Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

2nd reading
Tuesday 7th January 2025 Lords Chamber

Second Reading

16:38

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

That the Bill be now read a second time.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to open this debate on the first Home Office Bill to come before this Parliament under the current Government. I want to start with why we are here today. It has been more than seven years since an appalling act of terrorism was perpetrated as a music concert drew to a close in the Manchester Arena. Twenty-two people were killed and many more injured on that terrible night in May 2017. We think of them today and hold their loved ones in our thoughts and hearts, as we do with everyone who has been impacted by terrorism.

Noble Lords will be aware that this legislation has been a long time in preparation, including—and I acknowledge this—by the previous Conservative Government. It has been a long time coming but is now before us today. This Government wanted to move swiftly to introduce the Bill following the general election, to deliver on our manifesto commitment and the promise that the Prime Minister made to Figen Murray, who has campaigned tirelessly to introduce today’s proposed law. Figen’s son, Martyn Hett, was among those killed in the Manchester Arena attack. The fact that we are debating this Bill today is a direct result of her tenacity and persistence, and that of her colleagues in the campaign team. The commitment and courage that she has shown in campaigning for changes that will benefit others is, quite frankly, extraordinary. I am sure the whole House will join me in paying tribute to her for all that she has done and continues to do in the field of terrorist prevention. The Bill we are debating today is the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill but, in essence, for the reasons I have just mentioned and due to the campaigning spirit of Figen Murray, this Bill is now Martyn’s law.

Noble Lords across this House will agree that the number one priority of any Government is to keep their citizens safe. Sadly, since the start of 2017, agencies and law enforcement have disrupted 43 late-stage plots and there have been 15 domestic terror attacks, including the Manchester Arena attack I referred to. These incidents have shown that the public may be targeted at a wide range of events and public venues and spaces. The nature of the terror threat has become less predictable and potential attacks harder to detect and investigate. While we recognise that the risks posed by terrorism are already considered at some premises and events, the absence of legislation and requirements means there is no consistent approach, which then results in varied outcomes.

Engagement with business has highlighted that counterterrorism preparedness often falls behind areas where there are long-established legal requirements, such as health and safety. If that were not enough, the Manchester Arena Inquiry and the prevention of future deaths report from the London Bridge and Borough Market inquests called for clarity of responsibility for venue operators regarding protective security. That simply is what this Bill aims to do. It is designed to bolster the UK’s preparedness for and protection from terrorism. It will achieve this by requiring for the first time that those responsible for certain premises and events consider how they would respond in the event of a terrorist attack. Further, at larger premises and events, additional steps will need to be taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist attacks.

To be in scope of the Bill as qualifying premises, 200 or more individuals must be reasonably expected from time to time to be present at the particular premises at once. In addition, the premises must be used for one or more of the uses specified in Schedule 1 to the Bill—for example, as a venue, restaurant or bar. For those premises that are in scope, a tiered approach has been established by the Government, with requirements varying accordingly.

We have tried generally to put premises where 800 or more individuals are reasonably expected in an enhanced tier. Premises where between 200 and 799 individuals are reasonably expected to attend will fall into a standard tier. Events will be in scope only where 800 or more individuals are reasonably expected to be present on site for the event at any point and where the other conditions in Clause 3 are met, including that there is an appropriate level of control of access to the event. These qualifying events will also be in the enhanced tier. In limited cases, the Bill ensures that some qualifying premises will be placed in the standard tier regardless of numbers, such as places of worship. This recognises that places of worship play a unique and important role in communities across the country and are often readily accessible and welcoming to all.

This means that there will be certain requirements for those premises. Those responsible for the qualifying premises and events will be required to notify the Security Industry Authority that they are responsible for qualifying premises or events, and to have in place appropriate public protection procedures to reduce the risk of physical harm to individuals in the event of an act of terrorism at or near the premises or event. These two requirements apply to all in scope of the Bill but are the only obligations on those responsible for premises in the standard tier.

What does “public protection” mean? Public protection procedures are intended to be simple and low-cost. There is no requirement to put in place physical measures under this requirement, but there are four categories of procedure. First, evacuation—meaning the process of getting people safely out of the premises—needs to be identified. The second is a word I had not come across until recently: invacuation, which means the process of bringing people safely into safe parts within the premises if required. The third is lockdown, which is the process of securing premises to restrict or prevent entry by an attacker by, for example, locking doors or closing shutters. The last is communication, which relates to the process of alerting people on the premises to the incident and directing them away from danger.

In recognition of the potential greater impact of an attack, premises and events in the enhanced tier will be required to consider additional requirements. This includes the requirement to assess the public protection measures that are appropriate to reduce the risk of harm or vulnerability to a terrorist attack and, so far as is reasonably practical, to ensure that such measures are in place. These public protection measures are as follows: first, measures relating to the monitoring of premises and events and their immediate vicinity, which could include monitoring for warning signs and suspicious behaviour that might indicate a potential attack; secondly, measures relating to the movement of individuals into, out of and within the premises at an event, such as search and screening processes; thirdly, measures relating to the physical safety and security of the premises or event, such as safety glass or hostile vehicle mitigation, where appropriate; and, fourthly, measures that relate to the security of information about the premises or event that may assist in the planning, preparation or execution of acts of terrorism.

In the enhanced tier, the organisations responsible will be required to provide the Security Industry Authority with a document setting out their public protection procedures and measures, and how these may be expected to reduce the vulnerability and risk of harm from terrorism. Where the responsible person is a body and not an individual, it will be required to designate a senior individual to have responsibility within the body for ensuring compliance with the legislation’s requirements. However, I assure the House that this person will not be directly or personally liable for compliance. Part 2 amends the licensing legislation in England, Wales and Scotland to prevent the disclosure of sensitive information in those premises plans.

None of this is practical unless we have compliance and enforcement on top. I hope noble Lords will agree that it is no use having these requirements if an effective enforcement regime is not in place to ensure compliance. The Government have determined that, given the Security Industry Authority’s years of experience of increasing security standards around public safety and its wealth of experience in inspecting and enforcing legislation that better protects the public, it is the most appropriate body to oversee enforcement. My department, the Home Office, will work closely with the SIA to develop its new regulatory function, building on existing expertise and knowledge in both the Home Office and the SIA. It will, I hope, bring in the right people, with the right expertise, to ensure an effective and proportionate regulatory approach.

The Government are clear that they will expect the SIA’s role to be supporting and advising businesses in the implementation of the legislation in the first instance, if approved by this Parliament. However, it is necessary for the SIA to have an appropriate toolkit of powers and sanctions to carry out inspections and enforce the new regime. This will include the power to issue penalties for serious or persistent non-compliance. To reflect the potential for more serious consequences at larger premises and events, we have included in the legislation weightier penalties for the enhanced tier. These sanctions will be primarily civil, with a small number of criminal offences to underpin the regime and deal with serious non-compliance. Looking at Clause 20, I assure noble Lords that the SIA will be required to consider a range of factors when determining the amount of penalty, including the ability of the premises or event to pay any penalty.

The Bill also requires the SIA to prepare operational guidance, which will set out how it will discharge its duties. Such guidance will be approved by Ministers at the Home Secretary level.

I reassure noble Lords that there will be a significant amount of time following Royal Assent, if this House approves the Bill, before these requirements will be commenced—at least 24 months. We are doing that so that those organisations can plan and understand, guidance can be delivered and there can be a transitional period to ensure that the objectives are achieved in a way that is helpful to all. That will ensure that those responsible for premises and events will be given time to understand and, where necessary, act upon the new requirements. The Government will also continue to work closely with businesses and organisations to help them to prepare for the new requirements.

As the Home Secretary said when this Bill was debated in the House of Commons, wherever they are and whatever they are doing, people deserve to be safe and feel safe. This Bill is designed to complement the tireless and excellent work that our security services, police and other partners already do to keep us safe. To that end, I echo the words of the Home Secretary in saying thank you to everybody across the national security sphere for all that they do. This Bill is about action when a terrorist event occurs, but I reassure the House that the Government’s focus will always be making sure that the public are protected and that we use the powers of government to secure the safety of the public from potential attack in the first place.

Noble Lords will no doubt be familiar with the Bill’s long history, which I have touched on, and the extensive engagement, scrutiny and debate that have gone into the proposals. The proposals I have outlined have included a draft version of the legislation, which underwent pre-legislative scrutiny by the Home Affairs Select Committee in the Commons, under the previous Government. The Bill has been developed with the aid of two public consultations, conducted by the previous Government in 2021 and 2024. Under this Government, as under the last, we are trying to get the issue right for this House and for the public.

Throughout these processes, a number of concerns have been raised about the legislation’s potential impact, some of which may be reflected in this House today—but I hope that I have listened to, understood and acted on those concerns as reflected. This Government have substantially adjusted the Bill, with some changes from the last Government’s proposals, to strike the right balance in achieving public protection objectives but without placing undue burdens on business or other organisations. Crucially, this Government have raised the threshold for the Bill’s scope from 100 to 200 individuals attending an event. Furthermore, premises and events will meet that threshold, or the 800 threshold for the enhanced tier, only when it is reasonable to expect that at least as many people will be present there at the same time. This approach has been designed to ensure that they are not unfairly brought within the scope based on size alone.

We have also further clarified that the requirements are not one size fits all, which I hope helps the House. Rather, they are to be based on a more location-specific approach. That reflects the fact that the procedures and measures in place at particular premises and events might not be appropriate, reasonable or practical at another event.

Finally, on the reason why the practical standard now applies to public protection procedures required in both tiers, this is a concept which we expect the majority if not all of those in scope to be familiar with, as it is utilised in other regulatory regimes, such as health and safety. We are confident that, with those changes, the Bill strikes an appropriate balance.

That is the Bill before this House. I expect that there will be comment and discussion on this Second Reading, which I welcome. Before I finish, I pay tribute once more to Figen Murray and all those who have campaigned tirelessly for change. It falls to us with this legislation to carry the heavy burden that they have carried since 2017 and to get it on to the statue book as a matter of some urgency.

I thank those in the House of Commons for their scrutiny of the Bill to date and my honourable friend the Security Minister, Dan Jarvis, for his leadership on that. Those in the other place worked constructively and collaboratively to ensure that the Bill is in the best shape possible. I am sure we will experience the same from noble Lords across this House, and I am grateful to those noble Lords who attended the briefing I held yesterday or other meetings organised to discuss the Bill in detail. There is a wealth of experience in this House, and I know that many Members will feel the contents of the Bill personally. I look forward to the scrutiny today and in the coming weeks by noble Lords from across the House. As I look at the list of speakers, I know that they will bring fruitful contributions and suggestions that we will consider, look at and reflect on in due course.

The Bill deserves urgent support to get it through this House. The public rightly deserve to feel safe when visiting public premises and attending events. We think we have the right balance. We hope the Bill, as designed by the current Government, will be given a Second Reading and will complete its passage in this House, but we know there will be contributions and discussions today. I think it is important that locations take appropriate steps, as far as reasonably practicable, to protect staff and the public from the horrific events of terrorism.

It does not happen very often, but this Bill, if passed by this House, will save lives. It will aid people to save lives. It will be a testament to the people who have lost lives in the past and I commend it to the House.

16:56

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, it gives me great pleasure to address the House at the outset of this important debate on behalf of His Majesty’s loyal Opposition. The Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill represents a critical step forward in our collective efforts to safeguard the public from the ever-evolving threat of terrorism. As we did when we first introduced this Bill, we on these Benches recognise our solemn duty to protect the security of our citizens while preserving the freedoms and liberties that underpin our society. The Bill seeks to strike a balance between these imperatives, and I welcome the Government’s decision to bring it forward.

I wish to speak to the work done by Figen Murray, the mother of Martyn Hett, who, among others, tragically lost his life in the Manchester Arena terrorist attack. Figen’s advocacy for this law, alongside that of Detective Chief Inspector Nick Aldworth and Brendan Cox, is a testament to how, from great tragedy and hurt, some good can come. It is fitting that the Bill is more commonly known as Martyn’s law, and I join once again in offering sincere condolences to the relatives of the deceased.

The horrific events of recent years, both at home and abroad, have underscored the need for robust measures to prevent attacks and mitigate their impact. The Bill places the onus on those responsible for high-risk premises to take practical steps to ensure public safety. The introduction of a Protect duty to ensure that venues assess risks and take proportionate actions to mitigate them is a principle that I wholeheartedly support. We live in an age when threats to our national security are diverse and very dynamic. The ability to respond swiftly and effectively, whether to physical threats or those emanating from cyber domains, is paramount. This legislation reinforces the message that we are serious about countering terrorism and protecting our citizens in public places.

We Conservatives believe in the principles of responsibility and accountability. The Bill reflects those values by requiring venue operators to play their part in safeguarding the public. It encourages businesses and organisations to take ownership of their security arrangements and supports a culture of preparedness that will undoubtedly save lives. Furthermore, by focusing on proportionality and risk-based assessments, the Bill will ensure that smaller businesses and community venues are not unduly burdened—a welcome consideration that reflects the realities that local enterprises face across the country.

However, while we broadly support the Bill, it is our duty as legislators to scrutinise it carefully to ensure that its implementation is both effective and fair. There are issues that require clarification, and I therefore have a few questions for the Minister. First, on cost and resource implications, many businesses, especially small and medium enterprises, are still recovering from the economic challenges of recent years. What financial and logistical support will be made available to ensure compliance, particularly for venues that lack the expertise or resources to implement these measures?

On the practicality of enforcement, how will the Government ensure that the Protect duty is enforced consistently across the country? Will there be a clear framework to avoid a patchwork approach that might leave gaps in our national security network? On co-ordination with local authorities, local councils will inevitably play a role in supporting the implementation of the Bill, so has sufficient thought been given to the capacity of local authorities to provide guidance and oversight, particularly in areas where resources are already stretched?

On cybersecurity considerations, in an increasingly interconnected world, how does the Bill address the intersection of physical and cyber threats to premises? Are venue operators equipped with the knowledge to protect themselves against both forms of attack? While the principle of proportionality is embedded in the Bill, how will it be applied in practice to ensure that smaller community venues are not inadvertently discouraged from hosting public events due to perceived administrative or financial burdens?

The Bill is a vital step forward in our efforts to protect the public from the scourge of terrorism. It embodies Conservative values by emphasising responsibility, proportionality, and a collaborative approach to security. However, as always, the devil is in the detail. It is incumbent on us to ensure that this legislation is implemented in a way that is practical, fair and effective. By addressing the questions I have raised, we can strengthen the Bill and ensure that it delivers on its promise to enhance the safety of our citizens without placing undue burdens on those tasked with its implementation. This side of the House looks forward to engaging constructively with the Government and noble Lords across the House to refine this important legislation. Together, we can ensure that our country remains secure and free, a balance that lies at the heart of our Conservative values.

17:02

[Baroness Suttie (LD)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister for his comprehensive introduction to the Bill and for the very collaborative approach he has adopted so far, which is extremely welcome. I echo his words and those of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, in paying tribute to Figen Murray and the work of the campaign team, which has been tireless and, I hope, will be ultimately successful in passing this Bill very soon.

Keeping people safe, protected and secure when they are in public venues has to be a key responsibility of the state. For that reason, these Benches welcome the introduction of the Bill and will continue to work with the Government and on a cross-party basis to ensure that we have at the end of this process the best possible legislation, which is both proportionate and workable in practice.

The Bill has been broadly welcomed by all key interest groups, including the victims’ families. It is important that we continue to reach out to all those with detailed or personal understanding and knowledge. In that regard, I am very grateful for the briefing we have received from the Martyn’s law campaign team and Figen Murray. In all our deliberations, it is essential that we remember the potential human impact of not getting this right. The Manchester Arena terror attack was utterly heartbreaking. Deliberately targeting children and young people at a concert is beyond evil. It is so important that we learn lessons from that and other terrorist attacks. Inaction is simply not an option.

The nature of terrorism is changing. There are increased global tensions, including ongoing wars in the Middle East, Sudan and Ukraine. There is growth in state terrorism and information—and misinformation —wars are constantly developing. Threats are no longer necessarily from organised groups. Lone individuals, often with mental health issues and motivated by things they believe that they have read online, can organise random attacks resulting in devastating death and destruction, as we so tragically witnessed over the Christmas holidays in Magdeburg in Germany and New Orleans in the United States.

All this means that we have to change how we think about security, terrorism and potential attacks. As the very powerful briefing note we received from the Martyn’s law campaign team reminded us, we need to ensure that this new law

“will mobilise society against these enduring, and ever-changing, threats and make us more resistant to terrorism, and more resilient as a society … As the tactics of terrorists change, so must our strategies to defeat them”.

As the Minister reminded us, there have been many stages to reaching the Bill we are debating today, including pre-legislative scrutiny and consultation, which have resulted in some substantive changes to the previous draft introduced by the Conservative Party. Notably, the threshold has been increased from 100 to 200 for the standard-sized venues or events. This has not been universally welcomed, with some believing the figure is still too low and others feeling it is now too high.

This is no doubt a subject we will return to in more detail in Committee, but I would be very grateful if the Minister could say in his concluding remarks how the Government intend to assess the appropriateness of setting the threshold at 200, and what criteria and timeframe they will use to make this judgment.

It is very important that there is public trust in this legislation. So many organisations will be directly impacted, from local government to the entertainment industry, the voluntary sector, small businesses and the insurance industry, to name just those that made contact with us ahead of this debate. It is important to keep consulting them to ensure that unintended consequences stemming from this legislation are kept to a minimum.

One issue raised by a great many organisations is the need for greater clarity regarding training and guidance. I know that some welcome commitments, specifically on training, were given to my honourable friend Ben Maguire MP in Committee in the House of Commons, but I would be grateful if the Minister could say a little more about how the Government intend to ensure an overview of the quality of the guidance and training. In particular, it would be helpful if he could say by whom and how trainers and training courses will be approved.

Closely related to the issue of guidance is the issue of communication and information flow. It is vital that all organisations that will have to comply with this new legislation are aware of what they have to do, in what timeframe, what their responsibilities are and why it is important. They will also need to know what financial assistance, if any, will be available to them. I am sure that the Government are planning a significant information campaign about this legislation, but it would be extremely useful to hear a little more about their communications plans from the Minister in his concluding remarks.

There is also the equally important issue of the information flow from the security services, on which I am sure other noble Lords speaking in the debate will concentrate. It is particularly important for larger venues, especially during times of enhanced national threat levels, that there is an adequate communication between larger venues and the security sector. I would be grateful if the Minister could say a little more about how the interface between the security services preventing terrorism in the first place and those responsible for ensuring security in premises will work in practice.

My final area of concern is enforcement, on which the Minister concentrated rather a lot in his speech. Like him, I believe there is no point in passing new legislation if it is not enforced. Last week, following the New Orleans attacks, there were reports in our media that many of the permanent anti-terror barriers have still not been built in the UK following the 2017 attacks. Several key bridges in London, for example, have not yet introduced the necessary safety barriers. I appreciate that such outdoor attacks would be beyond the scope of this Bill—which is about protecting premises—but the wider issue of enforcement and implementation is incredibly important, not least in terms of ensuring public confidence in the process.

As I understand it, the SIA, the new regulator, will have the power to enforce the anti-terrorism measures springing from the Bill. The public need to have confidence that the measures will be backed up by rigorous enforcement and accompanied by the necessary funding. Can the Minister say whether he is confident that the enforcement measures in the Bill will be strong enough? How will they be monitored? Does he not agree that the SIA will require additional resources and funding?

Getting this Bill right is terribly important, but so is getting the balance right. People must never be too scared to go out and live their lives; nor should we produce laws that end up stifling creativity or local activity and volunteering. We need to ensure that the provisions in the Bill are proportionate. The costs of implementation must not be overly burdensome for small organisations. However, that has to be weighed against the cost of not having effective protection strategies in place. First and foremost, there needs to be confidence that systems and security measures are in place to protect people in public venues. As the Minister said, there has been an extremely long wait for this legislation, but I hope we can now work quickly and effectively, and as thoroughly as we can, to get it done.

17:10

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, this Bill has been forged in reaction to a despicable terrorist attack, dignified by the name of one of its victims, promoted by his courageous mother and subject to a high degree of cross-party consensus. Those are all admirable things, but they also underline the need for serious and dispassionate parliamentary scrutiny.

It is sometimes said that the meaningful scrutiny of Bills is nowadays the province of this House only, and examples of that are not unknown. However, having followed the progress of this Bill through the Commons, with particular reference to the work of the Public Bill Committee and the Home Affairs Select Committee—the independence of which on this matter was notable— I have a lot of respect for the evidence they have taken and the work they have done. That is now reflected in the reformulated and, I must say, improved Bill. I particularly welcome the test of reasonable practicability, so familiar from health and safety legislation, and the changes to the lower threshold for qualifying premises, which is strongly supported by the National Association of Local Councils. It will take out of the scope of the Bill over 100,000 premises—including small parish churches, village halls and town centre cafes—that cannot reasonably be expected to host as many as 200 people.

I remember discussing with Tom Tugendhat, when he was the Security Minister responsible for the Bill, whether it was necessary to put the limit as low as a capacity of 100. He of course held the line at the time, but it was interesting to see that, once released from his responsibilities, he tabled an amendment in Committee that sought to raise the revised lower limit from 200 to 300.

I am grateful to the Minister for meeting with me on this issue. I hope he will forgive me if I remain slightly sceptical about the likely value of the obligations placed on the smallest standard duty premises. A £3,313 average cost over 10 years is not a trivial amount for a financially marginal business or a village hall struggling to raise funds. Yet compliance with the standard duty, as can be seen in Clause 1(1), is intended not to reduce the vulnerability of such premises to acts of terrorism, but to reduce only the risk of physical harm once an act of terrorism is imminent or has started. As the Minister covered in his opening speech, Clause 5(3) demonstrates what that will mean: guarding and locking doors, ensuring that people know where the exits are, and so on.

Bearing in mind the modest extent of the standard duty, I wonder how much the centrally available guidance, which operators are supposed to download, will add to the common sense of those who operate small venues and know them inside out, particularly when, as is thankfully the case in most places, the risk of a terrorist attack is almost vanishingly small. The Minister probably feels that by shifting the minimum threshold to 200 he has reached a widely acceptable compromise, and he may well be right.

However, I remain concerned by the ease by which, by affirmative regulation, 100,000 extra premises could be brought within the scope of the Bill, and many more made subject to the enhanced duties. After a terrorist attack, it can be tempting for any Government to be seen to take immediate action to tighten up the law. Of course, the noble Baroness, Lady May, to whom it was my great privilege to report as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, was made of stronger stuff, and so, I suspect, is the Minister. But others do succumb to temptation of this kind, and activating such a power would be an obvious and tempting response.

I make two suggestions. Just to concentrate minds a little, could the operation of Clause 32 not be made conditional on the Secretary of State being satisfied that changing the threshold is justified on the basis of the terrorist threat? That is in the Delegated Powers Committee memorandum; why not put it in the Bill? This would not prevent it being done, but it would make it more likely that it will be done for the right reasons. Secondly, the Delegated Powers Committee memorandum claims as a precedent for this power Section 2 of the Fire Safety Act 2021, which indeed provides for a similar affirmative power to change premises to which the fire safety order applies, but that section contains a statutory obligation to consult. Bearing in mind the extensive consultation that arrived at the figures of 200 and 800, surely at least some consultation would be appropriate before Ministers intervene to change them by regulation.

I have a couple of other points. Noble Lords will have seen a submission from LIVE, which describes itself as the live music industry body in the UK. LIVE makes the point that music festivals, venues and events are already regulated under the Licensing Act 2003, with, where appropriate, highly developed counter- terrorism measures secured by licence conditions. This is overseen, it says, by safety advisory groups which take advice from local police forces and local counterterrorism security co-ordinators. Is that a picture the Minister recognises and, if so, can he give us some more detail on what the regime in the Bill will add to what is described? I do not doubt it will add something. Will the mechanisms described by LIVE persist after Martyn’s law has entered into force? How will any overlap be dealt with, and how will the existing mechanisms be integrated into the approach of the SIA? It would be good to hear more about this since, as the Regulatory Policy Committee points out, the Bill’s impact assessment provides no evidence that a new regulator with national inspectors would be efficient compared with local authority compliance, and the new regulator is of course given very strong enforcement powers.

Finally, I noticed from Schedule 2 that certain premises are excluded from the Bill. Premises occupied by the devolved Administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are excluded, but those occupied by the United Kingdom Civil Service are not. I wonder if the Minister can tell us why. Also excluded from the Bill are premises occupied for the purposes of the devolved legislatures, the House of Commons and the House of Lords. I assume that these premises, or some of them, are considered to fall within Schedule 1; otherwise, no exclusion from the Bill would be necessary. No doubt other precautions are in place, but although we are frequently urged to do our fire safety training, I do not recall hearing anything about the threat of terrorism, which is perhaps rather greater here than it is in my village hall. I should be grateful if the Minister told us what difficulties there are in applying the standard and enhanced duties to Westminster as they are applied to Whitehall, and explained why parliamentary buildings are exempt.

17:18

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

My Lords, as a bishop whose diocese includes around 300 places of worship, most of which will find that this Bill directly applies to them, I have, along with my right reverend friends on these Benches, a very obvious interest to declare. But as the Bishop of Manchester, I have a more specific reason for wanting to see this Bill reach the statute book. Martyn Hett, whose name is immortalised in the informal title by which we know this Bill, was killed some three minutes’ walk from my cathedral. We are all grateful for the persistence of his mother, Figen, over these last seven years, and for achieving the degree of cross-party consensus that has brought us to this point today.

In the immediate aftermath of the Manchester attack, it fell to me to help lead my city and its people in how we responded. I spoke then of the crucial difference between defiance and revenge. For me, that comes direct from my reading of the Christian scriptures, but the application is for those of all faiths and none. The terrorist sought to divide us. Acts of revenge by one part of the community against another would have played into his hands.

Instead, we showed our defiance. We came together in one of the most moving examples of a community embracing its diversity and showing its love that I have ever seen. We in Manchester were helped in responding to the atrocity by the support given to us by national leaders, not least the then Prime Minister, the now noble Baroness, Lady May of Maidenhead, whom it is a pleasure to see in her place among us this afternoon.

Crucially, by being defiant we did not allow the extremists to determine how we lived our lives. We did not cower behind our front doors. We did not retreat to the safety of those who looked, thought or believed like us. We got on with our lives, while being somewhat more vigilant than before. That same principle needs to lie at the heart of this Bill. Its provisions need to be such that they do not lead to mass cancellations of events, nor to the closure of social, commercial and religious venues which cannot afford the costs of compliance. What we enact in this Bill must be proportionate. It must balance the very real risks that we face with the need for us to live as we choose, not as the terrorists seek to dictate.

I think that we have got that balance broadly right in the form that the Bill has reached us. I am grateful for the various amendments made in the other place. It is right that we focus on the expected attendance at an event rather than some technical capacity of a building. Many of my churches are built to hold the largest occasion likely ever to be required. While I pray for the day when every service is as packed as it is on Christmas Eve, I need to be realistic, and we all need to pursue measures commensurate with the numbers that we expect. The same will apply to many other venues.

I am grateful, like other noble Lords, for the standard tier commencing at 200 rather than 100. This will save smaller events, often community-led and dependent on volunteers. It will help vital local venues remain open to serve their community. However, increasing the figure to 300 would go too far. I am minded to oppose any changes to the number during the future stages of the Bill.

While we are still at an early stage of our consideration of the Bill in this House, I hope that either today or at a later stage the Minister can offer faith and voluntary sector groups, along with other less commercial venues, training that is free, easy to access and available in a wide range of languages and formats. We all need to be fully equipped for the responsibilities that this Bill assigns to us. Given that places of worship across all main religions form between 10% and 20% of the affected premises at a guess, I ask the Minister for his assurance that His Majesty’s Government will produce guidance specifically to address these contexts before the Bill is enacted. I assure him that I and others stand ready to help in that task in any way that we can.

I thank those who drafted the Bill for recognising that places of worship are special and are allocated accordingly to the standard tier irrespective of capacity or likely attendance. As other noble Lords have noted, this appropriately recognises the relationship between those buildings and the communities that they serve and the deep experience that faith communities have of working with police and specialist security providers for those occasional very large events that we host.

Much will no doubt be said, later today and as we go on, about the role of the SIA as regulator. As with the other provisions of the Bill, the regulator’s powers and responsibilities need to be proportionate to the task. We do not want a toothless tiger or an overbearing and unaccountable overlord, but I will listen carefully to the arguments made on the powers, responsibilities and accountabilities of the regulator as the Bill progresses.

Finally, while reiterating my thanks and those of my colleagues on these Benches to Figen Murray, I also single out Brendan Cox, whose wife Jo was murdered while fulfilling her parliamentary duties. I have had the privilege of meeting him on a number of occasions and offering my support to what he, Figen and others have been doing over these last few years to address the ever-present threat of terrorist atrocities. However, Jo’s death reminds us that one of the main ongoing terror threats in the UK, as recognised by our security forces, comes from those inspired by extreme right-wing voices. These seem to be increasingly tolerated, perhaps even encouraged, on some social media platforms. Beyond the scope of this Bill but building on the exchanges that we had at Oral Questions earlier today, I urge His Majesty’s Government to complete the implementation of the Online Safety Act now, as a matter of urgency, so that fines based on total global earnings can be levied against those who seek to undermine our parliamentary democracy from outside the UK.

It is not enough for us to focus purely on security at public events; we need to get upstream. This year, 2025, must be the year when Britain takes decisive action against those who seek to radicalise others or to normalise violence in pursuit of political ends, whether they come from within the UK or beyond our shores, and no matter how wealthy or how powerfully connected they may be.

17:24

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as chair of the National Preparedness Commission.

I will also start by paying tribute to Figen Murray: tempered by her own experience of the tragedy of the Manchester Arena terrorist attack, her work promoting the principles behind the Bill has been nothing short of extraordinary. Not only has she campaigned, but she has researched the subject and was awarded an MSc by the University of Central Lancashire in 2021. Her thesis, which I have read—particularly as I am quoted in it—argues that legislation needs to be part of a wider initiative to inform the public, so that people can be empowered to be more vigilant and more conscious of their personal safety. A legislative framework and public awareness not only have to go hand in hand but are mutually reinforcing.

In 2016, Mayor Sadiq Khan—I congratulate him on his knighthood in the New Year Honours List—asked me to report on London’s preparedness to respond to a major terrorist incident. One of my recommendations, published six months before the Manchester Arena attack, was that, as a condition of licensing, venues should have to be reviewed by a police counterterrorism security adviser and to have taken the necessary action as a result of that review.

The point of this, which is implicit in the Bill before your Lordships’ House, is that there cannot be a one-size-fits-all approach. Each venue is different and faces a different type of threat, but the principle of carrying out a basic assessment of the risk and taking sensible, proportionate security measures is simple, straightforward and should be unavoidable.

Concert halls, theatres and other venues must, by law, take fire precautions as well as meeting other regulatory requirements. It seems extraordinary, therefore, that, until the Bill passes, there is no requirement on them to take advice on reducing the risk of a terrorist attack and to take sensible precautions. In some instances, bag checks may be enough; in others, they may want to look at other measures. In extreme cases, metal detectors or knife arches may be more appropriate for the largest of venues. Similar rules should also apply to sports stadia, large shops and shopping malls.

This principle was accepted by the previous Government. The 2019 Conservative manifesto said:

“In the wake of the terrible events in Manchester in 2017, we will improve the safety and security of public venues”.


Last year’s manifesto was even more explicit:

“We will urgently introduce Martyn’s Law … This will ensure premises are better prepared for terrorist attacks by requiring them to take proportionate steps to mitigate risks”.


Thus, there is wide political consensus about this measure and, after the delays of the last few years, I am pleased that this new Government are at last taking action.

Let us be clear: terrorism has not gone away. Only last week, we saw the car ramming in New Orleans. Ken McCallum—also knighted in the New Year Honours List, and whom I also congratulate—warned in October that:

“Since March 2017, MI5 and the police have together disrupted 43 late-stage attack plots”.


“Some of those … were … in the final days of planning mass murder”,


at the point when the intervention took place.

The nature of the terrorist threat has changed. It no longer necessarily comes from organised groups. In my second report for the Mayor of London, completed three years ago, I warned that attacks are increasingly committed by individuals who operate alone, frequently self-radicalising and learning techniques online. Attacks of this nature are inevitably harder to detect and prevent in advance. They may also be opportunistic and mean that the range and nature of potential targets have widened to include far more venues that previously would not have been considered under any circumstances.

What is more, while the majority of those planning attacks would appear to be Islamist extremists, an increasing proportion are domestic and extreme right-wing. As Ken McCallum said, MI5 and the police are increasingly encountering would-be terrorists who are more volatile and with only a tenuous grasp of the ideologies they profess to follow, and it is becoming harder these days to determine whether a particular act or planned act of violence is ideologically motivated or driven by another factor such as mental health. It does not really matter what the ideation or motivation is: the effects are the same, and the needs for the sensible precautions being included in this Bill remain under all those circumstances, irrespective of whether it is traditional terrorism or something else.

Of course, as I warned three years ago, in online spaces, extremism is increasingly prevalent and, more worrying still, has become almost normalised; this point has just been made by the right reverend Prelate. This spills over into greater polarisation in the real world, which, in turn, can and does lead to violence. That is the context of modern terrorism, and that is why anyone can be a target. The first volume of the Manchester Arena inquiry reported:

“None of those directly concerned with security at the Arena … considered it a realistic possibility that a terrorist attack would happen there”.


Yet, as we know, it did, and 22 people were killed and 1,017 injured. That is why this Bill is needed.

Nowadays, it is taken as a given that the places we visit abide by health and safety regulations and will take appropriate fire precautions. It is surely not unreasonable to expect them also to take appropriate and proportionate protection measures against terrorist violence. Now, of course, better security checks and a Protect duty will not prevent terrorism, but they make soft targets harder. Where many people congregate together, they have a right to expect that the appropriate and proportionate measures to protect them will have been taken. The aim should be that all venues have their own Protect plan and, in the event of an incident, be geared up to guide and shelter those who visit. At the very least, those responsible should have considered the implications—how to evacuate, how to invacuate, what doors should be locked, and so on—and that this has been conveyed to those working in the location concerned. It is much better to have thought about it, even just a little bit, before an event happens than to be doing so in the heat of an attack.

The principle has to apply to other sectors as well. In the past, most places of worship—again, the right reverend Prelate has talked about this—have often seemed to operate on the basis that an attack would not happen to them because of their innate goodness, but they, too, need to plan and take sensible precautions. They have been the subject of attacks in Europe and elsewhere. Of course, it is difficult: places of worship are intended to be open places of sanctuary and peace, but that does not mean that they cannot be targets, and sensible and proportionate measures should be taken there too.

In my 2016 review, I made a series of recommendations on strengthening the Protect responsibilities, which I think remain valid today, including that the Home Office will need to provide more funding for CT security advisers around the country; that counterterrorism advice should automatically be taken by those applying for venue and event licences; that there should be short- form advice on CT matters for small and micro businesses rolled out using local authority and neighbourhood policing networks, so that everyone has access to that sort of sensible advice; that owners and operators of shopping centres and other large venues should ensure that Project Griffin training is being given at regular enough intervals to deal with the high staff turnover that those businesses and organisations experience; and that there should be specific training for other sectors.

I also suggested that the Department for Education should build on the model of having a designated governor responsible for safeguarding, to ensure that each school appoints a governor responsible for ensuring security and preparedness against an attack—to at least think about it in advance. Each school should have a preparedness plan, and those plans should be tested. Schools have fire drills where they evacuate pupils, so they perhaps need to have lockdown drills to invacuate pupils or at least to have considered how those might operate.

I hope that the Bill gets a smooth passage through your Lordships’ House. I believe that we owe it to the victims of the Manchester Arena attack, the two London Bridge attacks and all the other attacks of recent years. It is our responsibility to give them, and the public who visit those venues, the security that this offers.

17:35

[Baroness May of Maidenhead (Con)]

My Lords, the attacks that took place in Magdeburg and New Orleans over Christmas and the new year, as have been referenced by other noble Lords, show that we cannot be complacent about the terrorist threat. There is a danger, when terrorist attacks do not take place for a period of time, that we are lulled into a false sense of complacency, and we must not be. That is one of the reasons why this Bill is so important. I welcome the fact that the Government have brought it forward so early in their legislative programme, and I welcome the fact that it has such broad cross-party support.

As we debate and talk about this Bill today, my thoughts are with all of those who were the victims and affected by the Manchester Arena terrorist attack. Having visited some of the survivors in hospital shortly after the event, and having met more survivors thereafter subsequently, I realised the absolute horror of what took place on that night and the horror of a terrorist who deliberately focused on attacking children and young people. That night was a traumatic night for all involved, and, of course, as we know, that will be with them for the rest of their lives, but our response has to be that we do what we can to ensure that, in future, if a terrorist attack takes place where an event is taking place of that sort in premises where there are significant numbers of people, fewer people lose their lives and, as far as possible, injuries are reduced. That, of course, is the key focus of this Bill. As Clause 5(2) says:

“The objective is to reduce the risk of physical harm being caused to individuals if an act of terrorism were to occur on the premises, at the event or in the immediate vicinity of the premises or event”.


I also would like to commend Figen Murray and all those who have worked with her for their dogged determination in making sure that this legislation is now before Parliament and is—we all hope, shortly—to reach the statute book.

I want to make just a few points about some aspects of the legislation and slightly more widely too. My first point is about the SIA, and I think that it is important that this House properly considers the role of the SIA and the capacity of the SIA to undertake the tasks that it is being required to do as a result of this Bill, tasks which are different from the original purpose set up for the SIA, which was very much in terms of the licensing and consideration of the suitability of individuals to be part of the security industry. This is a significant expansion of its work, and we need to ensure that it understands and has the training that it needs in order to be able to undertake its tasks in relation to this, and I just ask the Government that they think very carefully about the SIA and its role, because I think it is right that we should debate that and consider it.

I also am concerned that we do not allow or do not see a situation where venues are almost bombarded by consultants who are all too keen to advise them on the steps that they should be taking, regardless of whether those steps are actually what is required in the legislation or not. That will be particularly the case, I think, for smaller venues, whose responsibilities will not be so great but which could be lulled into thinking that they have to do significantly more as a result of the advice that they receive from such consultants. So there is a very real issue there, I think, that has to be considered.

I want also to go a little beyond the Bill, if the Minister and the House will indulge me. This is about premises that exist already. One of the great things we did at London 2012 was to ensure that, when all those new Olympic venues were being built, security was built in and planned in at the earliest stage of planning those buildings. I just wonder whether the Government could look at encouraging—this would probably be in other legislation, perhaps planning or building regulations —efforts to be made at the earliest possible stage to build that security in, particularly for large-scale events venues, so that we do not have to look at it as an afterthought.

I also want to talk about communications, which has been raised by other noble Lords—communications in several senses. The first is communication between those responsible in a venue and the emergency services. I have been thinking of a situation where the people responsible in a venue know what to do, something has happened, and they possibly start evacuating, but the emergency services and the police—who would undoubtedly be, as they always are, the lead in this—might actually wish to see different action being taken. The communication between those two, and the staff in the venue understanding the role of the police and the emergency services and the importance of recognising the primacy of the police in that situation, will be an important part of the education.

One of the issues that arose in the response to the Manchester Arena attack was the lack of communication between the emergency services. Again, this is perhaps not something that is technically for the face of this Bill. But it is an issue that needs to be considered as we look at the whole question of the response at premises should an attack take place, making sure that the rules of engagement, the rules of communication, between the emergency services are rather better understood, and that the proper JESIP training takes place so that we do not see those gaps in communication.

Another point on communication is cyberterrorism, which my noble friend Lord Davies referenced. As we look at and think about the Bill, it is about premises, locking gates, evacuating people, having the right exits and so forth. But some of that will be about communicating, and cyberterrorism could actually mean that the means of communication with members of the public in a venue are affected. Indeed, if perhaps a venue has automatic door-locking systems, they could be affected. So, in looking at what people need to do, it is important that the potential impact of cyberterrorism is looked at as well.

As I said, this is an important Bill. It does something that, on the face of it, seems to be very obvious: that people who are responsible for venues, or for holding large-scale public events, just think about the safety and security of people within those events and about what needs to happen if there is an attack—if something goes wrong. But sadly, as we saw at Manchester Arena and elsewhere, what is obvious is not always done. That is why the Bill is so important, because it will bring home to people the responsibilities they have to ensure the increased safety of those people who attend events at their premises. The responsibility we have is to make sure that this Bill is the best it can be.

17:43

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to speak in support of the Bill and a particular pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady May of Maidenhead, who has a long and distinguished record in this area of policy. I share her concerns about the appropriateness of the SIA as a regulator and, as she is aware, I have a few of my own.

Because of my noble friend the Minister’s characteristically collaborative approach and his and his officials’ openness to discussion not only in this context but outside aspects of the Bill, I have had the opportunity, as other Members of your Lordships’ House who will speak in this debate had yesterday, to discuss aspects of the Bill with him at his invitation. I shared those discussions to some extent, but I do not intend to take up much time today on the details of that; I will wait to see how far those off-piste conversations get me before I decide what I will say further. But in any event, I thank him and commend him for his comprehensive and helpful introductory speech. I am very conscious that he will live up to the offer he has made to be engaging and collaborative.

When measuring the effectiveness of legislation, the simple law of cause and effect should be adhered to. We should always ask ourselves two questions. First, why is the Bill needed? Secondly, does it do what it purports to do and address the problem that led to its creation in the first place? I believe that this legislation offers an answer to both questions. As your Lordships’ House has already been reminded—as if a reminder were needed—it is tragedy that has brought us here today. I do not intend to rehearse the circumstances at length, but I pay my own tribute to Figen Murray, whose indefatigable campaigning, with others, is not only a model of its kind but reflective of her selfless determination to ensure that no other parent should have to suffer the same grief she has suffered. Indeed, that is itself an answer to the first question I posed. The Bill is necessary to help protect our people from co-ordinated malign terrorist activity, to protect their families from unimaginable grief, and to increase our collective preparedness for acts of terror where they seem feasible.

The answer to the second question I posed is less stark but none the less positive. As we heard, the Bill establishes a tiered approach, linked to the activity that takes place at premises or an event, balanced against the number of individuals it is reasonable to expect might be present at the same time. It does not, and does not purport to, prevent terrorism, save, perhaps, at the margins. That is the job of the police and the security services.

In recognising that, I note the extraordinary work of the security services in disrupting 39 late-stage terrorist plots since 2017. In that context, can the Minister indicate what percentage of those plots would have affected premises within the scope of the Bill? Again, I realise that it is not a Bill designed to mitigate terrorist activity but to ensure that staff and volunteers know what to do in the event of an emergency. I ask that question because, when reading proceedings in the other place and the briefings that I suspect we have all received—I do not think they were sent to me for any particular reason other than that I was on the list of speakers—the bombings of two Birmingham pubs in 1974 came to mind. The Mulberry Bush and The Tavern in the Town were the two pubs in question. I re-read some of the things I was familiar with, and the testimony from a survivor who was in The Tavern in the Town tells us that everyone who was in the pub was either injured or killed. That was 111 people in total, with similar figures tragically reflected in The Mulberry Bush. If that information is correct, neither of these pubs would have been within the scope of the legislation.

The briefing that I and other speakers received from Survivors Against Terror suggested that the threshold has significantly reduced the impact of the Bill and that we should support, as it does, reducing that threshold, either now or in due course, to 100 or below. I am not making a case for this; I am simply reflecting the case that was made to us all. I am sure that my noble friend the Minister is familiar with the detail of its advocacy for such an approach. Interestingly, the Birmingham pub bombings, and possibly other atrocities, support that approach too.

The iterative approach by which the Bill has emerged from its chrysalis phase under the last Government into the proportionate, measured and effective shape of the legislation we are gathered to examine this afternoon, is testament to the value of our proceedings. It is Parliament’s scrutiny—principally in the other place, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, reminded us—that has achieved this.

In July 2023, a previous attempt at this legislation was described as a “not fit for purpose” by the Home Affairs Committee, which also outlined serious concerns about its proportionality. I do not often praise them, but the previous Government received this feedback in a constructive spirit and launched a further public consultation to remedy these shortcomings, the findings of which enabled the new Administration to fashion this improved legislation.

This spirit of constructive cross-party unity around this Bill has its dangers—again, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, reminded us—but, from my perspective, it is not merely enormously helpful from a practical standpoint but also holds symbolic value in that, in response to the amoral exercise of terrorist violence, we show the value of quiet diligence and a willingness to work across the House to find the remedy for it.

One of the comparatively small areas of contention has been the existence of the discretionary powers afforded to the Secretary of State to reduce the numerical threshold for the standard tier from 200 to 100 people. I recognise that the current number has been chosen for good reasons, not merely financial but in terms of freeing small businesses and organisations, such as village halls and community cafés, from more than necessary regulatory burdens. But, while they are all equally important in absolute terms, some venues of equivalent sizes are at significantly divergent risk of terrorist attack: for instance, a pub or a café near a military base that habitually hosts off-duty soldiers incurs a more significant terrorist threat than a hospitality business located elsewhere. With the proviso that the responsibility for monitoring such threats lies elsewhere, is any scope being considered to take specific venues of this type into either the standard or the enhanced tier?

My final point of clarification at this stage in the debate is that, subject to some minor qualifications, the extent of this Bill is for the whole of the UK. However, it has implications for policy areas that are devolved. I understand that officials are discussing these areas. I know from my experience as Secretary of State for Scotland that that process has proven positive many times before in relationships between the United Kingdom Government and the devolved Government in Scotland, for example. Can the Minister confirm that these discussions will be appropriately supported by Minister-to-Minister dialogue to preclude any difficulties in this respect further down the track? They can arise very quickly.

Despite my few points of clarification, I emphasise that I support this Bill, its intentions and the way in which they have been reflected in the drafting of its provisions. As it stands, this legislation is referred to as the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill, but we all know, as we were appropriately reminded by noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, in his speech, that it will forever be known as Martyn’s law. I believe we owe it to his memory, and to all those who have been victims or survivors of terrorism, to ensure that it undergoes that transformation as soon as possible.

17:53

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, having spent just over half of my life in one or other House of this Parliament, I regret that I have become more resistant than I should be to campaigns. But I am proud to support the campaign that has led us here today, and I congratulate the Government and, indeed, the Opposition on their support for this legislation in general terms and on their willingness to improve the Bill as we work our way through it. I particularly congratulate Figen Murray, whom I have met on a number of occasions, and her supporting team, on everything they have done. They have taken a balanced and constructive approach and have been ready to listen to arguments on some of the difficult issues that have already been discussed during today’s debate. Of course, we should never forget all those who suffered as a result of the Manchester Arena attack.

I also congratulate Sir John Saunders, who conducted a magnificent inquiry into the Manchester Arena attack, using all the skill that he gained as a judge in Birmingham Crown Court and later as a High Court judge. It was an absolute model of its kind and we owe Sir John a great deal.

What we are discussing here is not something that fills a gap but something that completes more fully counterterrorism law and provisions in this country. Making these particular provisions is going to be very useful in that task.

In supporting the Bill, I do however want to raise a few issues that I urge the Government to consider. The first echoes what was said by the noble Baroness, Lady May, in relation to the SIA. I had some dealings over the years with the SIA and, as the noble Baroness said, it has been dealing mostly with security guards and other individual issues, so it is embarking on new and difficult territory. The two-year introduction period, which is long, nevertheless allows for full and proper implementation to be achieved. It will need that time and it will need every bit of help that it can be given, including by us as legislators.

Part of the SIA’s task is to produce legal guidance on the provisions of the Bill. I hope that some scoping of that legal guidance has taken place and I also hope that we can see at least a draft of such a legal guidance before Committee, so that we can consider and comment on such guidance. There is a great deal of expertise in your Lordships’ House that would assist the SIA and it is perfectly reasonable to ask for that to be seen as part of the legislative process.

I turn next to a difficult issue about civil liability. There may well be cases where normal civil liability—that is to say, mostly for negligence or breach of statutory duty, under ordinary civil claims procedures—might be justified and appropriate in relation to the failure to meet the requirements set out by the Bill, the Act as it will become, and the legal guidance that has been issued. Clause 31(2) appears to share that view. However, Clause 31(1) as described and explained in paragraph 166 of the Explanatory Notes—I will not read it now because it would take too long—excludes claims for breaches of statutory duty. I do not begin to understand the rationale for that. As a veteran of industrial injuries claims—hundreds and hundreds of them in my time as a barrister—I know that it is absolutely common- place to plead in a claim both breach of statutory duty and negligence, and often judges give judgments in which damages are awarded for both breach of statutory duty and negligence. Why is that excluded here? I believe it is an inadvertent mistake that should be reviewed.

I turn next to the question of corporate civil liability. In some parts of the Bill there are provisions that appear to extend corporate civil liability—but they do not. What is provided in the Bill is that, if a company commits an offence, an officer, as described in Clause 26(2)(a) may also be liable for the offence that has been committed. But it does not make the company liable if an individual who works for that company has committed an egregious act that otherwise might give rise to criminal liability. The bar against establishing the liability of a company in any civil proceedings is high because, to use the vernacular phrase often used by lawyers, there is a requirement to show that someone who is the eyes and ears of the company is responsible for the wrong that has been committed. That has not been extended in this Bill, even though it has been extended elsewhere in legislation in the recent past. So I ask the Minister to examine that issue and I would be very happy to discuss it with him further. Indeed, I pay tribute, as others have, to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, who could not have been more available to all of us in this House who wished to discuss this Bill with him.

I turn next to planning and licensing considerations. Planning considerations arise when an application is made for planning consent for a new venue, obviously, or for significant alterations in the planning provisions for a venue. The issues raised in this Bill should become central to such planning applications. Equally, it should become central to licensing authorities’ considerations when they are deciding whether permanent or temporary licences should be granted. Indeed, I would suggest that those who are already involved—I know there are distinguished organisations, particularly in Manchester, involved in training commercial entertainment and retail centre providers—should be asked to train planning officers, councillors and licensing authorities in these matters.

I echo something that was said by the noble Baroness, Lady May, about consultancies. I fear, having represented at one time a lot of villages in rural Wales, that those village hall committees may find themselves paying not £300 a year but a great deal more to some good and some pretty awful consultancies, which do not have very much to offer and where such things could be offered in a different way. We owe a duty to those who run village halls and similar entities to be assisted to avoid unnecessary costs arising from the Bill. If there are necessary costs, so be it, but not unnecessary costs.

I emphasise—and this has not been said—that the Bill does not remove from the public their sense of responsibility. How many of us have been to venues where we waited in a queue while somebody brought into that venue—be it a theatre, nightclub or restaurant where there is security—large bags full of unnecessary quantities of possessions that are almost impossible to examine in a meaningful way without the mechanics or machinery for search? The public must understand that it is their responsibility when they go to such a venue not to take with them haversacks on their backs containing their overnight clothes and equipment for the weekend. This is something that requires all of us to do our duty as citizens.

Finally, I regard this as a very good Bill. If the Minister can provide reassurances on the subjects that have been raised by me and others, it would be very welcome. What we are doing is improving the safety of the public, albeit arising from tragic circumstances that should never have occurred.

18:03

[Lord Frost (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by thanking the Minister for his very reasonable opening statement. I regret not being able to make his consultation meeting yesterday.

I have a dilemma with this legislation. On the one hand, it is clearly true that we all have a responsibility to consider how we as a society face up to the sickening evil of major terrorist attacks. We all have huge sympathy, of course, with the families of victims. We understand their outrage and anger at the failings, and we admire their work to try to ensure that what happened to them does not happen to others in future. On the other hand, we as legislators have a duty to take a wider perspective and to assess whether proposed measures will genuinely reduce risks without imposing disproportionate burdens.

I am not the first person to make these points; they were made a couple of years ago by the Commons Home Affairs Committee in the previous Parliament. It is striking to me that both consultations on this legislation, in 2021 and last year, produced quite a wide range of responses, with concerns about implementation and costs being just as strong as recognition of the need to act further against terrorism.

This Bill was in the manifestos of both main parties, which is unusual—although perhaps not as unusual as it should be. It will clearly pass in some form, but we still have a duty to scrutinise. History shows that, when there is wide consensus on legislation, it often ends up being quite difficult legislation to make workable in practice. That is what we have to look at.

Against this background, I welcome the rethinking for which the Government have clearly been responsible with this version of the Bill. It is clearly better and more proportionate than the one introduced by my own party when in government. Equally, I believe there is a case for further thought in some areas, as many noble Lords have already noted.

Personally, I think the case for the measures in this Bill is much stronger for major events and major venues—that is, those in the so-called enhanced tier—where there is clearly a need to respond to the IOC’s call back in 2018 to clarify the legal responsibilities, and where the size of events and premises, such as major halls, theatres, et cetera, requires a degree of co-ordination and pre-planning. If legislation can help in that, it is sensible that it should.

I cannot help echoing the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, about the exclusion of Parliaments, devolved Administrations and indeed schools from this legislation. I wonder whether we are seeing another example of the phenomenon of the Government imposing duties on others while excluding themselves—a point that we discussed in this Chamber yesterday.

I have three concerns about the standard tier. The first is a point that has been made by other noble Lords. I welcome the fact that the threshold has been increased to 200 but I still believe there is a case for increasing it further—for example, to 300, as the then shadow Security Minister proposed in the Commons last year. I agree with those who have asked the Minister to set out more fully in winding up just why this threshold has been chosen and what the Government see as the potential pressures, in either direction.

My second concern is the nature of the burden on small organisations. This Bill will produce a burden. Unless the threshold changes further, it will hit small organisations and voluntary organisations, particularly perhaps those that have events that occasionally go above the threshold and thus permanently come within the scope of the duty. Indeed, the fact that the Government have excluded certain categories reflects a recognition that there is a burden imposed by the Bill.

The cost of £330 annually for smaller voluntary organisations is not trivial. In effect, it pushes up the cost of insuring, say, a village hall by between a third and a half every year. For organisations that are under pressure, that is significant. I note that the Night Time Industries Association has similar concerns about smaller venues. I agree with it and others who have made the point about the need for clarity on the relationship between the powers in this Bill and those in the Licensing Act. Perhaps the Minister could address that point as well.

My third concern is about the consequences—perhaps unintended, but arguably foreseeable—of legislating at all. When you give something the force of law you do two things. First, you increase the risk to individuals of non-compliance. As a result, you increase the risk of risk-aversion: the pressure to do more than is necessary just in case, to make sure that the law is fulfilled. In other areas, the observed behaviour of regulators is that they often encourage this through defining and spreading so-called best practice. The Bill imposes the reasonably practicable duty on the responsible individuals, but it is a subjective test, drawn from a different, albeit related, area of legislation. I think it will be subject to mission creep, as these vague forms of words often are.

The second thing you do when you create a duty through legislation is, in effect, to create an industry that depends on that regulation, that has a potential interest in maintaining and developing it and which, in practice, often has a big influence on setting and defining the levels of standard practice and in seeing them promulgated by the regulator, industry bodies and others. I think that is foreseeable in this case too, and the Henry VIII clauses in the Bill certainly give the Government the power to support that kind of mission creep over time, and to give it the force of law over time if they are so minded.

This all means that what may be a limited and justifiable burden at first may well grow over time, and that is often hard to reverse. The problem is that none of this adds to productive activity. When you give something the force of law it has to take priority over other activities. Again, for smaller businesses and voluntary organisations this means that it must often take priority over the actual purpose of that organisation. That is what giving something legal force means. When we are adding so much to the burdens on those organisations already, we have to think very carefully about the value added.

There is a particular risk in areas of voluntary activity. For example, one in eight village halls is still apparently caught by the Bill, according to the impact assessment. The risk in voluntary areas is that people are just not ready to devote the extra personal time or take the extra risk and the burden, so facilities simply close rather than take on board the burden of compliance.

I hope, and actually I believe, that the Government will not just dismiss these concerns, which came strongly out of the consultations and the evidence sessions. I hope and suspect that we will see amendments covering them, and I hope the Government will take them seriously. As the Minister noted, if and when the Bill passes it will have a lengthy pre-implementation period in which they can be addressed too.

I note that many noble Lords have asked whether the SIA is the right regulator. I note that the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health has proposed the creation of an advisory board for the SIA for these purposes, and some form of that could be well worth the Government considering.

Let us reflect on what the Bill will do. It will mean that most businesses and organisations serving the public in any numbers need to consider the risk of a terrorist attack all the time. You may say they should, and certainly the threat, regrettably, is substantial—very high. However, even now, the risk of any individual person facing an actual terrorist attack remains extremely low. The Bill may reduce the risk slightly further as regards events or premises but, equally arguably, might only deflect it. After all, we have plenty of evidence that the risk exists in other places too, most notably on the street or in parks, both of which have been the location of serious attacks in recent years—indeed, very recently.

We cannot reduce the risk to zero through prevention measures and, as a society, we should not try. An attempt to do so may cause more harm and more problems of other kinds. To take one analogy that is perhaps imperfect but it makes the point, just as our streets have filled up over the years with street furniture, barriers, controls or whatever in a partly—but only partly—successful effort to reduce road deaths, they have also become more ugly, complex and difficult to navigate for many people as a result. The Bill may well see many public facilities go down the same route and, as we have seen from the barriers on our bridges across the Thames, once they are introduced, these measures rarely get removed.

I hope we do not have to—and I do not want to—live in a society where all our public facilities become like airports, with security checks, barriers and cordons, and with security officials barking at us if we put a foot wrong. We have already gone some way down that road. That is all the more reason to be sure that the Bill’s provisions are genuinely proportionate, reduce risks in a worthwhile way and do not take us further down a path that risks never being reversed.

18:14

[Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the Bill, and the collaboration and working manner of my noble friend the Minister. The Bill is about improving the safety of the public, as stated by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile.

I am well aware, coming from Northern Ireland and having been a former public representative for a long period, of the impact that terrorism had on our local communities and people, and of how it robbed families of their loved ones, livelihoods, homes and businesses and placed many restrictions on their lives as a result of the ensuing security measures. Thankfully, political dialogue became the prime order of the day. It showed that terrorism had failed and that compromise and the Good Friday agreement succeeded. That is the issue that we have to address—the need for compromise and political development—but in many cases this new form of terrorism may not lend itself to political dialogue.

Although I support the Bill, I realise that there are some challenges, and I have some questions for my noble friend the Minister about its implementation. I am very much in favour of the concept of the protection of premises from terrorism, considering what happened in London in March 2017, when I was a Member in the other place and we were all in lockdown in the Chamber, what happened on London Bridge and what happened at the Manchester Arena in June 2017. In that regard, I pay tribute to Figen Murray and the Martyn’s Law campaign team, who have demonstrated such tenacity, fervour, diligence and determination in the face of tragedy and adversity.

However, I do not want any additional financial burdens to be placed on the owners of premises to protect their properties and restrict their civil liberties without a clear indication of adequate financial and other support measures being put in place. What assistance, including the provision of finance, will be provided to the owners of premises to ensure full protection from the ravages of terrorism? At the end of the day, there must be proportionate risk.

I have received representations from the Heritage Railway Association. In this, I am minded of my noble friend Lord Faulkner of Worcester, who chairs the APPG for Heritage Rail; I know that similar representations have been made to that group. I have a heritage railway in my town of Downpatrick, and its members feel that the Bill’s provisions and its application to heritage railways are not realistic or proportionate to the risk. Many heritage railways are staffed by volunteers who operate on a part-time basis. I have also received representations from the insurance industry and from Martyn’s Law, which support this legislation and want it to move forward, but I would like my noble friend the Minister to favourably consider the position of heritage railways. The Heritage Railway Association believes that the legislation is premises-based, and its guiding principle is to require different levels of terrorism protection by reference to capacity in terms of the premises. For the purposes of the Bill, heritage railways and tramways are treated like hospitality and entertainment venues, including all parts of a railway line from end to end.

I understand that a Minister wrote a letter to the Heritage Railway Association, dated 23 December, stating that a railway line itself and passengers on a train are excluded from the Bill’s scope—I understand from his gesticulation that it was my noble friend the Minister on the Front Bench. I hope and believe that that exclusion may help to reduce the likely impact on some heritage railways, but I feel it needs to be clearly stated in the Bill. As it stands, the legislation would effectively place many heritage railways in the higher-capacity category, adding significant and costly compliance burdens. What assurances can my noble friend the Minister provide about this issue to assuage the fears of the volunteers in the heritage railway movement, and could they be placed in the Bill?

It is also felt that organisations including heritage, cultural and tourism attractions that rely on volunteers will face higher training costs or, if volunteers choose not to take on responsibilities required under the Bill, those organisations may be faced with the costs of engaging additional personnel to meet compliance requirements. What provision will be made for the training of volunteers and the owners of heritage and tourism premises? This factor was raised in a representation received today from the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health’s personnel.

The Heritage Railway Association feels that the Bill as drafted perhaps does not address the realities of dealing with those burdens. The threshold for eligibility is too low and that could make some businesses, particularly those in the tourism and cultural sector, unviable. Perhaps the Minister could advise whether effective consideration will now be given to their inclusion on the excluded list.

Coming from Northern Ireland, I suppose there is a fear about the provisions in the Bill extending there. I would like the Minister to clarify that. Why are the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive not included, since this issue was discussed by the Assembly commission? It has overall responsibility for the management of the Assembly and for the Parliament buildings at Stormont, so what is the issue there?

Do the provisions extend to tourism and heritage attractions? What additional assistance will be provided to the owners of premises? Will small premises be excluded, and what are the size thresholds for eligibility for businesses to comply with this legislation?

Finally, considering the political and febrile history of Northern Ireland, what discussions have taken place with the Northern Ireland Executive and the Justice Minister regarding the implications of this legislation? With the need for additional investment in police resources in Northern Ireland, what discussions have taken place with the chief constable regarding the implications and consequences of implementing the legislation, including capacity levels for enforcement?

In conclusion, I support the thrust of the Bill. I support it in its entirety because, undoubtedly, terrorism in any form is a divisive, cancerous menace in our society, and that is irrespective of where it comes from.

18:23

[Baroness Newlove (Con)]

My Lords, it has been so heartwarming to listen to every speaker. Every bit of wording has been correct and it is so heartwarming to hear that, after so long, we are going to have something set in stone to protect future lives.

The events of the Manchester Arena bombing are seared into our collective memory. The shock and horror that we felt as the news unfolded on our television screens remain deeply ingrained. Any act of terrorism is abhorrent, but an attack targeting an event attended by thousands of young people is an evil of unimaginable cruelty.

Today, we remember the victims: Saffie-Rose Roussos, Nell Jones, Sorrell Leczkowski—apologies, I knew I might get that wrong—Eilidh MacLeod, Megan Hurley, Olivia Campbell-Hardy, Chloe Rutherford, Liam Curry, Georgina Callander, Courtney Boyle, John Atkinson, Philip Tron, Kelly Brewster, Elaine McIver, Angelika Klis, Marcin Klis, Alison Howe, Lisa Lees, Michelle Kiss, Wendy Fawell, Jane Tweddle and Martyn Hett. These names are not just a roll call; they represent lives filled with dreams, love and potential, all cruelly taken that night. My heart goes out to their families, who will carry the pain of their loss forever. As many grieving families will attest, you never truly move on from such heartbreak; you simply learn to live alongside it.

Let us also not forget that over a thousand other concertgoers suffered physical and psychological injuries that night. Many young people witnessed death and destruction first hand, a trauma that they will carry for the rest of their lives. The impact of this attack ripples far beyond those whom we lost.

Among those affected, as we have all said, is the tremendously courageous Figen Murray, Martyn Hett’s remarkable mother. I have had the privilege of meeting Figen several times; most recently, I was privileged to present her with the Women of the Year achievement award for her extraordinary efforts to make change in her son’s name. Figen is indeed an incredible and dignified lady, whose tenacity and grit are an inspiration to everyone in this Chamber. In fact, I recall her sharing how, during the trial, she was allowed to bring her knitting into court—a simple but meaningful comfort for her. As a knitter myself, I appreciated how this small act of compassion from the police and security helped her to endure the harrowing process that she listened to on a daily basis.

Despite facing her own health challenges, Figen has also achieved other extraordinary things. She walked 200 miles, from the site of her son’s death to London, to raise awareness of Martyn’s law—a campaign born of her pain but driven by her hope that no one would suffer as she and other families did that night.

I welcome this Bill, which has been a long time coming. If implemented effectively, it has such potential to save lives. The need for such a law is painfully clear. The Manchester Arena bombing was not an isolated incident. While successful attacks have, thankfully, been fewer since 2017, the threat of terrorism has not gone away. Only last year, Assistant Commissioner Matt Jukes, the UK’s most senior counterterrorism officer, warned:

“It’s hard to remember a more unstable, dangerous and uncertain world”


and that Britain faces

“the most acute period since the Cold War”.

As the tactics of terrorists evolve, so too must our strategies to combat them. Over the past decade, we have seen a shift from centrally co-ordinated, sophisticated plots to decentralised and crude attacks. Individuals radicalised by hatred are prepared to inflict unimaginable violence on innocent civilians, as we saw only last month. This changing landscape presents significant challenges for our law enforcement agencies yet without adapting our approach, we leave ourselves vulnerable. The greatest power of this Bill lies in its ability to increase public and corporate awareness of the threats that we face. It mobilises all parts of society to respond to the ever-changing risks of terrorism, helping us become more resistant to attacks and more resilient as a nation.

I understand the concerns about whether the requirements of this Bill are proportionate. I too would not wish to see businesses burdened with unnecessary regulations and more red tape. However, the measures outlined are far from excessive. The duty created by this Bill is tiered, balancing the risk of a potential attack against the capacity of premises. Smaller venues expecting 200 to 799 attendees would be required to implement simple, practical steps to protect the public. Larger venues expecting over 800 attendees would be required to take more robust measures to prevent attacks. Manchester City Council has already demonstrated the feasibility of implementing the principles of Martyn’s law. Licensed businesses in the city have embraced these measures, and feedback indicates that they do not find them unduly burdensome when it comes to cost or time.

There has been debate about the threshold for the provisions of this Bill. The initial proposal, as we have heard, was a threshold of 100 attendees, but the Government have set it at 200, while some amendments have even sought to raise it to 300. My concern is that the higher the threshold, the less effective the Bill becomes. I would welcome the Minister’s explanation for the Government’s choice of 200 as opposed to 100, which was originally proposed.

The Bill represents such a vital step in addressing the persistent threat of terrorism. Its provisions are reasonable and proportionate, and its potential to save lives is immense—after all, is that not what we are here to do today? By supporting this legislation, we honour the memory of those lost and injured in the Manchester Arena bombing, ensuring that their legacy is one of action and progress. I am delighted to see such cross-party support.

It has taken all these survivors and families to get us where we are today. I would like us to recognise that they all have three things in common in their lives: fortitude, tenacity and sheer guts. They have the fortitude to stand no matter what, the tenacity to stick with it, and the guts to deal with whatever and whoever stands in front of them and puts up another barrier. This sums up the energy and the passion it takes for anybody to come to Parliament and say it as it is, for legislators to truly understand. This sums up Figen Murray and all other campaigners. The pain never leaves you; I know what it feels like. I am delighted to take part in this debate and honoured to speak about those who cannot be with us today.

18:32

[Baroness Harris of Richmond (LD)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister for introducing this Second Reading debate, and I speak to support the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill, otherwise known as Martyn’s law.

This is practical legislation that will empower communities to fight the ever-present threat of terrorism. Indeed, the need for this Bill and its contribution to the UK’s counterterrorism response cannot be understated. Since May 2017, the UK’s security services have stopped 42 late-stage terror attacks, there have been 15 successful terrorist attacks, there are 800 live investigations for terrorism offences, and there are 2,500 subjects of interest and 30,000 persons who are taking an unhealthy interest or curiosity in this area. These are not my figures; they come from the police and the director of MI5.

The nature of the terrorist threat facing the UK is changing and it is imperative that we have a comprehensive and robust approach to protecting our communities. We need look only at the recent vehicle terror attacks at a Christmas market in Magdeburg, Germany, and in New Orleans and other places since—to which noble Lords have referred—to see how vulnerable public locations can be. Copycat atrocities are being seen all too often.

Martyn’s law, as we have heard, is named after Martyn Hett. Martyn was one of 22 innocent victims murdered in the 2017 terrorist attack at the Manchester Arena. This has been campaigned for by his mother, Mrs Figen Murray OBE, referenced by most noble Lords. Mrs Murray is not just a grieving mother, as the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, has already mentioned; she understands terrorism and the complexities surrounding it only too well. She has never looked for sympathy, and she holds a master’s degree in counter- terrorism. She is a quite remarkable woman. I am most grateful for her personal help in preparing this speech and will refer to her again shortly.

I also thank Mr Nick Aldworth, a former counter- terrorism national co-ordinator, who has given me excellent advice, and Mr Brendan Cox, the husband of Jo Cox MP and founder of Survivors Against Terror, who has been involved with this Bill throughout.

Although this is one of those rare pieces of proposed legislation that comes before us after being driven forward by private citizens, it is not unique. Nevertheless, it is hugely important and imperative. As we have heard, the Bill has entered this House after years of development, which has included contributions from our security services, counterterrorism policing officers and experts from across the security industry. Its very existence was recommended by Sir John Saunders—already referred to by my noble friend, if I may, Lord Carlile of Berriew—as a finding of his extensive inquiry into the Manchester Arena attack. It has not just been developed on a whim; it is deadly serious and involves the safety of millions of people. This legislation has been the subject of two rounds of public consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny by the last Government’s Home Affairs Select Committee. By any measure, the Bill arrives before us having been well considered and refined in response to the views of the public, which is demonstrated by the wide cross-party support in the House of Commons.

Chief among these considerations has been to make the Bill a proportionate contribution to countering terrorism. Its standard duty requires premise operators to establish highly achievable procedures that will make businesses more resilient to terrorist attacks. In most cases, these procedures will be at no cost to the premises, as they simply require the creation of a plan for how they will respond to an act of terrorism. Only those that derive their revenues through having the greatest numbers of people on their premises will be expected to do more, through the enhanced duty. This will require them to take measures that will stop acts of terrorism being successful at their premises.

Wise choices about the scope of the law’s application have been made. Proof of the Bill’s proportionality is that there are 1 million premises in the UK to which this law could apply. A sensible threshold, I believe, of 200 persons present being the point at which premises engage with the law means that only 180,000 of those premises are now in scope. These are the places where we gather to commune, socialise and be educated or cared for. The people who use these spaces deserve to be protected. I anticipate that some in this House might consider 180,000 premises to be an example of overregulation, but I suggest that those in London and Manchester in 2017, and those on the streets of London, Birmingham, Manchester and Belfast in the 1970s, would probably take a very different view. They might suggest that 180,000 premises is not enough.

The Bill recognises and respects those different views of the threats we face. In recognition of the ebb and flow of terrorist intentions, it contains a sensible mechanism through which the Secretary of State might vary this threshold in times of need. Dynamic threats require dynamic responses, and the Bill supports that. It takes an encouraging approach to enforcement, with the creation of a new regulatory role within the Security Industry Authority, which I was pleased to see. I know that my late dear friend Lady Henig would have been delighted to see the authority she chaired so ably involved in its implementation. I echo the calls to ensure that the SIA has the ability to fulfil its new enhanced role.

There is a clear declaration in the guidance notes to the Bill that the regulator will act as

“an educator in the first instance”.

This is a further recognition of a proportionate approach. However, if the premises operators wish to be reckless with the safety and security of others, the Bill has the teeth to encourage compliance.

The eighth anniversary of that terrible attack in Manchester will be on 22 May this year. Mrs Murray told me:

“No legislation was put in place to enforce security at that time. There was no legislation to mandate that venues keep people safe. There are laws about the number of toilets venues must have; laws about noise levels a venue is allowed to create—but nothing to help keep people safe”.


This is a good Bill, with good intentions and good outcomes, which my party wholly supports. It has been tailored to proportionately meet the needs of those affected by it, and it will serve to make this country stronger and more resilient. I commend it to the House.

18:41

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I support this legislation, which commemorates the lives of terrorist victims from the past and obviously intends to reduce the chances of more deaths and injury in the future. Therefore, for all the reasons that have been described, it has my full support. It is the latest manifestation of the UK counterterror strategy Contest, which is there to Prevent, ideally stopping people becoming terrorists; to Pursue, so that, if they do become terrorists, they are locked up and put before the courts; to Prepare, so that, in the event that terrorists get through, we make sure that we recover as quickly as possible; and to Protect—that is this strand—the targets that terrorists may find the most attractive.

For a long time, where people have gathered in large numbers, venues have tried to reduce either the likelihood of an attack getting through or, if one did get through, the damage caused. But I am afraid this has been inconsistent and has lacked an evidence base on which to operate. In my view, this is the ideal opportunity to make sure that does not happen.

I will make only five points. I will first briefly respond to some of the points raised. There is clearly a debate about where we should draw the line: it could be 200 or 100, and some people prefer 300. I would be careful about altering it from 200. In 2018, at the request of the royal commission in New Zealand, I visited to look at the terrorist attacks on the Christchurch mosques, when 51 Muslims were murdered and 84 other people were injured. They were two small mosques—small in the numbers of people who gathered but terrible in the outcome of what happened when one man with an automatic weapon swept through them. So I would be really careful. Of course, they were places of worship. Although there is an exclusion in this legislation for places of worship, the fact that they are places of worship can actually amplify the target. Thousands of people can gather at—and do visit every day—some of our national venues such as Westminster Abbey. We have to be really careful before, in trying to accommodate their difference, we leave people who visit more vulnerable.

Secondly, I raise something that is not directly relevant, although it is relevant to the issue of communication in emergencies. The Minister may want to reassure himself about the latest level of the Airwave project, which is now eight years late, running at £12.5 billion and has no procurement in place to deliver the new system. It is indirectly impacting on the ability of the emergency services to respond to these terrible events together. We all ought to take this seriously, and it is worth at least contemplating when considering this legislation.

The noble Baroness, Lady May, raised a good point about who is in charge when emergency services attend. Is it the people who are already running the venue? There is some good experience there post the Hillsborough event, and the Green Guide makes some clear recommendations about how this happens at football grounds. Rather than reinvent this, it may well be worth at least considering the advice there.

On CTSAs, the noble Lord, Lord Harris, got it right: there are very few of these people across the country, and they will need enhancing. There are tens of them throughout England and Wales, and I suspect that, given the number of premises involved here, there will have to be a significant investment to make sure that can go forward in the future.

The first of my five points is to support the point from the noble Baroness, Lady May, on design. This is about the design of new buildings, of course, but also the retrofitting of existing buildings. Design can help to reduce the number of attackers, can help to reduce the impact of attacks and can allow people who can escape to do so—or keep them safe where they choose to be. But this needs some clear thinking. Our shopping malls are open plan—they are not compartmentalised—but it is possible to design them so that they could become compartmentalised in the event of an attack. But it is not straightforward, as this place found out when PC Palmer was murdered. Do you lock down or do you open up? If you open up, where do you go and how do you communicate with people? Of course, people are in a panic and are not always able to hear you clearly. What advice will you give them when you at the time are not sure exactly what is happening? These are very difficult problems, but design can play a major part in making sure that we give the people who are operating these places a good opportunity to respond as well as they can.

Secondly, on technology, many of the venues that we are talking about—not the smaller ones, perhaps, but even some of them—have CCTV. We often have debates in this place about the horrors of AI and the terrible things that facial recognition can do, but actually it can do some pretty remarkable good things as well. If CCTV is available at some of our bigger venues—think about ExCeL and some of our big shopping malls such as Westfield in London, of which there are two—it can play an important part in spotting unusual patterns of behaviour in individuals. AI can assist with that, but I argue that the Bill is silent about how it might help. I will come back to why I think it is particularly important that it says something about this.

Facial recognition is another great opportunity. I am not necessarily talking about randomly checking people’s faces and whether they should be there or are terrorists. I am talking about checking them against lists of people who we know are dangerous: terrorists on control orders, people who have been released on parole from a terrorist sentence, or people on bail who have not yet been charged. These are significant characters, and I guess that any operator of a significant venue would like to know whether they have bought a ticket to some of these events, are strolling around their car parks or are carrying out reconnaissance in the days preceding their attacks, as we saw in New Orleans, to make sure that they are as effective as they can be.

How do we enable our CCTV to be as effective as it can be? If we cannot get this right for counterterrorist legislation, we will struggle to get it right for volume crime and general surveillance of public areas. This is a live debate, and we should not go to one end of the spectrum and say that AI and facial recognition are always bad. They can be, but they can also be incredibly effective, and we should not dismiss technology just because we occasionally have some concerns about privacy.

The third thing that I urge the Bill to say something about is different regulatory bodies. As we have heard, the venues are covered by different regulatory bodies: the Health and Safety Executive, local authorities looking after football grounds and some of the venues for alcohol licensing, and fire brigades, which inspect these places too. So there is a chance that they approach the same problem inconsistently—not intentionally, of course. We need to make sure that all our regulatory bodies approach these issues consistently and do not end up giving inconsistent advice—not least given that we have many local authorities but intend to give this to one national body, the SIA.

Of course, the methods of security are regulated by other people, too. The SIA already regulates the security operatives who work at these places. The Biometric Commissioner has interests in how data is collected, and the Data Protection Commissioner has an interest in privacy, while the Surveillance Commissioner has an interest in how all those systems come together. I would argue that we need them to consider the terrorist threat in a wide, not a narrow, way and that, when we come to things such as facial recognition or AI application, we need them to give consideration in a generous, not a narrow, way.

At the very least, we need the venue operators to know that, when they are trying to get agreement on how they operate their systems, they will get an open hearing and they do not have to approach the same problem in 172,000 ways—because there are 172,000 venues out there that will have to resolve some of these problems. Of course, the smaller ones are larger in volume, but some of the bigger ones are pretty high in numbers, too. So we need to consider at this stage how the various regulators are going to work with this legislation and make sure that it works effectively.

My fourth point is about research. We have already heard concerns about whether the SIA will be well equipped by the time this Act comes into force, and I can understand why those concerns are there. It is a relatively small organisation and there have been mistakes in the past: security operatives have had convictions for manslaughter and we have seen various things that have not gone well. But that could be said of many public organisations—so it can learn and it can improve. But the Bill is silent on where it is going to get its advice. It will of course need good research and academic support to work out how to deal with a crowd that is panicking. There is a science in this. We have had to see it through football matches and learn how to deal with large crowds, and how crowds respond. So I should like to hear a little more about how it is anticipated that the SIA will get its advice and develop research over time, because it seems to me that it should be able to develop commissions of research so that it can respond to new problems—because new terrorist attacks will come up and it will be vital that the SIA is dynamic and responds to the new threats.

My final point is about powers of search. At the meeting earlier, I said that you might think, “Well, that’s just what policemen say, isn’t it? That they need a power of search”. But my point is that all these venues often have security operatives. Sadly, in the Manchester attack we saw that the terrorist who attacked entered at the end of the event into an area that was not protected and was not being excluded, and was carrying the device that murdered so many people. But of course, if some of the security operatives had tried to approach and deal with him, they had no power of search. It is expected that security operatives are able to search as a condition of entry to the premises—you either get searched or you do not come in. But of course some of these people are trespassers—not all are terrorists—and with some people you cannot be sure whether they have a right to enter. So I wonder whether it is worth thinking about whether security operatives should have some kind of right, because the alternative is that you have to call the police, which will be inefficient; it will be slow and might be too late. So we should give some consideration to security operatives’ powers, used properly and reasonably, in a way that enhances security.

Finally, I realise that, on some of my points, the Minister might say, “Well, actually, there’s going to be advice issued and there will be secondary legislation”, so I am quite content that some of those points might have to be covered there. But I would argue that some of the regulatory issues need to be considered in the Bill because, if the regulator is faced with controlling legislation that gives it very clear direction and is then faced by secondary legislation that gives advice, it may have to go with its first statutory, primary legislation. So it is worth saying something about this in the Bill to help the other regulators. Things such as stop and search would certainly need primary legislation: in my view, it should not be the subject of secondary legislation, if it is considered applicable.

My final point is that I wish this Bill speedy progress, as the Minister said, so that we can implement it quickly. Although I agree that two years is a good period in which to implement it, in that we want to build the credibility of the SIA and make sure that the businesses are ready, I would keep an open mind that, if the businesses and the SIA achieve that more quickly, we should implement more quickly, too. Two years is quite a long time and we are already saying that the terrorist threat is high. Those two years could be a time in which we have some awful attacks that could have been prevented had we all got our act together a little earlier. So I would keep an open mind about the implementation date, should the evidence show that in fact the systems are ready and we are able to implement more quickly.

18:54

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who made some very wise points based on his considerable experience in this area. I, too, very much support this Bill. Like other noble Lords, I remember all too well the night of the Manchester Arena attack during the 2017 general election, as well as the generous and defiant response of the people of Manchester, as the right reverend Prelate rightly reminded us in his contribution. We all remember today with admiration Martyn Hett and his mother, Figen Murray. As the briefing note from Survivors Against Terror puts it, Martyn was living his best life—as were the other 21 victims who lost their lives that evening and the more than 1,000 people injured in that appalling attack.

It will not surprise noble Lords to know that I associate myself with everything that my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead said, or that I take the opportunity to pay tribute to the diligent and dedicated way in which she reacted to evil acts such as this, and how she and others worked with the brilliant men and women of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies to prevent others like it.

While the Prevent and Pursue elements of the Contest strategy, to which the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, alluded, receive considerable attention sometimes, it has always seemed to me that the Prepare and Protect elements receive comparatively less, especially when one considers that these are the elements in which so many more of us can play our part. We need a whole-society response to countering the ever-present and evolving threat of terrorism. The owners and operators of cultural and heritage venues want to play their part in that solemn task, and they take their responsibility very seriously. My purpose in speaking in this debate today is to reflect some of the points they have raised with me and other members of the shadow Culture, Media and Sport team regarding how they can do that most effectively. In particular, I am grateful to those who took the time to join my right honourable friend Stuart Andrew, the shadow Secretary of State, and our colleagues for a round-table discussion about the Bill last month, as well as the cultural and security professionals I had the pleasure of speaking to at the International Arts and Antiquities Security Forum in County Durham in October.

It is clear from talking to those people that there is nervousness about the Security Industry Authority’s ability and capacity to act as the new regulator in this area. The role envisaged by the Bill, as noble Lords have noted, is quite a departure for that organisation, which already has a mixed reputation in the sector. Is the Minister satisfied that the authority has the resources and expertise—and indeed the confidence of the sectors it will be regulating—it will need to succeed? Has it begun its engagement with the people who are on the front line in each of the varying sectors it will be regulating? This Bill has been long in gestation, as noble Lords have reminded us; the authority does not need to wait for Royal Assent to begin engaging with the people who have the practical knowledge about how it can best be implemented.

In the absence of that sort of engagement, as my noble friend Lady May said, these organisations will be bombarded with consultants. Indeed, a number of those whom we spoke to in our round-table discussion said that they are already being contacted by what one described as “snake oil salesmen” purporting to advise them on how to implement a Bill that has not yet become law. Of course, many of those organisations have dedicated professionals who have worked out detailed and well-considered plans to maintain the safety and security of those who visit them. Those plans are, by necessity, sensitive and confidential documents, and many are wary of sharing them externally, even with a new regulator, potentially opening them up to new vulnerability. Therefore, it is vital that the new regime that this Bill brings about enjoys the confidence and support of those with whom it will work.

A number of speakers mentioned the tiers that the Bill sets out. A capacity of 800 or more tips a venue into the enhanced tier, so a moderately sized theatre such as the Lyric or the Noël Coward becomes in the same category as Wembley Stadium or the Glastonbury festival. I welcome the exemption that the Government have introduced for churches and other places of worship, but there may be a case for more granular tiering, or perhaps a super-enhanced tier for the very largest venues and events.

The seasonality of venues is also worth considering. A venue which is extremely busy for only one day, or one part of a year, such as a live music festival or an annual sporting event, would stay in the enhanced tier for 365 days of the year. There is also the complexity of multi-event venues. For instance, a conference or exhibition hall, such as the ExCel centre, which has been mentioned already, might stage a number of different events, of different sizes, all at the same time. Are these to be considered separately or counted cumulatively?

The Bill defines the premise operator as the freeholder or leaseholder, and the event organiser as the entity overseeing the delivery of an event. As the Society of London Theatre and UK Theatre have pointed out, a number of theatres operate within multipurpose venues, such as university complexes—Northern Stage in Newcastle is one example. The Society of London Theatre and its members can provide useful insights into these operational differences and how they might be overcome; how can we make sure that the SIA takes account of this practical, first-hand advice?

A number of speakers raised concerns about physical thresholds—the grey areas or “zone Ex” as people leave venues. Where do the boundaries of a venue’s responsibility begin and end? The Bill seeks to enhance security measures in what it refers to, but does not define, as “the immediate vicinity”. The vicinity of an event space, including transport routes and the public realm, is, by definition, beyond a venue’s perimeter and control. As LIVE, the body representing the live music industry, has set out in the briefing noble Lords will have received, event organisers and security personnel have no jurisdiction over crime and disorder in the public realm; only the police do. That needs to be reflected in the Bill. In particular, LIVE argues that the SIA should not be allowed to serve a notice requiring action outside the premises or outwith the control of the person who is being served the notice.

UK Theatre also raised the concern that external measures, such as bollards, should not get in the way of the essential operations of our cultural venues. The public space around a theatre can be essential for its operation. The changing of sets, where equipment for one show is dismantled and another installed, is critical, particularly for plays in repertory or an opera, where a number of productions are staged simultaneously.

As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, set out, we need to ensure consistency with existing legislation, such as the Licensing Act 2003, and data protection laws. Many venues have seen the burden of complying with subject access requests relating to the use of closed circuit television rise exponentially. If they are being encouraged to make greater use of CCTV, which can provide protection to the people who come to their venues, or indeed facial recognition technology, as we have just heard, what support will they be given to comply with data protection regulation and the potential burden there?

Many venues operate as franchises. On whom do the new duties fall? Will these be on the parent company or on the franchisees? Who ought to pick up the bill for compliance? All this speaks to a need for sector-specific guidance but, as the sectors understand it, that is not currently planned. Is that the case? If so, will the Minister urge the SIA to reconsider that? I echo the very reasonable request of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, that the guidance that it is minded to prepare should be made available before Committee.

Finally, we must be mindful of the burden on the venues and organisations that will play their part in this important new law. Many are run not for profit while others are very small businesses in which profit margins are extremely tight: 43% of grass-roots music venues in the UK made a loss in 2023, to give just one example. They are reliant on a mixture of their own full-time staff, contactors and volunteers. They are squeezed already by the additional burdens of the new and higher national insurance bills that the Budget brought. For this Bill to work and to make the difference that we all want it to, the duties that it places on businesses and venues need to be practicable, effective and proportionate. I hope that these are aims we can keep in mind as we scrutinise the Bill further.

19:04

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, it seems appropriate that we are discussing the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill today, on the 10th anniversary of the Charlie Hebdo massacre in Paris. Armed with Kalashnikovs, two Islamists, enraged by the satirical magazine’s depiction of the Prophet Muhammad, stormed into a workplace and murdered 12. There was a memorial protest at Trafalgar Square this morning: well done to the organisers, OurFight.uk, and all attendees, because it is important that we do not forget.

Ten years ago, “Je suis Charlie” rang out as an international call to action in defence of the Enlightenment principle that no idea, belief or figure is beyond scrutiny or satire. We were united then against the culture of fear that Islamist terrorism was trying to impose on free speech and a free society. Sadly, within months, too many liberal apologists in the arts, literature and media started to argue that the cartoonists had been a bit too offensive to Muslims, and that perhaps the staff were asking for trouble. Since then, terrorist atrocities have become too normalised in European cities, in my opinion.

I am all for any measures that tackle terrorism head-on, but I have concerns about this particular legislation. I have heard the message to this House from Dan Jarvis, Minister of State at the Home Office, who, to quote him, gave

“a gentle word of encouragement to colleagues in the other place”,—[Official Report, Commons, 9/12/24; col. 758.]

meaning us, calling for consensus and stressing that the Bill should proceed smoothly. That sentiment has been echoed here today, and in the letter from the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, who has urged us to deliver without further delay.

I am also aware of the emotional weight on our shoulders here. The Bill has been called Martyn’s law, as we have heard, in honour of Martyn Hett, who was so brutally and tragically murdered in the Manchester Arena attack in 2017. I am very conscious that these legal changes have been vigorously and compellingly argued for by Martyn’s mother, Figen Murray, for years, as we have heard. Despite the undoubted admiration that has been expressed here today for Figen’s courage and determination, I think we need to take a step back.

Our obligations as legislators means that we need to remain cool and dispassionate in bringing in laws, ensuring that legal changes are fit for purpose and proportionate, and that we consider the unintended consequences. In that sense, I agree with the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord Frost, that however emotional this might be, and however serious it is, we have to be cool-headed. There are certainly points of concern and clarification that need to be probed during the stages of the Bill, and we should not have undue haste.

On a positive note, I welcome some modifications that this Government have made to the Bill. I am glad that concerns raised in consultations and pre-legislative scrutiny were listened to, especially the raising of the standard tier from 100 to 200, which will remove a large number of village halls, for example, from scope. I actually disagree with Figen, Brendan Cox, Nick Aldworth and the Martyn’s law team, who urged us, in a briefing today, to return to a starting threshold of 100. I am rather concerned that the Bill gives the Home Secretary discretionary powers to lower it to 100, without any clarity as to what might justify such a move.

I am pleased that education settings are now classified as standard duty premises regardless of capacity, although I am rather mystified that universities and higher education institutions are not included. We have already seen the way that the costs of security measures have been used as an excuse to close down debates on university campuses. The last thing we want is to turn universities into fortresses against public debate in any way.

It is positive that the Government claim to want a lighter-touch approach but, as we know from bitter experience, any powerful national regulator can lead to mission creep, and the paraphernalia around regulation is what worries me. I assure the noble Baroness, Lady May—though it is not reassuring—who is not in her place, that the consultants she talked about are already queueing up at the doors of those of us who organise events, offering to give us cheap advice on how we can comply with this law.

I declare an interest here. The Academy of Ideas, of which I am director, organises public events and debates ranging from our annual Battle of Ideas festival, now in its 20th year, which attracts thousands of members of the public, to more modest salons, seminars and panel discussions. We work with a wide range of venues of all shapes and sizes. The Bill will impact on our work through the potential added costs in hiring venues, liability, bureaucracy, et cetera.

More crucially, the aim of our work is to reinvigorate the public square and cultivate political and social engagement, for all ages but particularly for young people, at town hall-type gatherings, to open up conversations for the public with the public in public. That broader public square may be adversely affected by this law if we do not keep our eye on it. Civil society, people self-organising and getting together and grass-roots gatherings risk being curtailed. We need to think hard when we are told by small venues and event organisers, such as voluntary organisations and community groups, from church halls to small football clubs, that people will be put off volunteering by too much regulatory responsibility and paraphernalia. We need to probe what the consequences of such legal burdens could be in terms of loss of community infrastructure and assets.

In the most recent consultation, many respondents still expressed reservations about not just the financial implications and the fear of big fines—you cannot underestimate that—but the time spent on burdensome and bureaucratic admin. Venues are worried about their ability to meet legally mandated requirements with the limited resources available to them. There is genuinely some panic about how people will cope.

The Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, was spot on to note that the Protect duty must not be so prescriptive as to prevent people enjoying normal life. Yet consider the plethora of venues swept up by this law: pubs with beer gardens, swathes of the hospitality industry, which is already on its knees, libraries, museums, galleries, entertainment venues and even childcare facilities—lots of places where people socialise. These are places where normal life happens. I appeal to her idea that we must ensure that, although it might not be the intention of the Bill, there are no consequences which will lead to a more restricted public square and more impoverished normal life; otherwise, the terrorists win.

The Minister says that the Bill will save lives. That is quite a “gulp” moment. We need to be clear about whether it does. We are told that it will lead to a reduction in terrorist attacks or less vulnerability to them, but it is a bit disconcerting that the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee report and the Regulatory Policy Committee both queried the lack of evidence about whether the proposals will lower the threat of terrorism. Will lives be saved? I am still not convinced.

I understand the explanation about the changing nature of the threat, with DIY lone wolf attacks emerging out of the view of the security services, but if this means that greater swathes of public space can be possible targets, where anything can be used as a weapon—we think of the lethal use of the car in the recent awful New Orleans and German Christmas market attacks—is a focus on protecting bricks and mortar not rather missing the point? But if everywhere is a target and everything is a weapon, how will we avoid living in a police state? The worry is that the legislation could lead to energy being expended on a process-driven, box-ticking approach that may miss, for example, the deeper cultural and social challenges that we face.

It was harrowing to read in Sir John Saunders’ Manchester Arena inquiry, which others have commended and which is crucial to this discussion, about the preventability of Salman Abedi’s suicidal atrocity and the catalogue of failures in the months and even hours before he detonated that terrible bomb at the Manchester Arena. Venue regulation formed only a tiny fraction of Sir John’s recommendations. It seems pertinent to look at what the first volume of the inquiry told us about security at the venue.

In plain sight, Abedi was lurking around the arena for an hour and a half, acting suspiciously. We are told that he looked shifty and nervous and was fidgeting, carrying a huge, bulging rucksack and praying. One of the waiting parents, Christopher Wild, was so alarmed that he reported concerns that Abedi might be a bomber to security guards at 10.14 pm—16 minutes before the explosion happened. Mr Wild was fobbed off.

Maybe the training in this Bill would make those guards act differently. But let us also remember that we know from the inquiry report that one guard was suspicious but did not confront Abedi because he was

“fearful of being branded a racist”.

This points to the dangers of narrowing the threat of terrorism to organisational or technical issues. It suggests that we need to tackle more difficult challenges, such as the corrosive creed of identity politics, that can act as a barrier to acting on our instincts or using common sense for fear of being demonised—or recognising that promiscuous use of accusations such as “racist” and “Islamophobic” can paralyse individuals in society from doing the right thing. As we are all vividly aware at present, myriad local authorities, social workers, educationalists, care home staff and police officers failed to expose or intervene to stop gangs of men of largely Pakistani heritage committing industrial levels of rape and sexual abuse of girls throughout the UK, for fear of appearing racist, stirring up community tensions or being seen as—maybe I should not say this—jumping on a far-right bandwagon.

This Bill will not work if we do not confront that chilling impact of trepidation about speaking out over suspicions, exposing the ideologies fuelling and inspiring modern-day terrorism and doing the right thing. Je suis toujours Charlie.

19:16

[Lord Faulkner of Worcester (Lab)]

My Lords, it has been a humbling experience to sit through this debate and listen to every speech, for a number of reasons. The most important is the degree of expertise from all over the House from so many different angles—whether the police, the Church of England, former Ministers, lawyers, academics or other experts—who are united on the purpose of this Bill and want to see it work and for it to be brought into effect as soon as possible. I share that view completely.

I will, though, as the Minister will know, raise a subject which I hope he can be even more helpful on tonight than he has been in private meetings about it. I declare my interest as president of the Heritage Railway Association, which represents around 200 lines and railways around the country. They are run largely by volunteers but attract several million visitors a year and make a major contribution to the tourism economy.

The title of the Bill makes it clear that it is to deal with the security of premises: buildings like the Manchester Arena, profitable organisations running huge events for thousands of visitors with the paid resources to provide comprehensive security protection for visitors and the professional expertise to manage it. I whole- heartedly support that aspect of the Bill.

However, I underline the points made by my noble friend Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick about the heritage rail sector. I am sure the drafters of the Bill did not have in mind when they were putting it together the case of a small country station run by a handful of volunteers and providing a unique visitor experience, which is just able to cover its costs, often with the help of generous donations from those who work on the railway. Originally it looked as though the Bill would treat the big arena and the small station the same. If that had happened, it would certainly have undermined the future of some—maybe many—railways already reeling from the escalating cost of fuel and raw materials. But, importantly, the Minister has moved on that, which I welcome.

Like the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, I talked to Robert Gardiner, the chairman of the Downpatrick and County Down Railway, one of the member railways of the HRA, which has a long history of dealing with the very real terrorist threats that existed in Northern Ireland for many years and has direct experience of being used as part of a terrorist plot in the past—fortunately, directed not at its passengers but, sadly, at the British Army.

Mr Gardiner made the point that the railway is happy to work with the security authorities to protect the safety of the railway and its passengers without special legislation, but the crucial words are “reasonable” and “proportionate”. They are the key words for the small and impecunious volunteer organisations which need to be supported and taken account of in the consideration of the Bill.

There is a case for the security of heritage railways to be dealt with in the same way as for the national rail network in Great Britain, which is outside the scope of the Bill because its security is managed by the Department for Transport through the national rail security programme. This programme does not currently apply to heritage railways but there are many similarities, particularly at the around 40 stations used for interchanges by both heritage and mainline railways. I hope the Minister may be able to give me some encouragement that they at least will be treated alike and that the heritage sector will not be treated any differently.

The Minister was kind enough to write to me on 23 December. It was actually to me that he wrote just before Christmas, not to a Member of the House of Commons. He clarified in his letter some of the areas where doubt existed. He told me that the Home Office has decided that while heritage railway stations should be included within the scope of the Bill, rather than covered by the Department for Transport’s national rail security programme, the Bill would not apply to the trains themselves nor to the railway line linking the stations—again, an important assurance. That was very helpful in making the scope of the Bill clearer, but it would be more helpful still if that clarification was included in the Bill. I hope the Minister may be willing to consider this in the later stages of the Bill’s passage.

There is the question of stations. They are not big structures like a concert hall but are generally a collection of small buildings of a former country station, more akin to a sports ground with a pavilion, which could actually be exempt from the Bill. It would be really helpful if that could be recognised in the schedule dealing with premises to include enclosed buildings but to exclude open platforms or those covered simply by an open canopy.

A proper transition period is important, and the Minister has agreed to that. I was originally going to ask him for two years rather than one year, but he has already made it clear that that is the Government’s intention. A proper transition period is important because budgetary provision will need to be made for training and physical works as well as for undertaking the analysis of risk as newly defined, and for carrying out the work. So that is helpful, and I warmly welcome it.

I am particularly grateful to the Minister for his courtesy in convening the all-Peers meeting yesterday which I and a number of your Lordships attended. He is aware of the concerns that I have and has listened carefully to them, and I hope that the modest amendments I have proposed to table will clarify and make the Bill more workable and less onerous on smaller enterprises which would otherwise struggle with it. He encouraged me to table amendments for Committee and I intend to do so.

19:23

[Lord Udny-Lister (Con)]

My Lords, the very fact that we are discussing this topic today highlights that we are living in dangerous times and that we have a fundamental problem in this country when it comes to security.

Government’s first and foremost duty has always been to protect the public, and while the Bill laudably aspires to do just that, as with any draft legislation of this magnitude, there are a significant number of areas that require much greater clarity and careful scrutiny as the Bill progresses through your Lordships’ House.

I fear that I am going to sound a little more negative than many speakers this evening. I fully acknowledge that the Minister has considerably improved the Bill from some of the early drafts I have read, and he has gone a long way to answering a lot of the questions, but there are still a number of very difficult issues.

I start by touching on the changes the Bill proposes to make to the Licensing Act 2003. I fear that the House needs better to understand from the Minister how the integration of security duties into licensing requirements could place additional responsibilities on local councils, or on the already pressured court and enforcement systems. While councils and councillors are more than accustomed to managing licensing regimes, the Bill could impose further burdens on already under-resourced councils, including the need to oversee compliance with enhanced security measures. I therefore ask the Minister to outline how the Government intend to support local authorities with these changes, and what will be expected of the courts or existing local authority licensing regimes in implementing the proposed changes.

Furthermore, we need to better understand how the Security Industry Authority and the Licensing Act will work together to ensure there is no duplication or conflict. Co-ordination between these frameworks, and their practical implementation, will be critical. If the Government intend to use the SIA, there is a real risk of overlapping responsibilities with other bodies, and the Bill as drafted does little to explain how these responsibilities will be allocated. Will the Government provide clearer guidance on how the organisations involved in the implementation of the Bill will work together, rather than hinder one another, and how will the Government ensure that they support the bodies that will have new powers or responsibilities under the legislation?

If the SIA is to become the regulator for this new duty, we must consider the practical implications. How will venues and event organisers differentiate between inspections for compliance with this duty and standard SIA inspections? I am particularly concerned about the powers of entry. If my understanding is correct, SIA inspectors do not currently operate under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, so the Government will need to clarify whether they or another body will be granted additional powers for the purposes of the Bill, or whether these inspections will rely on existing frameworks.

If the power of entry or RIPA will not be used, who will be the authority responsible for ensuring that building owners comply? Surely the courts and councils will not have these responsibilities, unless more funding and resources—particularly for training provision—are provided by the Government. The House would benefit from the Minister’s clarification of these points, as the need for security measures must always be balanced with the need to ensure that the rights and liberties of both businesses and individuals are protected and maintained.

I also worry about the cost of the Bill and the financial burden that the draft legislation could place on businesses across the UK, which are already working to balance the books under extreme rising costs. To implement these requirements, businesses face costs of between £3,000 and £52,000. As a result, some businesses could be unable to afford to adapt. I am therefore seeking today from the Government an understanding of any finance that may be available to support businesses with initial adaptations to the legislation.

Additionally, I would like to hear from the Government about the possibility of improving planning law—either through this Bill or through additional means—to ensure that the design of new buildings both complies with this legislation and ensures that we can design out terrorism, as we have been trying to do over the past decade or so in designing out crime.

I would be interested to know whether, on the back of this Bill, councils will therefore be encouraged to consider such measures in assessing planning applications, and whether the Government are minded to bring in new legislation or statutory provisions on the incorporation of counterterrorism measures into the design and construction of new buildings. While this is not directly related to the Bill, the House needs better to understand how the Government plan to move forward in this area.

Some measures in the Bill may be necessary; they are a sad acknowledgment of the reality we face in Britian today. However, when it comes to anti-terrorism measures, or indeed measures to protect the public from terrorism, I cannot help but feel that we are firefighting an industrial blaze with a water pistol. It is deeply disheartening that we must legislate for protections against acts of terror in spaces that should be open, safe and welcoming to all. We have seen horrific acts committed in recent weeks and the fabric of our cities and venues changing in the face of the onslaught of people who seek to exterminate the existence of our values and destroy our way of life.

Today we are discussing how venues will have to share the burden of responsibility when it comes to countering terrorism. The additional burden in both time and expense that this will place on them prompts an important question: what steps are the Government taking to address the root cause of terrorism in this country? We cannot go on adapting our way of life to constantly counter those who wish to cause us harm. The Government should urgently update this House on what is being done on a society-wide basis to root out terrorism and the cause of terrorism in these islands.

We know from past and recent cases here in the UK that terrorism is not born in a vacuum. Terrorism in Britian today is fuelled by ideological extremism, social dislocation, weakness in our immigration and asylum systems, and a lack of trust in and respect for authority. Local authorities across the UK have a vital role to play in countering these root causes, yet many have faced significant challenges, particularly when it comes to resources. I am therefore keen to understand, in the wake of the reorganisation and creation of combined authorities, who will be responsible for countering terrorism at community level and how they will do it. I therefore seek clarity today from the Minister on what powers and resources government will hand over to reformed or devolved local authorities—particularly elected mayors—to ensure that they can effectively address the underlying factors that allow terrorism and ideological extremism to breed as an undercurrent in many communities across the UK. As we all know, it is far better to cure and we must grasp this problem before it is too late.

I welcome some of the intentions of the Bill. However, as it progresses, it is essential that these key areas are addressed to ensure that the legislation is both workable and proportionate, and that we balance protections with freedoms. We owe it to those whom we seek to protect, and to the venues and organisations tasked with implementing these measures, to provide them with a clear, fair and effective framework. I fear that we have a lot of work to do when it comes to clarity on what is being asked of whom, and the indirect consequences of this legislation. We must therefore provide businesses with support and certainty, and I urge the Government to listen to the concerns raised by industry in this regard.

In finishing, I say that I do believe that the legislation is significantly better than where it was before; I just feel that this House needs to do a lot more scrutiny.

19:33

[Baroness Goudie (Lab)]

My Lords, I very much welcome this Bill, as well as the discussions in the other place and what Minister Jarvis said. I am so pleased that it has come to this House speedily. I thank all of those who sent me briefings, who have been in touch with me and with whom I have had meetings, including Figen Murray and her colleagues.

Doing nothing is not an option. The public can be, and have been, targeted at a wide range of public venues. The terror threat is not predictable. Attacks are hard to deflect. Everyone needs to be part of the measures to keep people safe. “Reasonably practicable” is in the text: that is a familiar foundation of health and safety. However, as so often, there are concerns about an additional responsibility being imposed on local authorities without necessary resources—or proportionality, which is the key in the case of bodies with considerable resources and more liberty to resource. The measures in the Bill are proportionate: they are the result of two very extensive consultations, pre-legislative scrutiny and the legislative process so far. They are not unduly onerous and they have proceeded smoothly so far.

However, for local authorities, we have to find a way of giving them further support. We must ask whether there should be an extra way in the planning department, without having a planning Bill, through which we could amend planning legislation—perhaps through statutory instruments—to make this support go hand in hand with this Bill, without having to delay everything. We also have to look at resources for local authorities, because we know how strapped they are. This is a necessary and essential part of our day-to-day life. This should lead to speedy conclusions, legislatively and in terms of resources.

It is already almost eight years since the Manchester Arena attack and the attacks on London Bridge and Borough Market. As the Chief Coroner recommended after those attacks, protective security must be enhanced and duties must be clarified, with appropriate guidance on the implementation of duties and an assessment. As public authorities need to work together, there has to be joined-up partnership between private security firms, the police, local authorities and government. This cannot be done in silos; it has to be joined together. The more I have listened to colleagues today, the more I know that it is correct to recommend that we try to have this working together.

We must consider the reality of places and spaces, with consideration of terrorist attacks becoming part of planning procedures. We also have to ensure that there is more training for staff on how to use CCTV cameras. Staff have to check that they are actually working and that there are not just blank tapes inside. There has to be proper training and we have to work out how it will be paid for. It also has to be linked to the police and so on.

I know that there is a working relationship between private security and the police, but it now has to be stronger. As many Members have said today, we also have to consider the cost of consultants. We need to have a list of the consultants and to identify who are just working on the back of a brown envelope. That is very important because many lives are at risk.

Physical protection measures are only one part of the necessary security measures; they are component parts and embody an important principle. The owner of a public space has the responsibility for the safety of the public. This is an important piece of the counter- terrorism measures; it is paramount that it is included.

I have previously thought about something that my noble friend Lord Harris said about the protection of schools. Perhaps we could look at schools with local authorities, which could work joined up with the Department for Education and some other bodies. We have to look at both primary and secondary schools. We have been relatively lucky so far that we have not had in the UK what we have seen in other parts of the world, but we have to be conscious that this could happen in any state school, religious school or wherever else. We know that this could happen—I am sorry to say that. My noble friend’s recommendations are very important.

Also, in all places of worship, this is becoming more important than we have previously thought. We go to church, to synagogue or wherever else, and we do not really think about this. We just go in, see our friends, wander around and leave—but we know now, the more that we think about it, that we could be at risk. There needs to be some training, but that has to be linked to the police and the local authority; it should not be left to churches and other religious spaces to work out for themselves how this should be done using private security and other advice. That is very important. Resources must all be joined up together. This Bill could use statutory instruments—but not in the long term—to make this happen. I am interested to hear what the Minister has to say.

19:39

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I declare an interest, having for a long time been a member of the board at the Rose Theatre in Kingston, the capacity of which is over 800 when you include staff, volunteers and performers. I declare the interest because I still refer to them as “us” and “we”.

There is a lot of experience in the Chamber today, among not only the speakers but the people listening too. My experience is minor, but because I feel quite affected by it, I am declaring it as an interest as well. On 7/7, when the Mayor of London was in Singapore, after the announcement about the 2012 Games, the officers at City Hall told me that I was the most senior politician in the building—I was chair of the assembly at the time. I realised rapidly that the officials needed someone to report to, and that my role was to be supportive and make sure that those in operational roles were able to get on with the job without any interference from people such as me. That was my big learning from that. Subsequently, the London Assembly looked at communications on the day, including the role of the media. I echo a good deal of what the noble Baroness, Lady May, said about communications.

It was inevitable that words such as “balanced” and “proportional” would be used a good deal today, and they have been used by those who have made representations to us. What they mean to the user is of course affected by where that person is looking from. I would add the words “objective” and “measured”. It may be difficult not to focus on the most recent event, but not every situation is coverable and the Bill does stop, or seek to stop, all terrorism.

As my noble friend Lady Suttie made clear, Liberal Democrats support the Bill. Personally, I would have preferred the title to mention people, or at least the Bill to give them some priority over premises, because this is about people. I welcome the amount of consultation and general work in the lead-up to this. That needs to continue, as many noble Lords have said, including in the preparation of regulations and guidance. I accept that regulations will be needed. I do not think that from these Benches we will be quite as critical about regulations as we often are—although we reserve the right to be a bit of a nuisance.

I asked the Rose Theatre for its views, and it gave me only about three lines. Basically, it said that it wants easy to follow guidance. It will not be entirely easy, because events differ, numbers of volunteers and casual staff differ, incidents differ, and there are different factors and responses required—evacuation or invacuation —and the right response may be counterintuitive. Premises do not follow a single pattern, and the Bill extends beyond buildings.

At this point, I ask the Minister if the Government have in mind further clarification of the term “in the vicinity”. That is clearly troubling owners and operators as to how far their responsibility extends and what, in practical terms, they can do. It troubles me because of consequences for compliance and, perhaps, insurance cover.

We have made it clear that our principal concern is about training. I have seen the letter from the Security Minister to my honourable friend Ben Maguire MP, which says that guidance will signpost a range of suitable free training offers. I am interested in the term “free”. I know that it is envisaged that the SIA will provide a good deal of guidance, but like other noble Lords I think that the legislation seems to create quite a market for trainers, not all of them as skilled as they would present themselves. I gather it is not envisaged that the SIA will have to approve training programmes or trainers. I would like to explore at a later stage whether there is scope for some sort of franking approval, so that it is the properly skilled consultants who are relied on, as it is likely that people will think that it is the responsible thing to do to get in someone to make sure that they are doing the right thing.

The SIA is in a pivotal position—again, the noble Baroness, Lady May, talked a good deal about this. Under Clause 12, it is to prepare guidance about how it itself proposes to exercise its functions. I find “guidance” a rather curious term here. It is to have extensive powers. For now, I will just mention non-compliance penalties: the maximum of the greater of £18 million and 5% of qualifying worldwide revenue. That is an awful lot of power. It also suggests quite a lot of scope for avoidance through how accounts are structured and gives the SIA a lot of scope in determining—the word is how it “regards”—what comprises revenue. The noble Lord, Lord Frost, mentioned the briefing we received today from the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health. It raised some of these points about how the SIA will operate, given its new functions, so can the Minister say something—anything—about its governance?

On insurance, perhaps I am too cynical in envisaging the scope for squabbles about the extent of cover and exclusions relating to alleged non-compliance and the assessment of what is “reasonably practicable”, but I think I have a fellow cynic sitting across the Chamber from me at the moment. I may also be too cynical about legislating for co-ordination and co-operation, but I do not think this is a novel provision.

Related to this, I share the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, about Clause 31, which provides that the Bill gives no right of action in respect of non-compliance. I do not really understand how this can work. One question is whether non-compliance can be used in evidence in civil proceedings. The noble Lord shrugs his shoulders—exactly; that will not show in Hansard, I am afraid. I also want to pursue the observations of the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation on Clause 18—he refers to a number of provisions and queries their impact—and on Clause 32, as it affects alterations to thresholds. He draws attention to the shortcomings of unamendable regulations, which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, mentioned. If it would be helpful for the Minister, I would be happy to table amendments for these matters to be discussed in detail later rather than today.

Planning and licensing have rightly been mentioned, but perhaps we should add building regulations, which may be more relevant on a day-to-day basis. Various organisations have raised concerns about the costs, and we have heard what the Minister had to say on them. We must acknowledge the burden, including costs, which local authorities will incur.

The Government’s explanation for the particular treatment of places of worship is that they, to quote the Minister’s letter,

“are different to other premises … in being readily accessible and welcoming to all, without the same commercial drivers … usually having no restrictions on entry, or staff routinely present.”

A lot of community organisations would say, “Well, that’s us too.” The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, had quite a lot to say about this; I agree with very much of what he said. The Government also refer, with regard to places of worship, to

“developing measures to better mitigate threats through local police engagement”,

but that must also apply across the board. Of course, a lot of places, particularly places of worship, have their own security arrangements.

Recently, I visited a synagogue that I had not been to before. Its entrance was not easy to spot, but the Muslim cab driver who took me did spot it. He said, “It must be here: I can see the security”. If there is a danger in this Bill, it is perhaps that people will see the regime as a complete substitute for other measures, including their own common sense. There will be points raised in the form of amendments because it is what we do here, but from these Benches, supporting the Bill, our amendments will be because we want to see the Bill as clear and effective as it can be.

19:49

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Udny-Lister identified, the principle that the first duty of government is the protection of its people is one that is redolent in this legislation. In an era when terrorism remains a persistent and evolving threat, as the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, both noted, it is essential that we equip ourselves with the tools necessary to mitigate risk and enhance public safety. This Bill, by introducing a Protect duty, sends a clear message that safeguarding our citizens in public spaces is a shared responsibility. As the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Hogan-Howe, noted, this legislation completes the triangle of counterterrorism law and, indeed, it gives substance to what was previously a thinner field in the Prepare and Protect arena, as identified by my noble friend Lord Parkinson. All in all, this Bill is a significant step, but its practical implications warrant close scrutiny.

One of the most encouraging aspects of this Bill is its emphasis on partnership. Public safety cannot be the sole preserve of law enforcement or the intelligence services. Venue operators, local authorities and private security firms, together with the owners of establishments covered by this Bill, all have a role to play. However, to make this partnership effective, we must ensure that all stakeholders are properly equipped to meet the challenge. This includes access to training, resources and clear guidance on best practices. Prior to implementation, the Government should establish a comprehensive support framework to help businesses and organisations meet their obligations under this legislation. I understand that this is planned, but we have yet to have the detail. I have no doubt that the Minister will provide further detail on that in due course.

As was so well put by my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead, the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, and a number of other noble Lords around the House, there are significant concerns about the identification of the Security Industry Authority as the regulator in the context of this Bill. It may be that there are other bodies—for example, local authorities—which would be better at providing this regulation, and there may be an argument that it is consistent with the roles in respect of licensed premises. However, that can be explored further in Committee. At the least, as moved in the other place by my honourable friend Alicia Kearns, we believe that there should be a report reviewing the role of the Security Industry Authority as the regulator, to be laid before Parliament 18 months after Royal Assent. This would allow stakeholders to review and provide input on the appropriateness of the Security Industry Authority enforcing the measures in this Bill —in due course again reviewing whether their enforcement is done properly and to appropriate standards and ensuring that people attending venues are safe.

We also need to be alive to preventing the expansion in costs caused by gold-plating the provisions in these Bills in accordance with suggestions by consultants, about which we have heard so much across the House this evening and was particularly noted by my noble friend Lady May and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile.

In passing, I endorse the call by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that the House be shown at least outlines of the draft guidance, which is suggested in the Bill at Clause 12(2)(a), to be generated by the SIA, and the guidance to be generated by the Secretary of State in Clause 27. I also endorse the call that the Government provide an indication as to whether such guidance would be sectoral, for the reasons identified by my noble friend Lord Parkinson in his speech.

As the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, stated, the Bill provides an opportunity to leverage technology in our fight against terrorism. Advances in surveillance systems, AI and data analysis can play a critical role in identifying threats before they materialise. I therefore encourage the Government to look at ways to encourage innovation in this area. Could we, for example, incentivise the adoption of security technology? Could we establish a recognition scheme for businesses that go above and beyond in their security measures and in relation to measures and steps taken to address the problems in communication, as noted, again, by my noble friend Lady May and others? Such initiatives would not only enhance public safety but encourage a proactive security culture.

As my noble friend Lady Newlove made clear, one of the hallmarks of our society is the freedom of our citizens to gather and enjoy public spaces without fear. It is vital that, in our pursuit of public safety, we do not inadvertently stifle the very freedoms which we seek to protect. If I may echo the powerful points made in different ways by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, that is another way in which terrorism wins. This Bill must not lead to an environment of excessive regulation or create barriers for community events. It is all a balancing act.

I therefore ask the Minister to clarify how the Government intend to monitor and evaluate the impact of this legislation, post commencement, on civil society and volunteering. This goes directly to the issue which I have no doubt we will explore in Committee as to the threshold. I agree with many of the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. The House will want to look both at the threshold and at the power of the Secretary of State to lower that threshold.

Terrorism knows no borders, and our approach to security must reflect this reality. While the Bill focuses on domestic venues, we must not lose sight of the international dimension. The UK has a proud history of leadership in counterterrorism co-operation. How will the measures in this Bill align with broader international efforts? Are we sharing best practices in relation to the protection of public spaces with our allies and learning from their experiences? This exploration of factors is all part of the cool-headed approach encouraged by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and I would endorse such an approach in Committee in this House.

Finally, I highlight the importance of community resilience. No piece of legislation can be a substitute for an engaged and vigilant society. This Bill provides an opportunity to foster greater awareness and preparedness at grass-roots level. Simple measures such as public awareness campaigns and community training programmes can make a significant difference. Empowering ordinary citizens to recognise and report suspicious activity is one of the most effective ways to prevent attacks.

The Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill is now a necessary piece of legislation. It reflects our commitment as a party to safeguarding the public and addressing the challenges of the modern age. However, as my noble friend Lord Frost observed, we must ensure that this Bill is implemented with care and foresight by fostering partnerships, embracing innovation, safeguarding freedoms and preserving community volunteering. We can create a security framework that is not only robust but reflects our values. We on these Benches look forward to working with colleagues across the House, as we have done hitherto, to ensure that this Bill delivers proportionately the protections that all our citizens deserve.

I have a few final questions to pose to the Minister. What assurances can the Government provide that businesses and venues will have sufficient time, importantly, and resources to comply with the new requirement before the penalties are enforced? Will implementation take place only when the relevant authority, possibly the SIA, is able to cope with the implementation of the provisions in the Bill? It may be that 24 months, although it is a period that has found some favour in the House, may not be long enough for the SIA to arrange its affairs such that it can administer the system. Is it right that the regulator would adopt a pragmatic and understanding approach to enforcement, particularly at smaller venues, at the outset of the commencement of the Bill’s provisions? Secondly, will there be specific government-funded training programmes to help smaller venues understand and meet their obligations under the Bill? Thirdly, is it intended that the new measures will integrate with other existing counterterrorism efforts on intelligence sharing and operational co-ordination?

On a specific point, there is a provision in the Bill for enhanced-tier premises to submit revised security plans to the SIA whenever they are changed or created. As my noble friend Lord Parkinson noted, there are concerns about the routine provision of these highly sensitive documents to the SIA. Would it not be better simply to have a dip-sample approach, such that every premises has to update its plan and make it available for a spot check by the SIA? This would have the benefit of reducing the administrative burden on both the participants and the SIA. No doubt that can also be explored in Committee. Finally, will the Government keep these measures under review to ensure they continue to strike the right balance?

While I look forward to the Minister’s responses, I also look forward to continuing the co-operative and iterative cross-party process that the Bill has hitherto enjoyed. I am sure that it will achieve its vital aims effectively and fairly in the end. It is a matter of grave regret that we need to have such a Bill, but it is clear, given the present and enduring terror threat, that we need such a Bill.

20:02

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions in the House today. There has been a great deal of expertise and reflection shown, and the serious issues that have been addressed demand a serious response from the Government.

I particularly thank the noble Lords, Lord Murray and Lord Davies of Gower, for their broad support from the Opposition Front Bench, and the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, for her similar approach to cross-party agreement. There may be some areas that we need to look at and examine between us, but I am grateful, and the House and public need to know that there is a broad support for the Bill from the House.

I start with the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, because she mentioned victims and they have to be at the heart of our consideration in the Bill. The reason for this Bill is to prevent more victims in the future, as she mentioned.

The noble Baroness, Lady May of Maidenhead, held very high office at the time of this atrocity, and I could tell from her contribution how that impacted her and she carried it upon her shoulders. She is one of the few people who has seen the vast vista of the impact of this on individuals, the community and the Government.

I was struck also by the speech from the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester. In reflecting on the impact on his city, he also reflected on something that came out of the contributions of all Members, which is the spirit of this nation and that city to ensure that we have integration and a positive approach to our society, and that we do not bow down to terrorists or their threats but do what the noble Lord, Lord Murray, said, and uphold the security of our people as the first tenet of good government.

Figen Murray has been mentioned and we have focused on her great efforts, but I think she would also recognise Brendan Cox and others who have supported her, and I want to refer to them from the Government Front Bench. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Harris of Richmond and Lady Fox, also mentioned Sir John Saunders, chair of the Manchester Arena inquiry. He deserves our credit and support for focusing the minds of the political class on the solutions to this problem. He said in his report:

“Doing nothing is, in my view, not an option”,


which was repeated by my noble friend Lady Goudie, and he is right: doing nothing is not an option.

Today, after seven years in gestation, two consultations, a Home Affairs Select Committee report and the power of Figen Murray and her campaign team, we have brought to this House and the House of Commons a Bill that will, I hope, address the issues raised by Members and deliver the prevention of victims that began with the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove.

Your Lordships made a number of points and I will try to cover them in broad terms. The points that I will try to address are cost, guidance and communication, enforcement and the SIA, the threshold issue, exclusions, the terror threat and a number of other individual issues that I will come to in due course.

First, I hope I can give confidence to my noble friends Lord Browne of Ladyton and Lady Ritchie that the devolved Administrations were involved in discussions on this at administrative and ministerial level, and will be during the passage of the Bill and in particular during its implementation in due course. But the issues that have been raised are important and I will try to address them in the time that I have.

The cost to business was mentioned by the noble Lords, Lord Frost, Lord Udny-Lister, Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord Davies of Gower—in his Front-Bench contribution—my noble friend Lady Ritchie, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond. The reason we decided to reduce the number of venues in scope was to ensure that costs are proportionate and do not fall on a range of bodies that it would have been disproportionate to hit.

The changes that we made to the Bill that was produced earlier have taken the number of properties or venues in scope from 278,900 to 154,600 in the standard tier and to 24,000 in the enhanced tier. Overall, the costs have therefore decreased from the estimated £2.17 billion over 10 years to £1.83 billion. For standard-duty premises, we estimate the cost to be around £330 per year, in time and money, and around £5,210—not £52,000, which I think one contributor mentioned—for enhanced-duty premises. Those are the costs, but our focus to prevent victims and to ensure that we put in place some preventive measures is relative. We have tried to assess costs and ensure that the Government take as light a touch as possible to achieve our objectives, while acknowledging that obviously there will be some costs.

We have to take these actions. I appreciate the potential difference of opinion between the noble Lords, Lord Frost and Lord Udny-Lister, and me about some of the burdens—as they described them—but I regard this as an important issue of the security of people who use these venues. Therefore, that is a burden, like many other burdens in society, that we have to accept, adopt and adapt to. That is one of the reasons we have tried to make it as limited as possible.

The second issue that was raised was that of guidance. The noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, and the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, all mentioned guidance. Guidance will be set down by the Government on the requirements of the Bill. We will publish it as soon as possible, but I do wish to get it right. I cannot give a timescale on the guidance at this point, because I want to make sure that the Government undertake engagement with key stakeholders across relevant sectors, in industry and in government, to support our understanding of the Bill and the ultimate Act and to address any questions posed.

Guidance was also linked to training. Following pre-legislative scrutiny, it was determined that we did not want to prescribe specific training obligations that applied to both tiers, and that that was not necessary or desirable, but it is entirely reasonable that practical procedures and measures are implemented. Therefore, we will be looking to issue guidance in due course to support identifying suitable training opportunities in an effective and cost-effective way for the individuals concerned. In fact, the noble Baronesses, Lady May of Maidenhead and Lady Harris of Richmond, and the noble Lord, Lord Murray, mentioned that.

There has rightly been a debate about the SIA enforcing and having the ability to oversee this potential legislation. First and foremost, the SIA has a full regulatory approach to this matter. There is a two-year implementation period. That goes back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and the noble Lord, Lord Murray, from the Front Bench. The noble Lords, Lord Udny-Lister, Lord Browne of Ladyton and Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Suttie and Lady May, all mentioned that aspect of the role. We have set out the powers of the SIA in the Bill. It will be given powers to gather information, to inspect premises for such events and to ensure that we assess compliance with powers of entry and interview, consistent with other regulatory regimes.

The SIA will be accountable to Home Office Ministers. This Government have four and a half years left of their term, and this legislation will be implemented after a two-year period as a potential minimum—it may be longer. We will implement the legislation only when the SIA is ready to adopt that role. Home Office Ministers such as myself and my honourable friend Dan Jarvis will be accountable for the performance of the SIA in the period up to it taking on that role, so that the Home Office can make sure that it does the job we want it to do. The SIA has already been engaged in this, it obviously knows the Bill and the direction of travel, and it is working with senior officials in my department to bring forward proposals. It is important that we give the SIA that power.

We can undoubtedly debate this issue further during the passage of the Bill, but we can already understand how the SIA deals with the security industry. Guidance, support, training, point of contact and the inspection regime are issues we will work through and no doubt discuss further in Committee and at Third Reading, but they are solvable and, with political ministerial control, will be about delivery. It is not about passing legislation but delivering an effective mechanism that has that balance between inspection, guidance and training. It is not about setting up an organisation that is not fit for doing that job; we want to make sure that this is a good job done. I hope that will reassure a number of noble Lords who have raised this issue.

The impact of the threshold has been a key issue. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, with his experience, mentioned that, as did the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Frost. The Government have to take a decision on this. Some people have argued for 300 as a minimum threshold, and some for the original figure of 100. I have heard a number of other figures put into the domain at different times. We have had to settle on a figure, and that of 200 is in response to the consultations and the feedback we have had. We have therefore taken out a large number of properties that would have been in the scope. The threshold is something we just have to settle on. I am hopeful that, for all the reasons that have been mentioned, we do not focus so much on the threshold but on the Bill’s ability to encourage good practice as a whole. But we are where we are with the threshold, and colleagues will have to look at that.

The noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, mentioned the 800 figure and the understandable issue that it is in use for maybe one day a year, and there are different thresholds on other days, for perhaps even a month. We have to have a settlement, and we are trying to make things simple. If we had a different regime for different days or months of the year for organisations that might have an 800-plus threshold on certain days of the year, that would overcomplicate the regime we are trying to introduce and create more implementation difficulties downstream. I hear what the noble Lord says, but I hope that he can also hear what I am trying to say about the simplicity of a regime as a whole.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, referred in private discussions, and today on the Floor of the House, to the powers of the Secretary of State—I wrote “SOS” in my notes, and it sometimes it feels like an “SOS” in this job. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Murray, also mentioned the power of the Secretary of State to make those changes. I have heard what individuals have said, but, again, we have had to make a judgment that, at some point, the Secretary of State might need to look at what has happened with the wider terrorist activity in the country and make a determination accordingly. We can revisit that, I am sure, in due course.

My noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey, the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond—there are too many Harrises—the noble Baronesses, Lady May, Lady Newlove and Lady Hamwee, my noble friend Lady Ritchie and the noble Lords, Lord Carlile, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Udny-Lister, all mentioned the wider terrorist threat. There is a growing threat, and New Orleans, Germany and the 10th anniversary of the Charlie Hebdo attack have shown us that that terrorist threat moves. There is a public responsibility, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for all of us to be vigilant about how that threat evolves.

There is a need for us to look at long-term conflict resolution, as my noble friend Lady Ritchie mentioned. There is a need to look at all the terrorist strategy elements that we can, including facial recognition, AI, and stop and search, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, mentioned. Those are all part of the issues we need to look at in the wider terrorist prevention field, which are, in a sense, separate to the Bill but are still drivers for all the reasons why the Bill is necessary. I take that on board and we can have further discussions in due course.

A number of specific issues were mentioned, which I will try to cover in the short time I have left. The first is the issue mentioned, quite rightly, by the noble Baroness, Lady May, and the noble Lords, Lord Carlile, Lord Hogan-Howe, Lord Udny-Lister, and others, about how we design and build terrorist activity out of buildings in new build—it is an extremely important point. The National Planning Policy Framework—the devolved Administrations have their own national policy frameworks—already includes security considerations, as appropriate for new builds, to ensure the health and safety of communities. But I will consider and take away those points as they are very important. They are not in the scope of the Bill but it is important that we talk to the appropriate Ministers in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, and in the devolved Administrations, just to make sure that we are on the ball on those issues.

The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, mentioned the issuing of instructions and the overriding of the tenets of the Bill by the emergency services on the day. It is not the intention of the Bill to have the responsible person, in the event of a terrorist attack, not follow the instructions of the most senior person in the police, fire or other agency that arrives on their doorstep. I make it clear from this Dispatch Box that in that co-operation the lead person should be the responsible professional officer who deals with this on the day. I hope that reassures noble Lords who raised the issue.

We have had some correspondence and discussion around why places of worship are treated differently. We have taken a view—again, it is challengeable in this House but we have—that 200 or more individuals present should be a standard tier impact issue for places of worship, because they play a unique role in our community and across the country. Although they are not invulnerable to attack, I hope that we will continue to work with faith communities to look at how we can help support them in any vulnerability on terrorist issues. I know that is an important issue.

The noble Lords, Lord Frost and Lord Harris, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, asked why schools are treated differently. There are existing safety and safeguarding policies and procedures in place, such as access control measures, lockdown, and evacuation procedures for schools, so we have not tried to impose further burdens because that is good practice that they are already following.

I will reflect on the question of exclusions mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, including this building as a whole, if he will let me, and write to him in due course about those particular issues.

On the civil liability issues mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and others, the Bill provides for new requirements on those responsible for qualifying premises, and the effect of Clause 31 is only to prevent these requirements giving rise to a distinct right of action in civil proceedings. I reassure the noble Lord that no provision in the Bill seeks to remove or limit current civil liability. The noble Lord is looking at me quizzically. The lack of time means that we do not have the opportunity to discuss that in detail now but there will be opportunities to discuss that in due course outside this Chamber.

On the issue about railways, raised by my noble friends Lady Ritchie and Lord Faulkner, I wrote to my noble friend Lord Faulkner on 23 December, as he knows. I hope that has satisfied him but, if it does not, we can potentially look at it further. Heritage railways will be in the scope of the Bill—but the buildings, not the railways, if that helps.

The noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Udny-Lister, mentioned licensing conflicts. The licensing regime is separate. There are different regimes; we do not believe the two regimes will conflict.

On the question raised by a number of noble Lords—they know who they are; I will not list them all—about local authorities, in line with established good practice on new burdens assessment, we will undertake an assessment on that, which is in progress and will be discussed and taken forward further.

Finally, I give thanks to those who have contributed and those outside this House who have put pressure on political leaders to make these changes. To extend a hand of friendship to the noble Lord, Lord Murray, who said as his first words today that the first duty of Government is public safety—I agree. The first duty of this Bill is public safety. The first duty of this House is to help prevent further terrorist atrocities. We want to understand what has happened to date. We want to take action. The Bill will, I hope, ensure that with all the other measures the Government take, we are putting in place a further deterrent to terrorist offences and giving hope to people that we can honour the memory of those who died in Manchester in 2017, including Figen Murray’s son, Martyn Hett. I commend the Bill to the House.

Bill read a second time.

Commitment and Order of Consideration Motion

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

That the bill be committed to a Committee of the Whole House, and that it be an instruction to the Committee of the Whole House that they consider the bill in the following order: Clauses 1 to 4, Schedules 1 and 2, Clauses 5 to 12, Schedule 3, Clauses 13 to 34, Schedule 4, Clauses 35 to 38, Title.

Motion agreed.

House adjourned at 8.23 pm.