(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I beg leave to ask a Question of which I have given private notice.
My Lords, these horrific crimes are sickening and I commend the bravery of victims coming forward and the police for the successful prosecutions so far. The Government have made a commitment to tackle child sexual abuse in all its forms and we have made a significant investment to help transform law enforcement’s response.
My Lords, justice delayed is justice denied and this seems to have happened from Huddersfield to Rochdale, from Halifax to Newcastle, and in many other towns. Criminal law practitioners have sought to maintain the rule of law for victims and perpetrators without fear or favour. Have timely investigation and prosecution been sacrificed in favour of social cohesion? Will the Government invite the inspectors of constabulary and the CPS to analyse and report on the timeliness of the investigations and the prosecutions?
My Lords, I do not think that what has happened here is political correctness; I think that, given the sheer number of people involved in the types of crimes they committed against some very vulnerable girls, it has taken time to bring this case forward—and, of course, the case was delayed for reasons outside the CPS’s control. It is really important, for successful prosecutions to be brought, that full rigour goes into the investigation and subsequent prosecutions.
My Lords, first, I join the noble Baroness in paying tribute to the police and to the bravery of the victims of these appalling crimes. By coming forward, they have highlighted this evil, had the criminals brought to justice and protected other young girls from becoming victims. Compare that to the irresponsible actions of those who risked collapsing the trial. What work are the Government undertaking to understand the full scope and size of this crime, of these offences, in our country? Without understanding that, it will be very hard to effectively resource both prevention and investigations, and to bring all the perpetrators to justice.
The noble Lord makes a very good point: unless we can understand the root causes of this, it is very difficult to tackle it. There have been several similar cases of the abuse of children. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary has said:
“I will not let cultural or political sensitivities get in the way of understanding the problem ... I’ve instructed my officials to explore the … characteristics of these types of gangs and if the evidence suggests that there are cultural factors that may be driving this type of offending, then I will take action”.
My Lords, according to the Sunday Times, the Chancellor of the Exchequer thinks that the police would help their case for more money if they were more responsive to local residents and investigated crimes such as burglary, rather than labour-intensive investigations into historical sexual offences. Does the Minister agree?
I have to apologise to the noble Lord because, although I read the Sunday Times, I did not read that particular article. But nobody can be in any doubt about the commitment of this Government commitment to tackling this type of abuse, and in particular that of my right honourable friend the Home Secretary. Child sexual abuse has been declared a national threat and the Government are investing millions of pounds to enable officers to actively seek out and bring these types of offenders to justice. Last February, the Government published our tackling child sexual exploitation progress report and we have announced a £40 million package of measures to protect children and young people from sexual abuse, exploitation and trafficking, and to crack down on offenders. This has included £7.5 million for a new, ground-breaking centre of expertise that will identify, generate and share high-quality evidence of what works in preventing and tackling child sexual abuse and exploitation. We have put a significant increase in resources into the NCA, leading to a near doubling of the CEOP command’s investigative capability, and an additional £20 million has been committed up to 2020 to maintain this. There is a further £20 million of transformation funds going into the regional organised crime units, which do a superb job in bringing to justice perpetrators who target children online.
My Lords, this Question from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, is actually just a provincial equivalent of the discussion we had on the first Oral Question. The simple fact is that the Minister is explaining small penny-packets of money that are being put into a particular problem. My successor but two as commissioner, Cressida Dick, has 20% less money than I had when I left 10 years ago. Will the Minister accept that it is simply impossible for the police service to go on with 20% less money without something giving? Something is already starting to give and the Government must take action.
I think I have made it clear, in response to both this and the earlier Question, that there are certain types of crime patterns, such as knife and gang crime in London, which are worrying and into which the Government have sought to put specific types of funding, but also that this type of child sexual abuse and exploitation requires a dedicated approach to a specific problem. But I do not resile from the fact—and my right honourable friend the Home Secretary recognises this, as does the Policing Minister—that considering all the things that the police have to do and the strain they are under, they have significant burdens on them. Both my right honourable friend the Home Secretary and the Policing Minister are very aware of this as we go into next year.
My Lords, does the Minister agree that the police’s resources and priorities should be in part determined by public concern? Is she in any doubt at all that the public are deeply concerned about the exploitation of vulnerable girls by gangs? What role have the police commissioners played in this matter?
My Lords, this has to be a multiagency approach. It is a job that local government will have across its desk in terms of protecting vulnerable children. The police will have it across their desks. The Department of Health will have it across its desk. It is also the job of education to ensure that girls—predominantly—who may be vulnerable to this sort of exploitation are supported in the communities in which they live. I have outlined the various funding packages to try to prevent such things happening, but the noble Lord is not wrong when he says that resources need to go into this. Sometimes the public’s priorities are not the priorities that the police might seek to invest in, but this is a major national priority.
My Lords, the Minister may have read the Times report this morning on the county lines abuse of young children in Bradford. I am sure that the Government think that getting at this abuse of children through county lines drug networks is also a priority. The last time I was driven around north Bradford by one of our local councillors, I did not see a single policeman on the streets all afternoon—although I did see three people peddling drugs on the streets as we passed by. Does that not mean that we need larger resources than we have at the moment to cope with the underlying social issues that give rise to this sort of exploitation of children, male and female?
The noble Lord is absolutely right to bring up the issue of county lines, because that encompasses everything we have been talking about in response to the Question of the noble Baroness, Lady Hussein-Ece, as well as to this one. There is definitely a link between gangs, guns, drugs and exploitation, and at the heart of it—always—is exploited children.
My Lords, do the Government accept that if we extrapolate nationally the Jay report on Rotherham and other reports from Telford and Oxford, there appear to have been upwards of 250,000 young white girls raped in this century, very largely by Muslim men, usually several times a day for years? What is the Government’s answer to the chief constable of Northumbria Police, who has just said that there is every likelihood that these grooming gangs are operating in every one of our major cities? What are the Government doing to prosecute those in authority who turned a blind eye to all this because they were afraid of being called Islamophobic and so on? What are they doing to compensate and help these victims mentally?
My Lords, I refute the charge that those in authority are turning a blind eye to this. Noble Lords from across the House have outlined various child sexual abuse perpetrations in various parts of the country. One thing we can say above all else is that what these people target is vulnerability. It is not specific to race, creed or colour—it is vulnerability.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberThat the Bill be considered in Committee in the following order: Clauses 1 to 12, Schedule 1, Clauses 13 to 18, Schedule 2, Clauses 19 to 21, Schedule 3, Clause 22, Schedule 4, Clauses 23 to 27, Title.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, unusually, I shall be supporting Amendment 1 but I shall also speak to Amendments 2 and 3 in this group. My noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have added our names to Amendment 1 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Kennedy, but we feel that the amendment to Clause 1 as drafted does not go far enough.
Before I come to that, however, I wish to say that I wholeheartedly support what the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has said about the provisions of the Bill. Bearing in mind that they are likely to be mutual, in that similar provisions would be in a Bill in a country with which we are going to enter into a treaty, it is very important to have a death penalty assurance in that treaty, which is what the amendment seeks to do. In addition to what the noble Lord has said about UK Ministers saying that we in the UK are opposed to the death penalty, Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, together with Protocol 13 to which the UK is a signatory, provides for the total abolition of the death penalty. In early meetings with the Minister, we were led to believe that that death penalty assurance would be part of any treaty. However, we feel we need that reassurance in the Bill.
As I say, we took the unusual step of both supporting and amending the Labour amendment on the basis that we both agree on the principle of Amendment 1— that the Government should not enter into a treaty that would require UK companies to provide electronic data to law enforcement in a country that had the death penalty unless the treaty contained assurances that the death penalty would not be implemented if data provided by UK companies was used. We believe that the prohibition on entering into a treaty with a country that has the death penalty should be broader than just the data covered by Section 52 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which is what Amendment 1 covers, because that provision covers only the interception of communications in the course of transmission—wiretaps, listening in to telephone conversations and that type of electronic data. A British company could hold personal information about an individual that could be crucial in an investigation for an offence that carries the death penalty in the country making the request. Such electronic data would not necessarily be in the course of transmission but held on servers in the UK.
Our Amendment 2 would therefore include,
“any other enactment which provides for the collection of electronic data”.
Amendment 3 makes it clear that the prohibition on entering into a treaty would not apply if an assurance had been given that the death penalty would not be imposed whether either intercepted communication or any other kind of electronic data had been provided under the Act. That amendment is consequential on Amendment 2.
We want to ensure that no UK company is complicit in providing electronic data of any kind that could lead to someone being executed. I beg to move.
I thank both noble Lords for speaking to their amendments today and express my gratitude to all Members of the House for their contributions both in Committee and today on Report—I think it is the same two noble Lords, but perhaps there are one or two more.
I stress to the House the importance of the UK-US data access agreement. The agreement will allow the UK authorities access to valuable evidence and intelligence directly from US communication service providers. The House should be made aware that the vast majority of CSPs and their data reside in the US, not the UK. The Bill gives our law enforcement a strategic advantage in the fight against the threat we face.
Indeed, in almost every serious criminal investigation, we expect those we investigate to be using services provided by CSPs based in the US. The agreement will make a significant contribution to the detection, investigation, prevention and prosecution of serious crime and terrorism. The Government have been working towards the agreement with the help of US CSPs and the US Government for several years following the recommendation from the then Prime Minister’s data envoy Sir Nigel Sheinwald.
All Governments and any future Governments have the duty to put the security of their people first. It will always be in the public interest to ensure that our police and agencies have access to the necessary intelligence and evidence in order to fulfil that duty. Just as it was under the previous Labour Government and as it is today, Ministers must always be mindful of the current threat environment they find themselves in. That is why we believe that better scrutiny of these agreements and accountability for future treaties is the best way to ensure that the Government’s principles are tested, rather than prescribing a rigid format for treaties that have not yet even been mooted, let alone being currently under negotiation.
Of course, the Government’s objective is to obtain a satisfactory death penalty assurance, but negotiations are ongoing and not yet concluded. Playing the discussions out in public may make it much harder to conclude them effectively.
Let me be clear to the House: there will be an assurance in the agreement. We can expect it to rule out the direct use of information obtained under the agreement as evidence in a prosecution where the death penalty might apply. Parliament will scrutinise the final detail of any agreement and the assurance it contains. We have already tabled an amendment today clarifying that the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 process will always apply to relevant international agreements, ensuring that Members have two opportunities to scrutinise a treaty.
But I am willing to go further. Noting the concerns that noble Lords have expressed, the Government will commit to bringing forward an amendment in the Commons. Such an amendment would not pre-empt negotiations with the US, or any future agreement with another country, but would instead absolutely guarantee that Parliament has the chance to conduct proper, thorough scrutiny of relevant agreements and death penalty assurances.
The amendment I envisage would ensure that Ministers cannot make regulations to designate any agreement with a country which retains the death penalty for incoming requests without first laying before Parliament the agreement and details of any assurances obtained. There would then be a defined period during which Parliament would have a chance to examine those details, and this could include scrutiny by any relevant committees.
Finally, the Secretary of State would be obliged to consider any recommendations made by a committee in relation to the assurances before laying regulations to designate the agreement. Of course, the regulations themselves would then be subject to the usual process of parliamentary scrutiny, during which time Members of both Houses could consider any recommendations and respond to them.
Ultimately, it is right that Parliament has a say on the difficult decision between not concluding negotiations on agreements and securing the death penalty assurances we would like. Both the amendments tabled by Labour and Liberal Democrat Peers could lead to our being unable to conclude a data access agreement with the US. If we find ourselves in that situation, law enforcement agencies and the UK intelligence community will continue to be denied timely access to valuable evidence and intelligence.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said that Section 52 of the IPA covers only material intercepted in the course of transmission. That is not entirely correct. It can authorise obtaining stored communications as well as intercept. As I said, there is a balance to be struck here. That is why I ask Members not to tie the Government’s hands in negotiations. Instead I will commit to amending the Bill in the Commons to ensure that Parliament has ample opportunity to scrutinise any future treaty and, if relevant, its death penalty assurance.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. Unless she wishes to contradict me, I think she just said that these treaties are very important to the extent that the British Government are prepared to allow people to be executed on the basis of data provided by British companies to overseas law enforcement. The essence of these amendments is that that should not be allowed and we want that reassurance on the face of the Bill.
I do contradict the noble Lord. I am asking noble Lords not to tie the Government’s hands in negotiation.
Forgive me, but I do not see the difference between what I said and what the Minister has just said, unless she wants to clarify further.
We are concerned about this because of the recent case of Kotey and Elsheikh, in which the American authorities asked for information from the British on two people who were part of an ISIS cell. The Home Secretary decided that the information would be provided without a death penalty assurance. We are concerned that what might considered a one-off case which contradicts the British Government’s usual global opposition to the death penalty is now going to be enshrined in treaties. I understand what the Minister said about Section 52 of the Investigatory Powers Act, but that is not our understanding and I therefore wish to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 2.
My Lords, the Government recognise that, when it comes to agreements for direct access to data, it is unlikely that either the UK or another country would commit to complying with orders that have extraterritorial scope without acknowledging this through a formalised agreement or arrangement. Therefore, in reality, any arrangement we choose to enter into for direct access to data will likely be in the form of a treaty requiring formal ratification before entry into force. It is not the Government’s intention to conclude such international arrangements by memoranda of understanding, for example. We do not think that such informal arrangements would afford the appropriate level of certainty that such international arrangements require.
As noble Lords know, treaties that require ratification are subject to formal parliamentary scrutiny in the form of a procedure under Part 2 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010—CRaG—which must be followed before the Government can complete the ratification process necessary to bring the agreement into force. The text contained in the Bill introduced to this House was intended to allow the UK to consider other measures, such as EU instruments that do not fulfil the definition of “treaty” under CRaG. However, we have since concluded that it is highly unlikely that the UK, or any other country we enter into agreements with, would accept anything less than a formal treaty. I therefore propose to make an amendment to Clause 1 to make this clear.
The amendment provides that a designated international co-operation arrangement must be a “relevant treaty”. It would further provide that a “relevant treaty” is one that has been laid before Parliament under Section 20(1)(a) of CRaG. The effect of the amendment would be to ensure that where the Secretary of State, by way of regulations, wishes to designate an arrangement under the Bill, they can do so only if that arrangement is a treaty that has been laid before Parliament for scrutiny under CRaG. Only treaties that have been laid before Parliament under CRaG can be designated. However, it is still possible for an agreement to be designated before ratification. There may be operational reasons why one would want to designate an agreement before ratification has been finalised. For example, an agreement may come into force on ratification—depending on the terms of the agreement—in which case designating after ratification may be too late and there may be a risk of breach of obligations under the agreement.
The effect of Amendment 5 in the names of the noble Baroness and the noble Lord would preclude any designation of an international co-operation agreement until it has been ratified. Ratification is a process which requires an act—for example, the exchange of diplomatic notes between the parties—which signals in international law the parties’ consent to be bound by the agreement. However, the amendment could cause a detrimental effect, as I have explained, where the terms of an agreement require that it comes into force on the day of ratification. The amendment would make it impossible to designate until after the ratification process, which may put the UK in breach of any obligations under the agreement. I should also make clear that even where an agreement is designated after having be laid under CRaG but before it is ratified, an agreement could not come into force until the process of ratification is complete and therefore any requests could not be made until the agreement is entered into force, following ratification. I hope that the noble Baroness will be happy to withdraw Amendment 5. I beg to move.
Amendment 5 (to Amendment 4)
My Lords, we welcome the Government’s significant movement towards the use of the treaty procedure, which we and, I believe, the Labour Benches argued for at the previous stage. I was concerned that the amendment was incomplete, and the Minister has explained why her amendment refers to “laying” the treaty, but not the other provisions of Section 20 and several subsequent sections of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act.
As the Minister has told the House, it is quite a complicated and potentially long drawn-out procedure. I accept that, but it is long drawn-out because it is designed to give Parliament a proper opportunity to have input into the final product of the treaty, with various stages for its consideration, ending up in ratification. The Minister, in arguing on the first group of amendments, stressed the importance of the procedure. She has just said that the Government might want to make a designation before ratification. It seems to me that this nullifies the impact of the procedure process, and assumes that Parliament will ratify—in other words, will vote as the Government tell it to, which is precisely the arrangement we do not want in place.
The Minister has, however, just talked about the treaty not coming into force until ratification—she is nodding at that, for which I am grateful. I wonder whether she would be prepared to have a discussion—she has been prepared for lots of discussions on the Bill already, for which we are grateful—about an amendment we might table at Third Reading to tidy this up, encapsulating what she has just said to the House about delaying the process until the parliamentary process has been completed. I had better move this amendment, and then we can debate it.
My Lords, I am sorry that I have not been very clear. I am very happy, should the noble Baroness wish to withdraw Amendment 5 and accept Amendment 4, to have a discussion before Third Reading—we have discussed our way through this Bill—but in the meantime I ask her to withdraw Amendment 5.
Of course I am happy to do that. I am sorry, I thought that was implied. I do not wish any more exercise on noble Lords than we need to have during the course of this afternoon. I look forward to that discussion and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the Bill provides that journalistic material which is non-confidential can be obtained through an overseas production order without having to give notice. This type of material may, for example, be the manuscript or copy that the journalist is working on. A judge must be satisfied that the material is relevant to a UK investigation and in the UK public interest before he can approve an order to obtain it. The Bill implicitly recognises that a person named in an order may merely store data on behalf of a person, including those who create or acquire it for journalistic purposes. Journalistic material that is already published is unlikely to form part of an application for an overseas production order. That is because this material can already be freely accessed by law enforcement agencies, and there would be no need to compel production of information that was already in the public domain.
However, where information relates to confidential journalistic material—that is, it is created subject to an obligation that it would be held in confidence and that obligation continues to be held, or it is held subject to a restriction on disclosure or obligation of secrecy contained in legislation—that material will be subject to the notice provisions under Clauses 12 and 13. Therefore, if a journalist stores information—whether in their manuscript, copy or otherwise—that relates to or contains such confidential material, that can be sought but only if an application is made “on notice”. We expect court rules to set out that such an application cannot be determined by the court in the absence of a respondent unless they have waived the opportunity to attend. That already exists in court rules in relation to domestic production orders if, for example, the police wish to obtain access to a journalist’s notebook.
Our objective is to protect legitimate journalism, ensuring that those who may wish to harm us cannot hide behind claims of the data being journalistic to evade investigation or prosecution. Coupled with that, we have been clear that material acquired or created by the journalist to further a criminal purpose is not considered journalistic material. That terminology is borrowed from the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which sought to ensure that safeguards and protections were targeted at legitimate forms of journalism.
The reason that the Government have carved out material,
“created or acquired with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose”,
is to follow the direction that the Investigatory Powers Act identified, which is that safeguards should not exist for those who intend, through media channels, to do us harm, but then seek to hide behind spurious claims of journalism. One example is the media wing of Daesh, which may use an internet blog designed to disseminate harmful information and claim that it was journalistic material and therefore not caught by the provisions. Conversely, if a journalist acquires a leaked document from a source which alludes to criminal conduct, the journalist acquires it for journalistic purposes, not with the intention of themselves furthering a criminal purpose.
I may have misheard the Minister and therefore misunderstood her argument, but she seemed to be saying at one point that my noble friend’s amendments were not necessary because this is already covered under the PACE regulations. Is that the reason for resisting it—it is not necessary because it goes no further—or is she suggesting that there are elements of it which do go further that the Government are resisting? If the latter is the case, perhaps she could indicate to us what has gone further that she does not like. If it is simply that it is not necessary, can she explain why the Government are resisting it?
I think I have already explained at length why it is not necessary. If Clause 12 were to be amended, a court would not be able to make an overseas production order in relation to confidential journalistic material unless the requirements set out there were satisfied.
So there is no objection to what my noble friend has tabled; the Minister is saying simply that it is not necessary?
The protection of sources in relation to confidential journalistic data is very important to the free press in our country. I pointed out—and, as far as I understand it, this is not being contested by the Government—that there is no requirement in the Bill for the journalist or media organisation which acquired the confidential material to be informed. That seems to be a significant hole in the legislation. Surely in that situation the journalist or media organisation concerned should be able to make representations and to oppose the granting of an order; in other words, their voice should be heard—perhaps, from their point of view, to seek to protect their confidential sources.
I note the Government’s argument that this is already provided for in other legislation. I say only that we are dealing with something here which can relate also—under reciprocal arrangements, presumably—to orders made by a court in another country and not only in relation to orders made by a court in this country. In that situation it is absolutely vital, even if the Government believe that the safeguards are already there, that the ability of a journalist or media organisation to be informed of an application for an order, and the chance to appear and make representations in connection with that order, should be repeated in the Bill. I wish to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, Amendment 7 is an amendment to Clause 5, which deals with the contents of an order. If my amendment were agreed to, subsection (2) would read:
“The judge must not specify or describe in the order electronic data that … consists of or includes excepted electronic data”.
The clause would not include the phrase,
“the judge has reasonable grounds for believing”,
includes excepted data. That may sound as if I am dancing on the head of a pin but I think it is quite an important issue. In Committee I explained that I was seeking a formula that was objective. The Minister responded by referring to the phrase “reasonable grounds” being used elsewhere in the Bill. Indeed, the clauses that she mentioned, Clauses 1 and 7, include that phrase but they are not about an order; they are about the basis for making an application, which I suggest is a rather different matter.
I accept that, as she said, the contents of data may not be known until they are produced, but without our amendment, or some such amendment, the judge could make an order that it later turned out did include excepted data. I was looking for an objectively based exception because how otherwise do you appeal? Would you be appealing against the judge’s reasonableness? That would not be the same as appealing on the basis that the data was excepted. I would find it very uncomfortable to have to appeal against whether or not a judge was reasonable. What really should be at issue is the character of the data, and we are not satisfied that the Bill really addresses that. I beg to move.
I thank the noble Baroness for moving her amendment and for raising this point again. Perhaps my response in Committee was not persuasive enough for her.
The Bill has been drafted to include multiple safeguards so that a person is not required to produce excepted electronic data. “Excepted electronic data” means electronic data that is either an item subject to legal privilege or a confidential personal record. The Government do not want to see overseas production orders being used to obtain such information, nor do we expect our officers to target it.
First, Clause 1(3) sets out that an appropriate officer must not apply for an overseas production order in respect of electronic data where that officer has reasonable grounds for believing that it consists of excepted electronic data. Clause 5(2) includes another one of these safeguards: a judge must not specify or describe data in an overseas production order where he or she has reasonable grounds for believing the data sought includes or consists of excepted data. The wording “reasonable grounds for believing” is important given that there is no guarantee, at the time of considering an application, that either the judge or the applicant can be certain if the data sought will, in fact, contain excepted data.
Let me put it in this context: say the email records of criminal X were requested from June in a certain year because law enforcement agencies believed they had been communicating for criminal purposes with someone else. It would be impossible for either the law enforcement agency or the judge to know for certain that within those emails, there also happened to be correspondence between criminal X and their doctor.
I understand that the noble Baroness’s concerns in Committee were about the objectivity of the judge in allowing an order including potentially excepted data. The Government believe that the term “reasonable grounds for believing” gets us as close to objectivity as practicable. If a judge has “reasonable grounds for believing” that excepted data is included in the data sought in an application, they will not specify that excepted data when making the order. But if they do not have “reasonable grounds for believing”, as long as the other criteria are satisfied, the judge can make the order.
Indeed, should the respondent in receipt of an order know that it includes excepted data, Clause 6(4)(b) ensures that, despite the terms of the order, they are not required to produce that data. The noble Baroness asked in Committee how, if electronic data was within an order, it could be varied or revoked. The fact that the respondent is under no obligation to produce the excepted data removes any need for the respondent to apply to vary or revoke the order. To the extent that the order includes excepted data, it has no effect.
If we return briefly to criminal X, if a judge has allowed an order to be served on a communication service provider where the judge did not know that the emails requested included medical records, but the CSP did, that CSP would not be required to produce those emails. If the CSP provided the emails, knowingly or by accident, the data would then be sifted out by the appropriate body during the sifting exercise. It is therefore reasonable and proportionate for the Bill to retain the term “reasonable grounds for believing”, and it is a sensible reflection of what would happen in practice with overseas production orders.
I hope that, with that explanation, the noble Baroness will feel happy to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. Much of what we said was what we rehearsed in Committee. I have been looking to see whether Clause 6, which deals with the effect of the order, would meet my point. It takes us straight to the provision about the order having effect despite any restriction on the disclosure of information, which we found a difficult provision when we discussed it in Committee.
I will not tax the House by continuing with this at this stage, but I hope that the Minister will understand that I was not simply playing with words; there is real concern that the way that the Bill has been framed raises questions which people may have to grapple with in practice. I hope that they do not have too hard a time. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the noble Baroness has suggested amendments stipulating that court rules must make specific provision for certain things. Amendment 10 prescribes that court rules must be made relating to service of notice on a data controller, a data subject or where the application relates to journalistic data. I hope that I have already set out how we intend rules to include notice provisions in respect of the respondent and anyone else affected by an order. The rules already made by the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee in England and Wales for applications for production orders under Schedule 1 to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and under other legislation, already include provision for the service of notice of applications, and additional special requirements where what is sought is the product of journalism. I refer the House to Part 47 of the Criminal Procedure Rules. The Criminal Procedure Rule Committee has already settled draft rules that, if this Bill passes, would be in terms corresponding with those existing rules.
We expect the court rules to include the same provisions as are currently in place for domestic orders. They would provide that a court must not determine any application for an overseas production order in the absence of the respondent, or other person affected, except in the following circumstances. First, the person has at least two days in which to make representations. Secondly, the court is satisfied that the applicant cannot identify or contact the person. Thirdly, the court is satisfied that it would prejudice the investigation if that person were to be present. Fourthly, the court is satisfied that it would prejudice the investigation to adjourn or postpone the application so as to allow the person to attend. Fifthly, the person has waived the opportunity to attend. In the case of an application which would require the production of confidential journalistic material, the court must not determine the application in the absence of the respondent until they have waived the opportunity to attend. I hope that that satisfies the noble Baroness on Amendments 9 and 10.
My Lords, we have learned about the draft of the new rules and I am grateful for that. It is obviously difficult to take them in simply by listening and not reading them, although I noted the wording that one of the exceptions was that the court was satisfied that the person concerned—I am not sure what the technical term would be—“cannot” contact somebody. That is not the same as “will not” contact: anybody “can” contact someone, so I suspect that there might be a little more reflection on that.
Throughout the Bill’s progress, we have been told that the Government “intend” something or “expect” something. There comes a point when one hears that rather too often not to want to see something on the face of the Bill when it is material to the Bill. However, I am glad to have heard that progress has been made with regard to the rules and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, raised an issue about which Act would take precedence in the event of a conflict between this Bill—when it becomes an Act—and the Data Protection Act 2018. His amendment makes it clear that, in the case of a conflict, the DPA, along with the GDPR, would take precedence. That seems quite sensible: it gives us certainty on the matter, for the reasons outlined by the noble Lord. I support his amendment.
I thank both noble Lords for their points. There has been nothing in our own domestic law that requires a UK provider to comply with an overseas order. There will therefore be no conflict with domestic law if a CSP decides that complying with a foreign order would put it in breach of its obligations under the GDPR.
The existence of any conflict with UK data protection law does not have the effect of making the order from the other country invalid. Equally, the existence of the order does not compel the UK CSP to ignore its data protection obligations under UK law. It will be for the CSP on which an order is served to reconcile and comply with all legal obligations it is under. It could apply for the variation or revocation of the order, or use the dispute resolution mechanism that we expect all specific international agreements to include. That said, we do not think that this is likely to be necessary in practice. The GDPR contains several “gateways” which permit the cross-border transfer of personal data, including in response to a request or order from overseas law enforcement.
I know the noble Lord’s concerns about data protection, and I absolutely sympathise with him. We have discussed this before, and I think that ultimately we all want the same thing: adequate protection for the privacy rights of individuals. I hope that my explanation will satisfy the noble Lord that the Bill does not in any way threaten data protection rights, which are robustly protected by existing legislation. UK CSPs will continue to be bound by the GDPR and the Data Protection Act. Therefore, I hope that the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw Amendment 12.
I am grateful to the Minister. I understand that she has just said that a communications service provider could refuse to comply with an order coming from overseas if the CSP believes that that would bring it into conflict with the GDPR and the Data Protection Act, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I explained in Committee that Clause 7(1) creates a power for the judge to vary or revoke an overseas production order. Where a non-disclosure requirement is included in an overseas production order—by virtue of Clause 8— Clause 7 will apply so that the non-disclosure requirement can also be varied or revoked by a judge.
However, as I said to the Grand Committee, it is the Government’s intention that judges should be able to vary or revoke all orders made under the Bill. As well as overseas production orders, this includes other orders made under provisions in the Bill; for example, an order made under Clause 8(4) which maintains an unexpired non-disclosure requirement when an overseas production order has been revoked. It has also been the intention of government that the procedure and process for varying and revoking an order would be governed by court rules, mirroring current legislation for production orders under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 or the Terrorism Act 2000.
We gave a commitment in Grand Committee to review whether provisions that can be made in court rules relating to non-disclosure requirements when an overseas production order has been revoked should themselves be capable of being varied or revoked on application. Clause 11 provides that court rules may make provisions in relation to the practice and procedure to be followed when making an overseas production order. But the Government accept that this could give rise to doubt as to whether court rules could make provision in respect of other orders made under the Bill. I have therefore proposed an amendment to Clause 17 that puts beyond doubt that court rules can be made not only in relation to overseas production orders but in respect of the types of orders made under Clause 8(4) and Clause 13(3) and (4)(b). This will include making provision for the practice and procedure to be followed when applying to vary or revoke such orders.
Noble Lords raised questions in Committee about the process concerning how someone could vary or revoke an order. The future appeals process also arose in the context of notices that could be served on UK companies by another country party to an agreement. While the Bill deals only with outgoing orders—that is, ones issued by a UK court—we have ensured that the remedies available to someone served with a domestic production order are available to a person served with an overseas production order, and we would expect the other country to do the same.
In addition, we envisage a dispute resolution mechanism as part of any agreement we might designate under the Bill, which would allow a service provider concerned about whether the order that was sought complied with the terms of the agreement to raise objections with the authorities of the country concerned. This would allow a UK service provider to raise objections if it believed that a particular order should not have been served under the agreement. At first instance, these objections would be raised with the issuing country. If the service provider was still not satisfied, it could then go to the relevant UK authority. There may be ongoing discussions between the two parties to the agreement, but ultimately it would be a decision for the relevant UK authority to say whether or not the request from the other authority could safely be given effect to. I hope this addresses the concerns raised in Committee.
My Lords, I think it must be lucky 13 for the Minister. However, I have a question. It may be that I did not properly follow the latter part of her explanation but I come back to “normal speak”. The amendment says that the references,
“include proceedings for the making, variation or revocation of an order”.
Is “include” here a synonym for “mean”? Do we read it as “references mean”? I am sorry to throw that at her at this point. Perhaps I should talk inconsequentially for a moment or two until she receives information via semaphore. The term does suggest that something else might be within the references. I think the Minister is about to get a response to that question.
With the leave of the House, I suggest that the Government return to this tiny thing before the next stage.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for moving his regret Motion. I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Haskel, who first alerted your Lordships to this issue. The House is also grateful, not only on this issue but generally, for the work of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, which scrutinises every instrument that comes before Parliament. It is able to get into what a particular instrument does and then, by engaging with a Minister and through its reports, bring matters of concern to the attention of the House.
Covert surveillance is an important tool that is used to provide the evidence needed to prevent and detect crime. It is necessary, as there may be no other way to get the intelligence needed. Having said that, we have to have proper codes of practice in place and, where that involves young people under the age of 18—who are still legally children—it is of particular concern and importance. We have to ensure that children’s rights are protected and that there are adequate protections in place to take care of their physical and mental well-being and that proper risk assessment is undertaken.
The regret Motion before us rightly expresses regret that organisations concerned with human rights and the welfare of children were not consulted about the decision to extend the maximum length of juvenile covert human intelligence sources authorisations from one month to four months. The Home Office certainly got its presentation of this change wrong. It used terms such as “administrative convenience”, which does nothing to reassure Members that the Government have got the balance right here. What should be of paramount importance is the welfare of the child being used as a covert intelligence source.
As we have heard, this issue was debated in the Moses Room in July—a debate led by my noble friend Lord Haskel—and during that debate I posed a number of questions to the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, and I shall pose some more today. I hope she is able to give more reassurance to the House when she responds to the debate shortly.
Can the Minister explain carefully why the decision was taken to extend the term from one month to four months? Can she tell the House how the Government have satisfied themselves that these proposals satisfy Section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1999 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the United Kingdom ratified in 1991? Can she say how she has satisfied herself that the safeguarding and protection of the children concerned while they work as covert human intelligence sources is delivered? I am sure that she would not have brought this here if she were not personally satisfied.
Moving on to risk assessments, can the Minister tell the House how the rights of the child are protected? Can she outline what specific training or expertise a police officer or other security professional would have in respect of understanding the needs and rights of the child? In what circumstances would it be acceptable for someone who could represent the interests of the young person to not be present during meetings with the handler?
Can the Minister also deal with the issue of consent? How do we make sure that the consent is appropriately understood and given, both where the child’s parents or guardians are informed and in those instances where the parents are not informed or aware of what is happening? Indeed, they could be the people the child is seeking to monitor. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, also raised important points that need answering by the Minister when she responds.
In conclusion, this is a very sensitive and important area of policy affecting vulnerable young people in some very difficult circumstances. It is right that the House uses every device available to it to assure itself that the Government have put the correct and adequate protections in place. Again, I thank both my noble friend Lord Haskel for raising this issue in the first place and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for tabling the regret Motion that has enabled us to debate it.
I also thank both the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for introducing the debate and the noble Lord, Lord Haskel, for his work in bringing this issue to the committee’s attention in the first place. He may think that I am not really thanking him, but I am—it is important for your Lordships’ House to discuss these matters, particularly one such as this which has been in force for the past 18 years and only recently amended ever so slightly.
The debate allows me to both reiterate the importance with which the Government view the safeguarding of those small numbers of young people authorised as covert human intelligence sources and restate the enhanced safeguards that support the juvenile CHIS authorisation framework. We have recently strengthened those safeguards further, as noble Lords have mentioned.
I recognise the concern about the power more broadly, which has been remarked on before not just by me but by other noble Lords. The deployment involved is very small—it is unlikely to reach double figures. However, it is not a new concept. The 2000 order and the various iterations of the CHIS code of practice have governed the use of juvenile CHIS for almost two decades, ensuring that where it is necessary to authorise juveniles as CHIS, an enhanced authorisation and risk assessment is applied. I hope that the debate will assure noble Lords that the existing regime and our amendments to provide a legal framework place the welfare of the CHIS as the primary consideration; the interests of the child have been and will be paramount.
I will start by addressing the question of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, asked me a very similar one—on why we have extended the authorisation for the juvenile CHIS from one month to four months and why we are increasing the period between renewals at a point when CHIS are being deployed in increasingly dangerous situations. Secondly, he asked why, when a monthly review of the case is required in any event, the review could not just continue to consider renewal of the authorisation—that is a question that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has now posed to me twice.
I am very grateful to the Minister. Can she clarify? Under the old system, the assistant chief constable or equivalent would have to renew the authorisation every month; under the new system, it is my understanding that the assistant chief constable will only be involved every four months if there is a renewal and is not involved on a monthly basis as under the old system.
I have this answer somewhere, if the noble Lord will bear with me. It is a statutory requirement for the authorisation to be at the rank of assistant chief constable. I think the noble Lord knows that. The monthly review is not a statutory requirement, but as a further safeguard we have included it in the updated code of practice.
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness. The question was: is the monthly review undertaken by the assistant chief constable or by the officer who sought the authorisation to use the child as a CHIS?
I understand that the monthly review is done by the assistant chief constable. Have I still not answered the noble Lord’s question? The monthly review might be carried out by the authorising officer, but it is not a statutory requirement.
I am very sorry. My understanding was that the monthly review is done by the officer who applied to use the CHIS, not by the assistant chief constable. Have I got that wrong?
I do not know whether the noble Lord has that right or wrong. I will have to come back to him on that point. Just so he does not think I am derelict in my duty, I did ask that question but I will have to come back to him on it.
I turn to the second question, which was not about the changes that we have made but about the existing distinction in the safeguards, where an appropriate adult must be present in all meetings with a juvenile under the age of 16, but not for those aged 16 and 17. The noble Lord compared this with rules around the interview of juveniles under caution, where interviews of all under-18s require an appropriate adult to be present. I point out that 16 and 17 year-olds can absolutely request that somebody be present—a social worker, an appropriate adult or even a lawyer—but it is not mandated. That probably will not satisfy the noble Lord, but the law recognises that parental responsibility diminishes as a child matures. There are therefore a number of areas where the law treats over-16s differently from under-16s. For example, they can apply for their own passports or join the military.
Internal police guidance on deploying juvenile CHIS contains detail on how to safeguard and promote the well-being of the juvenile CHIS, including how to assess their maturity and capacity to give informed consent, which the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, mentioned, a requirement to ensure that handlers are properly trained to deal with young people—they have day-to-day responsibility for the CHIS and must raise any issues surrounding matters including the safety and welfare of the CHIS with those responsible for authorising their deployment—and requirements to consider all aspects of safeguarding the young person.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness on that point. Is she saying that the officers concerned get special training in that respect to deal with young people in this situation?
Yes. Any officer dealing with a juvenile will have safeguarding training.
The enhanced risk assessments required before a CHIS is tasked are reviewed and updated throughout the duration of an authorisation, and are also updated after an authorisation is cancelled and where contact is maintained with the CHIS. This applies to all juvenile CHISs, regardless of age, but it really should not be taken that the vulnerability of all those aged under 18 is not taken seriously when considering deployment as a CHIS. Rather, the risk assessments are made on a case-by-case basis by those charged with day-to-day dealings with the CHIS, including on their safety and welfare, and who are charged with relaying this to the authorising officer, who also has a role in this assessment.
In a recent letter to the chair of the JCHR, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, Lord Justice Fulford, provided clarity on what his inspectors considered when inspecting public authorities which have authorised juvenile CHISs, and confirmed that the detailed focus of his inspectors is on the “duty of care”.
Turning to the very specific comparison, I think we are probably talking about a different scenario—one where the juvenile could be charged with an offence, and convicted or given a caution. With a juvenile CHIS, we are talking about a very different scenario. A child would need to give or confirm their consent to take on the role, and is under no obligation or pressure to act as a juvenile CHIS.
The third question raised by the noble Lord, and also by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, is how the needs of the specific child are prioritised, particularly with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in mind. The UK ensures that the principles of the convention are considered and realised through the approach taken in legislation and other measures, ensuring that the child’s rights and interests are safeguarded.
On the previous point made by the Minister about there being no pressure put on a young person to act as a CHIS, is it possible, when a young person has come to the attention of the authorities—or may have committed a crime—that it would be suggested to the child that matters would not be proceeded with if they were to act as a CHIS instead?
I understand the noble Lord’s point. It would be unwise for me to stand at the Dispatch Box and say that that was the case, because I simply do not know. I can find that out. It would be rather cynical to take the view that these children, who are perhaps not perfect in many cases, would be deployed just on the information that officers could get out of them or as a quid pro quo for leniency over other matters in which they may have been found wanting.
I am just trying to understand the situation. It would be nice to hear from the noble Baroness at some point—maybe she can write to us. It should obviously always come to the attention of the authorities through various means, such as intelligence. However the authorities come to it, what are the circumstances such young people would find themselves in with the authorities?
I will certainly write to the noble Lord on that matter.
The legal framework governing the authorisation and the use of the juvenile CHIS, when taken as a whole, is clearly capable of being exercised in a way which is consistent with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The 2000 order, the supporting guidance provided in the CHIS code of practice and the internal guidance applied by public authorities seeking to use juvenile CHISs, all ensure that the welfare of any juvenile being considered for deployment as a CHIS is the paramount consideration.
Each part of the legislative framework is designed to ensure that the authorisation of a CHIS under the age of 18 is subject to enhanced safeguards, reflecting the need to consider the welfare of the child. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Juveniles) Order 2000 requires enhanced risk assessments to accompany any decision to use a juvenile CHIS, which are updated to reflect developments during the course of the deployment. They take into account the physical and psychological welfare of that young person, and are also updated after the deployment if contact is made.
The police will also have regard to their broader safeguarding responsibilities when making these decisions, which was the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. Indeed, the National Strategy for the Policing of Children and Young People, endorsed and published by the National Police Chiefs’ Council in 2015, says:
“It is crucial that in all encounters with the police those below the age of 18 should be treated as children first. All officers must have regard to their safety, welfare and wellbeing”,
as required under Sections 10 and 11 of the Children Act 2004 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Is the “operational community” operational in the children’s sector or is it police operational?
I understand that it would be police operational, but I will clarify for the noble Baroness whether operators in the children’s sector were also involved.
The updates to the CHIS code of practice in 2014 and 2017 were subject to formal public consultation, with no concerns raised about either the use of juveniles as CHISs or the safeguards that apply. But this provision has been in place for 18 years and it has probably had more scrutiny in the last two months than it ever had during those 18 years—and that is a good thing.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, also outlined an absolutely harrowing case study. I understand that those issues, if we are talking about the same ones, are being considered by the undercover police inquiry and that the Home Office is co-operating fully with the inquiry. We have responded to requests for information and have given the inquiry access to our files and records.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, raised the issue of further oversight. I think that I went through that point when we last debated this. It would not be a simple matter; it would be one for primary legislation. Nevertheless, I take his point. I hope he feels that, under the leadership of Governments of different political colours, the safeguards have been enhanced and are robust, and that there is strong and effective oversight in the form of Lord Justice Fulford.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, talked about the public consultations on the provision. It was subject to statutory public consultations—most recently in 2017-18—and views from all were absolutely welcome. It is not incompatible with existing legislation—but, as I have just said, this House has given it more scrutiny than any other.
I have two more scraps of paper. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked about the authorising officer. The authorising officer should, where possible, be responsible for completing subsequent renewals and any other related security or welfare issue—but I do not think that that answers his question. I now know what that question was, and the other scrap does not answer it, either, so I will get back to him on that specific point.
This House has given this really serious issue the time, scrutiny and questioning that it deserves, after 18 years of it passing largely unnoticed by either House of Parliament. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Haskel, for raising this in the first instance and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for raising it today.
My Lords, I too thank the noble Lord, Lord Haskel, and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee for bringing this provision to the attention of the House. As he said, using children in this way puts them in danger, and if any of us were in any doubt about that, the harrowing story that my noble friend Lady Hamwee told the House clearly indicates that.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, made the important point that surveillance commissioners formerly and now judicial commissioners review the deployment of child CHISs after the event. There is now a recognised definition of a child as a person under 18. We should be talking about child CHISs, not juvenile CHISs, in this debate. An eminently sensible suggestion was made. Under the Investigatory Powers Act, many surveillance powers are subject to the double lock whereby both a senior officer and a judicial commissioner agree to the use of the surveillance technique. Why can that not be used in this case?
The Minister kept talking about the enhanced safeguards provided by these regulations. We still do not know whether the independent senior officer—the assistant chief constable—will be looking at these cases every four months instead of, as previously, having to look at them every month because the assistant chief constable could authorise for only one month at a time. We still do not know who is doing the review. If it is being done by the officer who applied to the assistant chief constable, rather than by the assistant chief constable himself or herself, I do not think anybody could describe that as an enhanced safeguard.
The Minister said that a child being interviewed under caution for a criminal offence is not comparable with being recruited as a CHIS. It is far more dangerous to be recruited as a CHIS than it is to be interviewed. The fact that 16 and 17 year-olds can be recruited as CHISs without an adult being present but cannot be questioned about a criminal offence does not strike me as an enhanced safeguard. Whether the legal framework governing the authorisation and use of juvenile CHISs, when taken as a whole, is clearly capable of being exercised in a way that is consistent with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child is an issue that the courts will be asked to consider. Therefore, on that question we perhaps do not need to take things further today.
I am very grateful to the Minister not only for the time to debate this twice, once in Grand Committee and once in the Chamber, but for the time she has spent discussing these issues with me and trying to clarify what we need on the record. Unfortunately, I do not feel that we have got there this evening. There are unresolved matters which the Minister has agreed to write to noble Lords about. At this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the Motion.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper and draw attention to my interests as outlined in the register.
My Lords, all asylum decision-makers undertake a bespoke training package on how to assess religious and belief-based persecution claims. UK Visas and Immigration is currently working with the All-Party Parliamentary Group for International Freedom of Religion or Belief to develop a specialist considering religion or belief in the asylum claim training course. This will be introduced in the new year and will enhance asylum decision-makers’ religious literacy in dealing with these complex issues.
I thank the Minister for the work done by her and her officials since the publication of a report co-authored by the All-Party Parliamentary Group drawing attention to the problems with assessing these claims and, in particular, to policy and practice being somewhat different. Will the Minister outline what plans the department has to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of that training so that in a few years’ time we are not facing the same difference between training and the decisions being made?
I thank my noble friend for her Question, her follow-up question and the tenacity and commitment she has shown on this issue. The new specialist course will form part of a continuous training package for asylum decision-makers, technical specialists and senior caseworkers. UKVI expects to roll it out in early 2019. UKVI has an internal audit process to assess the quality of decisions and interviews and the application of policy. Allowed appeals are also regularly analysed. In addition, independent audits are carried out by the operational assurance and security unit.
My Lords, there was considerable publicity around the case of the Pakistani humanist Hamza bin Walayat who failed his asylum application in part, it is thought, because he failed to identify Plato and Aristotle as humanists. What steps will the Home Office take to ensure that asylum assessors are better educated about the beliefs of non-religious people, including humanists?
The noble Baroness outlines precisely why training in religious literacy and indeed about those who have no beliefs or are humanists, which is a belief in and of itself, is required in order to make proper decisions.
My Lords, the Minister will be aware of the report Still Falling Short, which was produced recently by the UK Lesbian and Gay Immigration group highlighting that LGBT+ asylum seekers were routinely disbelieved by Home Office decision-makers, and were falling short of the legal standard required in asylum applications. For example, one applicant was told that LGBT+ people cannot possibly follow a religion and that their application was rejected. What is being done to address this failure?
I think I outlined the process to my noble friend, but the noble Baroness is right to point out that you can be LGBT and have a religion. The care with which asylum case decision-makers make their judgments is very important, as are the sensitivities around interviewing LGBT people and those who are persecuted for their faith.
My Lords, having visited Pakistan earlier this month and seen first-hand the abject, festering conditions in which many of the country’s religious minorities live, and having heard accounts of abduction, rape, the forced marriage of a nine year-old, forced conversion, death sentences for so-called blasphemy—the Minister may have heard the interview on the “Today” programme on Saturday morning with a young woman whose mother has spent eight years on death row for so-called blasphemy with a death sentence hanging over her—and in one case, children being forced to watch as their parents were burned alive, I ask the Minister: how can the Home Office in all those circumstances continue to say that what is happening in Pakistan to religious believers and humanists is merely discrimination, not persecution?
I do not think I or the House would disagree with the noble Lord in the examples that he cites, particularly those in Pakistan of certain religious groups being persecuted under blasphemy laws. Sadly, the laws in Pakistan are quite different from the laws here; unpalatable though we might find them, they are the laws there. Nevertheless, each application to our asylum system should be dealt with in terms of the persecution that people might face.
My Lords, how long will it take from rollout for the whole of the relevant force of people to receive the training? What oversight will there be to make sure that it has been understood and implemented?
I think I outlined that process just now to my noble friend Lady Berridge. We are expecting to roll it out in 2019. With regard to quality assurance, the audits are going to be carried out by an operational security unit for both the quality of the decision and the application of the policy.
My Lords, there have been media reports that a further problem is that staff considering asylum applications are rushed because there is a backlog to deal with, and that in addition staff have targets to meet in respect of the number of decisions they have to make each week on whether to grant or refuse asylum seekers. Is there still a backlog of people waiting for an asylum decision or for an appeal to be heard? If so, how big is that backlog? What targets in reality are staff making asylum decisions expected to meet each day, week or month?
My Lords, it is important that the decisions made are the right ones. I could not comment on decisions being rushed, but I can go back to the department to ask that question. There are certainly a lot of decisions to be made, because people want to come to this country, and I can try to ascertain a figure for the backlog.
My Lords, before training is rolled out, will some religious leaders in this country be consulted on what sort of training might be appropriate, and the sort of questions that may be asked of asylum seekers? At the moment, I should be hard-pressed to answer some of them.
I would struggle with the questions proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, and might also struggle with questions on my religion. Religious leaders have been engaged. What is to be established is the reason for persecution, therefore religious literacy is needed for the assessors—it is not a test of religious facts.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the concerns raised by the National Police Chiefs’ Council about Police and Crime Commissioners and their impact on applications for Chief Constable positions.
My Lords, we are committed to ensuring that policing continues to attract the leaders that it needs for the future. The 2015 College of Policing Leadership Review set the foundation, and we have built on this by funding a leadership hub. Chiefs, PCCs and the college are rising to this challenge.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that Answer, but she will be aware that there is increasing concern about the rapid turnover of chief constables, particularly women. It seems to be a problem, too, that new appointments are often made from a shortlist of one—often, the deputy chief constable. She will be aware that Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary has expressed concern that bright officers are not applying for these posts because they think police commissioners have already made up their minds. Will she use the powers that she has to determine that any appointment must be made from a strong shortlist, and that no one should become a chief constable unless they have also undertaken a senior post with another force, rather than simply being promoted from the inside?
I certainly recognise the point that the noble Lord makes about the feeling that people are promoted from the inside and, therefore, that perhaps officers do not apply from other forces. On female turnover, we should welcome the fact that we have a female commissioner of the Met police, which is fantastic news. The chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council is also a woman, and the director-general of the NCA is also female. However, I understand the noble Lord’s point. I also think that chiefs themselves have a role to play in attracting and encouraging talent coming up through the pipeline. The College of Policing published a code of ethics, guidance on flexible working and guidance on the use of positive action to increase the recruitment and retention of underrepresented groups, including females.
My Lords, it has always been the case that incumbent chief officers have had an advantage over outside candidates, but this has been made worse by the fact that there is a one-to-one relationship between the police and crime commissioner and his or her chief officer team. Why will the Home Office not reimpose the requirement that a national Home Office-led assessment is part of the selection process? Even the noble Lord, Lord Sugar, has a panel of experts to help him decide who his apprentice will be.
The PCC, in recruiting his chief constable, has to be mindful of the quality of candidate he is recruiting. The thing about PCCs, which was not true of police authorities when they existed, is that the public can hold them to account at the ballot box.
My Lords, I declare my interest as the police and crime commissioner for Leicestershire. As the Minister knows well, Leicestershire has a long-standing chief constable—who is still fairly young, by comparison—who it is a pleasure and an honour to work with. Police and crime commissioners do come together in their joint concern—a concern the Minister will know of, and which is shared around the House—that Her Majesty’s Government have allowed cuts in this area to go too far, and this is seriously putting at risk the ability of the police anywhere to do their jobs.
First, I express my sympathy with the noble Lord—Parliament’s one and only PCC—regarding the number of times that his Benches stand up and criticise PCCs. I have been to Leicester, I have seen him in action, I have met his chief constable and I pay tribute to the work that they do. In terms of funding, the noble Lord will know that the Policing Minister visited every police force in England and Wales with regard to coming to a funding settlement for 2018-19. In addition, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary has recently said that he appreciates the pressures that the police are under, not least because of the things that they have had to deal with in the last 12 months.
My Lords, my noble friend referred to the fact that PCCs can be held accountable, but does she not recognise the problem in the case of Wiltshire? After Operation Conifer, the chief constable moved to another area and the PCC is not standing for re-election. How, then, can the public make their views known?
I fully understand the sentiments expressed by both my noble friend and Members of the House on this issue in general. In terms of the chief constable, although I am not referring to this particular case, moving force does not of itself absolve someone from accountability for their actions. As I said, certainly the PCC who, is much more high-profile than local police authorities, can be held to account by his or her voters.
My Lords, I refer to my interests as listed in the register. When I was involved in appointing chief officers in the police service, we had the benefit of receiving advice from the Home Office senior appointments panel, which the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, referred to, which told us whether the shortlist was adequate and broad enough, and we also had the benefit of advice from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary. Legislation now precludes the Chief Inspector of Constabulary from providing advice to chief constables. Why is that?
My Lords, I do not know the answer to that question. I will have to take that back, if the noble Lord does not mind, and come up with a reply, because I am not quite sure of the history of this.
My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that a senior police officer who had to leave Police Scotland under allegations of bullying has been appointed an inspector of constabulary in England? Has she any comments on that?
As I said, I do not have comments to make on individual cases, but I said in response to a previous question that moving forces does not absolve you from being accountable for the actions that you have taken in another force.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they will reconsider their decision not to institute an independent inquiry into Operation Conifer carried out by the Wiltshire Constabulary in relation to Sir Edward Heath.
My Lords, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary recently had the opportunity to discuss Operation Conifer with the noble Lords, Lord Armstrong, Lord Hunt and Lord MacGregor. He and I recognise the continuing interest of this House in the issue, but remain of the view that there are no grounds for the Government to intervene.
My Lords, is it not quite disgraceful that, a year after the completion of the deeply flawed Operation Conifer, nothing whatever has been done about the slur which unsubstantiated allegations have left on the reputation of Sir Edward Heath? The Wiltshire police and crime commissioner—Conservative, I am sorry to say—has made it clear time and again that he will take no action. The responsibility passes to the Government, and the Government must not evade that responsibility. Does my noble friend recall that when I last raised this burning injustice on 12 July, the noble Lord, Lord Blair of Boughton, pointed out that all the Government have to do is ask Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary to send one of Her Majesty’s inspectors to Wiltshire? Why has this not been done?
My noble friend will know that HMIC, as it then was, could investigate aspects of police operations or the function of the police. It would not be in a position, as I think I have explained previously, to investigate this allegation. I completely recognise the desire of noble Lords to find a solution to this and it is unfortunate that Operation Conifer was not able to resolve conclusively the position in relation to the allegations made against Sir Ted Heath.
My Lords, with the attempts to destroy the reputations of Sir Edward Heath, Paul Gambaccini, Sir Cliff Richard, Harvey Proctor, Leon Brittan, Lord Bramall and now Greville Janner, on the back of either false or unproven allegations and without a shred of evidence being brought before the courts, and often with statutory compensation in mind, is it not about time that the Government stopped turning a blind eye to these huge breaches of human rights and reviewed the law, particularly in the areas of anonymity and statutory compensation? British justice is being trashed and we are witnesses to it.
I absolutely recognise the strength of feeling from noble Lords, particularly in relation to those who have died and are not here to speak for themselves. Of course, if those individuals are dead, any inquiry that might be conducted would obviously depend on the evidence brought before it. The police are operationally independent of government and we must recognise that. The Government would step in only where all other avenues had been exhausted.
My Lords, Operation Conifer spent two years and £1.5 million conducting a range of interviews with those who had known Sir Edward Heath or worked for him, and produced not a scintilla of evidence to support allegations of child abuse. The operation examined 42 such allegations; 35 of them were dismissed out of hand. Seven allegations remained on which those involved said they would have wished to interview Sir Edward Heath had he still been alive; those remain, as it were, open and unresolved. It is now evident that four of those allegations are baseless and it seems highly likely that the other three are equally baseless. One can only speculate on why the Wiltshire Police decided to leave them unresolved. Is it not a reasonable measure of justice that somebody should examine these seven allegations to confirm that there is no reality to them and to clear the suspicion that has been hanging over Sir Edward Heath since the Wiltshire Police publicly instituted its investigation in 1915?
I think that the noble Lord might have meant 2015 but I absolutely take his point. A review, which of course it would be open to the PCC to instigate, may consider whether any of the allegations that he talks about—the remaining six—would have justified a decision by the Crown Prosecution Service to prosecute. But as I said to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, the ability of the reviewer to do this would depend on the evidence that was brought forward.
My Lords, there is no doubt that the chief constable has not been effectively held to account for Operation Conifer. The Minister says that it is not a failure of the Home Office. It must therefore be a failure of the police and crime commissioner. Is it not time to break up the often too cosy one-to-one relationship between chief constables and police and crime commissioners and revert to police authorities?
In the time that PCCs have been established, they are generally accepted to have worked well.
Noble Lords may laugh, particularly on the Labour side, but we have had many Labour PCCs. There have been two in my area: Andy Burnham and Tony Lloyd. The system is accepted to have worked well. In addition, the Home Affairs Select Committee has supported the way PCCs have operated and their visibility to the public. I was on a police authority and I am absolutely sure that at that time nobody knew the membership of that police authority, but they certainly know who their PCC is. In your Lordships’ House we have the only parliamentarian who is a PCC.
Will my noble friend accept that the reply she read out first really will not do? I hate to say that because I admire my noble friend as one of our best Ministers and I think she handles her portfolio brilliantly, but in this case I have to ask her to take that reply back to the Home Office. A dead statesman has had his reputation almost fatally tarnished on very dodgy evidence and it is time that justice was injected into this situation. This should be the time to do that.
I thank my noble friend for those very kind words. I have twice gone back to two successive Home Secretaries and my right honourable friends have seen my noble friends in regard to this matter. The most recent meeting was in the past few weeks, and that remains the position of my right honourable friend the Home Secretary.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, no Government take any pleasure in having to put before your Lordships’ House another counterterrorism Bill. Like its predecessors, this Bill is borne out of necessity. Regrettably, the threat to this country from terrorism is ever present. Indeed, the threat level has been at severe or higher for over four years, meaning that a terrorist attack is highly likely. The police and security services now assess that over the last two years we have seen an enduring shift in the threat, rather than simply a spike.
It is easy to reel off statistics. Seventeen Islamist or far-right terrorist plots have been thwarted since March 2017; as of June, there were some 3,000 subjects of interest known to the police and intelligence agencies, and 412 arrests for terrorism-related offences in 2017. But dry statistics can never bring home the pain and sorrow suffered by individual victims of terrorism. Over recent weeks, we have heard the harrowing testimony at the inquest into the deaths of the five victims of last year’s terrorist attack on Westminster Bridge and at the gates of this very building. In this and the four subsequent attacks in 2017, in Manchester, London Bridge, Finsbury Park and Parsons Green, a further 31 innocent victims lost their lives, and in total over 200 others were injured. The family and friends of those who lost their lives will have to live with this painful loss for the rest of their lives, while the victims who survive have to deal with the ongoing mental anguish and, in some cases, life-changing physical injuries.
As a Government, we must do all we can to prevent such tragedies happening again, although regrettably there can be no guarantee that every plot will be foiled. One way we can do this is to make sure that our counterterrorism legislation remains fit for purpose. Much of the current legislation dates back to Acts passed in 2000 or 2006. In the intervening years, the nature of the threat has evolved. We have seen new patterns of radicalisation, the widespread use of social media to spread hateful ideology, and the draw of the so-called caliphate in Syria. We have also seen more rapidly evolving plots using everyday items such as vehicles and knives as weapons, which although still deadly are less sophisticated and complex than the plots of previous years. This has led to a lowering of the barriers to entry and a decrease in the time taken to plan and prepare by those with murderous intent.
Against this evolving threat, it is only right that we should bring our counterterrorism legislation up to date so that our law enforcement and intelligence agencies have the necessary, but proportionate, powers to help counter the threat as it manifests itself today, and not the one they had to contend with nearly 20 years ago. The provisions in Part 1 are directed to this end. In reviewing existing legislation, we have listened carefully to our operational partners: the police, prosecutors and the intelligence services, but also the current and former Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation—I am pleased to see the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, in his place. We have also listened and responded to the debates on these provisions during the passage of the Bill in the House of Commons.
The Bill closes a number of gaps in existing terrorism offences. Under Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000 it is already an offence deliberately to invite support for a proscribed terrorist organisation, whether expressly or by implication. However, there are demagogues who, without intending to encourage others to support such groups, or at least without the prosecution being able to prove such an intention, nevertheless recklessly choose to voice their own support, knowing full well that the effect of their words will be to do just that. It is right that the criminal law should bite in such cases.
The Bill also updates Section 13 of the 2000 Act which criminalises the display, in public places, of a flag or other emblem of a proscribed organisation in such a way, or in such circumstances, as to arouse a reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation. The provision in Clause 2 makes it clear that the publication of an image of such a flag or emblem online, in circumstances which arouse that reasonable suspicion, comes within the ambit of Section 13. So, for example, a person would commit the offence if he or she posted on social media a picture of themselves taken in their bedroom and displaying a Daesh flag in the background, thereby making the image available to the public, and, if taking all the surrounding circumstances into account, such a display aroused a reasonable suspicion that he or she was a member or supporter of Daesh.
We are also strengthening the existing offence, in Section 58 of the 2000 Act, of collecting or possessing information likely to be of use to a terrorist. Here again, we need to ensure that the criminal law reflects how people now make use of the internet. If someone were to download a document containing information likely to be useful to a terrorist, it would be in their possession and they would therefore be committing the Section 58 offence. If, instead of downloading the document, they were to view it online or to stream a video or audio recording containing the information, without any record being made on their device, the offence would not apply. This cannot be right. This loophole is a clear illustration of how criminal law has not kept pace with the digital age. Clause 3 therefore provides that a person who views or otherwise accesses terrorist material online is within the ambit of the Section 58 offence. But it is not the intention here to criminalise a person who unintentionally views such material, so the clause provides that it is a defence for a person to show that they did not know, or had no reason to believe, that the material is likely to be useful to a person preparing or committing an act of terrorism.
This part of the Bill also helps us to respond more effectively to the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters—an issue which I know is of great interest to my noble friend Lord Marlesford. We already have a number of powers to disrupt travel to conflict zones overseas but here, as elsewhere, we need to ensure that the coverage is as comprehensive as it should be. Accordingly, the Bill provides for a new offence of entering or remaining in a designated area overseas. The Home Secretary may make such a designation where he or she is satisfied that it is necessary to restrict UK nationals and residents from travelling to, or remaining in, the area for the purpose of protecting the public from risk of terrorism. Any regulations designating an area will be subject to the affirmative procedure; consequently, after they have been made and come into force, they will need to be debated and approved by both Houses if the designation is to remain in effect.
The designated area offence will be subject to a reasonable excuse defence. We are clear, for example, that the defence would apply to a person travelling to a designated area for the purpose of providing humanitarian aid or to carry out work as a journalist. This defence will operate in the same way as the existing reasonable excuse defences in the Terrorism Act 2000. Accordingly, once a defendant has raised the defence, the onus will be on the prosecution to disprove the defence to the criminal standard.
The Bill also seeks to tackle the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters by extending the reach of the UK courts. It is not for the law enforcement agencies in this country to police the world but, when someone has travelled from the UK and committed a terrorist offence abroad, it is right that they should be brought to justice if they return here. Many terrorist offences are already subject to extraterritorial jurisdiction. We are now extending the jurisdiction of the UK courts to cover further terrorism offences committed abroad, including activity that we have seen conducted by those who have joined Daesh, such as the dissemination of terrorist publications to individuals back in the UK and the possession of explosives for the purposes of an act of terrorism.
It is not enough that we prosecute and convict those who commit terrorist offences; we also need to ensure that the punishment properly reflects the seriousness of the crime and that our communities are protected by the courts having the scope to hand down appropriately lengthy sentences. New sentencing guidelines which came into force in April will go some way in this direction, but the Sentencing Council and the courts necessarily have to operate within the current maximum penalties set out by Parliament.
Having reviewed the maximum penalties for some terrorism offences, we are satisfied that they no longer adequately reflect the seriousness of the offending behaviour and the high level of harm that can be caused. Accordingly, the Bill increases to 15 years’ imprisonment the maximum penalty for four offences, namely: collecting terrorist information; eliciting, communicating or publishing information likely to be useful to a terrorist about a member of the Armed Forces; encouragement of terrorism; and dissemination of terrorist publications. In response to representations from Max Hill QC, the outgoing Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, we are also increasing to 10 years’ imprisonment the maximum penalty for the offence of failure to disclose information about acts of terrorism. As now, it will be for the courts to determine the appropriate sentence in each individual case.
In addition, we are bringing preparatory terrorism offences within the scope of the extended sentence regimes in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Where an extended sentence is imposed by the court, the offender is not released automatically at the halfway point of the custodial term, and is instead only released ahead of the end of the custodial term when the independent Parole Board considers it safe to do so. They are then subject to an extended period on licence.
These changes to the sentencing regime will be further reinforced by a strengthening of the notification requirements, which can apply for up to 30 years following conviction. Registered terrorist offenders will be required to notify the police of a wider range of information, including banking and passport details and details of any vehicle they have use of, to enable the police to better manage the risk of reoffending.
As I said, the Government greatly value the work of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, and we are fortunate to have in this House two former occupants of that office. I look forward to hearing the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and I hope that we will also be able to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, during the course of the Bill.
I am pleased that this part of the Bill gives effect to two recommendations made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, when he was the independent reviewer. First, it introduces a statutory bar on the admissibility in criminal trials of verbal admissions made during an examination at a port under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000. Secondly, it provides for the “detention clock” to be paused where a person arrested or detained under the Terrorism Act 2000 is taken to hospital for treatment. This brings the 2000 Act into line with the long-standing provisions in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. It is right that the police should have the full time allowed under the law to question a suspect before they are released or charged.
Clause 19 is further evidence that this Government are receptive to reasoned arguments for changes to counterterrorism legislation. Noble Lords will recall that what is now the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 put the Prevent duty and Channel panels on to a statutory footing. I have no doubt that we will hear more about the Prevent programme during the debate today and subsequently, but for now I just pay tribute to the prescience of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, who argued back in 2015 that local authorities, as well as the police, should be able to refer to a Channel panel a person at risk of being drawn into terrorism. It might have taken us three years to take on board that suggestion but I hope that she can take some satisfaction from the fact that her proposal is now being given effect.
Finally on this part of the Bill, I want to mention the amendment to the Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act 1993 made by Clause 20. That Act enables the Government to extend an unlimited guarantee to the terrorism reinsurer, Pool Re. This in turn enables the insurance market to provide insurance to businesses for loss caused by damage to commercial property from terrorist attacks. The Bill will amend the 1993 Act to enable Pool Re to extend its business interruption cover to include losses from terrorist attacks that are not contingent on damage to commercial property.
The threats to our national security are not confined to terrorism; they also come from hostile state activity, and we have seen recent devastating evidence of this threat in our communities. In March, we saw the poisoning in Salisbury of Sergei and Yulia Skripal and Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey using a military-grade nerve agent. The Crown Prosecution Service has now charged two men for this attack, and the Government have concluded that they are officers in the Russian military intelligence service, the GRU. This was not a rogue operation. It was almost certainly approved outside the GRU at a senior level in the Russian state. The same two men are now the prime suspects in the case of Dawn Sturgess and Charlie Rowley.
The events in Salisbury are part of a pattern of behaviour by the Russian Government, and they are not alone in engaging in hostile activity that threatens the United Kingdom. Given this, the time has come to harden our defences against hostile state activity. As a first step, Part 2 of the Bill provides for a new power to stop, question, search and detain persons at ports, airports and the Northern Ireland border area to determine whether they are, or have been, engaged in hostile activity by or on behalf of a foreign state.
These provisions will serve to address a current gap in our ability to tackle the threat posed by hostile state actors and will mirror in many respects the existing powers to stop and question persons at the border for counterterrorism purposes. Indeed, this is another area where the Bill reflects a proposal made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, in his previous role as independent reviewer. In his report on the terrorism Acts in 2015 and subsequently in evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee, he argued for a power to determine whether a port user is engaged in national security threats such as espionage or proliferation.
No one wants their travel plans disrupted, or to be subjected to intrusive questioning as they enter or leave the country. As with existing border powers in the Terrorism Act, those afforded by Schedule 3 to the Bill will be subject to a number of checks and balances to ensure that they are not used in an arbitrary fashion, but are subject to rigorous independent oversight—in this case by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. The important safeguards on the face of the Bill will be augmented in a statutory code of practice, and I can give an undertaking to the House today to publish a draft of the Schedule 3 code of practice before we reach Part 2 of the Bill in Committee.
It is incumbent on the Government of the day to keep the people of this country safe and secure from the threats posed by terrorism and hostile state activity. As part of this, it is inevitable that from time to time we need to refresh our laws to ensure they remain up to date for present-day threats. Faced with the horrors of the five terrorist attacks last year, it is inevitable that such events can act as a catalyst for change. It is right, however, that your Lordships’ House should consider the provisions in this Bill dispassionately. Such individual tragedies should not cloud our judgment, but we must remain alive to the fact that the decisions we make as legislators have real world consequences. This Bill will help reduce the risk of tragedies similar to the ones we saw in London, Manchester, Salisbury and Amesbury from happening again, and on that basis, I commend this Bill to the House.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this very serious debate. We should never forget the nature of the issues we are discussing. Contributions throughout the debate have reminded us just what we are dealing with. I echo the tributes paid to not just the police but the emergency services, who dealt so bravely with the terrorist threats we faced last year, and to my noble friend Lord Tebbit, who spoke not only as a victim of terrorism but for the victims who can no longer speak.
It was particularly pleasing to hear the two maiden speeches. When my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier told the House that he had made his maiden speech in the middle of the night, I did not know whether he had actually engineered that because I arranged for my maiden speech to be in the Moses Room so that not many people would hear it. He brings to this House many years of experience practising at the Bar and of course was Solicitor-General for two years. Drawing on his experiences, he has given us some valuable insights into the provisions in the Bill, particularly those relating to the changes to the criminal law and sentencing. We also heard from the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie. I am glad he is not “Lord Tyrie of Tyrie, Tyrie”, because that might be a bit of a mouthful. But I know he will hold the Government to account in this House with the same vigour that he showed during his 20 distinguished years in the House of Commons, including seven years at the chair of the Treasury Select Committee. I note that one of the accolades he earned in that time was,
“The most powerful backbencher in the House of Commons”,
so it was with some trepidation that I listened to his speech, but I was very interested in some of the things he said and I look forward to further discussions with him.
The many other contributors to the debate demonstrated yet again the considerable experience that the Members of your Lordships’ House bring to bear when scrutinising legislation such as this. I am sure that, given the length and breadth of the debate, noble Lords will appreciate that I cannot possibly answer every single question but, in addition to responding to the debate, I will endeavour to write a fulsome letter, which I will place in the Library. We have had the benefit of insights from a former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, a former director-general of the Security Service, two former Metropolitan Police Commissioners, a former Chief Inspector of Prisons, and current members of the Intelligence and Security Committee and the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. We are so lucky to have such expertise, while other noble Lords bring to this debate their highly relevant experiences as members of the legal profession or academia.
As this Bill has already been through the House of Commons, where it was given a Third Reading by an overwhelming majority of 376 votes to 10, noble Lords have quite properly approached this debate from the perspective of our role as a revising Chamber. We have heard a range of views, as I have said. It was most important that the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, my noble friends Lord King and Lord Tebbit, and the noble Lords, Lord Blair and Lord Hogan-Howe, reminded us how very real the threat of terrorism is. I welcome the broad measure of support for the Bill from the Opposition Front Bench and from many who spoke from the Cross Benches, while accepting that they, like other noble Lords, will want to scrutinise the detail of the Government’s proposals. I think we are in for an interesting Committee stage. I sense from the Liberal Democrats that they might be more sceptical in nature but, even in that, there were expressions of support from noble Lords there. I am sure that they will approach Committee in the same constructive manner that we have heard in the Second Reading speeches.
It is evident that noble Lords will want to probe some of the changes to terrorism offences, the increase in maximum penalties—that was clear—and aspects of the new hostile-state activity ports powers in Schedule 3. I welcome the opportunity to explain these provisions in more detail and respond to some other points that have been raised in the debate.
Regarding Clause 1, “Expressions of support for a proscribed organisation”, and the concept that these provisions might be an attack on the freedom of speech, noble Lords are absolutely right to raise that issue. The noble Lords, Lord Marks, Lord Thomas and Lord Ahmed, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, expressed concern that the extension of the offence of inviting support for a proscribed organisation would undermine that freedom of speech. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Newcastle also spoke about this issue. It is of course right that we uphold the right to freedom of expression, something which we value so highly in this country and is part of our core values. People are free to express any view they wish, even ones which the wider public might find distasteful, as long as they do so within the law and do not harm others. However, we are clear that any groups or individuals that cause harm to our society and promote hatred and division will not be tolerated. This measure is aimed at those who are reckless—“reckless” being quite a well-established word in law—as to whether statements that they make will encourage others to support a proscribed terrorist organisation. That type of activity is very serious. It can have a strong influence on individuals who are vulnerable to radicalisation, as some noble Lords pointed out, and can create a real risk of harm to the public. As such, it is vital that we are able to target those who seek to exploit others and lure them into terrorism, so that they can no longer skirt the fringes of legality—something that noble Lords have talked about extensively today.
Moving to Clause 4, the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Anderson, my noble friend Lord McInnes and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raised the designated area offence that it provides for and sought reassurance that it would not apply to those with legitimate reason to travel to a designated area. I can absolutely confirm that the offence as drafted includes a reasonable excuse defence, which will be available to individuals who travel to a designated area solely for a legitimate purpose—such as, as noble Lords have said, to deliver humanitarian aid or journalism, or indeed to attend a family funeral. The police, the CPS and the courts are familiar with this approach, and it works well in other contexts where an offence has a reasonable excuse defence. In practice, such cases are unlikely to come to court as they would not get beyond the police investigation or scrutiny by the CPS, which would be unlikely to conclude that there was a reasonable prospect of securing a conviction. We do not consider it necessary or helpful to take a different approach for this offence. Whether a particular excuse is reasonable will be highly dependent on the facts and circumstances of the individual case and cannot be prescribed in advance in the abstract.
The noble Lords, Lord Janvrin and Lord Hogan-Howe, asked whether the police have the resources to implement the provisions in the Bill. It is of course important that we ensure that counterterrorism policing has the resources needed to deal with the threat we face. That is why the counterterrorism policing budget has gone up by £50 million of entirely new money in 2018-19 to at least £757 million. This follows the £28 million of new money the Government provided in 2017-18 to forces across the country for CT policing to meet costs relating to recent terror attacks. I totally get the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, about the pipeline of people required to fulfil those roles.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lords, Lord Ramsbotham and Lord Anderson, talked about the definition of hostile state activity and questioned whether the definition in Schedule 3 is sufficiently precise. For the purposes of this power, hostile activity has been defined as the “commission, preparation or instigation” of an act that threatens the national security or economic well-being of the UK or is a serious crime,
“carried out for, or on behalf of, a State other the United Kingdom, or … otherwise in the interests of a State other than the United Kingdom”.
That may seem broad, but I am afraid that the threat posed to the UK from hostile state activity is wide-ranging and includes espionage, sabotage, coercion, assassination and subversion. Consequently, the definition of hostile activity must necessarily be broad to encompass the range of threats this country faces from nefarious states.
The noble Lord, Lord Bew, talked about Schedule 3 and the creation of a hard border. He pointed to concerns that have been raised in some quarters about how the provisions of Schedule 3 will operate on the Northern Ireland border. As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, indicated, the issue was raised on Report in the Commons and the Minister for Security has written to Tony Lloyd on this question. I will make sure that noble Lords receive a copy of that letter rather than me repeating it this evening.
My noble friend Lord Faulks and the noble Lords, Lord Thomas of Gresford, Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate and Lord Kennedy, raised detainees’ right to consult their lawyer in private in the context of Schedule 3. In exceptional circumstances there may be a need for a more senior police officer to restrict that right by requiring that the consultation take place in the sight and hearing of an officer who has no connection to the detainee’s case, for instance, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that private consultation will result in interference with evidence, gathering of information, injury to another person, alerting others that they are suspected of an indictable offence or hindering the recovery of property obtained by an indictable offence. The aim of the restriction is to disrupt and deter a detainee who seeks to use their right to a solicitor to trigger activity that would lead to those consequences. It could be achieved by the detainee using their solicitor to pass on instructions to a third party by, for example, intimidating the solicitor or using a coded message of which the solicitor is unaware. However, the shadow Security Minister has put forward an alternative proposal for dealing with this issue, and we can explore it further in Committee.
There were a lot of contributions on Prevent, expressing support for aversion to it, or suggesting review of it. In particular the noble Lords, Lord Stunell, Lord Rosser and Lord Ramsbotham, and my noble friend Lady Warsi called for an independent review. Prevent is fundamentally about safeguarding and supporting vulnerable individuals to stop them supporting terrorism or becoming terrorists, regardless of whether that is in support of Islamist, far-right or any other form of terrorism. That point was extremely well made by my noble friends Lady Barran and Lord McInnes. When considered from this perspective, Prevent is working and we do not accept the need for an independent review. It has had a significant impact on stopping people being drawn into terrorism. Indeed, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Cressida Dick, said recently:
“There have been hundreds of people who have been turned away from violent extremism by their engagement with Channel and other aspects of Prevent, and that is all positive”.
It is clear that those who work to keep us safe from the terrorist threat back Prevent.
The noble Lords, Lord Janvrin, Lord Kennedy and Lord Rosser, and in particular my noble friend Lord Bethell, talked about online harms and ensuring that tech companies are responsible for rapidly taking down terrorist content that is posted online. That point about rapid takedown is very well made. The then Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport announced in May that at the next possible opportunity the Government will bring forward online safety legislation that will capture online terrorist content. We need a comprehensive online safety strategy, not one that tackles specific harms in a piecemeal fashion. That is why the Home Office is working closely with DCMS to publish a White Paper later this Session that will set out proposals for new online safety laws to ensure that the UK is the safest place in the world to be online.
A number of noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Rosser, Lord Kennedy, Lord Marks, Lord Blair and Lord Ramsbotham, and my noble friends Lord King and Lord Kirkhope, talked about co-operation on counterterrorism after Brexit. That is a crucial point and I think that the whole House is in agreement on it. It is something that the Government are absolutely focused on working towards. The government White Paper provides an ambitious and comprehensive vision for our future security relationship with the EU and reinforces the Prime Minister’s message that the UK remains unconditionally committed to maintaining Europe’s security, both now and after our withdrawal from the EU.
Some interesting points were made about updating the treason laws to reflect what is happening, particularly in foreign states, by my noble friends Lord King, Lord Faulks and Lord Marlesford. We have a comprehensive range of terrorism offences and other powers that the Bill will update for the digital age. That will provide the police and intelligence services with the powers that they need to protect the public from terrorism. We do not consider it necessary to create new treason offences for this purpose, but I know exactly where my noble friends are coming from. The Prime Minister announced on 14 March that the Government will consider the need for new counterespionage powers, including legislation to harden our defences against hostile state activity. Where relevant, treason offences may be considered as part of that work.
A number of noble Lords talked about combating radicalisation in prisons, which is a very good point. I must first point out that those convicted of terrorism offences have already themselves been radicalised, but it is important that we do not exacerbate the problem, as noble Lords said, while defenders are serving their sentences. A joint HM Prisons and Probationary Service and Home Office extremism unit was created in April 2017 to lead the response to extremism and terrorism in prisons and probation. We make every effort to ensure that terrorist offenders are given the best possible chance to rehabilitate while in prison and on probation, and all offenders of extremist or terrorist concern are managed actively as part of a comprehensive counterterrorism case management system.
In conclusion, all sides of the House recognise the real threats that we face, whether from terrorism or the hostile acts of foreign powers. As those threats evolve over time, so must our response. We must ensure that our law enforcement and security agencies have the powers and capabilities that they need to disrupt the activities of those who would do the people of this country harm. The safety and security of those who live in this country must always be our paramount concern, but I recognise that the laws that we create to help ensure such security are a matter of legitimate debate and should rightly be subject to proper scrutiny. In that spirit, I look forward to our further deliberations on the Bill, but it is the Government’s firm belief that its provisions are a necessary and proportionate response to the ongoing threats that we face. On that basis, I have no hesitation in commending the Bill to the House.
(5 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask Her Majesty’s Government what is the youngest age at which a child has been authorised to act as a covert human intelligence source under section 29 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.
My Lords, there are no national statistics currently available relating to the authorisation of juvenile CHISs. However, the Home Office has been made aware of academic research into the use of juvenile CHISs which contains a number of case studies. They include the age of the juvenile CHIS, the youngest of whom is 15 years of age.
I thank the Minister for her reply. I had hoped that the Home Office would itself start recording the names and ages of these children, who are vulnerable young criminals who have been caught by the police and are then put straight back into criminal gangs to act as spies. Will the noble Baroness please commit the Home Office to keeping a proper record of these children—their names, ages and the serious crimes for which they have been arrested before being sent back into these gangs?
I certainly will not undertake to commit the Home Office to giving the names of these individuals, because that would breach data protection laws. However, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner recently wrote to the Joint Committee on Human Rights with an estimate of how many children we are talking about. He estimates that there are fewer than 10 at any one time. He has now undertaken to collect statistics on the number of juvenile CHISs in place and will consider how that information and his oversight in this area can be appropriately included in his annual reports in the future.
My Lords, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child states that the interests of the child must be paramount in all decisions and actions that affect children. When the Government recently decided to weaken the safeguards on using child informants, despite the environment in which they operate becoming more dangerous, they consulted the people who use these child informants but not one organisation or individual that is responsible for their welfare. Can the Minister explain how this is putting the needs of the child first?
I absolutely dispute what the noble Lord has said because, far from weakening the safeguards, we have strengthened them by ensuring that the appropriate adult is someone who is professionally qualified to take on the role. The UK ensures that the principles of the convention are considered and realised through the approach taken, both in the legislation and in other measures, to ensure that children’s rights and interests are safeguarded.
My Lords, can my noble friend tell me how the current legislation affects the keeping by local authorities of lists of children at risk of non-accidental injury and their passing of that information about those individuals to other local authorities when those children move into their areas of responsibility?
As I am sure my noble friend will know, where there are safeguarding issues around children, information is shared, and certainly if the child moves from one local authority area to another. As the IPC has pointed out, the duty of care in the case of these children is absolutely paramount.
Would the Minister reflect that one possible way of alleviating understandable concerns about the use of young people in the way that is currently under discussion would be to extend the oversight and authorisation responsibilities of the judicial commissioners of the IPC?
I thank the noble and learned Lord for our conversation on this matter. Of course, that would require a change in the legislation, but we consider that this enhanced authorisation, which has been in place for 18 years and approved under the leadership of successive Governments, is robust. It is subject to enhanced safeguards and strong and effective oversight. It should command confidence.
My Lords, can the Minister tell the House how the safety of the child is ensured when they are put in these dangerous situations where serious criminality is suspected of taking place? That can include the children providing information about their parents and other close family members to the authorities.
The noble Lord asks the right question. The child’s safety remains paramount. Enhanced risk assessments are required before the CHIS is tasked and are reviewed and updated throughout the duration of an authorisation. They are also updated after an authorisation is cancelled where contact with the CHIS is maintained. In the case of children aged 16 to 17, the law recognises that these assessments must be done on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, the presence of a responsible adult may or may not be required at that stage.
My Lords, when these assessments are made of child informants, can my noble friend confirm whether an appropriate adult or guardian is part of that process? Can she also confirm whether the safeguards that we have in place for child informants in the United Kingdom apply equally to informants overseas?
I cannot answer the latter part of that question, but I will write to the noble Baroness. If a child is aged under 16, an appropriate adult—though not necessarily a guardian, because there may be conflict in that relationship—will be present in every case. Children aged between 16 and 18 are assessed on a case-by-case basis.
My Lords, even with all the safeguards mentioned by the Minister, is this not still exploitation of children?
The noble Baroness asks a very pertinent question. This is not a comfortable or easy arrangement. She will know, of course, that it was brought in by the Labour Government in 2000. With the safeguards that are in place and the work that needs to be undertaken, all these things are taken into consideration.
My Lords, would my noble friend agree that it is overwhelmingly in the interest of the child that he or she should grow up in a society in which crime is reduced? That is the purpose of the measures that are being undertaken.
My noble friend puts it absolutely succinctly and correctly: the overall aim is that children should grow up in a society free of crime.