Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th October 2022 Lords Chamber

Debate on whether Clause 1 should stand part of the Bill.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I am most grateful for this opportunity to discuss and debate whether Clauses 1, 2 and 3 should form part of this Bill. I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman of Darlington, for their support for all three stand part notices and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, for his support for the proposition that Clauses 2 and 3 should not stand part of the Bill.

I have listened very carefully to the earlier part of the debate and obviously some of the themes will be repeated in debating this group. At Second Reading, reasons were explained as to why the protocol may not be working, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, spoke at some length on his view of why that is the case. I have had a number of emails from Northern Ireland since I tabled these notices and I would like to say at the outset that the reason for my tabling them is not to deny that the protocol is not working. That is not their purpose. What I am trying to understand, in debating whether these clauses should stand part, is the Government’s thinking of the legal base and to press the Minister further.

I would like to quote two paragraphs from the report which I believe was published today by the Constitution Committee of the House. In particular, paragraph 15 on page 4 states:

“We do not accept the Government’s reliance on the doctrine of necessity as justification for introducing legislation that disapplies its obligations under international law. The doctrine of necessity is narrowly construed and applicable only in exceptional circumstances, which have not been satisfied in this case.”


Further, paragraph 18 also on page 4 of the report states:

“Legislation which puts the UK in breach of international law undermines the rule of law and trust in the UK in fulfilling future treaty commitments. The Government’s reliance on the doctrine of necessity does not justify introducing this Bill. This raises the question of whether ministers might be thought to have contravened their obligation under the Ministerial Code to comply with the law, including international law.”


I shall also refer to when this was debated in the other place on 13 July. My honourable friend in the other place, Bob Neill, the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst, stated:

“this is an unusual and rather exceptional Bill, and not necessarily in a good way. If fully brought into effect, the Bill would lead to the United Kingdom departing unilaterally from an international agreement and therefore breaking its obligations under both customary international law and the Vienna convention on the law of treaties, which is a grave and profound step for any Government to take.

I recognise that there are circumstances in which that step can be taken, and the Government asserted on Second Reading that the operation of the Northern Ireland protocol gives rise, or potentially gives rise, to those circumstances. The essence of it, though, depends on applying a factual evidence base to a legal test. The legal test in this case is essentially the international customary law convention of necessity, which is now enshrined in article 25 of the articles on state responsibility, which were adopted by the International Law Commission in 2001 and are recognised by the UN General Assembly, by our Government and by the international community as an authoritative statement of the law. Article 25 sets out that necessity may be invoked if certain tests are met. The point of these amendments is to say that if the Government, or any Government, were to take that step, they should do so upon the most compelling grounds, so that the factual basis for their actions met the legal test. The reputational consequences, politically, internationally and legally, are very significant, so this should be done only when that is thoroughly tested and set before this House to be tested.”—[Official Report, Commons, 13/7/22; col. 365.]


That was from my honourable friend next door, Bob Neill, who chairs the Justice Select Committee in the other place.

At Second Reading and earlier, the Advocate-General referred to the legal advice that was published by the Government. I quote from the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill UK Government Legal Position:

“The Government recognises that necessity can only exceptionally be invoked to lawfully justify non-performance of international obligations. This is a genuinely exceptional situation, and it is only in the challenging, complex and unique circumstances of Northern Ireland, that the Government has, reluctantly, decided to introduce legislative measures which, on entry into force, envisage the non-performance of certain obligations. It is the Government’s position that in light of the state of necessity, any such non-performance of its obligations contained in the Withdrawal Agreement and/or the Protocol as a result of the planned legislative measures would be justified as a matter of international law. This justification lasts as long as the underlying reasons for the state of necessity are present. The current assessment is that this situation and its causes will persist into the medium to long term.”


In my view, for reasons that were well rehearsed at Second Reading and earlier today, that is not an appropriate legal basis. I ask my noble and learned friend the Advocate-General to set out why the Government have reserved their position on Article 16 and have not brought it forward as the more appropriate legal base at this time.

The Law Society of Scotland has also been instrumental in my bringing forward these clause stand part debates. In its view,

“The Government do not rely on Article 16 of the NI Protocol to justify the Bill. That Article would entitle the UK Government to take unilateral ‘safeguard measures’ in certain circumstances but those measures ‘…must be restricted with regard to their scope and duration to what is strictly necessary in order to remedy the situation’.


Instead, the Government argues that these provisions do not breach international law because the situation in Northern Ireland is such that, under the doctrine of necessity in international law, any: ‘non-performance of its obligations contained in the Withdrawal Agreement and/or the Protocol as a result of the planned legislative measures would be justified as a matter of international law’”.


The Law Society of Scotland’s quotations are from the UK Government’s legal advice, which I quoted from earlier.

I believe that the Government have failed, and I regret to say that my noble and learned friend the Advocate-General has failed as yet to state why this doctrine of necessity satisfies the legal test which is understood in that regard. I again press my noble and learned friend. I am not asking him to bring forward Article 16—though I realise that, as we heard earlier from the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, the protocol is perhaps not working in a way that the Government and those representing Northern Ireland would have wished. If that is the case, why have the Government not taken what I believe is the more appropriate measure, Article 16, in that regard?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for canvassing that. Again, I accept that it is an important point, as are all those that have been made around your Lordships’ House today.

Not all principles of international law are tested before a court, and acceptance by the international community of a particular practice, or codification by relevant institutions, as in the articles on state responsibility, can provide very significant precedent. Necessity provides a justification for non-performance with specific terms of the protocol, for as long as the circumstances justifying necessity persist. That relates to the temporal point which the noble Lord makes. The relevant circumstances could last for a significant length of time, so it is not necessarily a short-term justification.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

I am grateful to have had the opportunity for this debate. I regret to conclude that, despite the affection, respect and regard that I have for my noble and learned friend, and the fact that we are both members of the Faculty of Advocates—albeit I am non-practising—the Government’s legal position remains confused and flawed. On my specific question, the Advocate-General said in a previous debate that the Government reserved the right to invoke Article 16 as the legal base but did not give us the basis on which they would seek to do that. That was regrettable.

I am grateful to all who have spoken, particularly from the Front Benches opposite. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, for responding to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Bew, more adequately than I could possibly have done. To all those who have spoken from the Northern Irish perspective, the House is absolutely agreed that the protocol is not working. I have had briefs from the National Farmers’ Union, NFU Scotland, and the Food & Drink Federation, which would particularly like to see that matters regarding trade work as smoothly as possible, bearing in mind that the food industry is probably the largest manufacturing industry; it is larger than the car industry. It is a very big sector taken with food, farming and farm production.

So I regret that we have been put in this position and that the Government are wilfully seeking to breach an international agreement and public international law that they freely entered into. I do not intend to press this matter any further this evening, but I reserve the right to revert on Report.

Clause 1 agreed.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

To pick up the noble Lord’s point about the CJEU, the Belfast/Good Friday agreement is based, as we have heard, on the consent of both communities. It is part of a package, along with VAT and state aid rules, that causes unionists to feel less connected and less part of the United Kingdom. As your Lordships have heard in the course of the debate today, all unionist parties cited the CJEU as a key driver of a major democratic deficit. This is not a hypothetical issue; there have been seven separate infraction proceedings brought against the United Kingdom by the EU, covering issues such as value-added tax, excise, pet passports and parcels. We consider it inappropriate for the CJEU to be the final arbiter.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

I listened very carefully to what my noble and learned friend said, but the situation remains the same today, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, set out, as it was on the day that the Government claimed to have an “oven-ready deal”—I think those were the words—of which the protocol was an integral part. It is a cornerstone of the EU Withdrawal Agreement and, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has stated, the remedy is in the protocol. So it is very unfair for the Members on the DUP Benches to be put in this position, but that is the position that was sold to both Houses.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, I beg respectfully to differ from my noble friend. The situation is not the same, because in the intervening period between the announcements to which my noble friend refers, and today, these problems about implementation have arisen; so the situation is not the same, and we simply cannot go back to reference the text of the argument.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 11th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

I regret the Bill before us this evening. On its passage through this place, I will oppose the provisions in it, on both legal and political grounds.

My starting point is that we cannot resile from or breach an international agreement that we freely entered into only three years ago. Moreover, the protocol is not a standalone agreement. It forms the centrepiece of the EU withdrawal agreement. By pursuing this Bill today, we risk reopening the whole agreement on which we left the European Union. In summing up the debate, what assurance can my noble and learned friend Lord Stewart, the Advocate-General for Scotland, give us that there will be no retaliatory measures following the passage of this Bill? I do not believe that he or the Government are in a position to do so. What I fail to understand is why those on these Benches who negotiated the protocol and the EU withdrawal agreement now jeopardise the very foundations on which they were built.

Politically, I welcome the positive engagement that the Prime Minister has undertaken with our European neighbours in attending the Prague summit of the European Political Community. I welcome the fact that—as my noble friend Lord Ahmad said in a conversation that I am pleased he took the time to have with me yesterday—the mood music has indeed changed. He gave an assurance to the House today that technical discussions on the protocol between the UK and EU have commenced, with a view to resolving the issues where they are not seen to be working under the protocol. I note that, in his words, the tone is cordial and that substantive practical measures are being considered.

The economy of Northern Ireland has flourished in the past three years. The economic activity has increased at a higher rate of GDP than that enjoyed in the rest of the United Kingdom. There must be a reason for that, and I suggest that it might be that Northern Ireland remains within the single European market.

As my noble friend Lord Howard put to the House this evening, the doctrine of necessity is not appropriate in the context of this Bill. Perhaps that legal basis has been chosen so that the Government can adopt a select, pick-and-mix approach to those areas where they believe that the protocol is not working, as opposed to those areas where they believe that it is working quite well. The fact that Article 16 has not been chosen as the legal basis proves in my view that the protocol has not fundamentally broken down.

I associate myself entirely with those such as my noble friend Lady Altmann and others in the Chamber today who have said that the Bill will allow an unacceptable level of delegated legislation. I also support the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, who described the mess of dual regulation that will flow from the provisions of the Bill before us this evening. I share her concern for what the Bill will mean for dairy movements between Northern and southern Ireland. I will add that there are other implications for farmers. I ask my noble and learned friend the Minister why the trusted trader scheme, the digital customs arrangements and data sharing have never been realised; why the principle of equivalence has never been agreed, to the detriment of many UK exports; and why the nonsensical prohibition of exports of seed potatoes into the EU and Northern Ireland from Britain remains in place.

Never in recent history have there been more pressing reasons for co-operation between European nations, because of the hostilities in Ukraine and the global threats to energy and food security. I urge the Government to prioritise negotiations on the protocol over the provisions of the Bill and to pause their proceedings after Second Reading today. I sympathise with the arguments put forward on democratic deficit by the noble Lord, Lord Dodds, and other noble Lords—who I consider noble friends—on the Democratic Unionist Benches. Those arguments were as valid at the time that the protocol was adopted as they are now. Perhaps the tragedy is that the Government of the day forged ahead with what this Government now consider to be, in part, a flawed agreement.

Negotiations are a two-way process. I very much welcome that current negotiations have commenced. I cannot support the Bill this evening. I will give it a Second Reading but I hope that it goes no further at this time. I urge the Government to think again and pause the Bill after today.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Thursday 10th February 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

156: Clause 59, page 63, line 1, leave out subsection (4)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment deletes Clause 59 subsection (4).

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for setting the scene and others who contributed to the previous debate on this part of the Bill. I welcome my noble and learned friend Lord Stewart to his place on the Front Bench. He is a much more distinguished member of the Faculty of Advocates. I am grateful to the Law Society of Scotland for raising its concerns with me, which has led to my tabling the amendment. I very much look forward to hearing from others on this group, particularly the noble Lords, Lord Alton of Liverpool and Lord Coaker. We will hear their views on their amendments in due course.

This amendment seeks to delete Clause 59(4), which states:

“Guidance issued under subsection (1) must, in particular, provide that the determination mentioned in paragraph (d) is to be made on the balance of probabilities.”


The amendment is to raise my concerns and dismay but also to provide the opportunity for my noble and learned friend in summing up the debate to explain the Government’s thinking on raising the bar for evidence.

Clause 59 makes specific reference, as we heard earlier, to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and seeks to amend Sections 49, 50, 51 and 56 of it. The clause raises the standard of proof for determining a reasonable grounds decision for a victim of trafficking from “suspect but cannot prove” to “balance of probabilities”. Indicators that a person is a victim of trafficking can be missed by first responders, meaning that a referral to the national referral mechanism is not made. If a referral is made, reasonable grounds represents a sift to determine whether someone may be a victim of trafficking and whether further investigation is needed.

Home Office statistics reveal that 92% of reasonable-grounds decisions and 89% of conclusive-grounds decisions on the balance of probabilities are positive. The evidence basis for so-called overidentification is not made. The lower standard of proof at the reasonable-grounds decision stage helps ensure that potential victims do not miss out on being properly investigated and progressed to the conclusive-grounds stage of the national referral mechanism.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope those remarks have gone some way to answer the points raised by the right reverend Prelate and my noble friend Lord Deben. I hope I have emphasised something which I am sure does not need to be shared across the House, as compassion for victims of these dreadful and wicked crimes is understood universally throughout the Committee, across party lines and in the House generally.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

I am anxious not to delay matters but to seek clarification at this stage. A number of noble Lords have raised concerns about why the burden of proof has been changed and the fact that, through this higher standard, a number of victims may not enter the system at all. I cannot believe it is the Government’s wish to prevent genuine victims of modern slavery and trafficking to be excluded from the process. My noble and learned friend gave a simple, clear clarification that it was to make the bar the same for both, but the fallout, in the view of legal opinion from practitioners who will be using this on a daily basis, seems to be that we will inadvertently exclude justified victims from the whole process. I cannot believe that this is the Government’s intention, where they are genuine victims.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for her intervention, which permits me the opportunity of not only repeating what I said from the Dispatch Box earlier about the importance of decisions being taken on a case-by-case basis, but advising the House—perhaps I should have done so in answering the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool—that in addition we are providing enhanced support and training to first responders.

The rationale underpinning the change proposed in relation to burdens of proof is certainly not to seek to exclude persons who ought to receive help and assistance from receiving it. The Government’s wish is that all who are victims should receive assistance and all who are criminal should receive their due punishment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, it has been an excellent debate. I thank everyone for their contributions. I think there may be a question outstanding from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, as regards children under the age of 18, but I take it as read that anyone aged under 18 would still be referred to the local authorities. I assume that my noble and learned friend will write to us if that is not the case.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for that, and I beg the pardon of the noble and learned Baroness for not addressing her question directly. If she is content, I will have that expressed in writing to her.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I am obliged.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

I am grateful to my noble and learned friend. He has endeavoured to be as full as possible in his response to all noble Lords. I express my disappointment that the guidelines are being changed in the way the Government envisage. I am slightly confused, because a lot of the situations for which this Bill makes provision would not have arisen if we had kept our international and European responsibilities under the Dublin convention, whereby we could have returned many asylum seekers to the first country in which they arrived.

It is a regrettable change. I do not think my noble and learned friend disagreed that a number of victims will be omitted from the system as a result. I will consider with others what to do at the next stage, but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 156 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I support all these amendments but I will speak to Amendment 169, to which I have put my name. I will deal with two other people apart from the anti-slavery commissioner who said that her gravest concern lies with Clause 62 above all the other clauses in this part of the Bill.

The United Nations rapporteur said:

“We are concerned that Clause 62(3) would be in violation of the State’s obligation to ensure non-punishment of victims of … forms of slavery for any unlawful acts … that are a direct consequence of trafficking.”


That, of course, is exactly what the Modern Slavery Act says in relation to people who commit offences if they are done in the course of being a trafficked person. So far as children are concerned, if they are under 18, they cannot be responsible for acts that they have done under the coercion of being a trafficking victim.

Perhaps of more significance to the Government is the issue of prosecution. Caroline Haughey QC, who advises the Government and regularly prosecutes traffickers—with great success I am glad to say—has described this Bill as catastrophic. She is a very successful QC. She is very measured and “catastrophic”, to my mind, is the most unusual word for a sensible prosecuting QC to use. She goes on to warn of the risks of losing witnesses for prosecutions because they have been guilty of offences themselves. We do not have enough prosecutions. It is an extremely serious matter that we do not have enough, and this clause is certain, if it is left in its original state, to reduce the number of prosecutions that Caroline Haughey and other QCs are trying to do in the criminal justice system.

I think again the Government ought to bear in mind why so many people who are victims have criminal records. It is perfectly obvious—they are much easier to identify and traffic, children as well as adults. They are the sort of people the traffickers go for because they know they are much less likely to come voluntarily to the public eye. They need protection against having been trafficked just as much as anybody who has a clear record. I implore the Government to think very carefully about this effect on prosecutions and the fact that criminals are very likely to be trafficked people.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

I am delighted to follow the noble and learned Baroness. The Committee has benefited greatly from her insightful comments on the background. This is a particularly murky world about which we are talking. People are in an extremely vulnerable and unfortunate position, and they may well be preyed on and further exploited by the very people I applaud the Government for trying to target.

I will speak briefly to Amendments 160 and 163 in my name. Amendment 160 is the key amendment; again, it is a concern raised by the Law Society of Scotland, which is keen to ensure that these provisions be brought to account only in exceptional circumstances. The reasoning for this—which follows very well from the discussion we have heard in this debate—is that Clause 62 excludes from the national referral mechanism persons who have committed criminal offences as well as other offences relating to terrorism. It excludes those who have claimed to be victims of terrorism in bad faith. However, it appears to divide victims into the worthy and the unworthy. Surely the Government must explain their reasoning behind this. In my view, and that of the Law Society of Scotland, no one should be disqualified from being a victim of one crime because they have been a perpetrator of another—precisely for the reasons that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, gave us. Victims of trafficking could be criminalised for conduct relating to their trafficking. This is in breach of Article 26 of the Council of Europe trafficking convention. I cannot believe for a minute that this is the intention of the Minister or the Government in this regard.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, referred to a recent court case; I do not know if it is the same one to which I will refer. A violation of Article 4 of the ECHR was recently found against the United Kingdom, in this regard, by the European Court of Human Rights in VCL and AN v the United Kingdom. For those who would like to research this further, the reference is application numbers 77587/12 and 74603/12.

I conclude with a question to the Minister. Does he not share my concern that the clause, as it stands and without reference to exceptional circumstances, introduces a high risk of a double punishment for those victims who have received convictions? Moreover, disqualifying certain victims from protection increases the prospect that they will be further exploited by organised criminal groups as they will be unable to access protection from the state.

[The Lord Bishop of Bristol]

My Lords, I have added my name to those of noble Lords who oppose Clause 62 standing part of the Bill. I echo remarks made by noble colleagues.

As the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, just said, Clause 62 goes to an essential point of principle in the entire operation of how modern slavery protections ought to work. The proposal is that Clause 62 makes victimhood a conditional state. In fact, it sets up a division between worthy and unworthy victims, as the noble Baroness commented. This would be such a retrograde step. If we are serious about destroying the business model of modern slavery and identifying and prosecuting as many slavers as we can, we must find ways of incentivising and supporting all victims to come forwards. By excluding from support those who have acted in bad faith—a term for which I greatly welcome more clarity from the Minister on what it would mean—or those deemed a threat to public order, we are creating two categories of victim.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 10th December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, referred to this as a potential abuse of power and, although I am entirely convinced that that is the last thing in Ministers’ minds, I say nevertheless: be careful what you wish for. I am very troubled by this section of the Bill, which is why I put down three amendments—Amendments 64, 66 and 69—to delete from the list of bodies authorised the Department of Health and Social Care, the Competition and Markets Authority, the Environment Agency, the Financial Conduct Authority, the Food Standards Agency and the Gambling Commission. However, putting those down as probing amendments, I became increasingly convinced that I had not gone far enough, so I say unequivocally that I prefer the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, which he introduced a few minutes ago.

This is a troubling Bill. I think that there has been a universal acceptance across your Lordships’ House, because it is the paramount duty of any Government to protect the state and those who live in it, of the need for, and the unavoidable necessity of, the Bill. However, it goes too far. We had a very interesting and challenging series of debates a week ago today, when we talked about whether certain crimes should be on a list of prohibited crimes. We also talked about authorising children—those under the age of 18.

Both those aspects of the Bill troubled me, and I have put amendments down, but this also troubles me: giving almost a carte blanche to a whole range of bodies, some of which are not concerned with the most heinous crimes or with the ultimate protection of the state and citizens. I urge my noble friend the Minister to accept that these are very important and valid points. We certainly will need to come back on Report, and I would like to consult the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and others on precisely which amendments we go for.

There are two developments in modern legislation that trouble me, as I know they trouble the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, more than anything else: the proliferation of Henry VIII clauses and of the granting of almost unlimited powers to Ministers of the Crown, as well as what I call the “Christmas tree Bill”—of which this Bill has some aspects. Having been persuaded that legislation was necessary, and I understand why that was so, the Government have said, “We’ll give as many people as possible as much permission as possible to do what they like, and we will give a particular power”—the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, underlined this graphically—“to the Home Office”. Therefore, power is ultimately given to a party politician whose motives, I am sure, would always be pure in his or her eyes, but it would not necessarily be conducive to enhancing public confidence in the machinery of government. All these issues are touched on in this clause.

We must be very wary of what power we give and to whom we give it. Although we have said before—and I do not for a moment resile from it—that some of the agents, of whom the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, spoke movingly a couple of weeks ago, are among the bravest of the brave, there are others who swim in murky waters and have a criminal background. It is not sufficient for the Food Standards Agency or the Environment Agency to say, “We’ll employ a thief to catch a thief”—because that is what it could come down to.

I urge my noble friend, who is due to reply, to take these points as serious points that require the most careful examination before and during Report stage. I am very grateful for the letter I received this morning from my noble friend, inviting discussions and co-operation; she has a very good track record in that regard and is an exceptionally conscientious Minister. Of course, we are not talking about current Ministers here; we are talking about giving an extended power for an indefinite period, whatever the complexion or orientation of the Government.

I strongly support the improvement on my amendments by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and I hope we can, on Report, ensure that this Bill is sufficiently trimmed down and that the right number of baubles are removed from the Christmas tree so that we have something in which we can all have a degree of confidence.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am delighted to follow my noble friend, and I associate myself with the comments made previously by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who spoke so powerfully, in introducing his Amendment 63. As he said, Clause 2 breaks new ground, giving powers to grant legal immunity and to authorise agents to commit acts that otherwise would be criminal to these other bodies that we have before us this afternoon, which can say that such acts are not to be considered criminal offences.

I echo the comments of my noble friend Lord Cormack. I was hugely moved by the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, who paid such justified tribute to those who work in the services that are largely contained in new Part A1 inserted by Clause 2. No one can take away from the risks that they run and the huge efforts they have made on our behalf to keep us all safe, not least those of us working in Parliament and public life; we are extremely grateful for that.

On reflection, as my noble friend Lord Cormack has said, I prefer Amendment 63 but would like to speak to the amendments I have tabled for the purposes of debate today: Amendments 67 and 68 and to oppose the Question that Clause 2 stand part of the Bill. I have absolutely no argument that the bodies listed in categories A1 to E1 of new Part A1—any police force, the National Crime Agency, the Serious Fraud Office, any of the intelligence services and any of Her Majesty’s forces—should not automatically be considered for preferment and allowed to fall under the provisions of this Bill. I assume that that was primarily what was in mind when the Bill was initially drafted.

I thank the Minister for the offer to meet; that would be extremely useful before we get to Report. On a number of occasions I was heavily involved, both as a local MP and as chair of the EFRA Select Committee next door, with rural crime. It grieves me greatly that many of these rural crimes are simply not taken as seriously as crimes that occur in towns, market towns or cities, such as London and other major cities in the UK. I am talking specifically of very serious rural crimes with a very heavy criminal content of organised gangs. I pay tribute to the work the Environment Agency has done in this regard by installing covert cameras and trying to solicit as much information and intelligence as it can. With the cost now of disposing of building waste and other hazardous waste, it is becoming extremely attractive to dispose of it on rural property, often privately owned. It is a public duty to remove this waste if on a highway or byway, but the cost of removing it to a private landowner is never considered and it is very difficult for them to resist this type of activity.

The other activity in which I was involved was taking evidence, particularly from the Food Standards Agency, on the passing off of horsemeat as beef and other meat. This is an ongoing activity. I pay tribute to Professor Elliott and others who have been heavily involved. I also pay tribute to the Food Standards Agency, and others agencies, which continues, as do local authorities—both environmental health officers and trading standards officers—to keep safe the food that we eat and ensure that, whatever we purchase, it is what it says it is on the tin or label. This is potentially a multi-million-pound fraud.

I have a simple question for the Minister: why are we seeking to extend the provisions of the Bill, in the terms set out by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in Amendment 63, to grant immunity from prosecution to bodies such as the Environment Agency and the Food Standards Agency? It would be perfectly proper for this action to be taken by any police force or the Serious Fraud Office. There was a problem with horsegate—the passing off of horsemeat as beef. I think it was the City of London Police fraud office that was asked to intervene, because no other body was deemed fit to have the wherewithal and capability to deal with that fraud.

I share the unease and anxiety of others who have spoken in the debate this afternoon. We are perhaps inviting unintended consequences and being a hostage to fortune by opening up to criminal activity those acting as authorising agents for CHIS to act on their behalf in bodies such as the Environment Agency and the Food Standards Agency. I would like to understand more the grounds for including these bodies and what activities will be covered.

To continue the theme, I am also deeply concerned that, in amending the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 to provide the exercise of these new powers to authorise criminal conduct falling within the statutory oversight duties of the investigatory powers provision, the secondary legislation that will be required will contain all the information and detail on the specific rank of officeholders within the bodies I have referred to who would be permitted to grant criminal conduct authorisation for the first time. I am very uneasy that this is not on the face of the Bill and that the detail will be provided in subsequent secondary legislation, albeit coming in very short order. I would much prefer that this is not included in such Henry VIII clauses in regulations; it should be in the Bill.

I support the main thrust of the provisions of the Bill, without a shadow of a doubt. However, I query many of the bodies included in the broader Clause (2) —in particular the Environment Agency and the Foods Standards Agency, which I have mentioned—and the fact that we are leaving so much to be decided at a later date; that concerns me greatly. I look forward to reassurance from my noble friend. These are intended as probing amendments.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 24th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

I am delighted to follow the noble Lord. I would like to speak briefly to Amendments 1, 2, 4, 10, 13 and 38, just to make these brief comments. I share the concern of, among others, the Law Society of Scotland that what the Bill proposes here in its original form, without these amendments, does not provide the necessary clarity. Indeed, if anything it seems to increase the uncertainty between national security law and the way that criminal law operates in practice.

The question I would like to put to my noble and learned friend the Minister is: does he share my concern that there may be a flood of cases in the courts to clarify the original wording without these amendments? It appears in the original wording of the Bill that there are no limits on the types of criminal conduct which could be permitted under this authorisation. Is my understanding in that regard correct?

I should perhaps state that when I was calling to the Faculty of Advocates, there were a number of courses that I had not taken as an undergraduate, because my first love being Scots law, then Roman law, I wanted to go off and practise European law—which I did, in a very modest way. I remember the sheriff who marked my criminal law paper actually wrote on it, “This candidate does not have a criminal mind”. I have always taken that as a compliment, but I am not quite sure it was entirely meant like that.

With those brief remarks, I will be very grateful if my noble and learned friend could clarify if my concern is well meant, or if he could put my mind at rest in this regard.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I would just add, in respect of Amendment 37, that we are rightly chary of imposing retrospective guilt, so how can it be right to impose retrospective immunity for something that was accepted at the time of perpetration as a crime not conferring immunity? When it was committed, the perpetrator therefore could be said to have had criminal intent.

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[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, I have considerable sympathy with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in moving his amendment. It has been a very instructive afternoon, sitting here and listening to the previous, very long but extremely enlightening debate. The more I listened and the more I reflect on what we are discussing, the more uneasy I am about the Bill. I do not dispute the need—any more than the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, or the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, or anybody else has disputed it—to recognise that for the greater safety of the nation, we have to allow some of these things to happen. However, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, made a very sober and sensible suggestion about perhaps having some special committee to look at this.

The Bill has far-reaching tentacles, because we are not just talking about the security services. We are talking about a whole range of agencies; we will come to that next week and I have tabled some amendments to delete most of those agencies. But we are discussing a really serious Bill, with far-reaching and unknowable implications. I am bound to say that I very much warmed to the suggestion of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that we refer to “undercover operatives” rather than CHISs. I was delighted when my noble friend took that up in his speech. I urge him to use that term henceforth, not something that the world outside will not understand if they turn on “Yesterday in Parliament” in a fit of insomnia.

Given the extraordinary wealth of legal experience that we have in this House—we have a former Lord Chancellor answering from the Opposition Front Bench —and that we have people who have experience in the police, and all the rest of it, we really are equipped to give this the most careful scrutiny, and we should. It deserves no less and demands no less. I hope that as we go through Committee and prepare for Report, where there will be some serious issues to debate and possibly to divide on, we will have at the back of our minds the suggestion of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the others who have tabled amendments in this group. I pay huge respect to him for his experience in this field. In the words of the noble Lord opposite, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, stands out as one of the few who have personal experience of this. One listens with great respect to him when he shares his views with the House on occasions such as this.

All three amendments in this group seek to achieve the same thing: to enable those who have been victims of the crimes authorised under the Bill to seek civil redress. I congratulate my noble and learned friend Lord Stewart of Dirleton, the Minister, on his sterling debut performance and his manner in approaching the Bill. I think we are all extremely grateful to him. I listened carefully to the words he used in summing up on the previous group of amendments. Following on from the third direction case, I heard him refer to placing responsibilities on a statutory basis and I think he has the support of all the House in this. That is the whole purpose of the Bill and I lend him my personal support in that regard.

I also heard my noble and learned friend say, and I hope I heard correctly, that civil redress is not excluded. In regard to this small group of amendments, is it the case that civil redress is not excluded? Are there any limitations, either under the Bill or the current law as he understands it, on civil redress being so required? If that is the case, I am sure he will be able to tell us that these amendments, albeit well-intentioned, may not be needed. Personally, I would obviously welcome civil redress in that regard and these amendments are very helpful in enabling us to probe him on that.

[Lord Judd (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, we are indeed fortunate to have working for us, in both Houses, the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I find its reports invariably well argued and well researched. The arguments and logic of those reports are not to be easily dismissed. We have been fortunate this afternoon to hear the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, and my noble friend Lord Dubs putting their experience on the committee at our disposal. They have argued the case very well.

It is unthinkable that innocent members of the public who are adversely, and perhaps grievously, affected by covert action have no clear means of recourse. That needs to be clarified and written into the Bill. It is also important that those involved in all such covert action, which must be authorised by people with judicial authority and experience—the will of the House has come across clearly in all the debate—have limits on what can and cannot be done, and who is to be held responsible and in what way. These amendments help to clarify that situation. In that sense, they should be taken extremely seriously. I am grateful to have heard the experience of those who have worked on this so thoroughly in the Joint Committee on Human Rights being shared with us this afternoon.

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[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]]

My Lords, obviously, a government agency cannot grant to an individual immunity from prosecution by a foreign power for offences committed on its soil—a point made strongly a moment ago by the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, who referred to the comments of a Minister in the Dáil. One understands the particular sensitivities in Ireland.

We are dealing with offences for which this country has extraterritorial jurisdiction, of which there are not many. At the moment, these offences consist of murder, manslaughter, crimes against humanity, torture and sexual offences where the victim of the crime is under 18. Under the Council of Europe’s Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence—the Istanbul Convention—the Government, in a paper published on 17 August 2020, indicated that they will extend the jurisdiction of the courts of this country to sexual offences committed against persons over the age of 18 and to domestic abuse.

Given that that is the current extension of extraterritorial offences, I would like the Minister to outline which of them any government agency would authorise. A current highly offensive issue that has been referred to many times this afternoon is that of covert policemen entering into relationships with individuals from whom they seek to extract information or to ingratiate themselves with a group under surveillance. That amounts to the offence of sexual intercourse without consent—another definition of rape. Is there a licence to kill, effectively to rape or to torture in overseas jurisdictions? Should there be? Would we be happy to see such immunities enjoyed by agents of a foreign power in this country? I suspect not.

As for the protection of the European Convention on Human Rights, I recall from my experience in the Baha Mousa case the vociferous complaints made by Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholas Mercer, the senior legal adviser in Iraq in 2003, all the way to the top of the Ministry of Defence, against the torture of prisoners by hooding and the use of stress positions against prisoners. These matters had been outlawed in Ireland. He said such conduct was against the European convention and was told that the Attorney-General of the day had advised otherwise, and if he were right, the senior civil servant told him, he should be Attorney-General himself. Of course, the Supreme Court later held that Lieutenant-Colonel Mercer was right that the convention did apply. Right-wing elements on the Government Benches have grumbled ever since about “lawfare”. That is a fight for another day. Their argument that squaddies should be allowed to torture without risk of prosecution or civil liability is for a Bill which will soon be heading towards us. But does this Bill permit such conduct to be authorised for covert agents? I ask the Minister specifically to reply to that point.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I lend my support to Amendment 7 as a probing amendment, which was so eloquently moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick. I have a very simple question for my noble friend Lady Williams. Is it an unintended consequence of the Bill that it may inadvertently have extraterritorial effects reaching beyond its original intention? That possibly goes to the heart of one of the conclusions of the legislative scrutiny performed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which says at paragraph 52:

“There appears to be no good reason why the Bill cannot state clearly that certain offences or categories of offences are incapable of authorisation.”


I therefore believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick, has raised genuine issues of concern, as there are in Amendment 9, and I am sure that my noble friend will wish to put their minds at rest.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, this is an interesting pair of amendments, because they go to the territorial extent of the Bill. Does the Bill seek to authorise state agents to commit crimes in foreign countries? That opens a whole legal and diplomatic mess. What happens if somebody is given permission to commit crimes abroad but is then caught and prosecuted in that foreign jurisdiction? Can the UK Government really seek some sort of immunity for their agents in that sort of situation? It raises the further question: to what extent do the Government think this recreates the status quo under the current system? Do they claim to have the ability to authorise crimes by their agents in other countries at the moment?

Competition Appeal Tribunal (Coronavirus) (Recording and Broadcasting) Order 2020

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Wednesday 15th July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I thank my noble and learned friend for bringing this order before us this afternoon. On the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, I understood that agreement is to be reached on what form arbitration on competition and other matters will take after the transition period has ended. Can my noble and learned friend update the House this afternoon on where we stand on competition and other laws arising in tribunals where the case is pleading the EU law under which the competition agreement was entered into? To which chamber will the referral be made?

The next question is not dissimilar, but slightly different, to that raised by my noble friend Lady Anelay, who asked about broadcasting restrictions. We have capacity in your Lordships’ House for a maximum of 50 Members. What is the maximum in any hearing of a tribunal before the Competition Appeal Tribunal, and how many can attend remotely? There might be appeals regarding the outstanding refunds of airline passenger tickets following multiple cancellations, owing to coronavirus and passengers being unable to complete their journey. Obviously, at the moment it is very difficult for airlines to make good those refunds until we all start flying again.

Looking ahead, when does my noble and learned friend expect the Competition Appeal Tribunal to start meeting as normal? If for any reason these arrangements have to remain in place, will he return to the House to extend the life of this order? The Explanatory Memorandum refers to 10 new locations. Are they just for CATs or for all courts and tribunals? With that, and subject to what I am sure will be my noble and learned friend’s reasonable answers, I very much welcome the order before us.

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th May 2020 Lords Chamber

Finally, if the Minister wishes to proceed with Clause 2 in its current form—notwithstanding the objections that he has heard and will hear during the debate—I hope and expect that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, would want to test the opinion of the House on Report. I therefore ask the Minister for an assurance that there is no question of a Report stage on this Bill that includes Clause 2, at least in its current form, until arrangements can be made to ensure a vote by remote access for all Peers.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I am sympathetic to the context set out so eloquently by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

At the outset, I seek clarification on a question similar to that put by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. As the Deputy Speaker set out, it appears that we can debate only those amendments that form the first amendment of each group and that we are unable to have clause stand part debates. If my understanding is correct, does that mean that we cannot debate and subsequently vote on a clause stand part debate, as the thrust of Amendment 1 seemingly seeks the ability to do? It would be helpful to have that clarification.

As has been expressed so far, it appears that the purpose behind Clause 2 relates to the Lugano convention. Does it have implications for the Brussels II recast, if not also for the Brussels I recast convention? I entirely endorse the comments that have already been made about the importance of the Lugano convention, particularly to those in the UK who wish to obtain judgments and orders in the UK but also to those across the EU 27. This gives individual citizens and businesses the right to make concrete their desire to ensure that judgments obtained anywhere in Europe will remain readily enforceable in the UK and the EU 27. It facilitates trade and a level playing field and affects inward investment in the whole of Europe. It avoids competing jurisdictions, which I think we all want to avoid, and is central to protecting workers’ rights and consumer protection under insurance policies, which I hope we are all signed up to.

I have some short questions for my noble and learned friend in the context of Amendment 1 and the original Clause 2. What steps is he taking to enforce the terms that are similar to the Brussels II recast convention to give them effect? Have they been set in motion? What stage are we at with the EU 27 regarding matrimonial matters?

I understand, as set out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, that we are leaving agreement to join the Lugano convention until the 11th hour of the 11th day—literally right on the deadline of our leaving the European Union and terminating the transitional arrangements. Why are we leaving it so late in the day? Have soundings already been taken as to the likelihood of the EU and EFTA member states agreeing our application to join the Lugano convention, for the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord? On balance, I would say that Lugano was a good thing to join.

Do the original Clause 2 and the Bill as currently drafted intend to give effect to not just the Lugano convention but the Brussels II recast convention? Can my noble and learned friend confirm my understanding that we would not in any way be conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Justice of the European Union but only giving weight to the relevant decisions, as we are currently obliged to do under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and common law?

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees]

It may help the noble Baroness if I answer the procedural question she put at the beginning of her speech. It is possible for the Virtual Committee to debate every clause stand part question—indeed, each clause has to be stood part in this procedure—but it is not possible to vote on that at this stage. If that will be required at a later stage, voting can take place. I hope that she finds that helpful.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I of course am listening to the contributions made to the debate in Committee and will take account of the observations that have been made. I make no comment on the procedural issues that the noble Lord raised.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

My Lords, I thank my noble and learned friend for his full answer to the concerns that were raised. Perhaps I misunderstood his response, but I think that the thrust of the interventions of noble Lords—nearly to a man and a woman—was that it is inappropriate to seek to put into UK law by delegated secondary legislation a new treaty that the Minister and the Government seek to sign. The thrust of the remarks was that it should require primary legislation. Have I misunderstood my noble and learned friend on that point? Why are the Government resisting the usual procedure of agreeing to implement anything that has been agreed by the Government by way of international treaty through primary legislation?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

First, let me make it clear that I do not accept that it is an invariable constitutional practice that the implementation in domestic law of an international law treaty is undertaken by way of primary legislation only. Secondly, when it comes to the implementation of a treaty that has been entered into at the level of international law, the purpose of drawing it down into domestic law is either to accept it into domestic law or not to accept it into domestic law. There is no scope for amending the terms of the treaty that has already been entered into. Therefore, the use of the affirmative statutory instrument procedure is considered appropriate. It gives this House and the other place ample opportunity to debate whether they should draw down the treaty obligations into domestic law. There is, essentially, no real scope for amendment; therefore, we consider the affirmative procedure perfectly adequate for that purpose.

Queen’s Speech

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Monday 21st October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome the gracious Speech. I will focus on local government in a rural setting, and family law.

I hope the Minister will join me in applauding the initiative of North Yorkshire County Council in setting up what I understand is the first ever rural commission in England to look at issues such as housing, farming and transport to save North Yorkshire’s most rural communities from decline. There is a need for affordable homes in the rural setting—I pay tribute to the words of the noble Lord, Lord Best—particularly to allow older farmers to leave the farm and move into smaller accommodation, allowing the next generation to step into their farming shoes.

At the heart of rural communities lie farms and other rural businesses, as well as market towns, often in remote, isolated areas where transport is sparse and hospitals and GP practices are some distance away. While North Yorkshire is certainly one of the most beautiful counties in England, it is also one of the sparsest of all, with 85% of the county classed as—to use a new term—super sparse. The commission will report in a matter of months and will consider the particular challenges of deeply rural communities and make recommendations to maximise their sustainability with regard to housing, farming, transport, connectivity— such as broadband and mobile phone—and access to public services. I hope that its recommendations will not fall on the deaf ears of urban government, which is represented broadly in London.

Secondly, in the brave new post-Brexit world, the gracious Speech sets the scene for our future. In this regard, the immigration Bill sets out the procedure for ending free movement of people. That is a matter of personal regret to me, as I have enjoyed a number of opportunities, both as a student and having worked elsewhere in the European Union. However, a matter of greater concern and regret is that the position of almost 2 million Britons living in other European Union member states has still not been made clear. I believe that this is a missed opportunity and a great omission in the gracious Speech. What skill level and salary will be set for those from other European countries, or from Commonwealth and other countries? Will those skill sets be swept aside in the points-based system?

Will my noble friend assure the House today that we will continue to attract and make welcome workers from EU countries whom we hope will work on our fruit and vegetable farms and deliver our health and social care? Will the Government commit to increasing the number of those entering under the seasonal agricultural workers scheme? How does my noble friend imagine that the Government will address the current shortage of veterinary surgeons? Without all those workers, our rural economy will grind to a halt.

I welcome the Bills outlined in the Queen’s Speech which will help families. Examples include the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill, which will minimise the impact of divorce on children in particular; and the private international law (implementation of agreements) Bill, affecting judgments handed out where one or other parent lives abroad. I speak with particular interest as co-chairman of the APPG on Child Contact Centres. However, are we seeking unilaterally to amend the Hague conventions which apply in this regard, because that would seem a very odd approach?

Most welcome are the Bills setting out new regimes for agriculture, fisheries and trade, changing measures that have been in effect for more than 40 years. Expectations run high that the Environment Bill will set out the means to protect our environment in the way that European Union policies have protected our waters, rivers and coasts in particular. Can my noble friend assure the House today that the level of protection from the new agency, the organisation for environmental protection, will be at least as strong as that currently exercised in the European Union? Will there be a role for the UK courts, taking up the previous jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice?

Finally, many of the decisions currently taken by the Scottish Parliament and the devolved Assemblies have been passed to Whitehall through the common frameworks. Can my noble friend commit to the House that they will be wound up in four rather than seven years, so that important decisions on fisheries, agriculture and other policies can revert to the devolved Governments?

Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 15th July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord True]

Whether judicial review should be limited will be a matter for whichever judge the case is put before. My submission is that this is an inappropriate use. The irony when it comes to judicial review is that most JRs of Jeremy Corbyn would come from the Labour Party itself.

Amendment 7 is not a question of allowing Parliament to decide on Brexit. Parliament asked the people to decide the question; the people decided. Parliament voted to invoke Article 50. This Parliament, in this very Session, voted by overwhelming majorities to leave the EU. Parliament has set the law of the land that we should leave on 31 October. It is not a question of anyone stopping Parliament deciding; Parliament has already decided.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords—

[Lord True]

I need to make progress, but I shall take one more intervention.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

I am trying to follow my noble friend’s thoughts. Is he arguing in favour of an elected judiciary, or does he uphold the rule of law that we currently enjoy in this country? Does he not accept that, while a majority voted to leave the European Union, we have yet to decide by a majority the process by which we do so?

[Lord True]

My Lords, I construe the statute law that lies before us and have expounded it to the Committee just now.

Amendment 7 is a final clutching at straws by hard-line remainers to obstruct, delay and prevent this country doing on 31 October what its people have asked. I submit that this House should have none of it.

On Prorogation, which Sir Oliver Letwin—and, it now seems, others—want to prevent, we have already endured in this pestilential, shameful Session, which has so damaged the image of Parliament and trust in politics, the longest parliamentary Session since the 1640s. What judge will now dictate when or why a Prime Minister may be permitted to advise Her Majesty to bring this wearisome Session to an end? I looked at the record. Until the change of the parliamentary year in 2010, and leaving out election years, Parliament was prorogued in October or November in 24 out of 24 years since 1979. There is nothing unusual about an autumn Prorogation; what is unusual is not having an autumn Prorogation. The prerogative power to end the Session was left untouched by the Prorogation Act 1867 and the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011. Parliament could have limited or removed the power; it did not do so. It did not do so, because, until this desperate ploy by hard-line remainers, an October Prorogation was a normal part of parliamentary life. Allowing a new Government to have a new Session with a new gracious Speech and new legislation necessary for the times was a normal and healthy part of parliamentary life. Everyone, wherever they stand on Brexit, is surely agreed that, when it comes, there will have to be new legislation and time to consider it, which means a full and fresh parliamentary Session.

It would be a serious mistake for your Lordships’ House to be a party to continuing games in the House of Commons. Seven days’ notice to Mishcon de Reya before any advice is tendered to the sovereign so that lawyers may wrangle over it is not a wise form of government to implement in the 21st century; nor is trying to prevent the calling of a new parliamentary Session. I submit that this farrago should not be tacked on to a Northern Ireland Bill. The other place rejected it and this House should reject it, too.