Licences and Licensing

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd May 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

Can I begin by thanking the Minister for his remarks? My hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North (Alex Norris) unfortunately cannot respond today, so I have been brought off the substitutes’ bench. To cut to the chase, I am pleased to be able to confirm to the Minister our enthusiastic support for this motion.

Football is a positive, powerful force that brings people together. Whether it be the European championships or the World cup, international tournaments can bring our nation together. The Euros this summer will be another focal point and will be watched keenly by millions across the country and indeed around the world. Each of the nations of the UK will have fond memories of supporting and celebrating its national team, and in a world that can sometimes seem pressurised and stressful, these moments have been genuinely joyous. It is no wonder that England and Scotland, and I sense that I would be pushing my luck if I tried to say anything more positive about Scotland—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

Order. For the sake of clarity, the hon. Gentleman would not be pushing his luck while I am in the Chair. He may proceed.

[Dan Jarvis]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker.

Scotland fans, along with England fans, will be particularly looking forward to this summer’s tournament, and hopefully celebrating great success. We therefore welcome this statutory instrument to extend the licensing hours of premises by two hours, should a home nation reach the semi-finals or final of this summer’s Euros.

Many will welcome this change to allow people to come together to get behind their country, and pubs, clubs and the wider hospitality industry across the country will also appreciate this move. The hospitality industry struggled immensely during the pandemic, and many are still suffering with the effects of that unprecedented disruption. Sadly, dozens of pubs continue to close each month across the UK. These will have been community hubs, places to meet friends and family, and ever more important social spaces when society can sometimes feel increasingly atomised.

Pubs, bars and social clubs are a part of our country, serving an important function that we must work together to protect and support. The opportunity to extend opening hours during what promises to be a very busy period for the sector will, I am sure, be greatly appreciated, so the Opposition are pleased to support the order.

I seek assurances from the Minister on a few points. Have the Government consulted trade bodies to ensure that the hospitality industry is best placed to reap the rewards of this change? It seems sensible to bring them into the process to ensure that this is done in the best possible way to support the industry.

Many will also have concerns about how this change will be policed, and the Minister touched on that. The recent Netflix documentary “The Final: Attack on Wembley” again brought into sharp focus what happened during the Euros in 2021, with public disorder a shameful feature of the latter stages of the tournament, so have the Government had discussions with the police or local government to hear any concerns they might have on these matters? How do the Government intend to respond in such circumstances, should those bodies require any assistance? They will be on the frontline of this change, so their assessment of the situation is, of course, invaluable.

Finally, on a point of process, many were disappointed that an extension of licensing hours was not agreed in time for the Lionesses’ appearance in the women’s World cup final last year. Indeed, many businesses say that they missed out on increased trade due to the extension not being agreed. The process of agreeing temporary relaxations of licensing laws is perhaps over-bureaucratic and potentially not flexible enough to allow quick relaxations to be agreed in time for sporting occasions.

The Minister helpfully mentioned that, last Friday, my hon. Friend the Member for South Shields (Mrs Lewell-Buck) steered her Licensing Hours Extensions Bill through Third Reading, with Government support. Her Bill will dramatically improve the process for making temporary extensions to licensing hours, making it less cumbersome. I wish her every success as the Bill now progresses to the other place, and I hope the Government will continue to support it to become law.

In the meantime, the Government, football fans and the hospitality industry can all be assured of the Opposition’s support for the order. I wish both England and Scotland all the very best for the forthcoming tournament.

[Chris Philp]

I thank the shadow Minister for his support. I am not sure that it was enthusiastic support—

[Dan Jarvis]

It was intended to be.

[Chris Philp]

I certainly take that in the spirit in which it was intended. Who knows, perhaps this is the last time we will face each other over the Dispatch Box.

Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd May 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his remarks. It is always good to see him in his place. At the outset, I want to put on record that we on the Opposition Benches believe national security—the defence of our homeland—is an issue that as much as possible should rise above the political fray and unite us in common cause.

Given that this statutory instrument relates to Scotland, I think it is right that we take the opportunity to pay tribute to the extraordinary Scottish men and women serving in government, our intelligence services, our police and our armed forces who work tirelessly from Land’s End to John O’Groats to keep Scotland and all of the United Kingdom safe. These men and women protecting our country must of course work within legislative frameworks. Today, we are debating the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (Risk of Being Drawn into Terrorism) (Revised Guidance) Regulations 2024 in the Chamber, some seven months, as the Minister said, after we debated a fairly similar statutory instrument to update the Prevent duty guidance in England and Wales.

Before I turn to the details of the statutory instrument before the House on the updated Scottish Prevent duty guidance, I want—with your indulgence, Madam Deputy Speaker—to very briefly put on record my great affection for Scotland. Home to beautiful highland countryside from Glen Affric to Glen Urquhart, breathtaking coastline from the Mull of Galloway right the way round to St Abb’s Head, and bustling cities on the Clyde, the Forth, the Dee and the Tay, Scotland is a truly special place. Add to that the fact that Scottish people are some of the most warm-hearted and generous people anyone could wish to meet, and I am so proud that Scotland stands shoulder to shoulder with the rest of our United Kingdom to counter the threats of an increasingly more volatile and polarised world.

[Sir John Hayes]

I am slightly hesitant about interrupting this eulogy to all things Scots, but has the hon. Gentleman noted that a Scot has just taken the Chair?

[Dan Jarvis]

I had made that observation, and that in part gave me the confidence to continue going perhaps longer than otherwise might have been the case. I sense, given the beady eye you have on me, Madam Deputy Speaker, that I should probably—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

It is okay with me.

[Dan Jarvis]

Madam Deputy Speaker says it is fine to keep saying nice things about Scotland, but I am slightly conscious that the Minister may have somewhere to go in the not-too-distant future. I do not want to detain him for too much longer, given that there is apparently quite an important meeting taking place at 14.15—

[Tom Tugendhat]

At 16.15.

[Dan Jarvis]

At 16.15—the Minister has admitted it—but although I would like the opportunity to spend even longer talking about what a fantastic place Scotland is, I should probably begin to turn to the substance of these matters. I do so by saying that we on the Opposition Benches support the update to the Scottish Prevent duty guidance, although there are some questions about how it sits within broader efforts to counter extremism and terrorism, which I will come to in a moment.

Regardless of where in the UK extremism rears its ugly head, it is fuelled by fear and hate, and stoked by malign individuals whose motives are abhorrent to the vast majority of decent people in Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom. We have felt the devastation that extremism can cause through terrorist attacks around the world and in our country. With every act of terror, there was a path starting with radicalisation and ending with lives lost and lives changed forever.

At this point, I want to take the opportunity, and I am sure the Minister will join me in doing so, of paying tribute to Figen Murray. She is the mother of Manchester Arena bombing victim Martyn Hett, and she is a campaigner for Martyn’s law. Just today, she has completed her walk down from Manchester to London to meet the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. The dignity and tenacity shown by Figen reminds us all of the painful legacies left by terrorism that are faced by too many people in our country.

That is why Prevent practitioners in Scotland and across the UK need confidence and clarity in Prevent duty guidance, as this guidance should ensure that the right interventions are taking place at the right time to detect, disrupt and defeat extremism wherever it presents itself. These interventions save lives, and we should not understate the crucial role played by Prevent practitioners. We therefore welcome changes in the guidance to improve the quality of Prevent referrals to multi-agency panels in Scotland by giving clearer advice on how to understand and manage risk, including through training and risk assessments and reducing permissive environments as a key theme to tackle the ideological causes of terrorism and broader radicalising influences. These are important steps, as there can never be any excuse for extremist violence anywhere on Britain’s streets or the glorification of any violence linked to any ideological cause. As the extremist threat landscape continues to shift across the UK, there must be full confidence in Prevent’s work in Scotland.

I would be grateful if the Minister could answer the following questions. First, since we debated the Prevent duty guidance regulations for England and Wales, the Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities has published the UK Government’s new definition of extremism—an update from their 2011 definition that the Scottish Government did not adopt. Can the Minister outline what discussions he has had with colleagues in the Scottish Government about adopting the new definition? To what extent can he say whether it was discussed as part of a wider discussion on community cohesion at the inter-ministerial standing committee meeting on 12 March?

Secondly, and still touching on the intergovernmental work, Sir William Shawcross stated in his review his concern about the lack of oversight and support for Prevent delivery in the Scottish education sector. He recommended that the Scottish Government restructure Prevent in line with the wider UK model. Although guidance for higher education institutions in Scotland was published alongside the updated Scottish Prevent duty guidance, it would be helpful if the Minister could explain what feedback was received from the Scottish education sector ahead of publication. What will the next steps be with the Scottish Government regarding Prevent and the Scottish education sector? Furthermore, Sir William said in February this year that Ministers had ignored some of his key recommendations. Has the Minister discussed those concerns with Sir William?

Thirdly, in his review, Sir William challenged the perceived extremist threat landscape in Scotland as identified by Scottish officials and recommended that more frequent assessments be made to enhance understanding among practitioners and officials alike. It was not clear in the UK Government’s response to this recommendation that they would work with the Scottish Government and Police Scotland on increasing the frequency. Can the Minister outline what is being done to improve this vital intelligence-gathering work in Scotland?

To conclude, the Opposition will work constructively with the Government as much as possible on these important matters, and I know that the Minister will take my points and questions in that spirit. All of us on the Opposition Benches want to ensure that the Scottish public and the wider UK are spared the terrors of extremism and shielded from the depravity of terrorist violence. We will work closely with the UK and Scottish Governments to ensure that they succeed in that vital task.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

Let me start with some of the points that the hon. Member for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss) made. I want to make it absolutely clear that incel violence is a form of extremism that draws on an ideology based on the hatred of women. It is completely unacceptable and, sadly, it has led to terrorism not just here but in other parts. It is utterly vile, and it is as serious and pernicious as any other form of terrorism or extremism. It is not quite as prevalent as some other forms—that is to be welcomed—but it can be kept down only if, as she said, we include people in our community and cut off the routes to hatred before they emerge and become passages.

The hon. Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis), as usual, has approached this in a calm and professional manner. It has been a pleasure to work with him on this, as it has been in many other areas. It has been an absolute joy to work with Figen Murray on another area. She has been a remarkable advocate for individuals across our country who have been victims of terror. Seven years ago, almost to the day, she lost her son Martyn. I know we all pay enormous tribute to her for the dignity and professionalism with which she has approached her campaign—one that has led to an awful lot of support, including from the Prime Minister and others. I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his approach to this. Sadly, I cannot offer any updates at this stage. As he knows, we are going through the necessary consultation process. I will bring forward further updates as soon as I can, but that will be in due course, I am afraid.

The hon. Gentleman raised an interesting question about DLUHC’s conversation with the Scottish Government. Forgive me, but I will have to leave the DLUHC Secretary to speak for himself on that, as I am not aware of his conversations. I speak regularly to the Scottish Government on these areas, some of which are reserved matters. As he knows, national security is a reserved matter and therefore the responsibility of the UK Government. That said, there is an awful lot of co-operation not just with the Scottish Government but with other administrations in Scotland, including different councils in different counties.

While we are on this matter, the hon. Gentleman’s paean to Scotland would not have anything to do with his desire to get in campaigning mode, would it?

[Dan Jarvis]

So cynical!

[Tom Tugendhat]

I appreciate what he said, but for somebody who decided to throw himself out of aeroplanes in the south of England rather than join our great and glorious core training in Arbroath—that is just a very strange thing to have done, for who claims to have that unbelievable love for the north! It is a huge privilege to tease the hon. Gentleman—we have been friends for far too long for me to miss the opportunity.

It is always a pleasure to be in Scotland and to see the extraordinary achievements made by the Scottish people, not just in this area but in many others. This is one of those areas where I just want to pick up on something. The hon. Gentleman spoke about the way in which Scotland is dealing with these cases. I want to pay enormous tribute to those who are gathered together in Gartcosh: over 20 different agencies, including everybody from Police Scotland, MI5 to His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, and various environmental agencies. It is absolutely extraordinary to see what they have brought together. It is a real power centre not just for keeping Scotland safe, but for fighting crime and disorder all across the United Kingdom. It is a fantastic resource and really impressive.

If we are giving this paean to Scotland, I should also say that the head of MI5, whose Scottish tones have informed me of some of the worst abuses of humanity in this country, demonstrates the level of commitment that many have. I place on record my extreme gratitude to all MI5 officers, counter-terrorism police and the National Crime Agency, who do a huge amount to keep us safe, alongside the territorial forces, whose work is absolutely essential.

None of that would work unless there was the underpinning, and the underpinning is making sure that society does not breed more extremists. The way we avoid that is by making sure that people are part of our community. The Prevent programme is absolutely essential to making sure that when somebody strays, they are assisted to come back into the fold. This is the work, as was said, of the good shepherd. That is what is so important today: making sure that we keep people in our society and within the fold, able to contribute and able to feel part of a wider whole. That is absolutely essential.

Political Violence and Disruption: Walney Report

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd May 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his statement and for providing advance sight of it. I join him in thanking Lord Walney for his work on this report.

It is important to say from the outset that the Opposition absolutely respect the fundamental freedom to make legitimate, peaceful protest but, when that freedom is abused to intimidate, harass and harm others, safeguards must be put in place to protect the public and our democratic system as a whole. We have seen in recent months that people have been intimidated and have felt threatened due to protest activity.

I therefore agree with the Minister that this is totally unacceptable, and there must be no no-go areas in our country. That is why we have been crystal clear that where there are public order offences, hate crime offences or terrorist offences on marches and demonstrations, they must face the full force of the law. The police have our full support in taking swift and robust action. Furthermore, we have been crystal clear that our police forces need the utmost clarity and support to carry out sometimes complex policing operations around protests.

The Walney report on political violence and disruption deals with some of the most fundamental and sensitive cornerstones of our democratic society. The Opposition will therefore go through and consider the report’s 41 recommendations very carefully, with an approach that our long and proud tradition of the right to peaceful protest must never be undermined by criminal or threatening activity on Britain’s streets.

In the first instance, I will touch on two points discussed in the report before asking the Minister a couple of questions.

The first point relates to whether the police should have more powers to ban protests that are intimidating or disruptive. It is important to note that the police already have powers under the Public Order Act 1986 to place conditions on protests, including amending routes and timings. They also have the power, in cases where there may be serious public disorder, to apply to the Home Secretary to prohibit a particular protest from taking place.

In addition, we have already had several new pieces of public order legislation in recent years that, in some cases, police forces are still getting to grips with. With this in mind, we believe the focus should be on making the existing framework work to make sure that the police can take robust action against those engaging in hateful or criminal behaviour on our streets. That said, we will look at this recommendation in more depth and see what the Government bring forward, because it is vital that everyone in our country feels safe on our streets.

The second point relates to protest organisers paying policing costs. The report’s recommendation raises a series of practical considerations about which organisations would be forced to pay and under what circumstances. Again, we think the focus at the moment should be on making existing legislation work but, as with the rest of the report, we will examine these recommendations in more depth and see what the Government bring forward.

Before asking the Minister a couple of questions, I welcome that the report raises serious concerns about the growing intimidation of Members of this House and local councillors. The Minister knows that, through the Defending Democracy Taskforce, we will continue to support the Government in their important work. He also knows that I stand ready to work closely with him to support his vital work in this area.

The report has been published amid activity across Government to counter extremism, bolster community cohesion and protect our democracy from malign forces, not least the work under way in the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities after the definition of extremism was published in March, and the work of the Defending Democracy Taskforce. I therefore ask the Minister to explain how other relevant Ministers in other relevant Government Departments will be involved in the preparation of the Government’s response to the Walney report.

Lord Walney’s work started in 2021 and, entirely understandably, had to be revised in the aftermath of the 7 October attacks. Although there had to be proper consultation and careful thought applied to such important matters, does the Minister think it would have been helpful if the report had been published sooner? I also point out to the Minister that the counter-extremism strategy is nine years out of date, while the hate crime strategy is now four years out of date. What plans does he have to update them?

To conclude, let me be clear that we on the Labour Benches will work to ensure that these threats are countered. We will work to defend the values of freedom and tolerance that are the cornerstones of our democracy, and we will work to defeat all those who seek to harm and undermine our way of life—in that, we will be unrelenting.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comments and the way he has approached this matter. He has always been extremely pragmatic in areas of national security, and has certainly been a very capable partner with whom I have been able to work. I am grateful for his approach today.

I am particularly grateful that the hon. Gentleman is open to looking at certain areas of this report seriously, such as the question of where costs should lie. Football clubs have to contribute to the cost of policing matches, and Wimbledon has to contribute to the cost of policing tennis, and yet here are organisations costing tens of millions of pounds in policing costs each year, and doing so as though this was their own private fiefdom. It strikes me as a very odd way of behaving. I also welcome the hon. Gentleman’s approach to the Defending Democracy Taskforce and the support he has offered for it today.

Let me just answer the hon. Gentleman’s questions briefly. We will be discussing with DLUHC—as he knows, it is an important participant in this discussion—and other relevant departments, including the Ministry of Justice, how to take these recommendations forward and which to adopt. I am sure he understands that I will update the House in the usual way at the appropriate time. I am also grateful for his support on that.

Cyber-security

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Tuesday 7th May 2024 Westminster Hall

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Bardell. May I say how good it is to see the Minister in his place? I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Preston (Sir Mark Hendrick) on securing this important debate. He is a long-standing and dedicated servant to his constituents and Lancashire more widely; any compliment about Lancashire does not come particularly easily from my side of the Pennines, but that is certainly one that my hon. Friend deserves for his very long-standing service for his constituents.

I pay tribute to the men and women who serve in the National Cyber Force, soon to be based in Samlesbury, and to those who serve across the security and intelligence services and in the cyber-security sector. They fight on the digital frontline day in and day out to detect, disrupt and deter individual and state-sponsored adversaries that threaten our cyber-security.

The cyber threat is constantly mutating and spreading. The latest crime survey for England and Wales shows a staggering 29% increase in computer misuse between 2022 and 2023. Computer misuse disrupts services, obtains information illegally and extorts individuals, meaning that personal information can be published online without consent, entire life savings can be lost due to fraud, and individuals, including children, can be blackmailed. The Government need to be increasingly ruthless in their approach to countering those threats and legislate for the challenges of today, not those of yesterday. Doing so will give cyber-security professionals the means to retain the advantage over those who seek to harm us and protect more people and organisations from cyber-crime.

Therefore, as the right hon. Member for Midlothian (Owen Thompson) rightly said, the Computer Misuse Act needs updating to reflect the challenges of the cyber age, not those of the Ceefax age. Accelerating technological change means that outdated legislation is struggling to catch up with cyber-threats posed by the likes of artificial intelligence. That is why, on this side of the House, we have already proposed criminalising the programming of chatbots that radicalise and spread terrorist material. We also welcome the Government’s announcement last month of the criminalisation, through the Criminal Justice Bill, of the creation of sexually explicit deepfakes. Outdated legislation is at best restrictive and at worst punitive for cyber-security professionals in the UK who conduct ethical hacking to expose system vulnerabilities and protect us from harmful cyber-attacks.

The National Cyber Security Centre, which is home to exceptional men and women fighting cyber-crime, has said that ethical hacking reports by individual researchers provide valuable information that organisations can use to improve the security of their systems. That is why the Opposition tabled an amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill that would reform the CMA by introducing a statutory defence for cyber-security researchers and professionals involved in ethical hacking.

Our amendment comes after the Chancellor’s commitment to implement all of Sir Patrick Vallance’s recommendations on the regulation of emerging digital technologies published alongside last spring’s Budget, which included the introduction of a statutory defence. If this Government do not deliver, the next one should. Until that happens, the legislative lag will have consequences. Half of UK businesses and 32% of charities suffered a cyber-breach or attack in the last year alone. Breaches due to vulnerabilities in cyber-security drive some of the most pernicious types of criminality. According to the accounting firm BDO, fraud doubled in 2023.

Furthermore, the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy warned in December that the Government could face a catastrophic ransomware attack at any moment. The sobering reality is that such attacks are already happening on the UK’s critical national infrastructure. Just today, it was reported that in response to a ransom not being paid, personal information illegally obtained by a ransomware attack on NHS Dumfries and Galloway has been published on the dark web—a truly despicable act that accompanies another deeply concerning development today: a hack into the Ministry of Defence’s payroll records by a malign actor.

Those are only two of the most recent examples, and they show that the threat landscape has never been more dangerous. However, progress on reforming the CMA has been buffering for three years since the Government first announced their review of the legislation. Despite two public consultations, a Home Office industry working group and several public commitments, the Government have not yet made progress and, as the Minister will know, we are fast running out of parliamentary time. Though time is in short supply, there is consensus on acting in the national interest to update the CMA, and the Opposition are keen to play our part.

I would be grateful if the Minister would answer the following questions. He will know that they are meant in the constructive spirit in which we always seek to engage on these important matters. First, will he give an assurance that the proposed legislation, as outlined in the Government’s response to the CMA consultation, will be introduced in this Parliament?

Progress on legislation requires political leadership. However, the JCNSS report on ransomware said that the leadership by a former Home Secretary did not treat it as a priority. The Minister will remember that I wrote to him in January about this matter and others identified in the JCNSS report. Can he give a further assurance that his Department and other Departments are now prioritising ransomware by confirming that they will finally respond to the consultation on unauthorised access to online accounts and personal data, which was published in September 2022?

On public sector payments to ransomware, the Deputy Prime Minister responded to me at Cabinet Office questions on 25 April by saying that that “is not something” that he would “rule out totally”. However, the Security Minister’s written answer to me on the same question on the same day was much more resolute about the policy not to pay ransoms.

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

Listen to me.

[Dan Jarvis]

I am listening to the Minister. I do not know whether the Deputy Prime Minister is; that is possibly the problem.

It would be really helpful if the Minister would say whether a new approach to the public sector paying ransoms will be included in any update to the CMA. These assurances and clarifications matter, as the Home Office is part of a cross-Government response to countering cyber-threats, joining the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, the MOD, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Cabinet Office in driving policy to detect, disrupt and deter cyber-criminality.

As the Minister will know, the fulcrum of such activity is the National Security Council, but he will also know that, while it has a sub-committee for economic security, there is not a dedicated equivalent for cyber-security. Has consideration been given to the creation of a dedicated sub-committee of the NSC for policy responses to intermediate and long-term cyber challenges?

Another long-term challenge, which the Minister will be familiar with, is the retention of our best and brightest in fighting cyber-crime, both in the security and intelligence services and in the cyber-security sector. Do our modern-day Alan Turings, who play a vital role in keeping our country safe, feel that the most innovative and effective work can happen in the UK under current cyber-security legislation? The answer, sadly, is likely to be no: 60% of respondents to a recent cyber-ops survey said that the CMA is a barrier to their work in threat intelligence and vulnerability research, and 16,850 cyber-defenders—the equivalent of two GCHQs—are estimated to have been lost due to outdated cyber-security laws. The Minister knows that criminals profit the most from poor retention and recruitment, so has he considered how changes to the CMA could unlock the cyber-security sector’s huge potential to protect our country’s cyber-space better?

This debate has not just been about protecting our cyber-space through effective legislation; it has been about the principle of legislation retaining the advantage over malign actors intent on harming us. I said at the start of my speech that there are exceptional men and women working to defend our cyber-security, who are very much at the cutting edge of efforts to detect, disrupt and deter myriad threats. As legislators providing the legal framework for that crucial work, we must now all play our part.

Draft National Crime Agency (Directed Tasking) Order 2023

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Wednesday 24th April 2024 General Committees

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

It is a particular pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Twigg. I thank the Minister for his remarks.

As the Minister set out, the order amends the Crime and Courts Act 2013 and the Criminal Justice Act 1987. Doing so will provide the director general of the National Crime Agency with the power to direct the Serious Fraud Office to perform specified tasks in investigating financial crime. As the Minister knows, the Opposition will always work with the Government on countering serious and organised crime. We therefore support the order, because it is crucial that there is a joined-up response across our law enforcement agencies to fight serious and organised crime, including fraud.

Fraud is the single largest crime type in the UK. The crime survey for England and Wales estimates that 40% of crimes against individuals are frauds. Britain should be a hostile environment for all types of serious and organised crime, with an approach from our police and law enforcement agencies that is ruthlessly relentless in countering what constitutes some of the most pernicious criminal activity. Therefore, although I will endeavour to be brief, I want to make a few points and ask some questions about the context and detail of the order, and I would be grateful if the Minister responded to them, either when he rises to his feet or by letter.

Before I do so, I pay tribute to all those in the NCA, the SFO, and all our police and law enforcement agencies who fight serious and organised crime. The nature of their work means that they serve in the shadows, and some of their work, for instance fighting financial crime, may perhaps be a little less gritty than some of their colleagues’, but it is no less important. The old adage “follow the money” continues to be a sound one. After meeting some of them recently, my huge respect for them has only grown. They do not always get the recognition that they deserve, and I am sure the Minister and the entire Committee will join me in thanking them for their service.

It is important to note that the order originates from the Government’s serious and organised crime strategy published in December. That document, which provides important direction in countering some of the worst crime in the country, should have the soundest of foundations. However, it states that the estimated financial cost of serious and organised crime to the UK is £47 billion, a figure the Minister mentioned earlier—interestingly, I think he said “at least £47 billion”. By my maths—I am happy to be corrected if I have got this wrong—£47 billion is an inflation-adjusted figure from the £37 billion in the 2015 report. With fraud alone recorded to have doubled in 2023, according to the accounting firm BDO, the £47 billion figure cannot properly reflect the reality of serious and organised crime now, and therefore cannot properly inform the response required from Government to disrupt and defeat it.

I would be grateful if the Minister gave us his assessment of the very latest actual cost of serious and organised crime to the UK. If he has a good memory, he might remember that he said in his answer to my written question on 23 January that the Home Office would publish an updated figure. On 8 February, the Minister for Legal Migration responded to my follow-up written question on this matter, saying that a research report on the cost of serious and organised crime would not be published until 2025. I have to say, that is not good enough. Why cannot that important information be published sooner? Why could it not have been calculated in time to be included in the serious and organised crime strategy that was published back in December?

On the arrangements that will support the order, I draw the Minister’s attention to two issues. The first lies with a specific type of direction the NCA will give the SFO to carry out. The complex nature of fraud and financial crime cases means that they can be connected to other ongoing investigations into other aspects of serious and organised crime that could be the responsibility of the NCA, but not of the SFO. It is entirely understandable, and indeed necessary, that the Minister will not want to say anything that would compromise capability, but it might be helpful to the Committee if he could say something about the thresholds that need to be met before the NCA gives direction to the SFO to conduct specified tasks. Does he also have an estimate, even if it is approximate, of how many direct orders the NCA could issue over the next 12 months?

The order specifies that the NCA will meet the costs of the SFO’s completing a specified task. However, there are still questions about how the SFO will deliver, because it is not yet clear that it will have sufficient resources such as staff, offices, payroll, equipment and so on. Can the Minister give an assurance that the SFO will have sufficient resources to deliver on what is being asked of it by the NCA? If not, what work has taken or is taking place with the Attorney General’s Office to ensure that it can? Also, if the cost of an NCA-directed task carried out by the SFO exceeds the payment made by the NCA, who will pay the difference?

The Opposition welcome the strengthening of the close working relationship that already exists between the NCA and the SFO, and we support the order. However, we seek assurances from the Minister that the right infrastructure is in place to facilitate the new working arrangements between the NCA and the SFO. I am sure the Minister will continue to appreciate the constructive spirit of our remarks in these Committees as we work together in the national interest on these important matters.

Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Wednesday 24th April 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his statement and I thank civil servants at the Home Office for briefing me in advance of the debate.

Today’s proscription order for the Terrorgram collective, also known as just Terrorgram, is brought about by the exceptional men and women who serve in our intelligence and security services, in government and in our police. They perform a vital public service, and I thank them for it. We on the Opposition Benches will always work with the Government on these crucial matters of national security in order to stop the malign forces that seek to harm us, divide us or undermine our way of life.

Let me say at the outset that the Opposition support the proscription of Terrorgram as a terrorist organisation. Terrorgram takes the form of an online network of neo-fascist terrorists, who produce and share violent material that incites violent, extreme right-wing activity here in the UK and abroad. Even after our nation’s existential fight and victory over fascists almost 80 years ago, their threat to our security and our way of life has never completely gone away. We must always defeat fascism wherever we find it. That is why it is important that the order before us will amend schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000 to add Terrorgram to the list of proscribed organisations. Doing so will make it a criminal offence to engage with the Terrorgram group, to promote support for it or to display its logo.

Terrorgram’s name derives from it being a group on the encrypted messaging platform Telegram, so we very much welcome the innovative approach to proscription outlined by the Minister. Even though Terrorgram is without a physical presence in the UK, its online presence, which glorifies terrorist acts and shares bomb-making materials, is a threat to our national security. The Minister cited a number of examples. I will refer to the attack in Slovakia in 2022, where the threat posed by Terrorgram became a deadly and tragic reality, when a 19-year-old assailant killed two people in an LGBT nightclub. He later took his own life but left a manifesto that thanked Terrorgram for

“building the future of the white revolution one publication at a time”.

We approve of the Government’s innovative action that will lead to the rightful proscription of Terrorgram. Within legal frameworks, there must be an approach that is relentless, agile and cunning to defeat all terrorist groups. Regardless of whatever warped ideology they peddle, violent extremists across the spectrum continue to use online platforms to radicalise their support base and organise their activities. We must prepare to proscribe more online groups, if that is necessary.

These online groups—online cesspits—regularly feature violent misogyny, an abhorrent trait that is a common feature in all terrorist ideologies, including extreme right-wing terrorism. As the Minister will know very well, the Prevent programme currently does not recognise violent misogyny and incel ideology as extremist ideologies. Will the Minister provide an assurance that the appropriate frameworks are in place to bridge the gap between violent misogyny and recognised extremist ideologies?

Today’s proscription of Terrorgram comes after the Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities published the Government’s definition of extremism in March. Although long overdue, we believe this definition of extremism is welcome and will lead us towards better countering some of the causes of terrorist threats to our country. As the Minister would acknowledge, the new definition was always intended to be the beginning of a process to better counter extremism, not the process in its entirety. What progress has been made between the Home Office and the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities on publishing a list of organisations designated as extremist?

Terrorgram’s corrosive influence must also be viewed in the wider context of rising hate crime across the UK.

Since 2018, police forces in England and Wales have recorded increases in reports in four out of the five hate crime strands—race, sexual orientation, disability and transgender. Furthermore, since 7 October, the Community Security Trust has recorded a 147% increase in antisemitic incidents compared with 2022, and Tell MAMA has recorded a 335% increase in anti-Muslim hate cases in the past four months alone.

The Minister will know that the last hate crime action plan was published eight years ago. He knows more than others that proscription is an incredibly important means to counter extremist activity, but it is not the only means. A new hate crime action plan could be part of the arsenal to disrupt and defeat violent extremism. Can the Minister say what plans the Home Office has to publish an updated one?

To conclude, proscribing Terrorgram is the right thing to do for our national security. It was no longer tolerable or safe for the poison of Terrorgram’s violent ideology and terrorist material to be in reach of malign actors in our country. It had to be treated with the strongest and most robust antidote: proscription. We welcome that the UK is the first country to do so. No Government can ever relent in their determination to ensure that, as a country, we are always one step ahead of those who seek to harm us, to divide us or to undermine our way of life. This House must always stand united in protecting the public whom we strive to serve and protect. That is why we strongly support this proscription order.

Oral Answers to Questions

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Monday 15th April 2024 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

The Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner said last year that our policing and security services were technologically vulnerable because of their use of Chinese-made equipment, including CCTV, drones and body cameras. Can the Minister say whether the digital asbestos of Chinese-made technology is still used in our policing and security infrastructure—yes or no?

[Tom Tugendhat]

My friend the hon. Member will know well that the work of Fraser Sampson before he retired or ended his mandate last year has been fantastically important to many of us in making sure “digital asbestos” —I approve of the term—is got out of our institutions. This is something that is ongoing. It has got out of the most secure sites already, but there are other areas where there is work to do, because an awful lot of sites bought technology that would now be problematic. It is not just static sites; there is potential that some electric vehicles could be easily turned into mobile intelligence-gathering platforms by hostile states, so it is about looking not simply at the past, but at the future.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment)Bill [Lords]

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 25th March 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 2—Requirement for the Secretary of State to publish an annual report on technology-enabled serious and organised crime and technology-enabled threats to national security—

“After section 234 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, insert—

“234A Requirement for the Secretary of State to publish an annual report on technology-enabled serious and organised crime and technology-enabled threats to national security

(1) The Secretary of State must publish a report on technology-assisted crime insofar as it relates to measures set out in this Act and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.

(2) The report must be published within one year of the passing of the Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Act 2024, and annually thereafter.””

This new clause would ensure the Secretary of State publishes an annual report on technology-enabled serious and organised crime and technology-enabled threats to national security insofar as it relates to measures set out in this Act and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.

New clause 3—Prevention of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment—

“(1) The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is amended as follows.

(2) Before section 260 (and the cross-heading before that section), insert—

“Prevention of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 259A Prevention of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

No public authority may take any action, whether retention, examination, disclosure, handing over to any overseas authority or any other action authorised by this or any other enactment, in relation to material obtained in accordance with the provisions of this Act if the public authority knows or believes that action—

(a) would result in torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or

(b) presents a real risk of resulting in torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.””

New clause 4—Members of Parliament: interception and examination of communications and equipment interference—

“(1) The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 26 (targeted interception warrants and targeted examination warrants: Members of Parliament etc.), after subsection (2), insert—

“(2A) The Secretary of State may not issue the warrant if it relates to communications sent by, or intended for, a member of the House of Commons.”

(3) In section 111 (targeted equipment interference warrants: Members of Parliament etc.), after subsection (7), insert—

“(7A) A warrant may not be issued under this section if it relates to—

(a) communications sent by, or intended for, a member of the House of Commons, or

(b) a member of the House of Commons’s private information.””

This new clause would remove the ability of the Secretary of State to authorise the interception of the communications of, or the obtaining of communications intended for, or private information belonging to, Members of Parliament.

New clause 5—Interception notification for Members of Parliament etc.—

“After section 26 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (Members of Parliament etc.) insert—

“26A Interception notification for Members of Parliament etc.

(1) Upon completion of conduct authorised by a warrant under section 26, or the cancellation of a warrant issued under that section, a Judicial Commissioner must notify the subject of the warrant, in writing, of—

(a) the conduct that has taken place, and

(b) the provisions under which the conduct has taken place.

(2) The notification under subsection (1) must be sent within thirty days of the completion of the conduct or cancellation of the warrant.

(3) A Judicial Commissioner may postpone the notification under subsection (1) beyond the time limit under subsection (2) if the Judicial Commissioner assesses that notification may defeat the purposes of an ongoing serious crime or national security investigation relating to the subject of the warrant.

(4) A Judicial Commissioner must consult the person who applied for the warrant in order to fulfil an assessment under subsection (3).””

This new clause would require members of a relevant legislature who are targets of interception to be notified after the fact, as long as it does not compromise any ongoing investigation.

Amendment 7, page 3, line 9, leave out clause 2.

Amendment 8, in clause 2, page 3, line 17, leave out “, or only a low,”.

Amendment 24, page 3, line 18, at end insert—

“(1A) This section does not apply to a bulk personal dataset unless it has been published in accordance with the Data Protection Act 2018.”.

This probing amendment would mean that individual and category authorisations for bulk personal datasets would not apply to bulk personal datasets unless they had been published in accordance with General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) set out in the Data Protection Act 2018.

Amendment 9, page 3, line 34, at end insert—

“(4) By way of example, bulk datasets of images obtained by CCTV and bulk datasets of Facebook posts are not to be considered datasets where the individuals to whom the data relates could have no, or only a low, reasonable expectation of privacy.”.

This is a probing amendment regarding the scope of “low or no reasonable expectation of privacy”.

Amendment 10, page 5, line 7, leave out “any dataset that falls” and insert “all datasets that fall”.

This amendment would clarify that all the datasets covered by a category authorisation must be “low or no privacy” and not just some of them.

Amendment 11, page 11, line 2, at end insert—

“226DZA Notification and review of bulk personal datasets retained under category authorisations

(1) This section applies where a category authorisation has been approved by a Judicial Commissioner under section 226BB.

(2) The head of an intelligence service, or a person acting on their behalf, must notify the Judicial Commissioner within 28 days of a bulk personal dataset being retained or retained and examined under the category authorisation.

(3) The notification under subsection (2) must include a description of the dataset and the data it includes, the purpose for which it is being used and the number of individuals whose data is contained in the dataset.

(4) The Judicial Commissioner, on reviewing any notifications received under subsection (2), must cancel the category authorisation if the Commissioner considers that section 226A no longer applies to any dataset that falls within the category of datasets described in the authorisation.

(5) The Judicial Commissioner, on reviewing any notifications received under subsection (2), must cancel the relevant individual authorisation if the Commissioner considers that the condition in section 226B(4) is not met in relation to that bulk personal dataset.”

This amendment would provide for ex-post facto judicial oversight of the use of category authorisations, including the conditions for individual authorisations made under them.

Amendment 13, in clause 12, page 34, leave out lines 5 and 6 and insert—

“(e) where the communications data has been made publicly or commercially available by the telecommunications operator or postal operator”.

This amendment would align the new provisions with existing Communication Data Codes of Practice.

Amendment 12, page 34, leave out lines 5 and 6.

This amendment would remove one of the example cases where a relevant person has lawful authority to obtain communications data from a telecommunications operator or postal operator, being where the data has been “published”.

Government amendments 3 to 6.

Amendment 14, page 36, line 2, leave out clause 15.

Amendment 15, to clause 15, page 36, line 35, at end insert—

“(c) the Investigatory Powers Commissioner agrees with the judgment of the officer made in accordance with paragraph (b)”.

This amendment would ensure that all use of new powers in relation to Internet Connection Records was subject to oversight by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.

Amendment 16, page 38, line 11, leave out clause 18.

Amendment 17, page 44, line 39, leave out clause 21.

Amendment 18, in clause 21, page 45, line 3, at the beginning insert “Subject to subsection (1A),”.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 19.

Amendment 19, page 45, line 6, at end insert—

“(1A) The Secretary of State may not give a relevant operator a notice under this section unless the notice has been approved by a Judicial Commissioner.

(1B) In deciding whether to approve a notice under this section, a Judicial Commissioner must review the conclusions of the Secretary of State as to the matters referred to in subsections (5) and (6)”.

This amendment would introduce judicial oversight of new powers to issue communications providers with notices requiring them to notify the Secretary of State of relevant changes to the service.

Amendment 25, page 47, line 28, leave out clause 22.

This amendment is consequential on NC4.

Amendment 20, in clause 22, page 48, line 13, leave out

“has the necessary operational awareness to decide whether”

and insert

“is either required in their routine duties to issue warrants under section 19 or section 102 or has the necessary operational experience”.

This amendment would permit the Prime Minister to nominate a Secretary of State to act for the Prime Minister under this section if they are required in their routine duties to issue warrants under section 19 or section 102 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 or if they have the necessary operational experience.

Amendment 21, page 48, line 14, at end insert—

“(2DA) The Prime Minister must be notified of the individual’s decision as soon as it is reasonably practicable to do so.”.

This amendment would require the Prime Minister to be notified of the decision of the designated Secretary of State as soon as is reasonably practicable.

Amendment 27, page 48, line 21, at end insert—

“(2G) The Prime Minister may not give approval under this section unless it has been authorised by a judge of the Supreme Court.”.

This amendment would require the authorisation of a judge of the Supreme Court before the Prime Minister could approve the interception of the communications of a Member of Parliament.

Amendment 26, page 48, line 22, leave out clause 23.

This amendment is consequential on NC4.

Amendment 22, in clause 23, page 49, line 13, leave out

“has the necessary operational awareness to decide whether”

and insert

“is required in their routine duties to issue warrants under section 19 or section 102 or has the necessary operational experience”.

This amendment would permit the Prime Minister to nominate a Secretary of State to act for the Prime Minister under this section if they are required in their routine duties to issue warrants under section 19 or section 102 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 or if they have the necessary operational experience.

Amendment 23, page 49, line 14, at end insert—

“(7DA) The Prime Minister must be notified of the individual’s decision as soon as it is reasonably practicable to do so.”.

This amendment would require the Prime Minister to be notified of the decision of the designated Secretary of State as soon as is reasonably practicable.

Amendment 28, page 49, line 18, at end insert—

“(7F) The Prime Minister may not give approval under this section unless it has been authorised by a judge of the Supreme Court.”.

This amendment would require the authorisation of a judge of the Supreme Court before the Prime Minister could approve the obtaining of communications intended for, or private information belonging to, a Member of Parliament.

[Dan Jarvis]

It is a privilege to open debate on Report of this important Bill. At the outset, it is worth reiterating that Labour supports the Bill, which updates aspects of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. That is because it is imperative that legal frameworks are updated to ensure that our police and security services keep up with changes to communications technology. Doing so ensures that they are always one step ahead of criminals and malign forces who seek to harm us and undermine our national security.

I hope the Minister, and all Members who were present in Committee, agree with me that we had a constructive debate, testing the Bill’s proportionality and robustness. Some matters relating to third-party bulk personal datasets and the oversight process for the addition of new BPDs to existing category authorisations have been largely resolved to the satisfaction of Labour Members, but other important matters still need to be addressed. I will speak first about the new clauses and amendments that stand in my name, before dealing with some of those tabled by other Members.

New clause 1 seeks to ensure that the Secretary of State publishes an annual report on the engagement between the Prime Minister and the Intelligence and Security Committee regarding the investigatory powers regime. A very similar amendment was tabled in Committee, but was withdrawn after a lengthy debate on the ISC oversight arrangements did not make any meaningful progress despite helpful contributions from my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) and the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes). We tabled this new clause because the Government must recognise that the ISC has a vital role to play in the democratic oversight of some of the most powerful measures that the state has at its disposal to keep us safe, to intercept communications and to interfere with equipment.

The ISC is and should be the only Committee of Parliament that can appropriately hold a Prime Minister to account on investigatory powers. There must be accountability at the highest level, and the Prime Minister is no exception. However, many Members, not least members of the ISC, know that this important mechanism is not just broken but has stopped working altogether. Not since 2014 has a Prime Minister appeared before the Committee, but, when asked about successive Prime Ministers’ lack of appearance, the Minister said that such decisions were above his pay grade. That might well be true, at least for now, so if the Minister cannot commit himself to reinstating the convention of Prime Ministers’ appearing before the Committee, the new clause would, at the very minimum, ensure that this new convention of non-attendance is reviewed annually, and scrutinised by this House and the other place. I therefore give notice of our intention to push the new clause to a vote.

[Dame Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that it is not above the Minister’s pay grade to be able to confirm that the conventions and arrangements that give the ISC a particular constitutional place in the way our system works ought to operate, even if they have not done so for the last 10 years? Does he, like me, look forward to being able to hear the Minister—rather than dismissing this important concern about the dereliction of a constitutional duty—give us an assurance that this will be the case in the future?

[Dan Jarvis]

My hon. Friend has made an important point, and one with which I suspect the overwhelming majority of Members would agree.

[Sir David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

I was the Minister who took through the House the Bill that created the ISC. At the time, the intention was that it would evolve to become a very powerful Committee, but it did not absolve the entire House from some responsibility. Two elements are involved here. One has just been mentioned by the hon. Gentleman—the Prime Minister’s appearance before the Committee—and the other is minimal redaction of the reports that the Committee creates. One of the problems we have encountered in recent years is excessive redaction of those reports. Has the hon. Gentleman any views on that?

[Dan Jarvis]

The right hon. Gentleman has made two important points, both of which I agree with, about redaction and about the attendance of the Prime Minister. I do not think it unreasonable to expect that once a year the Prime Minister should seek to meet what is a very important cross-party Committee of this House. I should be happy to give way to the Minister should he wish to add his own views on this matter, but given the basis of my sense of where the House is and given previous debates, I think most Members will agree that it is not unreasonable to ask the Prime Minister to turn up once a year.

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman’s point is made more potent by the fact that the matters the ISC considers are not typically—in fact, not at all—partisan. It operates on a non-partisan basis, although of course its members are drawn from both sides of the House, and the material that it studies is not seen through a party-political prism in any way; this Minister has engaged in sensible and meaningful discussion with members of the ISC in exactly that spirit during the passage of this legislation. Similarly, a meeting with the Prime Minister would be conducted in a way to which I think no Prime Minister could reasonably object .

[Dan Jarvis]

The right hon. Gentleman speaks about these matters with a great deal of authority, not just as a member of the Committee but as a former Security Minister, and I think he has described the situation very well. I hope the Prime Minister is listening; I hope the Prime Minister accepts what I consider to be the reasonable and constructive invitation that has just been extended to him by the right hon. Gentleman; and I hope the Prime Minister does take the opportunity in the near future to sit down with the ISC and discuss what are, after all, very important matters.

New clause 2 would ensure that an annual report was published on measures in the Bill, and in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, to defeat and disrupt technology-enabled serious organised crime and technology-enabled threats to our national security. We tabled the new clause because we must ensure that the law is always one step ahead of those who seek to harm us. The police and the security services are not best able to protect us today with the laws to counter the threats of yesterday, which is why we support this Bill to update the 2016 Act, which is now eight years old, but there is an opportunity to go further. The annual report proposed in the new clause would help to ensure that any changes required to primary legislation relating to investigatory powers were identified and implemented as quickly as possible. That would strengthen our legislative framework on national security, and weaken the capability and resolve of criminals and our adversaries.

I think that this is a genuine opportunity for the Government to work better with, and to constructively challenge, telecommunications operators and the wider communications technology industry on the requirements to use investigatory powers—a process that would be separate from the new notices regime included in part 4. A statutory requirement to produce an annual report on investigatory powers to counter threats to our security and safety would strengthen national security, as well as strengthening the oversight and safeguarding of measures to keep us safe. Those are two principles that guide this Bill and the 2016 Act, and that is why we will seek to push the new clause to a vote later this evening.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I hope that this evening will end with a measure of agreement. On the subject of the tech companies, I understand from information I have received that Apple, techUK, the Information Technology Industry Council and the Computer & Communications Industry Association have expressed concerns. Is the shadow Minister aware of their concerns and what this means for their ability to administrate and do their work, and does he agree that what we have tonight is a consensus that protects not just them but ordinary members of society?

[Dan Jarvis]

I know that the hon. Member takes these matters incredibly seriously, and he has raised an important point. To be absolutely fair to the Minister and to his Department, I know that this is a matter that the Government have considered very carefully, and that there has been an extensive process of consultation with a range of tech companies—I have met a number of them myself—but I think it only fair to conclude that while of course there are important contributions to be made by tech companies to this debate, these are ultimately matters for the Government and the House to determine. Having said that, new clause 2 would provide a helpful and constructive mechanism for the Government, and we have tabled it in a genuine attempt to be helpful and to monitor very closely the significant challenges that our national security faces from serious and organised crime as a consequence of rapid developments in technology.

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for the spirit in which he has addressed this issue, and he deserves a proper response. There is a valid concern that this is a process of engagement with tech companies, and there needs to be a partnership. I will be frank with him: I do not support new clause 2, for the very simple reason that the way in which this interaction takes place has evolved a lot, even in the two years that I have been in post. I suspect that during the four or five years that this House will supervise the Bill, under the next Government and in the five years beyond that, the interaction will evolve again.

What concerns me is that we could write into law a system of oversight and regulation that does not properly address the way in which tech companies are involved in this area. Therefore, the best answer is to have a more iterative process, which I have no doubt the fantastic civil servants with whom I have the privilege to work will adapt. Whoever takes over from me in 20 or 30 years’ time will no doubt want to iterate that as well.

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to the Minister for clarification on the response to new clause 2. He understands that we have tabled it because we genuinely think that it is a mechanism that—let us be honest about it—would not be particularly onerous for the Government, and would be helpful in focusing minds across Government. I completely agree with the point he made about his civil servants, who have been excellent throughout the passage of the Bill. We just happen to differ on this issue, because the Opposition think that the new clause would provide a useful forum for the Government to consider the challenges. He is absolutely right about the rapid evolution of technology, and we think it would be no bad thing to condense Government thinking into a report that would be issued on an annual basis.

[Sir David Davis]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way again. May I address the iterative issue that the Minister and he both raised? It is not just the development of technology that is important here; it is also about the development of other countries’ security systems. For example, the Germans are putting in place laws that require end-to-end encryption—the very thing that we were worried about—so we will have to manoeuvre over the course of the coming years to make sure that what we do fits not just with the technology companies, but with what our allies are doing.

[Dan Jarvis]

That is a very important point, and I completely agree. These are complex and difficult matters of public policy, and I completely understand that none of this is easy from the Minister’s perspective. However, if the right hon. Gentleman does not mind my saying so, his point strengthens the case for new clause 2, because we think it would provide a useful mechanism for the Government to track the development of these important matters, but also provide a mechanism for Members of this House to hold the Government to account on them. I am very grateful for the points he has made.

Before turning to amendment 24 on BPDs, which stands in my name, I would be very grateful if the Minister could say whether any progress has been made on arrangements to notify the Investigatory Powers Commissioner when adding new BPDs to existing category authorisations. It might not be in the Bill, but we think that even a reference to it in the IPC’s annual inspection would be helpful progress on this matter. The Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham and I have discussed that, and I would be grateful if the Minister could said something about it.

I acknowledge the amendments on BPDs that were tabled by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald). Both of our parties have concerns about the definition of “low or no expectation of privacy” for BPDs, which we debated in a pretty constructive fashion on Second Reading and in Committee. However, Labour does not oppose the concept of “low or no expectation of privacy” for BPDs, which is why we will not support amendment 7, which was tabled by the SNP spokesman. Instead, amendment 24, which stands in my name, seeks further clarification on how “low or no expectation of privacy” will be applied to BPDs, with the aim that the parameters must be as clear as possible for the House to understand.

In Committee, the Minister used the Panama papers as an example of leaked and widely republished material being defined as a BPD with a low or no expectation of privacy. I understand why the Minister chose to use that example, but most other leaked documents containing personal information do not attract anywhere near the same level of media attention. Again, I would be grateful if the Minister took this opportunity to provide another example of information from a leak without widescale press coverage that would be suitable for the designation of a bulk personal data set with a low or no expectation of privacy.

[Tom Tugendhat]

As always, the hon. Gentleman is quite right to highlight the areas I touched on. The important thing about the Panama papers was that they changed. They would have enjoyed a high level of privacy, but with republication they became “low/no”. It would not be right to say that any leaked document enjoys “low/no”, but the law should reflect the reality of the data that is currently being held. When data goes from being secret to being effectively public, it would be absurd to hold the intelligence services to a different standard from that which would apply to any of us, who would be able to access it on a website.

[Dan Jarvis]

That is a very useful clarification, and I thank the Minister for it.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

I accept what the Minister has just said, but where is the threshold for publicity? As he said, the Panama papers were widely distributed in the public domain, but somebody’s Facebook feed might be put into the public domain. If it gets into the national newspapers and on the internet, or it is shared by a certain number of people, do we then determine that it is in the public domain? We need to be very careful about this.

[Dan Jarvis]

My right hon. Friend is undoubtedly right: we do need to be very careful. In the end, the Government have to take a view about where they draw the line. These are very difficult decisions that have to be made. We had really useful and constructive debates in Committee about where the line should be drawn, but the issue will no doubt continue to be debated in the future.

Before I draw my remarks to a close, I will briefly speak to other amendments on the Order Paper, including those tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham, other members of the ISC, and the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Sir David Davis). We support amendment 23, which stands in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham. It is very similar to the amendments we proposed in Committee regarding the Prime Minister’s delegation to a Secretary of State to issue a warrant to interfere with equipment relating to a Member. The amendment sets out that the Prime Minister must be informed of a decision taken by a designated Secretary of State on their behalf as soon as the circumstances that prevented the Prime Minister from approving a warrant in the first place have passed.

We believe that the Prime Minister’s overall involvement in those warrants must be retained, even if it is retrospective in designated cases, so it was a positive step that the Minister said he would look into including such a provision in the statutory guidance, in response to the very sensible points made by the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings. However, we believe this does not go far enough, when this important notification arrangement should be on the face of the Bill.

This House should consider as many scenarios as possible when it comes to arrangements for prime ministerial power delegation on investigatory powers, even if scenarios of Cabinet members desperately trying to undermine the Prime Minister by any means possible perhaps belong more appropriately in “House of Cards” or “The Thick of It”. [Interruption.] I am sure that Conservative Members would have no idea about those kinds of activities; I am happy to take their word for that. But these are important matters, and we must seek to legislate carefully. The amendments tabled by the ISC are thoughtful and constructive, and I hope that, even at this late stage, the Government will consider accepting them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

I rise to confirm that we on these Benches support the Third Reading of this Bill. It is the first duty of every Government to keep their people safe. It is right that we take the opportunity to pay tribute to the exceptional men and women who serve in our police and security services, often in the shadows and often without recognition, working tirelessly to keep our country safe. We owe them all a debt of gratitude. We also owe it to them, as Members of this House, to provide them with the powers they need to discharge their duties. The Bill does that, in part, because it has been the product of constructive cross-party efforts both in this House and in the other place.

I wish to take the opportunity to thank the Minister for his work on the Bill. I wish him well with future endeavours. I also thank the SNP and all those Members who have contributed to this process, particularly those members of the ISC, who have made an outstanding contribution to proceedings.

On behalf of the whole House, I express our thanks to the civil servants working in the Home Office who have done an exceptional job, as have the Clerks of this House, who have worked very hard on what is after all a technical Bill.

It is always welcome when collegiate, cross-party working takes place in this House. I am very grateful that, on this occasion, we have been able to work together on getting this important Bill right.

Question put, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Committee stage & Report stage
Thursday 7th March 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Tom Tugendhat]

As always, I welcome my right hon. Friend’s contribution. That is covered in many areas in the letter I wrote to him.

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

In an earlier response to comments by the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings, the Minister helpfully mentioned the letter that I think has been sent to the right hon. Member and possibly other members of the Committee. Can the Minister confirm that that letter will also be sent to the Opposition?

[Tom Tugendhat]

To be absolutely clear, the letter was in response to my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings, so it was sent to him, it was copied to the secretariat of the ISC and it is in the Bill pack. The hon. Member for Barnsley Central therefore has access to it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

The notice review mechanism is an important safeguard. If operators are dissatisfied with a notice that they are given, or with any part of it, they have a statutory right to refer it to the Secretary of State for a review. Clause 18 is essential to ensure that operators do not make any technical changes during the review period that would have a negative impact on existing lawful access capabilities.

Operators will not be required to make changes to specifically comply with the notice. However, they will be required to maintain the status quo. If there was lawful access at the point at which a notice was given, access to data must be maintained by the operator while the notice is being comprehensively reviewed. This will ensure that law enforcement and intelligence agencies continue to have access to vital data during that period in order to keep people safe.

To be clear, companies can continue to make technical changes or roll out new services during the review period, so long as lawful access remains unaffected. The status quo will apply only to services or systems specified within the notice; anything outside the scope of the notice will be unaffected. If, at the conclusion of a review, the Secretary of State confirms the effect or varies the notice, maintaining the status quo will be vital to ensure that law enforcement and intelligence communities do not lose access to data during the review period that they would otherwise have been able lawfully to obtain. In the Lords, the Government amended the Bill to introduce a timeline for the review of a notice.

[Dan Jarvis]

I will be very brief. I am grateful for the Minister’s remarks, but I want to raise the concerns of some telecommunications operators and of organisations representing the sector about clauses 18 and 19. These include a view that the role of the proposed new notices regime would hinder and even veto product development.

I know that the Minister and his Department have engaged with stakeholders about those concerns, as have Labour Members. I would be grateful if the Minister briefly set out whether recent engagement has taken place with stakeholders with regard to these matters, and whether he has any further plans to address the concerns that they have expressed about clauses 18 and 19.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I want to make a similar case. We are now getting into territory where I struggle to understand exactly what is going on, because I am not a tech geek. We are speeding past this measure almost as if it were inconsequential, but the language in some of the briefings that we have received about it is pretty dramatic.

The bundle that was emailed to Committee members this morning includes evidence from Apple that I think needs to be addressed:

“At present, the SoS must navigate important oversight mechanisms before they can block the offering of a new product or service they believe will impact…ability to access private user data.”

Apple summarises the suite of clauses that the Committee is considering, including the requirement in clause 18 to maintain the status quo during the review process, as allowing the Secretary of State

“to block, in secret, the release of a product or service even before the legality of a Technical Capability Notice can be reviewed by independent oversight bodies. The effect of this amendment will be to, extraordinarily, hand the SoS the power to block new products or services prior to their legality being ascertained. This result upends the balance of authority and independent oversight Parliament struck in the IPA.”

Given the new definition of “telecommunications operator” in clause 19, Apple has also warned that there will be serious implications for conflicts with other laws, including the EU GDPR and with US legislation.

As well as Apple, we have heard from various other organisations. TechUK has highlighted problems with broadening the definition of “telecommunications provider” before control of provision of a telecoms service, including to UK users, is established overseas. It also highlights the potential conflict of laws. What if the domestic law in the country in which a company is based does not allow for compliance with the notice that the Home Secretary has delivered? That company might not even be able to raise the issue of a conflict of laws, because it would be sworn to secrecy under the Bill.

According to TechUK, the proposed changes mark a departure in the way that the UK approaches the extraterritorial reach of the UK or UK laws and the consequential conflicts of laws. That was all recognised in the 2016 Act, in which a partial solution was found in the form of a UK-US agreement. Currently, however, the Government have not set out any plans to work towards equivalent solutions.

In relation to clause 21, I will raise similar concerns from other experts, but it is clear that some very serious companies and organisations have significant concerns about what the combination of these notices may end up delivering. Those concerns need addressed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

I rise to speak briefly to Government amendments 3 and 4, which Labour welcomes. The principle of the appropriate Secretary of State giving approvals under section 26 of the Act was raised in the amendments proposed by Lord Coaker and Lord West in Committee in the other place. The amendments are an important further clarification regarding which Secretaries of States are eligible to be delegated the prime ministerial authority on investigatory powers relating to members. Necessary operational awareness demonstrated by the right people is, of course, crucial to ensure that the right decisions are made on what are, after all, very sensitive matters. I am mindful of the remarks made by the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings, so it would perhaps be helpful if the Minister could say something about how recent—mindful of the debate about whether “recent” is the right word—this operational awareness should be.

[Mr Jones]

I thought we had had a victory—one of those rare things we get with this Government—from the ISC in the House of Lords, but clearly the Minister has found a way of clawing that back.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I have said what I am going to say on the matter.

Amendment 3 agreed to.

[Dan Jarvis]

I beg to move amendment 17, in clause 22, page 47, line 26, at end insert—

“(2G) If a warrant is issued by an individual designated by the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister must be informed of that decision as soon as it is reasonably practical to do so.”

This amendment would require the Prime Minister to be notified of a decision of a designated Secretary of State to authorise the interception of certain elected representatives’ communications as soon as is reasonably practicable.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 18, in clause 23, page 48, line 21, at end insert—

“(7F) If a warrant is issued by an individual designated by the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister must be informed of that decision as soon as it is reasonably practical to do so.”

This amendment would require the Prime Minister to be notified of a decision of a designated Secretary of State to authorise a targeted equipment interference warrant relating to one of certain elected representatives as soon as is reasonably practicable.

[Dan Jarvis]

I am conscious of the debate that has just taken place, so I anticipate what the Minister may say in response. Let us give him another go anyway.

Amendments 17 and 18 relate to the decision of a designated Secretary of State to authorise the interception of elected representatives’ communications and interference with equipment relating to elected representatives. As the Minister will know, two similar amendments were proposed by Lord West in Committee in the other place. The reason for tabling the amendments in Committee in the Commons is that the Opposition believe that the Prime Minister’s overall involvement in the warrants must be retained, even if, in designated cases, it could be retrospective. As I said, I am mindful of the debate that has just taken place.

In the other place, Lord Sharpe rejected Lord West’s amendment on the basis that the oversight arrangements for warrant decisions taken by a designated Secretary of State, which include review by the judicial commissioner, are sufficient scrutiny. I understand that argument, but I wonder why it should not be the case that a Prime Minister is at least notified about decisions to issue warrants that they have had to delegate due to their being unable to do so. Furthermore, would a Prime Minister not being notified of a decision unnecessarily diminish their operational awareness in making future decisions to issue warrants?

My amendment would require the Prime Minister to be informed of a decision taken by a designated Secretary of State on their behalf as soon as the circumstances that have prevented the Prime Minister from approving a warrant in the first place have passed. I hope the Minister and the Committee will understand the emphasis on the important nuance in the difference between review and notification. Mindful of the earlier debate, I hope that the Minister will consider accepting the amendments.

[Tom Tugendhat]

For want of repeating myself, I will probably leave that to stand.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Ellwood]

That is the confirmation I was seeking.

[Dan Jarvis]

I suspect that we may return to this matter on Report. On the basis of the remarks made by the Minister, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Clause 23 stand part.

New clause 1—Requirement for the Prime Minister to appear before the Intelligence and Security Committee—

“After section 26 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, insert—

‘26A Requirement for the Prime Minister to appear before the Intelligence and Security Committee

(1) The Prime Minister must appear before the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament to provide oral evidence on the matter set out in subsection (2).

(2) The matter is decisions made by the Prime Minister or an individual designated under section 26 to—

(a) give approval to issue warrants to intercept and examine communications of Members of Parliament;

(b) interfere with equipment belonging to Members of Parliament;

(c) other relevant decisions relating to Members of Parliament in the interests of national security

(3) The duty in subsection (1) applies once every session of Parliament.

(4) Subsection (1) does not apply if the Intelligence and Security Committee does not require the Prime Minister to attend.’”

This new clause would require the Prime Minister to appear before the Intelligence and Security Committee to provide oral evidence on decisions made to approve warrants to intercept and examine communications of MPs or to interfere with equipment belonging to MPs, and other relevant decisions relating to MPs.

New clause 4—Interception notification for Members of Parliament etc.—

“After section 26 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (Members of Parliament etc.) insert—

‘26A Interception notification for Members of Parliament etc.

(1) Upon completion of conduct authorised by a warrant under section 26, or the cancellation of a warrant issued under that section, a Judicial Commissioner must notify the subject of the warrant, in writing, of—

(a) the conduct that has taken place, and

(b) the provisions under which the conduct has taken place.

(2) The notification under subsection (1) must be sent within thirty days of the completion of the conduct or cancellation of the warrant.

(3) A Judicial Commissioner may postpone the notification under subsection (1) beyond the time limit under subsection (2) if the Judicial Commissioner assesses that notification may defeat the purposes of an ongoing serious crime or national security investigation relating to the subject of the warrant.

(4) A Judicial Commissioner must consult the person who applied for the warrant in order to fulfil an assessment under subsection (3).’”

This new clause would require members of a relevant legislation who are targets of interception to be notified after the fact, as long as it does not compromise any ongoing investigation.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Clauses 22 and 23 will increase the resilience and flexibility of the warrant system. They will ensure the effective processing of warrants that authorise the interception of, or the use of equipment interference to obtain, the communications of a Member of a relevant legislature when the Prime Minister cannot fulfil their duties due to medical incapacitation or a lack of access to secure communications. The changes will enable the authorisation process to function in an agile manner, thereby enabling the important work of the intelligence agencies to continue while maintaining a high bar for the authorisation of some of the most sensitive warrants.

[Dan Jarvis]

I rise to speak to new clause 1, which relates to oversight by the Intelligence and Security Committee of warrants to intersect and examine the communications of Members or the interference with equipment relating to Members. The context of the new clause will be clear to those who followed the debates in the other place about the role of the ISC. To be absolutely clear, I am not seeking to debate the Wilson doctrine—I know that Members will be relieved to hear that.

The purpose of the new clause is to probe and seek further safeguards for the ISC to provide essential oversight of this extremely sensitive matter, codified by the 2016 Act as part of a wider context of decisions made by the Prime Minister in the interests of national security. Members of this Bill Committee who also serve on the ISC will know that successive Prime Ministers have, unfortunately, not appeared in front of that Committee since, I believe, 2014. As a result, there has been no opportunity for direct accountability over prime ministerial decision making on warrants to intercept and examine Members’ communications, or on interference with equipment relating to Members.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

On the point about notification: forgive me, but it is inconceivable that it should be required in law to inform somebody that they have been subject to an investigation by the intelligence services in such a way. I would be delighted to discuss with the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East in a more secure environment why, for a whole series of reasons, that may not be such a good idea. On the question of the Prime Minister appearing before the ISC, my friend the hon. Member for Barnsley Central knows my views—I have expressed them on many occasions—but that is way above my pay grade.

[Dan Jarvis]

For now!

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23

Equipment interference: Members of Parliament etc

Amendment made: 4, in clause 23, page 48, line 15, leave out from “and” to end of line 17 and insert—

“(b) has the necessary operational awareness to decide whether to give approvals under subsection (3) or (6).”—(Tom Tugendhat.)

This amendment replaces the reference to an individual being required in their routine duties to issue warrants under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 with a reference to an individual being required to have the necessary operational awareness to decide whether to give approvals under section 111 of that Act.

Clause 23, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 24

Issue of equipment interference warrants

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

The Bill makes minor changes to the equipment interference regime, specifically in relation to the warrantry processes associated with its authorisation. The purposes behind those changes are to correct minor drafting errors in the IPA to provide greater clarity, and to improve the efficiency of the warrantry process for equipment interference.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 25 and 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 27

Bulk equipment interference: safeguards for confidential journalistic material etc

[Dan Jarvis]

I beg to move amendment 19, in clause 27, page 50, line 9, at end insert—

“(2A) Where a senior official acts on behalf of the Secretary of State under subsection (2), they must inform the Investigatory Powers Commissioner of the selection for examination of BEI material as soon as reasonably practicable.”

This amendment would require a senior official acting on behalf of the Secretary of State who has selected BEI material for examination when there has been an urgent need to do so to inform the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as soon as reasonably practicable.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

[Dan Jarvis]

Amendment 19 would require a senior official acting on behalf of the Secretary of State who has selected bulk equipment interference material for examination, when there has been an urgent need to do so, to inform the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as soon as is reasonably practical. It would ensure that every reasonable oversight arrangement was in place concerning the Bill’s investigatory powers provisions.

The amendment does not suggest that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner retrospectively reviews the approval, but instead proposes that they be informed to ensure that there are the most comprehensive and effective oversight arrangements on investigatory powers. We intend not to burden the police and the security services with additional duties, but to ensure that there is the maximum possible oversight with the minimum possible additional work. I hope that the Minister will at least agree with the intentions of the amendment and consider its merits in further strengthening the Bill’s oversight arrangements.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I welcome the amendment, and not only do I agree with it, but I feel that we have already done it. My understanding is that the provision duplicates what already occurs in practice under the current regime, as well as the changes made by clause 27. Currently, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner is already effectively notified when a senior official acting on behalf of the Secretary of State, in urgent circumstances, approves the selection for examination of journalistic material derived from bulk equipment interference. Clause 27 already inserts into the IPA new section 195A(2), which will ensure that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner is notified as soon as is reasonably practical by the Secretary of State when a senior official approves the use of criteria to select for examination journalistic material in reliance on an urgent approval. Effectively, the senior official is informing on behalf of the Secretary of State, or indeed the Secretary of State is informing on behalf of the senior official. We all very much hope it is the former of the two.

Clause 27 enhances the safeguards already afforded to journalistic material within the IPA, and the Government recognise the importance of journalistic freedom within free and democratic societies, which is why we are introducing this measure. Under the current regime, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must be informed when a communication that contains confidential journalistic material or sources of journalistic material is retained following its examination for purposes other than its destruction. The clause introduces a requirement for prior independent approval by the IPC before any search criteria are used to select such material. Prior independent approval is also required before it is removed.

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to the Minister for that clarification. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 27 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28

Exclusion of matters from legal proceedings etc: exceptions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Clause 28 will amend schedule 3 to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 to provide exceptions for disclosures of intercepted materials to inquiries or inquests in Northern Ireland or Scotland into a person’s death. The clause will create parity with existing provisions for coroners in England and Wales. It also adds an exception to enable panel members of the Parole Board in England and Wales to access intercepted materials when considering parole applications and any subsequent appeals. It will also enable relevant coroners in Northern Ireland and sheriffs investigating deaths in Scotland to access intercepted material in connection with their inquiry or inquest.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 29

Freedom of information: bodies dealing with security matters

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

Clauses 30 to 33 are typical clauses that are included in the vast majority of legislation. Clause 30 allows the Secretary of State, by regulations made by statutory instrument, to make provision that is consequential on this Act. Clause 31 details the extent of the Bill. The Bill extends and applies to the whole of the United Kingdom, with the exception of measures contained in clause 28, in which subsection (2) applies to England and Wales only and subsection (3) applies to Northern Ireland and Scotland only.

As national security is a reserved matter, a legislative consent motion is required from Scotland only in relation to a small number of clauses in part 2—the oversight aspect—of the Bill. I am pleased that the Scottish Government have recommended that legislative consent be given.

Clause 32 details when the Bill commences. Part 6 comes into force on the day on which the Bill is passed; the other provisions come into force on such day as is appointed by regulations made by the Secretary of State.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 30 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 31 and 32 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 33

Short title

Amendment made: 5, in clause 33, page 56, line 1, leave out subsection (2).—(Tom Tugendhat.)

This amendment removes the privilege amendment inserted by the Lords.

Clause 33, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 2

Report on the Prime Minister’s engagement with the Intelligence and Security Committee

“After section 240 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 insert—

“240A Report on the Prime Minister’s engagement with the Intelligence and Security Committee

(1) The Secretary of State must publish a report about the Prime Minister’s engagement with the Intelligence and Security Committee in relation to the investigatory powers regime and lay the report before Parliament.

(2) The report must be published within six months of the passage of the Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Act 2024, and annually thereafter.””—(Dan Jarvis.)

This new clause would ensure the Secretary of State publishes a report on the engagement, including any meeting held, between the Prime Minister and the Intelligence and Security Committee in relation to the investigatory powers regime.

Brought up.

[Dan Jarvis]

I recognise that we have already had an extensive debate on this matter. I do not intend to detain the Committee any longer, and there is therefore nothing further I wish to say about new clause 2, so I do not wish to move it.

New Clause 3

Impact of Act on EU data adequacy decisions

“Within six months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish a report assessing the potential impact of this Act on EU data adequacy decisions relating to the United Kingdom.”—(Dan Jarvis.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish a report on potential impact of the provisions within this Bill on the requirements necessary to maintain a data adequacy decision by the EU.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Dan Jarvis]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 3 relates to the impact of the Act on EU data adequacy decisions. When a similar measure to this new clause was proposed by my noble Friend Lord Coaker during the Bill’s passage through the other place, the response from the Minister, Lord Sharpe, confirmed the UK Government’s regular contact with the European Commission about the Bill to ensure that any changes are understood. We welcome that but, as I hope the Minister will understand, such engagement is a continuous process, not a single event or even a series of events. As part of this continuous process, we believe that the Secretary of State should publish a report assessing the potential impact of the Act on EU adequacy decisions.

As Lord Coaker said in the other place:

“The adequacy agreement is dependent on the overall landscape of UK data protections”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 23 January 2024; Vol. 835, c. 688.]

That is even though the UK protections require some further work. However, given the time pressures, Mrs Cummins, that is all I will say about new clause 3.

[Tom Tugendhat]

First, I welcome the interactions we have had on this point, as well as the work of Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe to ensure that this is widely understood. The work that has been done is important. We face the challenge that although we obviously commit to fulfilling our side of the TCA and the various agreements we have struck, this is really a matter for the European Commission to determine, so it is not one that we can pass into UK law. It is really a matter for them.

[Dan Jarvis]

I have nothing further to add. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

[Tom Tugendhat]

On a point of order, Mrs Cummins. I would like to express my extreme personal thanks to Tom Ball and the Bill team, Phoebe, the Lucys, and the many others who have contributed brilliantly to ensure that this Bill has proceeded with speed and professionalism. I thank not only the members of the Committee, but all Members of many parties, and particularly the ISC, which has contributed so much to this Bill, despite what the right hon. Member for North Durham claims. May I say a particular thanks to my very good friend and shadow, the hon. Member for Barnsley Central? It is an enormous pleasure to think that we have gone from fighting the Queen’s enemies to passing the King’s laws together.

[Dan Jarvis]

Further to that point of order, Mrs Cummins. I join the Minister in warmly extending my thanks on behalf of Labour to all members of the Public Bill Committee and all the officials, both in the Department and in the House, who have done a sterling job in getting us to this point. I am grateful to the Minister for his collegiate approach, which I very much hope we will be able to maintain during the further passage of the Bill. Thank you, Mrs Cummins.

[Peter Dowd]

Further to that point of order, Mrs Cummins. May I say a particular thanks to you for chairing this Committee today in such a fantastic and eloquent way?

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Committee stage & Report stage
Thursday 7th March 2024 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)]

It is a pleasure to be here under your chairship, Mrs Cummins. The exceptional growth in volume and types of data across society globally since 2016 has affected the intelligence services’ ability to work and collaborate at the necessary operational pace. The existing bulk personal dataset safeguards do not account for the way that data and its availability have evolved since the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 was passed. This creates a negative impact on operational agility, while making it increasingly difficult for the intelligence services to develop the necessary capabilities.

Clauses 1 and 2 introduce an alternative regime for bulk personal datasets where there is low or no reasonable expectation of privacy—the so-called low/no regime. Clause 1 specifically provides a mechanism for the intelligence agencies to determine whether bulk personal datasets should be authorised under part 7 of the 2016 Act for sensitive datasets, or proposed new part 7A for low/no datasets.

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Cummins. I rise to speak very briefly to clause 1, and to thank the Minister for his opening remarks.

At the outset of our consideration, we should all take the opportunity to pay tribute to the exceptional men and women who have served in our law enforcement and security services. We owe them a deep debt of gratitude. Let me say that the Opposition support the Bill, which updates aspects of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. It is imperative that legal frameworks are updated to ensure that our security and law enforcement services keep up with the challenges to communications technology in an increasingly challenging and complex landscape of threats to our safety and national security. None the less, the important provisions proposed in this Bill need to be scrutinised carefully. The shadow Home Secretary and I made it clear on Second Reading that we will work with the Government to improve it in places, following the example of the constructive cross-party work that was done in the other place.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

It is good to see you in the Chair, Mrs Cummins.

I echo what the shadow Minister says. We are all here to assist the brave personnel in our security and intelligence services, but that does not mean that we will not closely scrutinise this legislation. We did not oppose the Bill on Second Reading. Some parts are good, but we have indicated our serious concerns about other parts because we think the powers go too far. They have not been shown to be necessary and proportionate; rather, they are more for the convenience of the security and intelligence services. How these powers are drafted also causes us concern, because they seem to allow behaviours beyond what we were told the powers were going to be used for. At other times, it is the nature of the oversight that is a concern, as the Bill introduces potentially intrusive powers.

I have one other brief point to make, which I indicated I would make at last night’s meeting of the Programming Sub-Committee. I had hoped that this morning we could perhaps have had some witnesses to guide us through this process. I think that would have been very helpful. It was very helpful in 2016, when we were looking at the original legislation, and I regret that we do not have such an opportunity this morning.

The provisions on bulk personal datasets and so-called low/no datasets are an area where we fear that the legislation is rather more a matter of inconvenience than something that has been shown to be a necessity. That will emerge in the debate about clause 2, which contains quite a lot of the detail about how the regime is supposed to work. Basically, we have been told that there will be a significant increase in the use of bulk personal datasets. We have been told that scrutiny is too slow, so we will either have to remove it or, perhaps more accurately, water it down in relation to these so-called low/no datasets. Fundamentally, I do not like that argument. The Minister will need to make a compelling case.

When we discuss clause 2, it would be useful if the Minister told us how many bulk datasets are retained and examined each year currently; how many datasets it is envisaged will be retained and examined after these powers come into force; what percentage of the datasets he thinks would be considered low/no datasets; how long authorisation processes take currently and why they take that length of time; and why cannot we improve or accelerate that process in some way, rather than having to water it down in the way that this Bill suggests. We will ask the Minister for that sort of evidence, because he is asking us to do away with parts of the oversight system that were put in place in 2016, and we want to understand how that oversight system is causing a problem at the moment. If he cannot explain that, we cannot support this new regime.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

What can I say? We have got a little further on clause 1 than I anticipated. I am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings, the right hon. Member for North Durham and other hon. Members who have spoken. Bulk personal dataset authorisation is clearly an important change, as my shadow, the hon. Member for Barnsley Central, has set out; I was interested to hear the suggestion from my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings that this was the shadow Minister’s first step on the path to greatness and to leading the Opposition. I am grateful for the points that hon. Members have made.

The type of data that may fall into part 7A is indeed covered—things like news articles, academic papers, public and official records, and the sort of bulk personal data that many people would have access to routinely. The changing nature of the need to hold data has meant that bulk personal data must be authorised in a different way than was previously thought. Paragraphs 4.14 and 4.20 of the draft code of practice set out further details of the datasets that would fall under the section 22A test, of which the hon. Member for Barnsley Central is no doubt aware.

The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East touched on various aspects of data that might fall within this approach. He will remember that Lord Anderson noted in his independent review that MI5 and MI6 estimate that roughly 20% of their bulk personal data holdings would fall into the category of “low and no”; for GCHQ, the figure would be nearer to 8%. Clearly, these things will evolve. To answer the point made by the right hon. Member for North Durham, the simple fact is that our world is producing incomparably greater volumes of data than ever before. The need to understand, handle and triage that data is therefore essential.

It is worth making the point, right at the beginning, that creating and storing huge volumes of data is to nobody’s advantage, and particularly not that of the intelligence services. The only purpose of having or examining data is to enable investigatory operations to get to targets of interest. It is not about anything other than ensuring that investigations can be properly targeted against those who threaten the interests of the British people, under various existing laws. This measure does not change those laws; it merely assists the targeting.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Low or no reasonable expectation of privacy

[Dan Jarvis]

I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 2, page 3, line 18, at end insert—

“(1A) This section does not apply to a bulk personal dataset unless it has been published in accordance with the Data Protection Act 2018.”

This amendment would ensure bulk personal datasets with low or no expectation of privacy have been published lawfully and in accordance with General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) set out in the Data Protection Act 2018.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 21, in clause 2, page 3, line 34, at end insert—

“(4) By way of example, bulk datasets of images obtained by CCTV and bulk datasets of Facebook posts are not to be considered datasets where the individuals to whom the data relates could have no, or only a low, reasonable expectation of privacy.”

Probing amendment regarding the scope of “low or no reasonable expectation of privacy”.

[Dan Jarvis]

May I reflect on my gentle amusement at hearing the Minister’s remarks about a former shadow Security Minister and his onward passage to becoming Leader of the Opposition? I know that these are matters on which he speaks with great authority.

We have already had very helpful contributions from two senior Intelligence and Security Committee members. Questions about the meaning of “low or no reasonable expectation of privacy” in relation to BPDs have been raised throughout the Bill’s progress in the other place and on Second Reading in this House, including by members of this Committee. The amendment seeks to probe the meaning of the phrase, but I should be clear at the outset that I do not intend to divide the Committee on this or any other amendment on which I intend to speak.

I will set out two scenarios. It would be genuinely helpful if the Minister could clarify the limits to the factors relating to the Data Protection Act 2018. The first scenario is where the data can be attributed to a leak that, although unintentional, resulted in the unconsented publication of personal information in the public domain. Would a leak of the personal details and working patterns of the staff of Members of this House—a number of hon. Members will remember the one that happened in March 2017—be subject to a low or no reasonable expectation of privacy?

The second scenario is the deliberate and unlawful publication of personal information into the public domain. If there were a hack resulting in the unlawful publication of personal information into the public domain, would that information also be subject to a low or no reasonable expectation of privacy? Data breaches of that nature occur regularly: the personal information of more than 2 million Duolingo users was compromised last year. A user’s mastery of French verb conjugation is unlikely to be of interest to anyone, with the possible exception of our friends over the channel, but other personal information could be. The Duolingo data was put up for sale on the dark web, so it might be regarded as third party BPDs. It is important that the Minister clarifies the meaning of “low or no reasonable expectation of privacy” in relation to those two scenarios.

Labour Members are not opposed to the concept of “low or no reasonable expectation of privacy” in relation to BPDs. We want to ensure that the police and security services are not unnecessarily limited in their intelligence gathering, but there need to be parameters for what is considered fair game. There must be clarity on important definitions relating to personal data. I hope that the Minister will respond in the constructive spirit in which the amendment was intended.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Clause 2 will remove the need for further judicial authorisation for personal dataset retention and examination if the datasets are deemed to fit into the low or no category, for which there is already authorisation, or if there is urgency. Many personal datasets can be contained within one warrant, so we have lots of questions about how proposed new part 7A will work. Amendment 14 demands an explanation of how the regime fits alongside data protection standards and how it applies to leaked and hacked datasets, as opposed to those that are lawfully obtained.

Our amendment 21 simply seeks to push the Minister to give examples of personal datasets that would be considered to have a low or no reasonable expectation of privacy. I refer hon. Members to a letter from the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), which has been shared with us all:

“There is perhaps some ambiguity or confusion as to what data is envisaged to be caught by these provisions. For example, is it merely online encyclopaedias, Companies House registers or news articles; or would it also cover, for example, quite extensive discussions over the internet or mass voice or face images, as has been mentioned in evidence?”

That is the question that we are getting at here.

The whole concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy seems to have been borrowed from the US, where it has been criticised for permitting fairly intrusive surveillance at quite a considerable scale. To my mind, it difficult to grasp the concept or even understand how the test to be applied. It is bad not just for citizens in general, but for people who are having to make these decisions who are not absolutely clear whether or not they can consider a set of data to have a low or no expectation of privacy.

Would bulk datasets of CCTV images or Facebook posts be no/low? How can someone assess whether a bulk personal dataset falls into the category if they do not know all the information within it because they cannot see it until they have a warrant? If the dataset contains information about many thousands or millions of people, with different types of information about different people, how can there be one single level of expectation? People with a low expectation of complete privacy might reasonably have a high expectation that their data will not be retained and processed by the intelligence services.

Why is the sensitivity of the data not expressly mentioned in the Bill? That should surely be pivotal, particularly if the Government want to operate within our human rights obligations. There is no clarity in the Bill to reassure us that sensitive information such as health data would absolutely not be captured by these provisions. Why could that not be on the face of the Bill? Why is publication the important factor instead? Publication in the context of small Facebook groups, for example, does not mean that there are no expectations that security services would not hold that information.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The reality is that once papers are effectively public, the argument for privacy somewhat falls away. That is exactly where we are getting to in this area, which is why we have looked at how to oversee it and the different elements within it. Part 7A explains the oversight regime clearly and section 226A really gets to the nub of it.

It is important that we focus there, where the argument comes back to the essential element: when considering whether intelligence services have applied the test correctly, the judicial commissioner will apply the same principles that a court would apply on application for judicial review. We therefore have an internal legal process overseeing this before it would even get to any legal challenge. That is why it is more robust than some voices have gently suggested, and covers many of those internal challenges.

[Dan Jarvis]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 22, in clause 2, page 4, leave out lines 27 to 30.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.

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[Stuart C. McDonald]

Again, I get all that, and I do not think that we are really at cross-purposes. However, we are talking about 12 months of access to datasets without necessarily having them before a judicial commissioner.

I do not think that anyone disputes that this is a slightly weaker form of oversight, which is because the services want to access this material at scale and regard the existing oversight mechanisms as cumbersome, slow and whatever else. We still ask the question of whether there is another way to do that that would still involve judicial commissioners but happen much more randomly and at scale. However, we will go away and consider that. I repeat my request—I know it is not easy—for some examples to reassure members of the public on how exactly this will work. That would be useful. In the meantime, I do not intend to push the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Dan Jarvis]

I beg to move amendment 15, in clause 2, page 5, line 14, at end insert—

“(4) The head of an intelligence service, or a person acting on their behalf, must notify the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as soon as is reasonably practical after a decision has been taken to include a bulk personal dataset within a category authorisation in effect under this section.”

This amendment would require that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner is notified when a new bulk personal dataset is added by an intelligence agency to an existing category authorisation.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 38, in clause 2, page 11, line 21, at end insert—

“(1A) The report provided under subsection (1) must include an annex listing the bulk datasets retained or retained and examined under each category authorisation granted during the relevant period.”

This amendment would require information about the scale and nature of use of category authorisations to be provided to the Intelligence and Security Committee.

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[Dan Jarvis]

The issue of closing the gap between adding a bulk personal dataset to an existing category authorisation was raised on Second Reading by my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham, who has a long-standing interest in these matters. I agree with the argument he made on Second Reading and the simple solution he proposed to close the gap: a one-line email to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as soon as reasonably practical.

Any such email would not be seeking real-time approval and would not necessarily be reviewed by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner in isolation, but rather as part of a wider trend of what is being added to existing category authorisations. Labour does not seek to create additional work for the men and women who serve in our police and security services. On the contrary, a simple arrangement —to send a single-line email—would enhance wider oversight arrangements, while keeping extra requirements for the police and security services to an absolute minimum. In response to my right hon. Friend on the matter on Second Reading, the Minister said the IPA 2016

“allows the collection… with prior authorisation”

and that

“This is intended to speed the process up.”—[Official Report, 19 February 2024; Vol. 745, c. 556.]

We do not intend to slow the process down through the amendment, as any such notification would be made after it had happened. I therefore ask the Minister whether the problem is the act of notifying the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as soon as reasonably practical, or the potential volume of notifications, that mean he deems it an unworkable arrangement. I would appreciate if he could be as open as possible in answering those questions. If the Government do not accept the amendment, perhaps a conversation could take place between my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham, the Minister and myself to agree a practicable solution.

[Mr Jones]

As my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central said, I raised the matter on Second Reading. In no way do I or other members of the ISC want to slow down the process or give more work to the hard-working men and women of our security services. However, as I understand it, the only reason put forward by the Government was that it would impair operational agility.

The amendment proposes, and what I proposed, is not for the security services to go through an authorisation, as my hon. Friend just said; it is literally an email saying, “This is what we are doing.” Members might ask why that is important. It is important because we are giving the security services new powers in the Bill and for IPCO to be informed in real time. I accept the retrospective look at them, but at least if there was a trend, we could see it.

The Government have also tried to argue that there is no need for more oversight because it is a low or no dataset, much lower than those governed by the existing section 7 of the IPA. We have just had the argument about the definition of “low” and “no”, but it means that we are giving the security services additional powers here. I am not for one minute suggesting that the internal protocols within those security services will lead to things that are just a free-for-all, as some might suggest, but it gives that assurance that there is oversight of what is happening in real time.

If we were asking for authorisation of each one, I would accept that it would be too burdensome and would slow down the process, but this is literally a one-line email so the IPCO knows what is needed. I do not understand why the Government are resisting that, except that—let us be honest, Minister—we have form on this. With the National Security Bill, there was an idea that it would be a weakness on the Government’s part to accept any amendments from the ISC. However, there was one slight change made with Lord West’s amendment, so there is possibly a change of attitude. I accept that the Minister respects the ISC—I am not sure it is the same for many people higher up in Government. But that should not be a reason not to accept this very simple amendment, which I think would give people reassurance that there is some real-time oversight of this. If an election was called in the next few weeks, this Bill—

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[Tom Tugendhat]

Well, the right hon. Gentleman could make a virtue of a necessity if he wishes. I certainly will. I shall enjoy meeting him to discuss this, and I hope that he will take that commitment in the spirit with which it is made.

[Dan Jarvis]

I think that this has been a useful debate. There have been a number of sensible and constructive contributions from both sides of the Committee. The Minister has made a commitment to sit down and discuss this further, and I am grateful for that undertaking. As I have said, we do not intend to push this amendment to a vote.

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[Mr Jones]

Their budget was cut yesterday.

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle. I am happy to give way to the Minister if he wants to respond directly to that point.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The point about these powers is indeed to make better use of resources. One challenge is that many intelligence officers are tied up doing things that are no longer genuinely necessary for the protection of personal privacy, but they are following processes that, were they to be working for a private organisation —a company or whatever—would no longer be necessary because bulk personal data could simply be bought. Therefore, what we are actually looking at doing is using resources much more efficiently and therefore helping the protection of the British people, from a better financial position. However, the point made by the hon. Member for Bootle on resources is always one that I welcome.

[Dan Jarvis]

I have nothing further to add, other than to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Duration of bulk personal dataset warrants

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 4 stand part.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank my right hon. Friend. Clause 3 amends the duration of bulk personal dataset warrants under section 213 of the IPA from six to 12 months. BPDs tend to be used to support long-term strategic intelligence activities, and a longer warrant duration will enable the value of the BPD to be better demonstrated, which will provide the relevant Secretary of State with a more accurate picture of the necessity and proportionality when an application for renewal is made. The existing part 7 safeguards will remain in place, including the double lock by the judicial commissioner.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5

Third party bulk personal datasets

[Dan Jarvis]

I beg to move amendment 16, in clause 5, page 14, line 34, at end insert—

“(4) A third party BPD warrant may not authorise the examination of a dataset consisting of the contents of the marked electoral register.”

This amendment would prevent a third-party bulk personal dataset consisting of the electoral register, which sets out whether people have voted, from being examined by the intelligence services.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

[Dan Jarvis]

Amendment 16 relates to third-party BPDs, specifically the use of the marked electoral register, which is a copy of the electoral register usually arranged by a polling station area or ward with names crossed off to indicate who has voted. Copies are available for political parties to buy from local authorities and add to their records, which aid with canvassing and voter engagement on the basis that a person who has previously voted has a higher propensity to vote again, and for that purpose alone.

Compared with the electoral register, the marked electoral register contains a record of individuals who have exercised their democratic right at the ballot box. The Opposition understand entirely that it would be appropriate for copies of the marked electoral register to be examined in an investigation into electoral fraud. Any attempts to undermine our democratic process must be dealt with with the utmost seriousness. However, we do not believe that it is appropriate or proportionate for information relating to voting records, contained in such documents, to be authorised as a third-party BPD. That could establish links between individuals or better understand a subject of interest’s behaviour.

More widely, we have concerns about records of democratic activity, such as any relating to trade union membership, being examined as a third-party BPD. Does the Minister agree that copies of the marked electoral register should be used to defend and strengthen our democratic processes, and for those purposes alone, and that safeguards should be in place to protect other data relating to democratic activity from being examined as a third-party BPD?

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[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank hon. Members for their points. The examination of third-party bulk personal datasets by the intelligence services is vital to their role of protecting the national security and economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom and preventing and detecting serious crime.

Clause 5 places an explicit statutory regime around the intelligence services’ examination, in situ, of bulk datasets held by third parties. The regime would apply only to the intelligence services, in line with the wider part 7 BPD powers in the IPA. The clause puts in place robust oversight and safeguards. For example, third-part dataset warrants are to be subject to a double lock, and the decision to authorise the warrant will need to be approved by both the Secretary of State and an independent judicial commissioner. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner and his office will oversee the regime to ensure the intelligence services’ examination of third-party datasets is both necessary and proportionate. That relates to the point made by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East about proportionality and need.

To answer the point made by the hon. Member for Barnsley Central, we do not consider it appropriate to exclude specific types of dataset from those for which a third-party dataset warrant can be sought. The reason is, as he knows, that we can begin to go down very tricky routes on this area, as the intelligence services have a requirement to keep safe not just our democracy but our wider nation. Therefore, limiting those different arguments can be problematic. What we are aiming to do is ensure the proportionality requirement is the test applied by both judicial commissioners and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.

The Secretary of State may issue a warrant authorising the examination of a third-party dataset only where it is necessary and proportionate—that is going to be quite a high bar in some of the areas asked about—for the intelligence service to examine the dataset to which the warrant relates. That decision will be double-locked by an independent judicial commissioner who, among other things, is required expressly to review the Secretary of State’s conclusions in respect of necessity and proportionality when deciding whether to approve the decision to issue a warrant. That is already in the Bill. Each decision will be made on a case-by-case basis and will be subject to prior judicial approval.

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful for the Minister’s response. I have to say, I am struggling to think of a scenario in which it might be necessary and proportionate to examine the marked electoral register. This is something we will reflect on.

[Sir John Hayes]

I broadly support the Minister’s view of this, but the easiest way to establish the case for this is to be clear about its operational purposes. Clearly, one would not expect the Minister or the agencies to speak about the specifics of operations, but dealing with the operational purposes would help the shadow Minister and the Committee. I am sure the Minister would be happy to do that in broad terms, either now or in writing. It would be really helpful to go through the kinds of operational purposes associated with this inquiry. I do not know what the Minister and the shadow Minister think, but that is how I see it.

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[Dan Jarvis]

That is a helpful and useful suggestion. I am happy to proceed on that basis, if the Minister is.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am happy to write to the hon. Member.

[Dan Jarvis]

On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Minor and consequential amendments

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Clause 6 makes minor amendments to the 2016 Act to reflect the introduction of parts 7A and 7B, including making it clear that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner is responsible for oversight of the part 7B regime.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)