Counterterrorism: AI and Facial Recognition

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Wednesday 1st July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord knows my clear view on this matter: we have to have a very constructive relationship with Europe; the things that we lost due to the Brexit withdrawal need to be examined in detail on the criminal justice front; it is in Europe’s and United Kingdom’s interests to have better access and understanding of who goes where, when and why; and it is the objective of the Government to try to help the European Union and to receive benefits. The summit that was planned for July has been postponed for reasons that are self-evident—because of a change of Prime Minister—but the objective of the Government remains the same.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, artificial intelligence chatbots are already engaged in skilfully targeted radicalisation. They may even be used in attack planning, as in the case of the Windsor Castle crossbow attacker, who was thwarted, fortunately, in his ambition to kill Her late Majesty but was assisted and encouraged throughout by his online “girlfriend”, Sarai. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation has suggested that we may need laws against the creation and deployment of computer programs that can be used for such malign purposes. Could the Minister update us as to what the Government are going to do about it?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful as always for the expertise that the noble Lord brings to this issue. The independent reviewer did indeed consider, in his annual report, the impact of generative AI on terrorism-related activity. The report concluded that, where AI is intended to be used for terrorist purposes, existing terrorism legislation generally provides sufficient coverage. Nevertheless, we are continuing to look at that. It is an important issue. As the noble Lord knows from our long discussions in the last few days, we have a security Bill and a police reform Bill coming up. We keep those matters under review and, obviously, it is a very fast-moving situation. We need to be ahead of the game for the reasons the noble Lord has mentioned.

National Security (State Threats) Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 30th June 2026 Lords Chamber

We are seeking to work together so that we can better protect the UK and its citizens, while at the same time not criminalising those extremely brave humanitarian organisations which may find themselves needing to deal with some of the most brutal people in the world as they seek to help the most vulnerable. I beg to move.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and I am delighted to add my support to Amendments 12A, 13A, 18A and 19A in her name. The unintended application of the new Sections 17B and 17C to those who carry out humanitarian activities was a danger to which we both spoke at Second Reading, and these amendments go a very long way to laying those concerns to rest.

My own Amendment 17, signed also by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, who is not in his place, has similarly been superseded by Amendment 17A, which I tabled yesterday after discussion with the Minister. It appears in the supplementary list and is accompanied by the minor and consequential manuscript Amendment 18B.

Amendment 17A was floated in the Second Reading speech of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, last Tuesday, tweaked in the note produced by Jonathan Hall KC on Thursday and tabled by me later that day. Three Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation might not be quite as entertaining as the Three Tenors, but we have, I hope, as so often, sung more or less in harmony.

The problem that Amendment 17A seeks to address is the breadth of Section 17C, which prohibits obtaining material benefits from a designated body. Section 17C(3) defines material benefits as including not only

“anything which has the potential to result in a financial benefit”,

but additionally, and separately, the unqualified word “information”. The Minister sought to assist by suggesting at Second Reading that the transfer of information was caught by the prohibition only when it possesses

“an inherent value that enriches the recipient”.—[Official Report, 23/6/26; col. 614.]

Although I am as keen on gift horses as the next person, and while I appreciate the helpful spirit in which the Minister’s interpretation was put forward, I must confess that it is not one in which I would feel complete confidence as an advocate.

The starting point of Section 17C is that any receipt of information from or on behalf of a designated body is a criminal offence. Diplomats and other public servants have a defence. There is another defence of reasonable excuse in Section 17C(7), but this operates as a defence only to the charge of retaining the material benefit, not to a charge of obtaining it, accepting it or agreeing to accept it. That is the hole this amendment fills where information is concerned. It protects those who are not diplomats but who none the less have a legitimate interest in soliciting or obtaining information from a designated body.

Those engaged in humanitarian activity will now be protected by Amendment 18A. I mentioned at Second Reading the HALO Trust, which could otherwise have been at risk for asking a designated body where the mines were laid. But Amendment 17A remains vital for those who are neither diplomats nor engaged in humanitarian activity. I spoke at Second Reading of a small number of reputable organisations which enter into dialogue with bodies susceptible to designation for the purposes of conflict prevention and resolution. One of those bodies is the charity Inter Mediate, founded by Jonathan Powell, in which I declare a non-pecuniary interest as chair. Such bodies might be described as humanitarian, in which case they are protected by Amendment 18A. But, in case of any doubt, their ability to engage in such dialogues is safeguarded by Amendment 17A.

There are also foreign correspondents, a number of whom I have engaged with in recent days. In order to inform the public as effectively as possible, some of them routinely speak to sources in and around bodies liable to designation. They do not make it their practice to alert government or anyone else to the fact that they are doing so. While they understand that the Attorney-General has a discretion over whether to bring prosecutions, they point, I am afraid, to the abusive exercise of equivalent discretions elsewhere in the common-law world and ask, in the words of the title of Peter Hennessy’s latest book, “Could it happen here?” Prosecutorial discretion is of course a vital safeguard, but it is no substitute for a clear law that neither penalises reasonable behaviour, nor chills those who are associated with it.

These amendments do not weaken this vital Bill, but they avoid its unintended consequences. They give effect to the Government’s unrealised intention, expressed in the factsheet that accompanied the Bill, to include within it defences for humanitarian engagement and journalistic freedoms. I thank the Minister and the Bill team for their courteous and helpful engagement.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I realise that it is unusual to speak this early in the debate, but I just hope the House will bear with me for a second. I believe it is important to give a view on the two sets of amendments that have been moved, so that colleagues will understand where the Government are coming from in any contributions they wish to make.

I recognise the concern raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and also by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, about inadvertently criminalising the provision of legitimate humanitarian aid, and the resulting chilling effect this could have on important work. We have listened to the concerns and we have had extensive discussion outside the Committee. The Government will accept a new defence into Sections 17B and 17C, which is manifested by Amendments 12A, 13A, 18A and 19A, where conduct is carried out for the purpose of carrying out humanitarian activities, which are defined as only those activities carried out in accordance with internationally recognised principles and standards.

I am also grateful again for Amendment 17A from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, which is based on the advice of Jonathan Hall KC, to expand the defence of “reasonable excuse” to cover obtaining, accepting or agreeing to accept information from a designated body. This pragmatic proposal will mean that, where a legitimate humanitarian organisation, such as those mentioned by the noble Lord, or a charity involved in conflict resolution, or indeed a journalist, takes information from a designated body, which could be about the location of landmines, for example, that organisation will not fall foul of the new offence at Section 17C. The amendment that the Government are willing to accept in the form of new Section 17C(7A) is intended to reflect that.

Again, I am happy if any other noble Lords wish to contribute to the debate and make any further points, if the House will allow me at the end of the debate to respond to those points. I thought it important to put on record now that there should be no difference between us. Therefore, the debate, I would hope, is about the importance of this subject, rather than the Government being forced into agreeing any particular amendment or not. With that, I will sit down and allow other noble Lords to contribute, but I hope the Government’s position is now clear.

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Moved by

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich]

17A: Clause 2, page 6, line 23, at end insert—
“(7A) In proceedings for an offence under subsection (1) or (2) where—(a) the benefit consists of, or includes, information, and(b) the conduct in question relates to that information,it is a defence to show that the person had a reasonable excuse for that conduct.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would create a reasonable excuse defence for obtaining, accepting or agreeing to accept information from or on behalf of a designated body.

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Moved by

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich]

18B: Clause 2, page 6, line 37, after “(7)” insert “, (7A)”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on another amendment in Lord Anderson of Ipswich’s name.

National Security (State Threats) Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 23rd June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I support the Bill, based as it is on a proposal from my admirable successor as independent reviewer, Jonathan Hall KC. It is regrettable that the Bill is being brought forward more than a year after his recommendation, yet in a manner that telescopes and truncates the debate in both Houses. How much more useful and productive it would have been to have seen a draft Bill, its scrutiny unrestrained by tight deadlines and positions already taken.

My remarks today are aimed not at what the Bill intends to do but at the law which, I am afraid, it exemplifies: the law of unintended consequences. Two of the new offences, in proposed new Sections 17B and 17C, have the potential to damage conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and humanitarian activity—endeavours in which this country excels—in parts of the world controlled by bodies liable to designation. I shall explain briefly why that is and how I think the problem might be resolved.

I declare a non-pecuniary interest as a chair of Inter Mediate, an independent peacemaking charity founded in 2011 by Jonathan Powell, who is now, of course, the Government’s National Security Adviser. Inter Mediate’s staff work discreetly at the highest political levels to support complex negotiations and conflict resolution in some of the most troubled parts of the world. It will not surprise noble Lords to learn that work of that kind requires intensive dialogue with brutal and unpleasant regimes to which it may be difficult, even impossible, for western Governments to speak.

I am also grateful to the International Committee of the Red Cross and the various peacebuilding and humanitarian organisations, from Conciliation Resources to Save the Children and the Halo Trust, that have approached me with their concerns in relation to this issue. I thank the Minister and his Bill team for our discussions on this issue since the Bill was published two weeks ago.

What do I mean by the “unintended consequences” of the Bill? Take proposed new Section 17C, which is about obtaining, accepting, agreeing to accept or retaining material benefits from a designated body. That is an offence punishable by 14 years in prison—quite right, too, in the cases highlighted in the Explanatory Notes: a business assisting a hostile state with new military technology or a contract criminal who knew, or should have known, where his fee was coming from.

However, “material benefits” are defined in proposed new Section 17C(3) with remarkable breadth. They include

“financial benefits, anything which has the potential to result in a financial benefit, and information”.

Taking that definition at face value, the likes of Inter Mediate could contravene criminal law by accepting information from a designated body as to that body’s objectives or negotiating stance. The defence of reasonable excuse in proposed new subsection (7) applies only to the retention of information; there is no such defence for agreeing to accept information or accepting it. There is a protection for public servants in proposed new subsection (8)(b), but not for charities or churches, which often have reach that Governments do not. One thinks of a charity such as the Halo Trust. Wishing to clear a minefield, it asks the IRGC, once designated, where the mines were laid. That, too, on a plain reading of proposed new Section 17C, would constitute the criminal offence of agreeing to accept information—although only 10 years in prison for that one.

Section 17B, as the noble Baroness has said, presents similar problems. Humanitarian organisations are not usually exempt from paying taxes, duties and fees to establish and maintain their operations in a country or territory—for example, tax on staff salaries, import duties on aid items and visa fees. It is at least arguable that anything which swells the coffers of a designated organisation will be of material assistance to the activities of that organisation locally or, by subsection (4)(a), in the United Kingdom. Bluntly, it helps to pay for them. That legally prudent interpretation risks blunting the aid effort where it is most needed and criminalising those who would seek to provide it.

The Minister will remind us that the CPS prosecutes only in cases where that is in the public interest and that for these offences, the additional consent of the Attorney-General will be required. In other words, “Don’t worry: it may never happen”. However, with respect, and as anybody familiar with these sectors well knows, reliance on the wise exercise of such discretions, though important, is not a sufficient answer.

Charitable trustees, of whom I suspect that there are quite a few in the Chamber, are properly cautious about signing off on activity which could expose us or our staff to the criminal law. So, to a still greater extent, are bank compliance departments, insurers and suppliers of humanitarian aid—all essential to the activities of those operating in these fields. The experience of NGOs in conflict zones is that banks and others are highly risk-averse. Why would they take the reputational risk of getting involved with potential criminality, even if only on paper? That is precisely why Parliament has expressly excluded those engaged in humanitarian activity from at least one comparable criminal offence—the designated area offence in Section 58B of the Terrorism Act 2000.

We have a week to sort this out. The Explanatory Notes, as they stand, are not sufficient, for reasons that I do not have time to get into. A clear statement from the Minister that Sections 17B and 17C are not intended to operate as I have suggested would be a start. An explicit reference to Pepper v Hart could be a useful signal to prosecutors and judges. Also helpful at a more general level would be an undertaking to co-operate through the established tri-sector group dialogue in amending the applicable guidance and a clear and unqualified statement that the new offences are not intended to apply to bona fide organisations engaged in conflict prevention, conflict resolution or, in the words of the Explanatory Notes,

“humanitarian assistance or other activities that support basic human needs”.

These are sticking plasters, but it will take amendment to remove the chilling effect and place the matter beyond doubt. Though I shall listen with great care, as I always do, to what the Minister has to say, I fear that this is an issue to which we shall have to come back in Committee.

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[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

The Minister has referred a number of times to humanitarian aid and to diplomacy. Of course diplomats have a special defence or exemption of their own, but he has not said anything about those engaged in the prevention or resolution of conflict. I wonder if he would like to associate them with the statements he has made about humanitarian aid.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am happy to do that, but I want to give clarity on these matters. If the noble Lord will allow me, given that that has been raised separately, I will write to him with an assurance on that and share that with both Opposition Front Benches so that they are aware of that. I want to give absolute legal clarity, as the noble Lord would expect, on these matters.

State of Extremism Report

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Wednesday 17th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The review has been received by the Home Secretary. We are examining its contents, and we intend to publish it before the Summer Recess.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I welcome the proposals outlined in Protecting What Matters, namely, to tackle the abuse of charitable status for the purpose of promoting violence and hatred. However, phrases in the extremism definition such as creating a “permissive environment” for the destruction of “fundamental rights” are quite vague. If applied without further elaboration this could, as the charitable sector has warned, have the effect of chilling lawful advocacy, campaigning and community involvement. What progress is being made in producing and consulting on these proposals? Will the Government ensure that the thresholds are clear and understandable when they emerge, so that we all know where we are?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

On the quotes mentioned by the noble Lord, I bow to his significant experience in managing these issues and I will certainly look at his comments. On the commitments set out in the proposals, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport is looking at strengthening the Charity Commission’s powers to tackle extremist and terrorist exploitation in the charitable sector. There will be consultation and development of further powers on persistent misconduct, while ensuring that the power to close a charity exists and that the focus is on extremism rather than any other issue.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 18th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Polak (Con)]

My Lords, I am pleased to support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, to which I have added my name. As I understand it, the purpose of the amendment is pretty straightforward: it seeks to remove the current requirement in Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 that, for a statement glorifying terrorism to be criminal, prosecutors must prove that the speaker intended to encourage others to emulate the act. In practice, this current requirement creates a significant evidential barrier.

Under the current law, it is not enough that someone praises terrorist violence, celebrates terrorist attacks or glorifies terrorist organisations; prosecutors must go further and demonstrate that the individual intended their words to encourage others to copy those acts. As a result, individuals can glorify terrorism while carefully avoiding an explicit call for imitation, and so remain technically within the law.

We know that extremist propagandists are acutely aware of these legal boundaries. They deliberately operate at the margins of the law. Rather than issuing explicit instructions, they rely on suggestion, admiration and narrative. They glorify past attacks, elevate perpetrators as heroes or martyrs, and celebrate organisations that Parliament has already determined must be proscribed because of the threat that they pose. Such messaging may not always contain an explicit instruction to copy the act, but it none the less plays a powerful role in the radicalisation process. It legitimises terrorism, fuels extremist ideology and contributes to an environment in which violent extremism becomes normalised.

In many cases, Parliament has already taken steps to proscribe certain organisations as terror groups. The decision reflects a clear judgment that those organisations pose such a grave threat that supporting them must be prohibited. It therefore follows that publicly praising or glorifying the acts of such organisations should also fall into the scope of criminal law, even where, as I said, the speaker avoids explicit calls for imitation. This amendment would simply align the legislation with that principle.

It is important to be clear on what the amendment would not do. It would not criminalise legitimate debate, historical discussion or academic analysis of terrorism, nor would it undermine the fundamental protections of freedom of expression that are central to our democratic society. Instead, it would target the deliberate glorification of terrorist organisations and their acts of violence, which extremist actors use to spread propaganda and to influence vulnerable audiences.

Extremist propaganda has evolved significantly since the original legislation was drafted. Today, radicalisation often occurs through narratives that glorify past attacks and portray terrorists as heroes, rather than through direct instructions to commit violence. If the law is to remain effective, it must reflect that reality. Removing the emulation requirement would close a loophole in the law, align our legislation with the realities of modern extremist propaganda and strengthen the ability of prosecutors to act against those who glorify terrorism while hiding behind technicalities. It would send an unequivocal message that the celebration of terrorist violence has no place in our society. This amendment represents a sensible, proportionate and necessary improvement to the existing legislation, and I hope that colleagues will support it.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I have sympathy, as I usually do, with the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, but I will make two short points.

First, by removing the emulation requirement, inserted very deliberately in 2006, this amendment would criminalise the utterance of unpleasant viewpoints without regard to whether they have an effect. It would become a police matter to say that the IRA did what it had to do in 1918 or that the Tamil Tigers, currently a proscribed group, fought bravely in defence of their homeland. It seems to me that this would restrict the scope of legitimate comment and be a departure from the principle that we normally criminalise behaviour only when it is liable to cause harm to others.

Secondly, I heard what the noble Baroness said about Hamas and the St Patrick’s Day parade, but I wonder whether the purpose of this amendment is not better served by Section 12(1A) of the Terrorism Act 2000, inserted as recently as 2019. This already makes it a crime to express

“an opinion or belief that is supportive of a proscribed organisation”,

being reckless as to whether that will encourage someone to support it. If police or prosecutors are being unduly cautious in this area—I heard what the noble Lord said about that—they might usefully be directed to that provision of the existing law.

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

My Lords, I support the amendment in the names of my noble friend Lady Foster and others. It is right that we look to close the loophole. We need to look at how terrorists operate in the real world. The loophole that is there at present suggests that the current legislation’s wording is not quite fit for purpose.

I agree that the refinements made between Committee and Report are useful. First, I disagree that this would in any way restrict freedom of speech. Historic debate is to be valued, and I do not believe that this would in any way restrict that. The amendment focuses on the contemporary situation. Secondly, it is important that the position of the so-called lone wolf is covered—unfortunately, we have seen more instances of this: people who want to, in effect, wear the badge of a terrorist organisation but who may or may not be directly connected with that organisation. Whether it is in Manchester or in Sydney in recent days, we have seen the horrific situation of a radicalised individual or group of individuals perpetrating such attacks, and it is right that this is covered as well.

There are two principal reasons why I support this amendment and think it is necessary. The first, arguably the lesser of the two, is that it is dealing with the present. Unlike the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and probably like most Members of this House, I have not been a victim of terrorism or had a family member who has been. All of us in that position can be thankful for that. Where we see people eulogising past terrorist actions for their own purposes—drawing people into their organisations or their way of thinking—it is deeply hurtful to the victims and relatives, whether that is in relation to terrorist atrocities that took place in Northern Ireland, the Manchester Arena bombing or the 7/7 attacks. The presentation of those who perpetrated these attacks as righteous martyrs, and people purveying the view that there was “no alternative”, is deeply hurtful to the living relatives of the victims. That reason alone is sufficient to make this change.

The bigger reason is looking to the future, and this is where we need to get real as regards terrorism. Terrorist organisations are not some closed cell or small group of people who simply never change and who wither on the vine as time passes. For any terrorist group to operate and continue its activities, it requires the influx of new blood, time and again.

One of the things that I find deeply disturbing is that a number of young people are naive and are drawn in; they are not simply handed a gun or a bomb on day one and told to go out and take it with them—they are drawn in bit by bit. The way in which terrorist organisations operate is to gradually indoctrinate those young people in a dangerous ideology and even more perverse methodology and gradually draw them in. In doing so, they get those people addicted to their methods—and past terrorism becomes, effectively, the gateway drug. Many young people, if we were to mention the 7/7 attacks, for example, would have no memory of them: they were before they were born, and they do not see the consequences and the hurt caused directly to those families or the evil done in society. It becomes a much easier sell for terrorist organisations to draw people in on that basis, and to present those who carried out those hideous attacks as being some form of martyr or indeed role model for the future.

To that extent, I do not care whether we are talking about Northern Ireland-based terrorism, whether it is the extremism of those who carry out violence on behalf of some Islamic extremist view, whether it is far-right terrorism or whether it is a terrorist group that is effectively a front organisation for some foreign power. The reality is that we judge terrorism not by its motivation but by its words and actions. There is a real danger of young people being radicalised and drawn in, with the presentation of the evils of the past as potential martyrs.

The argument will go that if, for example, we needed to create a united Ireland by violence 40 years ago and it was right then, surely it must be right now; that if white supremacism was right 30 years ago, it is right now; or that if having an Islamic caliphate across the world was right 20 years ago, it is right now. All those ideas are repugnant, but the logic is that if they are being used by terrorist organisations, using this level of loophole as the argument to draw young people in, we have a duty to protect society but also to protect our young people and prevent them being radicalised. That is why I think this is an absolutely necessary amendment that will help to protect society.

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 420 and 422B, both of which I have supported. I go to a lot of events where the right to protest is debated, and people are quite shocked when I describe how this Government bundled three organisations together so that they could push through the proscription of Palestine Action. It does not look just or fair. They do not even have to be similar or connected, as these three were not. It was interesting to listen to the entertaining noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, running through the debate on whether to proscribe Palestine Action.

These amendments are about the process: about how it is done and whether it is done in a proper way. It is not proper scrutiny and it is not what this House is for when we have a blunt choice to accept or reject all three. That is not a sensible system. Proscription is a really serious step: it criminalises people for association, for support and even for what they say. Such decisions deserve to be looked at carefully, case by case, and not rushed through or passed in a job lot. If the Government are confident in their decisions about what is and is not a terrorist organisation—I assume they were confident about Palestine Action—they should have no problem with each one being judged on its own, not in a job lot.

The amendment from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, comes down to something quite simple. These are very big decisions that can criminalise association, affect livelihoods and follow someone for years. If we are being asked to approve that, we should be properly informed—but we were not; we had to take the Minister’s word for it and we did not have the information. We are asked to nod things through without seeing the full picture. I do not think that is a very comfortable position for your Lordships’ House to be in.

Ensuring that Parliament has a clear and well-informed picture is the whole point of this. It also adds a bit more balance. At the moment, these decisions are taken by Ministers. It need not get in the way of a fair decision, or allowing things to move quickly. If there is urgency the Government can act, but they still have to come back and justify that decision properly afterwards. It is about making sure that when we take serious decisions, they are justified on the facts, not just on suppositions.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I add a few comments in support of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—but without repeating him—on the proposed ouster clause suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, in his Amendments 421 and 422DA. The schedule of proscribed organisations is often added to and rarely subtracted from. At present it has about 98 entries, if you include Northern Ireland as well as the rest of the world. That includes a number of nationalist movements from around the world that are, or have in the past been, committed to violence in pursuit of their aims.

Despite the recommendations of successive Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation, the annual review of proscribed groups by the Home Office and the NIO was discontinued in 2014. As far as I know, that automatic annual review has not been reinstated. There is no requirement in law that proscription should have to be renewed every three or five years, or indeed at all. In my report on the Terrorism Acts in 2016, at paragraph 5.24, I recorded the Government’s admission, which I found breathtaking, that no fewer than 14 groups on the list no longer satisfied the statutory requirements for proscription. Even more breathtakingly, they did not try to stop me saying it. There were almost certainly other groups in respect of which the same thing could have been argued, yet most of those groups remain on the list.

One group, the al-Qaeda offshoot to which the current President of Syria belonged, was recently deproscribed on the initiative of the Home Secretary. But if an application to the Home Secretary is turned down, it then takes money and determination to challenge a proscription in POAC—the tribunal that exists for this purpose. A handful of applications have been made by organisations that have definitively rejected violence, and these have been successful. With great respect to the noble Lord and without reference to the Palestine Action case, I am not persuaded that there is any good reason to block this necessary avenue for recourse.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I strongly support the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. It seems to me entirely sensible, for the reasons set out so well by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and I agree very much with what he said about the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, that Palestine Action should not be proscribed. It is not that I have any sympathy with it—it is a deplorable organisation that does a great deal of damage. If in fact the other laws required to deal with such appalling organisations are not sufficient, the Government should bring to this House, as well as the House of Commons, stronger laws to deal with them. But it is not, in my view, a terrorist organisation.

Counter-Extremism Strategy

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Thursday 12th February 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, extremism is not what it used to be. In October 2024, MI5’s director Ken McCallum said:

“Straightforward labels like ‘Islamist terrorism’ or ‘extreme right wing’ don’t fully reflect the dizzying range of beliefs and ideologies we see”.


My current experience as Independent Prevent Commissioner confirms his analysis. Young people, often disturbed by family trauma or personal grievances, seek comfort in the rigid hatreds of their offline or online tribe, often with added misogyny or antisemitism. Their minds are inflamed by geopolitical events, dehumanising computer games and the malign algorithms of social media into an unpredictable mash-up of resentment, rage and normalised violence.

Conspiracy theories are promoted by hostile states. Fragments of ideology are packaged as video clips. The boy drawing Nazi symbols on his arm may, the next week, be seen shouting sectarian slogans, refusing to interact with female teachers or posing as a suicide bomber. The terrorism statistics record violent offences that were motivated by a single, consistent ideology, most commonly—as the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, has rightly said—a perverted version of Islam.

Extremism in its broader sense, however, motivates many attacks of equivalent seriousness, including those perpetrated by the multiple killers Danyal Hussein, Jake Davison and, in Southport, Axel Rudakubana. These violent expressions of extremism represent, of course, only a small part of the social problems caused by its non-violent outworkings.

The single point I want to make today is that while the word extremism is a convenient label for drawing attention to a vast bundle of problems, it is not a satisfactory key to solving them. The normal meaning of the word is dauntingly broad. In the libel case Shakeel Begg v BBC, Lord Justice Haddon-Cave said:

“What is ‘extreme’ is, by definition, something which is not ‘moderate’”.


Attempts by successive Governments to narrow it down have been inconsistent and hard to translate into consistent policy. Phrases such as “opposition to British values” and “creating a permissive environment” are too wide to form a reliable basis for rules or coercive action.

Confronted with so large a target, counterextremism strategies have been diffuse and ineffective. The 2015 Counter-Extremism Strategy was diagnosed by Professor Clive Walker, our greatest academic authority on terrorism, as suffering from

“inexact and contested meanings, objectives, and mechanisms which generate dynamics of suspicion as much as persuasion”.

The rapid analytical sprint leaked last January was said by Policy Exchange to have confused extremism with

“any shocking crime, bad belief or nasty social phenomenon about which we are worried”.

Overbreadth is particularly dangerous when accompanied by harsh sanctions. The counterextremism Bill of 2016, which I was privileged to see, would have allowed the penalisation of “extremist activity”, defined to include huge swathes of otherwise perfectly legitimate political and religious speech. It was, at least to me, a relief when, after being announced in two successive Queen’s Speeches, it blew up on the launch pad.

Parliament and the courts have calibrated our laws over the centuries with extraordinary and rather impressive care. It would be a lazy and illiberal error to overlay those laws with vague and contested notions such as extremism or—I agree—Islamophobia. Let us promote integration, critical thinking, social media literacy and awareness of our civic rights and duties. Let us research harmful belief systems and challenge divisive or intolerant narratives wherever we find them. If our laws on online safety, public order, hate crime, counterterrorism, hostile state activity—

[Captain of the King’s Bodyguard of the Yeomen of the Guard and Deputy Chief Whip (Baroness Wheeler) (Lab)]

My Lords, it has been four minutes.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I have one and a half sentences left. If our laws on online safety, public order, hate crime, counterterrorism, hostile state activity or proscription are insufficient, let us revisit, amend and supplement them. But the trick is to excise the tumours without undue harm to the healthy tissue of free speech, which requires a scalpel, not the suffocating blanket labelled “extremism”.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful for the contributions from noble Lords today. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, who is persistent in raising this issue—rightly so, dare I say? He framed the debate, if I may say so, in terms of government action on examining non-violent extremism, but in the context of far-right, far-left and Islamist extremism. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who obviously has a great and deep interest in this, added the question of lone wolf independent radicalisation, which again is a common thread. I shall respond to the debate not only by addressing the points that the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, raised, but also in relation to high-harm extremism, where we have a very high threshold and take action upon it.

I will start with the point the noble Earl, Lord Effingham, mentioned: the statutory definition of extremism. My noble friend Lord Mendelsohn also touched on this point. I confirm to the Committee that there are no plans to change the definition of extremism that was set out by the previous Government in March 2024. This existing definition is based on behaviours and does not look at specific ideologies, although the points that have been raised today are obviously important. The definition is a useful tool for government departments and others to look at when considering public engagement and when reaching out to stakeholders.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I am grateful to the Minister. He described it as a “statutory definition of extremism”. I am not encouraging him, but is there an intention to put it into statute?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

It was a slip of the tongue if I used the word “statutory” in reference to the definition of extremism. If that was the case, I apologise to the Committee. In essence, the 2024 definition of extremism that the noble Earl mentioned is correct.

In the gentlest of ways, I will respond to the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, who said that there is government inertia on this matter. There is no government inertia on this matter. We have to protect our citizens against high-harm extremism. We have to ensure that the extremism that fuels polarisation, erodes social cohesion and undermines trust between communities is challenged. Those individuals in our communities who raise antisemitism, Islamophobia and far-right or far-left terrorism and extremism have to be challenged.

The Government must be able to protect our citizens from the harm of extremism, violence and hatred. In doing so, we must have a balance between allowing freedom of speech and tackling those who promote violence and hatred in our communities. There are fundamental values in our community, such as freedom of speech, freedom of worship and the freedom of democracy, which define us as a society and which the Government will continue to uphold and promote as values. Where they are challenged by individuals, groups or environments that foster or enable hatred, we will take action against them.

I say to noble Lords and Baronesses that there is a really serious issue here that the Government will try to deal with. We have a government response, which includes, for example, the Online Safety Act, which sets out that platforms, including those that are now likely to be accessed by children, must employ highly effective methods to protect children from content that is harmful or age inappropriate. We can now, through the Ofcom independent regulator, take enforcement action on those duties. Where extremists often deliberately operate below legal thresholds, we want to ensure, rightly, that they can be prosecuted and investigated and that we can take action.

Home Office efforts to counter extremism have certainly focused on high-harm threats. I understand that the noble Lord did not frame his argument around that, but we do have to focus on high-harm threats. We stop foreign individuals of extremist concern, including hate preachers and influencers, travelling to the UK through our visa watchlist programme. We advise and support public authorities and local partners to reduce permissive environments by disrupting extremist hate events, such as speaking tours featuring hate preachers. We have invested in capabilities to stop charities being exploited by extremists. We support communities targeted by extremists to ensure that there is protective security at places of worship—a point that my noble friend Lord Mendelsohn mentioned.

We have also put in place very strong mechanisms through the Prevent programme. At the very start of our term of office, we had the sprint to look at what we needed to do, and there are lessons to be learned from that. We commissioned the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, to look at an independent review of Prevent. He brought forward 34 recommendations, which I note answers the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. Lessons were learned from the Prevent programme—not just from the appalling cases of Southport and the murder of my former colleague Sir David Amess but also positive impacts—to ensure that we deal with some of the issues that the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, mentioned on how we stop radicalisation in the first place.

On the point the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, mentioned, I can say that the funding of Prevent is stable. We had £34.5 million of funding in 2023-24, and in the current financial year, the Government have committed £38.7 million to the programme. The noble Baroness asked what that does and what that achieves—I paraphrase, but that was broadly the tenor of her input. It is important, because we believe it makes a difference to people who are being radicalised by turning their lives around, pointing them in the right direction and stopping them from being influenced by far-left, far-right or, in particular, Islamist radicalisation. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, whom I thank for his work, brought forward recommendations, and we have implemented 33 of the 34 of them.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I hate to stand up again, but I want to put on the record that I made 10 recommendations. Sir William Shawcross had already made 34, and I felt that that was about as much as the system could stand.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord’s recommendations and the independent review of Prevent have been accepted by the Government. We have implemented the vast majority of the recommendations, and we will continue to learn. If there are lessons from today’s debate, we will continue to look at them.

I listened to, understood and accepted the points from the noble Baroness, Lady Jenkin of Kennington. She will understand that I cannot comment on individual organisations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood that she mentioned. We keep all organisations under review. That same principle applies to my noble friend Lord Cryer—I know he has heard this before—in relation to Iran’s revolutionary guards. We keep proscription under review because we do not announce what we will do ahead of doing it.

We consider whether there is sufficient evidence to proscribe an organisation, such as Palestine Action, which was mentioned by a number of noble Lords in the debate. I cannot comment on the court case in which the sledgehammer was involved, because potential further action will be taken on that. People have been remanded in custody, but I cannot comment on that. However, I assure both the noble Baroness and my noble friend that, if proscription is required against any organisation at any time, we will make that proscription.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jenkin, said that many of the people she speaks to feel unsafe, particularly women—I understand that. We now have a violence against women and girls strategy in place. Knife crime, which she discussed in particular, has fallen by 8% in the past 18 months. Knife homicides are down by 27% in the past 18 months. We have banned dangerous weapons, such as ninja swords and zombie-style knives, and have taken 60,000 knives off the street. I understand her concerns. We will look at organisations as and when, but, through neighbourhood policing and other things, we are trying—I hope—to make our communities much safer.

On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Massey of Hampstead, I do not want to see the normalisation of extremism; it should not be tolerated. We have a basic set of values in this society, and we need to uphold those societal values. There is freedom of speech, but we cannot normalise extremism as a whole.

The noble Lord, Lord Walney, made a number of key points. On the extremism definition that he mentioned—which I have spoken to—we keep all matters under review. On the counterterrorism review—which I know is of interest to him; he has done tremendous work in that field—we are looking at that as part of the arm’s-length body review. It does not take away from the principle that we want to ensure that we handle high levels of extremism and also deal with the issues that noble Lords have mentioned today.

I put on record—because this goes to the heart of the question of whether the Government are doing things in this area—that we are upholding the Public Order Act 1986, which imposes conditions on public processions. In the Crime and Policing Bill, currently going through the House, we have put forward a range of measures to ensure that persistent harassment on parades and demonstrations does not happen—that will be law very shortly. We put in place a range of measures through the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, which we still support; it allows civil injunctions to be put in place.

We have legislation, such as the Immigration Act, the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, the Communications Act 2003 and the Education Act 2002, which was passed by Governments of both my political party and the Conservative Party to ensure that we put in place basic standards so that Governments can take action. We want to ensure that we look at all these matters.

On extremism, we have a number of other potential issues. We set out a clear response to terrorism in the UK’s counterterrorism strategy, Contest—an overarching strategy, of which Prevent is a key part, that directs our work in this area and provides a framework for us to operate in. As part of the Contest strategy, the Prevent programme has helped nearly 6,000 people at risk of being drawn into terrorism to turn their lives around. There are always lessons that we can learn, but it is important that we have that information before us today.

I again thank the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, for bringing this important subject to the Grand Committee. I am grateful to him and to everybody who has spoken for their contributions; I hope I have referred to them all. Whatever form it takes and whatever form of bad ideology it espouses, extremism is a toxic force that has no place in our society. We have a high-level strategy to deal with high-harm extremism, but I will always look at, and work with colleagues to look at, what we do about the types of extremism that the noble Lord introduced in his opening contribution. That level of extremism remains unacceptable; the Government will not tolerate it. As I have set out, we are taking a range of actions to quell this threat and to prevent young and vulnerable minds being polluted. Counterterrorism remains a complex and multifaceted issue, but I assure noble Lords that we are unwavering in our commitment to tackle this crucial task.

My door will remain open, as will that of my honourable friend Minister Jarvis in the House of Commons. If noble Lords wish to raise issues, I am open to listening, debating and learning. The threat continues to change, as does the online approach, and so we as a society in this country need to make sure that we allow our fundamental values to remain operational, so that people do not feel harassment for their religion or beliefs or for things they cannot change. We support freedom of speech, but we also support the freedom to live life free from extremism.

Shamima Begum

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Again, with due respect to the noble Lord, I am not going to comment on individual cases, which the Government are currently actively considering, in terms of both the original decision and the court case to date. The noble Lord has said what he said and the House will have heard it; I cannot comment on it.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, the United States has begun the transfer of 7,000 Islamic State detainees from prisons in north-east Syria to Iraq. Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council said the other day that it would commence legal proceedings against transferred detainees of whatever nationality. Can the Minister tell the House whether any British detainees are among those 7,000, and what, if anything, can be done to guard against the risk that in Iraq, those detainees will suffer torture, unfair trials and the death penalty?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord will know that the issue he has raised is a US and Iraq-led operation. The UK is not involved in that operation. We expect all detainee transfers to meet international legal standards and will continue to monitor developments very closely. Again, I cannot comment on any individual cases in relation to the issue the noble Lord raises.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich]

390: Clause 135, page 167, line 6, at end insert—
“11D When information has been copied by virtue of paragraph 11A or extracted by virtue of paragraph 11B, and it is wished to retain such information under paragraph 11A(3)(a) or paragraph 11C(a) for a period exceeding three months beginning with the day on which detention commences, such information may be retained only where the constable has reasonable grounds to suspect that a person falls within section 40(1)(b).”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, building on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Beghal v DPP [2015] UKSC 49 §58, requires reasonable suspicion as a condition for the retention beyond three months of information extracted from an electronic device or from online accounts associated with an electronic device, when that retention is said to be necessary for the purpose of determining whether a person is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group are designed to probe a proposed extension of counterterrorism and national security powers, usable only at ports, airports and places near the land border with Ireland, that are among the very strongest of all those powers vested in the police. I have consistently supported those powers, controversial though they once were, and I support the extension of them to data on the cloud by Clause 137. The issue raised by these amendments is whether those powers and their extension should be attended by improved but streamlined safeguards. My amendments suggest two simple and modest ways of achieving this.

Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and Schedule 3 to the National Security Act 2023 authorise counterterrorism police to stop any person passing through a port or airport, on a no-suspicion basis, for the purpose of determining whether they are or have been involved in terrorism or hostile activity. Such persons may be searched; they may be detained and questioned for up to six hours; they are denied the right of silence in the face of the officers’ questions; indeed, they are liable to be prosecuted if they refuse to speak. All these powers are exercisable, I repeat, on a no-suspicion basis.

There are some thousands of Schedule 7 examinations every year—well down from the peak, but still a significant number. That is not all: any “thing” that a traveller has with them can be seized and inspected, again without any need for suspicion. That power has its origins in the historical power to rummage through hand baggage, and there are all kinds of “things” in there. Thanks to modern technology, such “things” now include laptops and mobile phones. Under the existing law, the contents of these electronic devices may be copied and retained for as long as the examining officer believes that they may be needed for use as evidence in criminal proceedings, or in connection with deportation. That is fair enough in my book. In addition, however, and relevant to my proposed amendments, the contents may be copied and retained

“for as long as is necessary for the purpose of determining”

whether a person is or has been involved in terrorism or hostile activity.

Clause 137 would extend this power so that it applies not only to data that can be extracted from the phone itself but—as touched on in the previous group—to data that is accessible from the phone and stored on the cloud. This includes, for example, the entirety of a person’s Gmail account and all their iCloud photos. The operational logic of the extension is faultless: cloud storage is a fact of life. I have no problem with Clauses 130 to 134, which apply the same principle to powers that are already well attended by safeguards. But Clause 137 gives us an opportunity to reflect, not least in the light of comments from the courts, on whether the Government and your Lordships are content for data that has been seized without the need for suspicion—and which, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said in the previously group, increasingly encapsulates every aspect of a person’s private life—should be retained by the police without clearer parameters.

We are urged to take that opportunity to reflect by Jonathan Hall KC, my successor but one as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. In a note published last October, he suggested that Parliament might want to consider: what safeguards will prevent excessive data being extracted and copied; how journalistic and legally privileged material on an online account will be protected; and, given the quantity of personal data that members of the public knowingly or unknowingly hold on the cloud, accessible from their device, whether, as he put it,

“merely travelling through a port or border”

is

“a sufficient reason to surrender so much of their privacy”.

Jonathan Hall does not say for how long data is, in practice, retained for the purpose of determining whether a person is involved in terrorism or hostile activity. The experience of the old management of police information, or MoPI, regime suggests, however, that personal data may be retained in police systems for very long periods indeed, particularly when the grounds for doing so are very broadly and vaguely expressed.

As one would expect, powers as strong as these have attracted legal challenge. The leading case was brought by Mrs Beghal, who was questioned under Schedule 7 at East Midlands Airport in 2011. The essentials of Schedule 7, as it then stood, were found, in 2015, to be compatible with the European convention by a majority of the Supreme Court. Lord Kerr, followed by a unanimous first section of the European Court of Human Rights, found otherwise. Fortunately, for those tasked with defending the power in the courts, Mrs Beghal was not subject to the inspection, copying, or retention of data on her phone, let alone, of course, on the cloud, but the Supreme Court was sufficiently troubled by this aspect of the power to address the issue anyway. It did not object to the suspicionless seizure, copying and retention of data belonging to a person going through a port or airport, but it did express the view, by way of obiter dictum, in paragraph 58 of its judgment that retention beyond an initial period for the purposes of determining whether a person is involved in terrorism should require objective grounds for suspicion.

My Amendment 390 would act on that dictum of the Supreme Court in relation to the existing Schedule 7 power and the proposed amendment to it. It would fix the initial period during which no suspicion is required at three months. This might be considered rather generous to the police, given that the Supreme Court appears provisionally to have had a period closer to seven days in mind. Should Amendment 390 find favour with your Lordships, a similar amendment to Schedule 3 to the National Security Act could be tabled alongside it on Report.

My Amendment 391 is directed exclusively to the National Security Act 2023. Its Schedule 3 allows an even broader basis for retaining cloud data than the Terrorism Act. As proposed by the Government, it will be sufficient reason for retaining such data that

“the constable believes it necessary … in the interests of national security”

or the

“economic well-being of the United Kingdom”—

national security being a concept that is famously undefined in our legislation.

The test of subjective belief on the part of a constable in relation to these weighty matters is about the least onerous threshold that could be imagined. Amendment 391 would replace it with an objective test—the same objective test proposed in relation to the alternative ground for retention in new paragraph 22B(a) in the Bill. This is keyhole surgery of the most minor kind, but I suggest it is the least this situation requires.

These are probing amendments, but they go some way to meeting the challenge we have been posed by the independent reviewer. They invite discussion of a question that is surely significant by any measure: are we or are we not prepared to contemplate meaningful limits on police retention of the most extensive private details of the lives of people who have done nothing more suspicious than pass through a port or airport? I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 390 and 391 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, which I have signed. As he has explained, these amendments are designed to probe the proposed extension of border powers. These are powers which are already among the strongest vested in the police, which are useable at ports, airports and near the land border with Ireland.

The Committee needs very little reminder of the pedigree of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. This informs his view of these new powers under Clauses 135 to 137, which represent a major extension of state reach. They extend the existing power to seize a physical device to include data that is accessible from a phone but stored in the cloud. We are no longer talking about just a handset, but the entirety of a person’s Gmail account, iCloud photo library and private digital history. Although the operational logic of following data in the cloud is understandable, we should reflect that this information is seized without the need for prior suspicion of an offence. As the successor of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, has asked,

“is merely travelling through a port of border a sufficient reason”

for a citizen

“to surrender so much of their privacy?”

As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said, Amendment 390 would introduce a vital safeguard based on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Beghal v DPP, which stipulates that if the police wish to retain the extracted cloud data for longer than three months they must have reasonable grounds to suspect the individual is involved in terrorism or hostile activity. We cannot allow the digital core of an innocent traveller to be duplicated and kept indefinitely by the state simply because they pass through a port of entry, as the noble Lord said.

As the noble Lord said, Amendment 391 is directed at the National Security Act 2023. As it is currently drafted, the Government would allow the retention of cloud data based on the purely subjective test that the constable believes that it is necessary. This is perhaps the least onerous threshold imaginable in our law. Amendment 391 would perform what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, described as minor “keyhole surgery” by replacing this subjective belief with an objective test of necessity, which would ensure that the retention of highly sensitive personal data, which may include journalistic or legally privileged material, was governed by an actual legal standard that can be scrutinised, rather than a mere hunch or the personal belief of an individual officer.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I think I have said that the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, are worthy of reflection, but we will put the discussion ultimately into the code of practice. The final settlement will be a consultation on the code of practice. I have heard what has been said today. There will be a consultation and an opportunity for the noble Lord, with his former hat on and his position in this House, and others to comment on it. That is the case I am making and I hope I have convinced the Committee. If not, methods are available. Given the late hour and the amendment target we are trying to reach, I will rest my case.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I thank the Minister and all noble Lords who have contributed to this excellent debate. Frankly, I am overwhelmed by the quality and quantity of the interventions. With the exception of the noble Lord who signed the amendment, I have not approached any noble Lords who spoke or even notified them that this debate was coming up. It is remarkable that so many spoke so strongly in support. I single out the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for whom we all have enormous respect as a former police officer. I hope that his approval in principle for these amendments will be heard on the Government Front Bench.

These amendments are operationally perfectly simple. Nobody has suggested that this would be a great burden on the police or any bureaucratic impediment to them doing their job. If they had been, I would have been very reluctant to propose them. Although they are operationally simple, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said, they are of constitutional importance. They may look technical, but they are important.

On that theme, I will address the Minister’s remarks on the code of practice and the consultation on it. That really is not enough. If the law says it is enough for a constable to have a subjective belief that the economic well-being of the United Kingdom is being harmed, it will avail nobody to complain that there was no objective evidence or reasonable suspicion. The Minister perhaps heard an indication from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, of what the reaction of the courts might be to an argument of that kind. I thank him for his offer, but I am afraid it is simply a deflection. This issue pre-eminently needs to be addressed in the Bill.

I end with two further thoughts for the Minister to consider. First, for most of the last decade, Schedule 7 was the most controversial aspect of our counterterrorism laws. One reason is that it potentially affects a lot of people; a lot of people used to be stopped and questioned at airports. It took over from the old “no suspicion stop and search power”, which was repealed when Theresa May was Home Secretary in 2011 or 2012 and defused as an issue of major public concern because of some sensible but quite minor changes made to it. For example, nine hours of detention were taken down to six, alongside several other technical changes. People who were upset by Schedule 7 and saw it as targeted at them and their community were reassured that Parliament was looking at it and prepared to respond to some of their concerns.

Although this may look very technical on the pages of the Bill, I ask the Minister to remember that we have reached a sort of equilibrium on Schedule 7, but it is a very delicate one. If you are going to increase the powers in this manner, it is really important to think about safeguards as well.

I ask the Minister to reflect on a second point. He may not accept my arguments, but I put the pragmatic case to him that these arguments have been put not only by me and previous independent reviewers—the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, was also a great reformer of Schedule 7—but by the Supreme Court, which felt strongly enough about this issue to single it out for comment in a case in which the issue did not arise. As a lawyer and a member of the brotherhood of the law, I am delighted by anything that could produce more excuses for litigation. However, at such little cost, administratively or otherwise, the Minister has it in his power to do what the Supreme Court suggested and neutralise a lengthy, and one might almost say pointless, bout of litigation.

I know the Minister has a lot on his plate, but in view of the way this debate has gone and the points that have been made right around the House, I hope the Minister will find time to meet with me and perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and others if they want to come, and discuss this properly. I was sorry to hear him say he had a defence against keyhole surgery. Keyhole surgery is designed to help; it is not the sort of thing one should have to defend against. He should count himself lucky he is meeting surgeons and not butchers. However, we are very keen to meet him and I hope he might agree. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 390 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for raising a point that really had not occurred to me in years of gazing at Sections 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act. I also thank the noble Lord for his reference to the Handyside case, quite correctly observing that freedom of speech means nothing if it does not include the freedom to offend, shock and disturb. But, of course, Handyside was about ideas that offend, shock and disturb. Sections 4A and 5 are not talking about ideas; as the noble Lord said, they refer to threats, abuse and insult.

Outside the rarefied walls of academe, the cases in which Sections 4A and 5 are applied are to the objectionable drunk, on a train or in a doorway, who yells at somebody and can cause, in the words of the statute, distress or alarm. I agree with the noble Lord that they are not very different. In fact, he said it would be otiose to have both “distress” and “alarm” in the sections, but surely there is a shade of difference between the two. If there is some lasting upset, we could call that distress, but if it is a question of frightening or unsettling somebody by yelling an insult in their ear, that is probably closer to alarm. Although I agree with the noble Lord and the noble Baroness about the evils of overzealous prosecutors, I suggest that there is some purpose to these two very similar words both appearing in these two sections.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I have listened to this rather short debate against the particular backdrop of the Government’s increasingly unsettling approach to public order—a direction of travel that raises real concerns on these Benches. The current stance seems to involve simply doubling down on the pattern set by the previous Administration, which, in our view, risks overpolicing protest, overburdening an already stretched justice system, diverting resources from serious crime and threatening legitimate speech.

In that context, we have sympathy with this proposal. However, I have some concerns about changing a standard legal formula in public order and anti-social behaviour law. It is widely embedded in guidance and operational policy; in removing it, there is a risk of creating uncertainty and confusion within the police, local authorities and the courts. At the same time, it is equally clear that the concepts of alarm and distress have, in practice, been stretched far beyond what Parliament ever intended. Some people are very easily alarmed or distressed by noisy but peaceful demonstrations, or simply by views with which they profoundly disagree. These cannot be a sound basis for criminal liability.

There is a real risk that an overbroad test inhibits free expression, penalises vulnerability and hands too much discretion to those who are most intolerant of difference. If the Government will not support this amendment, will the Minister explain how they intend to ensure that public order powers are not used to criminalise mere annoyance, eccentricity or disagreement, but are focused on genuinely threatening, abusive and harassing behaviour?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I entirely agree with everything that has been said about the need to highlight this appalling practice and, so far as possible, bring it to an end. But if one’s chosen means is the fettering of the discretion of a sentencer, one has to be extraordinarily careful about definitions. There, I rather echo what has just been said.

I understand how difficult this is, but, for example, the definition in Amendment 353 would mean that if there is an incident motivated by the perpetrator’s perception that an individual has shamed the perpetrator, the sentencing judge would be required to treat that as an aggravating factor. That could be two young lads outside a nightclub; one of them has shown a compromising picture of the other, and the other feels shamed or that he may be shamed if he shows it. That is how the violence begins. Violence is always bad and it always has to be punished, but of all the possible motivations for violence, is that really one that we are going to single out as a mandatory aggravating factor?

I must admit that I slightly wonder whether the best way to achieve the spotlight that the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, so rightly wants to place on this is by amending the sentencing guidelines. I thought that inherent in a lot of what she said was perhaps the implication that there ought to be a specific offence, rather as we managed to do with non-fatal strangulation and suffocation. If we are to adopt this means, imperfect and relatively low profile as it may be, we must be very careful about the words. As the Minister knows better than any of us, it is very easy to legislate for what one has in mind, but the unintended consequences are also there, and the law of unintended consequences is, I am afraid, one of the strongest on the statute book.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Sugg for bringing this matter to the Committee and for her eloquent elaboration of the rationale behind her amendments. I also thank other noble Lords for speaking, particularly those who recounted the moving stories of specific women who have been victims of this abuse.

It is safe to say that this is an issue that unites us all; no one wants to see any form of abuse perpetrated against women and girls, but honour-based abuse is perhaps one of the most pernicious forms of abuse. Due to its specific character and profile, it can all too often be swept under the carpet, hidden by communities that perpetrate it and ignored by authorities that should put a stop to it. I welcome in particular the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for making the important point that this is an international criminal phenomenon. It is very easy to see it within a UK bubble, but it is incredibly important to remind ourselves of that context.

The many victims of honour-based abuse are left without justice because of fears of inflaming what are termed community tensions. That is borne out by the facts. Only 95 prosecutions were brought forward for honour-based abuse cases in the year 2024-25, and of those cases only 46 led to convictions. The reason behind these appallingly low conviction rates is the persistent failure to recognise the unique characteristics of honour-based abuse—the fact that it often involves numerous perpetrators, many of whom are family members or members of an extended community, acting collectively to abuse and in many cases, as we have heard, murder the victim.

It is important to recognise that there has been a concerted effort more recently to better recognise and respond to honour-based abuse. The Government should be commended for committing—on 26 August, I think—to legislating for a statutory definition and the publication of multiagency guidance on how to deal most appropriately with such abuse.

Again in August this year, the College of Policing, as referenced by my noble friend Lord Blencathra, launched a new advice note to police forces to support officers in their efforts to identify and tackle these forms of abuse. That followed the recommendations that emerged from the Tees Valley super-complaint, which was an important investigation for many reasons but especially because it found that police forces generally tended to include the risk of honour-based abuse only in their domestic abuse policies, not in other policies, thereby leading to an incoherent approach. The investigation also found that police forces generally lacked the cultural awareness to recognise the wider religious and cultural drivers behind this form of violence, and that this had led to police officers failing to recognise the wider risks of honour-based abuse after victims reported it.

I commend and fully support Amendments 353 and 355 by my noble friend Lady Sugg. They simply attempt to put into the Bill two of the measures that the Government have already committed to: a statutory definition informed by the actual experiences and the reality of the victims, and a comprehensive set of multiagency guidance. That is an important step and the Government should be commended for committing to it, but it will be of no use if the Government do not speedily implement these measures.

I echo the sense of urgency expressed by noble Lords from across the Chamber. I believe that the Bill is the legislative vehicle for these changes, and if they are not included in this Bill then there will likely not be another opportunity for quite some time. I urge the Minister to bring forward amendments on Report to make good on the Government’s promise to the victims of what can only be termed the most horrific patterns of abuse and violence.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I very much appreciated the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, although I see more value in this this Bill than the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, was prepared to admit. I agree with what they each said about hard topics that this Bill might usefully have tackled but did not.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights has produced another of its helpful and focused reports. I agree with the committee that the difficult issue of concealing identity at protests may need to be better calibrated. I agree with it also on the issue of universal jurisdiction, which was debated in the Moses Room on 9 September. To bring our law into line with our neighbours and allow perpetrators of the gravest international crimes to be prosecuted here would involve nothing more complicated than removing the requirement of citizenship or residency in the International Criminal Court Act 2001. I look forward to supporting proposed amendments along those lines.

The Constitution Committee raised two issues in addition to that referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower: the widening by Clause 4 of the categories of people who can issue on-the-spot fixed penalty notices—now of up to £500—and the need for parliamentary scrutiny of statutory guidance to the police on the child sex offender disclosure scheme, Sarah’s law. Like many constitutional issues, they may seem mundane, but I hope they will not escape our attention.

Turning to national security, I support the youth diversion orders, which will be used to disrupt, at an early stage, young people who are believed to be involved in low-level terrorist offending, such as the possession and dissemination of material, often online. The idea is to divert them from the criminal justice system for their benefit and for ours. As noted in my recent report, Lessons for Prevent, their availability might also help to increase the rate of consent to Channel interventions, which is currently running at about 75%.

Polygraph testing is to be extended: I should like to know more about how rigorously the use of this technology has been assessed, and with what result, since it was rolled out for sex offenders in 2014 and terrorist offenders in 2021.

Finally, Clauses 130 to 137 of the Bill extend police powers following the seizure of electronic devices to access information accessible from such devices but stored on the cloud. The logic of that extension is not hard to understand, but its sheer scale requires us to think about safeguards. That is so particularly in relation to Clause 135, which concerns the no-suspicion powers to search and to question that are exercised by counterterrorism police in ports and airports under the Terrorism Act 2000 and the National Security Act 2023. The utility of those powers has not been doubted by any of those who have been tasked with the close examination of their use, but the latest of them, Jonathan Hall KC, was moved to ask this week what will prevent excessive data from being extracted and copied, how journalistic and legally privileged material on an online account will be protected, and—given the quantity of personal data that members of the public hold on the cloud—whether merely travelling through a port or border should be considered a sufficient reason to surrender so much private data. Senior courts have expressed a degree of disquiet about the existing power, and a further case is under way. Nobody wants a regime of pointless box-ticking, but we need to rise to the independent reviewers’ challenge and satisfy ourselves that, if this strong and intrusive power is to be further extended, it is accompanied by the right safeguards.