National Security Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bethell (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 37A on treason and aiding a foreign power is in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, who is extremely frustrated that he cannot be here today.

This is an excellent Bill. It is clear from the proceedings in this Chamber that it is welcomed, and I very much echo those sentiments. However, I have moved this amendment because I believe that there is a significant gap in the legislation. An important signal to the British public is needed in an era of hybrid warfare and mass migration. These points were very well made in the Policy Exchange publication Aiding the Enemy, authored by Professor Richard Ekins and current Home Office Minister Tom Tugendhat, with a foreword by my friend the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge.

We are living in an age of rising great power competition. As noted in the proceedings on this Bill, hostile states such as China and Russia are actively looking to suborn our nationals into actions that undermine our national security. As it stands, the law of treason applies only to international armed conflicts. That is where the gap is. The law of treason should pick out and condemn people who betray the UK where preparations for international armed conflict are being made or where attacks on the UK, such as cyberattacks, may fall short of the threshold required for international armed conflict. This would recognise accurately the wrong being done, which is typically worse than merely mishandling official information, and punish it accordingly. For example, in the Cold War there were British nationals who betrayed our country by passing secrets to the Soviets; they certainly deserved to be punished as traitors but were not because the law of treason was in a poor state. It remains in a poor state now, as a new cold war could be beginning, so it is time that we fixed it.

We need to speak to the hearts and minds of our citizens, to bind the British people and make it clear to those who seek to assist foreign powers to do us harm that they will be designated by law as traitors to their country. This is not about requiring patriotism; it is about the law clearly setting out that to assist a group or country to attack the country in which you are a citizen is a crime. It is for these reasons—that appeal to the heart—that similar arrangements have been recently introduced by other common-law jurisdictions such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand.

I was very struck by the story of Kimberley Miners, who travelled to Syria and returned. She said of her experience living with ISIS:

“People have no idea, but ISIS is actively searching Facebook for vulnerable people. People just like me. These people befriended me, I felt accepted.”


I feel enormous compassion for her but also enormous anger that she was so stupid as to make this decision. If our nationals had a clearer sense of where the boundaries lay, naive people would not make such mistakes.

Treason reform was dropped from the final text of the National Security Bill when it was placed before Parliament, which is a great shame. The consultation on legislation to counter state threats, with which many noble Lords will be familiar, claimed that significant historical analysis would need to be done to enable reform of treason but that that would significantly delay the Bill. I never like the idea that we should avoid good legislation because it is too time-consuming to draft; given the support for this straightforward, clearly drafted measure in many corners of the Committee, I do not think it need delay the Bill or overstress the resources of the MoJ.

One objection to a refresh of the treason laws was made by the excellent Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, who suggested that

“in order to prosecute an individual for aiding a hostile state or organisation, you have to label that state or organisation as such. Doing so could legitimise their cause and give them ‘special status and cachet’.”

I take a different view. Treason is not about labelling your enemies or legitimising their status; they put all their efforts into doing that themselves, without our help or otherwise. Jonathan Hall also suggested that juries would be worried about convicting on such a contentious crime with a controversial history. That is an important point to address, because it is exactly this squeamishness about considering treason a crime that means that we need to bring it back from the legal freezer and make it a commonly understood and demystified concept.

The incidence of treason is not going down—it is quite possibly becoming more frequent. We cannot live in a country in which a sense of social awkwardness prevents prosecution of a heinous crime. Therefore, it would be wise to leave it to the prosecuting authorities to decide which crimes can be most effectively prosecuted, as they are both qualified and rightly responsible to make these decisions. As a parliamentarian, I do not think that good law-making is best achieved by second-guessing juries. There are a number of horrible crimes for which, as noble Lords know, it is sometimes difficult to gain convictions, but we do it because they are important.

I am also conscious of the misuse of treason accusations by autocracies such as Russia. Accusations of treason can be abused and used to silence dissenters, but it is not logical that the misuse of a law by a tin-pot regime elsewhere means that we should not have it in this country, which values the rule of law. The best protection is good, workable legislation. That is why I ask the Minister to reconsider the decision to drop treason provisions from the Bill and to consider supporting this constructive amendment. I beg to move.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I have great respect for any new clause proposed by the noble Lord, and with the name of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. It is therefore with some trepidation that I may strike a discordant note. I am almost intimidated by the compelling ad majorem argument which the noble Lord used, and some of the names he referred to in support of his proposal. I read the Policy Exchange document at the time, which seemed to me both ambitious and, to an extent, misguided. I will give four or five reasons why I am of that view.

First, what is described as treason in this proposed new clause is in every instance already prosecutable under existing offences. In my view, duplication of conduct under different headings is a disadvantage to the courts and creates potential difficulties with juries, which are sensitive to the labels that would be placed by conviction upon those prosecuted.

Secondly, the clause refers generally to an “attack”. Does that include cyberattacks, which are now being conducted on a very large scale by countries which have hostile intent towards the United Kingdom? Is it proportionate that a cyberattack should be punishable as treason as opposed to under the available existing legislation?

My third argument is about symbolism in criminal justice legislation. I know that some of us sat in this building in another place during the content of the Westland affair, as a result of which the jury failed to convict somebody who in law had been held by the judge to be guilty of the offence as charged. That is a result we would all wish to avoid. Others here were in very senior official positions during what proved to be a very uncomfortable episode. I look in particular at my noble friend Lord Butler, to whom I give way with pleasure.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)]

I think my noble friend is referring to Ponting, not Westland.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I thank my noble friend for that correction—yes, it was Ponting, not Westland. I apologise; I had the wrong incident in my mind.

My fourth point is about the life sentence contained in subsection (3) of the proposed new clause. I simply do not like tautologies such as “manifestly unjust” in criminal sentencing provisions. In my view, if there is to be a provision of this kind—we have been told that it has been drafted very carefully—it should not contain tautologous phrases like that. “Unjust” will do very nicely, as far as I am concerned.

My fifth point is about the authority for such a prosecution. The noble Lord, Lord Bethell, referred to the involvement, presumably, of the Director of Public Prosecutions in authorising such a prosecution. However, as drafted, this proposed new clause would permit a private prosecution, which could be stopped by the Director of Public Prosecutions only in certain circumstances. Private prosecutions—often justifiably—are becoming more fashionable and frequent, particularly in fraud cases which the authorities are not able to undertake for reasons of scale and cost. Those are perfectly defensible private prosecutions, as results in the courts have shown. However, the use of private prosecutions for oblique motives in this context seems to be a very realistic possibility. I therefore urge that if we are to have a revised treason offence, it should be prosecutable only with the authority of the Attorney-General.

Finally, the House should pay very close attention—I would say this, as a former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation—to the views of Jonathan Hall KC, who has considered this matter in detail and with whom I agree. I also simply pose a rhetorical question: who seriously thinks that ISIS would be discouraged in any way whatsoever by the introduction of this clause? The Government are right in the decision they have taken, and I hope that they will stick to their view.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow two such clear and thought-provoking speeches. When this House has debated treason offences in recent years, it has generally been in the context of lending support to terrorist groups, particularly in foreign theatres such as Iraq and Syria. It has never seemed to me that there is much point in bringing treason into this. The bristling arsenal of counterterrorism law is already equal to any conceivable type of assistance to terrorism or adherence to a terrorist cause, whatever the nationality of the subject and regardless of the state, if any, against which terrorism is directed. As the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, put it, the boundaries are closely drawn and abundantly clear.

Prosecutions for treason in this area would certainly have the potential to raise the emotional temperature, both for us and for the terrorists themselves. I am against such prosecutions because they are exactly what the terrorists want: to elevate their squalid and immoral behaviour into some sort of noble cause. I remember this point being well made from the Government Front Bench by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, who is not in her place, shortly after I joined your Lordships’ House in 2018. She said that

“prosecuting terrorists for treason would risk giving their actions a credibility … glamour and political status that they do not deserve. It would indicate that we recognised terrorists as being in some formal sense at war with the state, rather than merely regarding them as dangerous criminals.”—[Official Report, 31/10/2018; col. 1382.]

No doubt this is why militant republicans in Northern Ireland were not given the platform of treason trials but rather prosecuted for murder, firearms and explosives offences and, more recently, catch-all offences such as the preparation of terrorist acts, which carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.

If we are looking for simple and effective ways to prosecute foreign terrorist fighters—particularly if they are suspected to have been active in a country where assistance from the authorities in gathering evidence is unlikely to be forthcoming—we would do better to concentrate on the offence of entering or remaining in a designated area, which was pioneered in Denmark and Australia, recommended for consideration in one of my own reports as independent reviewer, and introduced by the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. However, I believe that no terrorist hotspot has ever been designated under that Act, so the provision remains unused.

This amendment moves the debate on, as the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, explained, in that it relates to aiding not terrorism, but hostile foreign powers. The clause would target those who assist the Governments of countries with which we are at war or which wish to attack the UK by unspecified means including, I assume, cyberattacks on our national infrastructure. Unlike its Australian equivalent, which was introduced after 9/11 but is still to be used for the first time, it would relate only to hostile state activity—indeed, hostile state belligerence.

I look forward to hearing the Minister’s view on whether there is a gap in our law regarding assistance to the enemy—or will be one once the Bill, including Clauses 3 and 13, has become law. There might be a gap: I believe that Canada and New Zealand have their own laws against assisting the enemy, though I am not very familiar with them. Our own Foreign Enlistment Act 1870, introduced to restrict mercenary activity in the wake of the American Civil War and Franco-Prussian War, may not be as antiquated as the Treason Act 1351, but it was last used in the aftermath of the 1896 Jameson raid. It should certainly be reviewed if we are thinking of legislating in this area.

As we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, advocates of a treason law are often motivated by a sense that betrayal—in the words of the Policy Exchange report to which he referred, which was co-authored by the current Security Minister—

“is a specific crime against society and one that deserves punishment.”

I entirely understand that feeling, but betrayal is a regrettable fact of life, and one which we do not consider deserves special punishment in other contexts. The child who kills his parents betrays the family bond, but parricide and matricide are simply types of murder. Those who betray the most sacred bond of all—that of matrimony—may be called adulterers but are not criminalised at all. Can it be said that the bond of citizenship is of a wholly different nature, such that to break it must attract the most severe consequences? I think that is a difficult argument to make, particularly in circumstances where it is now so easy for the Home Secretary to break that bond by depriving people of their citizenship whenever she considers it

“conducive to the public good”.

Incidentally, that is something I hope we will look at some day: in the 15 years to 2020, there were 175 such deprivations on national security grounds alone.

This amendment, interestingly enough, does not follow the Policy Exchange model. Like its enacted but unused Australian equivalent, it has nothing whatever to say about betrayal. It applies to everyone, without limitation to British citizens or even to those who have been given leave to enter and remain in the United Kingdom. I assume it is not intended to apply extraterritorially, or it would criminalise the soldiers of foreign armies, contrary to the principle of combat immunity. But if the amendment is motivated by the desire to punish the betrayal of those who owe allegiance to the Crown, it does not succeed in that aim. Indeed, it is difficult to see why it flies under the banner of treason at all.

My position is simple. If there is a gap in the law as regards material assistance to the enemy, I would be in favour of filling it with an offence punishable by life imprisonment. That offence would be directed to our protection and would therefore apply to all persons within the jurisdiction. Betrayal of a bond of allegiance to the state would be an aggravating factor but not the basis for a separate treason offence, which is needed in neither the terrorism context nor the hostile state context.

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[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, Amendment 44 is in my name and that of the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Wallace, who has just spoken. I am reassured that I seem to be keeping better company than is my wont, which gives me some confidence for this amendment.

Before I get to Amendment 44, I want to say that I broadly support the amendments that have been tabled by the Minister, though I have real concerns about the phrase “spiritual injury”. In my inquiries into this, I fed into the internet, by mistake, “spritual injury”. Undeterred, the search engine came up with numerous definitions of spiritual injury. Interestingly, some are related to veteran issues. One of them, which comes from Australia, requires careful listening:

“It is proposed that a Spiritual Injury occurs when an incident or event creates a break in the relationship between an individual and their concept of God.”


It is a brave Government who go into that area.

This reminds me of a dinner I used to have from time to time with Ian Paisley, when I was a Member of the other place. The definition is rather similar to one—which I will not recount—that Ian Paisley once gave me of “conciliation”, which was as incomprehensible as what I have just read. He accompanied it with a comment about poor farmers, and I represented a lot of poor farmers in those days. He said that a poor farmer is one who does not have a Mercedes.

I turn now to my original point and Amendment 44. There is a very good reason for Amendment 44. It is an attempt to put on the political parties some responsibility for what happens to them, and particularly where they obtain their money. Having not been a member of a political party for some years—before that I was a member of a fairly virtuous political party—I believe that the political parties are prepared to take their proper responsibility for this area of their lives, and that they should be taking that responsibility.

There are major concerns about foreign financial influence on political parties. It is capable of being covert and indirect. It would not be right to impose criminal penalties on political parties when other measures are available and effective. I suggest that Amendment 44 is proportionate. It places a proper duty on political parties. It is unsensational; it is not the stuff of headlines. It is placing a responsibility on those political parties. It is trusting of our democratic process. Although there is a great deal of criticism of the political parties, they are all committed to our democratic processes, and, when things go wrong, of the type that we are talking about, on the whole they are willing to take the necessary action to reinforce the confidence of the public. But something needs to be placed in statute that sets out what that responsibility is.

Finally, in my view, the availability of civil remedies is potent enough to deal with these issues. Political parties do not like being sued—understandably—because, as I think all have found in recent years, it is actually very costly and not a good use of resources. They are therefore likely to respond to the threat of civil remedies. I think it disproportionate to place senior officers of political parties under the risk of prosecution in circumstances where they may well not have acted dishonestly but may have acted foolishly. Civil remedies are exactly designed for that sort of situation. So although I heard what the Minister helpfully said at the beginning about this amendment, I invite the Government to consider it carefully, because I think it would instil greater confidence in political parties and strengthen the political process.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am sorry to disagree with the noble Lord, but on this one I do. However, I commit to discussing this further with my counterpart at DLUHC. I will come back to the subject.

Spiritual injury was raised by the noble Lords, Lord Wallace, Lord Anderson and Lord Purvis. I will commit to write on FCDO engagement on this subject; I do not have the answers to those questions. What is spiritual injury and why is it part of this offence? Basically, it mirrors the Elections Act 2022. The term “spiritual injury” covers the potential harmful impact on an individual’s spiritual or religious well-being that could be directly caused by another individual—for example, excluding a person from the membership of an organised belief system or banning them from attending a place of worship. The term “undue spiritual pressure” could include, for example, pressuring a person to commit an act by suggesting that doing so is a duty arising from the spiritual or religious beliefs that a person holds or purports to hold. In addition, “undue spiritual pressure” could refer to conduct by a person that alters, or has the potential to alter, a person’s spiritual standing or well-being.

Reference to “spiritual injury” already exists in the definition of “undue influence” as set out in Section 114A of the Representation of the People Act 1983. Undue spiritual pressure is a new element of undue spiritual influence in the clarified offence in Section 8(4)(e) of the Elections Act, as part of efforts to clarify what types of conduct amount to an undue influence. I hope I have answered that question.

For these reasons, the Government cannot accept this set of amendments. I ask the Committee to accept the Government’s amendments to improve the foreign interference offence.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister and am very grateful to him for giving way. On this question of spiritual injury, has the Lord Chief Justice been consulted as to whether he and the judiciary regard this definition as something that judges can sum up to juries in a clear way? Although the phrase exists elsewhere, it has not been litigated to any great extent and, without a consultation of the judges, may cause great difficulty.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The simple answer is that I do not know, but I will find out and commit to write.

Police: Appointments in PCC Offices

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Wednesday 21st December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, it might help if I go into detail on the barred and advisory lists. Since December 2017, any officer, special constable or member of police staff dismissed is placed on the police barred list, preventing them rejoining policing in the future, and that includes PCC offices. Any officer who retires or resigns during a gross misconduct investigation, or before an allegation comes to light, is placed on the police advisory list. PCCs must consult the advisory list before appointing an individual, although inclusion on the list does not necessarily preclude employment. It will be for the PCC to assess.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that the issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, illustrate starkly the dysfunctionality of a police service that still consists of 43 territorial police forces, and that it is high time the service be restructured—for example, along the lines of the much more limited number of counterterrorism police services, which work very well across the existing boundaries?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord makes some very good points, but they are slightly above my pay grade, as I am sure he will appreciate. There are 39 PCCs across England and Wales, with three mayors exercising similar functions; the City of London Police has separate set of rules and regs. In the main and for the most part, most of those people are doing a superb job and are held accountable by the public who elect them.

National Security Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, there is an important principle at heart here. While I appreciate the description of the zone as grey, the problem is that, when you are criminalising conduct, particularly with the penalties that are mentioned in the clause, absolute clarity is needed so that the individuals at risk of being prosecuted can judge whether or not they are at risk of prosecution. Therefore, some attempt at changing the wording—not necessarily following the exact wording in the amendments—is needed to clarify the situation in the interests of the members of the public who are at risk of being prosecuted. I quite understand the greyness of the area, but that is a challenge that must be faced by finding a way, though some form of wording, to avoid the broad reach—indeed, the broadest possible reach—which is at risk if the wording of the clause is kept as it is.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I agree absolutely with the Government’s aim in that there are certain British interests that they wish to protect. However, the way the Bill is drawn leaves an area of opacity and inconsistency with other important and analogous publications. I draw your Lordships’ attention to the revised version of the integrated review produced in 2021, which refers to:

“Our interests and our values: the glue that binds the”


nation. It continues:

“The Government’s first and overriding priority is to protect and promote the interests of the British people through our actions at home and overseas. The most important of these interests are: … Sovereignty … Security … Prosperity”—

and it explains each of those terms. The explanation of prosperity is extremely vague, but the descriptions of both sovereignty and security are quite clear. Those two descriptions are different from “the safety or interests of the United Kingdom” in the Bill, at least as I understand it. My plea to the Minister is for him to accept that there may be some opacity in what we are presented with, and for him to go back and consider this—alongside other publications that the Government have produced, including the integrated review—so that we can have something which is consistent across the board by the time we complete the Bill.

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As in all our other discussions this afternoon, this is about precision and targeting rather than sweeping up all kinds of things that are not properly part of a national security Bill.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I rise with some trepidation to disagree with these amendments, for reasons that I will try to give briefly. Amendment 8 and, indeed, all the others in the group are concerned with intellectual property. My entry in the register of interests discloses involvement with a strategy consultancy. In that role, we sometimes make ourselves available for the investigation of imposter frauds, for example. Many of those frauds can be connected with the attempted theft of intellectual property, not just by individuals and companies but by nation states. Some of those nation states are extremely big and powerful and have the capacity to make full use of the secrets they steal to become world leaders in the marketing of such goods.

I would suggest, with respect, that Amendment 8 shows a misunderstanding of the issue by the JCHR. Indeed, the reason why the proposed Clause 2(1)(ca)—Amendment 8—is not needed is that the reasons for this provision are well set out, in subsection (2)(b) in particular. This is for the protection of some very important and extraordinarily valuable intellectual property, which is created in, and in the interests of, this country. Indeed, if one looks at the other amendments, in particular those seeking to amend subsection (2), one has to think for only a moment to see the problem, and that these amendments defy that problem.

Let us take the example of a university computer science or physics laboratory where leading-edge research is being done or, to take something extremely topical, a vaccination laboratory where research is being done that could make a huge difference to humankind in general. As it happens, it could also make an enormous amount of profit for those creating the scientific inventions and, given the advantages they gain through taxation, for the Government.

It seems to me that the provisions in the Bill are absolutely needed to protect those scientists and inventors. There is a stage between the idea—which may come to someone in the bath or shower—and the production of a patent or copyright during which that idea is not protected by registration. These provisions precisely protect that intermediate area between the idea coming into the scientist’s head and its being registered and protected under the intellectual property legislation, which can be quite slow, very expensive and very complex.

So I respectfully suggest to those who have tabled these amendments that they are not needed and that, in fact, the Bill gives the right sort of protection precisely where it is needed, in the clause in question.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I respectfully disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. He may well be able to make a compelling case that there is a mischief that here needs to be addressed, but it is surely nothing whatever to do with national security, which is the subject of the Bill. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, is right that it is puzzling that there is no requirement in Clause 2 that it be established that the conduct in question is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. The desirability of improving intellectual property law is really not an appropriate subject for a Bill of this nature.

Moreover, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, says that if one looks at Clause 2(2)(b), that paragraph ensures the protection. I remind the Committee that all that Clause 2(2)(b) does is define a “trade secret” as information that

“has actual or potential industrial, economic or commercial value which would be … adversely affected if it became generally known”.

That is the loosest possible definition of a commercial trade secret. It is impossible to understand why matters of that sort should be dealt with in the Bill; indeed, that information may be enjoyed or owned by a foreign individual or company.

Trade secret law is very well developed. It includes remedies for damages and for injunctions. To include Clause 2 in the Bill would attract not just the considerable criminal penalties that the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, referred to, it would invoke Clause 16, on the criminality of preparatory acts—

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, if this is an intervention, could the noble Lord make his point, please?

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

The noble Lord asked to make an intervention, which is why I allowed him to, and I regret that he used the procedure of the House to make a speech. He will be free to make a speech if he wishes to do so.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

No, I am not letting the noble Lord in now. I am sure he will make a speech if he wishes to in a moment.

I will respond to the noble Lord’s intervention, if I may be allowed a moment to do so. His intervention completely misses the point. He seeks to impose upon us his definition of national security. I do not share his definition of national security. If there is theft by a major state overseas of important intellectual property that has yet to be registered and which could make a huge difference to this country, in my view that falls well within the definition of national security. Indeed, that is why the Government have chosen to include economic issues in the broad definition of national security. So I respect my noble friend’s intervention but I disagree with it. I shall listen very carefully to any speech that he makes—after I have sat down.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am very sorry. I apologise to the noble Lord and the Committee; I thought he had sat down, and I was not the only Member of the House who thought so.

I have made my speech. The only point that I was going to add was that if we retain Clause 2, it includes the preparatory acts under Clause 16 and the powers of search under Clause 21. For all those reasons, I think Clause 2 should not be included in the Bill.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord obviously did not know that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, had not sat down, but he perhaps ought reasonably to have known.

This exchange has focused my mind much more on the following question: part of the grey zone that we are dealing with is whether or not economic security is now part of national security. To a considerable extent, it is. I have not yet fully understood the relationship between the Bill and the National Security and Investment Act, passed last year, which deals with, among other things, some aspects of intellectual property. There may well be—but I am not sufficiently expert on it—a degree of overlap between that Act and what is proposed here.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. The National Security and Investment Act 2021 deals with investment and the transfer of more than 25% of the equity in certain types of companies, and it is very clear. A unit has been set up, in two departments at least, to deal with those provisions. There is no real relationship between this provision and the NSIA.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

I am reassured. I declare a certain interest: I have a number of relatives in aspects of scientific research. My son tells me that he is a systems biologist, but I note that engineering biology and synthetic biology are defined in the NSI Act among the strategic areas, and they are in some ways very similar to systems biology. So that is part of my active interest in this area. I am well aware that, in our universities, we have a large number of multinational teams working on the cutting edge of advanced science in a number of different areas. That is part of the grey zone with which we are now dealing and which it is extremely difficult to come to grips with.

I will speak to my Amendment 11, which is very much a probing amendment, raising the question of how we handle the very substantial number of dual nationals we have in this country, both living here and living in other countries—in some cases, they are long-term residents in other countries. If we are moving towards an increasingly unfriendly and difficult international environment, as we are already seeing, dual nationals will come under increasing pressure, not just from what we may do, mildly, within the Bill but from the other countries of which they have citizenship and with which they have connections. We have seen the pressures that the Iranian Government are willing to push on to the family members of dual nationals or single British citizens living in this country, and we have seen the same in China. Therefore, there are a number of questions about whether we need to take on board the presence and complexity of our dual-national citizens as part of the complications of the Bill.

I am also conscious that, unless the Minister can reassure me, we have no idea how many dual nationals we have, who they are or where they are. All the questions I posed during the passage of the Elections Act about our overseas citizens, and potential overseas electors, have told me that we have very little idea of who and where they are. I raise this because I simply do not know whether there is a problem or how serious it may be. But it seems to me that we should pay more attention to a world in which some hostile foreign states will do their best to bring all the pressures that they can on British citizens with origins in their country or dual citizens.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I have not yet spoken to Amendments 9 and 10, which I was proposing to do before my noble friend spoke for us. Before doing so, I join my noble friend Lady Ludford in opposing the protection of all trade secrets without any requirement for there to be prejudice to the interests of the United Kingdom. That amendment, which has been proposed on behalf of the JCHR, seems to me to be sensible. I also share her bemusement, and that of others, that trade secrets are included in the Bill, because the way in which they are included is extremely wide.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has pointed out that Clause 2(2)(b)—he read it aloud, but I will not repeat doing so—is so wide that it effectively covers any information which has any commercial value of any significance. Of course, that information is important, and, to that extent, I accept the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. However, state actors may also steal, or act nefariously in respect of, trade secrets—as may others, be they state actors or not. They may be from the United Kingdom or abroad. They may be connected to national security, but if the Bill will deal with trade secrets, they need to be defined in such a way that it is confined to trade secrets that present a threat to national security. The Bill goes far too wide if we include wide threats to trade secrets in the criminal proceedings—which, as my noble friend Lady Ludford said, carry very heavy sentences—without the need to prove the threat to national security as an element of the criminal offence. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, threats to trade secrets are normally dealt with in the civil courts, where the protection to intellectual property is customarily and very frequently dealt with every day.

It is absolutely right, as the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, pointed out, that there is a requirement that the foreign power condition must be met. However, the foreign power condition in Clause 29 is not a very difficult hurdle to surmount. The present drafting does not require any prejudice to the security, defence or other interests of the United Kingdom. It is met if conduct is carried out not by a state Government but by any entity controlled or financially assisted by a foreign power—so that could be a commercial organisation that happened to be state-controlled. For “foreign power”, we have to read that as any power or any other state, including any friendly Government from anywhere in the world.

Our Amendments 9 and 10 tighten up the wording on trade secrets in Clause 2, but only in a limited way: by requiring that a trade secret must be subject to measures to prevent it becoming generally known or available to rival experts in the field. We suggest that it is simply not satisfactory—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I have been listening very carefully to the noble Lord, whom I always listen to with great respect. Can I take it that he or his party will put down an amendment to the Long Title of the Bill in due course? Perhaps he has not read the Long Title in full, because, as far as I can see, it covers all these amendments in the exact way in which they are intended. We are in danger of over-sophisticating a non-existent definition of national security.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I am bound to say that I discussed that before the noble Lord came in. Since, in my opening speech on the first group of amendments, I quoted specifically from the Long Title of the Bill dealing with Part 1 offences, I do not accept the criticism that I have not read it. Nor do I accept the criticism that it is apposite to threats that have nothing to do with national security, because the Long Title—which starts by dealing with Part 1, as far as the first semi-colon—is about making provision about threats to national security. My point is that, if you protect trade secrets in these very wide terms, it may include threats to national security, but it is not limited to threats to national security and it may go far wider.

It is not satisfactory for trade secrets to qualify for protection just because the information in those secrets might be reasonably expected to be subject to measures to prevent them becoming known generally. What would the measures be? Would they be imposed by a court, by government or by regulation? That is undefined. Perhaps the Minister, in replying, would explain what those measures might be. How does it help to protect trade secrets that are not subject to any protective measures, as the Bill specifically envisages? The clause raises far more questions than it answers.

UK Asylum and Refugee Policy

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Friday 9th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I thank the most reverend Primate for initiating this debate and, above all, for the characteristically profound ethical foundation of his speech. I also commend three truly promising maiden speeches, and I look forward to hearing more from all of their Lordships.

As the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford said, I agreed to chair an independent Commission on the Integration of Refugees—in my view, integration is a core necessity of the subject under debate. Convened and funded by the Woolf Institute, which is based in Cambridge, the commission has more than 20 commissioners from many disciplines, some of whom have real lived experience of life as a refugee. I thank the right reverend Prelate and two other noble Lords who have kindly consented to be on my commission—namely, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger. Just telling your Lordships those names confirms the promise of a thoroughly penetrating debate, as well as a chilling chairing challenge. Our purpose is to bring together different experiences and opposing views to build consensus on this sometimes-contentious political issue. Ours is neither a campaigning commission nor politically partisan; in many ways, it is simply a corollary to the most reverend Primate’s debate today.

Integration means different things to different people—it is a two-way process for new and existing communities respectively. The nature and outcome of integration is multifaceted. British values and culture are diverse, and integration most certainly should not be confused with assimilation. It comes from a neutral position, so one can say that policies geared towards refugee integration have been seriously neglected by all Governments over the past 30 years or so.

The lens of migration management is inappropriate for asylum and leads to unnecessary polarisation and toxicity. The UK refugee and asylum system should not be lumped together with general immigration policy—the former is wholly morally grounded, while the latter is more opaque, so immigration by refugees and through asylum is founded on a wholly different set of principles. At our first hearing in Birmingham, our commission heard from refugees, local officials and voluntary organisations. All raised major concerns about the way that the UK’s current refugee and asylum system functions. The polarising media discourse in this area was particularly identified as the enemy of fairness.

Recent successful and country-specific settlement schemes should be distinguished from the main subject that I am talking about: they have come with funding and resourcing to facilitate the integration of specified groups of new arrivals, but the same cannot be said for those who apply for asylum in the UK. Poor resourcing, the unprecedented waiting times for those in the system and the ensuing trauma and uncertainty make long-term integration much more difficult for anyone who exercises their right—it is a right—according to the Geneva convention to apply for asylum in the United Kingdom. I am afraid that additional damage is caused by legislation that puts into statute a two-tiered asylum system, depending on the method of entry.

We can all understand the argument for deterrence—and I think we should send back quickly those who clearly are not genuine refugees—but the current system has the effect of punishing those who legitimately claim asylum in the UK by putting severe restrictions on access to English language training, work, which has already been mentioned, and good accommodation. The current policy does not seem to deter a single person; it is a fiction that government policy has increased deterrence.

Finally, I want to raise a point about unaccompanied asylum seeker children. I believe that they should be treated as children first and foremost. The British state has a duty of care to them. Sadly, in many circumstances, that is not provided. Unaccompanied asylum seeker children are often processed as adults on arrival at the UK border. They are sent to adult accommodation, and it is left to local authorities to try to pick up the pieces later on. Those children are usually not provided with access to the health support and, especially, the mental health support that they require. Sadly, some simply disappear into child trafficking, sex work and human slavery. There are serious issues about the age assessment of people who claim to be children and the disputes process on that matter. These must now be resolved in a way that is fast, fair and imaginative. If the system does that, it will also be accurate.

The UK must play its role in working to alleviate these defects through an improved system that respects the rights of refugees and asylum seekers, while also winning the acquiescence of the British public.

National Security Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 6th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, a benefit of my removal to the Cross Benches some years ago is that, very occasionally, I have the pleasure of following the noble Lord, Lord Beith. As ever, he spoke in a cogent and considered way, and I agree with most of what he said.

I am very grateful to Ministers and officials for the level of consultation that at least some of us have received on these important and difficult issues. Officials have been exemplary in those discussions: not venturing opinions but giving options we can discuss, to the benefit of the Committee stage, when we come to it. I know that my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich shares that view. Unfortunately, as has been said, he is absent today as he is doing public duty in another part of the British Isles, but I am sure that his absence will be requited in Committee.

I broadly support the Bill, and, in doing so, I join in the tributes to the intelligence agencies. When I was the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, I saw not only their diligence and efficiency but that they spared this country from numerous very unpleasant events which would have caused enormous distress to the public. They are not thanked often enough, perhaps because of their innate secrecy.

It is doubtless that, in Committee, we will discuss nuances and finesses that we will make on this Bill. I listened with particular attention to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, who raised some very important points which will benefit from detailed discussion. Broadly, I welcome the opportunity to update the legislation around official secrets and connected matters; it is overdue for this kind of update. As has already been mentioned, the Bill was amended in important aspects in Committee in another place. Of course, while we all acknowledge the skill and interest of the Members of Parliament concerned in those amendments, any amendment by even very senior Back-Benchers in Committee represents a perilous way of producing enduring legislation which would survive the scrutiny of the courts—and not only of mature policymakers.

I want to raise two issues in particular, both of which have already been raised. Clause 28, which the noble Lord, Lord Beith, referred to a few moments ago and the noble Lord, Lord West, referred to earlier, would amend Schedule 4 to the Serious Crime Act. Total and predestined immunity from prosecution is an unattractive option in any area where there may be—however remote—a risk of serious and possibly deliberate wrongdoing. I am totally opposed to any form of immunity, which sits uncomfortably in our law anyway, not least because there are alternatives. For example, I suggest to the Government that they could easily prepare a separate statutory defence that explicitly protects those carrying out acts necessary for the proper exercise of the United Kingdom intelligence community’s statutory functions. This could include a separate offence with an evidential burden of proof—mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Marks—in which the prosecution would have to disprove to the criminal standard that the burden of raising the evidential standard of proof had been created in the case, rather than an elaboration of a reasonable defence. Reasonableness is something that is extremely difficult to define in a reasonable way because, of course, we have many views of what is reasonable, even in the expertise of your Lordships’ House.

I also suggest that, as an alternative to Clause 28, there could be a clear reference to the responsibility of agency heads and ministerial responsibility, which in my view remains important. Ministers should be required to take these responsibilities if they become Ministers; after all, it is voluntary and known to be responsible. Ministers and agency heads should ensure the acts of a member of the UK intelligence community which would otherwise be an offence under the Serious Crime Act are necessary to fulfil statutory functions. It is similar in wording to Section 13(2) of the Bribery Act. That could include a new document which would bear close similarity to the July 2019 document entitled The Principles relating to the Detention and Interviewing of Detainees Overseas and the Passing and Receipt of Intelligence relating to Detainees. That is a government document and is a splendid example, a paradigm, of the sort of document required in the situation we are discussing.

I also ask your Lordships to remember that in our unwritten constitution there is a further guarantee that is very rarely discussed: the second part of the Crown Prosecution Service code test. Before a prosecution can be brought, even if there is evidence prima facie that there was an offence, the Director of Public Prosecutions considers whether it is in the public interest to bring that prosecution. That is a very important protection which has been exercised in a few—only a few—extremely significant cases. In my view, the fears that I have heard expressed from the agencies that without an immunity there would be a serious risk of prosecution and that operatives would therefore move very nervously is not borne out by any evidence at all. If you look at very delicate areas of the law—take, for example, assisted suicide—there are almost no prosecutions and one can rely on that constitutional protection given by the public interest test as being important.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has suggested—indeed if you care to read his interesting tweets you will see this set out in detail—an amendment of Section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994. I offer that too for consideration and explanation so that we can make an educated choice on the alternatives to Clause 28 as it exists.

I turn to the second issue that concerns me: Part 3 and the foreign influence registration scheme, or FIRS, which has been mentioned by others. I should mention my interest in this area. I happen to be involved in running a small company that advises foreign Governments and entities, including companies and, occasionally, charities that would also be affected by this. We have experience in the work that we do with the National Security and Investments Act 2021. We have examined many cases under that Act and there have been more than was imagined at one stage, but the Act deals competently with national security issues. FIRS is not about national security. National security cases with an investment element are considered under that legislation. The Ministry of Defence and BEIS have set up well-organised units to deal with that small cohort of cases.

I have no objection in principle to the FIRS system. However, it is much broader than the United States equivalent, which is called FARA, or the Australian FITS system. The way it was raised in the House of Commons means that, to take a metaphor from architecture, it looks like the first concept drawing by an assistant in an architect’s office to see very roughly what the skyscraper they might possibly design in future would look like. That concept drawing has not been the subject of any detailed analysis or information.

FIRS could affect a huge number of entities. It could have a dramatic effect on legitimate commercial confidentiality by there being a registered public register that would tell competitors in the United Kingdom what foreign companies were thinking of doing. It would require the disclosure of other forms of confidential information, which fall within the normal commercial confidentiality picture. As I said, it would affect charities. I am aware of charities operating in Ukraine—Ukrainian charities that collect money in this country and do very good work. There are charities operating in Romania, dealing with the aftermath, now many years later, of the problems in orphanages, which many of us are old enough to remember. Those are foreign charities, some of them very small, which would find themselves having to instruct lawyers and consultants to swallow their hard-earned cash to be able to carry on with their work. I suspect that some smaller charities would simply give up. It will also affect the appetite of foreign large-scale investors, including sovereign wealth funds, to invest in the United Kingdom, if they think that, without a clear architecture to which they can refer, they will simply have to disclose. Because there are criminal sanctions, people will take the cautious approach and feel that they must register, even though it is not strictly necessary.

If we are to have a FIRS system—as I say, I am not opposed to it in principle—we must have the structure that makes it work. There has to be a registrar and it has to be a separate registrar, which must have enough staff, so that it does not become a pale imitation of the immigration system. We must have points of reference, so that those who intend to register can write frankly to the registrar and ask whether it is necessary, obtaining advice on how best to do it, as we do when we register our interests with the registrar of Members’ interests in your Lordships’ House, who is always very helpful in assisting us to draft a form of our registration of particular interests. We have seen nothing of that. If we in your Lordships’ House do not see codes for guidance—a document similar to the principles relating to the detention of overseas detainees—while we are debating this matter, we will be working in the dark. That would not be a proper way for the Government to proceed and, more importantly, could be damaging to the national interest.

The registrar could be self-funded, because it is perfectly reasonable to ask people to pay fees in proper circumstances, and required to produce annual or biennial reports, like the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. Indeed, I am puzzled as to why FIRS has found its way into a National Security Bill, because it is not a national security issue. It looks as though it is a way to appease some argumentative Back-Benchers in another place, but I suggest to the Minister and the Government that what should really be done is that the Government should commit themselves to introducing another Bill in the next Session of Parliament, when these questions raised by me and others have been ironed out, so that it is a proper vehicle for legislation.

Public Order Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 16th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I apologise in advance to the Ministers for making their ears bleed. A lot of what I have just said is relevant to this group as well. In previous hours in this Committee, noble Lord after noble Lord from around this Committee—from the Benches opposite, the Cross Benches, lawyers, lay people, people concerned with the balance between peaceful dissent and other rights and freedoms for the rest of the community—has been really concerned about these new offences and the justification for them. There was a real consensus that it is for the Government of the day, and those who propose new restrictions of whatever kind on liberty, to make the case. Particularly when we are talking about coercive police powers at a time when there has been a bit of a crisis of trust in the police, which is not what we want, it is really important that the justification for new offences, new police powers and so on be made before we sign these blank cheques. It is no disrespect to the police. Every day that I come into this place, I am grateful to our wonderful police, who stand out there and protect us all as legislators. I am so grateful to them. Of course, it crosses my mind that I am criticising expansive police powers and so on, but I still feel that is my duty.

I will not take up too much time, but the case for these new offences has not been made by the Government. I tried to make my point in response to the debate on the previous group. We need a statement from Ministers about the existing public order statute book, what these existing offences and powers do and do not do, and what the gaps are thought to be, so that noble Lords in this Committee, including the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, who knows a little about the criminal law—he and I have debated it over many years; sometimes we have agreed and sometimes we have disagreed—can bring their minds to this schedule, which hopefully the Government will provide, and ask, “Is there really a gap?”

That has not been done to date, despite the fact that these measures are largely defrosted and reheated from a previous Bill and have been through the elected House. That forensic case, that examination of the existing statute book and where the gaps are, has not been made. I do not vote on people’s liberties to protest, whether I agree or disagree with them, unless I see the case being made. That is why I have taken the step of opposing so many of the clauses—and I apologise if that seems rude in any way.

Make no mistake: I would be doing this if it was my party in government or whoever’s party in government. Sometimes, when it comes to civil liberties, whoever you vote for, the Government get in. As legislators we have duties to be a little more careful and forensic before adding to the very expansive public order statute book, with people concerned for their basic protection—yes, from each other, but also from abuses of power. With that, I do not have to say anything more.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and in the widest sense I agree with her—but I come at it from a rather different angle. I am concerned about the integrity of the legal process.

I do not want to repeat what I said earlier. The Minister heard me referring to a very recent statute that came into force in August, I think from memory, which in my view covers all the conduct we are considering here. One has to consider the effect on the legal process of having different provisions, with very different consequences, which are not alternatives to one another; they have to be charged separately. It is not like wounding with intent under Section 18 of the Offences against the Person Act, where Section 20, unlawful wounding, is always an available alternative. These are quite separate offences, in totally separate Acts of Parliament, separated by a little time—though oddly, in this case, if the Bill is enacted, both introduced in the same year by the same Government.

We have to think about the way the process operates. The biggest Crown Court in London has a backlog, partly because of Covid, of nearly 4,000 cases, and we should consider the case management that is placed on the judges there. I have a particular interest in that Crown Court, which I place on the record. My interest in that court leads me to the view that the judges, the prosecutors and probably the defenders there are unlikely to be aware of the alternatives. However, as I suggested earlier, in another Crown Court another charge might be brought under the other Act of Parliament, and the judges there would know about the offences with the lower imprisonment maximum but would not know about the other statute. We will end up with a crowded calendar, with the Court of Appeal eventually having to say, “Why do we have two Acts of Parliament that deal with the same conduct but have totally different consequences?” I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, who is an experienced, busy and highly regarded lay magistrate, has similar experience of backlogs in the courts in which he sits in London, and the same is true in all the cities around the UK.

Public Order Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 16th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Balfe (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, and even more of a pleasure to reflect on the words of our good friend, the noble Lord, Lord Hendy. Before he came into this House, I do not think that we had quite the same level of wisdom and knowledge about the details of trade union legislation.

I too rise to ask that the Minister gives serious consideration to accepting Amendment 60; all it does is make it quite clear that a person, picket or trade union does not commit an offence under the clause by removing the words:

“It is a defence for a person charged with”—


they should not ever be “charged with”. This is a perfectly legitimate action undertaken by people in pursuance of a trade dispute, and quite reasonable. So I ask the Minister to look very carefully at Amendment 60, and when it comes back, to see whether this amendment cannot be accepted, because it is a very sensible amendment.

One could make virtually the same speech on many of the clauses in the Bill. I do wonder: what are we trying to achieve? Most of the things in the Bill are already offences. If we have a problem, it is that the police do not seem to think that it is worth prosecuting them—of course, we saw in the last few days that glorious picture of 11 rather bewildered policemen standing in the middle of the M25, gazing at a gantry.

This is not a sensible way to make laws; I am not sure that it appeals even to the Daily Mail. A lot of the Bill is reflex action stuff. It is man-in-the-pub stuff: “Oh, we don’t like this”—of course we do not want people to stick themselves to the pavement, but the law already exists. Between now and Report, I ask the Minister to have a very careful look at what we are trying to achieve, whether the Bill achieves it and, in particular, Amendment 60 and the Bill’s effect on the trade union movement—I probably should have declared that I am the president of a TUC-affiliated trade union —and its many voluntary workers who spend their leisure time trying to improve the lives of their colleagues. Please can the Minister have another look?

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Balfe. I absolutely agree with his fundamental point that here we are trying to create offences which are not necessary because there are already adequate offences to deal with these situations. I do not understand why the police have not used those existing offences in entirely appropriate situations.

I apologise for not having been able to speak at Second Reading, and I will try to be very brief now as a result. We have a situation here in which we are responding to someone else saying to us, “Something has to be done.” There are often situations in which, when we hear those words, the answer should be, “No, it doesn’t; we just need to do the things we have rather better”, and not produce a load of speciality legislation that will barely be used.

Sitting just behind me is a former Director of Public Prosecutions, my noble friend Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. I have heard him, very recently in fact, talk in another setting of the discretion not to prosecute that is vested in prosecutors. I apprehend that in many of the cases we are thinking of here, the police will NFA—no further action—a lot of them. If they do get to the Crown Prosecution Service because the police have not NFAd them, Crown prosecutors will NFA them using the second part of the CPS code test; namely, the public interest. It is very important, is it not, for us and the authorities which we invest with these powers to be proportionate in their use of them?

I absolutely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and others who have said that it is much better in principle for the whole burden and standard of proof to fall on the prosecution. However, I agree with my noble friend Lord Anderson that there is a bit of dancing on pins about that; it does not really make much difference in the end.

We should not be creating offences where, if they are summary offences, lay magistrates are going to find it very difficult to square their consciences with convicting people charged with them, and where—this is the worst possible scenario—if they are triable by jury, the jury may refuse to convict when there is overwhelming evidence that the offence was committed. Juries have done that recently, not least in relation to the Colston statue case in Bristol.

If your Lordships will allow me one quotation, I return in the end to some of the very wise words of Dr Martin Luther King, who said:

“One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws.”


That does not mean that a member of Just Stop Oil has the right to block the M25; the just or unjust law they would be dealing with is not the Government’s policies on oil but whether it should be a crime to obstruct the highway, so it will not actually help them very much in those cases. What I really want to say is that I think we will spend many hours today talking about issues that we really should not be troubling ourselves with at all.

[Lord Horam (Con)]

My Lords, I shall follow up on precisely the point that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has just made about whether we are wasting our time on something which we should not really be discussing because the offence is already there. As a non-lawyer, I tread with some trepidation in this area, as the Committee will understand, but I would like to have clarified the extent to which the law to deal with this problem already exists. This has concerned me.

I took part at Second Reading and I was very interested in the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who has operational experience in dealing with problems similar to this, if not this particular problem. No doubt there were similar efforts of a similar kind before this business of locking on to block roads. In his remarks, he said that until recently,

“obstructing the highway has always been a simple offence—an absolute offence. No intent required”.

That had been the position, apparently. However, I gather from his speech that subsequently the Court of Appeal was overruled by the Supreme Court, which said that, if a protest is obstructive, the circumstances of that protest should be taken into account. The noble Lord also said:

“Crucially, it means that protesting in a way that obstructs road users is not automatically a criminal offence.”—[Official Report, 1/11/22; col. 174.]


Therefore, as a lay man, it seems to me that some doubt has been bought into the question of whether an ordinary police officer, acting as he thinks sensible, has the right to stop someone obstructing the highway, even if he thinks the cause is just. There seems to be some doubt, so I hope that when he comes to wind up my noble friend can clear this up. If there is no doubt here, why are we discussing all this? If there is some doubt, there is every reason to have the Bill and this clause. It seems to me that in that situation we need clarity.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

If I am to be corrected, I am, but may I just offer a view? It is an offence to wilfully obstruct the highway. Of course, if you obstruct it because a person in your car is having a heart attack and needs attention, there will probably be a reasonable excuse for the obstruction and that is a defence. However, it is a summary offence to obstruct the highway, punishable by imprisonment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Before the noble Lord continues, I ask him to point to the provisions in this Bill that make up for the problem relating to highway obstruction that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, identified. Having read this in detail, my understanding is that nothing in the Bill addresses the noble Lord’s concern. Therefore, the question remains: why are we discussing this?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Again, we will come back to that in some detail in the debate on a later group. The amendments have been grouped thematically today so there will be a bit of overlap, for which I apologise. For now, I respectfully disagree with these amendments and ask that they not be pressed.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Will the Minister at some point explain to us why Section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, introduced by this Government, does not meet exactly the requirements discussed in this Bill? It is not an ancient Act of Parliament but a new one, and it seems to me to fit the bill proportionately.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I commit to doing that in the debate on a later group.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I cannot sit still any more. I am starting to feel sorry for the Minister, who is on a very sticky wicket because this is clearly rubbish legislation. I do not understand how it got through or who directed the civil servants to write it. It is absolute rubbish. We have heard all of the arguments about how it is so broadly written and will criminalise too many people—many more than the peaceful protesters whom the Government are trying to target. I just wonder where the idea came from. This is so right-wing; it is not an appropriate Bill for a democracy.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has beautifully laid out the lack of a definition of “serious disruption”, and I cannot better that. But, for example, what about arresting the Government for serious disruption to the NHS over the last 12 years? I would support that. But we would obviously have to know exactly what “serious disruption” meant.

The criminal courts in this country are crumbling and cannot cope with the number of cases that they have at the moment. Yet here the Government will insist on more cases, sometimes on very specious grounds, which will clog up the courts even more and make life even more difficult for people who care about justice and law. I beg the Minister to meet with some of the more learned noble Lords here and perhaps start either to clarify the Bill or to scrap it altogether.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I will make a very serious request of the Minister, who is dealing with this difficult Bill with great courtesy and who is very amenable to comment, even if he disagrees. I ask him to take the trouble, before he replies to this debate, to read Section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022—it is only one page, and I will lend him my iPad if he needs it. In this country, we have training for magistrates and judges, which is provided by the Judicial College— certainly for judges; indeed, I see the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, nodding that this is the case for magistrates as well. One of the reasons why this training is provided is to ensure consistency between courts around the country.

If there are two sets of legislation—this Bill and Section 78 of the 2022 Act—the Government cannot control who charges whom with what. It is quite likely that, in “Lonechester”, the police will charge someone who glued themselves to the passageway of the cathedral with this new law, while in “Scuddersfield” they will charge them with Section 78 of the 2022 Act. They are quite different: the Bill is basically a summary trial on these offences and has very low sentencing powers, but the 2022 Act, which we have already passed, has a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said. We cannot expect police officers to know these differences when they are busily rushing around trying to save the public from being stuck on the M25 for seven hours. But they can expect the law to make life easier for them by ensuring that it has that consistency. At the moment, we are breaking the rules which we generally set ourselves to scrutinise legislation so that we do not create ambiguity and inconsistency. In the context of what we are discussing now, nothing in the Bill is not covered under Section 78 of the 2022 Act, which has already had the scrutiny of your Lordships’ House.

[The Lord Bishop of Southwell and Nottingham]

My Lords, in the absence of my right reverend friend the Bishop of St Albans, who is a signatory to Amendment 17 but unable to be present in the Chamber this afternoon, I am pleased to speak in its support, as it provides much- needed clarity to the law. I am also very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for explaining the amendments with such clarity at the beginning of this group.

I will make two main points. First, the Bill, in its present form, fails to provide a definition of what constitutes “serious disruption” to the “community”. I strongly support providing a strict statutory definition of this; it will give clearer guidelines to the police as to what is acceptable, as well as to those wishing to engage in lawful protest, and will provide much-needed democratic oversight to the Bill. Under the current law and the Bill as drafted, there is no clear definition of what disruption to the community means, and it would be subject to the discretion of the police themselves. A lack of clarity is not helpful to either the police or the community. As reported in evidence to the Bill Committee in the other place, many police officers have expressed a desire for clearer statutory guidance, and many are concerned that they will be asked to make decisions on matters which they do not have the confidence to make. If we are to reflect on the consequences of the amendment, we can see that it would mean that protesters would rightly be prevented from disruption to essential services—schools, hospitals or places of worship—but the right to reasonable democratic protest would still be protected.

Secondly, it is important that proposed new paragraph (c) in the amendment upholds the access to “a place of worship” as an essential service. I am very pleased that this amendment would enshrine freedom of religion or belief as a central part of the Bill. As we have been reminded over the pandemic, churches and other religious buildings offer essential services for their local community. Access to these buildings and the pastoral work of the clergy and other faith leaders should not be unreasonably hindered.

Churches are not unfamiliar with protests. Indeed, they have sometimes been a catalyst for good and even forthright protest inspired by principles of faith in the interest of the common good. The example of Jesus is a challenge and, I believe, an inspiration in this regard. Sadly, there have also been times when churches have been the focus of reasonable protest, challenging the Church when it and society have failed to exemplify the values that underpin faith. Either way, many protests over the centuries have happened inside or within the vicinity of our buildings. Churches are public buildings, places of sanctuary and refuge, there to serve all in their community. They are therefore to be considered essential places for people to meet, to worship and to nourish their faith, and for all who are seeking spiritual comfort or hope, often in difficult times. The right to attend a place of worship is therefore a vital human right enshrined in law in our country, and it is important that this law makes that clear. I once again express my wholehearted support for this amendment.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 8th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, my name, on behalf on these Benches, has been added to Amendment 64A. The House will be glad to have heard some very compassionate and rigorous speeches.

The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, talked about trust. Of course, that is hugely important. It may be the circles that I move in, but what young asylum seekers say—what many asylum seekers say—is not taken at face value; quite the contrary.

The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, talked of the young Afghanis whom she met. Amendment 64 refers to “demeanour”—I know that is not the term of the noble Lord, Lord Green, but it made me reflect on the fact that, as regards demeanour and appearance, we must be very careful how we regard people of a different culture from our own.

On Amendment 64A, so much of age assessment, as the Government present it, is about science. In Committee, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, acknowledged that there is no silver bullet, but the Bill itself and the Government’s argument rely very heavily on scientific assessment, although the scientific methods specified in the Bill are only physical examination and measurement and analysis of saliva, cell, DNA and other samples. So, it is particularly worrying that the relevant professional bodies are so loudly and clearly opposed to these provisions on the basis of ethics and because of concerns about the accuracy of tests and measurements.

A lot of factors are—or should be—in play in assessing age, using a range of professional skills. The Home Office fact sheet also acknowledges that there is no single method, scientific or not, that can determine age with precision, but then makes a particular point of referring to the Home Office chief scientific adviser. I ask the Minister: what disciplines will be covered, and will it involve professionals in the psychiatry and psychology parts of the scientific/medical world with qualifications, expertise and experience in assessing and treating young people who have gone through the experiences that young asylum seekers have frequently gone through? They must also have experience in dealing with asylum seekers and others who have undergone traumatic experience, dealing with them in a trauma-informed way and avoiding retraumatising them. I refer noble Lords to my Amendment 84C, which will be the very last to be discussed in this debate, probably some time tomorrow morning.

Clause 51(7) provides that the decision-maker must

“take into account, as damaging the age-disputed person’s credibility … the decision not to consent to the use of the specified scientific method.”

Clause 52(1)(f) provides for regulations about

“the consequences of a lack of co-operation with the assessment by the age-disputed person, which may include damage to the person’s credibility.”

I leave it to noble Lords to assess for themselves where that is leading or where the Government would direct us. How all that works, with the standard proof being the balance of probabilities, I am really not expert enough to be sure, but, taken together, it all worries me. I commend the rounded approach of Amendment 64A.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, given that misrepresentation of age is a matter of concern, it is very important that the determination of age should be conducted in a way that is robust, certain in application, equitable and reliable. In my view, Amendment 64A, in the name of my noble friend Lady Neuberger, absolutely fulfils those criteria; indeed, it is a template for such criteria. I strongly support the amendment and adopt everything she said.

Age assessment techniques must be proportionate and fair. If any intrusive measures are to be taken—including dental X-rays, for example—that must be based on proven evidence of scientific reliability, not vague opinions that it might add something. It must be done in a service setting that is suitable for dealing with children, who are the vast majority of the customers under consideration in the cohort we are discussing. I commend proposed new subsection (5) to your Lordships, because it sets out the principles behind my noble friend’s amendment concisely and correctly, in a way that I am sure is the envy of some parliamentary draftsmen who have tried to draft something along similar lines before.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, given the hour and the address by the President of Ukraine, I beg to move that the debate on Amendment 65 be now adjourned, and that further consideration on Report be adjourned until 5.15 pm.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, there may well be a Division on the second of the amendments in the group. In which case, can we take it that the House will not resume until we have had the opportunity to come back to your Lordships’ House, even if it is a bit after 5.15 pm?

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, there was no attempt on my part to forestall any Division, and I apologise if ignorance of procedure perhaps led to the suggestion otherwise. [Interruption.] I am grateful to my noble friend for indicating that that was not his position.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Monday 28th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, and I agree with what she said and that, although the amendments moved by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, have made Clause 9 less bad, it is still a bad clause that should disappear from the Bill. When introducing this group, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said that these amendments were all about Clause 9. I would rather say that my Amendment 22, to which I will speak, was provoked by Clause 9. One thing revealed in public debate—and there has been an enormous amount of public debate around Clause 9—is the fact that so many people had not realised that what the Minister described earlier as the “warm embrace of citizenship” can be taken away, and that there is profound discrimination in the way that this can happen.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, talked in Committee talked about two-tier citizenship; I talk about it as two classes of citizenship. I regret that I was not able to take part in Committee; I thank my noble friend Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb for very ably speaking for me. However, there are about 6 million Britons—I declare an interest as I am among them—who, because of another citizenship or their descent from people who came to Britain and chose to be Britons, have second-class citizenship. It can be taken away by the Government and, as the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, just outlined very clearly, we have seen a very rapid and considerable escalation of the ways in which that power can be, and has been, applied.

My Amendment 22 makes one exception. If someone attains citizenship by means of fraud or misrepresentation, obviously, the power should remain for that citizenship to be taken away, but if that citizenship has been acquired honestly, my amendment says that it cannot be taken away. I suggest to your Lordships’ House that this is the only way that we can ensure that every British citizen is the same class of citizen and treated in the same way. Given that people who have, or have access to, alternative citizenships come from migrant backgrounds, the discrimination in how this is applied is very obvious. I note from having read the Hansard report of Committee very carefully that the noble Baroness, Lady Mobarik, expressed support for this. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for also expressing support in principle for the idea that there should be only one class of citizenship and the Government should not be able to take it away.

I can imagine the response I might hear from the Minister: what about someone who is a security threat? If we have given millions of people British citizenship, we have benefited from the contributions, of all kinds, that they have made to the UK. Should we be able to say, “This person’s a problem so we’re going to get rid of them”, and make them someone else’s problem? If a person is a security threat to the UK, they might well be a security threat to the country that they hold citizenship for and that we send them to. Why should we be able to dump our problems on someone else?

I find myself torn. I aware of the desire in your Lordships’ House to take away some of the worst elements of the Bill, but I also find myself supported by many people in civil society who say that they want to ensure that there is one class of citizenship. I have said to all the relevant authorities that I will reserve the right to call a vote on this, because I find it a matter of principle on which it is very difficult simply to withdraw the amendment. I would really like to hear everyone’s position on this, particularly the Front-Bench speakers—I hope one of the Lords spiritual might contribute—and everyone’s explanation of whether they believe there should be two classes of British citizenship. Having heard that debate, I will make a decision about whether to push Amendment 22 to a vote.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords—oh, sorry.

[The Lord Bishop of Chelmsford]

Thank you. My Lords, I am grateful for the suggestion that the House might like to hear from the Lords spiritual. I support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, which proposes that Clause 9 should not stand part of the Bill. We debated this at some length in Committee. It is somewhat disappointing that the Government have not taken the opportunity to reconsider more fully. I will not delay the House by repeating the arguments, but I will briefly speak about trust.

The Government seem genuinely confused by the level of opposition that the clause has triggered, but this should not have been surprising because I am afraid that it is symptomatic of a serious breakdown in trust between the Home Office and society groups, particularly minority ethnic groups, as we have heard. The response to the Windrush Lessons Learned Review promised a new culture in the Home Office—one that was more compassionate, that saw faces behind the cases and would rebuild and enhance

“public trust and confidence in the Home Office”.

The Bill as a whole does not do much to create the impression that this new culture has been embedded. Trust is hard to build and very easy to lose. On the issue of deprivation of citizenship and the treatment of minorities, trust is sufficiently low that any new changes to these powers must surely come with a compelling and overwhelming demonstration of a serious and widespread problem that needs to be solved.

I remain unconvinced that the Government have demonstrated that there is a sufficiently major problem that existing powers do not address. I am quite convinced that the impact this clause will have—indeed, already has had in continuing to undermine trust between the Home Office and civil society—is serious enough that the Bill would be greatly improved by Clause 9 being removed in its entirety. Having said that, I have heard the words of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. He provided a compelling and informed case for his saving amendments. I will listen with interest to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford for my lack of control over my new varifocals, and to your Lordships for entering the debate at this late stage. I have been listening to the debate in the context of my concerns about the majority judgments in the D4 case, which has already been mentioned. I read my noble friend Lord Anderson’s amendments and listened with enormous care to his very clear—indeed, brilliant—opening. I support his amendments. My view is that they go further than is absolutely necessary in terms of proportionality between the duties and rights of citizens and the setting of safeguards to ensure that this equation is well balanced. Overbalancing in favour of protections is a good fault in the circumstances, hence my declared support for my noble friend’s amendments.

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[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

The noble Lord has displayed a very touching faith in the Home Office, which I do not think reflected the view of your Lordships’ House in an earlier debate in terms of how we are approaching Ukrainian refugees. Is he aware of the case of the gentleman known as E3, who was deprived of his British citizenship for many years, was eventually able to appeal that, has never been arrested or charged, and has finally—on 11 February—returned to the UK and is now back with his family after many years of separation.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I am not aware of the details of that case, but I would say to the noble Baroness that the architecture that the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, set out would protect such a person in a much better way than was the case before.

Independent Office for Police Conduct

Lord Carlile of Berriew Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness is going to be disappointed because I have said in the past and will repeat that if the Home Secretary feels that the inquiry is not fulfilling its terms of reference, she can put it on a statutory footing. Of course, it is a decision for the Home Secretary.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

The noble Baroness is absolutely right to express disgust at the findings of the IOPC against the Metropolitan Police, but why is the Metropolitan Police not being held to account? Why is its leadership not being held to account and why is there not a thoroughgoing review of the structure and leadership of that force?