Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill Debate

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Department: Home Office
Baroness May of Maidenhead Portrait Baroness May of Maidenhead (Con)
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My Lords, the attacks that took place in Magdeburg and New Orleans over Christmas and the new year, as have been referenced by other noble Lords, show that we cannot be complacent about the terrorist threat. There is a danger, when terrorist attacks do not take place for a period of time, that we are lulled into a false sense of complacency, and we must not be. That is one of the reasons why this Bill is so important. I welcome the fact that the Government have brought it forward so early in their legislative programme, and I welcome the fact that it has such broad cross-party support.

As we debate and talk about this Bill today, my thoughts are with all of those who were the victims and affected by the Manchester Arena terrorist attack. Having visited some of the survivors in hospital shortly after the event, and having met more survivors thereafter subsequently, I realised the absolute horror of what took place on that night and the horror of a terrorist who deliberately focused on attacking children and young people. That night was a traumatic night for all involved, and, of course, as we know, that will be with them for the rest of their lives, but our response has to be that we do what we can to ensure that, in future, if a terrorist attack takes place where an event is taking place of that sort in premises where there are significant numbers of people, fewer people lose their lives and, as far as possible, injuries are reduced. That, of course, is the key focus of this Bill. As Clause 5(2) says:

“The objective is to reduce the risk of physical harm being caused to individuals if an act of terrorism were to occur on the premises, at the event or in the immediate vicinity of the premises or event”.


I also would like to commend Figen Murray and all those who have worked with her for their dogged determination in making sure that this legislation is now before Parliament and is—we all hope, shortly—to reach the statute book.

I want to make just a few points about some aspects of the legislation and slightly more widely too. My first point is about the SIA, and I think that it is important that this House properly considers the role of the SIA and the capacity of the SIA to undertake the tasks that it is being required to do as a result of this Bill, tasks which are different from the original purpose set up for the SIA, which was very much in terms of the licensing and consideration of the suitability of individuals to be part of the security industry. This is a significant expansion of its work, and we need to ensure that it understands and has the training that it needs in order to be able to undertake its tasks in relation to this, and I just ask the Government that they think very carefully about the SIA and its role, because I think it is right that we should debate that and consider it.

I also am concerned that we do not allow or do not see a situation where venues are almost bombarded by consultants who are all too keen to advise them on the steps that they should be taking, regardless of whether those steps are actually what is required in the legislation or not. That will be particularly the case, I think, for smaller venues, whose responsibilities will not be so great but which could be lulled into thinking that they have to do significantly more as a result of the advice that they receive from such consultants. So there is a very real issue there, I think, that has to be considered.

I want also to go a little beyond the Bill, if the Minister and the House will indulge me. This is about premises that exist already. One of the great things we did at London 2012 was to ensure that, when all those new Olympic venues were being built, security was built in and planned in at the earliest stage of planning those buildings. I just wonder whether the Government could look at encouraging—this would probably be in other legislation, perhaps planning or building regulations —efforts to be made at the earliest possible stage to build that security in, particularly for large-scale events venues, so that we do not have to look at it as an afterthought.

I also want to talk about communications, which has been raised by other noble Lords—communications in several senses. The first is communication between those responsible in a venue and the emergency services. I have been thinking of a situation where the people responsible in a venue know what to do, something has happened, and they possibly start evacuating, but the emergency services and the police—who would undoubtedly be, as they always are, the lead in this—might actually wish to see different action being taken. The communication between those two, and the staff in the venue understanding the role of the police and the emergency services and the importance of recognising the primacy of the police in that situation, will be an important part of the education.

One of the issues that arose in the response to the Manchester Arena attack was the lack of communication between the emergency services. Again, this is perhaps not something that is technically for the face of this Bill. But it is an issue that needs to be considered as we look at the whole question of the response at premises should an attack take place, making sure that the rules of engagement, the rules of communication, between the emergency services are rather better understood, and that the proper JESIP training takes place so that we do not see those gaps in communication.

Another point on communication is cyberterrorism, which my noble friend Lord Davies referenced. As we look at and think about the Bill, it is about premises, locking gates, evacuating people, having the right exits and so forth. But some of that will be about communicating, and cyberterrorism could actually mean that the means of communication with members of the public in a venue are affected. Indeed, if perhaps a venue has automatic door-locking systems, they could be affected. So, in looking at what people need to do, it is important that the potential impact of cyberterrorism is looked at as well.

As I said, this is an important Bill. It does something that, on the face of it, seems to be very obvious: that people who are responsible for venues, or for holding large-scale public events, just think about the safety and security of people within those events and about what needs to happen if there is an attack—if something goes wrong. But sadly, as we saw at Manchester Arena and elsewhere, what is obvious is not always done. That is why the Bill is so important, because it will bring home to people the responsibilities they have to ensure the increased safety of those people who attend events at their premises. The responsibility we have is to make sure that this Bill is the best it can be.