(5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we are at Third Reading and this is not a time for long speeches, but I want to congratulate my noble friend and his colleagues on having listened to what was said. He remarked that I had gone from moving a regret amendment to signing an amendment. I gently point out that it is not me who has moved position.
I am struck by how the attempts to get this dealt with under both the Media Bill and this Bill came across the problems of the Long Title of the Bill and getting it in order. Going from an amendment that was 16 lines long to one that is 16 pages long tells us how much hard work has gone into this with the civil servants in both departments that are affected. It is fashionable to be rude about this place and the work it does, which I believe is outstanding, but it is even more fashionable these days, even among some Ministers, to criticise the Civil Service. To turn this around in this period, and to do it with such diligence and careful consideration, is a great tribute to the officials in those departments. It just goes to show that, contrary to what is believed, if Ministers give a clear view of what needs to be done, the Civil Service is more than capable of delivering that.
The noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, has done a fantastic job on this. I agree with everything that she said, and I see no need to repeat it. My understanding—I am very conscious of Pepper v Hart here—is that what the Minister has said from the Dispatch Box is absolutely clear. I have to say that, when I read the amendment, I thought, “Is this secondary legislation a Maginot line that will enable a future Government to get around the clear principle that no foreign Government should be able to own or influence in any way a newspaper or a news magazine?” The words that have been stated from the Dispatch Box make me confident that that is not the position. That has to be right. After yesterday’s events, it is inconceivable that the Chinese Government could own 1% or even one share of a British newspaper.
The carve-out is sensible, if sensibly applied, and there will be an opportunity for this House and the other place to consider it. I very much look forward to this legislation receiving Royal Assent, which will mean that there is a complete ban on any foreign Government having either ownership or influence over our press. That must be right in a free and democratic society.
My Lords, I also pay tribute to the Government, Ministers, officials and lawyers for their speedy response to the amendment put down on Report by the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, and others. I declare an interest as the chair of the Independent Press Standards Organisation, which regulates 95% of the printed press and its online manifestations.
I shared with many other noble Lords concern about the prospective acquisition of the Daily Telegraph and the Spectator by the United Arab Emirates—or at least the acquisition of a substantial part of those important titles. It seems to me that this amendment will make this sort of acquisition much more difficult, if not impossible, as soon as the Bill becomes law.
I agree with other noble Lords that it is most important in framing the necessary secondary legislation that the driving principle behind the amendment, which is to prevent foreign state ownership of newspapers, is reflected appropriately. There is a risk that too tightly drawn definitions might catch wholly benign investors who might have a very modest and non-active interest in newspaper organisations. Sovereign wealth funds have already been mentioned, and the noble Lord has given assurances in this area. I do not entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, in his citation of Pepper v Hart and its importance, but none the less we will be much reassured by anything the Minister might say. I also ask him to consider the position of banks which may provide a newspaper organisation’s finance. Banks are often part of a consortium, and one part of a consortium may well be a bank with a connection to a foreign state. It is important that that is not captured.
There has been a deliberate choice by those drafting these amendments to change the language of the Enterprise Act 2002, which speaks of “material influence” to provide in the amendment that a relevant merger situation arises where one party acquires “influence” over another. That is plainly a much lower bar. I imagine that the change is designed to protect against somewhat unconvincing assertions by prospective acquirers of an interest in newspapers that editorial independence is protected by some form of editorial board or other Chinese wall. I welcome the Minister’s clarification on this.
The definition of a newspaper in the amendment is,
“a news publication circulating wholly or mainly in the United Kingdom or in a part of the United Kingdom on any periodic basis”.
That seems to exclude news websites or broadcasters. News websites are increasingly a source of news for consumers, many whom have deserted conventional newspaper models. It may be that more power and influence can in fact be obtained there than in the traditional format. I hope that the Minister can continue to reassure the House that these websites are in the Government’s sights, simply on the basis of consistency. I venture to suggest that the Media Bill might provide an appropriate parent for relevant provisions to bring websites into the same category as newspapers. I welcome clarification on that.
The provisions make it clear that the Secretary of State must—I emphasise the word “must”—
“make an order … reversing or preventing … the foreign state newspaper merger situation”.
There is no discretion here. That makes it all the more important that any exemptions should provide that remote or benign interest in newspapers by various emanations of foreign states will not necessarily fall foul of these provisions.
I would like to make it clear that I am entirely in favour of the thinking which animates this amendment, but it is inevitable that when an amendment is drafted, at considerable pace, at a late stage in the progress of a Bill, there may be gaps or ambiguities. Freedom from state interference is of fundamental importance. Our newspaper industry is not in anything like the healthy state it once was, and its vulnerability is what makes newspapers potentially prey to outside investment from foreign states which seek influence. However, important though it is to keep our newspapers free of such influence, we want them to survive and, indeed, to prosper. I hope that the amendment entirely comprehends that aim.
Finally, I simply ask for clarity—the drafting is impressive, but sometimes the meaning is a little hard to tease out—on how the Minister envisages parliamentary involvement in the case of a contentious merger situation.
My Lords, I intervene just briefly. I am very pleased to take the opportunity to follow what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, was just saying because it touches directly on the points I was going to make.
First, I am very grateful for the conversations I have had with the noble Lord and Minister Lopez in his department. I look forward to further debate about the extension to online news services. It will certainly be my intention to table amendments to the Media Bill to enable us to consider how the media public interest test is to be applied in relation to this wider definition of news providers, since the definitions are clearly now out of date—I can say that, having been part of the Puttnam committee on the 2003 legislation.
My noble friend has done an amazing piece of legislative work. I just have to ask, as I did on Report, why it would not have sufficed to have added a new specified consideration to Section 58 of the Enterprise Act 2002, in effect on the need to prevent the acquisition, control of, or influence over newspapers or newspaper periodicals by any defined foreign power. As my noble friend says, we have 16 pages; frankly, we could have done it in about three lines, but clearly there are differences in terms of the bar that has to be crossed and the requirement on the Secretary of State. As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, the Secretary of State must do these things, as opposed to the discretion under the current merger regime, but it seems to me that, with a new specified consideration, the current merger regime would provide the necessary powers. For example, it was sufficient for the purpose of meeting the capability to deal with a public health emergency in Section 58 as a specified consideration, or to maintain the stability of our financial system, as specified after the financial crisis, in Section 58. I am not at all clear why we have departed from the same approach in this case. There is a risk that we end up with overlapping and very complex provisions relating to one type of merger situation as opposed to other merger situations, but we will come on to discuss that.
On Report, I raised with my noble friend the question of broadcasting. We can return to that in the Media Bill, but, of course, where broadcasters are concerned, we have the benefit of the relationship to the Ofcom standards code, which does not apply in relation to newspapers. I hope we can revisit that when we come to the Media Bill.
We will shortly consult on expanding the existing media mergers to look at online. The new regime will not cover TV and radio broadcasts at this time, but we will continue to consider that in our broader work on the media mergers regime. As my noble friend Lord Lansley pointed out, there are specific additional protections through the regime to which they are subject under Ofcom.
My noble friend Lord Forsyth rightly asks when we will bring in the secondary legislation. We want to do it after Royal Assent of this Bill, which is in the control of Parliament, not just the Government. Officials are working on it already. I cannot commit to a date for its introduction, but I am happy to commit to continuing our conversations as we work on it and before we introduce it after Royal Assent.
I have one more question, if I may? I asked about the change in wording in the Enterprise Act from “material influence” to “influence”. I suggested that there might be a reason behind that. Can the Minister clarify the thinking behind the change?
I will reply in writing, if my noble friend is happy with that, so that I can give him the legalese which he would want.
(5 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am delighted that we have made it to Report and look forward to today’s debate. Before we get under way, I express my sincere thanks to all noble Lords who took part in Committee and to those with whom I have had the pleasure of discussing a number of issues that have arisen since then. I am extremely grateful for the constructive, collaborative nature of those discussions. It is clear to me that the broad support for this Bill across the House and the desire to see it pass swiftly remain undiminished, which is great to see.
The Government have tabled a number of amendments to improve the clarity and accountability of the regime. I turn first to the amendment to the Henry VIII power in Clause 6. This clause would originally have given the Secretary of State the power to amend by regulations the position of strategic significance conditions in the Bill, to allow them to be updated to account for future changes to digital markets. The Government recognise that Henry VIII powers should be used only where absolutely necessary. I noted the strength of feeling on this issue in Committee and the concerns that the power could be used to introduce broad changes to the framework of the regime. The DPRRC also noted this point in its report on the Bill, for which my noble friend Lord Offord and I were very grateful. Reflecting that strategic significance criteria have been designed to be suitably broad and technology agnostic, we are content to remove this power. Amendment 1 will do that, so I hope that noble Lords will support it.
Amendment 42 ensures that non-commercial organisations acting in a non-commercial capacity will be subject to fines with the same fixed statutory maximum amounts and/or maximum daily amounts as individuals. We expect it to be extremely rare that the CMA would ever need to fine these organisations, but the Bill should provide for all circumstances. These organisations could be subject to financial penalties for investigative breaches—for example, providing false or misleading information to the CMA.
Amendment 40 clarifies that all individuals—including, for example, sole proprietors—will be subject to penalties with fixed statutory maximum amounts and/or maximum daily amounts. Amendment 41 removes a superfluous subsection in the same clause. I hope noble Lords will support these amendments.
Amendment 48 will ensure that private actions relating to the digital markets regime can be transferred between the Competition Appeal Tribunal and the relevant court. This will reflect current practice for competition cases. Effective co-operation and information sharing between regulators is vital to ensuring efficient and coherent interventions under the digital markets regime.
Amendments 160 and 161, under the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006 and the Postal Services Act 2011 respectively, will allow Ofcom to share information it holds with the CMA where it is necessary for the CMA to discharge its digital markets functions. Ofcom is likely to hold relevant information under these Acts that would be valuable to support work relating to, for example, mobile ecosystems and e-commerce. The amendments will also help prevent unnecessary and duplicative information requests by the CMA. The Government have also put forward Amendments 50, 53 and 159 to improve the Bill’s clarity.
Amendment 58 will ensure that the existing provision in Clause 116—which prevents information the CMA holds as part of an investigation being subject to a disclosure order—cannot be circumvented by instead seeking disclosure from another party that holds the same information.
I hope that, for the reasons I have set out, noble Lords will support the government amendments. I beg to move.
My Lords, Amendments 13 and 35 are in my name and those of the noble Baronesses, Lady Stowell and Lady Jones of Whitchurch, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones.
The Bill has been welcomed across the House and it represents a crucial step forward in regulating the digital market. I pay tribute to the level of engagement that has taken place with Ministers and officials. We have had some excellent and well-informed debates in Grand Committee. However, good though this Bill is, it is capable of improvement. I refer to my interests in the register. I am not a competition lawyer, but I do have experience of judicial review and of the operation of the Human Rights Act. I was also chair of the Independent Review of Administrative Law, which reported a few years ago.
My Amendment 13 is concerned with the use in the Bill of the word “proportionate”. Despite some heavy lobbying of the Government by big tech, the right to appeal against an intervention by the CMA will engage the judicial review test, rather than a merits test, except as to penalty. Later amendments will probe the appeal test further.
The original adjective in the Bill was “appropriate”. The word “proportionate” replaced it at a late stage of the Bill’s progress through the Commons. Why? I am afraid I have yet to receive a satisfactory answer. In Grand Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, referred to a letter from the Minister about the change. However, it did nothing to allay concerns that the change was a response to lobbying by big tech.
According to one view, it is an innocuous change; indeed, one would expect an intervention to be proportionate. The word also has a reasonable legal pedigree: for example, you can defend yourself against attack providing your response is proportionate to the attack. Whether your response is proportionate will be a question of fact, or for a jury to decide.
Judicial review, however, is not primarily concerned with the facts of a decision but with the process whereby the decision is made. Classically, the courts got involved only if a decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable public body could have reached it. The scope of judicial review has expanded to include challenges based on, for example, irrationality or failure to take into account relevant considerations. There are other grounds, but all are concerned with how the decision is reached rather than whether the court agrees with the factual findings.
Since the enactment of the Human Rights Act, the concept of proportionality has entered the law in relation to judicial review, but only in limited circumstances. I will quote the most recent addition of De Smith’s Judicial Review, as I did in Committee, which is generally regarded as the leading textbook in this area:
“Domestic courts are required to review the proportionality of decisions and enactments in two main categories of case: cases involving prima facie infringements of Convention rights and cases involving EU law”.
There are those who think that proportionality should be the test in all cases of judicial review, but that is not the law.
I cannot immediately see why an appeal in the context of the Bill should involve a convention right, but they have a habit of appearing in all sorts of places. If convention rights are engaged, proportionality comes into the analysis anyway. I understand that the Government consider that an appeal may well involve A1P1—Article 1 of the first protocol of the ECHR—which is concerned with the arbitrary inference with property rights.
To speak of human rights in the context of enormous companies such as Google, Apple or Meta is certainly counterintuitive; I do not think that that is what the framers of the European convention had in mind after the Second World War. Last week, Apple was fined €1.8 billion under the European Union’s regulation on market abuse, and there is an appeal. That perhaps gives us an idea of the context of human rights in this area.
If—and this is a big “if”—the courts consider that the convention is engaged, there will be considerations of proportionality. Amendment 35, which I believe is consequential to Amendment 13, raises precisely the same point in a further context. In choosing to put the word “proportionality” into the legislation, a court might well conclude that Parliament had deliberately used the word to widen the scope of judicial review challenge, even when no convention right is engaged. For my part, that is a risk that I do not think should be taken. Your Lordships’ House is well aware of the expensive and time-consuming nature of appeals, which of course favour larger organisations with a large legal spend. The noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, spoke at Second Reading of long and expensive battles and death by lever arch files—although he did not quite put it that way. Large companies have the resources.
A proportionality test is far closer to an appeal on the facts than one based on conventional judicial review principles. The issue as to whether an intervention is proportionate or not gives the court much greater scope for looking at those facts at greater length and greater expense and with a more uncertain outcome. I would therefore much prefer to revert to the word “appropriate”, as was originally in the Bill, which does not carry the same legal charge and does not risk expanding the basis of appeal.
In the Media Bill, criticism has been made of the use of the word “appropriate”, but, as many judges have said before, context is everything, and here it is the right word. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response and explanation behind the change in wording.
Now that my friend the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has spoken, I am happy to stand, because I hoped that he would cover all the technical aspects of his amendment, to which I have put my name.
Before I turn to the amendment, at the start of Report it is worth me reminding noble Lords and my noble friends the Ministers of something, because there are an awful lot of amendments in this group and they cover quite a bit of ground. The Communications and Digital Select Committee, which I have the privilege to chair, endorsed the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill as it was introduced in the Commons. We held quite a few hearings on the Bill last year, which came after a long period of campaigning for this legislation, and so it was one that we cared deeply about. Indeed, we applauded the Government for striking the right, careful balance on some difficult issues covered in Part 1 of the Bill, especially the appeals process, the countervailing benefits and the leveraging principle.
My Lords, I invite the House to cast its mind back to the debates we had on the first group. Amendments 13 and 35 are both concerned with the use of “proportionality”. The debates in Grand Committee and today on Report have been very much cross-party: there has been a shared endeavour to improve what is an excellent Bill, which strikes an important blow in regulating appropriately the digital market and, in particular, establishing a proper balance between big tech, with its immense power, and the smaller players.
The original Bill had “appropriate”, and I wish to return to that wording. The change in the wording followed a heroic amount of lobbying by big tech, and there was a reason behind this lobbying: to make it easier to prolong, appeal and obfuscate—to use the legal might and finances that big tech has—and to possibly frustrate the whole purpose of the Digital Markets Unit.
The Minister, who has engaged with thoroughness and politeness throughout this process, did his best to reassure the House by saying that the use of “proportionate” was to reinforce the Government’s expectation that the Digital Markets Unit would act proportionately. We do indeed expect it to act proportionately, but the use of “proportionate” in this context carries a heavy legal charge, as he tacitly accepted by saying that the use of “proportionality” meant that the analysis would spill over from cases involving the Human Rights Act or A1P1 into all cases, so that the scope for challenge of an intervention would significantly increase. That is not a happy situation, as a number of noble Lords have so eloquently said in supporting this amendment.
Amendments 13 and 35 are to the same effect, and I hope that Amendment 35 is regarded as consequential on Amendment 13. I wish to test the opinion of the House.
(6 months, 4 weeks ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, may I crave the indulgence of the Committee? Unfortunately, I missed the first minute of the speech made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, as I was trying to comply with etiquette and remain in the Chamber until the conclusion of the opening speeches on the Rwanda Bill. If the Committee permits, the points I was going to make have largely been made by others, so I can be particularly brief.
At the heart of this legislation is the decision: do we want the regulation to be done by the DMU or, de facto, by the courts? This is, effectively, a twin attack. First, there is the proportionality provision inserted into the statute, and now we have the change in the test of appeals on sentences. The combination of those two seems inevitably to lead to further court involvement, and it is not the intention that courts should be the regulator. The courts are there, as the noble Lord said, to stop executive overreach or some illegality in the approach based on usual JR principles. They are not there to second-guess what the DMU has done.
If the amendments, or something like them, are not accepted, I fear that an appeal of the merits will involve going into everything, as other noble Lords have said. We would have the war of the lever arch files, so eloquently described by the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, at Second Reading. Lawyers will act, and continue to act, and it will frustrate what we are trying to achieve.
My Lords, as I have been cited by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, it is incumbent on me to speak on the same principles as him. Everything that I want to say has already been said, but that will not stop me putting in my two pennies’ worth. This is the stuck-record part of the debate, where I repeat what I said at Second Reading and simply put on record my support for all these amendments.
I will pick up on what some noble Lords said in their comments. I wholeheartedly endorse what my noble friend Lady Stowell said. In the real world, if you have an appeal on the merits of a fine, it seems almost impossible to see how you stop leakage into an appeal on the merits of the case. So you are, in effect, back to square one and, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, put it, the war of the lever arch file.
The speech by the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, was fascinating and a master class on the different aspects of judicial review: an appeal on the merits, an appeal on JR-plus, or an appeal on JR. When I was a Minister, I dealt with this debate with Ofcom, when it started the process of wanting to move from appeals on the merits to appeals on JR. To the layman, an appeal on the merits is in effect a full rehearing of the case: you go back to square one and simply have the trial all over again. An appeal on JR means that you at least have to identify a flaw in the reasoning of the regulator when it comes to a judgment. If, in effect—here, I bow to the expertise of the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie—settled law informed by European directives means that some element of the merits of the case are taken into account in a JR appeal of a regulator, so be it. It may be the difference between a passive and an active decision, as it were.
In this Committee, we understand how you can judicially review a decision by a government department. When a regulator is making an active decision to bring a prosecution, and it then finds guilty the company that it is prosecuting, some element of the merits may well be taken into account. It seems to me that how it is drafted may well be important, but the clear intent should be that any appeal, whether on the actual decision or the level of the fine, should be an appeal based on JR, when it comes to how a judicial review is understood when appealing a decision by a regulator.
I finish with the simple point—this is the stuck-record part—that it clearly is the settled will of this Committee, and I suspect it will be the will of the House when this comes to Report, to constantly guard against giving the SMS companies too much opportunity to wriggle out of decisions made by the regulator.
I should add that a lot of the tone of my remarks at Second Reading and in Committee might make it seem that I am in the pocket of the regulator. I am certainly not. I have lots of concerns that, at other times, would make me say that I think the regulator often strays too far and interferes in far too many cases. I am not resiling from the fact that there clearly should be an opportunity to appeal its decisions. Often, it backs away before it gets to a decision, but its interference in mergers and takeovers sometimes leaves me slightly baffled, particularly when it involves companies that have very little presence in the UK market. I am not saying, by any stretch of the imagination, that the regulator is perfect, but I know that any procedure it undertakes, as it will do when this law is passed, will be long and expensive, so we must guard against making it even longer and even more expensive.
I hope very much that I have a point. I think it would be best for me to write to my noble friend and the members of the Committee to clarify that.
I am listening very carefully to what the Minister says. It would be helpful if he would give an idea of the sort of arguments that would be open to somebody who is challenging a decision as to the fine and the merits. Will they be circumscribed simply by saying, “Well, it was too much”, or will they be able to look in some detail at the whole process and the interventions that ultimately resulted in the fine? How will those two things be kept separate from each other?
As the noble Lord says, the intent is to keep those two separate. During and on the merits appeal for the penalty, the penalised firm could argue that the value of the penalty exceeded the crime, or that the breach took place inadvertently or by accident. It could not argue, however, that no breach took place; the fact that a breach took place is the premise against which the rest of the penalty appeal takes place. If the firm then wants to appeal that no breach took place, that would be done under JR, not on the merits.
The boundaries of the merits appeal process are explained in the Explanatory Notes for Clause 89. If those can be made any clearer, I am happy to engage on that. We will continue to listen to any concerns that noble Lords have on this important point.
I turn now to Amendments 72A and 72B from the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie. I thank him for his amendments, which raise an important question about the appeal standard across the wider digital markets regime. These amendments would align the appeal standard of all regulatory decisions in the regime with appeals carried out against Ofcom’s decisions taken under the Communications Act 2003. I am sure that many noble Lords are aware that the appeal standard in the Communications Act regime is often referred to as judicial review-plus. Although Parliament amended the Act in 2017 so that these appeals are to be decided on judicial review principles, the CAT has ruled that, due to retained EU law, it must also
“ensure that the merits of the case are duly taken into account”.
To turn back to this Bill, the Government heard the strong views expressed by your Lordships on the Select Committee, among others, on the importance of retaining judicial review. The changes made by the Government in the other place sought to uphold the use of the well-known judicial review principles for appeals in the new regime, except for those about penalties, as I have already discussed. Judicial review principles balance robust scrutiny of the CMA’s decisions with the need for the CMA to use its expertise to act quickly and iteratively to resolve issues.
As we discussed on the second day in Committee, the Government have made an explicit requirement for the CMA to consider proportionality when imposing conduct requirements and PCIs. As I set out during that discussion, it is right that interventions should be proportionate, but we are clear that any appeals of these matters should be heard under standard judicial review principles.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. Again, in the vast majority of the contributions, we seem to have reached a wide degree of consensus, although not totally, in the light of that from the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie.
Noble Lords have made a number of important points. The noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, was quite right to take us back to the practicality of appeals on a merits basis; I will come back to the Minister’s response on all that because things are still not clear. How can we be sure that such an appeal will not open the whole case up again? That is at the heart of what we are debating here.
The noble Lord, Lord Holmes, said that we do not really understand why this must be different. Why is it such a special case? It has not been explained to us why this exception has been made.
I very much appreciate the point made by noble Lord, Lord Faulks: at the heart of this issue is whether we want regulation by the DMU or by the courts. There is a real danger of us drifting towards the latter with the Government’s amendments.
The noble Baroness, Lady Harding, rightly reminded us that regulators cannot afford to take too many risks. There is a fundamental imbalance, with regulators perhaps being forced to be risk-averse because they do not have the budgets of the big tech companies. We understand the danger of the David and Goliath situation that we are in here. It is all too easy to create a system where big tech companies’ lawyers can rule the roost.
The Minister said that decisions on penalties will address what an SMS firm has or has not done. He said that a decision will address not whether a breach has occurred but what led to the breach. Our concern is that we are going to go back over all the evidence of what led to a breach, whereas the fine at the end of it represents the end of the decision-making and is meant to be the deterrent. Again, I will look at Hansard and the Minister’s subsequent letter, but it seems to me from his explanation that he risks opening the whole case up again.
I listened carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie. I understand his experience in all this. Importantly, he said that there is not just one model here—that is, we have a number of regulators that do things differently. As he pointed out, the Government have previously supported the JR model; we must be reminded of that. The noble Lord also raised his concern about what happens if mistakes are made. If mistakes are made, they would be made in the process leading up to the decision, not the subsequent fines. A merits appeal on the fine would not really help if the decisions had happened further up the decision-making process.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, that the regulators are not perfect. However, as we have discussed and will discuss again, we need stronger regulatory oversight. That will come—indeed, it needs to come—from stronger parliamentary oversight, which we will continue to debate in our discussions on this Bill.
I come back to the fundamental point made by the Minister. I listened to him carefully but I am still not clear how he will keep the stages separate. How will he keep the decision-making separate from the decision on the penalty? If SMS firms argue that the penalty is too high, they will have to revisit the evidence leading to the decision.
Can the noble Baroness confirm that, in her understanding, there is nothing in the Bill itself that makes that separation clear?
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Faulks; he is absolutely right. Again, we look forward to the Minister’s letter that will try to explain how these are two separate processes and that there is a clear cut-off point between one and the other, because I am not sure that that was really what he said in his reply. To be honest, I do not see how they can be separate, as that is not how the systems work. The appeal will be, as I think the Minister said, on what the SMS firm did to lead up to that penalty; therefore, the whole case would have to be revisited.
I do not know that the Minister persuaded many people on this matter. I am sure that we will continue to debate this, and we look forward to reading his letter, which I am sure will explain things in a little more detail. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
(11 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I strongly support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Agnew. I do this as a former chair of the Jersey Financial Services Commission. In Jersey we made a major effort to increase the transparency of trust information so that beneficial ownership could be accurately identified. One of the inhibitions for cleaning up, if you like, the register in Jersey was the behaviour of the Government in the United Kingdom, and their persistent obfuscation of the way in which trusts were to be treated.
The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, contains exactly the process that needs to be dealt with in a consultation. I understand the assurances he may have received and that he may feel it appropriate to withdraw his amendment, but I hope he proves as dogged as we know him to be in pursuing this. I assure him of my continuing support.
My Lords, I also support what the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, has said and done. I am very sorry that the Government did not accept the amendment in relation to trusts. It was entirely in keeping with the purpose of the Bill, and more specifically with the purpose of the introduction of the register of overseas entities.
Some of us have been advancing the cause of this register—some would say banging on about it—for some considerable time. I had the privilege of chairing the Joint Committee on a draft Bill. We recommended legislation as soon as possible. Unfortunately, it took the invasion of Ukraine for the Government to incorporate the necessary legislation into the last economic crime Bill.
During the taking of evidence by the committee in 2019, the need to avoid trusts being used to avoid the identification of the true owner of property was specifically brought to our attention. It then became part of our recommendations that the legislation, when it came before your Lordships’ House, should cater for this obvious loophole. The Government ignored the recommendation then and have now resisted the amendment passed by your Lordships’ House.
If there is concern about minors and keeping them ignorant about their status as beneficiaries, this could have been catered for by an appropriate provision. Instead, the Government, against whom the former Lord Chancellor voted in the other place on this issue, have resorted to “financial privilege” as a means of blocking the amendment.
Trust lawyers are going to be very busy, as foreign owners will set about frustrating the purpose of the register and the aspirations that we all share for this and related legislation. I hope the Government bear that in mind.
My Lords, I will take this opportunity to speak to my Motion H1 in the same group, which proposes, as an amendment to Motion H, to
“leave out from ‘161’ to end and insert ‘, do disagree with the Commons in their Amendment 161A in lieu, and do propose”
the amendment listed at page 24 of the Marshalled List.
However, I should explain that there is a mistake in this amendment, which is no doubt my fault. There were various communications between me and the Public Bill Office on Friday afternoon, in order to get the amendment in the appropriate shape, and a “not” features in the wrong place. I will explain where the omission is and why I submit that it does not ultimately matter.
The intention behind this amendment, under “Civil recovery: costs of proceedings”, was to try to give some protection to the agencies in the case of adverse costs orders made against them. This amendment was passed by your Lordships’ House; it went back to the House of Commons last Monday and was rejected.
My amendment is a softening of the original amendment put down by the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, and me—softening because it had to be softened somewhat to comply with the rules. Proposed new subsection (2) should read:
“The court should not normally make an order that any costs of proceedings relating to a case to which this section applies … are payable by an enforcement authority to a respondent or a specified responsible officer in respect of the involvement of the respondent or the officer in those proceedings, unless it would be in the interests of justice”.
So the “not” should be inserted earlier and removed later on.
The amendment that was drawn to my attention today did not entirely reflect my intention. I have been in communication with the Public Bill Office as to whether it was possible to amend it. Although it is possible to table a manuscript amendment—see paragraph 8.172 of the Companion—it is inelegant and I am told that the better course is to explain the purpose of the amendment. Were the House to be in favour of the amendment, the matter can be amended at the House of Commons stage. That appears to be the position.
Now perhaps I can come on to the merits, as I see them, of the amendment. The Minister says that my amendment—which is really not much more than a nudge; it does not compel the court to do anything in relation to costs—is intended to prevent any disincentive being provided to the agencies, who may seek to recover the proceeds of crime, often against very well-resourced defendants. Unexplained wealth orders, brought in by the Criminal Finances Act, were to be a powerful weapon in seeking to obtain recovery, ultimately, from those whose wealth was not easily explicable. The agency tried on one occasion to do that and was unable to surmount the hurdle the court said was appropriate in these cases—and, indeed, which Parliament said was appropriate. The result was an order of £1.5 million-worth of costs against the agency.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, there has not been great enthusiasm to take up unexplained wealth orders on the part of the Serious Fraud Office. So your Lordships’ House, during the last economic crime Bill proceedings, very sensibly produced an amendment that, broadly speaking, reflected the amendment we are now discussing in relation to unexplained wealth orders, so as not to provide such a disincentive to the authorities seeking to obtain one of these orders. The rationale behind my amendment is precisely the same. The Minister says that this offends the “loser pays” principle. He is right that the starting point in most civil cases is that the loser pays—for very good reason. If A brings a claim against B that proves to be unjustified, and B has been put to expense thereby, why should B not recover his or her or its costs from A?
However, that rule is subject to many exceptions, as all those who are familiar with the law will know. For example, on some occasions the court orders each side to bear its own costs, having regard to the facts. Sometimes there will be no orders as to costs; sometimes there will be issue-based costs. There will be a variety of different orders to meet the justice of a particular case. Sometimes Parliament even specifically weights the cost in one particular direction. An egregious example is Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act, which is a controversial issue but shows that Parliament is perfectly capable of deciding who should pay the costs in particular circumstances.
What will happen if this particular provision becomes part of our law? I suggest what will happen is that a judge looking at the end of a case will see that Parliament has decided that normally there should not be an order that the agency pays the costs. However, if the agency quite unreasonably, without proper evidence, seeks to pursue somebody for the proceeds of crime, there is of course the saving provision—“in the interests of justice”—which is part of our amendment. So a court is perfectly able, as it will always do, to look at the particular circumstances of the case and decide that, in this case, the agency has been inappropriately pursuing somebody, seeking a remedy when they should not have done. But this is a nudge towards the judge, and a very qualified exception to the “loser pays” principle.
It is, however, an important amendment. Those giving evidence towards the Bill Committee included Bill Browder, who may be well known to your Lordships for his particularly vigorous pursuit of justice in this particular area, and representatives of the Serious Fraud Office. I would be interested to know from the Minister what the approach of the agencies is to this. If he tells me firmly that they do not want this power, that is of course a powerful argument. It would be somewhat at odds with the evidence and the information I have, but I do not have a complete and total understanding of what their approach should be.
It seems to me that someone running the Serious Fraud Office or the NCA, when deciding whether or not to pursue somebody, would bear very much in mind their budget and the cost consequences of taking a particular course of action. If they knew that there was a degree of protection—and that is all this is, a degree of protection—provided in this, it would act as much less of a disincentive. If they thought that, should they fail to recover what they thought they were entitled to, there would be a very heavy hit on their budget, it might mean that they would not do so, which might be contrary to the interests of justice.
Leave out from “161” to end and insert “, do disagree with the Commons in their Amendment 161A in lieu, and do propose Amendment 161B in lieu—
(1 year, 4 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I support the amendment. I have benefited, as I dare say have a number of other noble Lords, from the briefing from Transparency International explaining why the amendment is so important and very much consistent with the theme and title of the Bill.
I too will probe a little what the Minister said about the register of overseas entities. I think he said there were 27,000 on it at the last count—I am sure the figure changes regularly—and that is encouraging. The move for a register of overseas entities was, I fear, prompted mostly by the fact that on large wastes of central London and other parts of the United Kingdom were properties whose ownership was very unclear. In reality, they were often owned by what we now seem to be calling “bad actors”—at least, we did not know who they were, whether they were bad or good actors. That information should now be much more available than it was.
I think the Committee would be most interested to know whether, with the information that is now obtained, there has been any follow-up. In the evidence we were given about the register of overseas entities, it was explained, for example, that it should enable some link-up with pursuing people under the unexplained wealth order provisions, because there would be more information—you could identify who owned a property and why, if they were a fairly low-grade official in a Russian company, for example, they now owned a property in Belgravia worth several million pounds. Similarly, how is the information assisting in sanctions and the like, and with anti-money laundering?
Generally, there is a lot of information that should be available to the various agencies as a result of the register, rather than simply ticking a box. There may be a theme in the debate that we have been having. Yes, we are enthusiastic about the increased information that is in Companies House and the increased information that will flow from the identity of those on the register, but what we really want to know is whether it will be translated into valuable information that will fulfil the aim behind this legislation.
I appreciate that intervention. As I said, I would be happy to write with specific information as I do not have details on all 28,000 registered businesses.
The point I want to make, which is important, is that a very large number of overseas entities have registered and, we assume, sent in information that can be confirmed and will lead to them being compliant. That is quite a high number; it allows us to focus. That is the point. The question was about what happens to the 1,500 to 2,000 or so companies that have not registered. Well, they cannot transact; they cannot participate in transactions in this country. Their assets are untransactable, which, in my view, negates the value of those assets to a significant degree. In effect, they are compelled to register and comply if they want to get their money out; that is important. Clearly, the next phase is to do the work on the companies that have registered to ensure that the information we have is accurate. We then have to make sure of why those companies that have not registered have not done so. Sometimes, there are perfectly legitimate reasons why that would be the case but, on the whole, we have made significant process.
Following our discussion earlier in Committee and the sensible points from the noble Lord, Lord Wallace—I have been glad to discuss them with my colleagues—let me say that compliance and law enforcement are at the crux of this issue. There is no point in bringing in any of this legislation—not even a single line of it—if it will not be enforced and overseen properly. My view has often been that sometimes we may not need new legislation but we need to enforce properly the legislation that we have, where a great deal of our effort will be far more effective.
I am grateful to the Minister for his clarification about the level of compliance. If will press him on one point. Last week we were provided with a useful series of notes that made this point, among others:
“Public registers allow multiple eyes to interrogate data, including the absence of data, to inform a risk-based approach to investigation and enforcement”.
I think that what the Committee would like to know is this: now that there is this compliance, who are those “multiple eyes” and what are they doing with the information that was thought necessary to eradicate some of the kleptocracy that has clearly been identified?
I greatly appreciate the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, flagging so well the sentence that I was about to deliver. I would like to investigate further, personally as a Minister and for the benefit of this Committee, a more detailed assessment of the crime-fighting efforts that we will employ around this.
I have some good information to impart to the Committee, which to some extent answers the questions. I have particularly looked into the comments by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, about the UAE and so on. We have signed an anti-corruption pledge or framework with the UAE in the last few years. We have in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office—
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, and to speak chiefly to Amendment 108, to which I attached my name. I entirely agree with everything he said, and indeed with the introduction to the group. I will just add a couple of points.
My first point is about the cost. A few years ago, Transparency International calculated that the economic damage resulting from corporate secrecy in the UK’s overseas territories alone significantly exceeded the UK aid budget. These are crimes that have real victims and real costs. We must not forget that. The fact is that one hand is operating one way and the other another way, unless we take some action.
The Atlantic Council is not necessarily an organisation with which I am always 100% in agreement, but it produced an article in January entitled “Authoritarian kleptocrats are thriving on the West’s failures. Can they be stopped?” It recommended that the UK should
“address the close connections between the City of London and British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies”.
A further recommendation was that the UK should:
“Reduce regulatory mismatches between the primary UK jurisdictions and the Crown Dependencies.”
There is a real hole here. We can drive a cart and horses through the gaps between what is happening here and what is happening in the Crown dependencies and overseas territories. To extend the metaphor a little, for which I apologise, we might be slamming the stable door, but we are leaving the barn door open unless we address this issue.
In thinking about how these two amendments are connected, and to join them up, let us be really charitable about the capacities of these overseas territories and Crown dependencies. The population of the 14 overseas territories is 270,000 people; that of the Crown dependencies is rather less. Let us be charitable when we think of the size of their Administrations and their capacities, and think about the extreme inequality of arms between the kleptocrats and their enablers and those organisations. Even if those territories and dependencies want to do something, with the best will in the world, how can they conceivably have the capacity to do it? We have a responsibility, given the UK Government’s role, for this economic crime Bill to include this coverage. This is protection, support and assistance, as well as something that protects the whole world.
My Lords, I have great sympathy for these amendments. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, on his tenacity on this issue, which I have noticed on a number of different Bills. He is quite right that this issue tends to come up at the fag end of debates, so it can be overlooked. It is very important.
I have one point to make about this. There is, of course, a distinction between the Crown dependencies and the overseas territories. I speak as a former Minister with responsibility for the Crown dependencies. Their position is such that, before legislation that includes them is brought forward—certainly before it is passed—there is a well-established convention whereby the Government consult the Crown dependencies before including them in legislation, certainly by way of an amendment. I ask the Minister whether any such consultations have taken place. If not, why not? This is clearly important, and it is a long-standing issue that the Crown dependencies will no doubt have strong views about, but we need to know them before legislating.
My second point is slightly different—the Minister is quite understandably looking elsewhere at this point. I was rather disappointed by his response on the question of trusts that we would not have a debate on them now. I gently remind him that the Joint Committee on the Draft Registration of Overseas Entities Bill, which I had the privilege of chairing, reported in 2019. It emphasised the importance of trusts as a potential vehicle for fraud. The committee’s report set that out between paragraphs 76 and 79 and said that the matter needed looking at as a matter of urgency. The committee was given assurances that it would be; it was not. It took the invasion of Ukraine before the register came in. Here we have the second and final chance to look at economic crime, which would include the use of trusts as a vehicle for fraud. In those circumstances, it is very disappointing to hear from the Minister that we will not have a debate on that now.
The noble Lord saw my noble friend Lord Faulks nodding. The fact that we went to the same school, the same college at Oxford and the same Inn of Court has absolutely no bearing on this, save to say that he will answer that question in a moment. I am sure he would wish to catch the Committee’s eye. That having been said, I want to finish on this rather wishy-washy point. I sympathise with what has been said in support of these amendments, but we need to take a step back and have a reality check to see how this would be received by the people against whom it will bite.
I will, then, as I usually accept that invitation. As I understand the position, an Order in Council is the mechanism. The convention and the arrangement with the Crown dependencies that I spoke of is not the same with the overseas territories, although the points made about consulting them very much apply.
If I may respond to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, since I have been involved in discussion on this on a number of previous Bills, we are normally assured by the Government as a Bill goes past that there are ongoing consultations with the CDs and the OTs, and that they have been assured that the key proposals will be incorporated into their domestic law within a limited period. As I said, there have been a number of occasions when that has not happened in some territories. It has often been the weakest territories concerned and, after all, this Government have spent a good deal of money on taking over the government of the Turks and Caicos—having to intervene where things have failed. This is rather like saying, “On most occasions, we do not expect most banks or overseas territories to be involved in any form of corruption, but sometimes some will be tempted”. Some may be overcome and that is what we are trying to guard against.
My Lords, I will very briefly support the proposals. It makes sense to ensure that people who think that they are buying something legitimately are adequately informed. I like the series of amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, to solve the problem that was pointed out on a previous day.
The fact is that those of us involved with companies and so on regularly have to update the Companies House register very quickly indeed. Fortunately, because of modern technology, that is relatively easy to do. Similarly, we have to update our register of interests on a regular basis, so I see no reason why this should not apply in this important, specific case.
My Lords, the Joint Committee was certainly very concerned with the need to update when it provided its report in respect of the register of overseas entities. It particularly acknowledged that an event-driven update requirement was a much better way of securing the accuracy of the register. I entirely endorse what the noble Lord said.
To add further to the intellectual challenge, and in support of what the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, said, when you transfer land quite a lot of formalities have to be gone through, in terms of conveyancing and the like. We are just talking about another formality that needs to be complied with. I do not understand that to be particularly onerous and it is consistent with what is expected. An event-driven matter was what we raised in our report; I am not sure that it should come as a great surprise that we think this is a sensible idea.
As I hope I have illustrated, my enthusiasm for intellectualisation is paramount, even after an enjoyable light afternoon of committee debate. If I may expand further on the difference with the legislation relating to overseas entities and other types of purchase, using my noble friend Lord Agnew’s concept about the bus route or discovering moments before one buys a house that they are going to build past it some terrible thing—I was going to say a high-speed rail line, but of course we are enthusiastic here about building high-speed rail lines in this country—that is not the same thing at all.
Here, we are talking about the concept of overseas entities and the whole principle around this is to ensure that non-compliant entities are unable to transact. That is the only way to make this process workable. It is not a question of caveat emptor or something that can be corrected later, or whatever. This will prevent a transaction from happening. If a noble Lord purchases something—we were hearing earlier about the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, going to Battersea Power Station to purchase himself a downsized retirement villa, which seemed to be an upgrading, certainly for the Johnson household—is it reasonable to have a situation in which you cannot be sure whether the party you are dealing with is compliant?
I can see the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, waiting to leap up from his seat to tell me how it is possible. If it is possible to find a solution to this principle, I would be happy to have a discussion, but I am extremely reluctant to make a decision at the Dispatch Box.
(1 year, 4 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I had not intended to speak on this group of amendments, but I rise just to say that I agree with everything that noble Lords have said thus far. My enthusiasm peaked when the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, spoke. What we have done in this debate is create the environment in which we are making these really important changes.
I have just one complicated question, with subcategories, for the Minister. I approach this question on the basis that if an ACSP is unwilling to have its name associated with its professional work and assessment, it seems to me that that should be a disqualification from it being appointed an ACSP. I ask the Minister: were ACSPs consulted at the consultation stage, before this legislation was drafted? Did the ACSP cohort ask for this level of anonymity which the Government are gifting it? I just cannot believe that, if they think they are doing a good job, they will not want their name associated with it—all the more for those abroad. If the City of London, our Companies Act and our registration are to be all the things that the Government wish for, it will be a sterling mark for those abroad that they are able to facilitate access to that environment because they are accredited by the Government of the United Kingdom, and the Secretary of State specifically, to do this work.
Why are we in this situation, where this really important part of the gateway into the system of limited liability is in the hands of individuals and businesses which the Government seem to think want nobody to know they are doing the work? It is incredible. I repeat: if an ACSP or somebody who wishes it, says, “I will do this only if you do not associate my name with the work publicly”, you should say to them, “Well, goodbye. You’re not doing it at all”.
The noble Lord has anticipated the point that I wanted to make, but I will make it very briefly. I am puzzled why we are so keen to protect anonymity. What is the respectable argument in favour of anonymity? Can the Minister help us with that? A solicitor, for example, will append their name to a document, identifying litigation or other contexts, and many other professionals have similar obligations. Why are we affording these particular people some special allowance? It simply does not make sense.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said, for some time, those of us involved in the register of overseas entities were anxious that there should be improved verification. I gather that there has been some movement in that direction. I ask the Minister to consider having regard to the weight of opinion that there should be a similar movement in this area.
My Lords, I will be very brief. First, having chaired three public companies, I totally agree with my noble friend Lord Agnew’s Amendments 49 and 51, with the exception of subsection (1) of the proposed new clause in Amendment 51. I wonder about it being every three years; that basically means once a Parliament, and I wonder whether every two years would be more appropriate.
Secondly, I ask my noble friend: is there a difference between “foreign” and “worldwide”? Are they coterminous, or not? That is important.
Finally, proposed new paragraph (d) in Amendment 50A says that any authorised corporate service provider registering companies must
“disclose promptly on request from the registrar, or other relevant authorities including local authorities”.
Anyone who has been in local government or the chair of a major committee would like that to be a little more specific; otherwise, it opens the door to arbitration and legal matters as to whether the person making the representations is “relevant”.
The noble Lord just said exactly what I was going to say. If it is not this, what is the process to identify people and what documentation is required? It will be interesting to hear the Minister’s response to the challenge from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby: if it is good enough for voters in local elections, why is it not good enough for multi-million-pound companies?
I support this amendment. There is a slight irony because the Labour Party is against the provision on which it relies to support this amendment. That cheap debating point notwithstanding, this amendment seems quite useful and I cannot see an obvious reason why we should not have it.
I briefly thank my noble friend for Clause 187. It is a valid attempt to achieve some of the aims of these amendments, although I wholeheartedly agree that the sunset clause is puzzling. I ask my noble friend to bear in mind that the expertise being offered by this Committee and Amendment 65 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, as well as the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Agnew, are attempting to assist the Government in achieving the objectives that we all wish to see by injecting the difference between theory and practice. The Government want these measures to succeed. The Committee is trying to suggest that there are, in practice, a number of measures identified in each of these amendments—which, of course, could be combined—to guide those overseeing or producing the reports about what the important elements will be if we want to make this work well.
My Lords, in terms of timing, it is important to bear in mind that the genesis of much of this legislation can be found as long ago as 2015. It has taken a long time for anything to happen in response to what was then identified as a major threat—the corruption which has permeated our society. Eventually we got the Criminal Finances Act, then there were many promises of legislation, which did not materialise, then we had the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act, which dealt with some aspects of this, and then it took the invasion of Ukraine before we had the last piece of legislation. Now, eight years after the initiative of 2015, we have this legislation, which may or may not be the final chance. So, with respect, keeping the Government up to the mark with an annual report and not having a sunset clause is something we should learn from the very chronology that I have just described.
My Lords, I intended to sign Amendment 72, but I was beaten in the stampede to support it, which must in itself say something about the quality of the amendment. Amendment 64 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, is very similar. Like others, I think that both include important elements and it would be great to try to combine the best of both when we get to Report.
I shall not repeat what has already been said, but it does seem that adding this level of transparency into the system must help in ensuring that we have got this right. During the debates on ECB 1, the previous economic crime Bill, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan said:
“When we introduced the provisions on PSCs—persons with significant control—in relation to UK companies, we had to make some iterative changes to that, as it became evident over time that aspects were not working as effectively as we had hoped”.—[Official Report, 14/3/22; col. 44.]
The best way to see if things are not working as effectively as we had hoped is transparency and reporting, so I hope the Minister can accept this very simple and sensible amendment to promote that level of transparency.
With permission, I will make one addition to the list of items to report on set out in the amendment. Given the importance of the ACSPs to the process, as we discussed in the previous group, I think it would be useful to include some statistics on the number of ACSPs that have approved, both UK and foreign, who they are regulated by and the number which are suspended. With that addition, I add my support to these amendments.
My Lords, I signed the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Agnew. I am generally in favour of what has been said already regarding the need to increase the funding for Companies House. I was a member of the fraud committee. When we were looking at Companies House, we were astonished that we still had this ridiculously small registration fee. We thought that Companies House needed more to upgrade in the way now envisaged in this Bill; we did recommend an increase.
We were also taken to some extent with the notion of hypothecation of funds. One might say that nobody likes that idea because they think that they are getting perverse incentives and things are going wrong from that perspective, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, elaborated. However, the fact is that our prosecutors are underresourced. When recommending these hypothecations, some us may feel that it is a last resort. Well, that is what it is; there is no other way to get the sort of money that will allow adequate prosecutions into the system.
From my point of view, it does not matter how you get the money in. We have to accept that we need better-funded regulators and better-funded prosecutors in general. It is no coincidence that, whenever there is any kind of scandal, as happens a lot in financial services—about which I know rather more—it is always in the United States that they manage to prosecute them. That is because they have this hypothecation of fines, they have lots of money and they can pin them down. We cannot do that for all kinds of reasons. We cannot keep on being the poor, weak cousins where you will never be for the high jump, you will never be prosecuted and we are still the financial laundromat.
Hypothecation may not be ideal; the Treasury would lose the money, of course, so it would still come from the public purse. Well, why not put it there adequately from the public purse in the first place? I do not see the raising of Companies House fees to £100 as money for legal enforcement; I see it as raising money so that Companies House can be much better and much more advanced and do all the things it needs to do, perhaps more quickly, because a lot of expenditure will be required on technology. It is ridiculous to have this £10; it could be £100, and we could deal with the issue of getting decent enforcement separately.
My Lords, to take up the noble Baroness’s final point on technology, in the very helpful session we had yesterday—unfortunately the Minister could not be there—we were provided with some written information about the use of technology that was going to develop. I asked about artificial intelligence. Either in the course of answering these amendments or generally, could the Minister assist us as to how, with this increasing amount of information that Companies House will now have, artificial intelligence will allow it and the prosecuting authorities to have a great deal more information to put two and two together, which will assist with this legislation’s overall objectives?
My Lords, this discussion about how we fight economic crime would be an awful lot easier and better informed if we had seen the Government’s national fraud strategy, which I believe was supposed to be with us at the back end of last year. Perhaps the Minister might like to find out when we might finally see it.
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Grand CommitteeSo that the Minister does not have to answer questions seriatim, as it were, I endorse that. I am not sure that I have heard persuasive objections to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I understand what he says about risk-based, but sharing information with relevant public bodies and law enforcement agencies surely does not tie the registrar’s hand in any way. It must be remembered that while we can all applaud what has happened in Companies House and the change in culture that will follow, this is really a second attempt to tie things up. We should not forget that there was the first economic crime Bill, before the Minister came to his post, where much was promised, so this is the final word on it and the time to crystallise where we are on those things. Objective 5 is another step. If the Minister is saying that Companies House is coming a long way and it is further step to ask it to do this, that is an answer, but I do not think it is an answer that satisfies the Committee.
I appreciate my noble friend’s comments. I do not believe that I suggested at any point that this was not baked into the cake of what Companies House is expected to deliver. I would be delighted to have further dialogue with Members around this but, in my humble opinion, the entire Bill is designed to ensure that the registrar takes a risk-based approach to ensuring the integrity of the information at Companies House. I am very comfortable on that, and the Government are very clear on it. We are wary of having duplicative statements in the Bill because that causes more complications when we are trying to create the enforcement regime and the integrity regime that we want to bring to bear.
On the key clauses and the language therein, I am certainly happy to consult my dictionary as noble Lords suggest. I am sorry that I was unable to bring one with me. It would be unusual for us to be quite so prescriptive in part 3 of the four objectives. I am delighted to have further conversations if noble Lords feel that that would be more helpful in setting the right cultural change at Companies House, but I am wary of being too prescriptive. I hope this is not misunderstood by Members of this Committee, but we want to avoid a box-ticking exercise because that is exactly what criminals like, as they can then navigate the system. We want to allow the registrar and her officers to use their judgment because that will lead to far better outcomes when it comes to achieving the mission that all of us are embarking on together.
The noble Lord is quite right. What we are really trying to get to here is the ultimate beneficial owner, which is a problem that sits throughout this and the overseas property register. Neither of them really gets to that point. The wording requires refinement, but that is what I was trying to get to—that the ultimate beneficial owner, the directing mind behind the shareholding, is disclosed.
Does the noble Lord think this goes far enough? I chaired the Joint Committee on the Draft Registration of Overseas Entities Bill, and one of our recommendations was that there should be improved verification procedures for Companies House. We also thought it was well worth considering ensuring that regulated professionals acting should also provide statements, which would concentrate the minds of those advising who are responsible for providing this information.
I made exactly the same argument during the passage of what we used to call ECB 1—the first economic crime Bill. I entirely agree, and noble Lords will see that I have a number of later amendments dealing with those issues of the verification statements and the authorised corporate service providers being named publicly as opposed to—as is proposed at the moment—not being named on the register. That is really important. I agree that this probably does not go far enough. I am mindful of the Minister’s comments about not making this overly burdensome—if we do, it will not work—but we need to find a way to make sure that we understand who owns the shares.
I thank the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Leigh, the noble Baroness, Lady Blake, and the noble Lords, Lord Thomas and Lord Clement-Jones, for their contribution to the debate on this issue.
The Government’s view is that Clause 29 already introduces a revised Section 86 to the Companies Act 2006 in an effort to introduce a definition of what constitutes an acceptable and effective address for a company’s registered office. The amendment seeks to define the opposite: what would not represent an appropriate address. I hope your Lordships will agree with the following argument for why that is unnecessary.
I begin with the suggestion that PO box addresses be explicitly forbidden. We do not believe there is a need for this. A PO box address cannot be an address at which deliveries can be acknowledged, nor an address to which a sender can be assured that what is sent will find its way to the hands of a company representative. It is therefore clearly not an appropriate address—we very much agree with the noble Baroness on that.
I turn to the “reasonable suspicion” element of the amendment. Where the registrar has reasonable grounds to suspect that the company does not have permission to use an address, she will almost inevitably conclude that the conditions that I have just mentioned will not be capable of being met and, again, she will be within her rights to reject or force the company to change it as appropriate.
The other element of the amendment would prevent companies having their registered office address anywhere other than their main place of business. There are, frankly, many reasons why a company may choose to separate the two, so this could be problematic for many companies. That includes, for example, particularly small enterprises that carry out businesses from home but choose to register the company at the premises of their accountant in order to protect their residential address details, which I think we would agree is perfectly reasonable. We have been at pains elsewhere in the Bill to introduce measures to extend, where appropriate, the ability to suppress addresses that the public have access to which might jeopardise the safety or security of individuals. There are elements of the amendment that we believe would run contrary to those aims.
I hope the Committee will be reassured that new Section 86 will be an effective means by which to monitor and police the accuracy of company address information and that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment. As a final point, I personally have great sympathy with the ambitions of the amendment to make sure that the right address is being provided for the company register, but I hope I have laid out the reasons why the processes that the Government have put in the legislation should be sufficient to ensure that real addresses are given and other protections are employed.
Personally, I am convinced by what the Minister has said about the substitute for Section 86. I just have one query. It creates an offence whereby a person is guilty on summary conviction. The offence appears to be committed by a company and
“every officer of the company who is in default.”
Could the Minister help with who the statute envisages will be an officer of the company who is in default?
I appreciate that comment. I will come back to the noble Lord with more detail, if that is possible.
My Lords, I support these amendments. I have listened to what the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, has said and will perhaps think about that. I should declare my interest as a director of the London Stock Exchange. At 5% ownership, there are significant things that can be done: if it is a public company, at 5% you can apply to the court to prevent it going private. That is a significant power, and we ought to know that it is applied properly. I guess the court would find out if you were not who you said you were; nevertheless, you might be masquerading as such and could still have influence—you could call general meetings and propose resolutions. These are all events that could have a significant effect on companies of all sizes. I tend to feel, therefore, that other shareholders need to know that things have been properly verified.
I have sympathy for the SME angle and will think about it further. However, just because you are small does not mean that you do not need to know some of these things, including who might have an exercisable right which you know has been verified. I would probably follow suit in the decision on persons with significant control: if you are going to exempt SMEs, they should be exempted for both; if they are going to be included, they should be included in both. I am still veering towards including them, simply because it is a substantial power. There are plenty of private SMEs in which people have significant sums invested, and I do not really see that they should be protected any less from not having full awareness of who really holds these powers to do things or of whether they are sheltering a nominee.
At the moment, my tendency is to support both of these amendments as they stand, with the caveat that I will go away and think a bit about whether this would be too onerous for SMEs. We have to remember, however, that the “M”s of SMEs can be quite big.
I am not wholly convinced that what you would be required to do under this amendment is very onerous. I remember looking at this when we were examining the desirability of transparency in relation to ownership of shares. Presuming bad actors—although this is, I hope, infrequently the case—it is very easy for someone to, as it were, redistribute their shares to smaller packages if they wanted to conceal their identity. I am not saying that that is what people do most of the time, but it would be more difficult if there were an obligation to disclose of the sort contained in this amendment.
My Lords, very quickly, I will not repeat what we said on an earlier group, but these two amendments cover very much the same sort of areas of transparency. I ask the Minister—probably as a matter of relative urgency, given the discussions we have had—whether he could facilitate a meeting of the various interested parties so that we can try to thrash out where we want to start to coalesce around these issues, as that would be helpful.
My Lords, I do not really understand this provision. The purpose is to create a basic offence of strict liability—that is what the Minister and the Explanatory Notes say—but the wording that inserts the basic false statement offence says:
“A person commits an offence if, in purported compliance with a notice … or in purported compliance with a duty imposed… and without reasonable excuse, the person makes a statement that is misleading, false or deceptive in a material particular.”
It is the words “without reasonable excuse” that bother me. I do not see how a strict liability offence can have an excuse. Last week it was well-publicised that someone in the other place said, “Yes, I misled, but I had a reasonable excuse because no one told me. Indeed, I was advised that there was nothing wrong.”
What is meant by a reasonable excuse? How can it be, as put forward, a strict liability offence in circumstances like that? This of course goes to officers who are in default, which is another contradiction within that proposed new paragraph. I ask the Minister to take this proposed new clause back to those advising him and ask whether it is correctly drafted. I do not think it is.
Further to what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has said, the use of the phrase “false statements” rather than “inaccurate statements” is quite significant. A false statement carries with it the connotation of a deliberate inaccuracy, whereas simply getting something wrong is rather different. I agree with him that without reasonable excuse the prosecution would have to prove the absence of a reasonable excuse, which is contrary to the concept of a strict liability offence.
I agree with what the noble Lords say. It occurs to me that the intention of calling this a strict liability offence but including the concept of “reasonable excuse” might be to impose a burden on the person who is responsible for filing the misleading statement to demonstrate a reasonable excuse—shifting the presumption, as it were. That might work. It would not quite be a strict liability offence, but it would make it relatively easier to prosecute the matter where a false statement was filed, and it would cater for the rare case—like the person trying to persuade a committee in the other place a few days ago—where the person filing the statement was entirely blameless because they had acted honestly and reasonably in reliance on information supplied by someone else. In that rare case, where the person who had made an error and filed a false statement but was entirely blameless could demonstrate that, it seems right that they should avoid a conviction.
To echo a point made in relation to a different amendment by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, I am slightly troubled by the further subsection that talks about an offence being committed by
“every officer of the entity who is in default”.
At the moment I am not certain what that is getting at, and I simply seek clarification.
I do not get the impression that the Committee is against the idea; there is simply a lack of clarity as it is currently formulated as to what constitutes “false” and a “reasonable excuse”, and what is inaccurate. I think the Committee is generally in favour of this provision and understands why it is there; we are just not quite sure that this captures it, as currently drafted.
My Lords, the procedure in Grand Committee is quite clear: there has to be unanimity for an amendment to proceed.