FCDO-funded full-time jobs for Chagossians. The noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, asked me about commitments on this going forward. We are committed to these at least until the end of this Parliament. He will understand that what happens beyond that may depend on decisions of Ministers in the future.

Amendment 31 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and Amendment 55 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Weir, ask for an equality impact assessment on the payments to be made by Mauritius to Chagossians. The Government have already released the public sector equality duty report relating to the treaty, which addresses all the issues around equalities and the impact assessment.

Amendment 50A tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, raises a really important issue. We do not think it is necessary to make provision for this in the Bill, but we understand her concern. As I said in my letter in relation to the first day of Committee, we will work with relevant authorities to ensure that official documentation reflects historic connections to the Chagos Archipelago wherever possible. British passports issued to Chagossians will continue to display their place of birth and, if they wish, those who already have British Overseas Territories citizenship status can hold a British passport reflecting their status as British Overseas Territories citizens. I am very sympathetic to the arguments put forward by the noble Baroness and commit to making diplomatic representations to the Government of Mauritius to ensure that place of birth is recorded accurately on documentation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

We can pick which Government are looking to lever in additional influence in the area. I am simply saying that China has a particular record of reaching agreements with other countries to—

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

Will the noble Lord confirm that, although it is true that Mauritius is not part of the belt and road initiative—the road thing would not really work, if you think about the geography—it was the first African country with which China signed a free trade agreement, and it has received a state visit from the President of China, which, given the population of Mauritius, would suggest something a little more unspoken than just trade between those two territories.

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

It is clear that the Chinese interests—and indeed those of other countries, which I think goes to the heart of why we are seeing this as a key strategic point of view—go beyond simply trying to create trading relationships. We know that Mauritius has around 1.3 million people, much smaller than even my own beloved Northern Ireland—but President Xi is not beating down the doors for a state visit to Belfast any time soon, as far as I am aware. Whether it is China, India or anyone else, whatever the assurances that are there, what are the practical implications and what can we do to assure ourselves that there will not be a level of mission creep?

I will continue very briefly, as I suppose time is moving on. Amendments 61 and 62 probe the position as regards airspace and maritime assurances. Again, this has been sold particularly on the basis of it being not simply the British position but the US position, so I think we need to see some level of joint assurance in relation to that. There has been a concern—and some level of suspicion, which I seek assurances that the Government can allay—that the position of the Americans has been effectively to go along with this treaty. There was, I think, a level of reluctance. It was reported initially that the Americans had given a level of lip service. I think we want to get a much greater level of reassurance that they have bought into this, rather than simply acquiescing with something that one of their allies has asked for. Specifically, as highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, there are some restrictions in terms of notification that seem to undermine the security implications.

For instance, if we look at the airspace side of things, there is a 12-mile zone around Diego Garcia, but airspace around the rest of the Chagos Islands is simply with Mauritius. On a maritime basis, we know that the treaty details that the archipelago waters, the territorial seas and the EEZ around the Chagos Islands are all within the control of Mauritius. Where there can be a level of restriction or interference on airspace or maritime boundaries, that can also create a concern. We seek assurances from government that what is being proposed—and this is a question of belt and braces—is actually going to provide the genuine level of defence. If so much else is potentially being sacrificed to bring about this deal, we need to make sure that we have something that is ironclad as regards our defences.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

It is probably best to let the Americans be the judge of their own best interests. They seem to be rather keen on this treaty and its ratification. The Secretary of State in Washington, who is also currently head of the National Security Council, called its conclusion a “monumental achievement”. He does not seem to be concerned that it might open the road to Chinese influence; nor do the Indians, who are, of course, close friends of the Mauritians and are as concerned as we and the Americans are about Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean. The treaty is seen as a barrier to that, not an opening to it.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

Of course, the noble Lord knows better than anyone that Governments do each other favours in these situations, and Heads of Government will sometimes say, “I need you to say the following”, but I am pretty sure the Secretary of State said at the beginning that he was extremely worried by what he described as a serious threat to our national security when the deal was first put forward.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Kempsell (Con)]

My Lords, I am more than happy to associate myself with the amendments tabled in the name of my noble friend Baroness Goldie. We started the group by saying that your Lordships’ House would consider it expeditiously, so I will be brief.

My full sympathy is with the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, in these matters. All I can say is that he must be speaking to different people in Washington DC than I am when it comes to the provisions of this treaty. Occasionally in your Lordships’ House, we hear extreme criticisms of the Government of the United States, and that is entirely justifiable from noble Lords who take that position, but it is impossible on the one hand to criticise the position of the Government of the United States or the way they conduct themselves and simultaneously to suggest that the United Kingdom should resile from seeking to renegotiate provisions in the treaty that are, on further reflection and discussion in your Lordships’ House, found to be wanting. There is no reason why the Government of the United Kingdom should resile from seeking to renegotiate elements of this treaty which are deficient, as is being exposed in the debate. The noble Lord, Lord Morrow, gave an interesting constitutional deposition on the ins and outs of that process.

I will confine my comments to my controversial Amendments 81F and 20F, which seek that renegotiation. My full sympathy is with Ministers opposite who are trying to steer a difficult Bill on a difficult issue into a safer port. My amendments come from the fact that it is incumbent on your Lordships’ House to look beyond the current security situation. The treaty and its Annex 1 are necessarily drafted in the context of the current security picture, but that security picture is dynamic, and it does not take much imagination to envisage a time very soon when Ministers find themselves in a completely changed security scenario; for example, in the Indo-Pacific and the wider Pacific region. What if a military superpower were to invade a neighbouring country and the requirements of the UK’s Armed Forces in their use of the base area and the wider contested issue of sovereignty over the Chagos Islands changed dramatically from the position today? That is why I support the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, on issues such as the notification of the Government of Mauritius, the third-party armed forces being present, and the placement of devices and installations.

My Amendment 20F seeks to take that a step further by looking into the future and saying there may well come a point at which Ministers feel, at the outbreak of hostilities more widely in the world, a pressure to derogate from the restrictive provisions of Annex 1. That is why I package it with Amendment 81F, which would take the unusual step of placing a requirement on the Government to notify Parliament should there be communications from the Government of Mauritius about the application of that annex in future. It is an issue of such public concern. More broadly, outside of your Lordships’ House, the public feel the treaty has been so poorly handled and drafted that these extraordinary provisions are required.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

My Lords, I will not detain the Committee for long, but I want to speak briefly to Amendments 20D, 20E and 20F from my noble friend Lord Kempsell and to Amendment 87 from my noble friend Lady Goldie. We have witnessed in recent decades an extraordinary alchemy in the South China Sea. Whole islands are called from the vasty deep, summoned like Brigadoon into existence, not by prayer but by the imperatives of Chinese geopolitics. Reefs are dredged into runways; lagoons are refashioned into naval installations; artificial islands are planted thickly with radar, missile systems and airstrips, and it is all done in the name of installing civilian infrastructure. None of those installations or airstrips is openly avowed as a military unit, so, when we hear that in this treaty there is an effective British veto for any kind of defence installation, I ask noble Lords to consider that no one is going to call it a defence installation. It is going to be done subtly, little by little, and it is going to be a much tougher proposition suddenly to object when we feel that a line has been crossed than at present when we have the unquestioned sovereignty over the entirety of the archipelago.

I did not want to misquote the US Secretary of State, so just after my exchange with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, I looked up what he said on taking office. In November of last year, he said that the deal

“poses a serious threat to our national security”.

Obviously, he has changed his tune; people are entitled to change their minds. I just invite noble Lords to ask why he might have changed his mind. Is it that he saw a blinding figure on the road to Damascus and heard a voice saying, “Go into Damascus”—I think Marco Rubio has changed his religion at least twice, so I mean no disrespect to our most important ally. Or is it not more likely that he has been worked on by this Government’s officials?

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

Could it not also be that when he came into office, he had not received the security briefings from his own intelligence services and possibly then he saw the importance of getting this deal and the permanency which it gives to both us and the United States?

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

It is a very good point. I think there is a divergence, exactly as in this country, between the permanent apparat and the rest of the country, which would explain why my noble friend Lord Kempsell and the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, are speaking to very different sets of people. As the German ambassador to London in 1914 said to his French counterpart, “You have your information, we have ours”. It seems that there is at least a debate in the United States about this, and you can see why. As my noble friend Lord Bellingham said, there is a real prospect down the line that a future Mauritian Government may take a very different attitude towards the presence in the outer atolls of powers that are unfriendly to us. We have no assurance that we will always be on friendly terms with that republic.

The world is imperfect, I understand that. The world is sublunary. We are dealing with lesser evils, as is usually the case in politics. But when the Minister has justified this treaty and the treatment of the Chagossians, she has always done so by saying, “Our priority was the security of the base”. I just ask noble Lords on all sides to consider how this makes us more secure in an imperfect world than we are at present. We have obvious sovereignty over the entire region at the moment. We have the great advantage of its isolation. There is no prospect of anybody taking a leased island and putting any kind of listening infrastructure or anything else nearby. How does moving from where we are now to what is proposed in this treaty make us more secure, even if we set aside all the wrongs being done to the Brits of Chagossian origin?

I thought the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, was on to something when he asked, “What if the Americans were to change sides?” But I am not sure that quite makes the point he intended. I just invite noble Lords to consider the wholly pecuniary terms in which Mauritius has considered this territory: not as part of its own demos, not as part of its own nation, but as an investment and a way of raising money—of paving its streets with gold, as my noble friend said earlier. Would it not be the ultimate humiliation if Mauritius were to trouser the sum of money that we are now paying it and then to turn around and sell the base to the United States? Where would that leave this Government? I would love to hear the Minister’s reply.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Coaker) (Lab)]

I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to an important set of amendments, and I thank them too for the way in which they have put those amendments. There is clearly some disagreement between us, but there is no disagreement over the fact that every single person in the Chamber is seeking to ensure that we protect the security of the nation and the security of Diego Garcia, and on the importance of that base to us. I start from that point. There were a couple of times when noble Lords almost seemed to question that. I do not question it at all. I do not agree with everything that has been said, but I do agree with the right to challenge how we take this forward, because out of that come better legislation and more clarity. While I do not agree with the need for some of the amendments, some of the comments that those amendments require to be made from the Dispatch Box are important. I wanted to set that context out for noble Lords.

I also just want to say this, because I think it is important. I do not want to have a Second Reading debate again but the noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord Beamish, and others have made this point: the Government, whatever the rights and wrongs, are trying to bring stability. The noble Lord, Lord Hannan, disagrees with the treaty, and it is fair for him to make that point, but the Government’s point of view is that we are trying to bring stability and certainty to an uncertain situation. The noble Lord disagrees with that, as do a number of noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. But that is the Government’s view. The Government’s view, in answer to the challenge the noble Lord raised, is that we are changing it because we are trying to bring certainty to an uncertain situation. We believe we have done that, and we have made certain that we have secured one of the most important military bases—if not the most important military base—for ourselves and the United States. The noble Lord does not accept that or agree with that, but that is the alternative proposition the Government are making.

It is really important, therefore, to say, in answer to the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Morrow and Lord Weir, and others, that we would not have gone forward with this were it not for the fact that the Americans support it. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, is right. We can say, “Well, the Americans said this” or “The Americans said that”. I am going to quote this, because I think it is really important. The US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, said that

“the United States welcomed the historic agreement between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Mauritius on the future of … the Chagos Archipelago … this agreement secures the long-term, stable and effective operation of the joint US-UK military facility at Diego Garcia. This is a critical asset for regional and global security … We value both parties’ dedication. The US looks forward to our continued joint work to ensure the success of our shared operations”.

That does not mean, as the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord Ahmad, and many others, said, there are not challenges to that and what it actually means in practice. But it is a pretty fundamental starting point for the UK Government to be able to directly quote US Secretary of State Rubio saying that the US supports what this Government are doing and taking forward. I lay that on the table as the context for trying to answer some of the points and considerations that have been made.

Some of the points and comments—I say to the noble Lords, Lord Morrow, Lord Weir and others, and even to an extent to the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey—are perhaps better dealt with in some of the other groups, particularly on the rights of the Chagossians. My noble friend Lady Chapman has answered on this at great length and will continue to do so as we move forward. That context is really important for the debate and the discussion we are having.

I will try to deal with some of the amendments. It will take a little while and I hope that noble Lords will bear with me. Amendment 18 from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, seeks to prevent the presence of non-UK and non-US civilian personnel in the Chagos Archipelago. The treaty gives the UK control over these matters. The security provisions were, as I have said, designed and tested at the highest level of the US security establishment, which supported us in proceeding with the deal.

On Amendment 34 from the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, let me be clear: the entire treaty is designed to preserve the UK’s ability to take the necessary steps to preserve the long-term, secure and effective operation of the base. Article 3(2)(c) states clearly that the UK has

“the full responsibility for the defence and security of Diego Garcia”.

Mauritius and other states should have no doubt—this is the importance of comments made here—about our willingness to exercise our responsibilities in a manner that ensures the long-term, secure and effective operation of the base.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Hannan of Kingsclere Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Rather than allowing the opinions of legal certainty to be constrained by the circumstances of the non-legally binding judgment, the Government’s approach going forward should be fully animated by appreciation of the following truths. First, it was just as wrong of us to split the colony that covered Mauritius and the islands before decolonisation without consulting the Chagossians, let alone providing them with self-determination, as it would have been to refuse to split the Gilbert and Ellice Islands before decolonisation after having afforded the Ellice Islands a self-determination referendum in which they elected to separate. Secondly, it was profoundly wrong for us to forcibly remove the Chagossians from the Chagos Islands between 1968 and 1973. It was and is profoundly wrong that, from 1973 until today, we have refused to return the Chagos Islands to the Chagossians. In this context, the Government should produce a report that considers all the legal ways forward. I submit that the one best equipped to provide unassailable legal certainty is to afford the Chagossian people a self-determination referendum and to implement its results. I beg to move.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow. I thank the Ministers for the patience and courtesy that they have displayed all evening. The two Ministers and the Whip know that they are among my favourite Peers, not just my favourite Government Front-Benchers, and they have been very patient and good-humoured.

I take issue with the idea that this is a done deal. That is an argument that has run through a lot of the debates and this seems to be the apt amendment on which to take it on. We have been told repeatedly—including by the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, last week, and again just before dinner by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard—that the treaty has been signed and been passed by the CRaG process and that therefore all this is, as it were, dancing after the music, and we would be exposing ourselves to a much more dangerous situation if we now try to hold it up.

I ask the Committee to ponder the possibility that the CRaG process has not in fact been a full democratic exercise. There has been no vote. Everything was rushed through from Second Reading in one day—there was no Report stage. I have never been a Member of the other place, unlike some of your Lordships present, but, as I understand it, you have a vote in the CRaG process by moving an amendment or a resolution and then voting for it. Looking online, I see that there is such an amendment, standing in the name of my right honourable friend the Leader of the Opposition and others, signed by 107 Members of the other place, from six political parties. I concede that that is not nearly as big a deal as it would have been a decade ago—there has been something of a splintering of parties. As yet, there has been no vote on it.

I mention this because the idea that therefore we have no option except to tweak statements at the margin and polish the edges of this, and cannot look for substantive changes, is fundamentally at odds with what was promised when the CRaG process was brought in. If the treaty was rushed through without debate in another place, surely the only proper scrutiny and the only proper chance of amendment is in this Chamber. Therefore, I hope that noble Lords on all sides will feel uninhibited when it comes to moving and, in due course, voting on substantive amendments. This is the one realistic opportunity that we have to make the points that would be made by the people from the Chagos Islands watching us now if they had a voice in our counsels.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, reminds us, this amendment gets to the core of the criticisms that have been levelled against the Government’s approach to this Bill so far. As my noble friend Lord Lilley pointed out numerous times during the debates on the first day in Committee, it is very difficult to see which court could have delivered a binding judgment against the UK on the question of sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago. Yet it is the repeated contention of the Government that this treaty is somehow essential to deliver legal certainty.

The question remains of which court could have delivered a binding judgment that would have threatened that legal certainty and the security of the military base. I hope that the Government can finally provide us with an answer. If they cannot answer that question then the argument that this treaty and this Bill were both necessary falls apart. Indeed, the argument that the treaty and the Bill are needed urgently also falls apart, and we should consider whether the Government should take a more circumspect approach. That is what the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, suggests.

If this treaty is necessary, Ministers must surely have considered other options before coming to this agreement with Mauritius. Perhaps the Minister can tell the Committee what consideration was given to resettlement of the Chagos Archipelago by Chagossians, for example. What would the cost have been for that? What is the difference between that cost figure and the true cost associated with this treaty? I say “true cost” because the Government’s initial claims on costs have now been thoroughly discredited.

There were lots of options that should have been considered, so perhaps the noble Baroness can tell us what options were in fact considered. I understand that these are specific questions about the process followed by Ministers before agreeing to the treaty with Mauritius, so if the noble Baroness cannot say with certainty what potential approaches were considered, perhaps she could write to us to confirm the details.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere]

20L: Clause 1, page 1, line 7, at end insert “, subject to subsection (2A).
(2A) Sections 2 to 4 do not come into force until the Secretary of State has produced a report assessing the potential implications for other British Overseas Territories that would arise from this Act and the Treaty.”

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

My Lord, I beg leave to propose my Amendments 20L, 20N and 20P. In the interests of brevity and immediacy, I will speak only on Amendment 20L, because I have covered the others in previous groups. This is the amendment that requires the Secretary of State to look at the impact of this treaty on other British Overseas Territories and the implications for their sovereignty.

Of course, we are always told in these situations by whoever is in government, “Oh, it’s a unique situation, you can’t compare”. On one level, that is a truism. Of course, all these situations are unique, yet I think it would be extremely naive not to consider the possibility that they will be fallen upon hungrily by people who want a change to the status quo. The idea that even now there are not politicians and lawyers in Buenos Aires or Madrid looking at the implications of this deal and saying, “How can we press this into the parallel arguments that we have for claims over British Overseas Territories?” is utterly fanciful.

They may already be putting out feelers to British lawyers, who seem very happy to work against the interests of the Crown on these questions. The representative of Mauritius in this case gave an interview in which he gloried in the fact that he lived in a country where you could humiliate the Government. If he is not available, perhaps by then the Attorney-General will no longer be in politics, or indeed perhaps the Prime Minister. They also both have long records of working on cases of this kind.

I suspect that the briefs that will be put in front of them will make the claim that Britain has now, in practice, for all that there was no jurisdiction, for all that it was an advisory ruling, for all that Commonwealth disputes were excluded, conceded this extraordinary and perilous precedent that, if a territory was at one time or another ruled from somewhere else, that establishes the basis of a sovereignty claim. I do not think it is completely fanciful for these elements in foreign countries to feel that they will be dealing with sympathetic elements within the United Kingdom.

Indeed, they have had experience of that. If we think of the experience of our relations with Argentina prior to the war in 1982, we can understand why the Argentines felt that Britain was going to move on the subject. We had the 1968 Anglo-Argentine memorandum, which expressly talked about sovereignty being on the agenda. We then had the persistent proposals throughout the 1970s for the leaseback arrangement, and then the withdrawal of HMS “Endurance”. Argentina is a country I know well, and indeed I have had the privilege of visiting the Falkland Islands as well. To this day, I am often told by Argentine politicians that Margaret Thatcher led them on to the punch—that Britain deliberately looked as though it was preparing to withdraw from the islands in order to provoke this conflict. I think that is nonsense. None the less, you can understand why they think that there are sympathetic elements here.

Similarly, if we look at relations between Britain and Madrid in the run-up to the Córdoba agreement over Gibraltar, the 1990s were a time of constant proposals from this side for some kind of joint sovereignty. It was only a referendum of the Gibraltarian people that put a stop to that process. By the way, it was a referendum that official Britain detested and for a long time did not reconcile itself to and ignored, until it became politically impossible and a new dispensation was reached. So, yes, this will be looked at in Buenos Aires and Madrid.

It will be looked at, I am sure, by those in Nicosia. They will think that there is an extremely close parallel there, in the sense that this is a military installation rather than an ethnically separate population. Again, they will say “This was ruled from somewhere else and we have a claim”. When I was a Member of the European Parliament, I would often get petitions and resolutions from Greek Cypriot MEPs raising the issue of the base.

What all these claims have in common is that final resolutions are never treated as final by the other party, any more than the final and binding resolution was with Mauritius in 1965. I do not want to bore noble Lords on this, but I feel it bears repetition. Mauritius trousered a large sum of money in exchange for perpetually renouncing any claim over the Chagos Islands.

In fact, there are very few British Overseas Territories that have not at some point been ruled from somewhere else. In addition to the ones I have mentioned, I was listing just now which ones have at some point had some other seat of government. Cayman, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Turks and Caicos, St Helena and Montserrat were all, at some point or another, ruled by someone else. All of them will be looking at this as a precedent and a claim.

What all our overseas territories have in common is that they are all content with their present status. The British Empire was unusual in the peaceful and voluntary nature of the way it was relinquished: not completely, not universally—there were tragic exceptions in Cyprus, India and Kenya—but they were the exceptions. They were not the rule. Decolonisation in Malaysia was a perfectly peaceful process, for example. The only argument was about whether the British should stay longer to defeat the Communist insurgents. It was a generally peaceful process in the Caribbean and in most of Africa, so the places that have stayed are the places that wanted to stay, and they made that very clear, in the cases of the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar in quite recent memory, with overwhelming referendums. It seems to me that they will now be looking to those referendums as their one shield: the only thing that potentially distinguishes them. But of course they will be vulnerable to the argument that, if we are treating Mauritius rather than the Chagos Islands as the unit, why should we not treat all of Cyprus as the unit, since that was once partitioned in a similar way at the time of independence? They will all be extremely alarmed by that precedent.

It seems to me there is only one way of reassuring these countries, which is to allow a referendum of the Chagossians, dispersed and scattered as they may be. Then, if the Chagossians vote in favour, it does not matter. We would not be setting any precedent. We would be following the principle of self-determination. If the Chagossians vote to be Mauritian, that is of no concern to Gibraltarians or Falkland Islanders or anyone else, because the principle of self-determination would be upheld. But at least let us give them the vote.

We are privileged in this country to be custodians, stewards, of a largely maritime sovereign area. If we put together the oceans around our overseas territories, they are about the same size as India. We are in charge of some of the richest and most important marine environments, and that is our real string of pearls. The pearls are there because in every case they want to be on the string. Let us not set the precedent of tearing one of those pearls off and hurling it away in defiance of the wishes of the people most involved. I beg to move.

[Lord Jay of Ewelme (CB)]

My Lords, in his remarks, the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, has tried to pre-empt the comments that I was about to make. I remember well the Falklands War in 1982. I remember many negotiations with Spain about Gibraltar. I remember the struggles with China over Hong Kong. I remember discussions about the future of the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands—both of which I have visited—as well as discussions about the future of St Helena, Ascension, Tristan da Cunha, Anguilla and the sovereign territories in Cyprus. In each case, the discussions took place on the basis of the interests of each sovereign territory concerned and I believe that that will remain the case. I cannot see why this treaty over the British Indian Ocean islands and the Chagos Islands will affect the discussions that we will have with our other overseas territories about their futures. I think that the situation will remain as it has been in the past, so I do not feel that I can support this amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Hannan.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, I accept that about the ICJ, but the point is that other countries will act on an advisory opinion even if we choose to ignore it. We have not chosen to ignore it. That is a judgment call. Partly, that is because we think that, by negotiating now, we negotiate from a stronger position than we would have had we waited for other, binding judgments. Those judgments can come from any treaty to which both parties are signed up. That is why we feel—and not everyone has to agree with the Government on this—that there is sufficient legal question that we needed to act and to negotiate. If they are honest with themselves—there is a lack of former Ministers who were responsible for this arguing the point that the noble Lord makes; they argue other points but not this one—there was sufficient legal jeopardy for the previous Government to enter into this process. I hope noble Lords will withdraw their amendments.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

I am grateful to the Minister for dealing so comprehensively with all those points, and to all noble Lords who contributed: the noble Baronesses, Lady Hoey and Lady Ludford, my noble friends Lord Bellingham and Lord Lilley, the noble Lords, Lord Weir and Lord Purvis, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu.

On finality, almost all treaties are said to be final at the time but they are not always treated as final by one or both parties. The treaty of Utrecht was pretty final. It said that Spain would have first refusal if Britain ever left, but it was pretty final about granting sovereignty. I absolutely agree, as the Minister says, that Spain has now agreed to a permanent settlement, but it is one of many, and experience tells us that incoming Governments do not always regard treaties signed by their predecessors as final. Indeed, the treaty we signed when Mauritius became independent and renounced all claim to the Chagos Islands was said to be permanent at the time, so I am less reassured than I think she hoped I might have been.

Let me put it the other way around: the way to make these treaties final is to stop inviting people, through our behaviour, to reopen them—to refuse to countenance it. The French had a very similar issue in the Comoros; they just refused to countenance it. I cannot see any other country doing what we are doing now. Indeed, I am afraid to say I cannot see any British Government other than this one having done it.

I do not want to get into the whole history of the Malayan emergency, but there is a wonderful record that, when Malaysia became independent, one of the first acts of the new Government was to give some very valuable land containing the house called Carcosa Seri Negara—a very fine house—to Britain in perpetuity as sovereign British territory. It became the seat of the high commission in Kuala Lumpur in recognition of all the things that we had done together. A young anti-colonialist Minister said, “But if we give them the best land in KL, no one will believe that we fought for our independence”, and there was a rather awkward moment around the Cabinet table because, of course, they did not: we were in Malaya supporting a democratic Government against a communist insurgency. We would have left much earlier had we not had the requests of that Government to remain and support them. That is getting slightly off topic so, with your Lordships’ permission, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 20L withdrawn.

Moved by

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere]

20M: Clause 1, page 1, line 7, at end insert “, subject to subsection (2A).
(2A) Sections 2 to 4 do not come into force until the Secretary of State has produced a report assessing the impact of Article 6 of the Treaty and the transfer of sovereignty under this Act on Chagossian civic identity.”

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

My Lords, nationality has two distinct meanings: it is what it says on our passports, but it is also what we feel. The second of those, the sense of identity and belonging, of being a link in a chain between past and future generations, can be unconnected to territory.

Perhaps the supreme example of nationality that exists in the heart is the State of Israel. History affords few stories like it: a people who for 2,000 years were stateless and scattered but never lost the aspiration of statehood—“Next year in Jerusalem”. Then, one day, quite extraordinarily and almost providentially, they fulfilled it. The British Government recognised a claim of nationality based on cultural, ethnic and religious homogeneity, even though it had been unrelated to territory since time immemorial.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

There have been legal judgments in English courts and elsewhere that have established that the right that the noble Baroness’s amendment seeks to grant to the Chagossian people does not currently exist in law. It is not guidance. Those are decisions of English courts. I hope that, with that, the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

I thank the Minister. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, and the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, who were diligent and eloquent in their defence of the dispossessed Chagossians. Sometimes people approach the story of Britain overseas as a kind of morality play where Britain plays the villain, the Alan Rickman of the global drama. We heard a hint of it, I think, from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, in the previous round. Every disengagement was somehow disagreeable. Here, the disagreeable thing is pulling out in a way that disregards the wishes of the people who have been most injured. I was grateful to the Minister for making the clarification on birth certificates. She is doing enormously well defending this position, I have to say. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 20M withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, as some comments were made on the previous day in Committee about how few Members there were on the Government Benches, I thought it might be nice to say how pleased I am to see so many tonight. I am sorry that the Lib Dems still have not produced many people, but anyway: it is very nice to see so many people.

Amendment 47 is a stand-alone amendment, which again does not really affect the security aspects of Diego Garcia or the treaty in the sense of changing it hugely. It asks the Secretary of State to

“produce a report projecting the population growth of the Chagossian people over the next 30 years, including their global diaspora, and the impact of this Act upon that projected growth, and assess the implications for international recognition of their national identity”.

One of the Government’s recent arguments for the treaty and the Bill is that the Americans want it. They have explained that the United States is troubled about having a military base on an island with contested sovereignty, and that it has said that until matters are resolved and there is legal certainty, it will not invest in the base. That is probably précising the argument. The Government argue that the treaty and the Bill will deliver the requisite legal certainty. The argument is based on the assumption, if this Bill becomes an Act and the Mauritius treaty can then be ratified, that all the legal uncertainties will be put to bed.

It is my contention in moving Amendment 47 that if this Act passes and the Mauritius treaty is ratified—two things I very much hope will still not happen—all that will happen is that one legal uncertainty will be replaced by another, and the Americans will have made no progress towards getting that certainty. Instead of the uncertainty arising from the Republic of Mauritius contesting United Kingdom sovereignty over the islands, we will be presented with the uncertainty that arises from the Chagossian people contesting the Republic of Mauritius’s sovereignty. I get the sense that, in removing the basis for Chagossians living in the United Kingdom to continue to enjoy British Overseas Territory citizenship after the passage of this Act, there is a desire to try to collapse Chagossian civic identity into British civic identity, to the extent that Chagossians reside in the UK, so that distinctive Chagossian civic identity disappears.

The truth, however, is that the identity of the Chagossian community in exile will not go away, resting as it does principally across three states: the United Kingdom, Mauritius and the Seychelles. The number of Chagossians is increasing and they are becoming more animated in their commitment to securing self-determination as a people defined, even in exile, by their relationship to their islands.

There is a sense that, until this point, the impact of the Chagossian identity in international relations has been somewhat muted, in that their desire is not to be returned to their islands to become a sovereign, independent state. The Chagossians who issued the statement of self-determination, who have written to us and whom we have met, were very clear on this point. Since they see themselves as connected to the UK, there has never been a need hitherto for them to assert their identity and seek international personality to claim the islands. This will change completely if the islands are transferred to the Republic of Mauritius. Even while the United Kingdom has shamefully failed to resettle the islands, they have remained under British sovereignty, which over 99% of well over 3,000 Chagossians are recorded as saying that they want. Obviously, they do not want things as they are at present, but to be resettled.

In this context, the contention of my amendment is that the Government and the United States of America need to think carefully about what is likely to happen to the Chagossians as a people in exile. I believe that, rather than allowing themselves to be absorbed into other countries, they will continue increasing in number and adopting an ever-stronger and more resilient identity, and that in times to come we will look back on this Bill and this treaty, if it goes through, as something that has made even more uncertainty over Diego Garcia. I beg to move.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey. It would be interesting not only to look at the future projections of the population of Chagossians but to have a proper, full-on demographic study of this unique people. We heard it asserted again by the Minister, in a very embarrassed and regretful tone, that there was no population and the people do not really exist, “This may not be my view but it is the view of the courts”, and so on. It is worth spending a moment reminding ourselves of who these people are, some of whom—to remind noble Lords opposite who have just turned up—are observing this debate.

There was a unique inheritance in the Chagos Archipelago. The population came from both directions: largely from Africa—from Madagascar, which has its own unique demographics, east Africa and Mozambique—as indentured labourers from the Indian subcontinent, from Bihar, Tamil Nadu, Bengal and Ceylon to some degree, and a little bit from France. This is reflected in a unique linguistic tradition. I have listened, over many years representing the part of Sussex where most British Chagossians live, to the Bourbonnais Creole. There is a kind of French spoken throughout the Indian Ocean, in the Seychelles and in Mauritius, but Chagossian French is clearly distinct. It is not simply a dialect of Mauritian French. There are very different words. For example, a boat is a “pirog” rather than a “bato”, and a net is a “lagoni” rather than a “rezou”. My apologies to any watching Chagossians for my pronunciation. There is a unique and distinctive oral tradition, rich in nautical metaphors and especially in longing, melancholy and a sense of exile.

In the grey and unpromising streets of Crawley—I mean no disrespect to Crawley, which is part of my old patch—people have worked to keep alive these old folkways and traditions. They are focused on the sense of longing and return. There are ritual incantations that mention the villages now lost. There are special celebrations and meals marking what was taken away. A sense of exile can become a central part of your identity as a people. We have seen it happen many times. I invite noble Lords to recall the words of Psalm 137:

“If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, Let my right hand forget her cunning …let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth, If I remember thee not”.


With every passing year, it becomes a stronger part of your identity as a people.

All this is by way of saying that the idea that once this treaty is signed and a couple of signatures are exchanged, the people of Chagos will forget their identity, blend happily into the Mauritian population and become just one more exiled group with no more prospect of returning home is an utter fantasy. We will have replaced a legalistic dispute with a much more visceral one, which will carry on for as long as there are people who still remember the noise of the surf and swell of the archipelago. Those people will press every future Government for their right to return not as Mauritian citizens but as what they are asking for now, Chagossians under British sovereignty. Eventually, they will get a Government who honour their wish.

[The Earl of Leicester (Con)]

My Lords, in this amendment, we are talking about a democratic study of the Chagossian people. However, I want to speak about a matter that has been mentioned briefly by my noble friend Lord Callanan and that goes to the very heart of democratic integrity and the dignity of an entire people.

I wish to address a survey issued by the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee that aims to capture

“Chagossian views on the Agreement with Mauritius concerning the Chagos Archipelago”.

This survey cannot be relied on. It is methodologically flawed, structurally careless, open to manipulation and in several aspects dangerously misleading. The Chagossian people, who have endured decades of dispossession, displacement and injustice, deserve far better than an instrument that falls short at every level.

First, on the technical design, the survey is hosted on Microsoft Forms, a rudimentary platform that any undergraduate research supervisor would reject for a project involving even minimal verification. There are no safeguards against duplicate submissions, no protection against cyber manipulation, no identity checks and no mechanism whatever to confirm whether a respondent is actually Chagossian. For a survey that concerns sovereignty, citizenship, resettlement and the legacy of one of the gravest forced removals in modern British history, this is astonishing. It leaves the process exposed to interference by anyone, anywhere, with any motive.

Unfortunately, that is not a theoretical risk. The survey still has a week to run, and we already have deeply troubling reports from Mauritius. There are claims, supported by video evidence which I have seen and direct testimonials, that Mauritian officials and intermediaries have been filling out the survey on behalf of Chagossians who cannot read English, cannot understand the political implications and cannot write their own responses.

Even more seriously, multiple Chagossians have told us that they oppose the agreement with Mauritius yet believe that they have been marked down as supporting it in this survey. If this is true, then a foreign Government are, in effect, interfering with a House of Lords committee’s evidence-gathering process. Not only does this compromise the validity of the survey but it threatens the independence and integrity of Parliament itself. Let us be absolutely clear: this is not a consultation but contamination.

Let me take your Lordships through some of the survey questions. It begins with text that states that:

“A new law implementing the Agreement is currently being debated … and members of the House of Lords want to hear … opinions … before voting on it”.


What it does not say—and very much ought to—is that this agreement is not yet in force, that ratification is required and that Parliament can still reject it. The omission is misleading and may lead many to believe the treaty is inevitable. When you are asking a displaced people about the fate of their homeland, clarity is not optional; it is essential.

The survey repeatedly instructs respondents not to provide any identifying information. At the same time, it allows anyone in the world to submit answers as many times as they like, with no checks. There is no way to confirm whether responses come from Chagossians, non-Chagossians, organised political activists or even automated submissions. I have personally seen a text message from a high-ranking Mauritius official stating:

“My guys in the Mauritian Government are”—


I will change the wording—very worried.

“They are planning for civil unrest when they cancel the tax cuts”.

It is clear what the Mauritians want. For a consultation that claims to express Chagossian views, this alone renders the entire exercise invalid.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 82, which is consequential upon Amendment 80. As the Minister referred to before, Amendment 80 had attracted some flattering imitation yesterday, but nevertheless I hope that we might be able to see progress on what I would consider to be a serious proposal to address some of the concerns that have been raised very sincerely. As the noble Lord, Lord Jay, said earlier, we have a lot of history to make good, and I agree.

This has been an unusual Committee stage of a Bill in many respects. Perhaps it is because this legislation and the treaty that it is connected to will have, unlike some other legislation that we often might consider to be indirect, a direct impact on people’s lives. They are a defined but diverse group of individuals who have been in touch with many noble Lords. Therefore, I believe that we have an obligation to treat this seriously. In Committee, there have been many passionate, but also proper and probing, questions on how the terms of the treaty will operate and how UK interests will also continue to be represented. We have just heard that from the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, and we heard it earlier from the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad.

Amendment 80 in my name is a proposition for an ongoing inter-parliamentary committee for the duration of the treaty. The Minister mentioned before that she felt it was perhaps a novel response. It is not entirely novel; there are precedents which I have based this on. There have been quite frequently free trade agreements that had parliamentary committees associated with them. There is the EFTA agreement, which the UK had been part of. There was the AWEPA for our African partners in parliaments, which we had been part of. There is doubt from many about how critical parts of the treaty negotiated by this Government will be handled, both by the UK and the Mauritian Governments, and operate through the commission.

We have heard many references today to the deeply flawed Constitutional Reform and Governance Act. It was fascinating for me to listen to this debate, because this House in 2021 passed a Motion—it happened to be in my name—about the ability for Parliament to have a straight up-and-down vote on treaties. The House passed an amendment to the then Trade Bill which stated that negotiating objectives or before-treaty negotiations would have to be presented to both Houses, and the House of Commons would have an opportunity to vote on those. I believe that those aspects would have been beneficial for this treaty. I think the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, forgot that he voted against that, so I am happy to remind him, just for the record, that on the latter part—on the first part, he was not in the House—in one of his very first votes in this House, he was against what he has been arguing so passionately for today.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

My point is that there has not been a vote in the other place, so the only proper chance is here.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

No, the case that the noble Lord was making passionately was about the faults in the CRaG process, and I agree with him about that. It is just that if he had not had his view, with his noble friends, in 2021, we would have had the enhanced processes for treaty scrutiny.

However, we are we are because the current Government were supportive of changing the CRaG process for up-down votes on treaties, and now they are against. The Opposition, who had been against then, are now in favour of it. It probably has to do with whoever is sitting on the government side of the House, rather than the opposition side, but we are where we are now. The issue is how we go forward, to some extent. That is not denying that there is still Report stage, and there will still be divisions potentially, but I wanted to flag at this stage, in Committee, the proposal to try to address some of the major concerns.

Before briefly addressing that specific part of the amendment, I want to put something on record, as there have been quite a few allusions today to the notion that the negotiations on this treaty were halted by the previous Administration. In a letter to the Foreign Affairs Committee from the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton, on 5 April 2024—just seven weeks before the Dissolution of Parliament—he reaffirmed that negotiations were ongoing and that questions on the future administration of the islands were subject to the ongoing bilateral negotiations between the UK and Mauritius. He also said in the letter:

“We will continue to update Chagossians as negotiations progress”.


The negotiations were ongoing at the time of the election. It is worth stating that on the record, because there has been quite a bit of misleading information today. It is interesting that the Foreign Affairs Committee had been making the case since 2008 for a strong moral case for resettlement. That was denied again in the letter from the Foreign Secretary in April 2024.

We have a moral duty to try to ensure that, whatever circumstances arise from the parliamentary proceedings, we have a mechanism by which we allow the Chagossian community to be represented. Through Amendment 80, my proposal is for an inter-parliamentary committee, with MPs from the Republic of Mauritius and MPs from the UK forming a committee for the duration of the treaty. We know, and I agree with much of what has been said today, that trust is low to non-existent among many in the Chagossian community and suspicion is very high. I acknowledge all of that. A means by which that can perhaps be addressed as the treaty is implemented, if it is brought into force, is one where UK and Mauritian parliamentarians, through dialogue, debate and mutual understanding, can observe and scrutinise their respective Executives. Back in their Parliaments, they can scrutinise how the treaty is operating, the implementation of the treaty, whether rights of return are being implemented, the right to self-determination as understood in customary international law, and access to compensation, resettlement and other forms of support.

The commission in the treaty is executive but this would add a parliamentary oversight function, which I believe would be of value. I hope that the amendment will receive cross-party support. I am open to discussing its particular wording, but I hope that the principle will receive support. We owe a moral duty to that community for ongoing representations to address their concerns and suspicions. I therefore beg to move Amendment 80.

Caribbean: US Military Action

Lord Hannan of Kingsclere Excerpts

Wednesday 12th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The Government have not been coy at all in saying that international law should be adhered to. They have not been coy at all in what they have said about adherence to the UN charter and its principles. What I am trying to do, as a responsible Minister in a responsible Government, is deal with a difficult international situation and to say we have to be careful about what we say in terms of intelligence sharing. It is not in anybody’s interest sometimes to discuss these matters in the open, but what is important is for us to lay out the principles that the UK Government operate according to, and that is what I have done.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

My Lords, His Majesty’s Government quite properly did not recognise the last Venezuelan election, which was marred by fraud and widespread human rights abuses. I ask the Minister whether, consistent with that decision, His Majesty’s Government have plans to make available the interest from the Venezuelan gold reserves in the Bank of England to the legitimate Government of Edmundo González, and whether they have any plans to evict the Chavista squatters from the Venezuelan embassy on the Cromwell Road.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I do not know the answer to some of what the noble Lord has just said, and I do not think I even understand part of it; I have no idea of the road he has talked about, for example. I will review it and get back to him.

I will just lay out what the UK’s Venezuela policy is, because I think it is important to put this on the record: “Nicolás Maduro’s claim to power is fraudulent. The UK continues to call on the Venezuelan authorities to publish the results of the 2024 presidential election in full. This Government announced sanctions against 15 members of the Maduro regime last year, and the UK will continue to work with our international partners to achieve a negotiated transition in Venezuela. That is the only solution which ensures that the will of all Venezuelans is respected”. That is the position of the Government. I hope that in part explains to the noble Lord what our position is, and more generally informs the House as well.

Diego Garcia Military Base

Lord Hannan of Kingsclere Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord very much for that. That means there are two of us in this Chamber. For any journalists reporting this, that is a joke—just to ensure we have clarity. Seriously, I thank the noble Lord. At the end of the day—this is the point about scrutiny—the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, has done nothing but shake his head the whole debate. There is a legitimate debate and discussion to take place. The noble Lord has articulated a point of view that says this is essentially a sell-out. I take the view that, on the contrary, it is nothing like that. It is a Government taking seriously their responsibility to try to come to an agreement in difficult circumstances, as we have heard from some of the questions, and negotiate with the Mauritian Government to protect a base of huge, vital strategic significance.

The noble Lord does not agree with the vital strategic significance, but we have sought to protect it through a treaty that we believe helps guarantee that and will guarantee it. For those who oppose it, I repeat that there is judicial jeopardy and no certainty that the base can be protected. The idea that we can just ignore international judicial opinion and not worry about where that may take us is not the right way forward. The challenge the noble Earl made, and the one I have heard time and again, is that nobody supports this and it makes us a pariah internationally. I read out statements from many of our most significant partners and allies, including the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and India. All those countries said they support the arrangement and the deal we have come to.

The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, may propose a fatal Motion—he is entitled to do it; I am not saying he should not, and he will anyway. My point is that Secretary Hegseth, Secretary Rubio, the Indian Government, the Japanese Government, the Australian Government, the New Zealand Government and many others all support it. Those who oppose the deal will have to say why they are opposed to something supported by all those. They will say, “Because China is the real voice”. Let me say this: China can say what it wants. This Government know the malign influence of China, as the previous Government did. None of us needs any lectures about standing up to the Chinese, and we will.

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

Perhaps I might take the Minister back to the questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, about the wrong that was done to the Chagossians, and the agency and will of the Chagossian diaspora population. The Minister said at the beginning that they were divided, which is of course true—they are not a single block. I think it would address concerns on all sides of this House if this deal were made subject to a consultative referendum among the Chagossian population. Noble Lords may say that that is difficult to do because they are scattered—some are in the Seychelles and some are in Mauritius—but it is not logistically impossible. I voted not long ago on who should be the next chancellor of the University of Oxford—I voted for the noble Lord, Lord Hague—and there were people on five continents for that. You establish your credentials and then you vote, so I do not think it would be logistically unfeasible. If the Chagossian people voted for it, I think people would get behind it. Will the Minister consider giving a voice to the people who have more at stake here than anybody else?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord for his question. The answer is no. The British Government have made, and will make, their case. The treaty that has been agreed will be subject to parliamentary approval, and there will be a debate on it. No doubt the noble Lord will be able to put forward that point of view at some point. But the British Government have taken a decision on the basis of our national security and the geopolitical security of that region and beyond. Let us be clear: some of what happens at Diego Garcia has implications reaching far beyond the region, and the noble Earl, Lord Minto, the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, and many others here will know that. The geopolitical significance of Diego Garcia is not linked just to that region; it has a global impact. As the noble Lord will know, Governments sometimes have to make very real and difficult decisions and, in the interests of the geopolitical needs of our nation and those of our friends —to combat China and others—we have taken the decision to ensure, through this treaty, that we protect the integrity and future of the Diego Garcia base so that it can continue to operate in the interests that we all share: democracy, human rights and the international rules-based order.

Relations with Europe

Lord Hannan of Kingsclere Excerpts

Thursday 10th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for introducing the debate and I add my voice to those congratulating the noble Baroness, Lady Hodge. Her great experience in local and national government and in the private sector, as well as that extra dimension and perspective that comes from seeing this country from the outside as well as the inside, will surely continue to elevate and enrich your Lordships’ counsels.

This is going to be unpopular, but there are two fundamental misunderstandings when we talk about our relationship with the EU. The first is that the EU is behaving as a rational economic actor interested in maximising the benefits for its citizens. Of course there are people in the European Commission who think that way, and there are many in the national capitals who do so, but there are also many who are still resentful about the referendum result, whose judgment is clouded by emotion, who see Brexit as a sin that needs excommunication and who look on this country rather as China does on Taiwan: as a kind of renegade province that needs to be brought to heel.

That leads to the second misunderstanding, which is the implication that has run through a number of the speeches today: that somehow the remaining blockages and shortfalls in the TCA were all a result of Tory standoffishness. I just do not think you can look at the story of the negotiations and credibly claim that. Where we have imbalances—for example, the way in which EU nationals can use our eGates but not the other way around, or the way in which we grant equivalence to financial services companies from Europe without any reciprocity—the blockages were not on our side. On the issue that the noble Baroness, Lady Bonham-Carter, just raised, the United Kingdom does give visa-free access to touring artists, for a long time if they are on expenses and for a slightly shorter time if they are being paid, but the blockage, again, is not on our side.

I am afraid there are some people in this House who will always blame Britain, never Brussels, regardless of where the problem lies, but it is not the UK Government who can fix this. I think that this Government will learn what the last one did, which is that the EU is conditioned to say, “No cherry picking; you cannot have your cake and eat it”, whatever we come up with, even if we are coming to it with precisely what it has just been asking for. We found this during the talks. In September 2018 at Salzburg, Theresa May came to the EU with the kind of deal that it should have bitten our arm off for, promising to follow all the rules and pay for the privilege—but it replied, “No cherry picking. You’re a third country, you’re going to have to be treated like a third country; take a Canada-type deal”. A year later, Boris Johnson said, “Okay, fine”, and it replied, “Oh, no, you can’t have a Canada-type deal because you have to regulate”. I am afraid that there is a certain conditioning that is not prepared to engage in productive bilateral talks. We need to understand that.

I can understand how the new Government came in, as many previous ones have done, and said, “We’re going to reset by offering all these things that the EU has been asking for: a new deal on energy, a new deal on chemicals and a new deal on defence”. But again, instead of pocketing those concessions or saying, “That’s great; quick, grab those things before the Brits change their minds”, the EU came back with a list of counterdemands, as though we were not offering concessions but rather making demands. Actually, who is the bigger beneficiary of these things? Yes, both sides would gain from an energy deal, but particularly those countries that we kept warm during the last winter when their Russian gas supplies ended. Yes, a mutual deal on the recognition of qualifications would help both sides, but there are many more EU professionals here than the other way around. On defence, I have to say, frankly, that there is not a scenario where we will be menaced by a Russian army from across the channel. We are not the demandeurs here.

The worst possible attitude with which to enter negotiations is some kind of need, or perceived need, to atone for the referendum result. The sooner we look at our actual, practical national interests, the better for both sides.