Torture Overseas: Ministry of Defence Policy

Earl Howe Excerpts

Monday 20th May 2019 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, I shall now repeat in the form of a Statement the Answer given earlier today in another place to an Urgent Question which asked my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence whether she would make a Statement on the Ministry of Defence’s policy on co-operating with the use of torture overseas. The Answer is as follows:

“The UK Government stand firmly against torture and do not participate in, solicit, encourage or condone the use of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment for any purpose. Our policy and activities in this area are in accordance with both domestic and international law.

The MoD’s policy is fully aligned with the Government’s policy on sharing and receiving intelligence, and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has been entirely satisfied with our activities and has not identified any issues of concern.

However, the Prime Minister has asked the commissioner to review the Government’s consolidated guidance and submit proposals for how it could be improved. Once he has done so, and the Government have had a chance to consider them—I anticipate this will be a matter of weeks—the MoD will issue new internal guidance, as necessary, in light of any updated guidance that is published”.

That concludes the Statement.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am incredibly grateful to the Minister for repeating that Statement. He does not need me to suggest that, in the febrile times in which we are living, it is important that all of us in this House and elsewhere respect fundamental human rights and the rule of law, which may bind us together in the times ahead.

This Urgent Question arose because of media reports that a 2018 document suggests that the MoD was giving guidance that torture might be acceptable if Ministers agreed that the potential benefits justified accepting the risk and the legal consequences that might follow. Is that reported 2018 guidance real? Have any Ministers ever agreed to sanction torture over the past year?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness and I align myself completely with the sentiment that she expressed at the beginning of her question. Central government consolidated guidance sets out the principles which govern the interviewing of detainees overseas and the passing and receipt of intelligence relating to detainees. That guidance must be adhered to by officers of the UK’s security and intelligence agencies, members of the UK Armed Forces and employees of the Ministry of Defence. An internal policy document within the Ministry of Defence was prepared to, as it were, make the consolidated guidance more accessible and practical for those implementing it in the field. The MoD concedes that, as currently worded, there is an ambiguity in the internal document. I should stress that this ambiguity has not led to any problem or difficulty in the actions taken by the department, Ministers or members of the Armed Forces. It has been identified that the internal policy document could give the incorrect impression that Ministers could in all circumstances simply choose to accept legal consequences and act illegally. That is absolutely not the case. Ministers may not proceed when it would be unlawful, as opposed to when they would simply be assuming legal risk, which applies to any ministerial decision. I reassure the noble Baroness that, to my knowledge and that of my officials, Ministers have in no circumstances taken a decision which was unlawful in this context.

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, I too am grateful to the Minister for repeating the Answer to the Urgent Question and for his answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. Today, the Times suggested that the freedom of information request said that the MoD effectively created,

“a provision for ministers to approve passing information to allies even if there is a risk of torture, if they judge that the potential benefits justify it”.

I accept that no torture has been undertaken and that nothing so far has been illegal, but does the Minister not agree that, in line with Kantian imperatives, we should not treat people as means; we should treat them as ends in themselves? Surely a potential benefit cannot outweigh the human rights of individuals.

[Earl Howe]

I entirely take the noble Baroness’s point. The consolidated guidance is clear that, where Ministers or officials know or believe that a particular action will lead to torture being administered, that action may not be proceeded with. The difficulty comes where the state of knowledge may not be sufficiently high to act as a legal prohibition. In that event, were a Minister to be called upon to take a decision whether to release intelligence, that decision would be informed by detailed legal and policy advice. It is not possible to make generalisations in this context on what that advice might comprise because it would be highly fact-specific to the individual case. However, I emphasise that Ministers may never act unlawfully and officials must never advise Ministers to act unlawfully, and I am confident in saying that Ministers have not acted unlawfully.

[Baroness D'Souza (CB)]

My Lords, I think that the MoD policy adds to the evidence of complicity in torture and rendition programmes. After all, the Government accepted responsibility in the Belhaj case. Last year’s Intelligence and Security Committee report revealed deep and systematic involvement by the UK in extraordinary rendition but, due to government imposed-restrictions, the ISC was unable to produce “a credible Report”. In view of these revelations, does the Minister not agree that the time has come for an independent, perhaps judge-led, inquiry into the UK’s adherence to the convention against torture?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am not aware that there is solid evidence that this Government, the previous Government or the previous Labour Government engaged in the kinds of activity that the noble Baroness refers to. There was a single instance in 2004 that was admitted to, where compensation was paid. Upon investigation it was found that the security services and the department had released information that led to the detention and torture of an individual. That is the single instance that I am aware of, but I think that the noble Baroness conflates two issues in this context. The issue that she refers to relates to the Government being complicit and directly involved in the administration of torture, whereas here we are talking about the release of intelligence to third parties and agencies that might or might not engage in torture in certain circumstances. We need to make that distinction.

[Lord King of Bridgwater (Con)]

I strongly welcome the Statement that my noble friend has made on this matter. When I saw that the Question had been tabled, I thought that there was some evidence of a serious incident involving torture but, as I understand it, the Minister says that there is a possible misunderstanding about the rules that apply and he has indicated that this has been looked at very carefully. There can be no place for torture—it is counterproductive. In a very dangerous and difficult world, there are all sorts of temptations to go down that route but we must never do it.

[Earl Howe]

My noble friend is absolutely right: torture is never justified, and the Government will not countenance a situation where they are complicit in it. The internal MoD guidance was intended to have exactly the same meaning as the consolidated guidance. We now realise that there is scope for ambiguity. That ambiguity will be removed when the guidance is revised, and we will do that upon receipt of the Information Commissioner’s comprehensive advice on how the government-wide guidance should be amended.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, in June 2018 the Intelligence and Security Committee published a report, as has already been referred to. Recommendation JJ, which can be found on page 103 of annexe A, specifically says that the consolidated guidance,

“is insufficiently clear as to the role of Ministers, and what—in broad terms—can and cannot be authorised. For example, the Guidance should specifically refer to the prohibition on torture enshrined in domestic and international law to make it clear that Ministers cannot lawfully authorise action which they know or believe would result in torture”.

The Government gave a very long response to that, with which I will not take up the House’s time—others can read it for themselves—but in the last sentence the Government promised to,

“consider this recommendation further in light of any proposals from the Investigatory Powers Commissioner”.

How on earth has it come about that someone in the Ministry of Defence can draft a policy document in the light of that specific recommendation in the terms that have been revealed today and not even seek the IPCO’s views on it? There is something fundamentally wrong with the way in which that part of the MoD operates and it has to be fixed.

[Earl Howe]

The noble Lord should bear in mind that this has never been a live issue in the Ministry of Defence. The point that he makes is also weakened by the fact that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner does not judge every piece of paper that happens to circulate across government; he or she will judge a department by its actions. To date, the commissioner has judged the Ministry of Defence to have acted entirely in accordance with the consolidated guidance.

If I mis-spoke in responding to my noble friend Lord King and referred to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as the Information Commissioner, I apologise. I did not mean to do that.

Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy Missions and Operations (European Union Committee Report)

Earl Howe Excerpts

Wednesday 15th May 2019 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, let me begin by congratulating the members of the EU External Affairs Sub-Committee on their report, and by thanking my noble friend Lord Horam for his excellent introduction. I am equally grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken for sharing their knowledge and experience of defence and security policy in what has been a very useful debate.

As noble Lords are aware, the sub-committee’s report was published in May 2018. Since then, there have been significant changes resulting from the negotiations on our exit from the European Union. Notably, the terms of the withdrawal agreement explicitly rule out the UK commanding missions during the implementation period that would follow our exit. Accordingly, as pointed out by the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, we have handed over the operational headquarters of Operation Atalanta—the counter-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa—from Northwood, just north of here, to Rota in Spain. Likewise, the operational command of Operation Althea has transferred from NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Sir James Everard, to a French three-star general.

In May 2018, when the sub-committee’s report was published, there were around 120 UK personnel deployed to CSDP operations and missions. A year later, due to the conditions set out in the withdrawal agreement and the withdrawal of HMS “Echo” from Operation Sophia, we find ourselves with a much smaller footprint: today, the UK deploys 33 personnel. While the number of UK personnel in operations and missions is small, I need hardly say that the quality of their input is high, and they provide significant contributions in their roles.

The report makes clear, as have a number of speakers today, that our participation in CSDP operations and missions makes a significant contribution to a number of the UK’s foreign policy priorities, from the Horn of Africa to the western Balkans. CSDP missions and operations utilise member states’ considerable expertise to carry out long-term activities in complex circumstances, often to support the host nation to deliver a critical part of government. With these difficulties in mind, member states recognise that concrete results cannot be achieved overnight.

Europe’s security is our security and the Government have made clear their commitment to maintain it. Therefore, once the UK has left the EU, and in the event of a deal and therefore an implementation period, we intend to maintain a presence in those CSDP missions and operations where it is in our mutual interests to do so.

With a longer-term view, we have set out proposals for a new security partnership with the European Union, as a third country. The political declaration agreed alongside the withdrawal agreement in November last year provides the basis for a flexible and scalable future security partnership. This would allow for UK contributions to CSDP missions and operations on a case-by-case basis, building on existing frameworks for third-country participation.

I welcomed a good deal of the speech from the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, who correctly drew attention to the valuable contribution that the UK has made to EU missions and operations over the years. I agree with him that not only have we played a useful part in such missions but the missions themselves have supported some key UK policy priorities. Where I depart from him, and other noble Lords, is over the criticisms of the EU withdrawal agreement and the political declaration in terms of what may lie ahead for our future defence relationship.

The deal the UK has reached with the EU will provide for the broadest and most comprehensive security relationship the EU has ever had with another country. On defence, the political declaration is quite explicit in setting out that the UK and the EU welcome close co-operation in operations and missions, both civilian and military, in the future relationship. This co-operation would enable the UK to tailor its contributions and participate on a case-by-case basis through a framework participation agreement. The detail of such an agreement will need to be negotiated, but there is no dissent over its key elements. The UK and the EU would be able to exchange information.

As a contributor to a specific CSDP mission or operation, the UK would be there at the very start. As my noble friend Lord Horam made clear, the UK would participate in the force generation conference, the call for contributions and the Committee of Contributors meeting to enable information sharing about the implementation of the mission or operation. It should also have the possibility to second staff to the designated operation’s headquarters, proportionate to the level of its contribution. All this is recognition by the Commission that a perfectly reasonable quid pro quo for our involvement in an EU mission or operation is to be closely involved in the planning stages. Therefore, I do not share the view of the right reverend Prelate that our leverage will somehow be reduced.

My noble friend Lord Horam asked whether what we are asking for is in line with what third countries have achieved in similar circumstances or is a special set of arrangements. The current involvement of third countries in force generation, planning and oversight of operations is simply not adequate to enable the kind of deep co-operation we seek. The political declaration envisages a better-than-standard third-country relationship on the CSDP. In particular, it sets out in broad terms arrangements whereby the level of involvement in operational planning would be commensurate with the level of our contribution. We would not envisage being involved in the planning of operations we were not involved in, but we should be able to scale up our co-operation when our input to an operation is significant.

My noble friend Lord Horam and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked about UK observer status on the Political and Security Committee. Given that the detail of our future partnership has yet to be agreed, my best response to them is to quote from the political declaration, which says that,

“the future relationship should provide for appropriate dialogue, consultation, coordination, exchange of information and cooperation mechanisms”.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, also took the Government to task over the negotiations relating to Galileo. The Commission took a very hard line on this. We made it clear that we would continue to participate in the Galileo programme only on a basis that would enable us to rely on Galileo for our national security and allow UK companies to compete fairly and openly for all Galileo contracts. We felt that, given the UK’s contribution to Galileo to date, which has been significant, this was a perfectly reasonable ask. Unfortunately, the offer on the table from the European Commission does not meet our requirements for participation. That is not a failure of negotiation on our part. The Commission decided that this was not a matter on which negotiation was possible.

In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, and other noble Lords, we are absolutely clear what our future partnership with the EU should look like. It should be centred on three pillars. At the diplomatic level, we should have in place structured consultation on strategic priorities, underpinned by regular dialogue with the EU and member states on thematic and geographic issues so that we can tackle global issues together. We should also have the means to co-ordinate activity and action. That could mean the UK contributing to EU operations or missions, as I said, or to EU development programmes, as well as co-ordinating the implementation of sanctions. There is also a clear benefit to facilitating a collaborative and inclusive approach to European capability development and planning, including R&D. This is about being able, where we choose, to combine our efforts to best effect in pursuit of our mutual interests. Any agreement we reach must therefore be flexible, allowing the UK and the EU to respond effectively to situations as they arise. It is especially important that the partnership respects the sovereignty of the UK and the autonomy of the EU.

The noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, asked whether we thought the Committee of Contributors was a satisfactory set of arrangements. We do not feel that it is, as currently figured. While it provides information and a degree of oversight of operations, it does not allow third-country involvement in planning processes where that will be necessary to enable that country to contribute significantly. That is why we secured provision in the political declaration to intensify co-operation in the planning of a mission, proportionate to our level of contribution, as I said.

The noble Baroness also referred to the strength of UKRep. We will continue to play a leading role alongside EU partners in buttressing and promoting European security and influence around the world, as I have said. We aim to enhance our strong bilateral relationships with our European partners and beyond. To that end, I can confirm that UKRep will see its staff numbers increase from 130 to 180 personnel. Of that uplift, I am afraid I cannot confirm at the moment how many will be working on CSDP or security more broadly because that is yet to be agreed.

I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Helic for her powerful speech. I endorse her main point that Europe’s security is our security. The UK, the EU and its member states share the same values and interests. The UK will remain a committed partner, deploying our significant assets, expertise, intelligence and capabilities to protect and promote them as a leading NATO ally and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. However, the CSDP is just one part of a suite of tools the UK uses in, for instance, the western Balkans, the Sahel or the Horn of Africa, or against illegal migration piracy. For instance, last summer the Prime Minister announced a 95% increase of funding to the western Balkans, up to £80 million, and doubled the number of staff working in the region on security issues.

My noble friend asked what would happen in the event of no deal. As she is aware, the sub-committee’s report did not consider the impact of a no-deal Brexit, but in such an event a separate agreement would be needed for UK troops to continue as part of EU missions and operations, such as Operation Althea. We have made clear to the EU that we are open to reaching such an agreement to ensure continuity of the UK’s contribution to the operation. We have made contingency plans for UK military personnel taking part in Operation Althea. The UK’s other commitments in the western Balkans, including our support to NATO’s KFOR in Kosovo, will not be affected by any EU exit scenario.

The noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, referred to Kosovo, and in particular the future direction of EULEX. EULEX’s monitoring and operational mandate will continue until June 2020. The UK remains strongly supportive of EULEX’s work and the Kosovo Specialist Chambers & Specialist Prosecutor’s Office. Leaving the EU does not change the importance that the UK places on delivering justice for victims and ensuring that war criminals are held accountable. Strengthening the rule of law in Kosovo is important to the UK’s national interests. This is one of the key areas addressed by the Government’s commitment of £80 million in programme funds for the western Balkans this financial year.

The noble Earl also referred to Operation Sophia. Its current mandate expires on 30 September this year. Member states will continue to discuss a way forward towards a sustainable disembarkation solution, as well as the future of the operation. Until then, the operation continues to perform its tasks. Coastguard training modules are now planned for later in the year to take place in Italy, Croatia and Greece. All training provisions are subject to the security situation in Libya, which at the moment does not allow trainees to transit in and out of the country.

The noble Earl referred to our assistance to the Government of Ukraine. EU exit does not change the UK’s commitment to Ukraine. The UK will remain a major global actor and permanent member of the UN Security Council, continuing to collaborate closely with European and global partners to achieve our shared objectives. I am sure he will be reassured to know that, in this financial year, the UK is providing over £35 million to Ukraine to support a range of areas, including governance reform, anti-corruption, accountability in communications, conflict stability and security, humanitarian issues, human rights, and education and culture.

The noble Lords, Lord Dannatt and Lord Tunnicliffe, returned to a theme familiar to our debates: the size of the defence budget and, by extension, our Armed Forces. I cannot add materially to the comments I made in our recent debate on the 70th anniversary of NATO, but I gently point out that our defence budget is not reducing; it is growing. We did not spend just 2% of GDP on defence in the last financial year; we spent appreciably more than that. We also met our NATO commitment to spend 20% of our budget on equipment and research. The cornerstone—indeed, the bulwark—of our defence is NATO. The EU certainly can and does complement NATO’s role, but I cannot agree with the right reverend Prelate that the political declaration leaves the UK punching below our weight in defence terms. We remain the most significant European member of NATO. We are determined that our growing bilateral relationships with friends and allies, both in Europe and globally, will ensure no diminution in our soft power or the levers we use to exercise it. We are the only G20 nation to meet the NATO 2% target on defence spending and the UN target of 0.7% on development. Our commitment to European and global security as a leading global actor is every bit as great as it has always been.

I shall of course write to those noble Lords whose questions I have not addressed, but I conclude by saying that I am, as ever, reassured by the depth of expertise on these subjects that exists in your Lordships’ House. As the UK leaves the EU, I can only stress once again the UK’s commitment to maintaining and enhancing European security and continuing our co-operation with the EU on all aspects of our security relationship, including the main focus of this debate: the missions and operations that fall under the banner of the common security and defence policy.

Defence: British Steel

Earl Howe Excerpts

Tuesday 30th April 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hoyle]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to ensure the use of more British steel in defence contracts.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government are committed to supporting the British steel industry and we have policy guidance in place to address any barriers that prevent UK steel producers competing effectively in the open market. We remain engaged with our prime contractors to ensure their support in implementing this. The Government also publish their future pipeline for steel requirements on GOV.UK, which enables UK steel manufacturers to better plan and bid for government contracts.

[Lord Hoyle (Lab)]

I put it to the Minister that using more British steel would overcome the uncertainty in relation to Brexit. It would bring more prosperity to steel-producing areas and more job security for British steelworkers. Using only 40% British steel on defence projects is far too low. Surely we should be using 100% British steel in all our defence programmes.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, looking at recent warship procurement programmes, it is generally true to say that steel has been sourced from abroad in cases where UK steel suppliers have not been able to produce steel to the required grade. If one sets that issue aside, UK producers have generally proved to be very competitive, as demonstrated by the Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier programme, for which 88% of the structural steel was sourced from UK mills.

[Lord Trefgarne (Con)]

My Lords, does my noble friend anticipate any difference to the defence procurement rules following Brexit?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, at the moment, as my noble friend will know, it is a matter of law that all ships not classified as warships are procured through international competition. After we leave the EU, it will be open to us to decide whether to continue with that practice as a matter of policy, but we will be guided in our thinking by the need to strike the best balance between value for money and protecting national security.

[Lord Brookman (Lab)]

My Lords, steelworkers throughout the country will be pleased that my noble friend Lord Hoyle has tabled this Question. It has been a long time coming round, but it will do so again and again. My noble friend and I have a great deal of respect for the trade union leadership in the steel industry, which covers all the various unions involved. They continually face capacity and manpower issues, a point touched on by my noble friend a moment ago. As a past general secretary of the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation—only five foot five inches tall and I got the job of general secretary of a steelworkers’ union; just imagine that happening today—I know the problems and issues the officials face. They have been facing them for many years because this is not a new situation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Brookman]

I am coming to it. He said, “Keith, that was all right, but you must realise that we live in a post-industrial society”. If that is the case, we have a dim future in front of us.

[Earl Howe]

The noble Lord is absolutely right to point out that the UK steel industry has faced major challenges over the past three to four years, in particular from international competition and high infrastructure costs. Those challenges continue. But steel is one of this country’s foundation industries, which is why we have supported the sector in a variety of ways. As it is an energy-intensive industry, we have made provision to support any additional costs incurred by carbon-reduction policies; we have the industrial strategy challenge fund; we are reviewing business rates; and we were instrumental in securing antidumping measures through the EU. Also, wherever possible, across government we attempt to buy British when it comes to steel.

[Lord Sterling of Plaistow (Con)]

My Lords, in 2014 I commissioned a special document from the London colleges in connection with the value of defence procurement being sovereign and not overseas. The suggestion I read on Monday—that these three ships will be designated supply ships and therefore should be open to competition—is to my mind complete nonsense. In practice, they are supply ships going into action and have to be armed. Four of the countries of Europe, including France, are building very similar ships, which are designated as warships. It is absolutely ridiculous to consider otherwise. Also, it supports the view on steel, because some 100,000 tonnes of steel is involved. Further to that, it leads to jobs and, on the education side, continues the drumbeat that we need to build up the manufacturing companies. Will the Government re-examine this issue? This is another example of the Treasury being in love with cost and not value for money.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am afraid I cannot entirely agree with my noble friend. It is undoubtedly true that the Armed Forces benefit from the UK acquiring military capability from an open market. Competitive procurement ensures that we drive innovation and efficiency into our industrial base. UK suppliers’ drive to be competitive in their home market will ultimately secure their prosperity, not only in the UK context but in the global marketplace as well.

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, in the light of the Financial Times report that the company British Steel is pleading for carbon credit loans to tide it over Brexit, will the Minister explain what efforts are being put into defence procurement contracts to ensure that steel is being decarbonised as far as possible?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the industrial strategy challenge fund, which I mentioned earlier, is there to help industry drive innovation in its manufacturing processes. As I also mentioned, we have supported the industry with the costs associated with carbon reduction, which can in some cases be substantial. In those two ways in particular, we are doing our best to recognise the challenges that industry faces.

NATO

Earl Howe Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd April 2019 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Earl Howe]

That this House takes note of the seventieth anniversary of the founding of NATO and its continuing role in the United Kingdom’s defence and security.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, this week marks 70 years since 12 nations put their signatures to the North Atlantic Treaty and agreed that an attack on one was an attack on all. It is a privilege for me to open this debate celebrating the founding of that august institution, and I look forward to hearing the informed contributions of noble Lords who have had direct involvement in NATO, whether militarily, diplomatically or politically.

It is surely apt to use this moment to reflect on the achievements of what is rightly hailed as the most powerful defensive alliance the world has ever seen. During the Cold War, an age of unprecedented risk from atomic weapons and Soviet expansion, NATO provided the nuclear umbrella that is our ultimate deterrent, and a vital conventional shield against aggression. It is worth asking ourselves: but for NATO’s deterrence, would the Berlin Wall have fallen some 30 years ago? Would the values of the West have triumphed? Would millions in eastern Europe have been given the opportunity to live lives that are freer, more secure and more prosperous?

In signing the treaty seven decades ago, President Harry Truman was moved to express his belief that had NATO,

“existed in 1914 and 1939 … it would have prevented the acts of aggression which led to two world wars”.

It is of course impossible to test Truman’s hypothesis, but there is little doubt about the role NATO has played over the last seven decades in sparing us the terrible prospect of a third world war. Nor is there any doubt about the significance of the UK’s involvement in alliance successes. We were one of its 12 founder members; we were the providers of both of its first headquarters in London; and our great wartime general, Lord Ismay, was NATO’s first Secretary-General.

Today NATO is much more than the entity it was under Lord Ismay. For one thing, it has grown. Last month we marked the 20th anniversary of the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and the 15th of the accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Yesterday it was the turn of Albania and Croatia to celebrate their 10th anniversary as part of the alliance.

At the same time, as the threats have developed, so NATO has adapted. I remember some arguing, during my first stint as Defence Minister in the mid-1990s, that NATO was no longer all that relevant in a post-Cold War world. But in the modern era the alliance has repeatedly proven its worth, from ending conflicts in the western Balkans to supporting the United States after the atrocity of 9/11. On that occasion, the allies invoked Article 5 for the very first time, leading to the international response in Afghanistan designed to stop that country becoming a haven for terrorism. Significantly, NATO personnel remain there today, training local forces and creating the conditions for peace.

NATO has always stepped up, and I argue that today it is more relevant than ever. Consider the dangers we face. Russia is once more resurgent. Its pattern of aggression over the past decade—from illegal activity in Ukraine and Crimea to its interference in the sovereign affairs of other states and its deployment of nerve agents on the streets of Salisbury—undermines its claim to be a responsible international partner upholding the rules-based international system. At the same time, we are wrestling with a multitude of threats emanating from NATO’s southern periphery, including terrorism, instability and illegal migration. With Russia’s more challenging activity in the high north and the Atlantic, it can truly be said that NATO now has a 360-degree focus.

We often say that NATO represents the bedrock of European security. Equally, though, the commitment of the United Kingdom to that security remains as steadfast as ever. We have always been at the forefront of the alliance, benefiting as we do from Europe’s largest defence budget. As we mark 50 years of the UK’s continuous at sea deterrent, it is also worth reflecting that we are the only ally to assign all our nuclear forces to NATO’s defence, which we have done since 1962. All member states benefit from our nuclear capability, which gives the alliance another centre of decision-making to complicate the calculations of our adversaries. Indeed, the Brussels summit declaration last year recognised that critical NATO contribution.

At the same time, we hold the posts of deputy supreme allied commander Europe and chairman of NATO’s Military Committee. We host HQ MARCOM at Northwood; the HQ of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) at Imjin Barracks, Innsworth; the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre at RAF Molesworth; and the Joint Electronic Warfare Core Staff at RNAS Yeovilton.

Besides the nearly 1,000 British personnel serving in NATO’s command structure, we are contributing across alliance operations. As part of the Enhanced Forward Presence, we have forces on the ground commanding a battalion-size battle group in Estonia and a reconnaissance squadron in Poland. Our troops are also strengthening the security infrastructure of nations stretching from Iraq to Afghanistan. In the skies, our air force is policing the airspace above the Baltic and Iceland, and we have recently made a significant contribution to NATO’s Readiness Initiative, adding Apache attack and Wildcat reconnaissance helicopters to our Estonian presence. Significantly, the UK was also the first ally to offer offensive cyber capabilities to the instruments at NATO’s disposal.

The central proposition that I seek to advance today is that NATO’s importance is increasing. The world is becoming more complex and unpredictable. We have entered a new age of constant competition. It is an increasingly grey zone of proxy war, cyberattack and fake news. The boundaries between peace and war are blurring. We do not know what dangers lie down the line.

Since the Wales summit of 2014, the UK, alongside the US, has taken a leading role in making the alliance fit for purpose. Major strides have been made. The alliance is evolving rapidly. It has developed a stronger, larger command structure—influenced by senior British military officers in NATO—and has agreed to augment its current staff with more than 1,200 extra personnel. It has upped its spending. Non-US spending increased by $87 billion between 2014 and 2018. It has also widened its geographical focus to take a 360-degree approach to security, ensuring that the alliance is able to respond to threats and challenges from all directions. This includes contributing to NATO’s missions in Afghanistan and Iraq to build long-term stability, and anticipating growing competition in the Arctic.

However, given the pace of change and the persistence of our adversaries, the alliance cannot afford to rest on its laurels. Indeed, it must inject greater pace into its transformation. So in December the UK will host NATO heads of state and government. This will be an opportunity to do three things. First, we should remind parliaments and the public across the alliance of the need to show unity and resolve in the face of determined aggressors whose game plan is to divide and rule. In the short term that is about standing up to the Kremlin’s breaches of the INF Treaty and dealing with the threat of new Russian missiles. In the long term it is about continuing to show that adventurism has its cost. We should never forget that, as Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said:

“NATO is 29 allies … friends. Russia doesn't have that, China doesn't have that”.


Secondly, it will be about demonstrating that our words are matched by action. Central to this is NATO’s Readiness Initiative, which will enhance our deterrence by improving the alliance’s readiness and responsiveness, as well as its ability to reinforce. It will also be about getting to grips with NATO governance, which in the past has suffered from inefficiency and poor project management. It will be about reforming the headquarters function to speed decision-making processes and enable even faster reactions on the ground, and it will be about strengthening NATO-EU co-operation so that effort is complemented and not duplicated. Significantly, work is already under way to bolster a joint approach to hybrid warfare.

Above all, achieving such bold ambitions will require bolstering burden sharing. All allies have committed to spend 2% of GDP on defence and 20% of that on major equipment by 2024. This will be the most significant strengthening of NATO’s collective defence in a decade, but we must maintain our momentum if we are to adjust to new and evolving threats. Despite important progress, the US still accounts for approximately 50% of the allies’ combined GDP and more than 70% of their combined defence expenditure. Expecting US taxpayers to keep picking up the tab is unreasonable, especially when other allies are running up big surpluses.

This brings me to the third item on our December agenda. This is simply to recognise the pivotal role that the US continues to play in transatlantic defence. It is true that the security of Europe and the security of the United States are intimately bound together, united as they are by the common threads of democracy, liberty and the rule of law, and it is true that NATO is the living embodiment of our transatlantic bond—but it is also true that we take these links for granted at our peril. Any weakening of those bonds would make us all less secure.

Back in 1949, 12 allies gathered together and vowed never again to let conflict devastate the continent. As President Truman said in his historic speech:

“If there is anything inevitable, if there is anything unconquerable in the world today, it is the will of the people of all nations for freedom and peace”.


Since those days, NATO has proved the best guarantor of that peace and that freedom. It has been tried and tested; it has never failed. But in some senses, of course, I know that I am preaching to the converted. Most, if not all, Members of your Lordships’ House grew up in the chill of the Cold War. When the Soviet Union was casting its long shadow, we had abundant cause to be thankful for NATO’s defensive shield, yet in today’s very different world of more opaque dangers, a new generation does not have quite the same affinity for our treasured alliance, despite its self-evident importance.

So, in this anniversary year, we must seize the opportunity to remind both parliamentarians and the wider public at large about the value that the alliance brings. Indeed, we are already doing just that, not simply through debates such as today’s but through other means, for example a NATO 70 campaign run by our Armed Forces, our representation on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, whose current president represents Bridgend in the other place, and the leaders’ meeting in London in December. For seven decades NATO has safeguarded our people and our prosperity. By renewing our pledge to empower the alliance, we will ensure that it continues to protect us all for 70 years and more into the future. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, this has been a fascinating, wide-ranging and constructive debate, and I have been very firmly struck by the support which our great NATO alliance commands in your Lordships’ House in its 70th year. I feel sure I will not be alone in finding that enormous and enduring fund of good will both heartening and reassuring. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken for sharing their knowledge and experience of defence and security policy, and of NATO in particular. In expressing support for the alliance, it is perhaps unsurprising that a number of contributors chose to home in on the theme of resources and defence spending among NATO allies. The noble Lords, Lord Robertson and Lord West, spoke of the need for allies to channel those budgets wisely to deliver effective military capability.

Allies have committed to spend 2% of GDP on defence by 2024: that commitment was repeated at last July’s NATO summit. The UK has made it clear that the 2% commitment should be seen as a floor, not a ceiling, but equally I do not believe we should fixate on percentages. As the noble Lords, Lord Robertson and Lord Judd, said, it is about looking at what the threats are and then at how we have the capabilities to deal with them, making sure that those capabilities are properly financed and supported. I understand the call from my noble friend Lord Sterling that we in this country should spend more on defence. In the UK, we spend a minimum of 2% of GDP on defence; we also meet the target of spending 20% of our defence budget on new equipment and associated R&D. We are forecast to increase the proportion of our GDP spent on defence in 2018-19 and 2019-20, after the October 2018 Budget announcement. We should appreciate that the resultant figure will remain considerably above the 2% benchmark.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, criticised some of the areas of spending we count under the defence heading. I am sure she will know, but will not mind my repeating, that it is NATO that determines the definitions for categorising defence spending, not the UK. Like other NATO allies, the UK regularly updates its approach to ensure it is categorising defence spending fully in accordance with the NATO guidelines. We did this during the SDSR following machinery-of-government changes, as well as to reflect the changing nature of defence spending over time.

The noble Lord, Lord Robertson, the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and my noble friend Lord Patten, among other speakers, emphasised the importance of fairer burden sharing between allies. We can reasonably argue that this is a case of a glass nearly half full. Allies are making significant progress on burden sharing. The Secretary-General has calculated that non-US allies will spend an additional $100 billion between 2016 and 2020, increasing to over $350 billion by 2024, and eight allies will be spending 2% this year. We welcome the growing number of allies that have made commitments to meeting the 2% target by 2024, but there is more to be done. We cannot ignore the fact that some allies are spending less than 1.5% of GDP on defence, and three of these are spending less than 1%. I assure the House that we will continue to work with allies to ensure that defence investment is prioritised and sustained.

This is not, however, spending for the sake of spending. It must be considered with the other aspects of alliance burden sharing. That includes cash; capabilities, or what capabilities allies assign to the alliance; and commitments, in other words the NATO operations and missions that allies contribute to. That is why the pledge also includes agreement that:

“Increased investments should be directed towards meeting”,


NATO “capability priorities”, and that allies should,

“display the political will to provide required capabilities and … forces when they are needed”.

The noble Lord, Lord West, referred to the need to maintain complementarity between NATO and the EU in a defence context, a theme echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria. The UK’s vision is of every European nation stepping up to modern security challenges, taking responsibility, sharing the burden and investing in our shared security. We must have a united, modernised and fully resourced NATO, able to fulfil its crucial collective defence role and taking a comprehensive approach to Euro-Atlantic defence and security. We need deep security and defence partnerships between like-minded and capable nations, strengthening co-ordination and interoperability and underpinning our work in multilateral organisations. We also need a globally competitive and outward-facing European defence industrial and technological base, driving innovation and delivering the capabilities that Europe needs for its security.

There is frequent discussion on the theme of EU strategic autonomy. We agree that Europe needs to do more to improve its own security and that the EU can play a valuable supporting role, whether using its political weight and economic levers or supporting member states in countering hybrid tactics, building resilience and developing vital defence capabilities and interoperability.

[Lord West of Spithead]

Does the Minister not think there are real dangers in the route the EU is going down, with PESCO, the European Defence Fund and the fact that, in our negotiations with it, on a couple of occasions now we have been stonewalled when it comes to UK industry being involved in things—and one can think separately of Galileo? Is it doing the best for the defence of us all in a European or NATO context?

[Earl Howe]

I very much agree. We find the concept of EU or European strategic autonomy problematic if, as it appears to be, it drives an EU-exclusive or enclosed, institutionalised approach to security and defence that shuts out key strategic partners and could duplicate or undermine NATO. We see that exclusive approach prevailing in EU defence initiatives such as the European Defence Fund and PESCO, which otherwise have the potential to boost, in a coherent way, much-needed investment and support to capability development. That is exactly why we will continue to argue in favour of an open and flexible approach, to ensure that European security benefits from the capabilities and resources that the EU’s closest strategic partners can bring to bear.

My noble friend Lord Patten and the noble Lords, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Touhig, all spoke powerfully and with authority about Russia, undoubtedly NATO’s most significant long-term challenge. I listened with great respect too to the noble Lord, Lord Judd, on this topic. The November incident in the Black Sea has shown vividly how serious the Russia challenge has become and how robust we must be in response. Noble Lords will be well aware that NATO does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia, but recent Russian actions, including the Black Sea incident, have confirmed that NATO’s dual-track approach to Russia, of strengthened deterrence and defence backed up by hard-headed dialogue, is justified. We reaffirmed this approach at the Brussels summit last July, and will do so again at the foreign ministerial meeting in Washington this month.

As my noble friend said, Russia will continue to look for different ways to test NATO and its allies and partners. In both words and deeds, we need to be prepared to respond, and that is why NATO is already adapting its political and military posture. We are committed to driving forward efforts to modernise NATO, as I mentioned in my opening speech, enabling the alliance to respond to the threats it faces more effectively and with more agility. To test that agility and to enhance our contribution, as I am sure my noble friend Lord Attlee will have observed, the UK deployed some 3,300 personnel, as well as ships and planes, to Norway for NATO’s biggest exercise in 2018; exercise Trident Juncture had some 50,000 troops from 31 NATO and partner nations. This delivered undoubtedly a strong signal that allies can operate at an impressive scale and move across Europe in the event of a crisis. Again, my noble friend will be interested to know that, in spring and summer this year, we will demonstrate a robust posture in the Baltic region by our participation in the US-led BALTOPS exercise, Baltic Protector and a range of other military activities. We have also deployed 800 Royal Marines to Norway in 2019 to take part in cold-weather training. In March last year, a Royal Navy submarine took part in ICEX with the US Navy for the first time in 10 years, and the Navy will mount regular under-ice deployments in the years to come. There is much else that we are doing to up the tempo of our activity as a proportionate response to an assertive Russian posture.

We are also constantly looking at how we can build other structures that complement NATO as the bedrock of our defence. Last June, the Defence Secretary signed the comprehensive memorandum of understanding establishing the joint expeditionary force with our eight partners in that agreement. This year, the JEF signature activity will be the Baltic protector deployment, a large-scale maritime and amphibious exercise in the Baltic Sea, as I mentioned, between May and July 2019.

My noble friend Lord Cormack spoke with his customary sincerity about the need to ensure that we improve relations with Russia. On dialogue, NATO should continue to engage with Russia when it is appropriate and in our interests to do so, so that we can clearly communicate our positions. Periodic focused and meaningful dialogue through the NATO-Russia Council provides a means to avoid misunderstanding, miscalculation and unintended escalation, and to increase transparency and predictability.

In addition, to the NATO-Russia Council, we continue to use other fora, such as the OSCE and direct mil-mil links, to mitigate the risk of escalation and to voice concerns over Russian behaviour, including its failure to uphold treaty obligations. However, I have to tell my noble friend that, as the noble Lord, Lord Judd, reminded us, there can be no return to business as usual until there is clear, constructive change in Russia’s actions that demonstrate compliance with international law and its international obligations.

A number of noble Lords, including my noble friend, Lord Cormack and the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, mentioned China. It is instructive to remind ourselves of the words of the NATO Secretary-General in February this year:

“NATO and China have already worked together to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia. And our militaries are in regular contact. But China’s rise also presents a challenge. One example is of course the concern many Allies have expressed about China’s increasing investment in critical infrastructure, such as 5G. We have to better understand the size and the scale of China’s influence, what it means for our security. And we have to address it together”.


I would add that from the UK’s perspective China is an important economic partner. We do not expect to agree with the Chinese Government on everything, but we strongly support China’s greater integration into more of the world’s key institutions and organisations as its global role and responsibilities grow. We are committed to our relationship with China, which enables both countries to benefit and also allows us to be frank with one another on areas where we disagree.

The noble Lords, Lord Touhig and Lord Bilimoria, spoke of the current difficulties in the relationship between the United States and Turkey. We have repeatedly raised our concerns at ministerial and official level about the proposed Turkish purchase of S-400 missiles. Turkey is a valued NATO ally on the front line of some of the UK’s and the alliance’s most difficult security challenges, and we readily acknowledge that defence equipment procurement decisions are for individual nations. However, all NATO allies have committed to reducing their dependence on Russian-sourced legacy military equipment, and we believe that the proposed purchase would pose real challenges for the interoperability of NATO systems.

The noble Lord, Lord Robertson, spoke of the importance of ensuring that United States leadership in NATO is maintained and encouraged, and the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, expressed similar views. It is true to say that the White House in recent years has sometime proved unpredictable in its pronouncements, but my noble friend Lord Sterling was quite correct: President Trump has been clear about his commitment to NATO and Article 5. At January’s US missile defence review launch he confirmed that he was 100% behind the alliance. Those are not just words. We should recall that the United States continues to invest heavily in European security, spending $6.5 billion on the European defence initiative in 2018-19. The US also provides a huge proportion of NATO collective defence capabilities, including some which are unique to the alliance, such as strategic bombers, full-spectrum naval forces and strategic intelligence. Thanks to the EDI budget, there were in 2018 approximately 6,850 US troops in Eucom, and EDI is only one of a range of different pots available to fund approximately 80,000 US troops in Europe. Since 2015, there has been more than a sixfold increase in funding available through the EDI.

I was prepared to say a little bit about cyberdefence. I will write to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, about that as I am reminded that time is short.

[Lord Robertson of Port Ellen]

I know that the noble Earl will come to my somewhat critical comments about the lack of information on NATO from the Government, especially to parliamentarians, but I exempt him from some of that criticism because he is a shining example of what Ministers should be doing, given his early morning briefings of all-party groups of MPs. I should like to put that on the record but it does not exempt the rest of the Government from a frankly pathetic effort in getting over information about what is happening in terms of British-NATO relations.

[Earl Howe]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his comments but am sure that no one listening to his speech will have overlooked a powerful point he made about government messaging in general. I had intended not to comment too much on that theme but rather to go away and report back to him on what we can and should do across government to address his powerful points.

I should like to cover the issues raised by my noble friend Lord Jopling on shortcomings in NATO’s internal financial management. NATO bodies have been strengthening the areas of internal control and risk management, as identified by IBAN audits as areas of weakness to address. The Secretary-General has taken the opportunity of the functional review to do the same at the HQ, and the nations agreed the additional resources for him to do so in December 2018. The UK expects an enhanced internal control and risk management team to be established by autumn this year. Unfortunately, there is currently no consensus among allies on the implementation of the IBAN’s financial performance audit recommendations, which makes progress slow. However, I understand that NATO is looking to create a resource executive function—more or less a chief financial officer role—and is due to submit a recommendation on this matter to the North Atlantic Council this summer.

In my opening contribution to this debate, I quoted NATO’s current Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg. I will finish with the words of one of his illustrious predecessors. Dirk Stikker served at a tumultuous time more than half a century ago, with the Cold War at its height and the Cuban missile crisis taking the world to the brink of nuclear confrontation. He was also a great friend to the UK, having previously served many years as Dutch ambassador. Long after he stood down, he reflected in his memoirs on why NATO continues to play so vital a role in world affairs. He concluded:

“However great a nation, it never has all the pieces on the checkerboard. The checkerboard is vast. And the game without end.”


NATO’s achievements over the past 70 years have been remarkable. It has forged its member nations’ individual strengths into an alliance sufficiently formidable to deter all adversaries—those then and now who would impose their own norms of intolerance and authoritarianism on the free world. NATO has made an enormous difference—whether helping to end the Cold War, stopping terror or bringing reassurance to the vulnerable across the globe from Bosnia to Operation Ocean Shield in the Gulf of Aden. Sometimes this has meant conspicuous heroism on the battlefield or in the conflict zone, and sometimes quiet but tenacious work behind the scenes or under the oceans. As the right reverend Prelate so eloquently put it, NATO is not only a military alliance but a community of values—values that endure. Whatever form it has taken, NATO, as my noble friend Lord Attlee witnessed at first hand, has always done its work supremely well. So today we take the opportunity to pay tribute to the alliance and, in particular, we say thank you to all those men and women over the past seven decades who have served NATO with fortitude and honour. We owe them much. We owe them our peace.

Motion agreed.

Aircraft Carrier Task Force

Earl Howe Excerpts

Wednesday 13th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what they consider to be the minimum size and composition of a United Kingdom aircraft carrier task force when deployed to the Pacific.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, the United Kingdom carrier strike group will achieve initial operating capability in December 2020 and deploy in 2021. The size and composition of that group is set by the deployment requirements as determined during operational planning.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

I thank the Minister for that non-Answer. Can he confirm that the normal aircraft carrier task force requires two, three or four frigates, one or two submarines and a couple of support ships, and that to maintain a task force of that size in the Pacific requires at least as many ships at home, in maintenance or on their way in and out? Does he recall the Secretary of State for Defence’s speech at the Royal United Services Institute some weeks ago, in which he promised that we intend in our future global deployment to keep six ships permanently in the Gulf and maintain a permanent presence in the Caribbean and the Asia-Pacific? He said:

“Our vision is for these ships to form part of 2 Littoral Strike Groups complete with escorts, support vessels and helicopters. One would be based east of Suez … and one based west of Suez in the Mediterranean”.


Is the Minister confident that the Navy is capable of supporting all these parts of the Secretary of State’s vision?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, we will always have a sovereign task group capability. As I said, the carriers will operate as part of a maritime task group, which will be tailored to meet the required tasks in a particular case. The precise number and mix of vessels deployed would depend on operational circumstances. As the noble Lord knows, we will be able to draw on a range of modern and highly capable vessels to support the carriers, including Type 45 destroyers, Type 23 frigates, Astute-class submarines and, in due course, Type 26 frigates. We will also work routinely with ships from allied navies.

[Lord Touhig (Lab)]

My Lords, is this sabre-rattling in the Pacific intended to give our friends in the region confidence, or to make the Chinese tremble? When the Americans deploy a carrier they provide an escort of a cruiser, four destroyers, a carrier wing, a submarine and 7,500 sailors. Can we do that?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, this is not about sabre-rattling. Indeed, it is not about antagonising China in any way. My right honourable friend the Defence Secretary announced that the first operational mission of the “Queen Elizabeth” would include the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Pacific region, thereby enabling the Royal Navy to maximise the opportunities we have to exercise and interact with our key regional allies and partners, and to make a statement about upholding the international rules-based system, including freedom of navigation.

[Lord Boyce (CB)]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that one must be careful not to get seduced by the destroyers and frigates—much as I would like to see a bigger destroyer and frigate force? The Royal Navy consists of other vessels—for example, the important role of mine counter measures vessels in the Persian Gulf, and what our great RFA ships can do. They will all contribute to that statement that the Secretary of State made at RUSI. One should not focus purely on destroyers and frigates, much though I would like to do so on a day-to-day basis.

[Earl Howe]

The noble and gallant Lord is absolutely right. Of course the number of platforms matters, but I would say to noble Lords, look not only at the number of warships; look also at the breadth of capability that the Royal Navy possesses. There are few navies in the world that can match the Royal Navy for the range and quality of the defensive, offensive and deterrent effects that it can deliver.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

Does the Minister not agree that we talk about this as if the carriers were vulnerable, whereas they can go 500 miles in any direction in one day, and are extremely difficult to find? Certainly, terrorists cannot get at them at all when they are at sea, unlike a static air base, which is very easy to find, as we know exactly where it is. However, if we deploy a carrier group east of Suez into the Indo-Pacific region, does the Minister not agree that it would be foolhardy—historically we have never done this—not to have within the region, because of the transit times, at least one SSN, one destroyer, two key ASW frigates and the support ships involved? Doing that will put huge pressure on the other tasks the Navy does day to day, because we have insufficient frigates and destroyers to do all those tasks as well.

[Earl Howe]

The noble Lord, with his immense experience, is almost certainly right about the kinds of deployment that we will see the carrier perform. The first operational deployment is still in the planning stage. As recently announced, it will involve our Dutch allies: it will be a joint deployment with US Marine Corps Lightning squadron. The precise composition of the group is being worked through at the moment. We should emphasise the noble Lord’s first point: this carrier represents an extremely capable strategic deterrent for the nation. Let me stress that it will be robustly protected by air and sea assets against threats of all kinds.

[Lord Trefgarne (Con)]

My Lords, I do not wish to challenge the principles set out by the Secretary of State in his recent speech, but is it not better not to go into too much detail on these occasions, for fear of challenging the safety and security of the units concerned?

[Earl Howe]

My noble friend is absolutely right. We do not comment in detail on operational matters.

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister has on several occasions talked about working with our allies, as he has in the past in the context of the escort ships alongside the Queen Elizabeth class. What additional work are the Secretary of State and the Ministry of Defence doing to ensure that we have stronger bilateral co-operation, particularly in the context of Brexit, to strengthen our resilience?

[Earl Howe]

There is a great deal of interest on the part of our European allies, in particular, in working more closely with the Royal Navy once the carriers come into service. The carriers will enable the UK to make an unparalleled contribution to NATO, not only through the carriers’ own capability but also as a means of coalescing European naval effort alongside that of our close partners the United States.

Royal Navy: Type 31e Frigates

Earl Howe Excerpts

Wednesday 6th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, there has been no change in the Government’s plans. It remains our intention to award a single design and build contract for five Type 31e frigates by the end of 2019.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Earl for his answer. Many of us who are concerned about the number of ships in the Navy have been concerned about this delay in ordering. Only yesterday, the noble Lord, Lord Lee of Trafford, accosted me and asked whether the ships’ names committee could call them the “Grayling Class” as there were no ships, which I thought a little unfair. Can the noble Earl reassure the House that the first of these ships will be fully active in the Royal Navy in 2023? If not, as the noble Earl knows, “HMS Argyll” will pay off and the number of frigates that this great maritime nation possesses will have dropped to 12.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, we see no reason at all to depart from the timescales that we set ourselves; they remain unchanged. We want the first ship in 2023 and all five by the end of 2028. I say to the noble Lord that we have streamlined the procurement procedure in a way that should be helpful, to enable us to award the contract by the end of this year.

[Lord Howell of Guildford (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend will be aware that we are both designing and building frigates for other Commonwealth countries, notably Australia and Canada. Will he encourage his friends to consider the proposal that these frigates—I am not sure whether they are Type 26 or Type 31e—shall be crewed and operated jointly by Commonwealth navies?

[Earl Howe]

My noble friend draws attention to something very encouraging. The UK shipbuilding sector has been able to compete in the world market for very high-end specification frigates—it is the Type 26 frigates which he was referring to. This aids the issue of interoperability between allies, which he also highlighted. We welcome the fact that Australia and Canada have entered the fold of nations which will operate this vessel.

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, in light of the National Audit Office’s November 2018 report, which suggested that the MoD’s equipment plan remained unaffordable, falling about £10 billion short over the next 10 years, will the Minister explain to the House what plans the MoD has to ensure that the Type 31e frigates are delivered on time and, crucially, on budget? Are the new procurement arrangements intended to deliver that?

[Earl Howe]

The noble Baroness is quite right: in April, the forecast cost of the equipment plan exceeded the allocated budget of £7 billion over 10 years, which is the central estimate. Indeed, if we took no action, the plan would not be affordable. However, based on past experience as well as what we are doing, we are confident that we will successfully deliver the plan within budget, both this year and next year, through effective management, by monitoring and controlling costs as we go, and with the benefit of the additional money secured in the Budget.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, on 20 July 2016, the then chief executive of Defence Equipment and Support, said to the Defence Committee that,

“the eight Type 26 frigates are approximately £8 billion-worth of planning going forward”.

I interpret that as meaning that a Type 26 frigate will cost £1 billion. The Government have consistently said that the Type 31e frigates will cost a quarter of £1 billion each. Just how incapable will these frigates be, or does the Secretary of State have a magic wand?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the Type 26 is a high-end specification, anti-submarine warfare frigate; not unnaturally, that specification makes it expensive. The Type 31e is an adaptable, general purpose frigate, subject to completely different procurement processes. However, it should not be inferred from that comparison that the Type 31e will be in any sense a low-grade warship. Of its kind, we intend it to be a world-beater, which other Governments will wish to buy.

[The Lord Bishop of Portsmouth]

My Lords, will the Minister confirm that these frigates will be based in Portsmouth, and when a decision will be announced to this House? As the home of the Royal Navy, Portsmouth is the obvious home for these frigates, not least because the general purpose Type 23 frigates are currently based there. This decision would bring much support and give reassurance to the city, community and the diocese I serve.

[Earl Howe]

The right reverend Prelate’s bid will not be lost on those of my colleagues who are responsible for decisions of this kind. However, I am afraid I can tell him that no decision has been taken as yet.

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, I declare an interest in defence procurement issues, as reflected in the register. I wholly support the noble Lord’s aspiration to increase the size of the surface fleet—it must be expanded. The Minister will, however, recognise that the three principal trade-offs in a great military procurement exercise are performance, cost and time. Cost is fixed. Time is fixed. Performance must be traded down. Does the Minister agree that the best way to trade on performance is in some way to compromise on the exquisite nature of the platform to ensure that the combat and command systems on board are state of the art?

[Earl Howe]

The noble and gallant Lord speaks with great experience and he is right: we are consciously prescribing an adaptable but general-purpose specification for the Type 31e, as opposed to the more exquisite high-end specification of, for example, the Type 26. That is not to say—as I emphasised before—that the Type 31e will be in any way an inferior warship—quite the contrary, in terms of the capability that we will require of it.

Parking (Code of Practice) Bill

Earl Howe Excerpts

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 4th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hunt of Wirral]

That the Bill do now pass.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, I have it in command from Her Majesty the Queen to acquaint the House that she, having been informed of the purport of the Parking (Code of Practice) Bill, has consented to place her interests, so far as they are affected by the Bill, at the disposal of Parliament for the purposes of the Bill.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and Wales Office (Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral for bringing the Bill to this stage with his customary aplomb and expertise. It is not a flashy Bill but a necessary and welcome one, providing for uniformity and consistency in private parking practice. I also thank the honourable Member for East Yorkshire, Sir Greg Knight, for introducing the Bill and progressing it through the other place. I think the whole House—indeed, the whole country—should be grateful for this small but necessary measure.

Armed Forces Act (Continuation) Order 2019

Earl Howe Excerpts

Wednesday 20th February 2019 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Earl Howe]

That the draft Order laid before the House on 24 January be approved.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, the Armed Forces Act (Continuation) Order is a routine item of business. It is a short but vital document to preserve the existence of one of our greatest assets—the Armed Forces. The order also serves to remind us that the existence of the Armed Forces is not just a matter of executive decision but also a matter that requires regular parliamentary consent. We provide that consent through our annual consideration of the legislation governing the Armed Forces: the Armed Forces Act 2006. This reflects the constitutional requirement under the Bill of Rights that a standing army, and, by extension, the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, may not be maintained without the consent of Parliament.

It is worthy of note that a change was proposed by the Ministry of Defence in the Armed Forces Bill 2005. That Bill did not make any provision for annual renewal, but this was resisted by the Defence Committee and the Select Committee that considered the 2005 Bill in another place. Both committees favoured retaining the present arrangements. The Ministry of Defence amended that Bill, and the practice of annual renewal continues.

That brings me back to the draft order we are considering this afternoon, which is to continue in force the 2006 Act for a further year, until 11 May 2020. Much of what I am about to say has been said in the past, but it is important to explain, and to place on this year’s record, the process for renewal, and to set out the consequences if that does not happen. Every five years, renewal is by Act of Parliament—an Armed Forces Act. The most recent was in 2016, and there must be another by the end of 2021. Between each five-yearly Act, annual renewal is by Order in Council, and the draft order that we are considering today is such an order.

The Armed Forces Act 2016 provided for the continuation in force of the Armed Forces Act 2006 until the end of 11 May 2017, and for further renewal thereafter by Order in Council for up to a year at a time, but not beyond 2021. If the Armed Forces Act 2006 is not renewed by this Order in Council before the end of 11 May 2019, it will automatically expire. If the 2006 Act expires, the legislation that governs the Armed Forces and the provisions necessary for their maintenance as disciplined bodies would cease to exist.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

My Lords, that is not a question for me but for the Minister. What it brings out, given some of the contradictory statements by Her Majesty’s Government, is the need for a proper Armed Forces debate in the not too distant future—I think that is the view across the House.

I move on to my narrower questions. First, what happens if we do not pass this instrument? The Minister has anticipated that question substantially in his opening speech, but the one area he did not cover is what would happen to military personnel if it is not approved. What happens on simple issues such as whether they are paid and whether their accommodation is still available? The information he gave us earlier was all about the maintenance of discipline, which we can all understand. But we also have to recognise that we may be unabling the continued proper employment of personnel by passing this order.

The order and the Act that we are keeping alive are about the law. The one area that I have never really managed to understand is this: by what authority does a member of the Armed Forces use lethal force? To put it more directly, when that person kills someone, why is that not murder? Is the explanation different when war has been or has not been declared? In particular, what is the legal position if they kill someone supporting the civil authority in the United Kingdom?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. I will of course do my best to answer all the questions that have been raised. I start with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, who gave us a most interesting exposition of his long experience, not only in relation to the Armed Forces but also as a law officer. Not unnaturally he homed in on the service justice review, which is being undertaken by His Honour Shaun Lyons, who, I am sure noble Lords will agree, has an excellent knowledge of criminal law and procedures, as well as having served in the Royal Navy as Chief Naval Judge Advocate. The review is covering all aspects of the service justice system, including court martial and the types of cases that it deals with, the summary hearing process, the service police and the Service Prosecuting Authority.

The policing aspects of the review are being led by Sir Jon Murphy, a former chief constable of Merseyside Police. The noble and learned Lord asked whether it was possible to see the conclusions of the report. The answer is, “Not yet”. The review is due to report in the spring. That will give us time to consider it and, if necessary, make plans for any legislative changes before the next Armed Forces Bill in 2020. As for consultation, there is no public consultation on the process, but Judge Lyons is consulting a wide range of stakeholders with an interest in the service justice system. Of course, he can be contacted by interested parties through the head of the review secretariat.

The noble and learned Lord asked in particular about the ability of the service justice system to deal with serious offences. As he will be aware, the service justice system is capable of dealing with the most serious offences, and has done so over the course of history. It has been held to be compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights, both for investigations and prosecutions within the UK and abroad, where the civilian police do not have jurisdiction. We are, however, keen for the review to take a strategic look at all key aspects of the service justice system, and this is one of the issues being explored.

The noble and learned Lord referred to the use of majority verdicts under the current system. The Government, as he will be aware, have been successful in establishing, both in the European Court of Human Rights and in the civilian courts, that the court martial system is in principle safe, independent and impartial. The current system has been considered twice by the Court Martial Appeal Court in the last five years and was on both occasions held to be fair and safe. Noble Lords, and noble and learned Lords, will know that the Court Martial Appeal Court is made up of the same judges as sit in the civilian Court of Appeal. That Appeal Court has held that there is no ground for deciding that a verdict by simple majority is inherently unfair or unsafe. I am advised by my noble and learned friend Lord Keen that in Scotland a majority verdict of eight to seven in a murder case, for example, would be sufficient to convict an accused person. However, the Government recognise that there are differing views about the system of majority verdicts, and this is another issue that will be covered by the review.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, for the compliments he paid me over the recent Written Answers that I was able to give him. I am glad that he found them helpful. He referred to the dreadful accident that I am sure we all remember involving the deaths of two RAF pilots in Scotland. I will take away the suggestion he made about the possibility of encouraging the process to move forward in Scotland. I would not wish to give a firm undertaking to that effect, because I do not want to do anything improper as regards undue influence on the Scottish Executive, but I undertake to take the point away.

The noble Lord asked me about Gibraltar and the jurisdiction over Gibraltar in relation to this order. The Armed Forces (Gibraltar) Act was passed by the Gibraltar Parliament on 8 November 2018—very recently. It came into law on 10 December 2018. The Act gives effect in Gibraltar law to certain provisions of the Armed Forces Act 2006, and Gibraltar wishes to make its own provisions in relation to that Act. Of course, we continue to work with Her Majesty’s Government of Gibraltar on the inclusion of the Royal Gibraltar Regiment within the Armed Forces Act 2006 service discipline regime to ensure that a discipline system is put in place that meets the needs of the regiment. The noble Lord also asked whether there had been any consultation on the order. There has been no public consultation but, as a matter of routine, the Armed Forces are consulted in relation to legislation that affects the service.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, asked what point we had reached in relation to an issue that he has very effectively championed in this House on more than one occasion: the vexed issue of the challenge in recent years to the principle of combat immunity. This has created considerable legal uncertainty about liability in combat situations and the risk that we may be moving towards the judicialisation of war, if I can put it that way. We want to introduce better combat compensation for those injured in combat operations and for the families of those killed. The public consultation closed on 23 February 2017. Therefore, we have consulted and are still carefully considering the views expressed during the consultation and will be publishing a response.

The proposal that we are advancing is that compensation would be paid at the same level as court damages, which can often be substantially greater than awards under the Armed Forces compensation scheme. Our aim is to ensure that those who have risked their lives in the most challenging of circumstances should be put in the best possible financial position quickly. That last word is one of the operative words, because some of these cases have a tendency to drag on and it is immensely upsetting to the individual or their family—and many times to both. The vast majority of compensation paid in these circumstances currently is not as a result of MoD negligence. These proposals are aimed at providing combat compensation to those who have suffered in the most extreme circumstances. We will announce further proposals in due course and I hope to have further news before too long on that front for the noble and gallant Lord.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, asked what arrangements involving the Armed Forces are being considered for the case of a no-deal Brexit. She will remember, I am sure, that on 18 December last year my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence announced that approximately 3,500 service personnel would be held on standby to ensure that defence resources were available to support the wider Government to implement their no-deal Brexit contingency plans, if required. In headline terms, the prudent standby package will comprise approximately 3,500 personnel at varying levels of readiness, including niche capabilities such as military working dogs. No defence estate is ring-fenced at this time as it is anticipated that there will be spare capacity available during spring 2019 to provide a warehousing/storage function, if that is required. Similarly, it is judged that in extremis a request for defence strategic transport capability could be accommodated by existing capacity.

In addition to the prudent standby package, defence has also been making available military planning expertise to support other departments with their Brexit contingency plans. To date, we have provided 28 military planners to a number of departments across Whitehall. I hope that that outline is helpful to the noble Baroness.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Will the Minister bear in mind, before deploying military forces to deal with possible civil unrest arising from Brexit, that the deployment by Winston Churchill as Home Secretary of troops to Tonypandy, who never got involved in that strike, is so built into people’s memories that it was resurrected only a week ago?

[Earl Howe]

I assure the noble Lord that we are only too aware of the point he has raised. I think there is common to us all an antipathy to seeing large numbers of Armed Forces personnel on our streets, so to the extent that that can be avoided, it will be. However, it is prudent nevertheless to have the kinds of contingency plans that I have outlined.

The noble Lord, Lord Judd, asked me, very properly, about the training that Armed Forces personnel receive before they are deployed to a combat zone. I can tell him that such training as he asked me about does take place; that is, training in international law, international humanitarian law and the law of armed combat, which of course governs all that we do, and indeed those key provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. We are as mindful as he would wish us to be of the need to maintain the kinds of standards that set an example to other nations in how our Armed Forces personnel should behave in such circumstances.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, referred to the fall in Armed Forces morale, as evidenced in recent surveys. It will not surprise him to hear that we take this extremely seriously. There is no single reason for that fall in morale, but we are aware that a number of factors play into it. That is why the chief of defence personnel is leading an important work strand in the Ministry of Defence known as the people programme, which involves looking at the terms and conditions of service—that is, pay and pensions—and accommodation arrangements for personnel; flexible service is another strand. A proposal is also being explored to use the early departure payment resource more effectively and efficiently, which, it is hoped, will address part of the issue we face over the retention of trained people. Therefore, we are not sitting back and doing nothing. However, it is true to say that at a time when the Army in particular is not deployed on an overseas operation in large numbers—although we are overseas in modest numbers—morale tends to suffer. Young men like an exciting challenge, and if they are sitting in barracks and simply training, there is a tendency for morale to dip. That is not to sound complacent, but I am advised that we have seen that in the past.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked me by virtue of what law a soldier or serviceperson is empowered to kill. Of course, UK military personnel are always subject to UK law, even on overseas deployments, under the Armed Forces Act. As such, they have the right to use force in self-defence in accordance with UK domestic law. In the context of overseas armed conflicts, personnel may also use offensive force in accordance with their rules of engagement, which reflect the position under both domestic and international law, including the law of armed conflict. I hope that those answers will have been helpful to noble Lords. To the extent that I have not covered everything, I will of course write.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

I wonder whether the noble Earl could be a bit more specific in the answer to the last question—not now, obviously, but I really would value a letter, because this is a key question. As we know, when it goes wrong, the alternative is that the person involved is indicted on a murder charge. When we give people the responsibility to use lethal force, it would not be unreasonable for them to know that there is a very solid background for them to do as they are ordered.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe]

I entirely understand the noble Lord’s point, and I shall, of course, be happy to write with any further information on the legal basis that he seeks.

[Lord Stoddart of Swindon]

Could the noble Earl answer a question that the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, quite properly, was unable to answer, or did not want to answer? Why have we cut our Armed Forces to such a degree at the same time as the Defence Secretary wishes to expand our operations abroad?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the Armed Forces are fulfilling all the tasks assigned to them, and it is right that we have an Army, a Navy and an Air Force no bigger and no smaller than we need. The noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, is referring to the expansion of the activities of the Armed Forces rather than the size of the Armed Forces. The areas of operation must now take account of world events and changes in the geopolitical situation. That is why my right honourable friend has been talking about the discussions we are having in government to extend our naval presence across the world, and possibly even to look at further bases across the world. But we have no plans to expand the numbers in the Army beyond the target we have set ourselves—which is, broadly speaking, the numbers that we currently have. There is a problem with recruitment to the forces, which is perhaps a subject for a separate debate, but I do not foresee any large-scale expansion in numbers.

Motion agreed.

Public Procurement (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Earl Howe Excerpts

Wednesday 20th February 2019 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Earl Howe]

That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 13 December 2018 be approved. Considered in Grand Committee on 4 February.

Motions agreed.

Offensive Weapons Bill

Earl Howe Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 6th February 2019 Grand Committee

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

My Lords, I have Amendments 79 and 80 in this group. They are word-for-word what was in the Bill when it was first published in the House of Commons. I am attempting to put back into the Bill the clauses put forward by the Government originally—not my usual role here as opposition spokesperson; I am usually trying to take out government clauses or change them, but here we are today trying to put them back in.

My noble friend Lord Robertson of Port Ellen set out clearly at Second Reading and again today why these weapons should be banned. They are more dangerous in terms of their penetrative power and range. My noble friend quoted the Home Secretary’s comments; I shall not quote them again. The Home Secretary was very clear why these weapons had to be banned; he had had intelligence about why it was important to do that. Then we had a complete about turn and the clause was taken out between Second Reading and Third Reading. I am sure we will find out at some point what happened and why that was done. My honourable friend Louise Haigh, the shadow Policing Minister, was very clear that the Opposition backed the Government’s original position and that the provision would pass through the House of Commons without any problems.

It is interesting that the Government have gone much further than what people on the Government Benches wanted. The Member for The Cotswolds, Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown, suggested level 3 security, but that is not here. They were not looking for the weapon to be banned but wanted enhanced security, very much along the lines of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, but there is nothing here. That security level means that the gun, the bolt and the ammunition are kept in three separate safes. At the moment the Government are proposing not to do that. They are going to leave the security as it is. That is regrettable.

I am not an expert on guns. I do not particularly like guns, but I have fired some weapons, including a sniper rifle and a few shotguns. I fired them on ranges, and when I was in the Armed Forces Parliamentary Scheme I did some stuff. I have shot only at targets and clay pigeons. I am very pleased that we live in a country where we have tough laws on weapons. I am very proud that we have them, and they are good.

My noble friend Lord Robertson was right to point out in respect of evidence that, before Hungerford and Dunblane, handguns were not generally seen as an issue. It was only after the two tragedies that Government had to act to ban them. We can never say what is going to happen in the future.

The Government were right in their original proposals, and it is shame we are here today. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has tabled an amendment to improve the position today. I am very pleased to see it because it is better than the Government’s suggestion. It at least gives level 3 security. That will make it more difficult for weapons to be obtained illegally, and although it is not an absolute guarantee it is certainly progress. I shall not press my amendment, but I am looking forward to hearing the Minister’s comments in response to the debate, because these are serious issues. As my noble friend Lord Robertson said, although the Government removed the two clauses, at no point has the Home Secretary withdrawn the remarks he made. My worry is that after we have had this review, the Government will decide that we need to ban these weapons and then will say that we have no legislation to ban them and we will have to wait until something comes along. That is the often the case with many things which we suggest in opposition. The Government aim to do things and say they will do them at some point when they find a Bill they can put them in. My worry is that we may end up there. I raised that point at Second Reading with the noble Baroness, Lady Williams. If the Government are going to do a consultation and then decide to ban these weapons, they should take a power to enable them to do that through secondary legislation. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Lucas began by quite rightly pointing out that this is a Bill about setting boundaries. As we have heard, this group of amendments deals with what is the appropriate form of regulation for high muzzle energy rifles. We have heard a variety of views from all sides of the Committee. Some noble Lords are seeking to restore the prohibition of these rifles removed from the Bill in the Commons. Other noble Lords are seeking to go further than the amendments made in the Commons by also removing the prohibition on so-called MARS rifles, while yet other noble Lords seek to find a middle way by introducing mandatory security requirements. I will endeavour to disentangle these competing approaches by setting out the Government’s considered view on the various amendments.

I begin with what is, in effect, the middle-way option, if only because my noble friend Lord Lucas’s Amendment 74 is the first one in this group, but I will address my noble friend Earl Attlee’s Amendments 80A to 80C as they cover similar ground, albeit from a different perspective. Amendment 74 provides us with an opportunity to test whether a requirement to apply the highest standards of security for the storage of specific firearm types when not in use might be an alternative to prohibition. The Government are not seeking to prohibit ownership of high muzzle energy rifles through this Bill, so it is relevant for us to discuss the merits of applying enhanced security to the storage of such firearms while they continue to be available to civilians under our firearms licensing arrangements. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, takes the contrary view, and I will come on to his amendments shortly.

The Bill will prohibit civilian access to more rapid-firing rifles, which makes any discussion of secure storage in respect of these weapons otiose, although we will come to Amendments 78A and 79A, which would have the effect of removing that prohibition from the Bill, and Amendments 78B and 79B, which seek to make changes to the prohibition.

The Government are concerned about the potential public safety risks that more powerful and more rapid-firing rifles pose, should they fall into the hands of criminals or terrorists. It is therefore right that where any such firearms remain available for civilian use and ownership on a firearms certificate issued by the police they should be subject to the highest standards of security to prevent theft and misuse. I therefore understand the reference in my noble friend Lord Lucas’s amendment to the requirements of level 3 security. This relates to different levels of security arrangements that are set out in the Home Office’s Firearms Security Handbook, with level 3 being the highest level of security measures set out in the handbook.

The first point I want to make in respect of this amendment is that it would be something of an anomaly to specify particular security conditions in this way in the Bill. It is currently an operational matter for police forces to satisfy themselves that the security in place for any firearm held by a civilian is proportionate to the risk that the specific firearm poses, taking all relevant factors into account. The issue of the relevant firearms certificate can be made contingent on the required levels of security being in place. While it is right that we should ask the police to have due regard to the requirements of the handbook, it would, as I have said, be an anomaly to set out in primary legislation the level of security required for one specific rifle type.

While I fully understand the point behind the amendment, it is important to be aware that the Firearms Security Handbook is a joint Home Office and policing document, intended to guide forces. The document has no specific legal weight and can be amended administratively. In such circumstances, I contend to my noble friend, it would not be appropriate to specify level 3 security in this Bill.

Amendments 80A to 80C in the name of my noble friend Earl Atlee address the same issue, but in a different way. These amendments in turn seek to amend the Firearms Act 1968 in order to provide the Secretary of State with an order-making power to specify the conditions relating to the secure storage and transportation of high muzzle energy rifles, which must be attached to the relevant firearms certificates issued by the police. The point behind the amendments is important. Dangerous firearms held in the community must be kept and stored as securely as possible.

The Government have given a commitment that we will consult on the issue of whether high muzzle energy rifles should be subject to a general prohibition, along with a number of other issues relating to firearms safety, after the Bill has completed its passage through Parliament. But the Government recognise the strength of feeling on this issue, on all sides. I know that some, including the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, have concerns about waiting for a further public consultation to run its course, particularly if this leads to a call for further legislation. We therefore take the point that there is a case for action in this area at this time. The Government will therefore give further consideration to the amendments tabled by my noble friends Lord Lucas and Earl Atlee ahead of Report. I cannot at this juncture give a commitment beyond that, but I assure both my noble friends that the case they put forward has landed and will be looked at seriously.

Amendments 78, 78B, 79A and 79B provide us with an opportunity to consider potential alternatives to the prohibition of the rifle types specified in Clause 32. Clauses 32 and 33 will strengthen the controls in respect of rapid-firing rifles, as defined by these clauses. As I explained earlier, these are currently available for civilian use or ownership under general licensing arrangements administered by the police under Section 1 of the Firearms Act 1968 or Article 45 of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 2004. This means that at present they can be owned only by somebody who has a firearms certificate for which they have been vetted by the police. Following advice from experts in the law enforcement agencies, we consider that these rifles should be brought under stricter controls. That will be achieved by adding them to the list of prohibited firearms provided for by Section 5 of the Firearms Act 1968 and Article 45 of the Northern Ireland order. Weapons that are so prohibited are subject to more rigorous controls than other firearms and may be possessed only with the authority of the Secretary of State.

My noble friend Lord Shrewsbury and the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, argued that the proposed ban of rapid-fire rifles could discriminate against disabled shooters. That point was raised during discussion of the Bill in the other place. I have to say straight out that I am not impressed by that argument. If the prohibition has an impact on disabled shooters, those who provide shooting facilities should see what alternative assistance might be provided to disabled shooters by shooting clubs, whether by adapting other types of rifle or adapting the places where disabled people shoot. So I am afraid that I do not find my noble friend’s and the noble Earl’s argument particularly powerful on that issue.

It is not our intention to restrict unnecessarily or arbitrarily the lawful use of firearms by licence holders for legitimate sporting purposes, for example. The vast majority of people in lawful possession of firearms use them responsibly and it is right that any controls need to be proportionate. But at the same time, the Government are concerned about the recent rises in gun crime and the changing threats and heightened risk to public safety. All firearms are by their very nature potentially dangerous and, indeed, lethal, but the rifles specified in Clauses 32 and 33 are considered to be more dangerous than other firearms permitted for civilian ownership under the firearms legislation. These rifles can discharge rounds at a much faster rate than conventional bolt-action rifles, which are permitted under licence and are normally operated manually with an up-and-back, forward-and-down motion.

The definition as set out in the Bill refers to the use of the energy from the propellant gas to extract the empty cartridge cases. This brings them much closer to self-loading rifles, which are already prohibited for civilian ownership under our firearms laws. The Government are therefore concerned about their potential for serious misuse and loss of life if they were to fall into the hands of criminals or terrorists.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Goschen]

My Lords, I said that I was open to hearing the arguments. I was saying that we should have a powerful case before we move to such a ban, if that is the direction that Her Majesty’s Government seek to take. The airing of these issues in this House and in another place are very helpful, but we need to follow the spirit of evidence before any action.

[Earl Howe]

That is extremely helpful. I agree with my noble friend. That is exactly why the Government felt that a longer public debate about this issue was appropriate.

In the light of representations made by representative firearms bodies and others during the passage of the Bill, the Government sought advice from the National Crime Agency on whether heightened security standards governing the safe storage of these rifles would be sufficient to reduce the concerns expressed to us. In the light of the advice received, we took the view that we should look again at options for enhancing the security requirements associated with these particular rifles, rather than push for their prohibition under the firearms legislation at the present time. That is why the provisions to prohibit high muzzle energy rifles were removed from the Bill on Report in the Commons.

It is the Government’s view that we should not proceed with prohibition without considering further the views of the police, relevant shooting organisations and members of the public. As was announced in the Commons, it is the Government’s intention to launch a full public consultation on this and on the firearms safety issues that have arisen during the Bill’s progress. That will provide an opportunity fully to consider the views of all those involved or with an interest and to make a better assessment of whether enhanced security, as proposed by my noble friends, would be sufficient to address the risks set out by the police and the NCA.

Finally, Amendment 80D in the name of my noble friend Lord Attlee seeks to make a change to the definition of “rifle” in Section 57 of the Firearms Act 1968. The purpose of that definition is to make it clear that the ordinary definition of “rifle” includes carbines, a particular type of long gun firearm with a shorter barrel than a normal rifle, which is classified as a rifle for the purposes of firearms controls. As he helpfully set out, my noble friend’s purpose in tabling the amendment is to make it clear that when we talk about rifles, including for the purposes of Clauses 32 and 33, we are talking about hand-held rifles, specifically those that are fired from the shoulder. My noble friend is clear that he wants there to be no confusion with artillery or guns fitted to tanks. The Government are not persuaded that this change to the Firearms Act is necessary. “Rifle” will continue to carry its normal meaning. I understand that this might have been a concern had we been talking about rifled weapons, but we are not.

In the light of the explanations I have provided and my commitment to consider further Amendments 74 and 80A to 80C, I hope that my noble friend Lord Lucas will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

In my contribution, I made a point about the Government taking out amendments then putting them back in. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, at Second Reading, the Minister referred to consultation. Today, the Minister told us that the Government remain very concerned about these weapons and their power. I worry that we will have the same problem as with the rogue landlords database. We wanted to make the database public through the Housing and Planning Act. We won the votes in the Lords, but they were overturned in the Commons. A year later, the Government changed their mind. Now, of course, the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, is saying, “The Government want to make the database available. We need primary legislation but we cannot find anything to tag it on to”. I worry that the Government will decide in the end that they want to ban these weapons but will say that they cannot find the legislation. Will the Government consider a precautionary power so that if they decide to, they could do that very quickly through secondary legislation?

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, could achieve his objective by supporting my amendment, or at least the concept behind it, slightly more strongly.

[Earl Howe]

It was in an endeavour to address the general concern put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, that I undertook for the Government to consider seriously my noble friend Lord Attlee’s amendment and my noble friend Lord Lucas’s arguments. However, I take his point. I am sure that it will not be lost on Home Office Ministers or officials. Of course, we will give that further consideration.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I am grateful for my noble friend’s calm and consideration, as ever. He would make an excellent target shooter. I will try to persuade him to join the Lords’ team for our battle against the Commons in July. I am grateful for what he said about Amendment 74, but when it comes to what my noble friend referred to as rapid-firing rifles, I would be grateful if he could share with us the evidence on which the Government have based the conclusion that the lever release rifle, in particular, is in practice a rapid-firing rifle.

I am not trying to pose as an expert in these things, but in terms of the evidence I have seen from people outside government, that matter is in question, and that is what lies behind my noble friend Lord Shrewsbury’s amendment. If my noble friend felt able to share the information or opinions on which that conclusion was based before Report, I would be immensely grateful.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, in so far as the security classification of the advice that the Government have received is not confidential, I would be happy to see what information we can release to my noble friend.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly. The amendment is clearly a good addition. We certainly want consistency on medical checks, police checks and how people look at this issue. Without that, we will have problems. That cannot be right. We want to ensure that people’s suitability to have a weapon is assessed, and to know that this is done to the highest possible standards. We are all clear on that. Where we have inconsistency, we have problems. I support the amendment and I hope that the Minister will respond positively to the issues raised.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Shrewsbury for raising this issue. His amendment would place a duty on the Secretary of State to,

“within the period of six months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, publish a report on how the Government’s Guide on Firearms Licensing Law (April 2016) is being implemented”.

The Home Office has published guidance on firearms licensing law for many years. The latest edition was published in 2016 and is currently undergoing revision to take account of recent legislative changes. It is an important document as it assists police forces in applying firearms law.

The Government want to ensure consistency of approach and high standards for police firearms licensing, and for this reason, we introduced the power to issue statutory firearms guidance in the Policing and Crime Act 2017. The new statutory guidance will apply to issues such as background checks, medical suitability and other criteria aimed at protecting public safety. We will be holding a public consultation shortly on the introduction of the new statutory guidance.

The amendment moved by my noble friend indicates a particular interest in the medical aspects of the firearms guidance, and in the engagement by GPs with the information-sharing arrangements which were agreed and introduced in 2016. These arrangements were brought in to help ensure that police would have sight of relevant medical information about certificate holders and applicants, to safeguard both licensed gun holders and other members of the public.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe]

I have a partial answer for my noble friend. The consultation will be launched after Royal Assent, but I am sure that the spirit of that undertaking is as soon as possible after Royal Assent.

[The Earl of Shrewsbury]

I am most grateful to my noble friend for his response. I am somewhat disappointed because this has been hanging around for a long while and action needs to be taken. I find it incredible that, in a modern country such as ours, the Home Office and general practitioners cannot come to some sort of agreement for a level playing field on fees. It seems such a simple thing to do. Most people in commerce and industry would try to agree this sort of thing every day. I will read my noble friend’s words and I reserve the right to talk to him again about this, but I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Earl of Shrewsbury]

Well you must be right then.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, it is fair and right that owners of previously legally-held firearms, who voluntarily hand these weapons over to the police for safe disposal, should be properly compensated. The purpose of the surrender and payment provisions in the Bill are directed to that end.

Amendment 80K seeks to extend these compensation arrangements such that compensation would be payable to owners who choose to modify their rifles, or indeed deactivate them, so that they may lawfully retain them. The reason for the payment scheme in the Bill is to rightfully compensate owners for the value they lose when surrendering these rifles to the police. My noble friend Lord Shrewsbury has suggested that owners may look to modify their rifle to a straight-pull bolt action function and therefore retain it on a section 1 certificate. We are not against this; individuals are perfectly within their right to do so. However, it is one thing to compensate owners of these weapons where they are deprived of their property, and quite a different proposition to expect the state to pay for their conversion or deactivation. We are seeking to remove these potentially dangerous rifles from our streets, and it is right that the Government should use public money to compensate only those individuals who surrender their prohibited rifles.

The arrangements covering compensation payments for firearms made unlawful by the Bill will be set out in regulations. I hope noble Lords will have had an opportunity to read the draft regulations which my noble friend Lady Williams circulated late last week. These regulations will be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, so in due course they will have to be debated and approved by both Houses before they can take effect.

There is clearly a balance to be struck here, taking into account the proper use of public funds. It is the Government’s view that compensation should only be paid to those who surrender firearms prohibited by the Bill. If an owner instead chooses to modify or decommission one of these firearms, such that it may continue to be lawfully held, that is a matter for them, but it would not be right for such modifications or decommissioning to take place at taxpayers’ expense. Given that explanation, which I am sure will come as a disappointment to my noble friend—I am sorry about that—I ask him to withdraw his amendment and support Clause 36 standing part of the Bill.

[The Earl of Shrewsbury]

My Lords, at least I get 10 points for trying. I am most grateful to my noble friend the Minister for what he said, and I understand it all. Having been around at the time of Dunblane, and through other guns being prohibited and compensation being given, I understand where he is coming from. If I may ask one further question, with compensation being paid for the guns which are to be handed in—if the Government go ahead and ban them—does this include compensation on manufacturing equipment for the businesses that manufacture these guns? I know that it does not include ammunition, but does it include manufacturing and the stock held?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am advised that the compensation will embrace ancillary equipment unique to the weapons concerned.

[The Earl of Shrewsbury]

My Lords, I am most grateful. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.