Commonwealth Parliamentary Association

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Thursday 8th September 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness on her timely initiative. Both she and the Minister are long-serving Commonwealth people. As for myself, I chaired the UK branch of the CPA for four years and currently I am vice-chairman. I have benefited enormously from the Commonwealth experience.

I make two comments—reflections—on the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and one on the Commonwealth. Having been a member of the CPA for more than 46 years, I have seen many changes in our Parliament and in the association, mostly for the good. Our Parliament has become, I regret, rather more parochial. Fewer people have direct overseas experience, and the CPA is one means of providing that valuable experience. It is important not only in allowing smaller countries to walk tall but because it concentrates on the practical problems of parliamentarians, such as financial control of the Executive, the role of opposition, and so on. The linkage between governance and development is increasingly recognised, as is parliamentary diplomacy.

So far as the Commonwealth itself is concerned, the leitmotiv of the new Government has been their new commitment to the Commonwealth. To the CPA centenary conference in July, the Foreign Secretary said that,

“this Government has rediscovered the Commonwealth”,

and that,

“this government has put the Commonwealth back at the very heart of British foreign policy”,

and “back into the FCO”. Those are fine words but perhaps I may allow myself a little scepticism on those claims.

In the 1980s, I spoke on Africa for the then Opposition. I recall the period during which the then Government almost destroyed the Commonwealth in relation to sanctions on South Africa. The noble Lord, Lord Kinnock, and I were regularly briefed by Bob Hawke at the famous 1986 Marlborough House conference. I also notice that today, for example, the Foreign Secretary will give a speech on the diminution of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. I began as a young diplomat in 1960. I remember two periods when the FCO was being diminished. One was in the 1980s in respect of South Africa and the other was before 1997 in respect of the European Union. I suspect that that will not figure in the Foreign Secretary’s speech today.

My other suspicion is that for some—but not, I am confident, for the Minister—the Commonwealth is viewed virtually as an alternative to the European Union when most Commonwealth countries value our membership of the EU as an advocate for the Commonwealth. I recall that in 1975, prior to the referendum on the European Union, the then Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, visited African countries and learnt that they welcomed wholeheartedly our continued membership of the European Union, as it is now.

My final scepticism is that this is not year zero and not a new commitment. The Labour Government had a number of fine initiatives, in particular at Gleneagles, particularly in relation to the informal Commonwealth.

I welcome the Government’s stated initiative but it needs clear and realisable objectives. The claims of the possibilities should not be exaggerated, nor the likely results. Clearly, there is important work in the field of soft power, which is no less important. The Commonwealth has a role in the new political agenda—climate change, terrorism and energy security. They should recognise the limitations as shown by CMAG, as well as the fact that the Commonwealth could not play a role in key areas such as Kashmir and the conflict in Sri Lanka, and that in terms of election monitoring, it has not been a great success because of its reluctance to criticise failings in elections in member states.

The Secretary-General recently wrote that he had no role to speak publicly on human rights. Do the Government agree that he should have that role? If they are so committed to an increased role for the Commonwealth, where is the money in terms of new possibilities for the secretariat and for new issues such as human rights development, which really needs a new commissioner perhaps on a model of the European Commissioner for human rights? Nevertheless, we hope that the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group reporting to the Perth CHOGM will lead to a number of initiatives. I hope that the Minister will indicate their proposals in respect of the EPG and the CHOGM in Perth in October.

My final reflection is that one test of the relevance of an organisation is that new members wish to join—in respect of the European Union, Croatia and the western Balkans. In respect of the Commonwealth, we have not only South Sudan with its application on the table but also Somaliland. I shall end on this point: is it perhaps too fanciful to suggest that after the highly acclaimed visit of Her Majesty the Queen to Ireland, even Ireland in the new circumstances might over time consider some new relationship with the Commonwealth?

Indonesia: West Papua

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Tuesday 19th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

The noble Lord is absolutely right: it is not only in the interests of Indonesia—wherever there is repression, it is not the right way forward—but in our national interest as well. It may seem far away, but the reality is that we are talking about an area mid-way between the Pacific rim and the Indian Ocean, where all the world’s growth, dynamism and accumulation of wealth and influence will be. It is very important that we are constructively and helpfully involved there.

The matter of journalists' access to Papua and West Papua was discussed at the EU human rights partnership meeting with the Indonesians in Indonesia on 5 May. It is one that we continue to raise, because clearly access for balanced reporting would be of benefit to the situation.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

My Lords, in terms of human rights, it is normally best for representations to be made on behalf of the European Union as a whole so that individual countries are not picked off. What is the position here? Have there been representations by the European Union? Are we fully behind them?

Piracy

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Wednesday 29th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

My noble friend is perfectly correct that the African Union has proposed an air and sea blockade of Somalia, and its idea is to blockade ports such as Kismayo to put pressure on al-Shabaab logistics and funding. I should have said to the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, that we have very little evidence of connections between al-Qaeda and the piracy operations, although there may be some at an individual level.

As to blockades, an issue that my noble friend Lord Chidgey raises, the difficulty with permanent blockades is that they are hugely demanding on resources and a lot of the pirate operations are from beaches, not ports, so if you blockaded the port you still would not catch the pirates. However, intermittent or occasional blockades make sense, have already been tried against several operating bases and appear to have had a dramatic effect in reducing pirate operations. As a “from time to time” operation, this makes sense, but mounting permanent blockades would be immensely expensive and probably not very effective.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

My Lords, again on the question asked by my noble friend Lord Clinton-Davis, there appears to be an increasing consensus that there is a need to re-examine the case for armed guards on merchant vessels. Where do the Government stand on this?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

I should have answered that third question from the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis; the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is absolutely right. The view up to the present is that armed guards on UK-registered vessels would be technically illegal unless they came under military, authorised guard arrangements. However, that matter is being looked at again by my right honourable and honourable friends in the relevant departments. Some changes might be necessary, but hitherto the feeling has been that armed guards—certainly mounted on a private enterprise basis—could lead to more bloodshed and horror, possibly not deter the hijackers, and merely increase the violence. However, the matter is being reconsidered.

Europe Day

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Tuesday 28th June 2011 Lords Chamber

Asked By

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government why No. 10 Downing Street and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office did not fly the European flag on Europe Day.

[The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Howell of Guildford)]

No. 10 Downing Street and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office take a straightforward approach; they fly the union flag at all times, with limited exceptions mainly for the patron saints’ days for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

My Lords, this is a change of policy. In what way do such silly gestures serve our national interest?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

The noble Lord speaks of silly gestures, but the idea that flying flags is any indication of the policy of commitment, in our case to the European Union, is frankly absurd. If we flew the flag for every relationship with every multilateral organisation, we would be for ever hoisting flags and taking them down again. There is frankly no relationship between our activist and forward position on the European Union—we are playing a major part, as demonstrated by the Prime Minister over the weekend—and the actual flying of flags, which is not the intention of 10 Downing Street.

Gibraltar

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Tuesday 14th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

I am not quite sure that that last point is correct. I think that the vessel was seen off. It was warned and departed as the warning came—it all happened simultaneously. As to a response from Madrid, I do not think that there has been an apology or a reassurance that it will not happen again. However, there has certainly been a recognition that this was an unfortunate incident which they do not want to see recur. I would not put it higher than that. We have not got there yet.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

My Lords, I can only declare that I have visited Gibraltar. Does the Minister agree that, however provocative this incident, it is within the context of a much improved relationship with Spain on the Rock? However, does he also agree that there is now perhaps a danger that, if there were a change of government, there would be a rather more populist and nationalist attitude to the Rock on the part of Spain, and that it is very important to improve the hotlines and ensure that there are protocols for better co-operation and understanding if such an unfortunate incident arises in future?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

That is very wise. One move that we have been anxious to make is to get back into regular meetings of the trilateral forum, which were interrupted before by concerns in Gibraltar. On his recent visit, my right honourable friend the Minister for Europe certainly succeeded in establishing that we should go forward with these ministerial meetings in a sensible way. The hope, although it has not yet been satisfied on the Spanish side, is that there will be a ministerial meeting of the Cordoba agreement group—the trilateral group—before the summer is out.

Syria

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Wednesday 8th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

As Syria is not a signatory to the International Criminal Court it would need a UN resolution to direct such a course. I have no doubt that the idea has been circulated but no action has been taken on it. As for gaining the support of the surrounding region and the leading Arab powers, my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary and other Ministers are in direct contact with a range of leaders in the area. Our posts are in constant contact with the area. I myself had contact last week with a number of leaders, including, although not directly an Arab leader, Mr Najib Mikati in Lebanon, which is directly affected by what is happening in Syria. We keep lines as open as we can with all the major influences and parties, not least the Turkish Government and Mr Erdogan who have some direct line of influence over Bashar al-Assad, but so far their efforts have been to no avail.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 were built on the platform of the Arab League agreement, and that provided a degree of cover, preventing Russia from vetoing the resolutions. What is the working assumption of the Government in respect both of the Arab League generally, which presumably is fairly pessimistic about support, and the way in which Russia will now react?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

The noble Lord, with his experience, is describing precisely the modalities and parameters that my colleagues in the British Government and other diplomats are having to cope with in New York at this moment. There is some hope that a resolution can come forward. There are varying views within the Arab League and among Arab leaders about which way to go and how much pressure to apply. There have been in the past first the traditional Chinese attitude of non-interference, which I have already described, and secondly some reluctance from Moscow to be involved. But this could be changing and there comes a point in this transparent interconnected world where the sheer volume of the atrocities means that there is a unity of intolerance to the continual misbehaviour. We may get to that point soon.

European Union Bill

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Tuesday 26th April 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard]

I asked at the start of Committee why we needed Clause 3. Clause 3 refers to the simplified or accelerated method used in Brussels for producing a treaty amendment. Clause 2 refers to the product of the normal method used in Brussels. The product, by the time it reaches us, is exactly the same: it is a treaty amendment. How it began, who proposed it and which process was followed in Brussels are irrelevant to the ratification requirements here. We should decide the ratification requirements and any necessary referendum requirements on the basis of the weight of the amendment, not of the means by which the amendment was agreed in Brussels. I therefore asked why we needed Clause 3 as well as Clause 2. I have read very carefully the Minister’s answer at the end of the debate. He did not answer the question. He cleverly lured me into a semantic debate about competencies and powers, which we played into the sand, but we did not hear the answer as to why we needed Clause 3.

There is a difference between Clause 3 and Clause 2. If you eliminated Clause 3, you would eliminate something that is not in Clause 2. That is the final section of Clause 3, which contains the significance test. It is to that section that the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, is now proposing an amendment.

There is no significance test in Clause 2, which is the first of the two clauses setting out what we do when a treaty is amended. Does that mean that the Government believe that any treaty amendment made by the traditional method, however insignificant, must require a mandatory referendum? That seems to be the implication of having the test only in Clause 3 and not in Clause 2. I would be inclined to argue that we should eliminate Clause 3 now but transfer subsection (4) to Clause 2, so that the significance test, whatever its form—the form in the Bill, the form as revised by the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, or the form as revised by others—applies to any treaty amendment. That seems to be logical.

The noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, used two arguments which perhaps play on the question. One was implicitly that Article 48(6), the accelerated method, would be used for the trivial, whereas the full-dress method, Article 48(2) to (5)—Clause 2 of this Bill—would be used for the heavy stuff. That may be so, but it does not seem very plausible to me. The noble Lord argued that we need not worry about having a series of referenda on the trivial because amendments would be bundled. He said that, from his long experience of Brussels, he knew that that was the way it worked. That is completely correct. In the past, treaty amendments have been brought together in a bumper-package intergovernmental conference, resulting in a new treaty or a massive treaty amendment.

In my view that will not be the case in future. A lesson has been learnt that it is not right to lump a whole series of questions together. The answer in the French referendum and the Dutch referendum came about partly because a whole lot of measures—not all of them necessarily very large—were put together and people were asked whether they would buy the package. If there is anything in such a package that you do not particularly like, the reasonable answer is to say no. The European Union has learnt from that and the Article 48(6) method—the Clause 3 material—will not be trivial relative to the Clause 2—or Article 48(2) to (5)—material.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

Is there not a logical problem in saying that because a number of insignificant matters are lumped together, they will by definition become significant? If they were to be lumped together as the noble Lord is saying, surely it would be very difficult for someone who accepts one matter but not others to vote in a particular way. But surely a bundle of insignificant matters does not by itself therefore become insignificant; it becomes significant.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard]

That seems likely to be the case. I agree with the noble Lord.

The second argument that the noble Lord, Lord Howell, used was about time. Here I have to say that I warmly welcome the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, which brings in the concept of urgency. It seems to me that the situation in which Article 48(6) is likely to be used will be the urgent situation. That is what was in the minds of those who invented the Article 48(6) procedure. The heavy procedure under Article 48(2) to (5)—Clause 2 of our Bill—contains provisions for a convention of representatives of national parliaments and the European Parliament meeting with representatives of the member states. It also contains provisions for doing away with that and concludes with a two-year period for national ratification. These timetable elements, and the reference to the convention, drop out in the accelerated method. The idea of a two-year delay has gone in Article 48(6), just as the convention has gone. People had in mind that there could be crisis situations in which the European Union would need to revise its texts quickly—hence Article 48(6). That makes it a little paradoxical that we are insisting on adding a referendum requirement.

More than that, we are—as the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, pointed out at the start of our first day—doing something that we have never done in this country before: we are providing for an Act of Parliament to be overruled by a referendum. That is literally unprecedented, and we would be doing it in relation to matters, if they were under Article 48(6), where we had voted in the Council for an urgent change, since nothing can be done other than by unanimity in the Council. Everybody has voted for it; it is sufficiently urgent to justify the accelerated procedure; it goes through the House of Commons and through the House of Lords; but under this Bill it then requires a referendum which could overrule an Act of this Parliament. That is why I think that there is something really dangerous in the Bill, not just in terms of our position in the European Union but in terms of our basic constitutional position in this country. I really do worry about it.

I come back to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Liddle. It must be right to introduce the concept of urgency and to make the tests not cumulative. It seems to me that Amendments 16A and 16B deserve our support. However, even if they were included in the Bill, I would still argue that Clause 3 should not stand part of the Bill, because in logic you do not need different procedures depending on how it started over there. The procedures you follow should be decided by the significance of the measure itself.

Libya

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Friday 1st April 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

My Lords, I congratulate the Minister on his helpful update, both on Libya and on the wider repercussions of the Arab awakening. I shall have but three reflections. First, what are British interests in this conflict? Secondly, what light does this conflict throw on wider issues? Thirdly, what happens after Gaddafi?

First, it is perhaps not very fashionable nowadays to talk about British interests, either narrowly or more broadly defined. Certainly, interests as shown by the relatively low number of diplomatic personnel we have had in Tripoli suggest that we do not have major interests there as we do in certain neighbouring countries. Equally, we have substantial oil interests with British companies very much involved but, whatever the future of Libya, they will still have to sell the oil on which they are very much dependent.

We have an interest in migration. I recall that when I was in Libya, five or so years ago, it was claimed, following the time when he claimed that he was the leader of Africa as well of the Middle East, that Gaddafi invited all African citizens to come to his country. There were said to be up to a million people from sub-Saharan Africa waiting for Tunisian boatmen to bring them over to Europe. Over the weekend we heard that the first boat since the troubles had arrived in Italy with 300 potential migrants, mostly Eritreans and Ethiopians, with another 800 on the way. We certainly have an interest in moderating that illegal flow from north Africa.

However, what is crystal clear is that, more broadly defined, we have an interest in international law and in keeping in close touch with our allies, hence the importance of the two Security Council resolutions—1970 and 1973. They were a triumph of the Security Council, bringing on board all the relevant players without being vetoed by some who one might have thought would veto them on the grounds of interference in the internal affairs of another country. However, in my judgment a clear reading of both 1970 and 1973 leads to this conclusion: their primary purpose—certainly that of 1973—is as the Prime Minister said in the other place. Resolution 1973 limits our operations; its primary purpose is clearly civilian protection. All the activities that we take part in must be seen in that light. Clearly, when a military convoy threatened Benghazi, it was wholly consistent with Resolution 1973 for the French planes initially to take out those tanks and armoured personnel carriers. That was probably also true when we took out the ammunition dumps, which would have been used for attacks on civilians.

Beyond that there are difficulties. What happens if those tanks are retreating from civilian areas? What is the position on the supply of arms to both sides? I submit that a clear reading of Article 9 of Security Council Resolution 1970 shows that we cannot supply arms to either side in the conflict. Unless and until a new Security Council resolution in respect of arms supply is moved, we must be constrained, as NATO has now agreed. Although it is in the interests of the country, of world peace generally, and certainly of regional peace, that Gaddafi no longer be there—it is impossible to conceive of a pluralist democracy under the rule of law if Gaddafi remains in place—it would be wholly wrong to seek to remove him by force and have regime change. The carefully constructed coalition would evaporate if regime change was made a clear aim. We have to be extremely careful. It is in our interest to remain four-square within international law.

As a side reflection on this, there was no mention in the coalition document of the Maghreb, yet it is now at the centre of attention, which shows the extent to which events move quickly—beyond documents of even a year or so ago. However, in Libya and the Maghreb, the response to the Arab awakening may be the defining issue for the coalition, as perhaps Iraq was for my own Government over the period from 2000.

As a second reflection, what light does the conflict in Libya throw on other issues? From the United States we have had the Obama doctrine, which is more restrained and avoids the Richard Haass-type “reluctant sheriff” approach. It seeks to ensure that there is a new multilateralism, working with allies. It will be interesting to see the extent to which that new multilateralism is shown in other areas as well because of the fear of overstretch within the US Administration.

From the European Union, yes, there are resources, but not unity. Germany abstained from Resolution 1973. France was quick off the mark. Perhaps the German and French responses were due to the proximity of elections, but neither Baden-Württemberg nor the cantonal elections in France showed that they succeeded. However, we hear little about the European External Action Service. Disunity and the British-French alliance have been the major features of the European Union response. Perhaps there will also be new thoughts on humanitarian intervention, but I have no time to go along that path.

Finally, on the post-Gaddafi situation, some of his advisers may say to him that it would be wise now, having reached a high point and taken the oil-exporting areas, to stop, call for a real ceasefire and allow in observers and humanitarian assistance. At that point, he would possibly split the coalition. What is clear is that we have an interest in stability in the region; that we should work through our alliances to ensure that; and that the European Union has the resources of soft power. Certainly, from the experience in central and eastern Europe, with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, it has the instruments for soft power. Clearly, the United Nations must be in the driving seat. Clearly, the Arab League must be the party that is most engaged. Our interest should surely be to work through the European Union as one of our key instruments to ensure, as far as we can, that our border area—the Maghreb—is given as much, if not more, attention than the eastern partnership. That, surely, is in our interest, in the interests of the region and in global interests.

Yemen

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Tuesday 29th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

My noble friend is right that that defection is significant. Those are influential people and that might help the move towards a peaceful resolution and a final decision by President Saleh on how and in what manner he goes in an orderly way. Concerning the UN, it has not recently played a significant role in Yemen. In most people’s view, the responsibility really lies with President Saleh openly to engage with all parties in a sustained and credible fashion. As I said earlier, we think the best kind of outside support should come from the countries immediately around, which are obviously as concerned as us about developments there.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

Does the Minister agree that it is difficult to avoid seeing any change in the administration as a potential threat to western interests? What is his assessment of the role of al-Qaeda among the many other causes—secessionist, tribal and so on—of the unrest? If there were to be an implosion, what is his assessment of the danger of the unrest moving across the frontiers to other countries?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

Of course, as the noble Lord knows, these dangers are there all the time; there is no doubt about that. The al-Qaeda threat is there but is not the only threat. Al-Qaeda is most active in the north. Many of its members are being pushed over the frontier from Saudi Arabia. They are a problem and no doubt they are thinking of ways of exploiting any trouble or disturbance they can find. That is why it is essential that the president and the people of Yemen move away from the threats of violence and towards an orderly pattern of transition which they can decide for themselves.

European Union Bill

Lord Anderson of Swansea Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

In using the words,

“constructive engagement with the EU”,

the noble Baroness’s memory might go back to the fact that the Conservative Government of that time talked about constructive engagement with apartheid South Africa.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

My memory goes back even further to when the Labour Party was itself completely riven on what approach it might take to the European Union, which was rather before the apartheid saga.

The coalition programme looks forward to forthcoming legislation with a view to increasing parliamentary scrutiny of new powers and competences, and looks outwards to ensure that the demands of democratic engagement are upheld. It goes further than before by enshrining in law that for significant changes sovereignty should be ceded by those who own it, the citizens or people of our country. It is therefore a far cry from the wording in the Conservative manifesto, which stated:

“We will work to bring back key powers over legal rights, criminal justice and social and employment legislation to the UK”.

The Bill takes the treaties, as amended most recently by Lisbon, as the starting point. While the coalition agreement gives a commitment to examine the EU's existing competences, and particularly to work to limit the application of the working time directive, this is not in my view a dramatic change. In fact, in an age of austerity, it might seem sensible to review the need for greater labour flexibility. However, it does raise the question of what other competences there will be and when. I wonder whether my noble friend could explain when winding up the debate the timeframe to which the Government are working in their examination of competences, and what role Parliament will play in scrutinising their conclusions.

Let me now turn to the substantive parts of the Bill. Clauses 2 to 5 will no doubt attract considerable scrutiny, as they deal with the procedure to be followed for treaty amendments and changes. They change the current situation in now requiring an Act of Parliament after the Government have signed up in principle to the change. This will no doubt add a considerable time lag to EU decision-making. We had an example of a draft European Council decision only last night on the European stability mechanism, and I wonder what useful purpose might have been achieved by a country that is not in the eurozone holding up those that are in it doing something that tidies up an existing situation and seeks to put it on a permanent footing. The way in which we dealt with that last night would no longer be possible if these changes go through.

I accept that every change of treaty requires an Act of Parliament, and I am in no way opposed to that level of parliamentary approval for significant and substantive treaty changes. Yet I wonder whether raising the test for an Article 48(6) decision—the simplified revision procedure—as set out in Clause 1(5) is necessarily the way to go. Clause 4 sets out a rather long list of criteria whereby a future treaty change will be judged and changes the situation whereby qualified majority voting ensues. I understand that the list is so comprehensive due to our lack of a written constitution in the United Kingdom and therefore to the relatively open-ended possibilities of judicial review. Can my noble friend explain whether that is the rationale behind this prescription and, if it is not, why we are spelling out our parameters in such detail? Does that not reduce the flexibility of the Government of the day to evaluate each decision on its merits and to go forward on that basis?

I turn to that other area of controversy, the so-called use of the referendum lock. The potential use of referendums will cover large numbers of procedures, including ordinary and simplified revisions and passerelles. The Constitution Committee, in its report on the Bill, lists some 50 treaty provisions that might attract a referendum. I accept the Government’s premise that a significant disconnect has developed between the British people and EU institutions. In fact, I wrote a thesis in the early 1990s on British attitudes to European federalist integration, and that disconnect had been there for some decades before. The challenge for succeeding Governments is to improve education about the EU and its institutions rather than just lamenting the lack of support for them, as put out by noble Lords on the opposition Benches a few minutes ago.

As we moved to a federal settlement in the UK in the 1990s with the establishment of a Parliament in Scotland and an Assembly in Wales, one would have expected that we would have also taken the opportunity to talk of our rightful place in Europe. Yet the Opposition became obsessed instead with impregnable tests on the euro and whether the ill-fated constitutional treaty would get through. In the mean time, another generation has grown up knowing the European countries better than ever before but not feeling the common solidarity that should unite us, other than in the most instrumentalist manner.

That distrust of EU institutions now leads us to the logic of the referendum lock. As noble Lords will know, the Constitution Committee defines a limited set of conditions in which, in its opinion, a referendum would be warranted. The committee goes on to say that this Bill is a radical step-change in the adoption of referendum provisions. As a Lib Dem who was privy to several animated discussions in our own party over whether to commit to a referendum before joining the euro, I know how difficult it is to agree what constitutes a fundamental shift in power. I was proud of moving to that promise and am overall a supporter of referendums for significant changes. Other European countries have their own scrutiny and control mechanisms in place. I come from a view that every generation should be able to have a voice on the direction of its country’s stance on sovereignty. At this stage, I am not inordinately concerned about these clauses. As the Constitution Committee reminds us, Parliament could repeal or amend any or all of the control mechanisms established by the Bill, including the referendum lock provisions.

On the significance condition, therein will lie the practical issues of how frequently referendums will be held. First, let us be clear that this condition in the Bill will enable Ministers to judge whether a simplified revision procedure change that gives an EU body the power to impose sanctions, requirements or obligations on the UK would not require a referendum. If this reading is correct, can the Minister give us examples of the sort of changes he has in mind that would then fall under ministerial judgment under this test? In other words, what would he consider insignificant?

On the subject of referendums, my recall is that if a treaty change would have triggered a referendum, we would have had about five in the past 25 years. Does the Minister expect a similar number in future? The other contentious area—