Investigatory Powers Bill (Tenth sitting)

Gavin Newlands Excerpts

Committee Debate: 10th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 21st April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

On a point of order, Mr Owen. May I add my remarks to yours? We wish my hon. Friend well and hope that he has a swift recovery from his operation.

Clause 109

Implementation of warrants

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

I beg to move amendment 293, in clause 109, page 87, line 39, leave out subsection (3).

This amendment would remove the provision which allows a targeted equipment interference warrant to be served on a person outside the UK for the purpose of requiring that person to take action outside the UK.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 645, in clause 109, page 87, line 41, at end insert—

“(3A) Subsection (3) shall not be applicable where the person outside the United Kingdom has its principal office where it is established for the provision of services in a country or territory with which the United Kingdom has entered in to an international mutual assistance agreement or is subject to an EU mutual assistance instrument.”

This excludes the extraterritorial provision in cases where any mutual assistance arrangement exists between the UK and the provider’s jurisdiction while enabling the government to seek voluntary assistance from CSPs in non-MLA countries.

Amendment 679, in clause 110, page 88, line 9, at end insert—

“(1A) Where such a warrant is to be served upon a person outside the United Kingdom the warrant shall be served at that person’s principal office outside the United Kingdom, where it is established, for the provision of services.”

Amendment 694, in clause 110, page 88, line 10, at beginning insert—

“Where service of a warrant in the manner envisaged in subsection (1A) is considered unfeasible or inappropriate in the circumstances,”

Amendment 647, in clause 110, page 88, line 10, after “Kingdom”, insert—

“the warrant shall be served at that person’s principal office outside the United Kingdom where it is established, for the provision of services. Where it is considered unfeasible or inappropriate in the circumstances,”

The Home Secretary confirmed at second reading that a UK agency would only serve a notice on an overseas entity that is capable of providing assistance under the warrant. UK agencies today routinely use secure means of communication to transmit notices directly to the main office of overseas CSPs. This would make government’s commitment clear on the face of the Bill (as it is in the relevant code of practice) and address contradictory provisions that remain in the Bill.

Amendment 648, in clause 111, page 89, line 19, after “take”, insert—

“which for a relevant operator outside the United Kingdom shall include—

(a) any steps which would cause the operator to act contrary to any laws or restrictions under the law of the country or territory where it is established, for the provision of services, or

(b) where a warrant could be served pursuant to an international mutual assistance agreement or subject to an EU mutual assistance instrument.”

This amendment clarifies the reasonableness test for overseas CSPs.

[Gavin Newlands]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Owen. May I add to your comments that I will miss the exchanges with the hon. Member for North Dorset? I wish his replacement well.

Clauses 109 and 110 deal with issues about compelling a third party to provide assistance in the execution of a warrant and extraterritoriality, which is the subject of amendment 293. In speaking to the amendment, and to the clause more generally, I will unavoidably stray into matters relating to clause 110, as the two are inextricably linked.

Clause 109 provides the UK Government with the power to issue warrants that in turn force third-party organisations or individuals outside the UK to assist in acquiring information for the means of equipment interference. The clause states that

“any person whom the implementing authority considers may be able to provide such assistance”

can be served with a warrant to assist in carrying out a targeted hacking warrant. Under clause 110(2), this warrant may be served at a person’s principal office or specified address in the UK, or by making it available for inspection in the UK after appropriate steps have been taken to bring the contents of the warrant, and its very existence, to the attention of the person.

First, the problem here is the lack of judicial authorisation in this part of the process. Privacy International rightly points out that this compelled assistance will not be subject to judicial authorisation. Although law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies will have to seek a warrant to gain access to people’s devices and computers, it is correct that those authorities are not required to seek judicial approval to compel technology companies to assist in their investigations.

Secondly, we should be mindful of the difficulty that this places on any individuals or organisations who are forced to comply with the Government’s demands. These issues were heard by the Science and Technology Committee, where serious concerns were raised about the security implications of forcing companies to, for example, upload and install malware, as well as the fear that equipment interference could jeopardise their business model. The Science and Technology Committee took note of these issues and concluded that

“the industry case regarding public fear about ‘equipment interference’ is well founded.”

Amnesty International UK is deeply concerned about the dangerous precedent that this broad, aggressive power will set in forcing third-party companies to engage in hacking without any independent provision or scrutiny, and to do so in secret.

Thirdly, the extraterritorial measures in clauses 109 and 110 may cause more problems than they solve. That is why amendment 293, which stands in my name and that of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West, seeks to delete subsection (3) entirely, thereby removing the extraterritorial aspect. If we serve hacking warrants on those outside the UK, what sort of message does that send to other countries? We need to be mindful that introducing this type of clause could open the floodgates for other countries to follow suit, which will ultimately have an impact on companies based in the UK. That point was articulated by Yahoo!, which said:

“Extraterritoriality encroaches on the sovereign rights of other governments and risks retaliatory action, including against UK CSPs operating overseas.”

On that point, the Government’s independent reviewer’s report suggests that, when countries seek to extend their legislation extraterritorially, those powers may come into conflict with legal requirements in the country in which companies being asked to comply with a legal request are based. Companies explained to the reviewer that they did not consider it was their role to arbitrate between conflicting legal systems. The protection of vital human rights should not be left to the goodwill and judgment of a company. The concerns of the industry were articulated in this perfect quote. The industry

“expressed concerns that unqualified cooperation with the British government would lead to expectations of similar cooperation with authoritarian governments, which would not be in their customers’, their own corporate or democratic governments’ interests.”

I shall finish with this comment from Yahoo! It states:

“The current legal framework comprises the law in the requesting country, law in the receiving country and the international agreements that connect the two.”

It is additionally possible that the requesting and receiving countries’ laws may be in conflict. For example, the receiving country’s law may outlaw the provision of content data outside their own legal process. It continues:

“Taken as a whole, this framework is fragmented, with gaps and conflicts which have gone unaddressed for many years. In this more global communications environment, this fragmentation has become more and more obvious and creates a patchwork of overlapping and conflicting laws which overseas and domestic UK CSPs must navigate in order to discharge their legal obligations to safeguard users’ privacy and to respond appropriately to valid requests for access to data… It also creates a complex environment for users to navigate and establish their privacy rights.”

This issue is global, and national laws cannot resolve global issues.

[Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)]

I will be brief. Members will have observed that the amendments in my name are in keeping with my previous amendments about implementation, service and extraterritoriality in relation to other warrants. I will not repeat the points I made then. The only one that is different is amendment 646, a simple proposed change to clause 109 that would add the provision:

“A warrant may be implemented only to the extent required for the purpose for which the warrant was issued.”

I think that may be implicit. If the Minister could indicate that that is his understanding, that might allay concerns and the amendment would not need to be pressed.

[The Minister for Security (Mr John Hayes)]

As the hon. and learned Gentleman says, we have been down this road before. I well recall discussing similar amendments to the targeted interception provisions in part 2. The Bill maintains the existing position in relation to extraterritorial jurisdiction and those obligations that apply to overseas companies. I am unhesitating in my view that overseas companies, because of their important role in communications, must do their bit to do the right thing, as I said previously and memorably. As a result, I will not tire the Committee by going into that argument in great detail.

Amendment 293 to clause 109 seeks to remove the ability to serve a warrant on an overseas provider and amendment 645 seeks to remove the ability to serve a warrant on an overseas provider when a mutual legal assistance agreement is in place. I draw the Committee’s attention once again to David Anderson’s comments in his report, in paragraph 11.26:

“There is little dispute that the MLAT route is currently ineffective.”

I will not quote it at length but he goes on to say that it is because it is too slow and so on. I do not think that those amendments are in line with either his view or mine.

The effect of accepting the first amendment is evident. It would mean we could serve an equipment interference warrant only on a provider based in the UK. The second amendment seeks to assert mutual legal assistance arrangements as the only route. For the reasons I have already given, that is not appropriate.

The hon. and learned Gentleman asked, in the context of his amendment, whether that matter was implicit. Yes, it is implicit and I can confirm what he thought might be the case.

The arguments have already been made and, on careful reconsideration, the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North will realise that his amendment and argument are pseudodox and will withdraw on that basis.

[Gavin Newlands]

I thank the Minister for that response and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[The Chair]

We now come to amendment 646 to clause 109. I call Keir Starmer.

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Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Gavin Newlands]

I can deal with this in fairly short order. The Scottish National party tabled an amendment to leave out the clause, which places a duty on telecoms operators to assist with the implementation of equipment interference warrants. We agree with those in the industry who are rightly concerned about being forced by the state to engage in the legal hacking of customers and other individuals and groups.

The Bill defines a telecoms operator as

“a person who…offers or provides a telecommunications service to persons in the United Kingdom, or…controls or provides a telecommunication system which is (wholly or partly)…in the United Kingdom, or…controlled from the United Kingdom.”

That flexible and all-encompassing definition means that not only online companies such as Google, Facebook, Twitter, Dropbox and Yahoo!, but private offices, businesses, law firms, the networks of Departments such as the NHS and institutional networks such as those of universities would be forced to comply with the Government’s instructions to interfere with or hack the communications of an individual or group. That was confirmed by the Home Secretary in her evidence to the Joint Committee that scrutinised the draft Bill. That power will place those companies, whose services most, if not all, of our constituents use, in a deeply unsettling and invidious position.

I am not convinced that any of our constituents would be pleased to hear that we were passing legislation that would allow their email accounts or Facebook pages to engage in illegal hacking on behalf of the state. The extraordinarily expansive power that the clause gives the Government will force companies to engage in highly controversial work on their behalf, which will no doubt be in conflict with the interests of cybersecurity and product security that the companies work hard to innovate in, protect and extend. Forcing these companies to engage in legal hacking could seriously harm their business and operations. It will also lead to some of their customers and users losing trust in their businesses. I am not surprised that companies have long expressed deep concern about the powers laid out in the clause, as it is in direct conflict with their business interests. For those reasons, the SNP would like to see the clause deleted from the Bill.

[Mr Hayes]

I have nothing to add.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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[The Chair]

I call Joanna Cherry.

[Gavin Newlands]

I shall do my best impression of her, Mr Owen, but I fear it will be inadequate.

I beg to move amendment 296, in clause 113, page 91, line 22, at end insert—

“(A1) Material obtained via a warrant under this Part may only be shared with overseas authorities in accordance with the terms of an international information sharing treaty.”

This amendment would require that information obtained via an equipment interference warrant is only shared with overseas authorities where a mutual legal assistance treaty has been put in place for the purpose of doing so.

Clause 113 deals in part with the overriding issue of information obtained through equipment interference being shared with overseas authorities. We should take note of the oral and written evidence submitted by Amnesty International on this point about the lack of any proper controls over intelligence sharing with foreign authorities. The human rights implications may be very serious indeed. For example, there is nothing in the Bill to prevent data being shared with an overseas authority when that might lead to the abuse, or possibly torture, of an individual or group. Surely we should set an example by ensuring that data gathering does not lead to torture; that should be the minimum standard expected of a civilised country such as ours.

However, if the SNP and Amnesty International are a little left-wing for hon. Members’ tastes, I give them the Intelligence and Security Committee, which also criticised the lack of clarity on this point when it noted that the Bill

“does not…meet the recommendations made in the Committee’s Privacy and Security Report that future legislation must set out these arrangements more explicitly, defining the powers and constraints governing such exchanges.”

The written evidence submitted by Yahoo! and others expressed concern that the Government’s apparently unilateral assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction

“will create conflicting legal obligations for overseas providers who are subject to legal obligations elsewhere.”

David Anderson has also noted the lack of detail in this section of the Bill. He called for information sharing with foreign countries to be subject to strict, clearly defined and published safeguards. His report states:

“The new law should make it clear that neither receipt nor transfer as referred to in Recommendations 76-77…should ever be permitted or practised for the purpose of circumventing safeguards on the use of such material in the UK.”

However, such safeguards and guarantees are notably absent from the Bill. Furthermore, the independent reviewer’s report described the international trade in intelligence between the “Five Eyes” partners—the UK, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In so far as material gathered by the British services is shared with other countries, the report explained that the security services take the view that, under their founding statutes, information should be shared only if it

“is necessary for the purpose of the proper discharge of the security and intelligence agencies’ functions.”

When it is considered that the test is met, certain safeguards apply under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. However, the report concluded that

“in practical terms, the safeguards applying to the use of such data are entirely subject to the discretion of the Secretary of State.”

The 2000 Act and the codes of practice are silent on British services receiving or accessing information from foreign services, with security services limited only by the general constraints placed on their actions by various statutes. It was only during Liberty’s legal action against the security services in the Investigatory Powers Tribunal that limited information was revealed about the way in which the security services approach such situations. In its first finding against the agencies, the IPT held that, prior to these disclosures, the framework for information sharing was not sufficiently foreseeable and was not therefore in accordance with law. The tribunal held that, because the litigation had resulted in disclosures of information, the security services were no longer acting unlawfully when accessing information from the US. Based on the concerns that Amnesty International, Liberty and others have raised, the SNP has tabled amendment 296, which would insert a new subsection into clause 113. The language of the amendment is plain.

[Keir Starmer]

I have listened carefully to the hon. Gentleman’s comments. On the sharing of information with authorities that may engage in torture or other serious ill-treatment, can the Minister confirm the long-standing practice that our security and intelligence services do not share information where there is a risk of torture, because of their obligations under other international treaties, and that this provision sits within that framework of assurances?

[Mr Hayes]

I can confirm that, and I can say a little more. My residual generosity is such that I take the view that these amendments are well intentioned, but they are unnecessary. Let me say why.

Clause 113 already provides that the Secretary of State must ensure that satisfactory and equivalent handling arrangements are in place before sharing UK equipment interference material with an overseas authority. The Secretary of State must determine that they provide corresponding satisfactory protections. Furthermore, those obligations sit alongside those in, for example, the consolidated guidance to intelligence officers and service personnel on the detention and interviewing of detainees overseas, and on the passing and receipt of intelligence relating to detainees, as well as the gateway provisions that allow for intelligence sharing in the Intelligence Services Act 1994 and the Security Service Act 1989.

In addition, the overseas security and justice assistance guidance provides an overarching mechanism that sets out which human rights and international humanitarian law risks should be considered prior to providing justice or security sector assistance. This is supplemented by the draft code of practice on equipment interference, which is clear about the safeguards on the handling of information. It seems to me that the protections, absolutely necessary though they are, are comprehensively dealt with by that variety of means, rendering the amendment unnecessary. I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.

[Gavin Newlands]

I thank the Minister for his comments, and I am somewhat reassured, but I still do not understand the Government’s reticence about putting this in the Bill; it is only a sentence that is required. Nevertheless, we are minded to withdraw the amendment at this time. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 113 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 114

Duty not to make unauthorised disclosures

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move amendment 649, in clause 114, page 91, line 42, after “not”, insert “without reasonable excuse”.

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[Keir Starmer]

I have said all that I need to say on the amendment. Members of the Committee will appreciate that the amendment has been tabled for each of the offence provisions for the reasons I set out the first time we encountered it. That was dealt with by the Solicitor General, so I shall say no more about it at this stage.

[Gavin Newlands]

I will not detain the Committee long. I hear what the hon. and learned Gentleman says and broadly agree with it. I rise merely to point out the differences between the two amendments before us. The SNP’s amendment would insert an additional subsection that adds the additional defence and leaves subsection (3) in, whereas the Labour amendment removes that.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras. We are familiar with the arguments and our response is that the information gateway, which allows people to take concerns directly to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, caters for the public interest. For that reason I urge him to withdraw the amendment.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Eighth sitting)

Gavin Newlands Excerpts

Committee Debate: 8th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 19th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Starmer]

I cannot double check on my feet, but that sounds like the further evidence that was put before the Joint Committee when it was in the middle of its deliberations. In fairness, the Home Office did go beyond websites to include some, maybe all, of the matters to which the hon. and learned Lady just referred.

The way this will operate in practice is a cause of real concern. The Secretary of State, without the double check of a judicial commissioner, and operating against a low-level threshold—clause 53(7)—can issue a retention order that will permit the retention of a record of all the websites that somebody has visited. That record will then be kept for 12 months, albeit with a different test if it is to be accessed later.

The amendments—I think you have called them the first set of amendments, Ms Dorries—are intended to construct in the first instance a different framework around this power, because it is so extensive, and put it in the hands of a judicial commissioner rather than the Secretary of State. That would provide a greater safeguard in relation to clause 78, with independent oversight through the function of the judicial commissioner. Alternatively, amendments 152, 153 and 222 would give the Investigatory Powers Commissioner some oversight. In other words, the intention behind these amendments is to put some rigour and independence into the exercise of what is a very wide power that, in fact, is the starting point for the exercise of all the other powers under the parts of the Bill that we are now concerned with.

Anxiety has been expressed on a number of occasions about cost. Huge amounts of data could be required for retention under clause 78. The Government have estimated the cost at £170 million. That is considered to be a gross underestimate by those who will no doubt be called upon to actually retain the data. For those reasons, these amendments are intended to tighten up a clause that is very wide and very loose. It permits a huge amount of data to be retained, including websites visited by you, by me, or by our constituents.

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

It is a great pleasure to rise as part of this ongoing scrutiny, and to offer my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West brief respite in this Committee. It is also a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Dorries. It is great to follow the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras, who in his customary fastidious and engaging manner has covered in a short space of time all the aspects of many amendments. Some of that bears repeating, and I will speak to new clause 10, which is tabled in my name and that of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West.

My hon. and learned Friend spoke at length about the important role that the judiciary, in the form of judicial commissioners, should bring to this process. We do not think it is good enough that the Bill only proposes to use judicial commissioners to review the process used by the Secretary of State in making a decision. The Government may claim that it is important that the Home Secretary retains the power to issue retention notices to internet service providers, as it will ensure that democratic accountability is a salient feature of the process, but I do not accept that to be the case. In fact, I would argue that because of the political arena that any Home Secretary operates in, it is right that this power is handed to and delegated to an independent official such as a judicial commissioner.

It is also worth noting that we know very little of the various notices that the Home Secretary issues, and as such there is no possible opportunity to hold her to account for them. Building the role of judicial commissioners into this part of the process will help to ensure that we have appropriate checks and balances when it comes to the retention of communications data. This is vitally important, because it is the proper constitutional function of the independent judiciary to act as a check on the use of intrusive and coercive powers by state bodies, and to oversee the application of law to individuals and organisations. Liberty rightly points out that judges are professionally best equipped to apply the legal tests of necessity and proportionality to ensure that any surveillance is conducted lawfully.

I turn now to new clause 7. Schedule 4 provides a lengthy list of bodies that are able to access or retain data, including several Government Departments, such as the Department for Transport, and a range of regulatory bodies, such as the Food Standards Agency and the Gambling Commission. This suggests that access to communications data may be allowed for a range of purposes which may be disproportionate and inconsistent with the guidance offered by the European Court of Human Rights.

[Mr Hayes]

I draw the hon. Gentleman’s attention to clause 79, which we are not debating at the moment but which is directly relevant to the point he made about proportionality. Clause 79(1)(a) states:

“(1) Before giving a retention notice, the Secretary of State must, among other matters, take into account—

(a) the likely benefits of the notice”.

To me, that would be a pretty strong way of enforcing proportionality. Yet the hon. Gentleman is in his peroration claiming that that would not be taken into account, or not sufficiently so.

[Gavin Newlands]

I am grateful for the Minister’s intervention. I appreciate that that is a safeguard, but we must ask whether those Departments should be getting access in the first place.

[Mr Hayes]

I do not want to be unnecessarily brutal with the hon. Gentleman, but either he is making an argument about proportionality or he is not. If he is saying that nothing is proportional, then it should not happen at all, that is hardly an argument about proportionality. Those of us who take a more measured view of these things are considering whether such collection and access to data are proportionate. Proportions by their nature require an assessment of balance, do they not? Yet the hon. Gentleman is suggesting that the scales are weighted all on one side.

[Gavin Newlands]

The Minister did not actually address why these Departments need access to these data in the first place. I appreciate the point that he is making, but these Departments should not, in my view, require access to this information.

[Joanna Cherry]

The Minister talked about the duty to take into account the likely benefits of the notice, but does my hon. Friend agree that something may be beneficial without being necessary?

[Gavin Newlands]

I agree with my hon. and learned Friend. We are not opposed to every measure in the Bill. There are benefits, but unfortunately they are not covered by enough safeguards and are not drawn tightly enough. I would like to make progress but I will give way once more.

[Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)]

I apologise if I missed the hon. Gentleman outlining the Departments, but could he tell me which ones should be excluded and not have access to this?

[Gavin Newlands]

That has been dealt with at length. I have already mentioned the Food Standards Agency as one of the regulatory bodies. Schedule 4 does currently provide a lengthy list of bodies that should be able to access the data. New clause 7 would ensure that only the police forces and security agencies may request a communications data warrant, except where the warrant is issued for the purpose of preventing death, in which circumstances emergency and rescue services also fall within the definition.

New clause 10 outlines the requirements that must be met by warrants.

[Simon Hoare]

As, for example, the Food Standards Agency cannot itself bring a prosecution, may I conjure in the hon. Gentleman’s mind a situation whereby a criminal gang, as part of its activities, seeks to bring into the United Kingdom for sale to the British public a contaminated food source? Is that not something to which the Food Standards Agency should have access to information in order to ensure that citizens and consumers are safe?

[Gavin Newlands]

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, but surely the police would be interested in that scenario and would have access.

[Simon Hoare]

In the abstract—by golly, isn’t this debate being held in the abstract?—the hon. Gentleman is absolutely right, but we invest the powers with the agency. The police are not an infinite resource. If we have the many who are charged with multiple areas of our lives—

[Simon Hoare]

Forgive me. The hon. Gentleman knows my point.

[Gavin Newlands]

These powers are very large and we should limit who has access to them. The police can pass on the relevant information to the agencies that can deal with that particular incident, but in my view, only the police and security forces should have access. I want to finish my point on new clause 10 but I will allow one last intervention.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Order. May I just ask that interventions be kept short, please, or we will be here all night? Mr Newlands.

[Gavin Newlands]

I appreciate what the hon. Lady says but, as I am not a lawyer, I am struggling to distinguish the difference between Scottish and English law. Perhaps my colleague could address that.

[Joanna Cherry]

My hon. Friend will no doubt agree that, in Scotland at least, it is the police who investigate serious crime, under the direction of the Lord Advocate.

[Victoria Atkins]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Gavin Newlands]

The point has been dealt with, and I think we need to move on. The effect of new clause 10 —[Interruption.] I will finish, amid the chuntering. These new clauses require data retention notices to be issued only for specific investigative or operational purposes, to obtain specified data where those data are believed to be of substantial value. We do not believe, however, that the role of communications data in the investigation of crime justifies the Secretary of State’s mandate for blanket retention of historical communications data for the entire population for 12 months.

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[Keir Starmer]

Clause 78 is important for all the reasons that I have set out, but at this stage, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Gavin Newlands]

I beg to move amendment 303, in clause 78, page 61, line 12, leave out—

“of all data or any description of data”

and insert

“of specified relevant communications data”.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 304, in clause 78, page 61, line 14, leave out paragraph (2)(d).

Amendment 305, in clause 78, page 61, line 16, leave out paragraph (2)(e).

[Gavin Newlands]

I will not detain the Committee for too long; these issues have already largely been addressed. Amendments 304 and 305 seek to remove paragraphs (d) and (e) from clause 78(2). In a Bill replete with vagueness, those two subsections stand out as being particularly vague. The new clause that I will come to in a moment would require a data retention notice—or warrant, as we would wish—to be issued only for a specific investigative or operational purpose. The SNP has tabled amendments that will bring greater clarity to when and why a warrant would be issued.

As we know, communications data are defined as data that would be used to identify, or assist in identifying, the who, where and how. However, instead of allowing a blanket surveillance approach that treats everyone as a suspect, the amendments would allow the police to apply to a judicial commissioner for targeted retention warrants, in which data are required for the purposes of a specific investigation into serious crime, or for the purpose of preventing death or injury. I trust that these amendments are acceptable to the Government.

[The Solicitor General]

I rise to address the concerns of the hon. Gentleman. It is good to hear from him; I should have said that during the last group. He has made the point about his concerns of vagueness. However, I would argue that it is very important that a notice can have a degree of flexibility within it, because a single telecommunications operator may provide a number of different communications services, such as mobile telephony and internet access. However, there may be different complexities and sensitivities about the different types of communications data that are generated by those services. Considerable preliminary work is carried out between the Government and telecoms operators in advance of the service of a retention notice. That covers a number of issues, including the type of data that will be retained, the complexities of the operator’s systems, and the relevant security requirements. Flexibility is needed to ensure that the notice can appropriately reflect those issues, and that it imposes the minimum requirements necessary to meet the operational requirements.

What we are counter-intuitively getting at is to make sure that there is necessary give and take within the system to prevent what the hon. Gentleman and I would regard as an overweening approach from the Secretary of State, which would impede the ability of communications service providers to carry out their operations. For that reason, I respectfully urge him to withdraw the amendment.

[Gavin Newlands]

I hear what the Solicitor General has said, but I do not wholly agree with him. I reserve the right to bring this back at a later stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Joanna Cherry]

I beg to move amendment 306, in clause 78, page 61, line 18, at end insert—

‘(2A) A retention notice may not require a telecommunications operator to retain any data belonging to a third party data, unless that third party data is retained by the telecommunications operator for their own business purposes.”

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[Gavin Newlands]

I beg to move amendment 317, in clause 78, page 61, line 34, leave out “(or description of operators)” and insert “or operators”.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 315, in clause 78, page 61, line 37, leave out “(or description of operators)” and insert “or operators”.

Amendment 319, in clause 78, page 61, line 42, leave out “(or description of operators)” and insert “or operators”.

Amendment 328, in clause 79, page 62, line 33, leave out “(or description of operators)” and insert “or operators”.

Amendment 338, in clause 80, page 62, line 42, leave out subsection (3).

Amendment 361, in clause 83, page 64, line 16, leave out “(or description of operators)” and insert “or operators”.

Amendment 374, in clause 83, page 65, line 1, leave out “(or description of operators)” and insert “or operators”.

Amendment 375, in clause 83, page 65, line 8, leave out “(or description of operators)” and insert “or operators”.

[Gavin Newlands]

The SNP has tabled the amendments to provide for clear, appropriate and limited grounds on which data retention warrants may be issued. The amendments require that the data to be retained are specified and that organisations served with warrants to retain communications data should be identified rather than merely described.

Amendments 315 and 317 affirm that organisations that have been served a notice or warrant to retain the communications of their customers are properly and explicitly identified. The term “description of operators” is far too vague and we urge that it is changed to “or operators”. Amendment 328 ensures that those organisations are defined and named before a retention notice can be issued. Amendment 338 removes the possibility of the Home Secretary being able merely to describe the telecommunications operators that she wants to target. Amendments 361, 374 and 375 provide the basis for a concrete description to be included when there is any variation of a notice.

The amendments attempt to bring to the Bill some clarity, which is sadly lacking. It is not good enough that the Home Secretary can sign a notice that merely describes who is impinged on or directly affected by these intrusive powers, because that approach opens up the space for the powers to be abused. We need to act to ensure that, as much as possible, we operate a targeted approach.

[The Solicitor General]

I understand the purpose behind the amendment in that, in the opinion of the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North, it would ensure greater specificity in the giving of notices. However, I shall give a brief example of what a “description of operators” might be. With this provision we would have been able to give the same retention notice to all wi-fi providers supplying wi-fi to the Olympic park in London during the 2012 Olympics. In these circumstances the operators are providing precisely the same kind of communications service and the data required to be retained are the same. Whether a notice relates to a description of operators or to a single operator, it can only contain what the Bill’s provisions allow and the Secretary of State must consult with the operators to which it relates. Operators also have the opportunity to refer the notice back to him or her in relation to any aspect of it. Therefore, on that basis, I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

[Gavin Newlands]

I am content to withdraw the amendments at this stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Keir Starmer]

I rise to speak to amendment 152, in clause 78, page 61, line 36, at end insert “, and

(c) only when approved by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.

(5A) In deciding whether to approve a notice, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must determine whether a notice is—

(a) that the conduct required by the notice is necessary for one or more of the purposes in section 53(7); and

(b) that the conduct required by the notice is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by that conduct.”

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Amendment not moved.

[Gavin Newlands]

I beg to move amendment 320, in clause 78, page 62, line 13, leave out subsection (9) and insert—

“(9) In this Part ‘relevant communications data’ means—

(a) communications data of the kind mentioned in the Schedule to the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/859), or

(b) relevant internet data not falling within paragraph (a).

(9A) In this part ‘relevant internet data’ means communications data which may be used to identify, or assist in identifying, the sender or recipient of a communication (whether or not a person).”

Thus far while debating the clause we have covered providing for the judiciary, in the shape of judicial commissioners, to issue data retention warrants rather than notices, and removing the Secretary of State from the role, making it clear on the face of the Bill who is eligible to apply for a warrant; limiting the grounds for the issuing of warrants; ensuring that all targets are identified and not described; and that the data to be retained should be specified. The fact that we in opposition have had to table so many amendments highlights the main problem in the drafting of the Bill: vagueness. The Bill is wholly lacking in specificity and clarity and nothing highlights that more than the issue of internet connection records.

As trailed by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West during the debate on clause 54, the SNP has significant reservations about the provisions on internet connection records as drafted in the Bill. Not only are the definition and legality of the provisions unclear, but the Government's case for ICRs has simply not been made. Amendment 320, which stands in my name and that of my hon. and learned Friend, would effectively remove ICRs from the Bill and replicate the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 in its original form, to ensure that the definition of “relevant communications data” is consistent with current legislation. That will help provide the legal certainty and clarity that the industry needs to understand its legal obligations appropriately. At the moment the industry is having difficulty in understanding what exactly the Government want and require it to do. Although the industry is willing to work with the Government to try to implement their vision for ICRs, it does not know what ICRs are, and it looks as though the Government do not altogether know either.

Despite the significance of ICRs, very little detail about them has been provided, with the Government consistently saying that the detail can be worked out later. That lack of clarity is simply not good enough when the Government are asking us to sign off on legislation that will have a significant impact on the industry and impinge significantly on the right to basic privacy that our constituents, quite rightly, expect. Indeed, the Internet Service Providers Association says:

“The Investigatory Powers Bill deals with highly complex technical matters, however, our members do not believe that complexity should lead to a Bill lacking in clarity.”

I could not agree more. As has been mentioned already, the clearest definition of an ICR is not in the Bill itself but in the document “Operational Case for the Retention of Internet Connection Records” from the Home Office. That describes ICRs as

“a record of the internet services that a specific device connects to – such as a website or instant messaging application – generated and processed by the company providing access to the internet.”

A concrete definition of what specific data form an ICR, exactly who has access, precisely what for and exactly who must retain the data must be on the face of the Bill.

The Home Office may want to have a “flexible” definition, as typified in clause 54(6), but given that we are dealing with a Bill that may have the biggest impact on civil liberties than any other Bill for generations, that simply will not cut the mustard. The Intelligence and Security Committee helpfully referred to ICRs as providing information on the “who, when and where” of someone’s internet use. The Government claim that they have no plans to acquire the content of the said communications, but DRIPA and RIPA suggest that that does not matter, given that acquiring the sort of information that is going to be held under an ICR can provide important details on the date, time, location and type of communication used. Liberty suggests that ICRs will provide a detailed and revealing picture of somebody’s life in the digital age. That point was highlighted by the Information Commissioner when he said that ICRs can reveal a great deal about the behaviours and activities of an individual. In fact, Stewart Baker, former senior counsel to the United States National Security Agency, stated that it

“absolutely tells you everything about somebody’s life. If you have enough metadata, you don’t really need content.”

Based on those statements alone, it is important to assess the proportionality and necessity of ICRs, but also question whether they are in accordance with the law. We live in a digital world and, quite rightly, our constituents place a lot of importance on their right to privacy as they use the internet. We accept that the security authorities need adequate powers to keep us safe and it is only proper that the Government consider what new powers they need for the digital age. However, like most people, I am deeply concerned about the complete lack of specifics about ICRs. In publishing such widely drafted legislation and telling the sector that the detail will come shortly, the Government are asking us all to trust them. They are asking us, as Members of this House, to pass and approve legislation without knowing what its full impact, costs or consequences—unintended or otherwise—will be. In effect, they are asking us to sign a blank cheque on much of the communications data powers. Is that really a proper and effective way to devise and develop legislation that has such civil liberty repercussions?

The SNP is not opposed to certain authorities having the power to obtain communications data or internet connection information critical to their investigations. We fully accept that some power is not only necessary, but crucial, for law enforcement in the 21st century. However, rather than a blanket collection of the websites that everyone in the UK has visited in the last 12 months, we prefer a specific, targeted solution. We agree that intercepting someone’s communication data can be an important part of any criminal investigation and it is important that we do that for those suspected of being engaged in criminal activity. There is an obvious difference, though, in intercepting the communications of those suspected of criminal activity and those of the vast majority of our constituents, who are, by and large, law-abiding citizens.

The Government are asking companies to hold and retain information on all the internet sites that an individual visits. It is unclear how much information the Government want those companies to hold, but it is clear that it is going to be a huge amount of data and we still do not know about the feasibility or costs involved. The sort of information that the Government want companies to retain could be sites that the person has mistakenly accessed; it could be a website that the person has spent only a few seconds on; it could also be an internet site that a person has accessed for deeply personal reasons, such as receiving advice on domestic violence or on health matters. Putting the sensitivity and privacy argument to one side, we need to consider whether the Government are going to have too much information at their disposal and thus, inadvertently, make it harder for our security services to complete their investigations.

During the evidence session I made a point about mobile devices always being connected to the internet via various apps, following a similar point made by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras. Those applications are constantly creating ICRs and that will increase as phones become even more advanced and able to process more information more quickly, with bigger memories.

It is unclear how many automatic ICRs are being created by my phone alone, but the Government are demanding that the various communications companies retain these ICRs for a period of 12 months. Conversations with people in the industry have shown that companies have yet to figure out how they will separate the automatic data that are generated through a third-party app from the data that are generated manually by a user. According to the definitions in the Bill, both will generate the same data, showing that the user has accessed an app and recording the date, location, time and so on of that use.

Another industry expert told me that a single app could generate up to 100 ICRs per minute—that is just one single app. I am unsure of the figures for over here, but in America there is an average of 27 apps on every smartphone. If it is the same in the UK, and taking into account the average number of apps and possible connections, this could lead to 2,700 ICRs per phone per minute, or 100,000 ICRs per phone per day. Well over 3 million ICRs could be generated just by the phones in this room. The third party app issue has been raised by the industry time and time again, but it has not been properly addressed by the Government. In evidence given to this Committee, the CEO of BT security, which has been working with the Government, said in response to the third party app issue:

“We are considering whether to propose an amendment to the Home Office on the third party data question, which is the case in point here, and how that should be approached. We think that the principle is that other providers who have that data are the ones who should be subject to it, and that it should be explicit in the Bill”.

I then pressed him on whether at the moment the Bill was not clear enough on that aspect. He replied:

“It could be clearer, and we are thinking about proposing an amendment specifically to over-the-top providers, making it clear that they are responsible for that”.––[Official Report, Investigatory Powers Public Bill Committee, 24 March 2016; c. 49, Q137-138.]

I have to say, if BT are unsure who is involved, how are the rest of the industry supposed to know? We have to ask whether or not it is necessary or proportionate for the Government to have information and data on the apps that I or anyone else has on their phone. Given these points, among others, I can understand why so many people are calling ICRs a Home Office solution to a police problem, instead of being a police solution to a police problem. This point was articulated during the evidence session by Sara Ogilvie of Liberty, who said:

“It seems clear that, given the bulk nature of these powers, they will not deliver that kind of information in a helpful manner. If anything, it seems more likely to drive criminals to use bits of the internet that will not be captured by the service”.––[Official Report, Investigatory Powers Public Bill Committee, 24 March 2016; c. 15, Q31.]

We also need to be mindful of the amount of information that we want to expose and the potential for this to be targeted by criminal hackers. When a similar plan to collect web logs was proposed in 2012, the Joint Committee on the draft Communications Data Bill concluded that it would create a

“honeypot for casual hackers, blackmailers, criminals large and small from around the world, and foreign states”.

This wealth of data in the wrong hands could be used for identity theft, scamming, fraud, blackmail and even burglaries, as connection records can show when internet access occurs in or out of the house, representing a daily routine. This is an unacceptable level of risk to inflict on innocent internet users. The Chair of the Science and Technology Committee said:

“There remain questions about the feasibility of collecting and storing Internet Connection Records (ICRs), including concerns about ensuring security for the records from hackers. The Bill was intended to provide clarity to the industry, but the current draft contains very broad and ambiguous definitions of ICRs, which are confusing communications providers. This must be put right for the Bill to achieve its stated security goals”.

Furthermore, not to be outdone, the Joint Committee tasked with scrutinising the draft Communications Data Bill said in its final report that,

“storing web log data, however securely, carries the possible risk that it may be hacked into or may fall accidentally into the wrong hands, and that, if this were to happen, potentially damaging inferences about people’s interests or activities could be drawn”.

Surely with these warnings, which were issued by such influential and important Committees, the Government should have listened and addressed some of their concerns, but it would seem not. With regard to some of the case studies laid out in “Operational Case for the Retention of Internet Connection Records”, the likelihood of ICRs proving vital in identifying criminals has been questioned by ISPs and technologists. The justification for ICRs being helpful relies on the assumption that online criminals offend using a regular browser or public file sharing service on their own device, using personal internet connections, without employing the most basic of the widely available anonymity tools to avoid detection. The use of VPNs or Tor helps anonymise users of the internet. As such, ICRs will be unusable and, in fact, misleading where such privacy tools have been used. It is obvious for all to see that the more information that is retained, the greater the costs entailed to either the industry or the taxpayer.

When I spoke to people at TechUK last week, they explained that the introduction of ICRs will be a significant change to the industry and that all organisations will have to re-adapt to meet the new expectations and responsibilities that are being put on them. In addition, they are concerned about the new types of technology that they will need to install to allow them to cope with the new demands from Government. For example, they are concerned that many in the industry will have to install new filtering systems to help companies deal with the vast amount of data they now have to retain. It is difficult even to question the feasibility of such demands due to the limited information and detail provided by the Home Office.

--- Later in debate ---

On resuming—

[Gavin Newlands]

This is the first speech I have made in this place that has required an intermission. It has been suggested that I start from the beginning as I cannot remember where I had got to. I am nothing but a crowd pleaser, Ms Dorries, but I have found the place where I left off, so I shall continue.

I was saying that the question whether the Bill is in accordance with the law is up for debate. If this part is left unchanged, Liberty and others suggest that it will be in conflict with human rights law, including breaching the EU charter of fundamental rights and freedoms. In July 2015, the High Court upheld its challenge and struck down sections 1 and 2 of the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, finding them incompatible with the British public’s right to respect for private life and communications, and protection of personal data under articles 7 and 8 of the EU charter of fundamental rights.

In addition, we should be mindful that the challenge against DRIPA is ongoing and that the outcome will have an impact on whether this part of the Bill is lawful, although I suspect not. On that basis, I question whether ICRs will do the job the Government intend them to do. The Home Office has become entrenched with regard to ICRs and its fixation with them is clouding its ability not only to look at alternatives, but to assess whether ICRs are proportionate, necessary or in accordance with the law. The SNP believes that ICRs fail those three basic assessments.

I want to quote an unlikely ally, who, in 2009, said in Committee:

“Our consideration of the regulations comes against the backdrop of an increasingly interventionist approach by the Government into all of our lives, seemingly taking the maxim ‘need to know’ to mean that they need to know everything. Certainly, we need to know what the Government’s intentions are in relation to the creation of a new central database, which would create a central store of our electronic communications.”—[Official Report, Fourth Delegated Legislation Committee, 16 March 2009; c. 6.]

That ally was none other than the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire), now Minister for Immigration at the Home Office, speaking in a Delegated Legislation Committee on an EC directive with very similar provisions to parts of this Bill. That statutory instrument was passed by the House, but notable opponents included Members who are now Scottish Secretary, Home Secretary and Minister for Security—the Minister in charge of this Bill.

We in the SNP are mindful of the evidence that has been presented and submitted to the Committee, but it is our opinion, backed up by case law, that the power to retain ICRs is incompatible with the right to privacy and the protection of personal data, and I urge hon. Members to amend the Bill and ask the Government to think again.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to hon. Members for this important debate, which, although it relates to an amendment, inevitably strayed into what is, in effect, the stand part debate on communications data.

The hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North set out his case comprehensively, but his arguments relate to measures and proposals that are not before the Committee. We have moved a long way from 2009, and certainly from 2012, when the original draft Bill was considered by a predecessor Joint Committee. We are not in the situation where the Government will hold a centralised database. That sort of measure was rightly opposed by my right hon. Friend the Minister for Immigration and other of my hon. Friends at that time, because we are naturally suspicious of an organ of Government directly blanket-holding such data.

That is why this provision is not remotely like that. It does not contain anything like the provisions that the hon. Gentleman rightly cautions against, most importantly because the retention of that data is not in the hands of Government. That arm’s length approach is a key difference, which I am afraid undermines all the seeming quality of his argument.

[Gavin Newlands]

Will the series of private databases under the Bill be any safer from hacking than a central Government database?

[The Solicitor General]

The hon. Gentleman makes a proper point about security. This, in respect of the code of practice and in collaboration with the industry, will be at the forefront of everybody’s mind. What is important is that the Government do not have a pick-and-mix or help yourself avenue within which they can mine data for their own capricious purposes.

The framework of the Bill quite properly severely circumscribes the circumstances within which the Government can seek access to that material. Most importantly, when it comes to content, the warrantry system—the world-leading double lock system we are proposing—will apply. An internet connection record is not content; it is a record of an event that will be held by that telecommunications operator. It relates to the fact of whether or not a customer has connected to the internet in a particular way. If it goes further into content, the warrantry provisions will apply. It is important to remember that framework when determining, and describing and putting into context, what we are talking about. The Committee deserves better than indiscriminate shroud-waving about prospects and concerns that simply do not arise from the measures in the Bill.

The hon. Gentleman quite properly raised the Danish experience. The Danish Government and authorities are in regular conversation with the United Kingdom Government. That dialogue goes on because they are naturally very interested to see how our model develops, although there are important differences that should be set out briefly. The Danish legislation was not technology neutral, unlike these proposals, because it specified two options that proved unworkable. We work with operators case by case so that the best option for their network at the appropriate time will be determined. The Bill builds on existing data retention requirements, such as the retention of data necessary to resolve IP addresses, which regime already exists under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. The full cost recovery underpinning by the Government means that there is no incentive for communications service providers to cut corners, as I am afraid happened in Denmark. There are important differences between the two.

The hon. Gentleman rightly talks about IPV6. Although it is a great aim and something that all of us who have an interest in this area will have considered carefully, it still is, with the best will in the world, a way away, I am afraid. It will take a long time for all service providers to implement in full, and until then, there will be both types of system. Even with IPV6, CSPs may choose to implement address sharing or network address translation, meaning that it is not the guaranteed solution that perhaps has been suggested. Servers who host illegal material are much less likely to move to that system, meaning that, in practice, IPV4 may well remain with us. We therefore have to act in the interim, because, as has been said, the drift away from what I have called conventional telecommunications to the internet carries on whether we like it or not. We have to face up to the world as it is, rather than the world as we would love it to be, and therefore take into account the fact that we are in danger of being unable to detect criminality and terrorism.

--- Later in debate ---

[Gavin Newlands]

I hear what the Minister has to say but I am not assuaged by his comments, so this shroud-waver would like to press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Oral Answers to Questions

Gavin Newlands Excerpts

Monday 11th April 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

Around half of those who have travelled to Syria have returned to the United Kingdom. Obviously, the sort of action it might be necessary to take against individuals is considered on a case-by-case basis. That includes considering the sorts of activities in which they may have been involved in Syria and whether any intervention is necessary.

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

T3. Last week, 18-year-old Mohammed Hussain, a Kurdish refugee, died underneath a lorry as he attempted to flee violence and be reunited with his family in Manchester. The tragic story of Mohammed highlights the dangerous routes that many refugees are forced to take. When will the Government open up family visa opportunities to British citizens and settled residents so that we can prevent deaths like that of Mohammed from happening again?

[The Minister for Immigration (James Brokenshire)]

The hon. Gentleman highlights the appalling risks that some people have taken to get through the security and other steps that have been put in place. Our very clear message to those people is that they should claim asylum in France. On the issue of resettlement, we are certainly making the process clearer and working with the Red Cross and others on the guidance provided.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Second sitting)

Gavin Newlands Excerpts

Thursday 24th March 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

Q This is a quick follow-up to a question Mr Starmer asked earlier about ICRs as they relate specifically to mobile devices. The example that he gave involved a football app, but let us use Facebook as an example, as it may be of use in investigations. Facebook and apps like it have lots of background processes that generate thousands of ICRs. Is there any way of ascertaining whether an ICR is created manually or automatically by the app?

Mark Hughes: I think there is a principle here. Again, it is enshrined in the Bill to a certain extent, but I make the point now. The organisation that holds the data closest to source is the one that should be subject to the powers. That is the one that should be retaining and having to disclose data under the Bill as it stands. For example, you mentioned Facebook. If Facebook has those data, they are the ones you would have to ask about how they would go about retaining and disclosing it.

[Gavin Newlands]

Q I understand that, but would it be technically possible to understand whether somebody has pressed a button to create that record or whether the app has done it?

Mark Hughes: I would have to look specifically at the details around it. If it generated an internet connection record that was a website visit, for example, that might be something that we retained, but it would be very difficult for me to comment specifically on that without knowing the exact details. It depends on the engineering of the services and networks, but in principle, if Facebook had that data, then they are the ones that should be subject to the law. We are considering whether to propose an amendment to the Home Office on the third party data question, which is the case in point here, and how that should be approached. We think that the principle is that other providers who have that data are the ones who should be subject to it, and that it should be explicit in the Bill.

[Gavin Newlands]

Q So at the moment the Bill is not clear enough on that aspect?

Mark Hughes: It could be clearer, and we are thinking about proposing an amendment specifically to over-the-top providers, making it clear that they are responsible for that.

[Keir Starmer]

Q Can I come back to the question of what constitutes an internet connection record? It is the record that you may be responsible for keeping and passing over, so it is important that you have clarity. I take it from your previous answers that you have said some of it will be data that you are already collecting for your own purposes, and some of it will be other data that you are not currently retaining but will retain as a result of the Act. What are the data you are currently retaining? What is the bit that you keep already?

Mark Hughes: I gave an account number as an example. We obviously know our customers’ account numbers, so that is something that we currently have, and we have other types of information, as I went through, which are potentially subject to other pieces of legislation on retaining data. The point about the internet connection record is that it is rather like a series of ingredients, which you have to put together to create the record.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

Q So in those two areas—counter-terrorism and serious organised crime—this legislation could help not just our country, but our neighbours overseas as well.

Richard Berry: Yes, absolutely. From experience, I was involved in running a national operation on human trafficking, and we basically created a dataset from a significant amount of intelligence gained during that national operation over six months. It went straight into the analytical work files within Europol and we were able to map organised criminality right the way back to mainland China in some cases. The added value point, which is what you are making, very much comes from that sharing.

Simon Grunwell: Can I just add to that? A significant thread for us is organised tobacco smuggling, which is international by default. So it can only help.

[Gavin Newlands]

Q Just a follow-up to a question asked in the last panel about ICRs as they relate to mobile devices and third-party apps. You brought up easyJet earlier, and I have got an easyJet app on my phone. As far as I am aware, it creates a lot of ICRs as defined in the Bill. There is no way to differentiate between an ICR that is created manually or automatically by a third-party app. How would that limit the operational effectiveness of ICRs for you?

Chris Farrimond: To go back to my previous answer on this point, from your mobile record—the ICR from that—we would require your provider, Vodafone or whoever, to help us to understand which flight provider you were using. If they came back to us and said, “One of the domain names is easyJet”, we would say, “Thank you very much.” That is what we would expect from Vodafone. We would then go to easyJet and say—with the right authority signed off, obviously, and with the proportionality, necessity and everything that goes with that—“Can you tell us about his travel plans?” They would, hopefully, be able to do precisely that with the data that they hold on their flight details. But as for the actual app, all that we would look for from your provider would be to tell us that you have been making use of easyJet, and that would give us the next point in our investigation.

[Gavin Newlands]

I might not have used easyJet for several months, but the app still connects my phone to easyJet’s service provider. Likewise, I have a British Airways app. None of that limits any effectiveness for you?

Chris Farrimond: What I would expect to get is something showing you connected to easyJet for two minutes rather than for a nanosecond, or for an upgrade coming through. If we saw two minutes, we would say, “He did something with easyJet at that point.”

Richard Berry: Things like the tracking cookies you have on normal websites are not relevant information for our purposes. To offer a point of reassurance, we have a decade of experience of looking at what relevant data should be retained. ICRs are no different to that principle. Prior to any retention notice being served on a particular provider, law enforcement, the Home Office and the provider will be looking at the operational benefit, the cost and the technical feasibility of what data they hold and what data we would use. It almost takes each provider on a case-by-case basis to ensure we are gathering only relevant information. We could see those feeds back—the little connections you are talking about—being ruled out of the data we need to retain.

[Keir Starmer]

Q May I go back to the definition of internet connection record? To take it in stages, you are obviously concerned about your ability to deal with serious crime and the visibility of what you can do; I completely understand that. You make an ask of the Home Office, which as you said, is basically, “Who? When? Where? How?” That is where you think you need to go next, to maintain the ability you have now, because of the different ways people are communicating.

From that, you said, “Well, therefore The Guardian is enough for us, not that someone went to a page on Libya or clicked on something about Libya bombings, because that is not within our ask.” My difficulty is not to challenge why you want that, what you use it for or its utility. I just cannot see how the definition in the Bill is limited to your ask; in other words, it appears to go as far as you want to go.

Tell me if this is an unfair question, because it is about the words on the page, but which bit of the definition you understand to be the word or words that limit it to what you say you are asking for, rather than letting it go any further? At the moment, I cannot see that bit of the jigsaw. In other words, which is the trigger word in the definition of internet connection record that says The Guardian website but not “within The Guardian, the words ‘Libya’ or ‘bomb’” or whatever it may be that means we cannot go beyond what you have asked for?

Chris Farrimond: It is a bit difficult for us, because as law enforcement officials, we have no hand in writing the Bill.

Return of Kings

Gavin Newlands Excerpts

Thursday 4th February 2016 Commons Chamber

[Karen Bradley]

I agree absolutely with my hon. Friend.

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

On the very day when we will discuss for the first time at Westminster the positive role that men can play in preventing and ending violence against women, does the Minister share my concern that this small, small man’s abhorrent views and publicity seeking risk distracting us from the positive role that the vast majority of men —real men—would like to play in ending misogyny in all its forms?

[Karen Bradley]

The hon. Gentleman makes a very important point and I look forward to debating the matter this afternoon. He is absolutely right that men have a positive role to play, and the vast majority of men do so.

Preventing Violence Against Women: Role of Men

Gavin Newlands Excerpts

Thursday 4th February 2016 Westminster Hall

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the role of men in preventing violence against women.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Gillan.

I am proud to be an ambassador for the white ribbon campaign, which was started by men to help to end the scourge of violence against women by encouraging men to take responsibility for the issue. I am proud that this is the first debate held in Westminster looking specifically at what men can do to end violence against women. I am not proud that in the 21st century, in this highly developed country of ours, a woman suffers an incident of domestic abuse every 22 seconds.

Some 1.4 million women were abused by a partner in 2013-14, and the vast majority of those cases were not reported to the police. In addition, 28% of women report that they have suffered abuse in the home since turning 16. The horrific scale of those figures highlights the size of the problem, so I am grateful to the Backbench Business Committee for granting us the opportunity to bring this important issue to Westminster Hall. I also thank the hon. Members for Birmingham, Yardley (Jess Phillips) and for Brigg and Goole (Andrew Percy) for supporting the application.

My contribution to the debate will focus largely on male violence against women. I do not wish to imply that men are not victims of domestic violence; they are. However, the vast majority—about 80%—of domestic violence cases are perpetrated by men on women. All of us in the House should be concerned that the incidence of male victims of domestic violence in Scotland is on the rise, increasing from 11% of all victims in 2005-06 to 18% in 2014-15. Parliament may want to debate that important subject in the future, but today we are debating violence against women.

There have been significant positive legislative steps both north and south of the border, and the Scottish Government currently have an open consultation on establishing a new domestic abuse offence. It is hoped that the offence will be similar to, but wider in scope than, the new law recently enacted in England and Wales. Alongside physical abuse, the offence may include acts that are not currently viewed as criminal in the eyes of the law, including abusive behaviour that is likely to cause a victim to suffer psychological harm. That behaviour includes the deprivation of liberty and autonomy; isolating an individual from friends, family and wider society; withholding or controlling access to resources, including money; psychological control and manipulation; threats and the creation of a climate of fear, including threats towards children; and controlling or withholding access to healthcare, education or employment opportunities. The move would be welcome, and it follows on from the introduction of the Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Bill and of Clare’s law, which allows people to contact the police and request information on a partner’s background if they suspect him of a history of domestic abuse.

I have been asked by some why I am so interested in the issue. The truth is that until a few months ago, I was not. I had not realised that the statistics were so shocking, and I had not even heard of the white ribbon campaign. In September last year, I was playing rugby for Parliament’s Commons and Lords team. I actually only played for three minutes before I was carted off to A&E for what was eventually diagnosed as a bruise, which is quite embarrassing in rugby. When I eventually went back to the ground, we were posing for pictures and someone put a lapel badge on me. I did not know what it was, but it was put on my shirt by a team mate. If I were allowed to say that that team mate is now sitting in the Public Gallery, I would, but I am not allowed to say that so I will not. He put the badge on me and we all smiled for the pictures, but I thought, “I’d better look this up.” I was a new MP, and the Daily Mail does not need any excuses to write stories about Scottish National party MPs so, just to make sure I researched the badge straight away and was pleased to discover the white ribbon campaign.

In further research, I discovered the shocking statistics. Like many others, I had just assumed that domestic abuse was on the decrease, but I was shocked to discover that it was not. The fact was, I had been involved in politics at an activist level for such a long time and I had played rugby—where the white ribbon campaign is fully active—for 17 or 18 years, yet I had not heard of the campaign, so I thought I would use my voice as a new MP.

[Greg Mulholland (Leeds North West) (LD)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing the debate, and I am delighted to be working with him on this important campaign. I am sorry to hear of his experience with the Commons and Lords rugby team, and I apologise for having to leave the debate early because I am going to the start of the super league season in the other code—rugby league. Does he agree that sports stars such as Ikram Butt—the Leeds, Featherstone and England rugby league star—and strong sporting heroes from all sports are ideal role models for showing that strong men are absolutely against violence against women in all its forms?

[Gavin Newlands]

I could not agree more with the hon. Gentleman. Later in my speech, I will call on sportsmen, celebrities and MPs—men of all persuasions—to support the white ribbon campaign.

I am a father of two young girls, and I always worry about their futures—about how they will grow up and who they will settle down with when they are much, much older. As a father and as a citizen, I want to do all I can to stamp out the abhorrent use of violence and bullying that puts down and disempowers women, and I will work with anybody from any party in trying to achieve that.

In Scotland, the stark economic cost of failing to address domestic violence is said to amount to £1.6 billion. A 2009 study completed by Sylvia Walby of Lancaster University suggested that in England and Wales, domestic abuse alone costs society more than £15 billion a year in costs to services and economic output. However, regardless of the sums involved, failure to tackle domestic violence is simply not an option. The figures that I have just read out do not quantify the human and emotional cost that arises from violence against women.

At the very heart of it, this debate revolves around the premise and reality of equality. Some argue that we live in an equal society, that men and women are treated equally and that young girls are provided with the same opportunities as their male counterparts. Those people are sadly wrong. We are not living in an equal society, and still today, in the 21st century, too many men think they are in a position to overpower women and treat them as they see fit.

In England and Wales, abusive partners cost the lives of two women every week. Back home, Police Scotland spends 20% of its operational time dealing with instances of domestic violence. Domestic rape almost doubled in 2013-14, with an increase of 81%. Politicians are known to bandy about figures and statistics, and I do not intend to use too many more, but these are not just numbers; they are horrific and often life-changing experiences suffered by women across the country. The statistics show that we do not live in an equal society. They indicate that for too many women, this is still a broken society. With one voice, this Parliament should say, “Enough is enough.”

If there were any doubt that this debate is needed, by chance it falls in the week in which we have witnessed an angry outcry across the UK about the ridiculous and attention-seeking pro-rape blogger Roosh V. This small, pathetic excuse of a man has some of the most abhorrent views that I have come across, and is endangering the lives of women to further his own career. The views he expresses highlight the long journey that we still have to travel to ensure real, not perceived, equality for women.

A lot of good work is being done to tackle the effects of domestic violence and to enable authorities to charge and convict offenders. Efforts to prevent it from occurring in the first place have also increased. Both the UK and Scottish Governments are committed to eradicating domestic violence from our society and have adopted preventive strategies in combating it.

In 2010, the coalition Government launched their strategy entitled “A Call to End Violence against Women and Girls”, which committed to challenging the attitudes and behaviours that cause many women and girls to live in fear. The strategy is aimed at providing the authorities with the tools that they need to bring perpetrators to justice. The desire behind it is to adopt a partnership approach to preventing violence from happening in the first place. That is the correct approach to take—working across organisational boundaries to achieve a common goal. We need to intervene early, preventing violent acts against women from becoming the norm and working with all bodies to help eradicate domestic violence from our society. I will come back to the subject of prevention work.

The UK Government are providing funding to local groups that perform services that help to tackle violence against women. However, earlier this week Women’s Aid informed me that the current crisis funding for women’s refuges in England will come to an end on 31 March. The Minister sidestepped this question in the Chamber this morning, but when she responds, will she commit to a long-term, sustainable funding solution for women’s refuges?

[Dr Rupa Huq (Ealing Central and Acton) (Lab)]

The hon. Gentleman is making a powerful speech. He talks about cuts to services. Does he agree that the Government are often clever in defraying those cuts on to local government? In my borough, Southall Black Sisters does very good work for black and minority ethnic communities on issues such as forced marriage, female genital mutilation and the impact of religion and culture. The organisation is being stifled at the moment because the grant to Ealing Council has been cut drastically, which is affecting its ability to deliver those services.

[Gavin Newlands]

Absolutely. It is often the people who need such services the most who suffer as a result of cuts. I will return to funding, but the hon. Lady’s remarks are welcome.

I welcome the fact that the Scottish Government share the approach of seeking to intervene early and to work with others to help create a society in which women and girls are free from abuse. The “Equally Safe” strategy, launched in partnership with the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, is aimed at preventing and eradicating violence against women and girls, and creating a strong and flourishing Scotland where all individuals are equally safe and respected. One positive aspect of the strategy is that it not only sets out to prevent violence against women from ever occurring, but seeks to address the daily inequalities and injustice that women face.

The Scottish Government have supported the strategy with sizeable financial support. In March 2015 the First Minister announced that £20 million would be invested in a range of measures to address all forms of violence against women and girls, in addition to the £11.8 million provided as part of the Scottish Government’s equality budget for 2015-16. More than £2 million of that funding has been allocated to prosecutors and the courts service to ensure that cases involving abuse are heard more quickly. Some £1.8 million has been awarded to Rape Crisis Scotland over the next three years to allow it to expand its advocacy services across the country, including by having rape crisis services in Orkney and Shetland for the first time. Less than a week ago, the Cabinet Secretary for Social Justice, Communities and Pensioners’ Rights, Alex Neil, announced a further £0.5 million to help build stronger and more resilient women’s support groups across Scotland by helping to improve their infrastructure.

That investment by the Scottish Government amounts to a 62% increase on the previous Administration. Last week, during a hearing organised by the all-party parliamentary group on domestic violence, many groups raised concerns about funding for the services that they provide. Can the Minister assure those groups that not only will their funding not be cut but that they might see similar uplifts to the ones their Scottish counterparts have received?

I have spoken about prevention and about adopting a joined-up approach to addressing the issue, and I have said that eight out of 10 cases of domestic violence are committed by men on women. That basic premise is what led me to secure this debate. For the past few months I have been proud to be an ambassador for the white ribbon campaign, a worldwide organisation with active groups both north and south of the border. The campaign concentrates on working with men to speak out and challenge male violence against women. It urges men and boys to wear a white ribbon and sign a personal pledge never to commit, condone or remain silent about violence against women. Some 25,000 men have signed up to that pledge, and last year I tabled an early-day motion calling on all Members to support the work of the white ribbon campaign. I make that call again today and urge all MPs to sign the pledge, but this is not just about increasing the number of pledges; it is about creating positive male role models.

Other MPs have been long-standing supporters of the white ribbon campaign, including the hon. Member for Leeds North West (Greg Mulholland), who tabled an early-day motion in November welcoming its 10th anniversary. As MPs, we need to show leadership on this issue. As public figures and representatives, we have a duty to lead by example. Not only should we sign the pledge ourselves, but we should recruit others to the cause. I urge all MPs to go back to their constituency and draw up a list of 20 male figures who are influencers in their local community. They could be faith leaders, community activists, business owners, teachers, sportsmen or celebrities. Target those individuals and urge them to support the white ribbon campaign and to pledge to challenge violence against women in whatever form it takes.

Unfortunately, unlike in Australia, Ireland and Scotland, where central Governments have helped to fund the white ribbon campaign, the UK body receives no state funding. The Government might be interested in learning more about the white ribbon campaign’s work, and I invite the Minister to meet me and representatives of the campaign to learn more about its campaigns and to look at ways in which the UK Government might be able to support that work.

Other organisations are working with young boys to prevent violence against women. That is the key battleground in prevention, and one project that I want to spend time talking about involves going into schools and working with pupils on the issue of violence against women. It might shock Members—it certainly shocked me—to learn that police figures suggest that between 2012 and 2015, more than 5,500 sexual offences were recorded in schools, including 600 rapes. That is an appalling state of affairs and underlines the point that much more preventive action is required.

We need to understand the reasons why a young boy grows up to commit such violent acts. I believe that no one is born a violent person, but along the way something happens that makes them become a violent individual. Working with schools is one way that we can help to address that issue. In 2012, the End Violence Against Women coalition published a schools guide to address violence against women and girls, which includes a factsheet setting out the different forms of abuse that women and girls disproportionately experience. The guide helps parents, students and local women’s groups to work with their schools to promote girls’ safety. The coalition also accepts that we need to intervene early to prevent violence against women from ever occurring and, in addition to producing its schools guide, it has called on the Government to commit to long-term investment in public campaigns to change harmful attitudes and behaviours; and to ensure that all survivors of abuse have specialist support, whether or not they report it.

The End Violence Against Women coalition’s young people’s service focuses on interventions with young people who use violence and abuse in close relationships. That work targets young people aged between 10 and 25 years old and focuses on relationship abuse, parent violence and abusive behaviour within the family. That is an important area of work as it helps to change young people’s attitudes and behaviours and create more positive relationships between young men and their peers.

Some fantastic work is being done in schools by teachers and by groups such as Respect, which goes into schools to intervene when there are signs of abusive behaviour. However, a lot of that necessary work is interventional in nature. We should be looking to use the expertise of groups such as Women’s Aid, the white ribbon campaign and others by letting them go into our schools early and often to speak to young children about relationships, respect and domestic violence. There is evidence to suggest that boys’ attitudes harden when they reach their teenage years, so to get through to them, engagement needs to be either early in high school or later on in primary school, or in my opinion, both.

Will the Minister expand on some of the other work going on in schools that is aimed at preventing violence against women? That is an important area, as we want our boys to treat girls with respect and as equals from a young age. Can she assure us that she will consider implementing a formal national programme of engagement, rather than the current fractured localised work? I would also like her to respond to the calls from Women’s Aid and others for the Government to make sex and relationships education and personal, social, health and economic education a statutory part of the national curriculum. That would help to ensure that all boys and girls had the opportunity to learn about healthy, mutually respectful communication and the meaning of consent, and to be encouraged to develop broader, more flexible gender roles.

The Government have made progress and have done reasonably well in some areas, but they need a helpful shove in others. If we are to achieve the success that we all want in ending violence against women, we need an effective justice system that truly understands the issue and punishes those who commit such atrocious acts. That includes working with those who are serving time in the justice system as a result of committing violent acts against women.

Respect works with perpetrators of domestic violence, and as well as running an advice service for male victims of domestic violence, it runs a series of specialist domestic violence prevention services. Those services focus on changing perpetrators’ behaviour and managing their risk, and the safety of victims, including children, is at their heart. Such services help to prevent repeat cases of domestic violence and help us gain knowledge of why people resort to violence in the first place.

A four-year study conducted in the United States evaluating a similar service to Respect’s specialist domestic violence services showed a clear de-escalation of re-assault and other forms of abuse over time, with the vast majority of men reaching sustained non-violence. The services that Respect provides are extremely important, and I urge the Government to work with it, because we need to do more work with perpetrators. We need to help change their behaviour to prevent repeated abuse and to gain knowledge of the causes of domestic violence. All perpetrators of domestic abuse should be encouraged to enter rehabilitation programmes during and after their incarceration.

My final point is about the ratification, or lack thereof, of the Istanbul convention. The Government signed that document on 8 June 2012. Three and a half years is a long time to delay ratifying something to which they have already agreed. This morning, the Minister reassured us that the convention will be ratified once the one remaining issue with the devolved Administrations is resolved. What is that issue, and is she in a position to give Members an indication of when it will be resolved so that ratification can take place? The convention is important as it argues that no single agency or institution can address violence against women alone. The legally binding framework stresses the need for partnership working, intervening early and having a series of integrated policies that stretch across all Government Departments and across sectors. Ratifying the convention will send a clear and strong message about the UK Government’s commitment to eradicating violence against women from our society.

Tackling and defeating violence against women is one of the rare issues that unifies this Parliament. However, we should not allow that consensus to foster complacency. There are still too many women who are afraid of doing or saying anything at home in fear of violent repercussions. There are still too many young teenage girls in abusive relationships who are too afraid to get out of them. There are still too many children who go to bed at night and cannot sleep because they hear the violence that is poisoning their home. I for one have had enough. I pledge never to commit, condone or remain silent about men’s violence against women in all its forms. Today, as Members of this House, we must resolve that we can, should and must do more combat the abhorrent violence inflicted on women in homes across our constituencies and across the UK. It is an inexcusable shame and a national scandal that these violent acts persist in our society. We have a duty to fight back and eradicate this scourge once and for all.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[Gavin Newlands]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Betts. I thank the Minister for her thorough response, but there were a few holes in it, which I will come back to at the end of my contribution.

I thank all hon. Members who have contributed today, and I thank the white ribbon campaign for attending the debate. It has been a good debate that has included many varied points. To highlight the breadth of the debate, I will touch on a few of the contributions that were made. The hon. Member for Brigg and Goole (Andrew Percy) made strong points about local authorities and the power of sport in getting the message across to young men. My hon. Friend—I will call her that—the Member for Birmingham, Yardley (Jess Phillips) spoke about her undying love for all men, perhaps bar the hon. Member for Shipley (Philip Davies). She also gave us a powerful account of her own experiences and those of others, reminding us of how far we have to go.

My hon. Friend the Member for Inverclyde (Ronnie Cowan) made a powerful point about subconscious misogyny and whether violence against women is nature or nurture, and my hon. Friend the Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Patricia Gibson) spoke of abuse as a fundamental abuse of human rights, and of the good work of her local council.

The hon. Member for Bradford West (Naz Shah) gave her own deeply personal story, giving us a different cultural perspective by talking about misogyny and abuse in the black and minority ethnic community. My hon. Friend the Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Alan Brown) paid tribute to Women’s Aid for its work and shared his concerns about our relationship with countries such as Saudi Arabia, whose record on gender equality is atrocious.

My hon. Friend the Member for Lanark and Hamilton East (Angela Crawley) spoke about the importance of education and the powerful Women’s Aid report, “Nineteen Child Homicides”, and highlighted the fact that the issue exists just as prominently in the LGBTI community. The shadow Minister reminded us that the UN views tackling violence against women as a priority and listed a number of detestable posts by Roosh V, who has been renamed in Scotland as Sssh V.

The Minister, in her lengthy response, spoke about the “what’s hers is his” nature of tax collection as recently as 1990. She spoke about promoting the white ribbon campaign but stopped short of promising any funding. Will she look at that again, and will she meet me to talk about a national prevention strategy in every school? She spoke about the Istanbul convention, which the Scottish Government are keen for the Westminster Government to get on with ratifying.

On refuges, nobody said that they are the only answer, but I ask the Minister to give the groups involved some certainty. The funding ends on 31 March, and they would like to know whether they will have any funding thereafter. It is clear that, despite some small differences, we can and will move forward together to end violence against women.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered the role of men in preventing violence against women.

Donald Trump

Gavin Newlands Excerpts

Monday 18th January 2016 Westminster Hall

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir David. I would like to say it is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Shipley (Philip Davies), but instead I congratulate the more than 600,000 petitioners who have combined unintentionally to bring this debate to Parliament. I pay tribute to the speeches from hon. colleagues and the hon. Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn) who led the debate in his inimitable and, on this occasion, balanced way.

It horrifies me that in the 21st century we are still dealing with racism, sexism, bigotry and any other form of prejudice that Donald J. Trump can squeeze into his campaign. Let us be clear, he is an idiot. I have tried to find different, perhaps more parliamentary adjectives to describe him but none was clear enough. He is an idiot. The fact that such a person can get so deep into the selection battle to be the Republican party candidate for President of the United States, the most powerful job in the world, speaks volumes about how far the once mighty GOP—the “Grand Old Party”—of Lincoln and Roosevelt has fallen.

The petitioners have asked us to consider banning, or otherwise, a possible presidential candidate from entering the UK. The question we should be asking ourselves is whether Trump should be treated differently from anyone else because of who he is, how rich he is, how powerful he may become or what business interests he may have in the UK. Our immigration rules must cover everyone, regardless of how powerful they are or what religion they believe in. If we are to ban extremists, we should consider banning Christian extremists in the same way and to the same extent that we consider banning Muslim extremists from travelling to the UK.

Each and every day, young people are being held back and bullied on the basis of their gender, skin colour, the creed of their school, their sexuality or a disability. Each and every day, families lives in fear because they have had the audacity to flee a war-torn country. Victims of these hateful and poisonous acts look to authority figures and lawmakers to help to solve the issue and to protect them in future. However, today’s debate asks us to contemplate that a bigot and downright bully may be elected President of the United States. If Trump is able to stand on Capitol Hill next January and deliver the oath of office, it will send a message to bigots, racists and sexists the world over. It will tell the bullies that their behaviour is okay, that bigotry is not only okay but commendable, and that it is okay to hate people who may look, speak or act differently.

The question before us today is how we as a united Parliament defeat the hateful politics of Donald Trump and others like him. I am in two minds about this. I want to challenge Trump head-on to show how ridiculous his views are and to defeat his poison by highlighting the contribution that everyone, no matter what their background, makes to society. However, I also want us to treat Mr Trump in the same way we treat everyone else who has been banned from the UK.

The arguments for banning Trump are based on the principle that we ban other hateful preachers and extremists from the UK so why should we not add Trump to that list of undesirables. It is unclear how many individuals the UK Government have banned from visiting the UK, but in 2014, the Home Secretary indicated that she had excluded hundreds of people from gaining entry. On what grounds is it acceptable to ban those people but not Mr Trump who, as the Prime Minister said, has used language that is “divisive, stupid and wrong”?

The Home Secretary and her officials can refuse entry to the UK for reasons related to a person’s character, conduct, associations or if their presence would not be conducive to the public good. A list of unacceptable behaviour was published in 2005 and included using means or medium that foster

“hatred which might lead to inter-community violence”.

On that basis and to ensure that we are operating consistently, I see no reason why Trump should be allowed a visa to visit the UK. His racist, bigoted and sexist views are dangerous and divisive. He does not believe that women are equal to men, and in reality I think he believes that no one is equal to the Donald. I have sympathy with the view that because he wants to ban Muslims from entering the United States, we should ban him from the UK.

Although I agree with many of the arguments of those who want to ban Trump, I want to tackle head-on the poisonous views and polices that he believes in. The way to defeat people like Trump is to show him how outrageous his views of the world are. Sunlight is the best disinfectant. Invitations should be extended to Trump to visit a local mosque to meet ordinary Muslims to discuss their beliefs; to meet refugee families fleeing bloody war to hear their stories; to meet feminist and LGBTI—lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex—groups to debate equality; and to visit homeless shelters and so on. Let him debate all these issues and he will soon be found out for what he is: an idiot.

Trump’s rhetoric is not dissimilar to that spouted by Nick Griffin and the British National party, and where is he now? We cannot and should not be afraid to tackle the views held by Trump and others like him. To do so would enable them to try to convert others to their cause without being fully challenged. The fight against racism, bigotry, sexism and prejudice in general is not over. We have a long way to go to ensure equality and fairness throughout the world.

We must not allow bullies like Trump to think they can continue to offend people based on how they look, who they love or who they believe in. We should send out a message saying “no” to Trump and his bigoted politics, but we should do so through the power of argument. We should not roll out the red carpet, but we should let Trump come to the UK and have that debate. He would soon wish he had been banned.

European Agenda on Migration

Gavin Newlands Excerpts

Monday 14th December 2015 Commons Chamber

[Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)]

As has been mentioned, there is a fair amount of overlap between this motion and the previous item, so I will not repeat some of the comments I made in the prior debate. Unlike the previous motion, we will not be forcing this one to a vote, although one or two parts of it give us significant concern. I shall discuss those in a few moments’ time.

Yet again, I am disappointed, because we are talking about a refugee crisis, yet everything in the papers talks about migrants and migration. This is not a crisis of migrants or migration; it is a crisis of refugees fleeing for their lives. If we could get that into the mindset of not only our Government, but Governments across Europe, we might start to address this emergency in the correct terms. The terminology is important. We fully support the fact that we need to have co-ordinated and firm action against the criminals who are exploiting the vulnerable and desperate through people smuggling and people trafficking, but, as the Immigration Law Practitioners Association is keen to point out, people smuggling and people trafficking are not the same thing. They are very different in the eyes of the law, although it is sometimes difficult to tell them apart in practice in individual circumstances. This means that they need to be addressed in different ways.

We should also remember that the House of Lords EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee has recommended to the European Commission that when setting the legislation and directives that deal with people smuggling and people trafficking, we should make a distinction when it is clear that the smuggling has been carried out for humanitarian motives. Some may question whether that could ever be the case, but if it is clear that the act was done not for criminal purposes or for financial gain, but possibly through a misguided belief that it was a humanitarian act, would it be appropriate to classify such smugglers as international criminals? I certainly would not think so and the House of Lords Sub-Committee did not think so either. I would therefore be interested to know what the Government’s attitude to that is.

The motion also refers to action to tackle the “root causes” of migration, and I would be interested to hear what the Minister thinks are the root causes of 800,000 refugees arriving in Greece over the past year or so. What are the root causes of 4 million people being in the refugee camps in and around the Mediterranean coast? Unless the Government can prove to us that there were 4 million people last year and the year before, and every year for the past 10 years, the unescapable conclusion will be that the root cause of this crisis is war, violence and persecution in Syria and in other countries in that region.

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

In the previous debate, the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) said that the risks families take when trying to leave a situation such as my hon. Friend has just described were “foolish”. Does my hon. Friend agree that the hon. Gentleman does not understand the situation and his comment speaks to the mindset that my hon. Friend was discussing?

[Peter Grant]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for those comments and I fully agree with them. I had wanted to say more in response to what the hon. Member for North East Somerset said, but as he is not here I will not respond to him just now. There may be people taking risks that could be described as foolish, but they are not foolish risks—they are desperate risks. These people are not stupid. Some of them are very highly educated, highly skilled workers in their homeland, and the reason they are risking their lives and, even more remarkably, those of their nearest and dearest, including their own children, is because they have taken a calculated risk that leaving them behind in Syria puts their lives at even greater risk.

Immigration Bill

Gavin Newlands Excerpts

Tuesday 1st December 2015 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Robinson]

I am grateful to the Minister for his comments.

While we are on that topic, may I suggest that there is further work to be done in the other place? Schedule 11 relates to maritime enforcement. Reference was made on Second Reading to the failure of the schedule to mention the Belfast harbour police. I think the Minister took on board the fact that it is a properly constituted, legitimate authority that is mandated to operate within the port. It is a private police force, but it looks after the security of the port. I believe that an additional provision relating to the Belfast Harbour Police could be inserted into the Bill in the other place, should the opportunity to do so arise and should such a provision have the Government’s backing. If we are intent on pursuing the thrust of the Bill, and the protections that the maritime provisions will provide, it is important that we give that matter consideration in the other place.

I want to raise a couple of issues that have arisen in recent years that relate to immigration in general and to the UK Border Force in particular. They relate to the new clauses and amendments, so I shall not be straying too far from the subject. Border Force runs a skeleton operation in Northern Ireland. In fact, one could easily be forgiven for thinking that its effective operational role related only to mainland GB.

There are ferry links between my constituency of Belfast East and that of my right hon. Friend the Member for Belfast North (Mr Dodds), and the constituency that Stranraer rests in. I am struggling to remember which one that is, but I think it is Dumfries and Galloway. Stena goes there. UK Border Force will be waiting in Scotland for anyone travelling from our part of the UK to that part of the mainland. Should anyone wish to board the vessel in Belfast in a vehicle, they will not be searched or questioned at all. Foot passengers will go through more invasive security procedures, but the immigration screening does not take place in Belfast. That omission should be looked at.

I want to mention the case of Myriama Yousef. She is a wonderful character who sought asylum in Belfast and received great assistance from the Belfast Central Mission, the Methodist church in the city. I have to be careful about the terminology I use to describe her case. She is either a failed asylum seeker or a refused asylum seeker. She is someone who sought asylum in the United Kingdom and was turned down. She had to spend time in the Larne House detention centre, which is located within the Larne PSNI station. Anyone with any knowledge of security arrangements in Northern Ireland will know that the police stations there are not the most welcoming or inviting places. That is a consequence of our history. Anyone who is detained for immigration reasons in Northern Ireland is held there, in what looks like a military compound, with sangars, high fences, security lighting and security cameras. It is not an acceptable place. Myriama Yousef was deported to the country from which she had entered the UK. She was removed to Dublin, at which point she immediately got on the Ulsterbus, paid her £8.50 fare and was back in Belfast within two hours. Following her subsequent detection, she was brought to Yarl’s Wood.

Another case relates to a point made by the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper). She talked about a 19-year-old in Beirut who was separated from her family, but this case relates to Johnny Sandhu, an Indian-born solicitor from Northern Ireland who operated in Limavady. He was detected in the serious crime suite inciting a member of the Ulster Volunteer Force to commit murder so that they could evade prosecution. He was subsequently jailed for 10 years and, on his release, he was deported back to India. His family, who relied on him, were left in Northern Ireland. His children, who were going through the education system and doing their GCSEs at the time, were not in a position to up sticks and leave, but their father was never in a position to come back to the United Kingdom.

I would be grateful if the Minister considered cases such as that and the one raised by the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford to see how we can be a little more compassionate and recognise that, when someone’s 18th birthday strikes, they do not cut all ties or lose all connection with their family. We should consider how we, as a country, can best ensure that the family unit is held together.

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

On Second Reading, I described the Bill as heinous. My experience as a member of the Bill Committee has not altered that impression. The Bill is divisive and disproportionate, and it ultimately lacks a credible evidence base.

The evidence sessions were embarrassing for the Government because the vast majority of the oral and written evidence the Committee received was damning of their proposals. Witnesses from the private, public and third sectors sent the underlying message that the Bill lacks a proper evidence base, is not necessary and is merely being brought about to appease the right wing of the Conservative party and UKIP.

I take issue with part 5, which, among other things, proposes to remove support from those whose asylum applications have been refused. That blanket approach does not allow for the consideration of personal circumstances, nor does it protect families with children. We heard evidence from a number of organisations that voiced concern, shock and deep disgust over part 5, particularly in respect of how it might affect the welfare of children.

In giving evidence, Ilona Pinter of the Children’s Society said:

“We think the risks for children from this provision are very serious indeed. Essentially, it would see families becoming destitute—they would no longer have accommodation and financial support under asylum support. That obviously brings with it a whole range of risks, from families being street homeless to families having to move around, potentially for short periods of time, to stay in potentially unsafe accommodation.”––[Official Report, Immigration Public Bill Committee, 20 October 2015; c. 72, Q165.]

Even Lord Green of Deddington from Migrant Watch, with whom I disagree on almost everything else, agreed that asylum seekers with children whose claim has been refused should be treated differently.

Part 1 sets out ambitions to reduce the exploitation of migrants. However, when individuals and, in particular, parents with children are pushed into a vulnerable situation, they are forced into making rash and desperate decisions that only increase their vulnerability and the dangers they face. Most reasonable people would accept that we have a responsibility towards those who have had their asylum application rejected. Amendment 29 seeks to ensure that we continue to uphold that responsibility.

Amendment 29 seeks to omit all the changes to support that have been made by the Government by removing clause 37 and schedule 8. Assuming that the Government are not minded to accept such a wholesale change, amendment 40 would ensure that some protection exists for the children of the families affected.

The Government have attempted to simplify the support that is provided in the immigration system by moving from two sets of regulations whereby asylum seekers can claim support to four sets of regulations dealing with support by local government and central Government. That is not simplification as I understand it. Under the Bill, local authorities will be legally prevented from providing support to families, including those with young children, when there are

“reasonable grounds for believing that support will be provided”

by Home Office provisions. In practice, that might create dangerous gaps in the system where support is not provided to vulnerable families.

It is worth repeating the horrendous story of the one-year-old boy, EG, who died in 2012, followed two days later by his mother, when they were left in limbo between two different types of support. In responding to that example, the Minister stated that the gap in provision was between support from two different Departments. I accept that, but can he guarantee with absolute certainty that his proposals will result in no gaps whatsoever between the support people receive from central Government and local government?

The changes that are proposed by the Government will create a significant financial and administrative burden for local authorities. The Government claim to have consulted widely, but the Scottish Government and Scottish local authorities were not content with the level of consultation from the Home Office before the introduction of these provisions.

The underlying reason for removing support from failed asylum seekers is to allow the Government to expedite the removal of affected parties.

[Margaret Ferrier]

As my hon. Friend says, the Bill proposes the removal of support from those who are due to be deported. That will obviously have an impact on the children of the families who are affected. To give some context, is it not the case that this support amounts to just over £5 per day? Removing that bare minimum amount of support will not lead to refused applicants being removed from the UK any quicker. We should support families until they are deported from the UK.

[Gavin Newlands]

I could not agree more with my hon. Friend. In Committee we tabled an amendment to try to ensure that support was pegged at 60% of income support, which would have increased support by just over £1 a day. It is not a massive amount of money—I am not sure that many Members of the House could survive on just over £6 a day.

Immigration Bill (Fifteenth sitting)

Gavin Newlands Excerpts

Tuesday 17th November 2015 Public Bill Committees

[Sarah Champion (Rotherham) (Lab)]

I want to speak against new clause 17 and new schedule 3. I want to start by asking the Minister whether he has the approval of the Minister for Children and Families, because the provisions seem to challenge much of the core principles for which he has been arguing. The changes have far-reaching impacts on the core definitions and duties of the Children Act, and it is strange that such dramatic changes are being housed within an immigration Bill.

Section 23(4)(c) of the Children Act places a duty on local authorities to give care leavers assistance to the extent that their welfare requires it. While the young person was a looked-after child, the local authority was their corporate parent. That duty recognises the legacy of the parental role and allows the local authority to step in and protect a care leaver in crisis. The Government’s Staying Put initiative explicitly recognises the need for care leavers to have “stable and secure homes” and to

“be given sufficient time to prepare for life after care.”

The Department for Education care leavers’ charter outlines key principles that will

“remain constant through any changes in Legislation, Regulation and Guidance”,

including the provision of advice and practical, financial and emotional support. Such initiatives are entirely undermined by the proposals.

Migrant children in care often face additional difficulties to British children. They are particularly likely to have faced trauma. They may experience language and cultural barriers. They are less likely to have any contact with biological family members. Care leavers often need their personal adviser or advocate to help to identify and even instruct an immigration lawyer. Barnardo’s conducted a child advocacy pilot for the Home Office that by all accounts seemed to be very beneficial. It helped the young person enormously to make informed choices and it helped the state to provide the level of support that was needed, so it seems odd that the new clause will undermine the Government’s pilot.

Not only is it discriminatory to remove support from young people leaving care on the basis of their immigration status, but in order for migrant care leavers to enter adulthood successfully it is vital that they can access a care plan under the 1989 Act. They are very young adults who often have no one else to turn to. The Government’s changes will remove all possible support usually provided to care leavers—including a personal adviser, a pathway plan and funding for education or training—other than, as the Minister confirmed, basic accommodation and financial assistance for certain groups.

It is not clear from the new clause whether it is envisaged that local authorities or the Home Office will be responsible for providing the support set out in proposed new paragraph 10B. Although I oppose the changes as a whole, at the very least local authorities should be responsible for providing support if the Government are not, and that should be stated in the Bill.

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

We have spoken at length about the complexities of immigration law. In introducing yet another Immigration Bill, the Government had the opportunity to simplify some areas of the law. In areas such as appeals, the Government have, to their shame, done so by removing the right of appeal from the majority and proposing that the few who retain it might have to exercise it from outwith the country.

Some of the strongest arguments in the whole debate have been about the support we give to migrants and refused asylum seekers, particularly the children involved in such situations. The Government’s proposals on support for 18-year-old care leavers and destitute families with children in new clause 17 and new schedule 3 are nothing short of a dog’s breakfast, and are potentially dangerous. Either by accident or design, we could very well see support removed from the most vulnerable groups.

Under the existing system, Home Office support is provided under two relatively—I stress: relatively—broad provisions, namely sections 4 and 95. We will now have heavily caveated and more complicated support available across four provisions, including new paragraphs 10A and 10B of new schedule 3. The new clause and new schedule will sow confusion at a local authority level, and dangerous gaps in support can and will occur.

The changes relating to section 17 of the Children Act 1989 will prevent local authorities from providing accommodation and support where there are

“reasonable grounds for believing that support will be provided”.

That will prevent local authorities from supporting families on the basis that they might receive support in future, even though they are not currently receiving any support. It could prevent a local authority from providing emergency support if a family are destitute and have been unable to access immediate support from the Home Office. It will also prevent local authorities from providing support to families who in principle would be entitled to support under new paragraph 10A but are not receiving it in practice.

I am sure the Minister is well aware of the case of child EG, a one-year-old who died in 2012, followed two days later by his mother, when they were left in limbo between two different types of support. It is people like that who might be affected by the Government’s proposals. On the topic of vulnerability, there cannot be many more vulnerable people than young adults who have just turned 18 and have spent long periods of their childhood in care. Indeed, as has been alluded to, the Minister for Children and Families described them as “highly vulnerable” when calling for more support as part of a leaving care strategy as recently as July this year. It seems that our commitment to providing more care for this vulnerable group depends on where they were born or have come from.

The Minister for Children and Families is not alone. The Joint Committee on Human Rights also stated that unaccompanied migrant children must be properly supported in the transition to adulthood and receive bespoke and comprehensive plans that focus on educational goals, reintegration and rehabilitation. That includes planning for possible return to their country of origin and the provision of support to young people leaving care whose appeal rights are exhausted. The Joint Committee also stated that it would be difficult to reconcile the removal of support from young people leaving care on the basis of their immigration status, rather than on assessment of need, with the non-discrimination provisions of the UN convention on the rights of the child. Article 2 of the convention requires that states respect and ensure the rights of each child in their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind.

During the evidence sessions, we heard time and again from expert witnesses that the proposals in the Bill run counter to the provisions and principles in the Children Act 1989 and the Children (Scotland) Act 1995. The hon. Member for North Dorset mused that it might be easier just to amend the 1989 Act, much to the dismay of myself and my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow North-east. The Government may not have gone that far, but they are trying to make changes to the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 that will have a similar effect. Be in no doubt: the Scottish National party will be voting against these retrograde proposals.