(6 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall now repeat a Statement made in another place on 25 January by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State. The Statement is as follows:
“I undertook to return to the House at the earliest possible opportunity to update honourable and right honourable Members on the programme to modernise defence, which the Ministry of Defence will be conducting in the months ahead.
Following agreement of the high-level findings of the national security capability review by the National Security Council, I have agreed with the Prime Minister and Chancellor that we should take forward its recommendation for a programme of further work to modernise defence to deliver better military capability and value for money in a sustainable and affordable way. This is essential if defence is to make its full contribution to national security.
The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 set out a clear ambition to ensure that the Armed Forces can tackle the threats that we face. It also proposed important new policy initiatives, including a stronger international approach, pursuit of innovation, modernised personnel policies and defence making a bigger contribution to our national prosperity, and we are making real strides to unlock greater efficiency and productivity.
Protecting the United Kingdom and our people remains our first priority and responsibility. As the threats we face become more complex and intertwined, we will need to work ever more closely with our NATO allies. We can also expect to remain actively involved with our partners in the Gulf in tackling shared threats to our security, and the Asia-Pacific region will become more important to us in the years ahead. The Ministry of Defence is making a major contribution to our prosperity as we procure the equipment that our Armed Forces deserve and support defence exports, in which there have been recent successes, most notably the £6 billion Typhoon contract agreed with Qatar.
Significant events last year—the callous terrorist attacks in London and Manchester, and the major storms that ravaged British dependencies in the Caribbean—are reminders of our wider responsibilities. We need to contain threats that have their origin overseas and be prepared to react swiftly and effectively when crises arise. As we identified in 2015, this will require the joint force that we are building to be versatile and agile. It will need to be capable of operating in all five domains: land, sea, air, space and cyber. It will need to be international by design, routinely exercising and operating with allies and partners. It will need to be credible and capable of operating against state and non-state threats—normally not alone but with NATO allies and other partners, but we must also be able to act on our own if and when required. It must be able to contribute to our national security at home, working with the police and other national security organisations.
While the major elements of our plans for Joint Force 2025 remain the right ones, in order to secure competitive advantage over our potential adversaries we need to ensure that we can move quickly to strengthen further our capabilities in priority areas and reduce the resources that we devote elsewhere.
The Government commissioned the national security capability review to ensure that we have the policy and plans to implement our national security strategy, so that our investment in national security capabilities is as joined-up, effective and efficient as possible to address current national security challenges. A report will be published later in the spring.
As my right honourable friend the Prime Minister said in her recent Lord Mayor’s banquet speech, the threats, risks and challenges have become more complex and intertwined and have developed in areas and ways that we broadly expected, but at a much greater pace than was foreseen. The defence budget is £36 billion this year—the fifth largest defence budget in the world—and it will increase by £1 billion each year so that it will be almost £40 billion by 2021. The UK remains one of the few countries to exceed NATO’s 2% spending target, and this Government have committed to continue to increase the defence budget by at least 0.5% above inflation every year. However, we must do more to ensure that we use our resources effectively and deliver the efficiencies that the department has committed to, so that they can be reinvested in the capabilities that we require for our Armed Forces.
It is for these reasons that I have agreed with the Prime Minister and the Chancellor to launch the modernising defence programme so that we can strengthen and modernise the Armed Forces to meet the threats that the NSCR identified. Modernising defence will allow us to deliver better military capability and value for money in a sustainable and affordable way, and it will allow us to ensure that defence capabilities complement other national security capabilities in the most effective way. I am determined to realise this goal through a modernised, more productive and more effective joint force that can deter threats more effectively and ensure that we can deliver what is required of defence today and succeed in any future conflicts. Turning this approach into reality will be my key goal for the modernising defence programme.
This programme will involve four strands of work. The first three will optimise how the MoD is organised and is operating; identify further efficiencies and ways to be more productive, including through an aggressive programme of business modernisation; and improve our performance on the commercial and industrial issues. The fourth strand will look at the capabilities that defence requires to contribute to our three national security objectives today and in the future, but also and most importantly, to understand the ever-changing threats that this country faces. I am determined to use the modernising defence programme to ensure that defence can make its full contribution to our national security on a sustainable basis.
I will speak to right honourable and honourable Members about this programme of work on a very regular basis and I will keep the House updated as decisions are made. In the meantime, I would warmly welcome any contributions that right honourable and honourable Members would like to make. My department and I will be consulting beyond the House as this programme of work gets under way in the weeks ahead.
Protecting our national security and the safety of the British people both at home and abroad remains the Government’s first priority. Let us make no mistake—the world is becoming a more dangerous place. We cannot afford to shy away from this reality, nor can we take our security for granted. But even more than that, in a post-Brexit world, Britain must continue to champion the global good. It must continue to reach out to seize global opportunities and deal with global threats. Our history teaches us that we cannot have prosperity without security. To protect that prosperity we must have Armed Forces that are primed and ready to tackle the challenges to come”.
My Lords, that concludes the Statement.
My Lords, I join in the congratulations to the noble Earl on his birthday and thank him for repeating the Statement. He must feel, to some extent, that today is a rerun of the discussion we had last Monday. On these occasions tribute is often paid to the Armed Forces, but I have a question on that. What evidence is there of any impact on recruitment and retention as a result of the uncertainty that has surrounded these issues? I also remind the noble Earl that, as some of us in the House will remember, a lot of the language in the Statement is very similar to what we saw and heard in Options for Change and Frontline First. We know that the outcome of both exercises was a substantial reduction in defence expenditure and hence in capability as well.
There are only two passing references to NATO. I press the noble Earl on how far, and to what extent, interoperability with NATO and our other allies will lie at the very heart of the exercise it is now proposed to carry out. As has been said on a number of occasions in response to questions in the other place, the Secretary of State asserted that the exercise would not be fiscal-neutral. Last Monday the noble Earl rather adroitly avoided answering my question as to whether he agreed with the Secretary of State, and indeed the head of the Army, that more money needs to be spent on defence. I offer him another opportunity to answer that question and I hope he will forgive me if I ask: yes or no?
My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their good wishes. I will do my best to answer the questions that have been put to me. The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked about the findings of the NSCR. We are not making an announcement on those findings today. The NSCR is the report referred to that will be published in the spring. It will not be the early spring; I hope the noble Lord will allow me to leave the Government some flexibility on that matter, but our ambition is to publish the findings of the NSCR before what most people would regard as the summer. As for the annual report on the 2015 SDSR, which was indeed due at the end of last year, the noble Lord is right: publication has been slightly delayed. I hope it will be delayed for not too much longer but we remain committed to publishing the second annual report.
The noble Lord asked about efficiencies, as a number of noble and noble and gallant Lords have done in the past. In taking this work forward we will take all existing efficiencies into account and our targets for achieving further efficiencies. We will also look for opportunities to identify new efficiencies by understanding how the MoD can reduce duplication and adopt new approaches to delivering a more modern organisation. I am well aware that there is a great deal of scepticism around efficiencies. I endorse the noble Lord’s interpretation of the word: this is about finding savings that do not adversely affect defence outputs. We are very strict about that and if any noble Lord would like to quiz me further, I will be happy to answer.
He asked about the work strands of the MDP. I hope the timetable and detail of the work will emerge very soon. In essence, we are looking at a work strand that focuses on the MoD operating model and will deliver plans for a stronger and more capable head office.
Secondly, there is the efficiency programme and business modernisation. This consists of obtaining independent assurance over the existing efficiency plan, identifying any new savings deliverable through up-front investment and understanding how the MoD can reduce duplication and adopt new approaches to delivering a more modern organisation.
Thirdly, there is the work relating to our commercial and industrial partners: assessing how the MoD can improve on strategic supplier management, improve its commercial capability, and build on improvements to the performance of Defence Equipment and Support—DE&S. Those three work strands are already under way. There will be a continuation of those work programmes.
The fourth strand is, I am sure, the one that interests noble Lords the most. It is about defence policy, our outputs and our military capability. It is about analysing the global security context and implications for defence policy, understanding the relative priority of defence roles and tasks, and identifying opportunities—and, indeed, imperatives—for modernising capability, the workforce and force generation. I hope that gives a flavour of the four strands of work.
The noble Lord asked me to enlighten the House on the three national security objectives. To refresh the memories of noble Lords, as described in SDSR 2015, the first is,
“to protect our people—at home, in our Overseas Territories and abroad, and to protect our territory, economic security, infrastructure and way of life”.
The second is,
“to project our global influence—reducing the likelihood of threats materialising and affecting the UK, our interests, and those of our allies and partners”,
and the third is,
“to promote our prosperity—seizing opportunities, working innovatively and supporting UK industry”.
What confidence do the Government have that the MDP will be completed by the Summer Recess? We intend the MDP to be substantially complete by the Summer Recess. Our aim is to be in a position to share headline conclusions by that time and we are confident that we can achieve that. That means sharing as much as we possibly can with Parliament and with Heads of State and Ministers at the NATO summit.
I was asked by both noble Lords about the prospect of defence receiving more money. It is only fair that noble Lords do not press me too hard on this at this point but I will say that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State has been speaking regularly to the Chancellor since arriving at the Ministry of Defence. He will continue to do so as the MDP progresses, but let us put this question into its context. Against the backdrop of the increasing threats that the Statement refers to, this work is about ensuring that the Armed Forces have the capabilities they need to keep our nation safe. That is the objective. Given that, it is important that we maintain the dialogue that is already in train with the Chancellor. I will not pre-empt the results of the dialogue by plucking extra funding figures out of the air, but if we conclude that defence needs more money, we will have a very alive conversation with both my right honourable friend the Prime Minister and my right honourable friend the Chancellor.
The noble Lord, Lord Campbell, asked me a number of further questions. The first was about the effect on recruitment and retention. As I have said, any prolonged uncertainty is damaging and we have to acknowledge that. The recruitment and retention climate is difficult. It is difficult, however, to pinpoint a single reason for that. I think there are multiple reasons for it. What we will see over the next few months, however, is a much more inclusive dialogue about the programme as it goes forward. I hope that that effort in the direction of transparency will dispel a lot of the uncertainty that perhaps exists at the moment. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State is very clear about the outcome: he does not wish to do anything that will damage defence. It is important to restate that with regularity.
Interoperability with our NATO allies is certainly an important strand of our work, as it has been since 2015, when we articulated one of our overarching aims, which was to be “international by design”. That means not only working with our allies on training, strategy and doctrine but having equipment that is interoperable.
I hope I have answered noble Lords’ questions but I am happy to answer further questions.
My Lords, I guess we welcome this quasi-defence review, although it would probably not have been needed if SDSR15 had been properly funded in the first place. If the NSCR is to be a benchmark for this review but will not be published until the spring, and noting that the Secretary of State for Defence in his Statement is encouraging contributions and consultation, how can sensible contributions and consultation take place without knowing what the benchmark is until the spring?
My Lords, the NSCR and the modernising defence programme that flows from it are intended to act a means of implementing the 2015 SDSR. It is the SDSR that we should take as the baseline for the work we are doing because we still believe that many of the headline findings of the SDSR are as valid today as they were then. We can have a sensible discussion about our defence needs but clearly, as the work proceeds, the Ministry of Defence will wish to consult closely with other government departments that have an interest in what we do.
I draw attention to the summary of the national defence strategy of the United States of America, which was released last week. If noble Lords have not seen it, it is by General Mattis. It is an extremely interesting document, down to earth and in spoken English, and I cannot recommend it more highly. I would like to plagiarise it and pinch some of his comments. I had the pleasure of joining the Secretary of State for breakfast last Wednesday, and I came away with the view that he is a man we should support foursquare, and parliamentarians from both Houses who are interested in defence—there are many of them, from all parties—should support him in every way possible. A key relationship for the future will be between Sir Mark, our national security adviser, and the Secretary of State, but I suggest that the fourth strand is the key strand. The last word of the fourth strand talks about strategic needs for the future. A combination of brains and innovation can deal with the first three; much of it is already known. I suggest, however, that the key date we have to consider is that of the next NATO summit which takes place on 11 and 12 July in Brussels. The right outcome to that will go down marvellously with our European friends, our American allies and, most importantly, the Commonwealth. If we walk in with empty words, they will forget us completely. When we walk in—this is the key—we need at least 3% for the future. We must have a greater presence, with many more people in the armed services. That way, when we go in to speak at that summit, the result should be, “The Brits have come back”. Does my noble friend the Minister agree with my last comment?
I am very grateful to my noble friend for his support of this programme of work and for the support that he expressed for my right honourable friend. I can tell the House, having worked with my right honourable friend for a number of weeks now, that he is 110% behind our Armed Forces and will fight very hard to ensure that we have an outcome that is credible, sustainable and affordable, and in which everybody will have confidence. My noble friend is right in that a critical date this year is that of the NATO summit. I am sure that we will arrive at a position where our allies have as much confidence as we do, and it is very important that we work towards that date in our minds.
My Lords, the noble Earl is absolutely right that there is cynicism. It is not surprising when one bears in mind that for the last 12 months the noble Earl has very loyally been telling us how all in the defence garden is rosy, how wonderful the money for defence is and how wonderfully everything is going. Then we find out last week that his Secretary of State, a year ago, had seen the Prime Minister and said there is insufficient money in defence. We desperately need more money and are making cuts now that are very painful, so that is hardly surprising. My question relates to the crisis in defence today. If we are not being fiscally level, and there is fiscal enhancement, is it possible, in year, to find some money from the Treasury to stop the cuts to training, in terms of spare gear and of repair work, to enable our forces to actually do the things they really need to do? There is a very real crisis in defence.
My Lords, I hope noble Lords will agree that I have always been open with the House about the stresses on the defence budget, not least those arising from the EU referendum. In particular, we have been quite open about the fact that the exchange rate has impacted our procurement budget, so I cannot agree with the noble Lord that we have tried to obscure the strain on our budget. I am not aware that there is the prospect of any in-year money, but I take issue with his word “crisis”. Speaking to my finance colleagues in the Ministry of Defence, it is pretty clear that we can get through this year, albeit with some temporary cuts to training which I agree are regrettable. But we can get through this year in good shape. The decisions that we need to take affect next year and beyond.
My Lords, I warmly welcome the winnowing out of this exercise from the Cabinet Office’s capability review, but could the noble Earl explain the difference between a defence review and a defence modernisation programme?
My Lords, as I tried to explain a little earlier, a fully fledged defence review would look very like the exercise that we conducted in 2015: going back to basics on what threats we face, what our ambitions are as a country and what we need to do to deter those threats and to provide for those ambitions. This modernisation programme takes the fundamentals of the SDSR as read, because we believe them to be credible. It is to decide what capabilities we now need, in the face of intensifying threats around the world, to counter those threats in a way that ensures that we have a sustainable programme going forward.
My Lords, I have particular knowledge of the right honourable Gavin Williamson, the Secretary of State for Defence, who succeeded me as Member of Parliament for South Staffordshire. Because most Members of your Lordships’ House do not know him, and many of them have a lifetime’s knowledge and experience of the things we are talking about, could my noble friend—in whom I have very real confidence and for whom I have great admiration—arrange, at an early date, a meeting in the Moses Room, so that the noble and gallant Lords in particular can have the opportunity of meeting and questioning the Secretary of State?
I second the admirable suggestion by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack. If we are serious about value for money in defence, is it not important that we seize every viable opportunity that presents itself for collaboration with allies in defence procurement? The F35 programme is a good example of that, though of course the size of the US defence budget means that it is hardly an equal relationship. Does the Minister agree that OCCAR has done, and is doing, a splendid job in managing the collaborative defence procurement of a number of European countries in some very important programmes, including the A400M? I declare an interest because I renegotiated and relaunched that project in its present form. Can he give the House an assurance that if we leave the EU, which I think would be a disastrous idea from every point of view, including this one, we will nevertheless remain committed to OCCAR in the work that it is doing in this field?
I join the noble Lord in commending the work of OCCAR. He is absolutely right that many of our defence programmes are not directly related to our membership of the EU but are bilateral or multilateral, and we certainly wish to see those continue. That is why we at the Ministry of Defence are keen to ensure that the Brexit talks result in as frictionless a trading environment as possible between ourselves and the remaining members of the EU. Interoperability is one consideration in our support for these joint projects; another is value for money and a third is cutting-edge capability, a lot of which this country is in the lead in providing.
My Lords, it is welcome news that there is to be this study programme. “Modernisation” is a portmanteau word; perhaps the Minister could give some examples of defence capabilities that are most urgently in need of study under the modernisation rubric.
I cannot give the noble and gallant Lord specific examples of equipment. However, I can say that in the area of cyber we need to ensure that we are ahead of the game and that our programmes for the Royal Navy are as up to date as they can be. It is about focusing our resources on the areas that are most important regarding the threats that face us. It is also about ensuring that we have infrastructure that is fit for purpose, both in our head office and in the Armed Forces themselves. That relates very much to the efficiency programme. I am confident in that programme; we have a way to go on it but we are doing well. If one thinks about certain platforms in the Army, the Royal Navy and the air force, efficiency is a very live issue in all those contexts.
I add to noble Lords’ comments in wishing the Minister many happy returns of the day. I think he is 67; he should be reassured that that is only 19 degrees Celsius. Just 10 days ago in the Moses Room, the Minister said he could not stand before us and commit the Government to conducting a full defence review. I am very sorry that this is not going to be such a full defence review because it will be another wasted opportunity. We need a major review, as has been said all across the House by noble and noble and gallant Lords today. Just picking at the edges is not going to be sufficient. If we do not have a major and full defence review. then in one or two years’ time, if he is still the Minister, the noble Earl will be back apologising once more for having to go through the whole exercise again.
I hope I can assuage the noble Lord’s concerns to some extent by reminding him that we wish the modernising defence programme to be an inclusive process. We are eager to hear from parliamentarians and others about what we should be thinking about most of all. So, even if this is not badged as a fully fledged review, I hope noble Lords will feel able to raise with the Government the concerns and issues that they wish to.
My Lords, in my short 25 years in Parliament, the best defence review I have seen was the SDSR 1998 of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson. But it was ruined by the Treasury’s 3% year-on-year cost saving, because you can never get such cost savings. Why do we keep including efficiency savings in the defence budget, because you can never get those efficiency savings, nor even the money to pump prime them?
I do not share my noble friend’s scepticism about the efficiency programme. In fact, we already forecast a line of sight to 90% of our formal target of £7.4 billion, as set by the Treasury. I emphasise that these savings will not adversely affect defence outputs. I am talking about things such as transforming the way we procure equipment. We can get a lot better at that. The single-source contract regulations have saved us hundreds of millions of pounds already. We will be saving money by reviewing the military allowances. That programme is in addition to the multiple efficiency drives over recent years, such as improving our equipment support contracts, working more closely with industry partners to drive efficiency in, for example, the submarine programme, changing the way we procure complex weapons and, not least, a reduction in the size of our civilian workforce. Throughout those efficiency drives, we have maintained a world-class military, and that is what we will continue to do.
My Lords, I think I heard the noble Earl refer to temporary cuts. My experience of cuts in defence is that once a cut has been made, it is cut. Can he please explain what he meant by temporary cuts and what will be temporarily cut?
My Lords, I was referring to temporary cuts in some of the training for, for example, the Royal Marines. That is very regrettable, I would be the first to acknowledge, but the service chiefs are clear that these cuts cannot and must not be anything other than temporary. We are not, at the moment, making the kind of reductions to British defence that were widely speculated about at the end of last year. It has never been the Government’s intention to make such cuts. As I said, we are looking to strengthen defence and we will not pursue changes that would be damaging, but that does not mean that we will be looking to preserve every aspect of the department’s current plans. We will be working closely with the service chiefs to explore what changes need to be made to produce the headroom for the kind of modernisation that we want to pursue.
My Lords, the 2015 SDSR called for swingeing cuts to civil servants across the whole department, but of course it is civil servants who can deliver some of the savings that we have talked about this afternoon. Can the Minister update us on how successful the department has been at reducing the number of civil servants?
There has been considerable success in reducing civil servant numbers—for example, arising from our withdrawal from Germany. However, we have always been clear that the last part of the target will remain the most elusive. Unfortunately, I do not have figures in front of me as to how far we have got. It is still very much part of our target, set by the Treasury. We are doing our best to implement those targets, but clearly, as the modernising defence programme goes forward, there may—I am sure there will—be a case for us to have a further conversation with the Treasury about what a whole force concept looks like in the context of the programme that we are undertaking.
My Lords, my feeling is that the weak link in our national security is actually the Home Office. I am thinking particularly of the Border Force: it is a great deal more efficient since it was taken over and commanded by an admiral, but it does not have the right resources or technology available, and there is no proper, joined-up arrangements with our coastal defence. That is a big lack. Will my noble friend, who I admire so much, at least look at the possibility of a more joined-up approach in that respect of our national security?
My Lords, yes, and that is one of the reasons why I mentioned earlier that, as this work goes forward, we shall want to consult very closely with our colleagues in other departments of government. My noble friend has referred to an extremely important part of the work that we do under strand 1 of the national security objectives, protecting our people. That must involve joint working between departments.
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we have time for both speakers who have been on their feet. We shall start with the Conservative Benches and then go over to the Labour Benches.
My Lords, does my noble friend the Minister agree that the range and diversity of markets and services in the City of London, and the extent to which overseas institutions participate in them, means that it would be very difficult to produce a paper of the sort that the noble Baroness opposite has demanded without going into a gross oversimplification, and that it would be much better—as my noble friend Lord Lamont said—to allow these negotiations to progress?
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the instrument that we are considering today is the Armed Forces Act 2006 (Amendment of Schedule 2) Order 2017.
The Armed Forces Act 2006 established a single system of service law that applies to the personnel of all three services, wherever in the world they are operating. The Act provides nearly all the provisions for the existence of a system for the Armed Forces of command, discipline and justice. It covers matters such as offences, the powers of the service police, and the jurisdiction and powers of commanding officers and of the service courts, in particular the courts martial.
The draft instrument amends Schedule 2 to the 2006 Act. Schedule 2 lists serious service offences to which special rules on investigation and charging apply. The offences listed in that schedule are commonly referred to as Schedule 2 offences. They include serious disciplinary offences, such as mutiny and desertion, and serious criminal offences, such as murder, manslaughter and certain sexual offences.
The 2006 Act imposes a special duty on commanding officers with respect to the investigation of allegations of Schedule 2 offences and of circumstances which indicate that a Schedule 2 offence may have been committed by someone under their command. Under Section 113 of the 2006 Act, a commanding officer who becomes aware of such allegations or circumstances must ensure that the service police are aware of them as soon as reasonably practicable.
The Act also imposes a duty on members of the service police forces with respect to the investigation of Schedule 2 cases. Under Section 116 of the 2006 Act, the service police must refer a case to the Director Service Prosecutions if they consider that there is sufficient evidence to charge a person with a Schedule 2 offence. The offences listed in Schedule 2 include all offences under Part 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, except: sexual assault, voyeurism, exposure and sexual activity in a public lavatory.
There has been much debate in recent years about whether these four offences should be listed in Schedule 2. Indeed, this House was instrumental in making the case for change. At the heart of those debates was the question of whether a commanding officer should have a role in the investigation of any allegations or circumstances which would indicate to a reasonable person that one of these offences has, or may have been, committed by a person under their command.
For the avoidance of doubt, I want to make clear what the Armed Forces Act 2006 requires of a commanding officer who becomes aware of allegations or circumstances which indicate that a service offence other than a Schedule 2 offence has or may have been committed. The commanding officer may ensure that, as soon as reasonably practicable, the matter is reported to the service police. Alternatively, he or she may ensure that the matter is appropriately investigated. An investigation other than by the service police will in some cases be appropriate because service offences include all offences which may be committed by service personnel under the 2006 Act, including the less serious disciplinary offences.
My Lords, I pick up a point arising from the two speeches from these Benches and the Liberal Democrat Benches respectively. It is a long time since I did my two years’ national service, but I was for 35 years after that a trade union official. I pick up a point made by my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe—namely, the services should reflect that in some respects service life is becoming more like civilian life, and is not just in a separate silo. For example, a lot of people deal with technical work, sitting in front of computers like everybody else. The long-standing civilian arrangements, which include a mandatory grievance procedure on the one side and a disciplinary procedure on the other, may be applicable to service personnel on a charge. Having been on a charge, I add that little twist to the matter. It is interesting to note the cultural changes that have occurred in the services. Women now hold senior ranks. I do not know what the most senior rank is that is held by a woman. For example, I do not know whether there is a female general, but women hold very senior ranks, including that of commanding officer. It would be interesting to get some feedback on how much the culture in the services has changed. Formerly, in any consultation where a parliamentarian was present, a senior officer would say, “Private, you agree with that, don’t you?”, and the reply was, “Yes, sir”. The point made by my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe, and that made in a wider context from the Lib Dem Benches, are pertinent to the change in that culture.
My Lords, I am very grateful for the continued interest noble Lords have expressed in these matters. Lest there be any doubt, the Government have always made it clear—as have the services themselves—that there is no place for sexual offending in the Armed Forces. We have listened to the concerns raised in this House. I hope noble Lords are reassured by the steps we are taking today; it is indeed true that the Armed Forces take any allegation of any type of sexual offence very seriously. I noted with interest the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Lea of Crondall, on this subject. He is right: there is no doubt that since he undertook national service there has been a dramatic change of culture in all sorts of ways. One change is that there is now zero tolerance of this type of unacceptable behaviour. As to whether the increasing presence of women and women officers has made a difference in that regard, I would not hazard a guess, but it can only have been a beneficial influence, if there was any such influence from that quarter.
The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked me a number of questions, the first of which was whether we have consulted the service chiefs in drawing up this order. Our proposals to amend Schedule 2 to the 2006 Act have been agreed by the Service Justice Board, which includes the Second Sea Lord, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff and the Air Member for Personnel. The service chiefs collectively are of course absolutely clear that there is no place for sexual offending in the Armed Forces.
As to whether we have consulted the rank and file personnel of the Armed Forces, the answer is: not specifically at ground level. Each of the services is involved in the policy-making process and guidance will be issued by the chain of command to let people know of the changes being made. However, it is important to remind ourselves that the changes that we are making today already happen as a matter of policy—policy which the services themselves introduced.
I think the noble Lord’s concern on that aspect of the issue can be addressed in part by the measures that the Armed Forces are taking to prevent sexual allegations and offences arising in the first place—the subject of his third question. I assure him that the Armed Forces are committed to addressing sexual harassment and sexual assault through a range of actions, including awareness campaigns and training presentations around sexual consent. The Chief of the General Staff has made permanent cultural and behavioural change one of his priorities. To that end, there have been poster campaigns and training packages to better educate personnel on social norms, as well as on what is expected of them arising from Armed Forces rules and regulations. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, cited the experience of the United States armed forces in this context.
As regards the potential bias or perception of bias that can arise in cases of this kind, we recognise the great courage that it often takes to come forward and report a sexual offence. To ameliorate the tendency that some would have to refrain from coming forward, we strive to ensure, through training and awareness campaigns, that personnel know how to report any inappropriate behaviour and what will happen should they do so. It is to be hoped that these measures are gaining traction.
As the noble Lord is aware, we publish annual statistics on sexual offences in the service justice system on the GOV.UK website. Statistics are currently available for 2015 and 2016 for cases where the service police have been the lead investigating agency and where the service justice system has retained jurisdiction of a case throughout. Information for 2017 will be published in the spring. I remind noble Lords that data are drawn from the three main components of the service justice system: the service police dealing with the investigation of a crime; the service prosecution authority dealing with cases referred; and the Military Court Service, which lists the cases and reports on outcomes. Our annual statistics are in accordance with the requirements of the Office for National Statistics.
I hope that covers the questions that noble Lords have put to me.
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I beg leave to ask a Question of which I have given private notice.
My Lords, defence spending is rising, not falling. This year the budget is £36 billion, and it will increase by at least 0.5% above inflation every year of this Parliament to almost £40 billion by 2020-21. The UK is proud to be the second-largest defence spender in NATO and the fifth-largest in the world. Recent press speculation about changes to the UK’s force structure, and cuts to the budget, has been misleading and unhelpful.
My Lords, is it not unprecedented for the head of one of the armed services to intervene in a debate of this kind? It is made all the more remarkable by the fact that he has been endorsed by the Secretary of State for Defence. Does the Minister agree with the Secretary of State for Defence—whom of course he serves as a Minister of State? If the head of the Army and the Secretary of State have now reached the view that there is insufficient investment in defence, is it not high time that the Government did so as well?
It is difficult for me to comment on a speech that has not yet been given, but I recognise the sentiment that the noble Lord articulated. The National Security Capability Review is about maintaining agility in this country’s security and defence, and staying ahead of the curve in terms of the resources we deploy. We must remain agile in a world that is ever changing, and that is why the Government are conducting this review: it is about ensuring that our defence and security policies and plans are as joined-up, efficient and effective as possible.
My Lords, does this not show the chaos in the whole area of defence? The annual report on SDSR 2015 was due by the end of December. This has somehow been subsumed into the NSCR, a date for which we have not got. Will this review set out the threats and how they are going to be met? If, as the Minister has stated in previous answers, there is no money, what threats are we going to tolerate?
My Lords, there is no chaos whatever. The NSCR is about analysing, across government, the intensifying threats to national security and considering their impact on the implementation of the 2015 SDSR and national security strategy. In that context, the Ministry of Defence has done a great deal of high-quality work. Once the NSCR has drawn to a close, we will want to build on the elements of the good work that has been done, to explore further the opportunities for modernisation that have been identified.
My Lords, should it not be remembered that, for every hour of every day and every night, somewhere in the world one of our Trident submarines is on patrol, ready to respond should our supreme national interest so require? Should not any potential aggressor be reminded accordingly?
My Lords, setting aside potential cuts, there is no speculation about the cuts in train now, particularly those affecting the training of our Armed Forces. Will the Minister comment on this, which is affecting our fighting efficiency and morale?
My Lords, there is no starker illustration of the crisis in defence than that the Secretary of State actually allows a head of service to talk about the fact that it needs more resources. I cannot remember that ever happening before, though admittedly I have been in the Navy only for 53 years. This is a really worrying event and reflects what has been said in this House and the other place about defence.
My question relates to our sailors, soldiers and airmen. This uncertainty, the pressure on resources and the hollowing out that is going on day by day are affecting the morale of our people. It is causing difficulty in recruiting; people are leaving and it is causing churn because there are fewer people. Is the Secretary of State—or the MoD—going to produce something to tell our people what is going on, what the future looks like, when there will be an SDR, if there is going to be an SDR, and what exactly is happening? At the moment, there is huge confusion and that is bad for our military.
The noble Lord’s central point is, of course, quite correct. I agree with him that uncertainty in any context can be unsettling and damaging. The Government do not wish to prolong this exercise more than necessary. The review is still ongoing and Ministers will consider the conclusions in due course. Any decisions on whether, when or to what extent the conclusions of the work are made public will be made by Ministers separately.
My Lords, last Thursday in this House there was a defence debate which I had the honour to lead. The Thursday before there was a magnificent debate in the other House, supported by all Members on all sides of the House in a major way. During those debates, it became clear from those in this House and the other place who are much more experienced than me and who conduct themselves magnificently as a duty to the country, that there is grave disquiet among all Members of both Houses. My noble friend Lord Howe, who has great experience in this area and is always totally courteous, must be aware of this huge disquiet. Would he be prepared to ask the powers that be to allow this House to have a full day’s debate on the defence of the realm? The other House debated it for five and a half hours last week. This is a hugely important subject: none of us wants to live to regret not doing our duty.
My Lords, as my noble friend knows, this House returns to the subject of defence at regular intervals, but I will of course convey his request to the usual channels. I, for one, would be more than happy to take part in such a debate. I am of course aware of the disquiet to which he refers; I have been made aware of it across your Lordships’ House over many weeks. However, the exercise that we are doing is very important: it is to make sure that we have Armed Forces that are fit for the future, not the past.
My Lords, the Minister declared that the central area in this is agility—those were his words. Agility runs through three essential elements: air mobility, marines and naval mobility, and cyber, which now permeates all defence. Can he therefore guarantee that there will be no cuts to the marines, no cutbacks to air mobility, and that cyber will be an integral part of the first major report rather than a separate issue dealt with by a department other than defence?
My Lords, as I have made clear in this House, there is no question of this country abandoning its amphibious capability or cyber, quite the opposite: there is a £1.9 billion programme across government to boost our cyber capabilities. However, as I said last Thursday, the NSCR may result in our reprioritising how we allocate our resources to emphasise the most effective capabilities for the world in which we operate.
My Lords, I think the Minister implied that the results of the review may be made public. Will he tell the House why they might not be made public? We are asking not for the evidence but for the results of the review to be made public, so the rest of us can see how the Government have arrived at their conclusions.
My Lords, my noble friend, for whom I have very great respect, talks about raising defence spending by 0.5% above inflation but the fall in the value of sterling has negated this completely. In addition, the situation has changed so much, particularly with regard to Russia, but we could also mention North Korea, Daesh and whomsoever one wishes. The situation has changed so completely that a lot of people in this House, the other place and indeed the country are hugely concerned about defence.
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Sterling on securing this important debate. As the debate has proved, his Question undoubtedly reflects the considerable interest in the subject across the House, and rightly so.
Before I address my noble friend’s Question directly, I shall set the context. As noble Lords are aware, the National Security Adviser has been leading work on a national security capability review since July. It has been an important opportunity for the Government to conduct a thorough analysis of intensifying threats to national security and to consider their impact on the implementation of the 2015 national security strategy and strategic defence and security review.
Defence has played a major role in the capability review, contributing a huge amount of work. There can be no doubt that we will continue to build on elements of that good work after the review has drawn to a close, further exploring the opportunities for modernisation that have been identified.
However, it is important that I do not pre-empt the completion of the capability review. Ministers will discuss its conclusions in due course and will consider what needs to happen next. Precisely because of that, and because we believe that the last SDSR is a sound basis for the work that we are doing, I am sure that my noble friend will appreciate that I cannot stand here today and commit the Government to conducting a full defence review.
The substance of my noble friend’s Question is the capability of the Armed Forces to meet global defence needs, as he well articulated. Those defence needs, and indeed our wider foreign policy, begin with the three national security objectives set out in the 2015 national security strategy: protect our people, project our global influence and promote our prosperity. The Armed Forces, and the wider defence enterprise, make an expert and admirable contribution to the fulfilment of those objectives. That will not change.
The protection of our people is clearly at the very heart of what defence exists to do. At home, the Armed Forces contribute to the resilience of the UK. They support the police under Operation Temperer and hold 1,200 troops at very high readiness under government winter preparedness plans. Their outstanding support to UK overseas territories in the Caribbean last year, following Hurricane Irma, offers a remarkable example of their capabilities in this latter regard. In UK airspace and territorial waters, the Armed Forces keep a constant guard against threats. The recent images of HMS “Westminster” shadowing Russian warships through the Strait of Dover will be familiar.
Beyond our borders, the Armed Forces protect us through their potent deterrent effect. We tend to think first of the UK’s continuous at-sea deterrent, and more recently of our developing carrier strike capability. But every force element in our Armed Forces makes a vital contribution to our ability to deter. Wherever they are deployed, whatever task they are undertaking, the Armed Forces’ world-leading professionalism and skill send a powerful deterrent message to any would-be adversaries, and allow us to project our global influence.
In the latter context, our troops are building the capacity of our allies and partners across the world. In Iraq, the UK Armed Forces have helped to train over 60,000 Iraqi security forces. In Ukraine, the UK has provided defensive training in medical skills, logistics and counter-IED. We are training the Libyan coast guard, the Afghan security forces and the Nigerian armed forces, among very many more examples. Of course, the UK’s contribution to NATO and the UN reinforces international security and the multilateral institutions by which it is upheld. The UK is leading the NATO enhanced forward presence battle group in Estonia, commanding a significant proportion of NATO’s standing naval forces, and as my noble friend Lady Anelay reminded us, contributing to the UN Missions in South Sudan and Somalia.
Finally, defence makes a very large contribution to the prosperity of the UK. In December, the Secretary of State announced a huge £6 billion contract with Qatar for 24 Typhoon aircraft, a huge boost to UK aviation. Equally, contracts emerging from the national shipbuilding strategy—for the Type 26 and, as my noble friend Lady Wilcox rightly mentioned, the Type 31e—support thousands of UK jobs and hundreds of UK suppliers, as does the Ajax armoured fighting vehicle programme. The defence industrial policy was published in December. It sets out measures to help the UK defence sector to thrive on the global stage, including by supporting small and medium-sized enterprises, reinforcing critical skills and training, and increasing investment in defence innovation. I encourage noble Lords to seek it out.
These are our global defence needs. It is clear that the Armed Forces are meeting them. But changes in the global strategic context require changes in the way we conduct the business of defence and security. I have spoken in recent debates about increasing threats faced by the UK and its allies. I do not propose to repeat myself—I think we all agree that we have entered a period of sharply increased complexity and risk. The boundaries between competition, confrontation and conflict are becoming blurred, and the use of military and non-military capabilities is being blended. Our adversaries are investing heavily in traditional capabilities and in non-traditional tools, such as cyber and subversion. They are taking advantage of the proliferation of cheap yet sophisticated technology to exploit our existing vulnerabilities and to try to create new ones.
I will need to write to a number of noble Lords to give full answers to the questions put to me, but let me address at least some. First, there is the perennial question of the defence budget. Of course we must provide defence with sufficient resources to meet the country’s needs. But passionate as we may be about defence, we must do the same for health and social care, for education, for welfare and for civil infrastructure. Balancing those competing demands is the difficult business of government. I can, however, assure the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and my noble friend Lord Trenchard that the defence budget is rising in real terms: £35 billion last year, £36 billion this year, £37 billion next year and £38 billion the year after that.
The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, raised the subject of resilience. The need to maintain resilience—the ability to absorb the losses that you may suffer in theatre—is of course one that we fully recognise. I assure him that, as ever, it informs all deliberations on the structure of the UK’s Armed Forces as we go forward.
In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, in particular, the purpose of the NSCR is precisely to ensure that we have the right capabilities for the intensifying threats that we face, but also that we deliver those capabilities in the most appropriate ways.
The noble Viscount, Lord Waverley, raised the important issue of cyber. He will know that the National Cyber Security Strategy was published in the summer of 2016. It was largely welcomed at the time. It is being delivered through £1.9 billion of investment in the national cybersecurity programme. Investment from that programme is helping the MoD to deliver the new cybersecurity operating capability, and a defence cyber school will open this year. GCHQ and the MoD are working in partnership to deliver the national offensive cyber programme, so that we really do have a world-class offensive cyber capability.
My noble friend Lord Freeman spoke about supporting the aircraft carriers and asked how we would maintain both carriers and maintain worldwide reach. I assure him that operating both aircraft carriers is affordable. Work is being conducted as we speak to plan the most effective and coherent way to operate the capability.
In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Lee, who asked me about the propulsion systems on the Type 45, I can reassure him, I hope, in part, that Project Napier is addressing the reliability and resilience issues in the Type 45 destroyers. It is a programme that is progressing well and, if I may, I will write to him with further details.
We cannot and we will not allow the UK’s long-held military edge to be eroded, but maintaining our ability to meet those global defence needs and contribute to the national security objectives does not mean maintaining the status quo for our Armed Forces. It means upholding a long tradition of British innovation, harnessing new technologies and techniques. It means reinvigorating and reinforcing NATO, which maintains the bedrock of UK defence. It may also mean reprioritising how we allocate our resources to emphasise the most effective capabilities for the world in which we operate. We must consider the new threats that we face and the new opportunities for modernisation available to us. As the NSCR draws to a close, defence will continue to ask itself those questions and to build on the firm foundations that the review has laid down.
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall now repeat in the form of a Statement the Answer given earlier this afternoon in another place by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence on defence and the national security capability review. The Statement is as follows:
“In the 2015 strategic defence and security review, the Government identified four principal threats facing the UK and our allies in the coming decade: terrorism, extremism and instability; state-based threats and intensifying wider state competition; technology, especially cyber threats; and the erosion of a rules-based international order.
As the Prime Minister made clear in her speech to the Lord Mayor’s banquet late last year, these threats have diversified and grown in intensity. Russian hostility to the West is increasing, whether through weaponising information, attempting to undermine democratic process or increased submarine activity in the North Atlantic. Regional instability in the Middle East exacerbates the threat from Daesh and Islamist terrorism, which has diversified and dispersed. Iran’s well-known proxy military presence in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere poses a clear threat to UK interests in the region, and to our allies.
I have, as other Members have, seen much of the work that our Armed Forces continue to do in dealing with these threats. It is because of this intensifying global security context that the Government initiated the national security capability review in July. Its purpose is to ensure that our investment in national security capabilities is joined-up, effective and efficient.
As I said in Oral Questions, since becoming Defence Secretary, I have asked the department to develop robust options for ensuring that Defence can match the future threats and challenges facing this nation. Shortly, when the national security capability review finishes, the Prime Minister with NSC colleagues will then decide how to take forward its conclusions, and I would not wish to pre-empt that decision.
While the detail must wait until after the NSCR concludes, I can assure the House that as long as I am Defence Secretary we will develop and sustain the capabilities necessary to maintain continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence, a carrier force able to strike anywhere on the globe, and the Armed Forces necessary to protect the North Atlantic and Europe and to ensure that we continue to work with our NATO allies. The Prime Minister, the Chancellor and I will be doing all that we can to ensure that we have a sustainable budget so that we can deliver the right capabilities for our Armed Forces”.
That concludes the Statement.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. I may regret this but I am almost tempted to welcome it—however, I had better be careful to understand it first. It seems to say that this review will define the threats. I think its implication is that the Ministry of Defence will not do its normal thing of muddling through, and that when the defence needs for the threat are defined, the money will be found. Is that a reasonable précis?
Certainly, my Lords, there is no intent for us to muddle through. The threats we face are ones we believe we correctly identified in the 2015 SDSR. What we did not sufficiently predict was the intensification of those threats that we have seen over the last two or more years. So, the capability review is designed in part to ensure that we have the right capabilities for the threats we face and expect to face but, as the noble Lord is aware, it is also a response to the EU referendum turning out as it did and the pound sterling depreciating to the extent that it did. We must therefore be realistic in the way we configure our budget over the next few years.
As far as I am concerned—and perhaps this is in the mind of others—the word “realistic” conveys a certain ambiguity. I appreciate that the Minister is unable to go into detail about what the defence proposals may amount to, but I ask him as a matter of principle to agree three things: that it is necessary in a defence review, first, to state clearly your foreign and defence policy objectives; secondly, to determine the military resources needed to meet those objectives; and, thirdly, to provide the funding to ensure that those military resources are delivered. It is being said that the defence review is fiscally neutral. If that be so, how can all three of those principles be met?
My Lords, the capability review has indeed been fiscally neutral in its approach, but we are addressing the challenges we face—I would not disagree with the three factors the noble Lord articulated—by ensuring that the policy and plans that support the implementation of the national security strategy are as joined-up, effective and efficient as possible. That may mean that we enhance the resources that are channelled towards certain capabilities and, as the noble Lord might expect from that, that we reduce the resources we are currently devoting to other capabilities.
My Lords, I am prepared to give this review a welcome but if, as the Minister said, many of the threats are getting greater, we need to look at enhancing the amount of money we spend on defence. If the threats are greater, our defences must be greater as well.
My Lords, from many of our debates on this topic I am well aware of the feeling of the House—that many noble Lords believe we should be spending more on defence. However, that is not currently the reality we are working with in the context of this review. As I say, we have a budget. We want to ensure that we are spending it intelligently in the context of the threats we face, and of our overall foreign policy.
My Lords, my blood runs cold when I look at the various options that seem to be being floated about cuts to defence. The Minister and I have both been involved with government and Whitehall long enough to know that these things do not just pop out of the undergrowth; it means that people are genuinely looking at options like that. If any of the options I have seen so far are implemented, the Conservative Government will have overseen a reduction of 50% in our military capability since 2010—quite an extraordinary figure. I ask the Minister to confirm that none of the measures said to be under consideration—the Government say that nothing at all is on the table—have actually been looked at. Or are they being looked at, and are we really thinking of making such a major reduction in our military capability?
The Government have not reached the point where they are thinking of doing anything along the lines the noble Lord suggested. I am well aware of the press reports to which he refers. I must emphasise again that they are speculation. Ministers have not had a formal set of options presented to them, and that is the point at which there will be a decision-making process. Until then, I fear that I cannot comment on any speculation.
My Lords, I welcome the Statement, particularly the last words, “deliver the right capabilities”, and the word “ensure”. We may at last have a Defence Secretary who will fight our corner. When we talk about threats, many of those who are much more knowledgeable than me through their days in defence will say that it is the unknown threats that we have to be prepared for. The known threats are much more straightforward; the unknown requires a different capability entirely.
The debate in the Commons last Thursday was one of the finest debates I have come across since I have been in Parliament. If any noble Lord has not read it, you should. This coming Thursday, we will have our own debate, as some noble Lords will be more than aware. When will the Government come to a viewpoint and state the way forward? Will it be in March or April, because time is not on our side?
My Lords, my noble friend is absolutely right that there is no merit in delaying the announcement on this subject longer than we need to, but I am glad that he picked up the tone and tenor of the Statement. The main purpose of the review is to ensure that we have a full suite of national security capabilities, from hard power to soft power, to achieve the security goals, the economic goals—the goals that depend on our national influence around the world—set in the 2015 strategy and in the context of our exit from the European Union.
My Lords, my noble friend just confirmed the Government’s continued adherence to continuous at-sea deterrence. Will he further confirm that that means four submarines, no less?
My Lords, the Secretary of State makes a commitment to protecting the north Atlantic. Is he also concerned about the south Atlantic, or should the Falklands be concerned?
Does the noble Earl realise that the continued delay in making key decisions about future capabilities is simply paralysing decision-making inside the Ministry of Defence and encouraging our opponents outside? Our allies in NATO will also be dismayed at the fact that these decisions are still pending, still waiting and seem to be kicked further down the road. Is he not concerned that this is affecting the security of this country?
As I said, we certainly want to make our announcement as soon as possible, but I would have thought that it would be even worse if I were to stand here and noble Lords were accusing the Government of making snap decisions, as I have heard criticism to that effect in relation to the 2010 SDSR. We are not in the business of making unconsidered judgments.
My Lords, would the Minister agree with me that it is important in any public statement that the people of this country are properly apprised of the fact that, if we say yes to and prioritise some elements of our defence capability, we are inevitably saying no to others, and that we are given a proper appraisal of what our capability actually is? In this country, particularly in some of our newspapers, we still hear statements that imply almost that Britannia still rules the waves. Our rhetoric and prioritising ought to match the reality of the situation in which we find ourselves.
The right reverend Prelate is correct. We need to tailor our capabilities to what is affordable, certainly, but we also need to bear in mind that the importance of the UK acting with its allies will not diminish. As I have said many times, NATO is the bedrock of our national security, and will continue to be so.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the House will appreciate that I cannot go into the details of the United Kingdom’s anti-submarine capability. However, I assure the noble Lord that any threat to UK infrastructure is taken extremely seriously. In respect of submarine cables, there is considerable resilience in the UK network, and the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport is working closely with industry to improve this further. Undersea cables support the whole global economy, and states are well aware that any deliberate attempt to interfere with cables would have wide repercussions, including for their own interests.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his Answer. Indeed, in the spirit of Christmas, I shall not raise the fact that for the first time in centuries we do not have a single frigate or destroyer deployed overseas. However, for a Chief of the Defence Staff to mention a specific threat—something that has always been very sensitive in the past—is very worrying. This issue stems from the Policy Exchange report, and that is why it has been raised, but there is no doubt whatever that this nation’s anti-submarine warfare capability has been seriously degraded. We used to be pre-eminent in the world. Going back to when the Soviets first carried out attacks on undersea cables, when they did not carry all the digital information they do today, we had 20-plus submarines, an MPA force and 48 anti-submarine warfare frigates, and we had all the supporting infrastructure to carry out anti-submarine warfare to monitor these things. Today, we have eight anti-submarine warfare frigates and seven submarines, with no maritime patrol aircraft. It is extremely worrying when someone like the Chief of the Defence Staff mentions this.
My question relates to the frigates. We have now, at last, ordered the first of the Type 26 frigates, which is super, but it is going to take five years to build the first one. It took one year to build the ground-breaking battleship “Dreadnought”. We are taking five years, and we have ordered only three. Does the Minister agree that we need a steady drumbeat of orders of anti-submarine ships to drive down costs, to improve British shipyard efficiency and to counter this threat?
My Lords, the noble Lord has immense experience in this area and I acknowledge that immediately. He is of course quite right about the need for a steady drumbeat of shipbuilding. That was one of the themes in the national shipbuilding strategy that we published recently. I do not think we should underplay the cutting-edge capability of the Type 23 frigates, of which we already have 13. However, as the noble Lord will know, defence uses a variety of assets and means to monitor potentially hostile maritime activity in the UK area of interest and beyond. For example, the Royal Navy routinely escorts non-NATO vessels transiting through the UK area of interest. However, I can tell him that this whole area is a central consideration in the national security capability review, which is currently under way.
My Lords, the training budgets of all three services have been heavily reduced by savings measures, imperilling operational capability across our Armed Forces. Anti-submarine warfare is an art form as much as it is a science, and sufficient training is absolutely critical. Will the Minister say whether anti-submarine warfare training has been affected by the cuts I have just mentioned and by the lack of manpower that is keeping some of our ASW specialist ships alongside?
My Lords, my understanding is that the quality of our training in anti-submarine warfare has not suffered, but the noble and gallant Lord is right to draw attention to shortages of skills in key technical areas such as nuclear and other types of engineering. The Royal Navy has this agenda very much in hand but it is a challenge—the Royal Navy is competing with industry for those skills. However, the picture is steadily improving.
My Lords, an attack on undersea cables would be an illustration of hybrid warfare, or to put it otherwise, of using any available means for attack. What concern is being addressed in the Government’s current security review to hybrid warfare and the resources necessary to meet that challenge?
The noble Lord is absolutely right that hybrid warfare presents particular problems and issues for decision-makers. The Ministry of Defence’s contribution to the cross-government capability review is looking actively at our future defence posture and how we can best spend our defence budget—our rising defence budget, I should emphasise—in the light of the various threats we face.
My Lords, bringing the Minister back to the Question about the cables, the Policy Exchange report written by the Conservative MP Rishi Sunak said that Russian submarines are “aggressively operating” near Atlantic cables which are,
“inadequately protected and highly vulnerable to attack at sea and on land, from both hostile states and terrorists”.
The Minister will have heard concerns expressed around the House about operational capability. Does he understand the lack of confidence among the public and in the House when we find that the six Type 45 destroyers are all in Portsmouth and not at sea because of a combination of the need to give sailors leave, mechanical problems, routine maintenance and the shortage of manpower? Does he accept that this is damaging to morale in our Armed Forces?
It would be damaging if the story were entirely accurate. Over the Christmas period, the Royal Navy has about 1,500 personnel and 13 ships and submarines deployed on operations and defence tasks all over the globe including the Mediterranean, the Gulf, home waters and the Atlantic. In addition, it has assets and personnel at high readiness should there be a requirement to activate them. However, it should not surprise anybody that, wherever possible, the Royal Navy programmes leave over the Christmas period so that personnel can spend time with their families.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will now repeat a Statement made in the other place earlier today by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary entitled “Report on Recent Terrorist Attacks”. The Statement is as follows:
“Mr Speaker, I would like to make a Statement on David Anderson’s report published today on recent terrorist attacks in London and Manchester.
The attacks which took place this year shocked us all. Our thoughts remain with the victims of the attacks and all those affected by them. I am conscious that many will still be suffering acutely. However painful, it is essential that we examine what happened so that we can maximise the chances of preventing further attacks in the future.
At the outset, I would like to remind honourable Members of the context. Andrew Parker, the director-general of MI5, recently said that we are facing ‘a dramatic upshift’ in terrorist threats, and as the so-called caliphate has weakened, Daesh has increasingly turned its attention to encouraging people to launch attacks in their home countries. Indeed, there is simply more terrorist activity, partly inspired and also enabled by terrorist propaganda and instructional videos online. Plots are developing more quickly from radicalisation to attack, and threats are becoming harder to detect, partly due to the challenge of accessing communications that are increasingly end-to-end encrypted.
MI5 and Counter Terrorism Policing are currently running well over 500 live operations—a third up since the beginning of the year—involving roughly 3,000 active subjects of interest. In addition, there are more than 20,000 further individuals—or closed subjects of interest—who have previously been investigated and may again pose a threat. I would like to pay tribute to MI5 and the police, who work tirelessly to keep us safe. I can announce today that they have now disrupted 22 Islamist terrorist plots since the murder of Lee Rigby in May 2013, including nine since the Westminster attack in March this year.
I now turn to the reviews. Counter Terrorism Policing and MI5 have conducted a thorough review process. I received from them 10 highly classified documents which analyse the attacks and potential improvements to operational practices. In June, I commissioned David Anderson QC to provide independent assurance of, and external challenge to, the reviews. I am today placing a copy of his unclassified assessment of the reviews in the House Library, and copies will also be made available in the Vote Office.
David Anderson concludes that the reviews have been carried out in an ‘impressively thorough and fair’ manner, and he endorses, so far as he feels qualified to do so, the conclusions and recommendations. Based on the MI5 and police reviews, David Anderson explains that:
‘In the case of the Westminster attack, Khalid Masood was a closed subject of interest at the time of the attack. Neither MI5 nor the police had any reason to anticipate the attack’.
Regarding the Manchester Arena attack, Salman Abedi was also a closed subject of interest at the time of the attack, and so not under active investigation. In early 2017, MI5 none the less received intelligence on him, which was assessed as not being related to terrorism. In retrospect, the intelligence can be seen to be highly relevant. Had an investigation been reopened at the time, it cannot be known whether Abedi’s plans could have been stopped. MI5 assesses that it would have been unlikely. Across the attacks, including Manchester Arena, David Anderson notes that MI5 and CT Policing got a great deal right. However, in relation to Manchester, he also commented that,
‘it is conceivable that the attack … might have been averted had the cards fallen differently’.
In the case of London Bridge, Khuram Butt was an active subject of interest who had been under investigation since mid-2015. A number of different investigative means were deployed against him, but they did not reveal his plans. His two conspirators had never been investigated by MI5 or CT Policing. In regards to Finsbury Park, neither MI5 nor the police had any intelligence about this attack. Taken as a whole, MI5 and CT Policing conclude that they could not,
‘find any key moments where different decisions would have made it likely that they could have stopped any of the attacks’.
None the less, they go on to make a total of 126 recommendations.
The recommendations made in the MI5 and police operational review fall into four broad categories. First, there needs to be a concerted effort to enhance MI5 and the police’s ability to use data to detect activity of concern, and to test new approaches in the acquisition, sharing and analysis of data.
Secondly, MI5 should share its intelligence more widely and work with partners such as local authorities on how best to manage the risk posed by closed subjects of interest in particular. We are considering undertaking multiagency pilots in a number of areas, including Greater Manchester, and I have already started discussing how to take this forward with Andy Burnham.
Thirdly, there should be a new approach to managing domestic extremism, particularly extreme right-wing groups, where their activity meets the definition of terrorism. Fourthly, there are a large number of detailed and technical changes which could be made to improve existing operational counterterrorism processes.
David Anderson ends his report with several reflections. First, intelligence is imperfect and investigators are making tough judgments based on incomplete information. This unfortunately means that not every attack can be stopped. As we do not live in a surveillance state, it will always be a challenge to law enforcement to stop determined attackers getting through. Despite this, we should remember that most attacks continue to be successfully disrupted. Lastly, David Anderson concludes that even marginal improvements are capable of paying dividends that could tip the balance in favour of the security forces in future cases.
I have discussed these reviews at length with David Anderson, and separately with Andrew Parker and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Cressida Dick, as well as their senior teams. I am grateful for all their work and am confident that they have asked the right questions and drawn the right conclusions. I am clear, as are they, that the implementation of the recommendations is crucial.
There will be those who seek to apportion blame for the attacks. We should be united in our clarity that it lies squarely with those whose cowardly acts killed 36 innocent people this year, and with those who encouraged them. At the same time, we must learn all that we can from these attacks, and make sure that our overall counterterrorism response is equal to the shift we have seen in the threat.
I turn now to the next steps. Bringing those responsible to justice is our priority. We must not do anything that jeopardises the criminal prosecutions that are being pursued in relation to Manchester and Finsbury Park. The coroners’ investigations will probe the matter further and independently assess the circumstances of the deaths. Inquests have already been opened into the attacks and suspended where criminal investigations are continuing. It is right that those inquests proceed wherever they can. If the coroners consider that they cannot fully deal with the relevant issues, that is the point at which to decide whether an inquiry is needed. We are ruling nothing out.
I welcome the Intelligence and Security Committee’s intention to make these attacks its top priority, and I have already discussed this with my right honourable friend the Member for Beaconsfield. As I outlined, implementation of the recommendations will be crucial. I have asked David Anderson to provide an independent stock-take of progress in a year’s time, but linked to implementation are resources. We will shortly be announcing the budgets for policing for 2018-19. I am clear that we must ensure that counterterrorism policing has the resources needed to deal with the threats we face.
Finally, these recommendations need to fit into the broader government review of our counterterrorism strategy. That review reaches well beyond MI5 and CT Policing to look at the whole-of-government response and at how we can work better with communities, the private sector and international partners. I conclude by thanking David Anderson for his independent assurance of these reviews. I again pay tribute to the excellent work of the police and MI5.
I end as I started. The thoughts of everyone in this House and the other place are with the victims, their families and all those affected by the attacks. I commend this Statement to the House”.
My Lords, that concludes the Statement.
My Lords, I too thank the Minister for repeating the Statement and associate these Benches with the Home Secretary’s sentiments concerning those affected by the terrorist outrages. As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has just reiterated, there is no doubt that the blame for the suffering that was inflicted remains with those who carried out these criminal acts and those who supported them. As far as I am concerned, we have the best intelligence and policing services in the world.
It is important to explain what a “dramatic upshift” in terrorist threats actually means. Having been briefed by those at the highest level, my understanding is that the number of people being influenced by extremist propaganda, particularly online, who are then tempted to conduct unsophisticated attacks such as those at Westminster, London Bridge and Finsbury Park, is increasing. Can the Minister confirm that it is the volume rather than the degree of sophistication, the amount of strategic planning or the co-ordination that is seeing a “dramatic upshift” in the threat?
In the case of the Westminster, Manchester and Finsbury Park attacks, which were apparently carried out by so-called “lone wolf” attackers, can the Minister explain how end-to-end encryption mentioned by the Home Secretary would have made any difference to the likelihood of those attacks being prevented? Bearing in mind that in all these attacks, except the London Bridge attack, none of the murderers was under active investigation, how would their communications have been monitored, whether end-to-end encrypted or not? In the case of the one attacker who was an active subject of interest, can the Minister confirm that the investigative means that were deployed against him could have overcome end-to-end encryption? Is it not the fact that end-to-end encryption is a global issue that cannot be banned, and that we should be focused on what we can do something about, rather than on what we can do nothing about?
Can the noble Earl confirm that David Anderson agrees with MI5 and Counter Terrorism Policing’s conclusion that they could not,
“find any key moments where different decisions would have made it likely that they could have stopped any of the attacks”?
The Home Secretary reflects David Anderson’s conclusion that intelligence is imperfect and investigators are making tough judgments based on incomplete information, and she promises to deliver the resources Counter Terrorism Policing needs to deal with the threats we face. Does the Minister agree that a vital part of the intelligence picture is provided by community policing, to which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, alluded? The day after the London Bridge attack, a neighbour of one of the attackers told journalists how he thought that the man was being overfriendly and was asking about hiring a van without using a credit card on the day of the attack. Despite, as the Home Secretary said, a “number of” investigative means being deployed against him, this intelligence, which might have been discovered by a community policing team to whom the neighbour may have had links, did not surface until afterwards.
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, among many others, have warned about the erosion of police resources and the demise of community policing. Despite assurances from Ministers to the contrary, the facts are that police budgets continue to fall in real terms. For example, the Metropolitan Police has already had to make savings of £600 million, with £400 million of cuts in the pipeline. Does the Minister agree that effective community policing is as important, if not more important, against the current unsophisticated threat, as Counter Terrorism Policing, and that community policing must also have the resources needed to deal with these threats?
My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords for the very appropriate sentiments that they have expressed in relation to these terrible attacks. They asked about police numbers and the police budget. Overall police numbers is a big subject and it is probably appropriate that I write to them as comprehensively as I can with the details of the approach that the Home Office is taking.
As regards counterterrorism policing in particular, however—that is surely our focus for these purposes—we will, as the Statement made clear, shortly announce the budgets for policing for 2018-19. Ministers are absolutely clear that we must ensure that counterterrorism policing has the resources needed to deal with the threats that we face. We agreed £24 million of additional funding for CT policing this year, following the recent attacks and the move to “critical”. We will continue our regular dialogue with the National Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters and wider policing to understand demand in relation to the increasing complex threat that we face from terrorism.
It is, however, worth reflecting that, when it comes to policing in the community, it should be incumbent on all of us—communities as a whole—to play our part in being vigilant. We have, through various means, encouraged communities to report on suspicious activity. To defeat terrorism, CT policing launched the national awareness campaign, Make Nothing Happen. The campaign urges the public to act on their instincts and report suspicious activity, including all types of extremist behaviour, to the police.
I was asked by both noble Lords about the words used by David Anderson in relation to the Manchester attack, when he said that MI5 and counter-terrorism policing got a good deal right and,
“could have succeeded had the cards fallen differently”.
MI5 and the police conclude in their reviews that a successful pre-emption of the plot would have been unlikely had an investigation been open on the basis of the available intelligence. Ministers have probed this issue carefully both with David Anderson and with MI5 and the police, and having done that, we believe that the decisions made by MI5 and the police were entirely reasonable. However, while the scope of the inquests relating to the Manchester attack has not been set, I expect that the coroner will want to consider whether the state could have prevented the deaths. In any event, it is vital that we learn the lessons from these attacks. There are, as I have mentioned, 126 recommendations arising from the reviews, and we will be working with MI5 and the police to ensure that they are implemented.
I was asked about border controls. Of course, that is a very relevant topic when we consider the number of individuals who have travelled to Syria and parts of Iraq during the recent conflicts there. The flow has reduced considerably in recent months. Approximately 850 UK-linked people of national security concern have travelled to engage with the Syrian conflict. We estimate that just under half of these will return to the UK and more than 15% have been subsequently killed while fighting in the region. Everyone who returns from taking part in the conflict in Syria or Iraq must expect to be investigated by the police to determine whether they have committed criminal offences and to ensure that they do not pose a threat to our national security. Where there is evidence that criminal offences have been committed, those responsible should expect to be prosecuted under the full weight of the law.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked whether the intensification of the threat was a reflection of the volume of cases that the security services and the police are dealing with. Broadly, the answer to that is yes. Much of the radicalisation that we are concerned about is, of course, radicalisation online. The internet must not be used as a safe space for terrorists or for those who mean us harm. The noble Lord will know that the Government were at the forefront of encouraging Facebook, Microsoft, YouTube and Twitter to jointly launch the global internet forum to counter terrorism this year. Collectively, the launch of the forum and the development of the hash-sharing database is welcome progress, with 40,000 hashes so far. On an individual basis, since the Prime Minister led an event at the UNGA on preventing terrorist use of the internet, we have seen the companies be more public with their efforts, which is welcome. Recently, YouTube stated that 83% of its extremist videos had been taken down after being identified automatically, and Facebook stated that 99% of removed terrorist content is automatically detected, and 83% of original and uploaded copies are removed within one hour of upload.
On end-to-end encryption, which the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked me about, encryption of that kind undoubtedly makes the job of MI5 and policing harder—there is no getting away from that. As I am sure he will understand, there is a limit to what I can say about these particular cases and the part that end-to-end encryption played in them. For example, there is a potential prosecution relating to the Manchester attack, which none of us would want to compromise. However, the noble Lord is right that end-to-end encryption cannot be banned. His part in the passage of the Investigatory Powers Act, which I am sure we both remember with a good deal of pleasure, will remind him that we had long debates on this subject during which it was made clear that end-to-end encryption was something that the security services and the police had to live with.
My Lords, while we owe a great debt of gratitude to MI5 and the security services, does the Minister agree that in itself their work does little to tackle the causes of terrorism and of extremism? Does he agree that that cause lies in the misuse of outdated religious texts to incite impressionable youngsters to commit outrages?
My Lords, yes, I agree with that. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister was clear in her statement of 4 June that “enough is enough”. We need our counterterrorism strategy, which is currently being worked up in the Home Office, to keep up with a number of fast-moving areas. One is most definitely to tackle terrorist ideology and to deny online safe spaces to terrorist communications, part of which will be to ensure that warped doctrine does not reach the internet. However, we also need to deny safe spaces in the real world so that malign and misleading published material is not promulgated.
My Lords, I welcome the Statement repeated by the Minister and the report. Does he agree that the report illustrates well the importance of surveillance and good intelligence in preventing—in many cases—large-scale conspiracies to commit terrorist acts? However, it is of course more difficult with lone-wolf attacks, which are probably inspired over long periods of time without the necessary ingredients of a large-scale conspiracy. It is extremely difficult to prevent those offences. Consequently, all we can hope to do—I hope the Minister agrees with me—is to minimise the damage done once one of those attacks is commenced. The answer to that is more armed response officers in the area. Is there any plan to increase the number of armed response officers on the streets of the United Kingdom?
My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Lord’s knowledge and experience in this area. He will know that policing requirements are assessed almost day by day, and a particular situation may well require more armed police officers to be stationed in particular locations. I cannot generalise about that, but I am sure that noble Lords will all be conscious that the Palace of Westminster has seen a much tighter degree of security from armed police in recent months, for which we should be grateful.
On the noble Lord’s general point, I agree. Surveillance is important but, as David Anderson himself acknowledges, it is impossible for the authorities to prevent every single terrorist attack. In his executive summary he says in terms that the recommendations, if accepted, would not remove the risk of a terrorist attack—to do so would be manifestly impossible in a free society. He also mentions that MI5 and CT policing have thwarted 20 Islamist terrorist plots in the past four years, resulting in 10 life sentences from the seven plots that have so far come to trial. So we can point to some signal successes achieved by MI5 and the police, but they cannot possibly be expected to pick up lone-wolf attackers.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for repeating the Statement. I agree that it is the responsibility of us all to ensure that we do all we can to prevent these terrorist attacks. Much of this evidence is now in the public domain, but can he confirm that in each of the attacks by so-called Muslims—Khalid Masood, Salman Abedi and Khuram Butt—these individuals had been reported to the authorities by friends, family or members of the communities in which they worked and operated? In the light of the Government’s commitment, can he also undertake to ensure that all those attracted to terrorism are prevented from going down that route, and that the Government will look again at the recommendation of David Anderson, Human Rights Watch and individuals in the security services and the police to now have an independent review of the Prevent strand of the Contest strategy?
My Lords, as the Statement made clear, a number of the attackers in each of these incidents were, to put it loosely, on the radar of the authorities as either open or closed subjects of interest. I am afraid I am not aware of how exactly those people’s names came to the attention of the authorities but, if I am able to shed further light on that, I will of course inform my noble friend.
I hope my noble friend will agree that, if we did not have the Prevent strategy, we would need something very like it, because it is all about taking an end-to-end approach in the community and ensuring that partners work together to share information and that those who are vulnerable and susceptible to malign indoctrination are protected and not radicalised. I will write to my noble friend to let her know where the thinking in the Home Office has reached on the progress of the Prevent strategy, but I think it is doing very good work, and we can point to some welcome statistics on the number of people who have been successfully counselled.
My Lords, from these Benches I very much welcome the Statement and the sentiments in it, particularly its focus on the direct victims. However, there are also indirect victims of such attacks—those who are made to feel more afraid simply to go about their daily lives. That includes a lot of people, not least many in our Muslim communities. Does the noble Earl agree that, as a result of these attacks, it is very important to do all we can to increase the feeling of safety among those in Muslim communities, seeing them not just as people who must be targeted for information but as people who are part of our wider community and whom we must cherish and care for, helping them to feel safe and welcome? This includes not just community policing but many other areas of work with them, and it includes a very strong focus on dealing with right-wing extremism, which would threaten those communities.
The right reverend Prelate makes a series of excellent points and I of course agree that we need to remember that there are sometimes hidden victims in all this, not least in our ethnic minority communities, who may feel—wrongly, in my view—that they are being put under pressure or discriminated against. However, that feeling needs to be addressed, and I know it is very real among some communities.
On victim support more generally, we are very aware of the need to ensure that effective, comprehensive and co-ordinated support is available, which is why the Government created a new cross-government victims of terrorism unit earlier this year. We have worked closely with each local area affected by the attacks, alongside the police, the third sector and other agencies, to make sure that support to victims is comprehensive and effectively delivered.
I noticed that the Minister responded to the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Paddick, by saying that our focus must be on counterterrorism policing. I worked in that field for nearly 10 years, and I am afraid that that is not the answer. Counterterrorism policing, as a budget, is likely to take money from other parts of the police budget—it is a continuum. As both noble Lords said, community policing is a vital part of the counterterrorism process and if, as in Norfolk, the decision is taken to remove all the police community support officers, we are failing in our approach. It is not right to say that the focus must be on counterterrorism policing as a budget; I ask the Minister to consider that as a mistake that has been made for at least the last 15 years.
The Statement makes it clear that, as Islamic State has been expelled from most of the territory it occupied in Iraq and Syria, there has been a great dispersal of those fighters. The Government said that 850 potential fighters went out to join ISIS—there can be no clearer commitment to the objectives of terrorism than having done that. Of the 850, we gather, 15% have been killed, some 400 have already returned and 300 remain, perhaps waiting to return. Has the time not come to make it absolutely clear that anyone who has left this country to fight for ISIS should not be allowed back? We cannot afford to take that risk, or to pay the huge costs of dealing with them if they do come back. Do the Government have legislative power to stop them coming back and if not, will they take such powers?
My Lords, I will be advised on whether this is correct but my understanding is that the authorities have sufficient powers to apprehend and intercept anyone who is known to have joined a terrorist organisation overseas when they return to this country, and those people should expect to be subject to arrest and detention where appropriate. There are provisions in law for removing passports from certain individuals, but I would need further advice as to the conditions of those, and I will write to my noble friend about that.
My Lords, I got the impression while the noble Earl was speaking that the general public might have no real comprehension that they, too, have a part to play, and think that this is essentially something that can be left to the services. I am old enough to recall what we did just before the last war with the “Careless Talk Costs Lives” and similar campaigns. On the whole, those were remarkably successful. I am sure that no one wants to panic, but I believe that someone could examine how that was done. For example, people buy considerable quantities of certain chemicals. Every year, I buy two hundredweight—to use an old term—of a certain chemical for gardening purposes, although I will not mention the chemical. I was asked what I use it for. The noble Earl has mentioned a similar example. Actions like that could provide the public services with more information than they get now.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for his suggestions; indeed, they resonate very closely with comments made by David Anderson in his report, when he talked about the need for the public sector and the private sector to work together rather more than they do to keep the public safe. I would go further. The Government cannot and should not seek to carry out their work without drawing on the significant expertise that the private sector and, indeed, private citizens can offer. This is not about spying on innocent people; it is about enlisting the support of retailers, for example, both online and physical, to report any suspicious activity. We know that schemes such as Neighbourhood Watch have been extremely successful in their own way in preventing household crime. Perhaps that is something that could be developed rather further to encompass the kinds of crime that we are now discussing.
My Lords, one of the terrorists, Khuram Butt, is reported to be an acolyte of Anjem Choudary, who virtually became a household name. He was given the oxygen of publicity and a platform to carry on spewing his vile hatred. That is something that we need to take into account and stop.
Unfortunately, preachers inspired by the Wahhabi faith are still coming over from Saudi Arabia and preaching in mosques up and down the country. That is going on. I spoke recently to the family of a young man who is now distant from the family. He has been groomed and cut off from his family. He has dropped out of university and all he does is go round preaching. I am not saying that he would go out and do something but he has been groomed. What is being done to monitor the situation? These imams are coming over from Saudi Arabia and being given platforms in British mosques where they should not be and have no business. What is being done? Are they being monitored, and what is being done to prevent them entering the country in the first place?
My Lords, whenever there are reports of imams or anyone else preaching seditious material or any other kind of malicious doctrine, those reports are followed up. As the noble Baroness will know, the full force of the law is there to bear down upon them. The challenge is to find out where these people are and who they are. That is something that the community as a whole can play a part in highlighting. It cannot solely be for the police to do that. Indeed, it is important that communities should not feel that they are being spied upon all the time.
My Lords, does the Minister agree that one of the things that is encouraging about David Anderson’s report is the clear evidence of a complete lack of complacency in both the Metropolitan Police and MI5 and the self-criticism of their own performance? That has led to their producing 126 recommendations. David Anderson, as far as he goes, supports those recommendations, and we know that the ISC will look at them in detail. As the Minister said, there will also be other ways in which their performance will be scrutinised in the inquests. I, for one—and, obviously, I declare a strong interest—am proud that everyone I know who has been working on this, working extremely closely with the Met, has looked with great self-criticism at their own performance.
Perhaps I may be allowed to answer the noble Lord’s question. A great amount of information from the public reaches both the police and the Security Service. That does not undermine the discussions on the need for community policing, but many plots have been stopped because of information from members of the public in the first instance. People are not ignorant of the need to help.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, with her extensive experience in this field. She is of course right that we can be proud of how the police and MI5 have addressed their own performance in the way that these cases have been investigated. David Anderson is very clear that their process was thorough and fair. Nevertheless, it is reassuring to us all that we did commission David Anderson to do this exercise. It was not that the police and MI5 were not trusted to do the job but, on some occasions, we need that added element of reassurance which we have received clearly from Mr Anderson.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask Her Majesty’s Government what is the naval manpower ceiling required to ensure that all ships, air squadrons and submarines in the planned naval programme are fully staffed.
My Lords, the Government are committed to investing in growing the Royal Navy for the first time in a generation, utilising the department’s whole-force approach to deliver defence needs. The naval service will continue to adapt to ensure that it has the correct number of personnel to operate, maintain and support all its ships, submarines and air squadrons. This whole force includes service personnel, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, civil servants and contractors.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his Answer—I have to say that my flabber is totally gasted. The bottom line is that there is a real issue with manpower within the Royal Navy. A ceiling is needed which allows some flexibility to recruit people of various types so that you have a little bit of spare so that you can man ships. The fact that we have laid up one Type 45, one Type 23 and HMS “Ocean” and that we are swapping Royal Marines for sailors shows that there is a real problem within our manpower. Is there any intention at all to honour the pledge given by the coalition Government to up the number above 400 towards the 4,000 limit, so that we will then be able to man our ships? And why have we stopped production of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines monthly personnel statistics and the pocket brief, so that we cannot see what is happening?
My Lords, statistics are published on a regular basis but it has been decided that there is very little virtue in doing it month by month. On the noble Lord’s first question, he will know that the 2010 SDSR predicated a manpower figure for the Royal Navy that has now been superseded by about 1,600 personnel. There will be 400 more, measured against the current complement, by 2025. So we can genuinely talk about a growing Navy. We can also talk about a growing budget. There has been huge investment in the Royal Navy in the past few years, and that has gone not only into personnel but into cutting-edge equipment as well.
My Lords, is it not the case that members of the Royal Naval Reserve can very often be deployed in support of their regular colleagues in the Royal Navy, often in specialist roles, to the overall advantage of the system?
My noble friend is absolutely right. The maritime and, indeed, the RAF reserves are often used to provide individuals and small teams for specific roles, and their training is designed to integrate them with the regulars. In fact, my noble friend may be interested to know that there are reservists already serving on the offshore patrol vessels, supporting regulars, at the moment.
My Lords, as I am sure the Minister is aware, Plymouth—a city I know very well—is home to 700 Royal Marines. Speculation is rife in the city about a reduction in their numbers and their locations. What comfort can the Minister give those 700 Royal Marines about their future in the defence of our country?
My Lords, I hope that the comfort that I was able to give the House in last week’s debate on the Royal Marines will have reassured many in Plymouth that there is no question of scrapping the Royal Marines. What is going on at the moment is a national security capability review, which is looking at numbers and capabilities and seeing how we can invest and spend our growing defence budget in the most intelligent way. But the ability to transfer personnel and equipment from ship to shore will remain highly relevant to the Royal Navy’s capabilities.
My Lords, what is the Minister’s view of the evidence given yesterday to the Public Accounts Committee by officials from his department, who said that more should be spent on defence, not least because of the adverse impact of the depreciation of the pound on the defence budget?
My Lords, the depreciation of the pound is certainly an issue that we are wrestling with. To a certain extent, the Ministry of Defence hedges against currency devaluation but we cannot do that indefinitely into the future. We are protected to a large degree at the moment. But it is one of the reasons why we need an NSCR exercise such as the one going on at the moment, which is about not only investing in capability wisely but doing it in a cost-informed way.
My Lords, there has recently been good news about co-operation with the French on naval capability. Does the Minister anticipate any further developments of this sort, where we co-operate with our close allies?
Yes, indeed. One of our objectives is to strengthen our bilateral relationships, not only with the French but with Germany and other countries in Europe. But, as the noble Lord will be aware, the UK and France have had a long history of working together on operations and exercises, and the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force is a realisation of the commitment made in the Lancaster House agreement for our forces to train and operate alongside each other.
My Lords, following the Minister’s answer just a moment ago about foreign currency exposure and the procurement of military equipment, would it not be sensible—in the light of recent, rather uncomfortable experience—to extend the period of that hedging to cover the full delivery and payment period for the relevant project at the time when the contract is signed and the project is undertaken?
My Lords, in all this talk about cuts and the debate last week on the Royal Marines, is there any saving grace for the most famous military band in the world, the Royal Marines Band? Has the band been ring-fenced to make sure that this nation does not lose such a valuable asset?
My Lords, I am sure all noble Lords would agree that the Royal Marines bandsmen are the finest in the world, alongside those of the other Armed Forces. But on a more serious note, I emphasise to the noble Lord that the stories that have appeared in the press about what options may be on the table are pure speculation at the moment. No decisions have been taken on any of those options.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the impact of the review by the National Security Adviser on morale in the Armed Forces.
My Lords, the Ministry of Defence strives continually to ensure that our people feel valued and that their contribution and sacrifice are recognised. I regret that recent press speculation around the national security capability review has created a deeply unhelpful atmosphere of uncertainty for many of our service men and women. The review is ongoing and no decisions have been taken.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his Answer but I have to say that I am a little disappointed by it. The latest continuous attitude survey shows disappointing aspects of morale within the services and there is no doubt that, certainly among people I have met and know within the services—particularly young Army officers—there is a real drop in morale. To say that this is press speculation is slightly disingenuous. Since the Levene study, any work looking at costings of any parts of defence is done out in the sticks. This means that the people involved very close to those things are aware of it. I do not believe that talk about getting rid of the two landing docks, fewer Army numbers and so on has been made up by the press. These clearly are things that are being looked at in that arena, and that causes a great deal of worry. There is no doubt that the continual downward pressure on defence is having an impact on morale. Does the Minister not think that making a statement that we intend to not have any further cuts to the forces we have and that we will strive to get Force 2025 would have a wonderful impact on morale?
My Lords, the thing to emphasise here is that absolutely no decisions have been taken by Ministers. Any fall in morale is clearly a concern that we have to take seriously, and we do. I do not think that there is a single cause for this, but press reports which imply that decisions have been taken which have not been are deeply unhelpful to the men and women in the Armed Forces whose lives and livelihoods these reports directly affect.
My Lords, does the Minister not agree that, should the Government see their way to announcing a modest rise in the defence budget, this would have an inevitable upward boost to morale?
My Lords, in view of the uncertainty to which the noble Earl referred, what advice would he give to a young person wanting to make a career in the Royal Marines.
My Lords, the defence of the realm is the number one responsibility of government, yet during the Budget there was not a single word about defence. Does that help morale? Will the Minister also comment on the fact that the retention rate of some of our best people is worsening nearly every week?
My Lords, my noble friend has a deep knowledge of all these matters, in particular on the personnel front. There is no denying that recruitment and retention are currently a challenge, as they always are when the economy is growing and there is a demographic shortage of young people. That is precisely why we have to focus on the things that matter to those thinking of joining the Armed Forces and the offer that we make to them, not only in terms of pay but in modernising the lived experience of service personnel—that is where the covenant comes in—and in the Armed Forces family strategy.
My Lords, the Minister has said that the press are being deeply unhelpful. Now, the Minister has been around long enough to know that being helpful is not a core objective of the press. The MoD’s own attitude survey shows satisfaction in the forces over the past year has declined in almost all areas. The key measure, satisfaction with service life in general, has decreased from 61% in 2009 to 42% this year—a one-third decline. This is a service morale crisis. How are the Government going to arrest this decline if the review does not yield significant additional money?
My Lords, Britain has a competitive advantage in defence, and that advantage is based on the commitment, professionalism and skills of our people. We place heavy demands on them all, including those in the Armed Forces whom we ask to risk their lives on operations. Therefore, we place a very high premium on recruiting, retaining and developing the right people. As set out in the 2015 SDSR, we have identified a number of long-term plans to ensure that the service offer to which I referred better reflects the aspirations and expectations of our personnel and new recruits.
My Lords, our future military capability depends on retaining sufficient talented and experienced personnel. That retention in turn depends on offering those personnel sufficiently challenging, rewarding and exciting training. Can the Minister reassure the House that, in its search for savings, the Ministry of Defence will not be looking to cut back in this area, which would be the falsest of all false economies?
The challenge, when looking for efficiencies rather than straightforward savings, is to achieve the same or a better level of outputs with the money available. I can tell the noble and gallant Lord that, while training is of course under the spotlight, what we do not want to do is to dilute or degrade the quality of that training for those whose standards we set great store by.