Humanist Weddings

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Monday 16th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Thornton]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the progress and timetable towards legal humanist weddings.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government announced on 2 October last year that they intend to reform weddings law when parliamentary time allows. Our reforms will reflect a commitment to making marriage law fairer, simpler and more modern, while protecting the solemnity and dignity of marriage. We want to create a level playing field for all groups, and this will include allowing humanist weddings to be legally recognised for the first time. We will consult on the details early this year.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend for that Answer. I apologise to the House for my repeated appearances on this matter. Can my noble friend the Minister provide further clarity on the timeframe and next steps? It is already early 2026 and the consultation does not appear to be here yet. It is 13 years and counting since the Government acquired the right to legally recognise humanist marriages by order, and it is nearly six years since the High Court found the lack of legal recognition of humanist marriages to be discriminatory. Given the years of delay faced by humanist couples, can my noble friend the Minister assure the House that it will be our Labour Government who finally legally recognise humanist marriages, as has been done in Scotland and Northern Ireland in the interim while they have been looking at this matter? Perhaps she could meet with me to discuss in more detail the path to legal recognition.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My noble friend should not apologise for raising this matter again; I think the entire House will want to thank her for her continued commitment to driving this forward. I had a feeling that, if my noble friend did not ask what “early” meant, somebody else would. I thought about replying “at pace” but then thought that that would make me deeply unpopular, so I am going for “as soon as possible”.

On a more serious point, my noble friend asked a number of questions which it is possible several other noble Lords may also wish to raise. The Government are not planning on using the order-making power. We do not want to create other inequalities with other groups; we want to make sure that there is a level playing field for all groups.

[Lord Birt (CB)]

My Lords, in Scotland in 2024, there were more humanist weddings than there were weddings of all religious faiths combined—evidence not only of the substantial demand for humanist marriage but of the accelerating decline of traditional religions. Nine months ago, the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, assured the House that the Government were “working at pace”; later, he said that they were “making haste” on the issue. The Minister is obviously aware of this, and I do not apologise for requoting what she has just said. I wonder whether she can help us understand exactly what and when “working at pace” will deliver.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

This was one of the reasons why I thought I should probably not use the expression “at pace” a second time. The Government are going to run two consultations on three closely related issues, all to do with how families are formed and what happens when they break down. There will be a consultation on weddings reform and a consultation on cohabitation reform, which is a manifesto commitment. There is also going to be a consultation on financial remedies on divorce or dissolution of civil partnerships, including nuptial agreements. The Government are committed to doing this as early as possible.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, my noble friend is against making an order. Is she aware that the lead civil servant on the Equality Act and the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act thinks that the evidence for removing the discrimination against humanists by making an order, even if there is an interim measure pending a final order, is overwhelming? She further adds that it would not introduce any new inconsistency in the rules—that is to say, laying the order would not discriminate against any other group. So is it not such a bad idea after all?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I am not sure that I can do better than to quote from the Law Commission report, which looked specifically at this issue. It said that it would be anomalous and unfair to privilege these non-religious belief organisations over religious groups, which are subject to greater legal regulation. In particular, it would be very difficult to justify why the fewest restrictions should be applied to the newest categories. It is for that reason that the Government are not going to use the order-making power to single out humanists.

[Lord Hayward (Con)]

My Lords, a few years ago, despite major constitutional issues, a Labour MP in the other place, and I in this place, were able to steer same-sex marriage legislation through in relation to Northern Ireland in a very short time. When there is agreement on all sides, as there is here, why cannot we get the legislation through as quickly as we did a few years ago?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The answer to that is that there is not agreement on all sides as to what this should look like. I mentioned earlier the Law Commission’s report; its conclusions were greeted with some reservation by the humanists and the Church of England, while being widely welcomed by other groups. We absolutely need to make sure that we get this right and that we do not, in solving one set of inequalities, create some more.

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, the deficiencies and complexities of our marriage law were addressed by the Law Commission as long ago as 2022, followed by a government response three years later. The common objective is simple enough: to provide legally binding and reasonably dignified marriage ceremonies. Can the Minister agree that when these long-awaited and necessary reforms arrive, they should benefit not just humanists but other groups that are equally disadvantaged by the current law? If that does not happen soon, there will be increasing and possibly justified pressure for less satisfactory, piecemeal measures. At the same time, can the Minister indicate whether there will be a role for properly regulated independent celebrants?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The noble Lord makes a number of good points. One of the issues here is the question of the independent celebrant, because not everybody thinks it is a good idea to license independent celebrants—for example, humanists think it is not a good idea to license independent celebrants. That is why this has to be looked at and why we have to consult widely. However, we have given the commitment that we will legalise humanist marriages—it is just a question of making sure that we do it in a way that does not create further inequalities.

[Baroness Burt of Solihull (LD)]

My Lords, what advice do the Government have for humanist couples who are waiting to be wed and have heard that there is going to be a fourth consultation, as well as the introduction of complex and potentially controversial marriage law ahead of this much-needed change? What assurance can they offer to couples that humanists will soon have the choice of getting married in line with their beliefs, the same as their religious counterparts?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The assurance is that we have made the commitment and it is going to happen.

[The Lord Bishop of Southwell and Nottingham]

My Lords, I welcome the Government’s intention to make it easier for couples to marry in legally binding ceremonies that reflect their religious, or non-religious, beliefs. However, I am concerned by the potential direction of travel of some aspects of these reforms, particularly the possible authorisation of this new category of commercial celebrants, which the Minister has referred to. I understand that, as has already been acknowledged, Humanists UK shares this concern. Can the Minister set out how the Government will ensure that safeguards are in place to protect against the commercialisation of weddings?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

One of the things the Government are consulting on is how to ensure that all marriages, no matter by whom they are conducted, are dignified, solemn and worthy of the name. In that, they are reflecting the fact that the Government believe that marriage is more than just a ceremony between two individuals; it says something about the way society sees itself, about relations between society and families, and about the way families are formed. That is one of the reasons why we are consulting.

[Baroness Griffin of Princethorpe (Lab)]

Are there are any protections for those who may be at risk of forced or predatory marriage?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

Tackling forced marriage is part of our mission to halve violence against women and girls within a decade. In 2024, the forced marriage unit worked with the General Register Office to introduce bespoke workshops for registrars to help them to recognise these things. When it is suspected that a person is not entering a marriage of their own free will or lacks mental capacity, the proceedings will be stopped until the registrar is satisfied that the individual has the capacity to make an informed decision. It is also a criminal offence to cause a person who lacks mental capacity to enter into a marriage.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 13th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Effingham (Con)]

My Lords, debate on this group, as with every group thus far in the Bill, has been extensive and in depth. We have heard from around 19 noble Lords on over 70 amendments. His Majesty’s loyal Opposition do not believe that it would be an effective use of your Lordships’ time for us to summarise the excellent contributions made across all Benches by many noble Lords. The relevant points have been highlighted. We welcome the opportunity to hear from the Minister and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, to understand their position on the proposals that we have all listened to with interest.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, as with the groups on 27 February, I have structured this speech by grouping amendments by theme rather than taking them in order. This is in the interests of dealing with them as quickly as possible. If anything needs a longer explanation then I will take interventions, but it would be a more effective use of time if noble Lords wrote to me so that I could try to give a fuller and more detailed explanation.

I will begin with some observations about the legal implications of some of the amendments, then outline what the Government see as operational workability issues presented by some of the amendments. Finally, there will be some brief drafting considerations. I shall continue to limit my comments to amendments on which the Government have major legal, technical or operational workability concerns. I remain happy to write to any of your Lordships who have further questions relating to the workability of any amendment and will place a copy in the House Library.

The Government’s position remains that it is for Parliament to consider the policy. I will therefore not provide a government view on the merits of any proposed changes or make any observations in a personal capacity. When we were last in Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, raised how the Government plan to implement this Bill; she was not alone in doing so but she mentioned it specifically. We have not undertaken detailed implementation work as that would precede the parliamentary process. Should Parliament pass the Bill, the Government will undertake detailed work to develop a delivery model and on workforce planning, engaging with stakeholders and delivery partners, including the judiciary.

I turn first to legal considerations and specifically the compatibility of some of the amendments with the European Convention on Human Rights. The articles in question are Article 6 and Article 8. I turn first to Article 6 risk. There are four amendments in this group which, in the Government’s opinion, may interfere with a person’s right to a fair trial under Article 6. The first is Amendment 499, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, which would introduce a route to annulment of a certificate of eligibility where material circumstances have changed. However, it requires further detail about the process, so it is difficult for us properly to assess it at the moment.

The Government have concerns that Amendment 498, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, would prohibit any further referral to a panel where the commissioner has previously dismissed the individual’s application to review a panel decision. This has the potential to breach Article 6 in circumstances where a material change has subsequently arisen.

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[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

The Minister will know that I will discuss later why I do not think that the legislation should apply to Wales, and that the Welsh Senedd should make the decision. I tabled the amendment because, at the moment, the judge does not have to be a judge from this country. As far as I can tell from the Bill, it could be a judge from anywhere in the world who has served under the common-law process.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I am sure that the House will welcome that clarification from the noble Baroness, but it may be that there is a drafting issue, because the amendment refers to England rather than England and Wales, and there is no such creature as a member of the senior judiciary from England only.

Finally in this group, the Government have concerns that Amendment 929B, also in the name of the noble Baroness, may have an impact on the operability of an assisted dying service by placing apparently arbitrary limits on the resourcing of the panel when the demands of that service are, as yet, unknown.

I turn now to groups of amendments dealing with assisted dying review panel proceedings and powers. Amendment 463, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Murray, would require the commissioner to assess the procedure adopted by every individual assisted dying review panel. That would remove any flexibility for the panel to deviate from procedure, should it seem appropriate to do so for either inquisitive or compassionate reasons associated with the case.

Amendment 464, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Murray, would give the panel the same powers, privileges and authority as the High Court. The powers of a High Court judge are significant and wide-ranging. They are set out across statute, court rules and the inherent jurisdiction of the court. The Government think that some of them, such as the power to imprison for contempt, are not the sorts of powers that your Lordships may feel are appropriate for such a panel. Without more clarity and detail, it is impossible to assess whether this kind of extension would be appropriate, and it would be extremely difficult to apply in practice. In the view of the Government, the amendment ought to set out which powers, privileges and authorities it is intended to capture.

Regarding Amendments 495B and 941A, both in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean of Redditch, your Lordships may wish to note that requiring the panel to identify and provide a report on unmet social or palliative care needs is not within its remit, nor would the panel necessarily have the knowledge of local service provision or the expertise to make personalised recommendations on social and palliative care. Such a report therefore risks containing inaccurate or incomplete advice.

I turn to panel referrals and capacity. Amendment 445, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Maclean of Redditch, seeks to ensure that the panel is independently satisfied that the person seeking assistance has continuously had capacity from the point of their first declaration. Your Lordships may wish to note that the amendment is likely to cause major workability concerns. It would be extremely difficult for the panel to determine whether the person had capacity throughout this period, rather than just at the point at which the capacity assessment is made. Moreover, it might result in people being excluded because of temporary, brief periods of incapacity. For example, a person would not have had continuous capacity if they had had an operation under general anaesthetic during this period.

On panel decisions, Amendment 496, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, would mean that a person cannot apply for their case to be reconsidered on the basis that the decision was irrational. That would be unusual, as the elements of the existing test under Clause 18 reflect the three primary grounds applicable in judicial review proceedings and are part of a recognised set of legal principles applicable to decision-making. If a person wished to challenge a first panel’s decision for being irrational, which is a term of art in legal proceedings, they would still be able to do so via judicial review. That would create an inconsistency in forum that would need to be justified.

Amendment 496A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Weir, would add failure adequately to consider evidence relating to disability-related vulnerabilities to the grounds under which, where a panel declines to grant a certificate of eligibility, the commissioner could refer a person’s case to a second panel. Your Lordships may wish to note that failure properly to consider relevant information would already be captured by the irrationality ground for reconsideration set down in Clause 18(2)(b). Similarly, a decision that was inconsistent with equality legislation already engages the first ground of challenge in Clause 18(2)(a), because it would contain an error of law.

I have taken rather longer over this than I had intended. Noble Lords will be delighted to know that I am nearly there. The final part is on drafting considerations and Amendment 490. If your Lordships support any of these amendments, the Government may need to revisit the drafting to ensure clarity and coherence with the statute book. To give one example, Amendment 490, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, contains some ambiguous terms that might need tightening up. In the interests of time, I will not go into more detail, but I am happy to discuss further with the noble Baroness in due course. Having taken rather longer than I had hoped, that is it from the Government on this group.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

Actually, I have further questions of clarity from the Government’s response. In the amendment that I tabled about His Majesty’s Counsel, the Minister mentioned workability concerns about there not being enough people. I would like to understand whether the government proposal suggested that amendment to the Bill’s sponsor. Do the Government have any consideration about alternatives I proposed during debate, where, instead of King’s Counsel, we could have people such as deputy court judges or other sorts of judges? In the two weeks since we last discussed this matter, have the Government considered that?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

As a general point, the Government merely point out workability concerns and do not suggest ways in which they might be remedied. That would be a matter for the Member who tabled the amendment to discuss with the sponsor of the Bill. So no, we have not come up with any proposals because—I am sure that the noble Baroness is sick of me saying this—we are neutral on this. We just point out where we can see difficulties with the amendment as drafted.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

Did the Government propose, on workability grounds, the suggestion in Schedule 2 that King’s Counsel should be included? It may be that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, can answer that, but a constant theme has been trying to understand what the Government have suggested in their private workings with the sponsor of the Bill, which they will not share with the House. Did they suggest this as a way to make it workable? That is what I am trying to get to the bottom of.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I am going to have to write to the noble Baroness about this, because I do not think I can answer it. My noble friend the sponsor will deal with the question of panels. If this question is actually about the assistance given by the Government, I refer to my previous answers, but I will write to the noble Baroness on her specific point.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, in the course of this debate, the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, referred movingly to the death of her parents. I pay tribute to her courage and her contribution.

I will deal with the groups of amendments in themes. First, I will deal with appointments to the panels. The noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, through his Amendment 925A, said that there should be a proper appointments procedure. I agree with him that there should be a proper appointments procedure. The Bill currently places the obligation of the appointment of panel members on the voluntary assisted dying commissioner. That is in Clause 4(4)(b) and in paragraph 2 of Schedule 2. I believe that that is adequate. The voluntary assisted dying commissioner must have a proper process. I have faith that he will do that, and the law will require him to do so.

The noble Lord, Lord Murray, also proposes that the Judicial Appointments Commission make the legal appointments. Remember that one of each of the panels would have to be either a judge or King’s Counsel. I am not in favour of that. My noble friend Lady Levitt indicated that there were problems with that, but I have a more principled objection: we are dealing here not with judges but with members of a particular panel, so I do not think that this is either appropriate or necessary.

Victims and Courts Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 10th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her Amendment 1, which addresses the thresholds proposed in the Bill. As she knows, we on these Benches have similarly expressed concern about the proposed threshold. This restricts the effect of Clause 3 to offenders sentenced to four years or more. Given the evident consensus against the current threshold, we on this side look forward to the Minister’s response.

Amendments 2 and 3, spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, raise interesting and entirely reasonable points, revealing potential gaps in the present legislation, so again I look forward to what the Minister will say.

This brings me to Amendment 4, in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie. It seeks to extend the safeguarding framework in Clause 3 so that it applies to those convicted of the most serious child cruelty offences—and I emphasise “cruelty”, as it is not just about sexual offences. It should be noted that in respect of the Crime and Policing Bill we understand that the Government have tabled a new schedule, which lists child cruelty offences, taking the step of treating sex offenders and child cruelty offenders analogously. Our amendment uses the very same definition of child cruelty, so it is wholly consistent with the Government’s thinking.

Our amendment asks the Government only to take the same stance in this Bill to ensure that the parental responsibility of offenders is restricted when serious child cruelty has been committed. If the Government are not inclined to support this, we ask why. I ask the House again, regarding parental responsibility, why should our response to a child who has suffered cruelty differ from cases where a child has been sexually assaulted? I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government appreciate that this group of amendments is driven by a desire to safeguard the children who are, quite rightly, at the centre of these difficult and sensitive cases. As I said in Committee, this aim is one I share.

Amendment 2, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Meston and Lord Russell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, seeks to apply our proposed parental responsibility measures to as yet unborn children. There are complexities to this, because there are three distinct groups of as yet unborn children who would be caught by this measure. These are as follows: first, a child who has been conceived as a result of the rape of the victim by the defendant, but who is as yet unborn at the date of sentence; secondly, a child who has been conceived but is as yet unborn when their father is sentenced to four years’ or more imprisonment for a child sex offence; and, thirdly, a child who will be conceived at some point in the future but has not yet been conceived. Different considerations apply in relation to each.

We thank the noble Lords and the noble Baroness for their amendment because, in the course of our consideration of it, we have realised that an unborn child who has been conceived as a result of rape is not covered by Clause 4, as currently drafted, to which the noble Lord, Lord Russell, referred. As my honourable friend Minister Davies-Jones said in the other place, safeguards are in place through the family courts which could restrict parental responsibility in these cases, but it is a serious gap in Clause 4, and I have asked my officials to look further at this and consider how we can best protect this group of children. This is complex, and I cannot address it today, here and now, but I will write to your Lordships with an update on this as soon as I can.

The second group, to which I have already referred in outline, consists of women who are pregnant by a man at the time he is sentenced to four or more years’ imprisonment for a child sex offence. I appreciate that these children are likely to be at the same risk as the living children for whom he already holds parental responsibility. Again, in relation to that category, I have asked my officials to consider what approach may be possible in these cases.

It is the third group covered by this amendment that causes us difficulties. It refers to any or all future children of someone who has received a four-year sentence for a child sex offence, in perpetuity. This would cover a child conceived, say, 50 years after that sentence had been imposed and served. It is this last cohort of children that is the reason the Government cannot accept this amendment. We cannot know what the circumstances of each case will be for future children, particularly when decades may have passed between the sentence and their birth. We cannot, therefore, be sure that we are acting in the best interests of a child who may not be conceived for many decades hence by automatically preventing the offender acquiring parental responsibility.

It is important that I restate what has already been said by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton: these measures are not an additional punishment for the offender. The point of them is to offer rapid protection to the offender’s existing children who are deemed to be at an immediate risk, right then and right there, in the Crown Court. That is why under the Government’s proposals, the restriction can and should happen automatically, at the point of sentence—but a child conceived many years later is a much more complicated and challenging proposition. In general terms, the proper place to make decisions about the welfare of future children is in the family court, so in most cases it is the family court where these applications should be determined.

As I have said before, criminal court judges do not have the training, the experience or, frankly, the time to consider, in each individual case, whether the restriction of parental responsibility is in the best interests of that particular child. That kind of consideration should be made by the expert and experienced judges of the family court—judges such as the much-respected noble Lord, Lord Meston—who will have the benefit of reports from, for example, expert social workers. It is self-evident that this kind of determination cannot be made in advance of the child’s birth, possibly many decades in advance.

Finally, as the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and probably other noble Lords are aware, parental responsibility can be acquired in multiple ways, and while it may be the noble Lord’s intention that this amendment should apply only to parents who automatically acquire parental responsibility, it would not prevent an unmarried father obtaining parental responsibility for future children by being named on the birth certificate if the mother wished to do so. It is a fact that not all mothers accept the guilt of their partners, even post-conviction and sentence. This would create a situation in which some offenders could never acquire parental responsibility for a future child without a separate order being made, while others could. That would be a significant inconsistency in the law which we cannot accept. For these reasons, we cannot accept this amendment, but again I thank your Lordships for bringing to my attention cases where the mother is pregnant at the time of sentencing. Those unborn children require protection, and we will look at how best to provide it.

I turn to Amendment 3, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, but spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Russell. This amendment seeks to create mandatory bail conditions preventing defendants contacting children for whom they hold parental responsibility while they are under investigation or awaiting trial on bail. We all want to ensure that children are protected when a parent has been accused of a serious sexual offence, but the Government cannot accept this amendment. Existing legislation already provides the police and courts with powers to impose robust bail conditions, which can include requirements not to have any unsupervised access to children and not to live and sleep at an address where children are living, and it is absolutely standard for there to be a condition not to contact prosecution witnesses, including children, in a case where those children are giving evidence. If there is a real danger to witnesses or to children, it is very likely that bail will be refused. However, in the real world, there will be some cases in which there is plainly no risk to the suspect’s children, so to remove the judge’s discretion would probably be incompatible with Article 8.

As the law stands, there are no mandatory bail conditions of any kind for any type of offence. To start introducing them would restrict the important discretion of the police and courts to apply conditions on a case-by-case basis to address real risks. It would also interfere with the presumption of innocence and the presumption of entitlement to bail, both of which underpin our whole criminal justice system. The amendment also seeks to impose a condition which would require the accused to disclose the nature of any bail conditions imposed to the family court while they are under investigation or on trial if there are existing children proceedings. The joint protocol on the disclosure of information between family and criminal agencies and jurisdictions already provides a clear framework for the sharing of information, so there is no need for such a statutory provision. For these reasons, I ask the noble Lord not to press his amendment.

I now turn to Amendment 1 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I have had a number of very useful conversations with the noble Baroness, whom I greatly admire, and I understand the aim of this amendment. I think and hope that she understands that I share her wish to protect as many children as possible, but Clause 3 is not a marker for when parental responsibility should be restricted; it is about when such a restriction should happen automatically at the point of sentence—that is to say, without the usual consideration by the family court. Any individual who poses a serious risk to children should not be able to exercise parental responsibility, but to restrict it automatically, we must be certain that the restriction is in that child’s best interests. The seriousness of the offences in scope of our measure, marked by a sentence of four years or more, ensures that we can be confident, in those cases, that that is the case.

That is not to say that an offender who has committed sexual offences against children but has received a sentence of less than four years’ imprisonment cannot or should not have their parental responsibility restricted; in some cases, that will be exactly what should happen, but an application to restrict parental responsibility can then be made to the family courts in exactly the same way as it can be now. They will consider all the circumstances of the case and make a decision in the child’s best interests.

Amendment 4 in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, seeks to introduce an automatic restriction on the exercise of parental responsibility for offenders convicted of child cruelty and sentenced to imprisonment of four years or more. The Government believe the aim of this amendment is sound and principled; child cruelty offences are heinous, and we all wish to protect as many children as possible, so we understand why the noble and learned Lord seeks to extend the Government’s measures.

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[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 5 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, reflects a commitment to ensuring victims are entitled to free transcripts on the route to verdict and bail decisions and conditions that are relevant to their case. In Committee, we supported the broader amendment, which included sentencing remarks as well. On the amendment now before us, which includes transcripts of the route to verdict, our position has not changed; if anything, we are even more supportive, and I am grateful to the noble Baroness for bringing this matter to Report.

Similarly, Amendment 16 in my name and in the name of my noble friend Lord Sandhurst is also designed to enhance access to important transcripts without charge, this time focusing on sentencing remarks. I will not rehearse the arguments and evidence for this, as we have all heard the benefits and how it would help the interests of victims and underlines our open justice system.

We have listened carefully and, after further thought, have revised the amendment that we brought forward in Committee. While we have not changed our position on this amendment focusing on sentencing remarks, the amendment now gives the relevant victims the right to anonymity rather than non-publication. In addition, it still requires the court to make victims aware of this right before sentencing remarks are published. With this crucial and pragmatic safeguard in place, we hope that the House finds this to be a well-considered and reasonable amendment that focuses on how this will work in practice and not only on the principle of transparency, on which I believe we are all agreed. In these circumstances, I intend to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 16.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, for their constructive engagement on the subject of court transcripts over recent weeks.

As the noble and learned Lord said, there is nothing between us on the principle of increased transparency for criminal court proceedings. As your Lordships will know, the Government recently announced that we will provide free transcripts of sentencing remarks for victims whose cases are heard in the Crown Court; it is one of the provisions of the Sentencing Act. Delivering this new entitlement is a significant operational undertaking. It is essential that we get it right, so that victims can receive the information they need in a timely way. However, the new proposals in the amendments in this group, taken either individually or together, would put that commitment under strain.

Through her Amendment 5, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, wants to include an entitlement to transcripts of bail decisions and the route to verdict. There are two difficulties with that. First, providing transcripts of bail decisions would involve extra resource. Transcripts are not free and producing even those for short hearings, if extended across England and Wales, would be expensive. Secondly, it would not provide significant benefits over and above the systems already in place. Transcripts on bail decisions are rarely informative for victims; they usually just set out the decision—where the judge says either that bail is granted and lists the conditions, or that bail is refused, with rarely any kind of reasoned judgment—and, as I said, they would come with cost implications. Under the victims’ code, victims already have the right to be informed of bail outcomes and release conditions.

We recognise that, when information is not provided in a timely or consistent way, this can cause distress and anxiety for victims and add to what is already a difficult experience. The experiences spoken to in Committee by the noble Baroness is clearly not what we expect or wish—nor are they, I am pleased to say, the norm. We are currently exploring how responsibilities under the victims’ code are being met by the relevant service providers and how better to support them in the delivery of the code.

We will also seek victims’ views on access to bail information and whether current processes are working correctly, through the ongoing victims’ code consultation. To strengthen that further, the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 will introduce a compliance framework requiring criminal justice bodies to keep their delivery of the code under review. Therefore, legislation needed to drive improvement in notifying victims of bail conditions is already in place.

Because this amendment arrived only yesterday, I have not had an opportunity to discuss the question of routes to verdict with the noble Baroness, but I think it is possible that she may have been misinformed about what a route to verdict is and what it consists of. It is our view that a route to verdict is unlikely to add significant, or indeed any, value for victims. It is usually a very short document; in most trials, it is typically about 10 lines long. Very rarely would a route to verdict be longer than two pages. It sets out a few questions that the jury should ask themselves in private, when they are applying the law to the facts of the case. However, the jury never gives its answers to those questions because we do not have reasoned judgments in criminal trials. Therefore, the victim will not be any wiser as to what the answers were; they would simply know the questions that were asked. These routes to verdict are almost always—unless the printer is broken—provided to the jury in hard copy, so a transcript is not needed and would add nothing.

The noble Baroness also raised concerns in Committee about victims being asked to leave the courtroom after giving evidence. I agree that this is a real issue and should not happen. I give the noble Baroness my assurance that I will work with the appropriate officials to ensure that victims understand that they are generally entitled to remain in court if they wish to do so and that arrangements—such as the use of screens or remote observation, so that they cannot be seen and do not have to see the person they accuse—can be made in some, if not all, circumstances. This is a practical and immediate step that we hope will make a real difference to victims’ experience without requiring further legislation.

Amendment 16 in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, would require the Crown Court to publish transcripts of sentencing remarks within 14 days of a request for such remarks being made. Publishing sentencing remarks online is significantly more resource-intensive than simply providing them to the victim.

Public release demands a higher standard of anonymisation to remove both direct and indirect identifiers of victims and witnesses. Jigsaw identification is where a number of apparently innocuous pieces of information, when put together, particularly by people who have some knowledge of the local area, for example, can in fact lead to the identification of the victim. Even something such as the location of a shop, if there are people around who know it, could tell them who the victim is.

That kind of anonymisation is detailed and skilled work. Current AI-based tools cannot reliably carry out anonymisation for the complex and sensitive material heard in the criminal courts. The cost of getting it wrong is profound. It requires trained staff manually to review each transcript, and research suggests that it takes around 45 minutes of staff time to review every hour of a transcript before publication is possible. That means that even a modest increase in publication volumes would create disproportionate pressures in operational capacity in the Crown Courts, which cannot take any further pressure.

Furthermore, requiring the court to make the victim aware of their right to request anonymity, to make the appropriate redactions and to publish the transcript online within 14 days of any request is just not viable. Our priority must be delivering the sentencing remarks for victims, as set out in the Sentencing Act, properly and at pace, before taking on any further changes that could undermine or delay that work.

Finally, I would like to reassure your Lordships that we have listened to what was said in Committee, and work is already under way to improve the transcripts application process to make the system more accessible for all users. I thank your Lordships for raising these important issues. We all agree about the principle of transparency; the only issue between us is the best way to deliver it. We believe these issues can be and are being addressed through non-legislative means, and I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, if content, to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the Minister for their contributions. I thank the noble and learned Lord for his support of our Amendment 5. We on our Benches absolutely agree that his amendment helps the interests of victims’ right to anonymity, and we are very grateful for that. As he said, it is practical.

I preface my reply to the Minister by saying that through these amendments we are seeking to ensure that the problems that victims have at the moment are resolved. The difficulty we have is that we are being told it is all too expensive, difficult and complicated. I have been sitting in your Lordships’ House for at least six years getting that sort of response. Victims are very grateful for the pilot that has gone through on the sentencing notes, but the issue is that there are other things that victims need to hear.

We appreciate that there are significant issues that need to be resolved, but it was only through pressure from your Lordships’ House during the passage of the Victims and Prisoners Act that we got the pilot that is now being rolled out. I really hope we can convince the Government that they should do another pilot to at least look at some of the issues that either my amendment or the amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, tackles, because we believe that to be important. However, in the meantime, because we think that this is just too far in the future, I would like to test the opinion of the House.

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[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, the important amendments in this group address real issues for victims and victim support. Amendment 6 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, seeks to introduce independent victim navigators on a national basis to act as a liaison between the police and victims of modern slavery and human trafficking. The principle behind this amendment has force. Victims of these offences often face complex barriers to accessing support. To navigate the criminal justice system can be daunting for those who have experienced exploitation or coercion. This specific service is needed. The amendment reflects recommendations made by your Lordships’ Modern Slavery Act 2015 Committee. We on these Benches therefore hope that the Government will give careful consideration to the proposal, and we look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

Amendment 7 in the name of my noble friend Lord Polak, introduced so eloquently by him and echoed by my noble friend Lord Farmer and others, likewise focuses on strengthening the framework of support available to victims. It places a duty on relevant authorities to commission sufficient and specific services for victims of domestic abuse, sexual violence and child criminal exploitation. The principle that victims should have access to appropriate and specialised services is widely shared across this House. To ensure that support provision responds to the varied needs of victims, including children and those with particular vulnerabilities, is an important objective. My noble friend’s Amendment 7 also draws on the recommendations made by the Modern Slavery Act 2015 Committee. It seeks to translate those recommendations into a more structured system of support. These are serious matters that deserve careful reflection. We hope that the Government will consider the intent behind this amendment with that in mind.

Amendments 11 to 13, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, address different but no less important aspects of victim support. They include support for caregivers of victims, access to restorative justice services, and the assessment of their use. Each of these raises serious issues about how the criminal justice system supports victims and those adversely affected by crime. It is important to do something in this direction. They highlight questions around the availability of services, the role of restorative justice and the broader framework through which victims are to be assisted. They all deserve serious consideration. Again, I look forward to hearing the Government’s response.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 6, in the names of my noble friend Lord Hacking and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would require the Government to implement independent modern slavery victim navigators in every police force in England and Wales, and would also define their functions.

The Government welcome the interest shown in modern slavery and in providing assistance to survivors. I am grateful to my noble friend for meeting me to discuss the issue, and I was pleased to meet Eleanor Lyons, the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner. I have also been extended an invitation irresistibly put by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and I hope that I can respond in an equally irresistible manner by saying that of course I will make a commitment to meeting, particularly since I think that I am committing my noble friend Lord Hanson to doing so, rather than myself. If, however, it is me, I shall be delighted to meet Restitute and, indeed, would be genuinely interested to do so.

I am sorry to disappoint noble Lords, but the Government cannot accept this amendment because it would duplicate existing services, so statutory funding is not an effective use of taxpayers’ money. We are not saying that victim navigators, who are widely valued, cannot or should not be used. They are already successfully funded through police and crime commissioners, through central government grants such as the Ministry of Justice’s victims fund and through charitable donations. Of course local areas can continue to use them: it is right that each local area should determine their value and provide funding if it is appropriate to do so. Each police force, and other law enforcement bodies, such as the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority, has the autonomy to fund a victim navigator if it is considered a necessary resource to help it carry out its functions.

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[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I will start first with Amendment 8, in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier but introduced so ably by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth. The amendment seeks to insert a new clause. It would require a review of how domestic and overseas victims of fraud, bribery and money laundering offences could be better compensated. Crucially, such a review must look into how this can be done without the need for civil proceedings, which we all know would be drawn-out, expensive and not always fruitful. I have supported this concept since my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier first started arguing for it: certainly as long as I have been in the House and since I was a member of the Select Committee inquiry into fraud four years ago. Something must be done.

We hope that the Government have given this serious consideration since Committee and I look forward to hearing from the Minister what steps the Government are taking to address the issue and whether conclusions will be reported to Parliament. Warm words—which we have heard—butter no parsnips. We on this side want to hear that something will be done. If it is true that a review has been offered that will report in 2028, that is far too long. As Mr McEnroe would say, “You cannot be serious”.

Amendment 14 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, also addresses an important issue that we should not overlook. The amendment creates a clarification to support recognition of certain forms of online-only child abuse. It would bring them into the scope of recognition of the criminal injuries compensation scheme. We can only ask, “Why on earth not?” As I said in Committee, the scheme must keep pace with the way in which and the places in which criminal activity now takes place. We look forward to hearing an update from the Minister.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 8, in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and the noble Lords, Lord Murray and Lord Marks, has been spoken to most persuasively, as ever, by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I too join him in thanking the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, for his ongoing commitment to this matter. I am sorry he is not in his place today, but he and I met recently with my noble friend Lord Hanson to talk about this in more detail.

There is a review and it is a priority for all of us, and I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, for his continued drive to champion victims and his expertise in this matter. The Government take the compensation of victims of economic crime very seriously. We are committed to ensuring that, wherever possible, funds are taken from criminals and returned to victims. As I have said on several other occasions and will not repeat now, there are several existing mechanisms that enable compensation for victims of economic crime. We accept that they are either not used sufficiently or they do not go far enough.

The Government have an existing public commitment through the UK Anti-Corruption Strategy 2025 to review UK policies and procedures for compensating victims of foreign bribery. There is a review; it is comprehensive and I have happy news for the noble Lord, Lord Murray: it is not 2028 but 2027—and that is next year. I understand the desire of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, to see this matter addressed as soon as possible and I completely understand his frustration, which he has expressed both in this Chamber and privately when we met, but given the existing review and the other current and future measures, the Government do not believe that it is appropriate for a legislatively required review to be introduced at this time.

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[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

Given the incidence of appeals where initially it was ruled that it was not a crime of violence but, on it being investigated further, it was acknowledged that it did count as a crime of violence, can the Government request that that be looked into more carefully and closely? The incidence of such crimes, which may or may not be viewed as crimes of violence, is increasing rapidly. Clarification from the board as to what criteria it is using, so that those who have suffered have a much clearer idea of whether that might be included, would be extremely helpful to them and save a lot of time and anguish.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I will certainly take that away and write to the noble Lord. A number of things are in issue here. For example, I do not know how many appeals across the board are successful. It may be that it is a greater number for this category of cases; it may be a smaller number. I simply do not know, so I will write to the noble Lord.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for her comprehensive response on the question of a review. I know that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, was grateful for the meeting. Our continuing frustration is about the timescale. The noble Lord, Lord Murray, and I are very pleased to hear that 2027 is there rather than 2028, but we both know that that is next year and that now is March 2026. We would be even more grateful if there were a commitment to finish the review and produce results this year, because almost undoubtedly for a comprehensive scheme there will require to be legislation. That takes time, as we all know, and therefore the sooner that we can get on with this the better it is. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments clearly touch on important issues about victim safety, transparency and access to information. Amendment 10 raises an interesting question about how the victims’ code applies where a close relative has been killed abroad. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts on that proposal.

With regard to Amendment 15 in my name, the victim contact scheme needs to be extended here, given that some offenders convicted of violent and sexual offences may now receive sentences much lower than before. It is important to consider whether victims in those circumstances will be adequately supported and informed. I look forward to hearing from the Minister on that amendment as well.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin with Amendments 9 and 15 in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, which seek to extend the eligibility for the victim contact scheme. As far as Amendment 9 is concerned, as I said in Committee, victims of coercive or controlling behaviour, stalking and harassment are already eligible for the updated scheme regardless of sentence length. Victims of violent and sexual offences, and of dangerous driving, where the offender receives a sentence of less than 12 months’ imprisonment will be able to request information through the new dedicated helpline.

The Bill already includes a mechanism for providing information about an offender to victims of any offence, irrespective of sentence length, where probation considers them to be at risk of physical or psychological harm if they are not given such information. However, the Government have a duty to safeguard taxpayers’ money and to ensure that it is used in the most effective and proportionate way. Our approach targets finite public funding on those most in need of the proactive contact through the victim contact scheme, while still providing the helpline for all victims to request information. Any expansion of the scheme would require diverting public funds from other essential parts of the criminal justice system.

That said, we will keep the eligibility under review. The Bill includes regulation-making powers for the Secretary of State to amend the list of offences and the specified lengths of sentence of such offences, which determine eligibility for either scheme. The Government believe that secondary legislation is the much more effective way of being able to tweak the scheme should it prove to be needed, rather than requiring primary legislation, which, of course, is much more difficult to deal with if it has an unintended consequence. Each of these amendments contains a requirement that information should be communicated in a timely and sensitive way. Of course this matters, but we believe that this is best achieved through guidance and training, not primary legislation.

Finally on the subject of these two amendments, I reassure your Lordships that we will be monitoring the scheme through the victims’ code compliance framework under the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024, which will include an annual report. With this in mind, I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

I turn next to Amendment 10 in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell. I thank them both for their tireless work for victims and for continuing to raise this important matter. We have had a number of helpful and constructive meetings about this, and it is common ground between us that, when the unimaginable happens and a relative is a victim of homicide abroad, the help available to their families and loved ones can be patchy. We know that, and we all agree that it is not good enough.

As is so often the case with the noble Baroness’s and the noble Lord’s amendments, we agree entirely on the objective, but there is perhaps less consensus about the right way forward, because we think we can do this a better way. In addition—as the noble Baroness knows because I have discussed this with her—we are worried about unrealistically raising the expectations of victims’ families at an enormously sensitive and difficult time for them. The difficulty with this amendment, attractive though it may seem, is that many of the provisions of the victims’ code cannot and do not apply to most homicides abroad, because they cannot be prosecuted in the UK. In cases where the offence can be prosecuted in the UK, the code already applies.

Many aspects of support in these cases depend upon overseas judicial systems, which fall outside the scope of the victims’ code. Including them in an appendix risks creating unrealistic expectations. At a very stressful and dangerous time, we do not want families, who have had a quick look at the code and were not able to take in all the detail, to have the impression that they are guaranteed support and then to feel let down because decisions are made by foreign authorities over which the UK has no control.

Police in England and Wales can become involved only if they are formally invited by the relevant overseas authority. For example, under right 6 of the current victims’ code, victims have the right to be told by the police when key decisions on the investigation are made. However, in cases overseas, updates and access to information are determined by the processes and timelines of the foreign jurisdiction. This means that fixed reporting requirements, such as those in the victims’ code, cannot be guaranteed.

That said, we are all in agreement that these families can experience particular challenges navigating overseas criminal justice processes. For that reason, the Government published the victim-facing guidance in January 2026, and I am pleased to hear from the noble Baroness that she regards this as a good start. It brings together clear and accessible information for families in these difficult situations, setting out the services that can support them and directing them to the help that they need. As the new victims’ code is developed, we will review what further signposting information can be included to support all families bereaved by homicide abroad. Our feeling is that it should be a bespoke thing, rather than being tacked on to a victims’ code, most of which will not apply. The code consultation went live on 5 February; we are interested in encouraging everybody to contribute to it.

In addition, the newly updated organisational roles and responsibilities document, published in February 2026, sets out how the FCDO, the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the Ministry of Justice, the Chief Coroner and the coroners service will work together when a British national is the victim of murder or manslaughter abroad. While every case is considered individually, this document seeks to ensure a consistent level of service for bereaved families.

Within this, the Homicide Service can and does support families bereaved by a homicide abroad, including emotional and practical support, such as by covering the cost of translated documents. I suspect that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, will not be surprised to hear that I cannot confirm anything today about the long-term future and budget of the Homicide Service. I am sorry that I cannot do that here and now, but I am sure she understands.

When the Bill was in Committee in this place, I heard concerns that families accessing Homicide Service support for translated documents are not always having a consistent experience. In the delivery of the next multi-year Homicide Service contract from April 2027, the Ministry of Justice will work with the provider to look again at how translation services are provided for this group of victims. We want to ensure that their needs are properly met when documents require translation and that this is reflected in the contract.

In addition to addressing concerns from Members of your Lordships’ House, the FCDO will review and refresh the training provided to consular staff on supporting families bereaved by homicide abroad.

Finally, I am grateful to the office of the Victims’ Commissioner for engaging with the FCDO and other agencies through the murder and manslaughter working group, which brings together stakeholders from across government, policing and the third sector to share expertise, align efforts and drive meaningful improvement. Where appropriate, the FCDO’s senior officer for global consular services will offer to meet the Victims’ Commissioner herself, or her representative, when particular issues arise that merit further discussion. I have already put the Victims’ Commissioner in touch with those representatives whom the noble Lord and the noble Baroness met at our meeting.

I turn finally to Amendments 17, 18 and 19 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Russell, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and my noble friend Lord Ponsonby. Before I move on to the operational issues that concern the Government, there is a drafting issue, so I first must raise a technical point. These amendments apply only to new Sections 44F and 44K in Part 2 of Schedule 2 to the Bill. Those sections apply where a restriction order or restriction direction is not made. In Committee, noble Lords indicated that their concern is with cases of homicide—entirely understandably—but, in such cases, the offender will almost certainly be a restricted patient. Those victims would therefore be eligible for the victim contact scheme and would not need to request information through the helpline. The provisions updating the victim contact scheme are in Part 1 of Schedule 2, so the amendments as drafted cannot achieve their aim. I believe that noble Lords are more concerned about homicide cases, which would not be covered.

However, I turn to the wider points of principle. I listened carefully to the contributions made in your Lordships’ House and to the powerful arguments made to me by Emma Webber and Julian Hendy of Hundred Families, whom I was privileged to meet. I entirely accept that these three amendments are motivated by a desire to improve the provision of information to victims of mentally disordered offenders, but the challenge we face is not a legislative gap. The most effective way to secure better outcomes for victims is to ensure that clinicians have the understanding, confidence and tools to get it right first time. That is not achieved through more primary legislation, nor through complex, costly bureaucracy; it is achieved through improving decision-making in the first place, increasing awareness and embedding a clearer understanding of responsibilities—ensuring that there is not a knee-jerk defensiveness about supplying information.

That is why I am pleased to announce that we will be bringing forward a comprehensive capability-building programme with three core strands. First, we will make sure that clinicians understand their duties. To do that, we will work together with the Department of Health and Social Care to update the statutory Mental Health Act code of practice. We are going to add victim liaison requirements to the NHS secure service specifications, introduce a detailed joint protocol for clinicians and HMPPS staff and work with the Caldicott Guardian Council to support guardians’ role as expert information advisers to clinicians. Secondly, we will improve victim liaison officers’ understanding of this complex area and provide training to bolster the role of specialist mentally disordered offender victim liaison officers. Thirdly, we will produce victim-facing materials to explain clearly what information is and is not usually provided to victims of mentally disordered offenders. These will also explain the routes by which they can make a complaint, including if they did not receive the information they expected.

I consider that these measures will significantly improve the consistency of information provided to victims, and I therefore ask the noble Lord, Lord Russell, not to press his amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

I am sorry, my Lords; I had not actually spoken to Amendment 9, as may have been noted, so it rather passed me by that it was for me to respond.

Having heard from the Minister, it is certainly my intention to support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, which she will be moving.

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[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, on behalf of these Benches, I have relaid the amendment on the victim’s right to review in the event of discontinuance of proceedings. Amendment 23 would extend the period that a case can be discontinued in the Crown Court to bring it in line with the magistrates’ courts. This would mean that the CPS could discontinue a case at the Crown Court, with the option to reopen it following a successful victim right to review application, if it concludes that it made an error in stopping the prosecution.

I was grateful for the Minister’s response in Committee, when she explained that this amendment would mean wide-ranging implications for both victims and defendants. I have relaid it because I hope that she will be able to clarify the timescale for the Government’s response to Sir Brian Leveson’s important report on wider court reforms and improving efficiency. Perhaps even more importantly, will this issue of a victim’s right to review be, at the very least, included in discussions in the MoJ in the context of Sir Brian’s report and the wider court reforms? While appreciating that all of this may take time, there is a pressing and unequal arrangement at the moment. We will, I suspect, continue to lay amendments on this and to question Ministers in the future.

My noble friend Lord Marks has supported Amendment 20 on private prosecutions, from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen. As he said, we will support the Conservatives if they should choose to divide on it.

Amendment 29, laid by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, would create exemptions to the early release scheme for sex offenders and domestic abusers. In Committee, the Minister referred to enhanced supervision when offenders of sexual crimes are released—that is, the use of tags and bail conditions that can impose wide restrictions on an offender visiting or travelling in areas that pose risk for the victims. That is as it should be. However, the proposers of this amendment say that it has not been working well in recent years—I have to say that includes when they were in power. If that is the case, can the Minister tell me how we can then protect victims from their offenders?

I want to ask whether those convicted of stalking and coercive control would be included in the category in Amendment 29, given that they are now included in the appendix of relevant serious crimes covered in the victims’ code and are exempt from automatic release after recall, such as breach of a protective order.

Having asked these questions, we are minded to support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, if he should decide to test the opinion of the House in due course.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin with Clause 12. There are two points that I want to make at the outset: the Government’s motivation for introducing this provision is not to save money, and we do not wish there to be a chilling effect on private prosecutions. Indeed, we are supportive of the long-standing right to bring a private prosecution and we recognise the important part such prosecutions play in the criminal justice landscape.

Expenditure on private prosecutions is, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, has already said, a very small proportion of overall Ministry of Justice spending. But what matters, regardless of the scale of expenditure, is clarity, consistency, proportionality and value for money. The Justice Select Committee, in its 2020 report Private Prosecutions: Safeguards, invited the Government to take a closer look at the private prosecution landscape, particularly where public funds are engaged. An enabling power as in Clause 12 allows us to do precisely that, in a careful and evidence-led way. The Justice Committee highlighted three key principles which should underpin reform. These are: first, addressing the disparity between defence resources and those of private prosecutors; secondly, safeguarding the right of individuals to bring a private prosecution; and, thirdly, ensuring the proportionate and responsible use of public funds. We agree with the Justice Committee about these principles.

At present, there are no prescribed rates for private prosecutors recovering costs from central funds, which is public money. This results in significant uncertainty, with the courts and the Legal Aid Agency required to assess claims case by case, often by reference to civil guideline rates and leading to disputes, appeals and judicial reviews, adding to costs and delay in the courts. The courts play a vital role in overseeing private prosecutions and have made a number of important changes, but, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said during debate in Committee, this is a matter with which the Government have to grapple. The question of the amount of costs recoverable in principle is a matter of public policy and it is appropriate that such policy decisions are made by a democratically accountable officeholder, rather than developed incrementally through case law. The enabling power in Clause 12 ensures that any framework adopted has a clear statutory basis and is subject to parliamentary oversight.

The majority of private prosecutions do not result in any claim on central funds and will be entirely unaffected by this measure. Moreover, most private prosecutors are assiduous in applying the full code test set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors and in their overall conduct of the case. But there is some evidence that, at the margins, the near certainty of substantial costs recovery may cause private prosecutions to be pursued which are either disproportionate or an unsuitable remedy, when the issue in dispute is essentially one which requires a civil law adjudication.

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[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a thoughtful debate. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and her supporters for their work on these issues.

On Amendment 21, I reiterate the sentiments expressed in Committee and by many noble Lords across the House from all parties. In light of the appalling Post Office scandal, keeping in mind the increasing use of artificial intelligence, the need to remove the presumption of reliability for computer evidence is now clear. The noble Baroness has responded to some of the concerns expressed in Committee in bringing forward this redrafted amendment. I commend her attention to this issue.

My concern is that the Government have had long enough to look at this. Their call for evidence closed on 15 April 2025, so I look forward to hearing from the Minister where we are now, given that the call for evidence is a year old. I am sure she will be anxious to update us on that.

I understand the basis for Amendment 22, but I have some reservations about its detail. There is an issue about the objectivity of the conditions listed in subsection (2) of the proposed new clause. I would certainly be interested to hear more about how the court should consider who is suitably qualified to give evidence about

“linguistic and artistic conventions and the social and cultural context of the creative or artistic expression”.

It is an important area, but it is also a difficult one that will repay further consideration.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 21 in the names of my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and a formidable trio of other Members of your Lordships’ House, the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, who is not in his place, is extremely important. I really mean it when I say I want to thank my noble friend, both for tabling it and for the work she has done to refine it since Committee. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and my noble friend Lord Beamish, all of whom have given up their time to meet me during the last two weeks to discuss this amendment to try to get it right. I know the entire House wants to thank the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, and my noble friend Lord Beamish for their ceaseless championing of the victims of the Post Office Horizon scandal. It is thanks to them that we are here taking the steps we are today.

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[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly. I put my name to both amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, which we first laid in Committee. In essence, what the Minister said when she wound up this group in Committee was “We are listening and I am making a listening speech”. I hope that, even though she has been on her feet for much of today, she is still in listening mode. I do appreciate, as I think we all do, the way she has approached both Committee and Report; it is a refreshing change from some experiences one has had in recent years. I look forward to what I hope will be a positive “listening” response.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I express my thanks to Claire Waxman, the Victims’ Commissioner, and to Tracey Hanson and Katie Brett, who have campaigned with great commitment on behalf of victims.

In Committee, much was said on all sides about the importance of the unduly lenient sentence scheme in ensuring consistency. As all who participated know, it is not an appeal for victims who are dissatisfied by the length or type of sentence: rather, it is a legal safeguard, exercisable by the Attorney-General, to correct sentences that fall outside the appropriate range. As such, it is a constitutional safeguard vested in the Attorney-General as guardian of the public interest, not a mechanism for anyone to relitigate sentencing. That said, victims will often play a vital role in drawing cases to the Attorney-General’s attention for consideration: we recognise and indeed encourage that.

As is generally known, the time limit is a strict one: 28 days with no exceptions. The Government are aware of and have listened to the comments of the victims and those supporting them, who have long complained that the system just is not working for them; in particular, that they are often not told about the ULS scheme; and, in any event, 28 days is not long enough.

Against that background, I turn to the amendments concerning the time limits, in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lords, Lord Russell and Lord Sandhurst. Your Lordships will be aware that the Government had been considering tabling their own amendment to increase the time limit. As I said in Committee, we hoped to bring something forward on Report. Today, I take up the invitation of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, to set out why we have not done so.

This is fundamentally a Bill for victims. Unsurprisingly, victims have told us that they want to be listened to by the Government. Both victims and the Victims’ Commissioner have told us clearly that increasing the time limit to 56 days would not address the problem they face. They have told us that any time limit, whether it is 28 days, 56 days or 365 days, is meaningless if they are not informed about the ULS scheme in the first place.

Plainly, all victims should be told. There are mechanisms in place for doing so, but we have heard enough from victims to make it clear to us that there are occasions on which this is not happening. To paraphrase what I said today in an earlier group, a right is not much of a right if you do not know about it.

To the victims, I say: we have heard you and we will continue to listen. The victims asked us not to bring forward our amendment extending the time limit to 56 days, and so we have not done so. This explains why we cannot accept Amendments 24 and 25.

I turn to Amendment 26 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I thank her for not only raising the issue but for the positive and constructive talks we have had. As some of your Lordships may have gathered, the noble Baroness and I have been spending rather a lot of time together over the last few weeks. I have enjoyed every moment, of course. I can understand why it is felt that an exception from the strict time limit would be a good thing, but there are a number of issues with it, and I will try to deal with these briefly.

First, it seeks to treat a symptom of the problem rather than tackling the cause. The underlying problem is that some victims are apparently not being told about the ULS scheme. The noble Baroness’s amendment seeks to address that by creating a mechanism to bypass the time limit if that happens. But this Government are not here to patch up the symptoms; the Government’s view is that we must address the root cause—victims are telling us that they are not being informed—rather than create a mechanism that responds only after the problem has occurred.

The second issue is the question of what exceptional circumstances would mean in practice. The Government’s concern is that the amendment will be self-defeating, because “exceptional” has its ordinary meaning—something unusual, not typical—and cannot be exhaustively defined in legislation, but something that is not genuinely unusual cannot be described as exceptional. Given that the noble Baroness’s reason for tabling the amendment is, regrettably, that victims do not get told about it, if they are not told, it cannot be exceptional. This is very likely to apply to the very cases that would not be able to take advantage of the law. I hope the noble Baroness will understand why the Government cannot accept the amendment and that she will work with me and my officials as we look to address the real issue: ensuring that victims are notified of the scheme in the first place.

Amendment 30 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, would require a public consultation. The Law Commission did exactly this. The Law Commission has held a public consultation on the ULS scheme, including specific questions about the 28-day time limit. Holding another one would be a waste of taxpayers’ money. I hope your Lordships will join me in looking forward to the commission’s final report when it is published later this year. The Government will, of course, consider its findings carefully.

I turn briefly to the remaining amendments, which seek to place a statutory duty on a designated government department or the Crown Prosecution Service to notify the victims. Again, there is no issue between us about the fact that the Government need to ensure that every victim is told. I entirely agree with what the noble Baroness is trying to achieve, but I want to persuade her that there is a better way of doing it.

The amendments seek to create a duty which already exists. Police in witness care units are already responsible for informing victims about the unduly lenient sentence scheme. Using primary legislation to try to make people do what they are already required to do is not the best way of going about things. These amendments impose a duplicative statutory duty, potentially with different timeframes or differing lines of accountability. It must be self-evident that this risks confusion rather than clarity, particularly where concurrent statutory duties could blur operational responsibilities. The fear is that the victims might actually, as a result, end up worse off.

I therefore ask your Lordships to work with us, the Victims’ Commissioner and the victims themselves to get to the heart of the issue and develop practical, workable improvements to notification and awareness. We want every victim to be properly informed, in good time, so that they can exercise their rights with confidence. Our focus is on fixing the long-standing problems with notification rather than changing the time limits themselves.

We already have the commitment of the Attorney-General’s Office, the CPS, the Home Office and the National Police Chiefs’ Council to work closely with us to improve awareness of the scheme. They have all urgently assessed what actions can be taken in their respective areas. There is a quite a detailed plan.

Given the time, I will undertake to write to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, rather than read out the next four pages of my speech, for which I do not think anybody would thank me. For these reasons, I ask the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her explanation and understand that she is giving further consideration to this issue. In these circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Assisted Dying Legislation: Isle of Man and Jersey

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bassam of Brighton]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what plans they have to enable legislation passed by the Tynwald of the Isle of Man and States Assembly of Jersey allowing assisted dying to receive Royal Assent in a timely fashion.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, since receiving the Isle of Man’s Assisted Dying Bill, we have engaged with its authorities, in line with the UK’s responsibility for its international relations. This includes ensuring compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights. Advice on Royal Assent will go to the Lord Chancellor in due course and, when we receive the Jersey law, we will follow the normal process of scrutiny in a timely manner.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her reply. We are in an odd position—are we not?—on the assisted dying Bill. The Isle of Man has legislation in place, the Welsh Assembly has just approved a legislative consent Motion, the States Assembly of Jersey has agreed a Bill and the Scottish Parliament will shortly follow. Yet, after nearly nine months and 180 hours of consideration in our Parliament, we are still stuck on Clause 3 of a 57-clause Bill. Given that 73% of the public back the Bill, is not the position of the Bill’s House of Lords opponents beginning to look rather odd and, frankly, out of touch?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, as my noble friend knows, the Government have been clear that we are neutral on the topic of assisted dying and the passage of the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill. It is a Private Member’s Bill and my noble friend the Chief Whip has made it clear that there will be no government time given to the Bill in your Lordships’ House. It is for your Lordships to determine the progress of the Bill.

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

My Lords, before Royal Assent has even been granted to Jersey’s Bill, a Deputy has tabled a Motion calling for assisted dying to be extended to non-terminally ill people with unbearable suffering. In reply, the Health Minister has said “Now is not the time, but it would be appropriate to consider extending the law as part of the three-year review of the Act”. Does the Minister not agree that this demonstrates that the terminal illness criterion is no cast-iron guarantee, but is simply the mission creep that many of us have warned against concerning our legislation?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, the Crown dependencies are self-governing jurisdictions with their own democratically elected Parliaments. The UK is not responsible for looking at the content or the policy of any legislation that they pass, but merely for checking that it is compatible, for example, with the European convention. I am certainly not going to say anything that would change the Government’s position of neutrality in relation to the Private Member’s Bill that is passing through your Lordships’ House.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, the process leading up to advising on Royal Assent is one in which the UK Government examines island legislation to see if it has unintended effects in the United Kingdom. Is that process being gone through and, if so, how, given that we do not know what the Government’s position would be on such fundamental questions as whether assisted dying would be provided within or outside the National Health Service, and all the dependencies rely on specialist medical help from hospitals in England?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

At the risk of repeating myself, the Government do not look at the merits of the legislation that they receive in relation to the Crown dependencies: these are stand-alone pieces of legislation that do not affect the position the Government take in relation to the Private Member’s Bill before this House.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, in addition to the assisted dying legislation in the Crown dependencies of Jersey and the Isle of Man, there is, as the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, observed, also legislation coming forward in Scotland and, quite distinctly and separately, in England and Wales. If assisted dying becomes lawful in one jurisdiction of the United Kingdom but not another, can the Minister explain what UK-wide framework has been developed to manage the legal, ethical and medical consequences of that divergence, or are we in danger of creating for the United Kingdom a fragmented regime in this most ethically sensitive issue, without any agreed cross-border protocol?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I understand why the noble and learned Lord asks that question, but it would be entirely premature of the Government to work out what the situation is going to be, since we do not know whether or if that Private Member’s Bill will pass through your Lordships’ House.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, I oppose the principle of assisted dying and I think that the current Bill is very flawed. However, I also regret the fact that your Lordships’ House has not been able to actually have votes on some of the key elements within the Bill. I think there are many noble Lords who regret the way this Bill is being conducted.

My noble friend says the Government are neutral, which I fully understand, but, in the current circumstances, surely the Government need to think about how Parliament can be helped to come to some conclusions. Surely, we would start with a vote in principle in the Commons. If it is in favour, the Government should produce a Bill that would allow us to have proper scrutiny. Will she at least consider a way forward that enables us to come to a proper conclusion?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I do not know how many more ways I can find to say that the Government are neutral on this Bill. My noble friend the Chief Whip has made extra days available on Fridays: we still have four more to go. How that time is used is a matter for your Lordships’ House, bearing in mind that the position of the Government consistently has been that this is a question of conscience and not a matter for the Government.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

My Lords, how are the Government considering the proposed legislation in the different areas to be safe within the European Convention on Human Rights, given that we have already heard that Jersey’s euthanasia is proposed to extend to those who are not terminally ill and that the deficits in the infrastructure of the Isle of Man Bill have already been identified? There is ongoing discussion about the Bill proposed in Scotland, which looks quite different, and the Welsh Assembly gave legislative consent to only some parts of the Bill, under the impression that, if it did not, it would have no control whatever over how the legislation was enacted, given that health is devolved to Wales.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her question. She has asked for quite a lot of information and we may have to write to her on that. I can certainly speak about what happened in relation to the Isle of Man. We have the Isle of Man for assistance on the Bill’s reliance on codes of practice for the implementation of pre-death and post-death reviews. We also asked for assistance on the training and guidance of healthcare professionals, specifically around safeguarding against potential coercion. The Jersey Bill has not arrived with us yet, but I repeat that the merits of the legislation are not a matter for this Government.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, set out in the Ministry of Justice’s communications with the Isle of Man, there are a number of concerns with the legislation there that are very similar to the concerns that many of us have with the Bill before this House, and many amendments have been put down to deal with those concerns. We would be making faster progress if the sponsor of the Bill would engage seriously with those concerns and accept some of the amendments that have been put forward by those who want to make the Bill better.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

Can anybody think of another way for me to say that the Government are neutral in relation to this Bill? And I am certainly not going to comment on matters that are for the sponsor.

[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that respecting the settled will of the legislatures of the Isle of Man and Jersey on matters within their domestic competence strengthens the constitutional relationship between the United Kingdom and the Crown dependencies? Will the Government therefore commit to publishing clear criteria and timeframes for the granting of Royal Assent?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The most recent communication from the Isle of Man—the latest information—was received at the end of January. Officials are now preparing advice for the Lord Chancellor. It would be completely inappropriate for me to comment on either the timing or the content of that advice.

[Baroness Jay of Paddington (Lab)]

My Lords, notwithstanding the Government’s determined position of neutrality, which the Minister has rightly said she has repeated many times, would she not accept that, once Royal Assent is given to the procedures and the Acts in Jersey and in the Isle of Man, there will be an extraordinarily unsatisfactory patchwork of provision across the United Kingdom for assisted dying, and therefore it is particularly important that the Government should make sure that the Bill before your Lordships’ House is properly completed?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I still cannot think of another, better way of saying it. I think it would be rude to my noble friend to say that I refer her to my previous answer, but I am afraid I do.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 2nd March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

234: Schedule 9, page 315, line 33, at end insert—
“(ia) sections 8A to 8C (rape and other offences against children under 16);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my new clause (Sexual offences against children under 16), inserted after clause 73.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to government Amendments 234, 235, 237, 249, 250, 448 and 467, which will give effect to recommendation 1 of the National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey. She recommended that the law should be changed so that an adult who engages in penetrative sexual activity with a child who is under 16 is charged with rape. I thank the noble Baroness for the audit. She worked closely with us as we developed these offences, and it was important to us to ensure that we met her objectives. I thank her for her strong support of the Government’s proposals.

We are taking a two-stage approach, starting with the amendments being debated today. These will create new offences covering rape and other penetrative sexual activity with a child who is under 16 by an adult. The important thing to note is that the prosecution does not have to prove that the child did not consent, so ostensible or purported consent or reasonable belief in consent is completely irrelevant. This eliminates any question of whether an under-16 seemed to have consented. All that matters is the age of the child. If the child is under 13, the defendant’s belief about their age is irrelevant. If the child is aged 13 to 15, an adult who believed that the child was aged 16 or over would not be guilty, but only if that belief was reasonably held. This mirrors the existing approach to sexual offences committed against children.

The maximum penalty for these offences will be life imprisonment, and these offences will sit alongside existing ones in relation to sexual activity with and towards children. The Crown Prosecution Service will therefore retain discretion to charge the full range of child sex offences where appropriate, though we expect that the use of other offences will be very limited. As with existing offences against children under 13, the CPS will prioritise the more serious charges. We are also tabling the necessary consequential amendments, such as ensuring that where the relevant criteria are met, offenders will be eligible for extended determinate sentences.

This brings me to the second stage. The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, was clear in her audit that the law in this area needs to be changed to ensure that children are treated as children. Alongside our new offences, we are committed to doing two things. We are going to carry out a public consultation to look at how to treat what are known as “close-in-age relationships” within the cohort of relevant child sexual offences. This responds to the noble Baroness’s recommendation that the Government should consider a close-in-age exemption to prevent the criminalisation of teenagers who are in relationships with each other.

We will also conduct a post-implementation review of the new offences to test the impact they are having. We know that there are some concerns about the element of reasonable belief in age, and this review will look closely at how that works in practice. I assure the House that the Government will continue to progress this work as a matter of priority to ensure that we get the law right in the long term. I beg to move.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, we believe that Amendment 235 delivers on the crucial recommendation from the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, in her national audit. By creating these strict liability offences where consent is rightly irrelevant and the offence of reasonable belief in age cannot apply, these clauses send an important signal making it unambiguously clear that no adult can claim ignorance or excuse when preying on the young and vulnerable.

The audit explained how grooming gangs repeatedly evaded rape charges for penetrative sex with 13 to 15 year-olds. Cases were downgraded or dropped because victims were misperceived as having consented or been in love with abusers, despite children under 16 being legally incapable of consent. Perpetrators avoided accountability by claiming it was reasonable to believe their victims were older than 16, perhaps due to their demeanour or because they had fake ID. These clauses strip away both loopholes for good, and on these Benches we give them our full support.

The intent of Amendment 236 to elevate penetrative offences against young teens to rape is laudable, but, as we signalled in Committee, we have several concerns. Mandating rape charges for every act of intercourse with a child under 16 may sound resolute, but it introduces unnecessary evidential hurdles and extra elements that must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, which could result in guilty offenders walking free. Forcing every case into a life sentence framework risks deterring pleas from defendants and unnerving juries, driving up acquittals on technicalities. Amendment 236 also retains the “reasonable belief in age” defence, which—as the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, highlighted—offenders have exploited to evade justice. We believe the Government’s approach offers a surer path to protecting vulnerable children, and it has our support.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very grateful for the acknowledgement by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, that, in essence, Amendment 236 covers the same ground as the government amendments. I commend the noble Lords for bringing forward their amendment and making sure that it is on everybody’s radar. As the noble Lord said, the Government’s amendments go further than Amendment 236 was intended to, in that it covers all penetrative activity, not just penile penetration, and it is accompanied by all the necessary consequential amendments, such as ensuring, when relevant criteria are met, that offenders are eligible for extended determinate sentences.

We are indebted to the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, for her work and bringing about this important change. It makes it absolutely clear that penetrative sexual activity between adults and children under 16 is fundamentally wrong, cannot be excused by any suggestions about consent and will be treated with the utmost seriousness.

Amendment 234 agreed.

Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

235: After Clause 73, insert the following new Clause—
“Sexual offences against children under 16(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.(2) After section 8 insert—“Rape and other offences against children under 16
8A Rape of a child under 16(1) A person aged 18 or over (A) commits an offence if—(a) A intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another person (B) with A’s penis, and(b) either—(i) B is under 16 and A does not reasonably believe that B is 16 or over, or(ii) B is under 13.(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life.8B Assault of a child under 16 by penetration(1) A person aged 18 or over (A) commits an offence if—(a) A intentionally penetrates the vagina or anus of another person (B) with a part of A’s body or anything else,(b) the penetration is sexual, and(c) either—(i) B is under 16 and A does not reasonably believe that B is 16 or over, or(ii) B is under 13. (2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life.8C Causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration(1) A person aged 18 or over (A) commits an offence if—(a) A intentionally causes or incites another person (B) to engage in an activity within subsection (2),(b) the activity is sexual, and(c) either—(i) B is under 16 and A does not reasonably believe that B is 16 or over, or(ii) B is under 13.(2) An activity is within this subsection if it involves—(a) penetration of B’s anus or vagina,(b) penetration of B’s mouth with a person’s penis,(c) penetration of a person’s anus or vagina with a part of B’s body or by B with anything else, or(d) penetration of a person’s mouth with B’s penis.(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life.”(3) In section 73(2) (exceptions to aiding, abetting and counselling) after paragraph (a) insert—“(aa) an offence under section 8A or 8B (offences against children under 16);”.(4) Schedule (Sexual offences against children under 16: consequential amendments) contains minor and consequential amendments.”Member's explanatory statement
This new Clause creates new offences of rape, assault by penetration, and causing or inciting a sexual activity involving penetration, in relation to children under 16.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

237: Clause 75, page 102, line 9, at end insert—
“(ca) an offence under any of sections 8A to 8C of that Act (rape and other offences against children under 16),”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my new clause (Sexual offences against children under 16), inserted after clause 73.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

249: Before Schedule 10, insert the following new Schedule—
“ScheduleSexual offences against children under 16: consequential amendmentsFirearms Act 1968 (c.27)
1 (1) Paragraph 6 of Schedule 1 to the Firearms Act 1968 (offences to which section 17(2) applies) is amended as follows.(2) In paragraph (f), for “(3)(a) to (d)” substitute “(2)(a) to (d)”.(3) After paragraph (f) insert—“(fa) section 8A (rape of a child under 16);(fb) section 8B (assault of a child under 16 by penetration);(fc) section 8C (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration), where the activity was caused;”.Internationally Protected Persons Act 1978 (c.17)
2 (1) Section 1(1A) of the Internationally Protected Persons Act 1978 (offences for purposes of section 1) is amended as follows.(2) In paragraph (e), for “(3)(a) to (d)” substitute “(2)(a) to (d)”.(3) After paragraph (e) insert—“(ea) an offence under section 8A or 8B of that Act;(eb) an offence under section 8C of that Act, where the activity involving penetration was caused;”.Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978 (c.26)
3 (1) Paragraph 9 of Schedule 1 to the Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978 is amended as follows.(2) In paragraph (d), for “(3)(a) to (d)” substitute “(2)(a) to (d)”.(3) After paragraph (d) insert—“(da) section 8A or 8B (rape of a child under 16; assault of a child under 16 by penetration);(db) section 8C (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration), where the activity was caused;”.Criminal Justice Act 1982 (c. 48)
4 (1) Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice Act 1982 (early release of prisoners: excluded offences) is amended as follows.(2) In the entry for section 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, for “(3)(a) to (d)” substitute “(2)(a) to (d)”.(3) After the entry for section 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 insert— “Section 8A (rape of a child under 16).Section 8B (assault of a child under 16 by penetration).Section 8C (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration), where the activity was caused.”Children Act 1989 (c. 41)
5 In Schedule ZA1 to the Children Act 1989 (serious sexual offences for the purposes of section 10C), in paragraph 3 after paragraph (h) insert—“(ha) section 8A (rape of a child under 16);(hb) section 8B (assault of a child under 16 by penetration);(hc) section 8C (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration);”.Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (c. 33)
6 (1) Section 25(2) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (offences to which bail restrictions apply) is amended as follows.(2) In paragraph (k), for “(3)(a) to (d)” substitute “(2)(a) to (d)”.(3) After paragraph (k) insert—“(ka) an offence under section 8A of that Act (rape of a child under 16);(kb) an offence under section 8B of that Act (assault of a child under 16 by penetration);(kc) an offence under section 8C of that Act (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration), where the activity was caused;”.Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995 (c. 53)
7 In section 11(9) of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995 (definition of “rape”), for “or 5” substitute “, 5 or 8A”.Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (c. 43)
8 In section 32ZAB(1) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (specified offences for purposes of section 32ZAA), after paragraph (f) insert—“(fa) an offence under section 8A of that Act (rape of a child under 16);”.Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44)
9 (1) The Criminal Justice Act 2003 is amended as follows.(2) In section 256AZBB(1) (specified offences for purposes of section 256AZBA), after paragraph (e) insert—“(ea) an offence under section 8A of that Act (rape of a child under 16);”.(3) In Schedule 4 (qualifying offences for purposes of section 62), after paragraph 16 insert—“Rape of a child under 16
16A An offence under section 8A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.Attempted rape of a child under 16
16B An offence under section 1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 of attempting to commit an offence under section 8A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.Assault of a child under 16 by penetration
16C An offence under section 8B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.Causing a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration
16D An offence under section 8C of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 where it is alleged that the activity was caused.” (4) In Schedule 5 (qualifying offences for purposes of Part 10) after paragraph 15 insert—“Rape of a child under 16
15A An offence under section 8A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.Attempted rape of a child under 16
15B An offence under section 1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 of attempting to commit an offence under section 8A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.Assault of a child under 16 by penetration
15C An offence under section 8B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.Causing a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration
15D An offence under section 8C of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 where it is alleged that the activity was caused.”(5) In Part 2 of Schedule 15 (specified sexual offences for purposes of sections 244ZA and 325) after paragraph 109 insert—“109A An offence under section 8A of that Act (rape of a child under 16).109B An offence under section 8B of that Act (assault of a child under 16 by penetration).109C An offence under section 8C of that Act (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration).”(6) In paragraph 7 of Schedule 34A (child sex offences for purposes of section 327A), after paragraph (a) insert—“(aa) sections 8A to 8C of that Act (rape and other offences against children under 16);”.Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (c.12)
10 In section 116(8)(a) of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (offences constituting child sexual exploitation), after the entry for sections 5 to 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 insert—“sections 8A to 8C (rape and other offences against children under 16);”.Modern Slavery Act 2015 (c.30)
11 In paragraph 33 of Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (sexual offences to which defence in section 45 does not apply), after the entry for section 8 insert—“section 8A (rape of child under 16)section 8B (assault of child under 16 by penetration)section 8C (causing or inciting child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration)”.Sentencing Act 2020 (c. 17)
12 (1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.(2) In Part 1 of Schedule 14 (extended sentences: the earlier offence condition: offences), in the table in paragraph 9, after the entry for section 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 insert—

“(ga) Section 8A (rape of a child under 16)

(gb) Section 8B (assault of a child under 16 by penetration)

(gc) Section 8C (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration)”.

(3) In Part 1 of Schedule 15 (life sentence for second offence: listed offences), in paragraph 9, after the entry for section 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 insert—

“(ga) section 8A (rape of a child under 16)	The date on which section 8A comes into force
(gb) section 8B (assault of a child under 16 by penetration)	The date on which section 8B comes into force
(gc) section 8C (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration)	The date on which section 8C comes into force”

(4) In Part 2 of Schedule 18 (specified sexual offences for purposes of section 306), in paragraph 38 after paragraph (h) insert—“(ha) section 8A (rape of a child under 16);(hb) section 8B (assault of a child under 16 by penetration);(hc) section 8C (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration);”.(5) In Schedule 19 (specified offences carrying maximum sentence of imprisonment for life), in the table in paragraph 20, after the entry for section 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 insert—

“(fa) Section 8A (rape of a child under 16)

(fb) Section 8B (assault of a child under 16 by penetration)

(fc) Section 8C (causing or inciting a child under 16 to engage in sexual activity involving penetration)”.”

Member's explanatory statement
This new Schedule makes minor and consequential amendments in relation to my new clause (Sexual offences against children under 16) inserted after clause 73.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

250: Schedule 10, page 318, line 35, at end insert—
“(ia) sections 8A to 8C (rape and other offences against children under 16);”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my new clause (Sexual offences against children under 16), inserted after clause 73.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

270: Clause 87, page 111, leave out lines 31 to 39
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes a provision which requires the courts to dismiss certain actions in respect of personal injuries attributable to child sex abuse if there would be substantial prejudice to the defendant and it would not be equitable for the action to proceed.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, government Amendment 270 makes a change to Clause 87. In making this change, the Government are responding to the concerns raised by some of your Lordships in Committee.

Clause 87 itself is vital; it removes the current three-year limitation period for personal injury claims brought by victims and survivors of child sexual abuse in respect of the abuse committed against them and gives effect to a recommendation of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. This is needed because many victims and survivors are not able to talk—or even think—about the abuse they suffered until many years afterwards, which is a direct consequence of the abuse itself.

Clause 87 inserts new Section 11ZB into the Limitation Act 1980 because it is that Act that makes provision for the dismissal of actions which are outside the time limit for personal injury claims. Under new Section 11ZB(2), if an action is brought outside the usual three-year limitation period, for it to be dismissed the defendant must satisfy the court that a fair hearing cannot take place. Under the current drafting of new Section 11ZB(3), the action may also be dismissed if the defendant demonstrates that allowing the action to proceed would cause them substantial prejudice.

We have listened carefully to the testimony of victims and survivors, and reflected on the amendments debated in Committee, all of which raised concerns about the substantial prejudice test. We decided that they were right. The retention of Section 11ZB(2) alone both implements the relevant IICSA recommendation and ensures that those accused of child sexual abuse maintain their right to a fair hearing. I am therefore pleased to say that Amendment 270 removes new Section 11ZB(3) from Clause 87.

Many have spoken about this, and I pay tribute to them all, but I make special mention of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, and Mr Stephen Bernard, who brought this to our attention swiftly. Mr Bernard spoke to me most movingly about his own experiences, and I thank him for this; he has played a big part in ensuring that the Government reached this decision. I beg to move.

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)]

My Lords, as I mentioned at Second Reading, I am very proud that with Clause 87 this Government abolished the time limitations in historical Church child sexual abuse cases. Survivors such as my friend Stephen Bernard, whom my noble friend the Minister referenced, were concerned that the clause, as originally drafted, added a new substantial prejudice, especially for historical cases. This created uncertainty, delays and an extra hurdle for survivors.

I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for listening to the concerns of survivors such as Stephen, and for tabling Amendment 270. With the removal of lines 31 to 39, the IICSA recommendation has now been adopted in full, thus ensuring better access to justice for the survivors of historical sexual abuse. I am very grateful to my noble friend.

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[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, this is a significant amendment which my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower, with the support of noble Lords from across your Lordships’ House, originally tabled as a probing amendment in Committee. The removal of new Section 11ZB(3) from the Bill is important. If it had remained in the Bill, it would have weakened the removal of limitation periods for civil claims arising from child sexual abuse, correctly introduced by the proceeding provision new Section 11ZA. By removing subsection (3), it is fair to say we send a clear message that the law recognises the particular trauma and complexity that so often characterises historic cases of child sexual abuse.

In Committee, we moved the amendment on the grounds that new Section 11ZB added uncertainty for survivors. Noble Lords from across the House raised concerns then, and have mentioned them today as well, that an additional hurdle could undermine the purpose of the reform and create ambiguity for claimants. I am therefore very pleased that the Minister has had a change of heart. I am tempted to explore further the reasons behind that, but for the time being, I thank her for the change of heart.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all Members of your Lordships’ House who welcomed this government amendment. On the matters raised by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, sadly the courts are very used to dealing with non-recent cases of child sexual abuse and the issues of loss of evidence and loss of opportunity to present matters, and I am confident that the courts will be able to deal with that in a fair way. I am pleased to hear that there is overall support for the amendment. I thank again those who raised this with us in Committee, and I beg to move.

Amendment 270 agreed.

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Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

271: Clause 89, page 113, line 13, after “to” insert “semen-defaced images,”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment creating a new offence of sharing semen-defaced images (see my amendment to Schedule 11, page 321, line 19).

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, it is an honour to be opening today’s debate on intimate image abuse. It gives me great pleasure to be able to say that, over the course of the passage of this Bill in your Lordships’ House, I have had a number of extremely helpful conversations on the subjects of pornography, child sexual abuse images, misogyny and a lot of other subjects which, while often distasteful, are important in the fight against violence against women and girls. We will cover some of those issues in this group and others in subsequent groups. I want to say, in relation to all of them, how grateful I am to those Members of your Lordships’ House who have taken the time to speak to me and work with me.

In the context of this group, I pay tribute to the noble Baronesses, Lady Owen, Lady Kidron, Lady Brinton and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Clement-Jones. A substantial part of my career as a lawyer has been spent in the fight against violence against women and children—not only girls—and I thought that I was pretty knowledgeable about it in the context of the criminal law, but I am more than happy to acknowledge that I have learned a great deal from those to whom I have spoken in the context of this Bill, and I pay particular tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. On a number of occasions, I have changed my mind after speaking to them and I have no doubt that this is a better Bill as a result, and so I thank them.

As a result of what has been said in the debates and other conversations, the Government have tabled a collection of amendments that, taken together, create a package of further changes that strengthen the overall intimate image abuse regime already contained in the Bill. I hope that your Lordships will agree that they show that the Government are listening and acting.

I have already mentioned the noble Baroness, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge, but I also thank Professor Clare McGlynn; they have both worked hard to keep these issues at the top of the agenda. These amendments are also a tribute to the vital work of organisations such the Revenge Porn Helpline and Refuge and, of course, the victims and survivors themselves, who have taken the courageous and important step of reporting online abuse and raising awareness.

I have already said that I am proud of these amendments, but I am aware that, for some, they do not go far enough. I ask those who will speak to their amendments today to accept two things: that we are all on the same side about the harm that we are trying to prevent and that I am truly committed to trying to get this right. When I say that I cannot accede to something, there is a good reason for it, and I am not refusing to accept amendments for partisan reasons or simply out of stubbornness.

This landscape changes fast and usually not for the better, but there is a reason that we sometimes urge caution before creating new criminal offences and penalties. There can be real dangers in making piecemeal changes as soon as we are confronted by some new horrifying behaviour causing harm to so many victims. It is the responsibility of the Government to ensure that we do not legislate in haste and then come to regret it. If, in relation to some of these proposals, I ask that the Government are given time to gather more evidence and then consider the best way of going about preventing such behaviour, I ask your Lordships to accept that this comes from a good place—namely, wanting to make sure that any laws we pass capture the crimes we have in mind but do not have unanticipated consequences.

I turn to semen-defaced images. This is not a pleasant thing to discuss in polite society, but I need to make it clear what is meant by this, what the harm is and what we are doing in relation to it. What is meant by semen-defaced images are images of semen deposited on to another image, often a photograph and usually a photograph of a woman. It is disgraceful behaviour. It is designed to degrade and humiliate the woman in the picture, and we cannot tolerate this misogynistic behaviour in a civilised society. The noble Baroness, Lady Owen, persuaded me that we should make this a criminal offence and so we have done so. That is why the Government are bringing forward Amendments 271, 278, 279, 290 and 292 today. Together, they introduce a new offence of sharing a semen-defaced image of another person without consent.

This is the first step in stamping out this type of behaviour for good, but it is not the end. We are determined to tackle violence against women and girls in all its forms, and we want to ensure that the criminal law gets ahead of emerging harms. That is why we have announced in the VAWG strategy that we are launching a call for evidence better to understand online misogynistic, image-based abuse and the extent to which there are new harms and behaviour that may not be fully captured by existing criminal offences.

The issue of screenshotting was also raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge, at Second Reading and in Committee. Intimate images are personal and private. Consenting adults are of course free to share them and may do so in ways that are permanent or temporary. A person’s right to share their image temporarily in private must be respected, and if there is a violation of that right, it must be addressed. Government Amendments 281, 282, 283, 285, 286, 287, 288, 291, 293, 294 and 295, taken together, make it a criminal offence non-consensually to take a screenshot of, or copy in any way, an intimate image that the victim has shared only temporarily. This offence sits alongside, and mirrors wherever relevant, the other intimate image offences, and it sends a clear message to those who engage in this non-consensual behaviour that it is unacceptable and will be punished.

I briefly turn to the subject of takedown. I know that Amendment 275, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, will be debated later today in a separate group, but I will take a moment to mention the announcement made by the Prime Minister on 19 February. We will bring forward government Amendments at Third Reading in response to Amendment 275 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, to ensure that tech companies are legally required to have measures to take down reported non-consensual intimate image abuse within 48 hours to ensure that victims get rapid protection. It is important to refer to this now to demonstrate the Government’s action in this space as a whole. Where we have been able to, we have moved. I hope that your Lordships will bear that in mind as we progress through this debate.

I am also pleased to say that Amendments 296 and 456 designate new offences in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to criminalise creating and requesting purported deepfake, non-consensual intimate images as priority offences under the Online Safety Act. As many of your Lordships will know, this means that platforms will face the stronger duties that apply to the most serious illegal content. They will be required to assess specifically the risks of the service being used to facilitate this offence; to mitigate and manage the risk of the service being used to commit the offence; to take proactive steps to prevent users encountering such content; and to minimise the time that such content is present on their platform. There has been understandable public concern over the creation and dissemination of non-consensual sexual deepfakes on X, and the Government have been clear that no woman or child should live in fear of having their image sexually manipulated. These amendments help put that principle into practice.

Finally, Amendment 455 makes a small minor and technical change in respect of the taking and installing offences in the Bill, and I can provide further details if any of your Lordships would like them. I beg to move.

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 273, 274, 275, 276, 284 and 296A in my name and the names of the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Pannick, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. In doing so, I declare an interest as I have received pro bono legal advice from Mishcon de Reya on image-based sexual abuse. I will also speak to government Amendments 278, 281 and 296. I want to place on record my support for Amendment 277 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey.

I thank the Minister for her determination to make progress on this issue. We have made huge strides since Committee, and I am very grateful. I also thank the survivors and campaigners who have fought for so long for these changes.

Amendment 273 seeks to ensure that in relation to abusers who are convicted of an intimate image abuse offence the court must,

“order the destruction of any content used to commit the offence on any device or data store containing”

it, and that prosecutors,

“lodge a deletion verification report within 28 days”.

While I acknowledge that the Government have updated the law to clarify that this content should be seen as being used to commit the offence under Section 153 of the Sentencing Act 2020, this does not offer victims any guarantee of the total destruction of the content used to commit the crime.

One survivor, Daria, whose convicted abuser was allowed to keep the content of her, said, “The weapons with which he caused life-shattering harm remain in his arsenal. Despite the severity of the crimes, as reflected in the sentences handed down by the Crown Court, I remain at his mercy with regard to whether he chooses to violate me again in the same way”. Daria is not alone in her experience. Shanti Das, a journalist who undertook research on this and published in February 2025, found that of the 98 image-based abuse offences prosecuted in magistrates’ courts in England and Wales in the preceding six months, only three resulted in deprivation orders. It is quite simply appalling. Survivors of this abuse deserve better. On this amendment, I will test the opinion of the House.

Amendments 274 and 276 mandate the Secretary of State to bring forward regulations to create a centralised statutory hash registry and mandate hash sharing. The Revenge Porn Helpline currently runs the voluntary register called StopNCII.org and has confirmed that it would be willing to run the centralised registry. The Revenge Porn Helpline does incredible work supporting victims of intimate image abuse and has a 90% success rate on the removal of content. However, 10% of the content is on non-compliant sites.

The amendment seeks to tackle non-compliance by allowing the Revenge Porn Helpline to co-ordinate with internet service providers to mandate the blocking of verified NCII content in cases of non-compliance, thus avoiding the long and bureaucratic process of obtaining business disruption measures under Ofcom that are of little comfort to victims whose image remains online. One victim, Jane, stated that,

“the platform’s slow and inconsistent enforcement left me feeling trapped in a relentless cycle, where the harm snowballed with every hour the abusive content stayed up. Constantly monitoring the internet, reporting the same material, and watching it reappear has taken a huge mental toll”.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, the people-pleaser in me would love to be able to say, “Oh, go on then— I will accept them all and make everybody happy”, but I am afraid there are some good reasons why I cannot accept some of these amendments. I am going to try to respond to them all as briefly as possible, in the hope of explaining why the Government do not consider these amendments necessary in some cases, and do not consider it desirable for them to be done through the unwieldy mechanism of primary legislation in others.

I start with Amendment 273 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, on deletion orders. I say at the outset that the Government of course recognise the harm caused by those who retain copies of intimate images, and we want to ensure that the legal framework protects victims. We agree that it is a no-brainer about the principle, but, for reasons I will come to in a moment, it is not as simple to enact as it might seem.

The noble Baroness has correctly identified that there is a difference between depriving offenders of devices that have been used, and actually getting rid of—deleting—the images themselves. If there is an issue about insufficient judges making deprivation orders for devices, then we must tackle that. This amendment is not the solution to that. Indeed, if she is right that judges are proving to be reluctant, there is a risk that, even if this deletion order provision came into force, they might be reluctant to do that as well. That is not the way to tackle judges not making the orders.

We must make sure that what we do is workable. Verified deletion is highly complex in practice. There are a number of challenges concerning, for example, images stored in the cloud. The noble Baroness’s amendment is very short on the practical measures that would be needed to make it effective, such as how the verification is to be carried out, what the penalty would be for an offender who refuses to comply with an order to provide the password, or what happens during the appeal period. For example, in the Crown Court, defendants have 28 days following conviction to lodge grounds for appeal. These are all significant drafting issues that present problems with the amendment as tabled by the noble Baroness, so we need to give this further thought.

As I said to the noble Baroness in Committee and during our recent meetings, we are already amending deprivation orders so that they can be applied to seize intimate images and any devices containing those images, regardless of whether the device was used in the offence itself.

One of the issues which concerns us is that only a fraction of the victims of intimate images go through the criminal justice system. Many victims do not want to go anywhere near a criminal court, so we want to look at the available remedies in the civil courts in order to ensure that these, too, will offer meaningful redress for victims.

But anything we do needs to be comprehensive and in a package that works well together, ensuring removal of these images as quickly as possible. That is why I am pleased to announce today that we intend to review the available court order protection for victims of intimate image abuse across civil and criminal courts. The review is going to include routes for deletion to ensure that it is fit for purpose, that it identifies necessary improvements and that it has attached to it all the consequential provisions that are needed to make sure that it is actually effective.

This is not an attempt by the Government to kick the can down the road. We want to get it right, and we want it to have material value. We do not want to create something that does not work so judges do not use it. But we do not think a court order available in the criminal court addresses this problem as a whole, and that is why we need to take time to think more comprehensively about a tailored solution, working for victims and for criminal justice partners. The noble Baroness, Lady Owen, Professor McGlynn and I have discussed this, and I hope that the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment today in the light of that announcement.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way. The amendment, as she understands, imposes a duty on judges. Therefore, there is no question of a judge deciding not to use it. More substantially, I am very concerned about the delay that will result if the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, does not move her amendment. Surely, the proper way to deal with this is for the Government to accept the amendment, and, if they will not, for the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, to move it. If the Government wish, as they are perfectly entitled to, to add or to subtract, they can do so at Third Reading or, perhaps more realistically, in the other place. They will have plenty of time to do that; let us get on today and put this into law.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I will say two things in response to the noble Lord. The first is that the criminal courts tend not to be very keen on provisions that they regard as complex when they come at the end of a sentencing hearing. They tend to react by saying, “We’re going to leave this to be dealt with through some other mechanism because it’s too complicated. We can’t work out how to verify it”—the sorts of objections that occasionally are made in relation to, for example, very complicated compensation orders or confiscation orders. The second point is that there is, as I have already said, a real risk in piecemeal legislation that you bring in provisions for one court that then do not work in the read-across from the civil courts. On the civil courts, we cannot do that today.

We need to do this quickly, and we absolutely recognise this. After all, there is no point in saying that we take this stuff seriously and then saying that we are not going to do anything about getting rid of the images. It is illogical, apart from anything else, as well as perhaps not being very moral either. I ask the noble Baroness to accept the sincerity of what we say. That is as far as I can go today.

I turn now to Amendment 274, again in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen. I understand and agree with what she is trying to achieve. The only issue between us is whether this is the right way to do it. Ofcom has already consulted on additional safety measures for its illegal content codes of practice. These proposed measures explicitly include the use of perceptual hash-matching technology to detect and remove non-consensual intimate imagery, including deepfakes.

To be deemed compliant with their Online Safety Act duties by following the codes, services would need to deploy this technology automatically to identify and remove such content, providing victims with reassurance that their images are being removed swiftly. Given the urgent need to strengthen protection in this area, Ofcom announced on 19 February that it is accelerating timelines and will publish its final decision on these proposals on the use of hash matching in May, with measures expected to come into effect by the summer.

We consider that the work of Ofcom meets the aims of the noble Baroness’s amendment. The protection that she seeks will be delivered promptly and robustly through Ofcom’s forthcoming codes of practice. It is an area where unnecessarily imposing duties in statute, especially where work is already in progress, could have the adverse effect of restricting the flexibility of this work should it need to respond and change to the ever-changing online landscape in the future.

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

The Prime Minister launched his strategy for tackling non-compliance by saying that it would be a “one and done” system. Does the Minister acknowledge that the Ofcom system is not a “one and done” system? It is dependent on a series of factors, including whether all service providers choose to adopt third-party hashing. If they choose to operate their own hash database where they do not share the hashes, it is not a “one and done” system. I would really like to tidy up the confusion here between whether the Prime Minister is right or what is being said here is correct.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The Prime Minister is right. The difference between us is what we understand by the system. The Government’s position is that the Ofcom system will achieve what the Prime Minister said he wanted to achieve. That is the difference between the noble Baroness and me. I am not sure that I can go any further than that this evening.

I turn now to Amendment 276, once again in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, on the NCII register. The Government recognise the vital work undertaken by the Revenge Porn Helpline, including operating a database of existing hashes of non-consensual intimate images that are shared with participating companies to detect and remove the images online. We recognise the benefits that a register of verified NCII content would provide, including the important role that it could play in supporting victims in the removal of the content.

This is one of those instances where the issue between us is whether it is necessary or desirable to put it on a statutory footing. The Government’s position is that it is not a necessity for its success and needs very careful consideration, especially to ensure that an NCII register aligns with the process taken by the Internet Watch Foundation’s register for child sexual abuse imagery, which operates successfully and has never been on a statutory footing, and to avoid any unintended consequences. For this reason, I confirm that the Government are committing to undertake a preliminary evaluation to determine the operational needs and impact of establishing a successful central register for non-consensual intimate image abuse.

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

I think it is important to clarify for the sake of the House that, with regard to the Internet Watch Foundation’s CSAM register, CSAM is illegal in and of itself. NCII—non-consensual intimate image—material is not illegal in and of itself. Therefore, a voluntary system will not work. It needs to be on a statutory footing.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I do not think anyone is suggesting that it should be voluntary. It is simply whether it should be established through primary legislation or regulation. I used the expression earlier about the unwieldiness of primary legislation. After all, one of the problems with legislating through primary legislation is that, if you get it wrong, you have to try to amend it or repeal it, whereas if you have regulations, particularly backed up by enforcement powers, it is a much nimbler way of going about things. That is the issue between us.

The evaluation will also assess critical considerations that are still outstanding, including the effect that such a registry has on intermediary liability and what is needed to establish robust verification procedures. The findings will be used to guide next steps to ensure that any options are sustainable and effective and work alongside existing regulation for platforms.

Turning again to semen-defaced images and Amendments 284 and 296A, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, as I said when opening this group, the Government agree with her that semen imagery is disgusting behaviour. That is exactly why we have brought forward our own amendments to criminalise the sharing of a semen-defaced image without consent. The inclusion of

“semen … on any part of their body”,

as in the noble Baroness’s amendment, is unnecessary, because such images would already fall within the scope of the intimate image offences. To answer her question directly, I can confirm that the example she gave will, and should, already be covered by the existing legislation. The noble Baroness asked whether we can, in effect, require the CPS to amend its guidance to make it clearer. The CPS is, of course, an independent organisation—constitutionally, importantly so—but we can certainly look at asking the CPS whether it would be prepared to do so.

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[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)]

My Lords, before my noble friend sits down, I am sure the whole House agrees with, in essence, what Amendment 273 says, but I also noted from my noble friend that it is much more complex than I had understood. I am sure that she is as frustrated as everyone else that these things take time, and I wonder whether she is able to give us any timeline. Sorry, I am an optimist, but this is an extremely important amendment. I will be supporting the Government, but it would be good to know if we are talking about months or whatever, because obviously we want to see this in statute as soon as possible.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I do not think I can quite express how unpopular I would be if I suddenly, on the hoof, came out with a time. All I can say is that we are committed to doing this quickly.

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

My Lords, before the Minister sits down, I emphasise that we have talked about drafting issues on Amendment 273. Obviously, I do not want to delay proceedings, but I remind the House that I first brought up forced deletion in September 2024, so the issue has been before the House now for about 17 months. It was in the Data (Use and Access) Bill in December 2024, when the Minister said, “There’s no problem here because it should be seen under Section 153 of the Sentencing Act 2020”. This is not working, and the only answer really is to deal with the matter tonight.

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Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

272: After Clause 89, insert the following new Clause—
“Purported intimate image generators(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.(2) After section 66H insert— “66I Making or supplying purported intimate image generators(1) A person commits an offence if the person—(a) makes or adapts a thing, or(b) supplies or offers to supply a thing,for use as a generator of purported intimate images.(2) A “generator of purported intimate images” is a thing for creating, or facilitating the creation of, purported intimate images of a person.(3) A person makes, adapts, supplies, or offers to supply a thing for use as a generator of purported intimate images if a reasonable person (having regard to all the circumstances) would consider that they do so.(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that they took all reasonable steps to prevent the thing being used for creating, or facilitating the creation of, purported intimate images of a person without the person’s consent.(5) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or a fine (or both).(6) Section 72(1) applies in relation to an act which, if done in England and Wales, would constitute an offence under this section as if references to a United Kingdom national included—(a) a body incorporated under the law of any part of the United Kingdom, or(b) an unincorporated association formed under the law of any part of the United Kingdom.(7) In this section—“purported intimate image” of a person, and references to creating a purported intimate image of a person, have the same meaning as in section 66E;“thing” includes a program, information in electronic form and a service.66J Section 66I: further defences(1) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 66I to prove that the person did the act which constituted the offence for the purposes of the prevention, detection or investigation of crime, or for the purposes of criminal proceedings, in any part of the world.(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 66I to prove that the person—(a) was a member of the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service or GCHQ (a “security body”), and(b) did the act which constituted the offence for the purposes of the exercise of any function of the security body.(3) “GCHQ” has the meaning given by section 3 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994.(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 66I to prove that the person—(a) was a member of OFCOM, was employed or engaged by OFCOM, or assisted OFCOM in the exercise of any of its online safety functions, and(b) did the act which constituted the offence for the purposes of OFCOM’s exercise of any of its online safety functions.(5) In subsection (4)—(a) “OFCOM” means the Office of Communications; (b) a reference to OFCOM’s “online safety functions” has the meaning given by section 235 of the Online Safety Act 2023.66K Section 66I: application to internet service providers(1) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under section 66I by—(a) providing access to a communication network, or(b) transmitting, in a communication network, information provided by a user, if the provider does not—(i) initiate the transmission,(ii) select the recipient of the transmission, or(iii) select or modify the information contained in the transmission.(2) The references in subsection (1) to providing access to, or transmitting information in, a communication network include storing the information transmitted so far as the storage—(a) is automatic, intermediate and transient,(b) is solely for the purpose of carrying out the transmission in the network, and(c) is for no longer than is reasonably necessary for the transmission.(3) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under section 66I by storing information provided by a user for transmission in a communication network if—(a) the storage of the information—(i) is automatic, intermediate and temporary, and(ii) is solely for the purpose of making more efficient the onward transmission of the information to other users at their request, and(b) the internet service provider—(i) does not modify the information,(ii) complies with any conditions attached to having access to the information, and(iii) on knowing of a matter within subsection (4), promptly removes the information or disables access to it.(4) The matters within this subsection are that—(a) the information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network,(b) access to it has been disabled, or(c) a court or administrative authority has ordered the removal from the network of, or the disablement of access to, the information.(5) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under section 66I by storing information provided by a user who is not acting under the authority or control of the provider if—(a) when the information was provided the provider did not know that it was, or contained, a generator of purported intimate images, and(b) on knowing that the information was, or contained, a generator of purported intimate images, the provider promptly removed the information or disabled access to it.(6) In this section—“generator of purported intimate images” has the same meaning as in section 66I;“internet service provider” means a provider of—(a) a service that is made available by means of the internet, or(b) a service that provides access to the internet; “user”, in relation to an internet service provider, means a user of a service provided by the internet service provider.66L Liability for offence under section 66I committed by bodies(1) This section applies where an offence under section 66I is committed by a body.(2) If the offence is committed with the consent or connivance of—(a) a relevant person in relation to the body, or(b) a person purporting to act in the capacity of a relevant person in relation to the body,the person (as well as the body) commits the offence and is liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.(3) In this section—“body” means a body corporate, a partnership or an unincorporated association other than a partnership;“relevant person” , in relation to a body, means—(a) in the case of a body corporate other than one whose affairs are managed by its members, a director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body;(b) in the case of a limited liability partnership or other body corporate whose affairs are managed by its members, a member who exercises functions of management with respect to it;(c) in the case of a limited partnership, a general partner (within the meaning given by section 3 of the Limited Partnerships Act 1907);(d) in the case of any other partnership, a partner;(e) in the case of an unincorporated association other than a partnership, a person who exercises functions of management with respect to it.”(3) In section 79(5) (meaning of references to image of a person), for “and 66G” substitute “, 66G and 66I”.(4) In paragraph 1 of Schedule 2 (sexual offences for purposes of section 72), after paragraph (c) insert—“(ca) an offence under section 66I;”.(5) In Schedule 3 (sexual offences for purposes of Part 2), after paragraph 33B insert—“33C An offence under section 66I of this Act (purported intimate image generators), if the offender is sentenced in respect of the offence to imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months.””Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause creates offences of making, adapting, supplying or offering to supply a generator of purported intimate images.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I am pleased to be opening this group with the introduction of government Amendments 272, 297, 449, 450 and 458. I once again thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, for the insightful recommendations in her pornography review. I also thank her for meeting me on a number of occasions over the last few months, and for the cordial and constructive tone of those meetings.

There is very little between the Government and the noble Baroness in our objectives. We recognise that her intention is to prevent the deeply unpleasant and damaging effect of what happens in both the online and offline worlds, including the effects upon our children. I hope and believe she also recognises that I am sincere when I say that we want to achieve the same thing. Where possible, the Government have tried to deliver on the issues that she has raised, and I thank her for the time she has taken to talk them through with us. I know that she has some concerns with regard to certain aspects of these amendments, to which I will respond later, but first I will speak to the government amendments.

I start with nudification apps. Together, Amendments 272 and 449 introduce a new offence that will ban the making, adapting, supplying or offer to supply of a tool or service for use as a generator of intimate images. The offence will give effect to our violence against women and girls strategy commitment to ban nudification tools. The offence will capture intimate image generators in all their unpleasant forms, including, but not limited to, apps, software, websites, AI models and bots. To be captured by the criminal offence, the tool must be made or supplied for the use of generating purported intimate images, irrespective of whether that is a primary purpose. The nudification tool ban will be the first of its kind in the world, and it will target the developers and suppliers who profit from the profound distress and victimisation of others. We will work with international partners and fora to tackle this issue.

The Government are committed to tackling the scourge of non-consensual sexual deepfakes and will continue to act to ensure that artificial intelligence cannot be misused to generate this abusive content. In addition to banning image generators, we have announced that we will table an amendment to the Bill to allow the Government to bring additional chatbots into the scope of the Online Safety Act and require them to protect their users from illegal content, including non-consensual intimate images. We will also work with international partners and fora to tackle this issue. Once the offence is in force, the Online Safety Act will impose requirements on social media and search services to have processes and systems in place to remove illegal content that supplies or offers to supply nudification tools, and this will significantly limit their accessibility to users in the UK.

I turn to another unpleasant topic: incest. It is with some pride that I bring forward Amendments 297, 450 and 458. Together, these amendments criminalise the possession or publication of pornographic images that portray sexual activity between family members, otherwise known unattractively as incest porn. In doing so, we give effect to one of the key recommendations of the Independent Review of Pornography by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. I know that she will soon speak to a cluster of her own amendments on this issue but, before she does, I place on record my sincere thanks to her for the vital role that she has played in bringing forward this important change.

We know there are concerns that the proliferation of incest-themed pornography can contribute to extremely harmful attitudes, particularly where it risks normalising child sexual abuse. The government amendment recognises those concerns. We are also pleased to announce that the new offence will be listed as a priority offence under the Online Safety Act, requiring platforms to take proactive and proportionate steps to stop this harmful material appearing online.

The offence as it stands will not capture pornography depicting relationships between step-relatives. This is a controversial topic, but such relationships are not illegal in real life. To be clear, though, any pornography involving real children, whether a step element is present or not, is already criminalised under the Protection of Children Act 1978. I beg to move.

[Baroness Bertin (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 298, 297A to 297D, 281A, 300 and 300A in my name. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, in particular, who has worked on this issue for so many years, the noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron and Lady Kennedy, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for adding their names to this set of amendments.

One thing is clear from the past few weeks: the status quo that has allowed abuse, misogyny, paedophilia and the exploitation of women and girls to flourish cannot continue. The recent release of the Epstein files, which were porn-drenched, should be our moment of reckoning, a moment that forces us to confront uncomfortable truths about power, complicity and the systems that allow abuse to thrive in plain sight.

One of those systems is the modern online pornography industry. This House knows my steadfast commitment to bringing effective regulation to that sector, and I believe that this group of amendments will bring about this much-needed reset. It is a sector that has been driven to abusive extremes by powerful, profit-driven algorithms, too often monetising sexual violence and degradation. Categories such as “barely legal” may claim legality because performers are over 18, but the aesthetic is deliberate: youth, vulnerability and childhood. They are a fig leaf for the sexualisation of minors. Exploitation and trafficking are rife. Sexual abuse material remains far too easy to find on these sites, and many survivors tell us that what is filmed as content is in reality recorded abuse. This cannot continue.

Amendment 298, when tabled, had the intention of closing the gaping disparity between offline and online regulation. If content cannot be legally sold in a shop or on a DVD, it should not be freely available online. For decades, physical distribution has had classification, compliance and enforcement; online, self-regulation still dominates. This amendment sets out in clear terms the material that must not be distributed online. This is based on the BBFC’s guidelines and therefore mirrors what is illegal and prohibited offline, bringing parity across regimes. It also provides for an independent auditing body working alongside Ofcom—I would suggest the BBFC but I am not being specific on that—to carry out spot checks and audits of pornography so that content that would never meet the criteria for physical distribution is detected and removed, not simply noticed and ignored.

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Amendment 300A is an important amendment that would close the loophole in the current law whereby actors over the age of 18 create sexual contexts that depict the indecent sexualisation of children. That represents an overt endorsement and encouragement of child sexual abuse, and such a state of affairs is plainly wrong. I thank my noble friend for her efforts to rectify this issue. I thank all noble Lords for their contributions, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government of course sympathise with the intention behind all these amendments. They raise important but tricky issues. I am pleased that they have received such an extensive airing this evening, and I apologise in advance for the fact that this speech is a bit longer than some of the others, but some of these are complicated. I know that some of what I will say will not be what some of your Lordships may wish to hear. I remind the House that the Government have moved on some of the important issues raised, and I assure your Lordships that we have no intention of stopping here. But there are some areas that need further consideration and others where we have genuine operational concerns.

We are committed to continuing to work with the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. I and my fellow Ministers in the Home Office and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology have immensely valued her time and expertise in our meetings with her. It is because of this direct engagement that we have brought forward some of the amendments today. They are entirely to her credit, and I hope we can continue the discussions.

On nudification apps, we have sympathy with the underlying objective of Amendment 281A, but we do not believe that it is necessary for two reasons. First, the aim of Amendment 281A is already captured by the recently commenced Section 66E of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which bans individuals from using nudification tools to create intimate images without consent. Section 66B of the 2003 Act bans anyone from sharing such images once they have been created.

Secondly, nudification tools are commonly accessed online—for example, via a website, an AI model or a chatbot. A person using a tool will not necessarily possess or have downloaded the relevant software or model. That means that Amendment 281A would risk creating an unworkable discrepancy between very similar tools being accessed via different means. For example, it might capture a tool if it was downloaded as code by a user but not if it was accessed as a website. For this reason, we have focused the government amendment on banning the creation and the supply of such tools, rather than just the software. The Government are confident that the combined effect of the new offence in government Amendment 272, along with regulation via the Online Safety Act and existing criminal offences banning individuals from creating and sharing intimate images without consent, is an effective package in tackling this egregious harm in all its forms.

[Baroness Bertin (Con)]

I promise not to interrupt the Minister too much, but what about the point that it will not extend beyond UK apps?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

This is always the problem with criminal offences, which is why, on occasions, the Government have said that we want to urge caution before creating criminal offences when things that can be dealt with through regulation have a much wider reach. One drawback of criminal offences is that they typically apply only where prosecutors are able to establish UK jurisdiction. To provide some extraterritorial effect, we have ensured that Section 72 of the Sexual Offences Act applies to this offence, which will enable prosecutors to target overseas offending by UK nationals, bodies and associations. But the regulations—

[Baroness Bertin (Con)]

I accept that and, let us face it, this is the wrong Bill for this piece of legislation— I am prepared to accept that. I know that this is a criminal Bill, but surely the Government and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology have to accept—and make the point on the Floor of this House—that they will therefore re-open the Online Safety Act and bring regulation in to support the very good amendments that they are putting in at this point, or my Amendment 281A.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

These are exactly the conversations that we wish to carry on having, on how to best go about this to make sure that we achieve the aim that we are all trying to get to: getting rid of these horrible things. I would like to continue the conversation with the noble Baroness in due course.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, stressed that there was undue emphasis on intention and states of mind. Again, this is the problem with criminal offences: we do not create criminal offences where people who have done something accidentally end up being criminalised. That is why, on occasions, we say that regulation may be a better tool. The noble Baroness is looking outraged.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

No, I dare not tackle the noble Baroness on legal matters—what we do and do not do in the law—but, if you accidentally poison children’s food, you do not get a free pass. There are all sorts of places and spaces that have to—

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

We will continue this, but with the greatest of respect to the noble Baroness, the fact is that all criminal offences, pretty much, apart from those that are strict liability offences, which are pretty unpopular in the criminal law—[Interruption.] We will discuss this later, but take it from me that it is very rare to criminalise something that is done accidentally.

I turn now to incest. As I said earlier today, the Government have tabled a cluster of amendments that seek to go further than Amendment 299 by criminalising the possession and publication of pornography that depicts sexual activity between both adult and child family members. The reason for doing that is that it makes it more straightforward for law enforcement and regulators to tackle the harmful content, as pornography that portrays a family relationship will be criminalised and the prosecutor does not need to have to prove that the person concerned is under 18 or is a child. It can be very difficult to prove that the person is actually a child. We therefore consider government Amendment 297 to more robustly address the harm that the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, seeks to address.

I turn to the noble Baroness’s Amendments 297AA, 297B, 297C and 297D. Although I understand why she wishes to extend the Government’s amendment to a wider range of relationships, it is important that your Lordships understand that such an extension would criminalise sexual relationships that are lawful between adults in real life. With her Amendment 298, the noble Baroness has specifically sought to include that. It would go further than offline regulation, where some portrayals of step-relative relationships are classified, provided they are not in any way abusive in nature.

In addition, this change proposed by the noble Baroness’s amendment would significantly increase the complexity of the offence. For example, if the pornographic image depicted sex between step-siblings, operational partners would then also have to consider whether the persons live or have lived together, or whether one person is or has been regularly involved in caring for the other. It would be challenging for the police and the CPS to determine and ultimately prosecute. The intention behind the Government’s amendments is to make it as straightforward as possible to enforce and prosecute. That said, although I appreciate what the noble Baroness is trying to achieve, I urge her not to press her amendment.

Turning now to parity, I put on record that the Government accept the principle at the heart of Amendment 298 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. There is a clear and urgent need for greater parity between the treatment of harmful pornography online and offline. This Government, who have prioritised tackling all forms of violence against women and girls, will show the leadership necessary to deliver it. We have, with thanks to the noble Baroness, already taken steps in the Bill to criminalise some of the most egregious forms of content that are currently mainstream online. The strangulation pornography offence added in Committee and the further changes we are bringing forward today on incest pornography have been added because of the noble Baroness. These matters are now prohibited under offline regulation.

Acknowledging that the changing online world brings new challenges that must be tackled to address emerging harms, we will also be reviewing the criminal law relating to pornography to assess its effectiveness. We will ensure that our online regulatory framework keeps pace with these changes to the criminal law. Delivery of parity in regulatory treatment has already started. Once enforced, these offences will become priority offences under the Online Safety Act, requiring platforms to have proportionate systems and processes in place to prevent UK users encountering this content. This should stop this abhorrent content circulating unchecked on online platforms, where right now it is being recommended to unwitting users.

While these measures mark a significant step forward in protecting individuals online, we acknowledge that they do not address the totality of the complex question on parity. The current offline regime relies on checks on individual pieces of content, which can consider wider context and nuance in a way that does not easily translate to the scale and speed of online content. For this reason, we cannot accept the noble Baroness’s amendment, but because we completely agree with the need for greater parity, the Government are committing our joint pornography team, which was announced as part of the VAWG strategy, to produce a delivery plan within six months of Royal Assent.

Crucially, the delivery plan will set out how, not whether, the Government can most effectively close the gap. This will include consideration of how a new approach can address other potentially harmful content, such as pornography portraying step-incest relationships or adults role-playing as children. The delivery plan will thoroughly test which approach will be most effective by testing audit and reporting functions and considering how this can be done at scale to achieve the desired impact. The plan will also consider how and which regulatory frameworks can best address the issue, noting the interactions with the BBFC’s existing remit and that of Ofcom under the Online Safety Act, and how to ensure that there is effective enforcement in any future system. It will examine the case for tools, including fines and business disruption measures. We will keep up the pace. I can commit to including clear timelines for implementation in the plan, and we will keep them as short as possible, factoring in the possible need for legislation, subject to parliamentary timing. I know that my fellow Ministers will welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, joining us as we conduct this work.

[Baroness Bertin (Con)]

I want to say thank you. The Minister has just made a very big announcement and I thank her, because she has acknowledged parity, and I hope that she will therefore be using regulation to make sure that we absolutely do create that level playing field. I just want to acknowledge that.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I turn to Amendment 300. While we accept the intended aim of this amendment, we cannot accept the proposed approach. The part of the amendment relating to the withdrawal of consent and its application to professional entertainment contracts has a number of practical implications. Where content is produced legally, as with the wider film industry, the rules and regulations governing its use are usually a commercial matter to be agreed between the performer and the production company, taking into account the intellectual property framework. I add that much of the content captured by this proposed offence is already illegal. The creation, distribution and possession of child sexual abuse material and sharing an intimate image without consent are already criminal offences.

The law is also crystal clear about the distribution of indecent images of children. Under the Protection of Children Act 1978, the UK has a strict prohibition on the taking, making, circulation and possession with a view to distribution of any indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph of a child under 18. That said, as I said earlier this evening, we accept that there is harmful material, including content that is non-consensual and displays child sexual abuse, that remains online, and that is not good enough. So, while we cannot support the amendment today, we are keen once again to work with the noble Baroness further to consider existing best practice in the area and, where there are gaps, how these can be filled. The outcome of the work on parity to which we have committed today will also influence consideration of how this amendment could be regulated.

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[Baroness Bertin (Con)]

Law enforcement is already duty bound to investigate any material that may contain a child, so I do not believe that the amendment would suddenly create a whole load of legal activity that could stop the protection of children. I just do not accept that.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The concern expressed by law enforcement is that it would divert resources from what they are doing at the moment. We will consider this issue as part of our rapid work on parity, and we will also consider the issue as part of our broader work on reviewing the criminal law. I do not underestimate the importance of all these matters. I hope your Lordships will forgive me for the length of time it has taken me to deal with them. My hope is that your Lordships will take the commitments that I have made and the government amendments that I have tabled as a sign of the Government’s genuine intention. Take it from me: we will go further, but we must get these issues right. In the meantime, with every respect, I ask the noble Baroness not to press her amendment.

Amendment 272 agreed.

Victims and Courts Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Monday 2nd March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

That the amendments for the Report stage be marshalled and considered in the following order: Clauses 1 to 3, Schedule 1, Clauses 4 to 7, Schedule 2, Clauses 8 to 18, Title.

Motion agreed.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 2nd March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for her amendment, which would place a duty on the Secretary of State, within 12 months of the Act being passed, to make provisions for the way in which offences of sharing intimate images are reported and the mechanisms by which content is removed by the relevant internet service. I understand that the Government have given my noble friend an undertaking for Third Reading, and I am pleased that they have done so.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am pleased to put on record that this Government completely accept and agree with the intention that underlies this amendment. That is why, as I said earlier, the Government will introduce a legal duty for tech platforms to take down reported non-consensual intimate image abuse within 48 hours, to ensure that victims get rapid protection. This change, which will be brought forward at Third Reading, will create a strong, enforceable foundation for getting harmful material removed from online circulation, so that victims are no longer left chasing platforms for action. To support swift and effective action to remove this material by internet infrastructure providers, we will also explore any barriers to blocking and how this can be addressed. This will help ensure that rogue sites operating outside the scope of the Online Safety Act will be targeted. I appreciate the noble Baroness’s eagerness to see this change brought about quickly, but as the Government intend to bring forward amendments to this effect at Third Reading, I hope she will be content to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

Can the Minister confirm to the House that not only will the Government be bringing forward amendments but if I am not satisfied with them, I may bring back my own?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

Yes.

[Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)]

May I just check that that is an undertaking? We have a nod. Thank you. I am very pleased that we will return to this issue at Third Reading, but for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

278: Schedule 11, page 321, line 19, at end insert—
“1A After section 66A insert—“66AA Sharing semen-defaced image(1) A person (A) commits an offence if—(a) A intentionally shares a semen-defaced image of another person (B),(b) B does not consent to the sharing of the semen-defaced image, and(c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents.(2) A “semen-defaced image” of a person (B) is—(a) a photograph or film which—(i) shows, or appears to show, B, and(ii) has, or appears to have, semen on it or in its immediate vicinity, or(b) a photograph or film of a photograph or film within paragraph (a). (3) “Photograph” includes the negative as well as the positive version.(4) “Film” means a moving image.(5) References to a photograph or film also include—(a) an image, whether made or altered by computer graphics or in any other way, which appears to be a photograph or film,(b) a copy of a photograph, film or image within paragraph (a), and(c) data stored by any means which is capable of conversion into a photograph, film or image within paragraph (a).(6) A person “shares” a semen-defaced image if the person, by any means, gives or shows it to another person or makes it available to another person.(7) But a provider of an internet service by means of which a semen-defaced image is shared is not to be regarded as a person who shares it.(8) For the purposes of subsection (1)—(a) “consent” to the sharing of a semen-defaced image includes general consent covering the particular act of sharing as well as specific consent to the particular act of sharing, and(b) whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents.(9) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove that the person had a reasonable excuse for sharing the semen-defaced image.(10) A person (A) who shares a semen-defaced image of another person (B) does not commit an offence under subsection (1) if—(a) the semen-defaced image had, or A reasonably believes that it had, been previously publicly shared, and(b) B had, or A reasonably believes that A had, consented to the previous sharing.(11) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates a new offence of sharing a photograph or film of a person where the image has, or appears to have, semen on it or in its immediate vicinity, without the person’s consent.

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Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

281: Schedule 11, page 324, line 13, at end insert—
“66AD Creating a copy of intimate photograph or film shared temporarily(1) A person (A) commits an offence if—(a) another person (B)— (i) shares with A a photograph or film which shows, or appears to show, B in an intimate state, and(ii) does so in such a way that A can view the photograph or film for a limited time, but cannot send it to another person,(b) A intentionally creates a copy of the photograph or film that A can view at other times,(c) A knows that the photograph or film is shared with A by B,(d) B does not consent to the creation of the copy, and(e) A does not reasonably believe that B consents to the creation of the copy.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a)(ii)—(a) the cases in which A can view the photograph or film for a limited time include the case where A can view it for as long as B allows A to do so;(b) sending the photograph or film to another person does not include showing it to another person.(3) References in this section to creating a copy of a photograph or a film include —(a) creating a copy of part of a photograph or film, or(b) creating a copy of a photograph or film with modifications,where the copy shows, or appears to show, B in the intimate state in which B is shown, or appears to be shown, in the photograph or film.(4) Subsection (1) is subject to section 66AE (exemptions).(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove that the person had a reasonable excuse for creating the copy.(6) Section 76 applies to an offence under this section.(7) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).66AE Creating a copy of intimate photograph or film shared temporarily: exemptions(1) A person (A) does not commit an offence under section 66AD(1) in relation to a photograph or film shared with A if—(a) the photograph or film was, or A reasonably believes that it was, taken or recorded in a place to which the public or a section of the public had or were permitted to have access (whether on payment or otherwise),(b) the person the photograph or film shows, or appears to show, in an intimate state (B) had no reasonable expectation of privacy from such a photograph or film being taken or recorded, and(c) B was, or A reasonably believes that B was, in the intimate state voluntarily.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b), whether a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy from a photograph or film being taken or recorded is to be determined by reference to the circumstances that A reasonably believes to have existed at the time the photograph or film was taken or recorded.(3) A person (A) does not commit an offence under section 66AD(1) in relation to a photograph or film shared with A if—(a) the photograph or film had, or A reasonably believes that the photograph or film had, been previously publicly shared, and(b) B had, or A reasonably believes that B had, consented to the previous sharing.” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates a new offence of creating a copy of a photograph or film showing, or appearing to show, a person in an intimate state, that has been shared with the person creating the copy only temporarily.

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Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

282: Schedule 11, page 324, line 28, at end insert—
“(2A) In subsection (3), at the end insert “, or as a person with whom it is shared”.” Member's explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that the provider of an internet service by means of which a photograph or film is shared is not regarded as a person with whom it is shared for the purposes of the offence in section 66AD of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (inserted by my amendment to Schedule 11, page 324, line 13).

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Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

285: Schedule 11, page 325, line 2, after the first “(3)” insert “66AD(1), 66AE(3)(b)”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment applies the definition of consent in section 66D(10) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to the new sections inserted by my amendment to Schedule 11, page 324, line 13.

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Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

290: Schedule 11, page 325, line 18, at end insert—
“(za) section 66AA;”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment extends the time limit for prosecuting the offence in new section 66AA of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (inserted by my amendment to Schedule 11, page 321, line 19).

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Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

296: Schedule 11, page 330, line 21, at end insert—
“Online Safety Act 2023 (c. 50)
23 In Schedule 7 to the Online Safety Act 2023 (priority offences), in paragraph 28A (Sexual Offences Act 2003), at the end insert—“(c) section 66E (creating purported intimate image of adult);(d) section 66F (requesting the creation of purported intimate image of adult).””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment adds offences to Schedule 7 to the Online Safety Act 2023, requiring service providers to take action to identify and minimise users’ exposure to content created or requested in the commission of those offences and to mitigate the risk of services being used to commit those offences.

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Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

297: After Clause 91, insert the following new Clause—
“Pornographic images of sex between relatives(1) After section 67D of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (inserted by section 90 of this Act) insert—“67E Possession or publication of pornographic images of sex between relatives(1) It is an offence for a person (P) to be in possession of an image if—(a) the image is pornographic, within the meaning of section 63,(b) the image portrays, in an explicit and realistic way, a person (A) sexually penetrating—(i) the vagina or anus of another person (B) with a part of A’s body or anything else, or(ii) B’s mouth with A’s penis,(c) a reasonable person looking at the image would think that A and B were real, and(d) a reasonable person—(i) looking at the image, and(ii) taking into account any sound or information associated with the image,would think that A and B were related, or pretending to be related, in a way mentioned in subsection (2).(2) That is to say, A being related to B as parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, brother, sister, half-brother, half-sister, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece.(3) It is an offence for a person to publish an image of the kind mentioned in subsection (1).(4) Publishing an image includes giving or making it available to another person by any means.(5) For the purpose of subsection (1)(d)—(a) the reference to sound or information associated with the image is—(i) when subsection (1)(d) applies for the purpose of an offence under subsection (1), to sound, or information, associated with the image that is in P’s possession, and(ii) when subsection (1)(d) applies for the purpose of an offence under subsection (3), to sound, or information, associated with the image that the person in subsection (3) publishes with the image, and(b) A and B are not to be taken as pretending to be related if it is fanciful that they are actually related in the way pretended.(6) In subsection (2)—“(a) “parent” includes an adoptive parent;“(b) “child” includes an adopted person within the meaning of Chapter 4 of Part 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002;“(c) “uncle” means the brother of a person’s parent, and “aunt” has a corresponding meaning;“(d) “nephew” means the child of a person’s brother or sister, and “niece” has a corresponding meaning.(7) For the purpose of this section—“(a) “image” has the same meaning as in section 63;(b) penetration is a continuing act from entry to withdrawal;“(c) “vagina” includes vulva; (d) references to a part of the body include references to a part surgically constructed (in particular through gender reassignment surgery).(8) Subsections (1) and (3) do not apply to excluded images, within the meaning of section 64.(9) Nothing in—(a) section 47 of the Adoption Act 1976 (which disapplies the status provisions in section 39 of that Act for the purposes of this section in relation to adoptions before 30 December 2005), or(b) section 74 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (which disapplies the status provisions in section 67 of that Act for those purposes in relation to adoptions on or after that date),is to be read as preventing the application of section 39 of the Adoption Act 1976 or section 67 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 for the purposes of subsection (6)(a) or (b).(10) Proceedings for an offence under this section may not be instituted except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.67F Defences to offence under section 67E(1) Where a person is charged with an offence under section 67E(1), it is a defence for the person to prove any of the matters mentioned in subsection (2).(2) The matters are—(a) that the person had a legitimate reason for being in possession of the image concerned;(b) that the person had not seen the image concerned and did not know, nor had any cause to suspect, it to be an image of the kind mentioned in section 67E(1);(c) that the person—(i) was sent the image concerned without any prior request having been made by or on behalf of the person, and(ii) did not keep it for an unreasonable time;(d) that—(i) the person directly participated in the act portrayed as person A or B mentioned in section 67E(1)(b),(ii) the act did not involve the infliction of any non-consensual harm on any person, and(iii) the person is not related to person B or A (as the case may be) in a way mentioned in section 67E(2).(3) Where a person is charged with an offence under section 67E(3), it is a defence for a person to prove any of the matters mentioned in subsection (4).(4) The matters are—(a) that the person had a legitimate reason for publishing the image concerned to the persons to whom they published it;(b) that the person had not seen the image concerned and did not know, nor had any cause to suspect, it to be an image of the kind mentioned in section 67E(1);(c) that—(i) the person directly participated in the act portrayed as person A or B mentioned in section 67E(1)(b),(ii) the act did not involve the infliction of any non-consensual harm on any person,(iii) the person is not related to person B or A (as the case may be) in a way mentioned in section 67E(2), and(iv) the person only published the image to person B or A (as the case may be).(5) In this section, “non-consensual harm” has the same meaning as in section 66. 67G Penalties for offences under section 67E(1) A person who commits an offence under section 67E(1) is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine (or both).(2) A person who commits an offence under section 67E(3) is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine (or both).”(2) In section 68 of that Act (special rules relating to providers of information society services), after “67A” (inserted by section 90 of this Act) insert “and 67E”.(3) In Schedule 14 to that Act (special rules relating to providers of information society services), in paragraphs 3(1), 4(2) and 5(1) after “67A” (inserted by section 90 of this Act) insert “or 67E”.(4) In section 47(1) of the Adoption Act 1976, for “or sections 64 and 65 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sex with an adult relative)” substitute “sections 64 and 65 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sex with an adult relative), or section 67E of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (possession or publication of pornographic images of sex between relatives)”.(5) In section 74(1) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002—(a) omit the “or” after paragraph (a);(b) after paragraph (b) insert “, or(c) section 67E of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (possession or publication of pornographic images of sex between relatives).”(6) In Schedule 34A to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (child sex offences for the purposes of section 327A), after paragraph 13ZA (inserted by section 90 of this Act) insert—“13ZB An offence under section 67E of that Act (possession or publication of pornographic images of sex between relatives).”(7) In Schedule 7 to the Online Safety Act 2023 (priority offences), in paragraph 29, after paragraph (b) (inserted by section 90 of this Act) insert “;(c) section 67E (possession or publication of pornographic images of sex between relatives)”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment makes it an offence to possess or publish pornographic images of sex between relatives (that is to say, incest).

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Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

301: After Clause 94, insert the following new Clause—
“Sexual activity with an animal(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (5).(2) For section 69 (intercourse with an animal) substitute—“69 Sexual activity with an animal(1) A person commits an offence if—(a) the person intentionally touches an animal (whether living or dead),(b) the person knows that, or is reckless as to whether, that is what is touched, and(c) the touching is sexual.(2) For the purposes of this section, touching is sexual if a reasonable person would consider that—(a) because of its nature it may be sexual, and(b) because of its circumstances or the purpose of any person in relation to it (or both) it is sexual.(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years.” (3) In section 78 (meaning of “sexual”), after “66D” insert“, 69”.(4) In section 79 (Part 1: general interpretation) omit subsection (10).(5) In paragraphs 35 and 92 of Schedule 3 (sexual offences that make offender subject to notification requirements), for “intercourse” substitute “sexual activity”.(6) In the following provisions, for “intercourse” substitute “sexual activity”—(a) paragraph 151 of Schedule 15 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003;(b) paragraph 38(az) of Schedule 18 to the Sentencing Code.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment replaces the existing offence of intercourse with an animal with a wider offence of sexual activity with an animal.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, we have dealt with some unattractive topics already this evening, and we are about to embark on another one. Government Amendments 301, 302, 451 and 465 in my name deal with the unpalatable but very serious question of animal sexual abuse.

These amendments respond directly to concerns raised in both Houses. I am grateful to many noble Lords, particularly the noble Lords, Lord Black, Lord Blencathra and Lord Pannick, and Danny Chambers MP, all of whom argued persuasively that the current offence does not reflect the full range of abhorrent behaviour that we believe should be prohibited. I pay particular tribute to David Martin and Paula Boyden from the Links Group, who met me and provided the Government with further evidence.

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[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken to the amendments in this group and I echo the thanks of my noble friend Lord Black of Brentwood to the Minister for her remarks and for listening and acting on the concerns raised in Committee. I acknowledge the work of my noble friends Lord Black and Lord Blencathra, who are tireless champions of animal welfare and have worked effectively with the Government on the Bill.

We welcome the introduction of Amendment 301 and its consequential amendments, which build on the debate in Committee and update the offence of “intercourse with an animal” with a wider provision that covers all sexual activity, as we have heard. This area of law has long needed updating, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, and I am glad that the Government are doing it now. My noble friend Lord Black of Brentwood raised a couple of concerns that were worth highlighting. He said that to deprive an individual of animals that they own after they have been convicted is a logical next step. If the primary goal is to promote the welfare of animals, as I believe it is, it seems to me that the best way to achieve that would be to ensure that those who have been convicted are prevented from owning or having access to animals.

Similarly, he spoke about the discrepancy in sentences and that does not seem to make complete sense, as it stands. I look forward to hearing what the noble Baroness has to say in reply.

My noble friend also mentioned the possession and sharing of animal pornography. I am sure that there is not much appetite for further discussion of pornography today, but this is an important issue, and I would be grateful if the Minister could commit to considering measures to curbing animal pornography in the future.

Finally, these Benches wholly support the intention behind the amendment in the names of my noble friends. In the interest of brevity, I will not repeat the statistics or arguments raised by my noble friend Lord Black in his speech, but the evidence base is clear and irrefutable. It seems there is a causal link between animal abuse and domestic abuse and sexual violence. As he highlighted, pets are often used to coerce and control victims of domestic abuse. There seems to be institutional knowledge within relevant authorities that this is happening and yet we lack the safeguards to address it. My noble friend also mentioned the tragic case of Holly Bramley.

The cost/benefit of this measure is hard to argue against. The child sex offender register, a current practice that uses the same principle, costs just £1.92 million per year. I suggest that we would be in similar sums for this. I understand that the Minister may not be able to offer her support to this measure at this point, but I hope that it is something that the Government will return to in the future.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Black, Lord Blencathra, Lord Pannick and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for welcoming the Government amendments today and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for the flattering remarks that he made which were very welcome after a long day in your Lordships’ House. I am pleased to hear that the amendments have this support and, once again, I thank those who raised this with us in Committee.

This new offence is focused solely on strengthening the criminal offence relating to sexual abuse of animals, given the scope of this Bill. To establish this offence, the new offence that the Government are bringing today, the prosecution does not have to prove that the animal actually suffered, because this was sometimes an obstacle to prosecutions in the past. This was something that we were persuaded of during the meetings with the noble Lord and those who came with him. Where the conduct has caused the animal to suffer, the defendant can be charged with an offence under the Animal Welfare Act 2006, for which orders such as removing the animal from the offender’s ownership, rehoming or destroying the animal, or disqualifying the offender from keeping animals are available. It is not either or—they can both be charged at the same time. It is quite common with criminal behaviour.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

The Minister says that the accused could be charged. Charged and prosecuted by whom?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

Although the RSPCA conventionally prosecutes, there is nothing to stop the Crown Prosecution Service from prosecuting. If you had conduct that fell within both, you would not have two separate prosecutors bringing two separate sets of proceedings; it would be the Crown Prosecution Service for both. However, I understand the concerns. I am committing to continuing to engage with parliamentarians and key stakeholders on this issue. We will keep it under consideration.

As far as animal pornography is concerned—obviously a great worry to everybody—the offence of possession of extreme pornographic images under Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 already criminalises possession of pornographic images depicting extreme acts, which includes intercourse or oral sex with an animal, whether living or dead. We do not believe that further legislation is necessary.

Turning to the question of sentence, the current offence of intercourse with an animal carries a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment, which we will retain for the new offence. We do not have evidence at the moment that this is insufficient to enable the courts to deal appropriately with offending of this nature, but we know that, when animal suffering occurs, there are higher penalties available under the animal cruelty legislation, which—as has already been said by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra—provides sentences of up to five years’ imprisonment. Once again, we will engage with parliamentarians and key stakeholders as to how the existing animal cruelty offences operate alongside the new offence. With that in mind, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Black, to withdraw—

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

I am sorry for holding the House back this late at night. The Minister says that there is nothing to stop the CPS prosecuting for animal cruelty if it is prosecuting a case of sex with an animal and discovers cruelty. In that case, will she guarantee that the CPS will issue guidance to all its prosecutors that, where a prosecutor is prosecuting for animal sexual abuse and discovers animal cruelty, he or she will automatically prosecute it and not wait for the RPSCA to do it God knows when?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The difficulty is that the Crown Prosecution Service, as a matter of constitutional convention, is independent of the Government and does not take well to being told what to do by them. However, we can raise this with it and ask whether it will look at it again. I beg to move.

Amendment 301 agreed.

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Moved by

[Baroness Levitt]

302: Clause 95, page 122, line 12, leave out “paragraph 35” and insert “paragraphs 35 and 92”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment updates the wording of a reference to the offence of sexual activity with a corpse in paragraph 92 of Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

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[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I had written “I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones”, which I crossed out, and then “the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey”, which I also crossed out. I will now say that I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Addington, for bringing forward this amendment and for the careful way in which he outlined the basis for it.

We support the intention behind Clauses 115 and 116. These are serious offences, designed to capture those who deliberately encourage or assist serious self-harm. Precisely because the subject matter is so grave and so bound up with vulnerability, it is essential that the law is applied with clarity and care.

The amendment’s focus on consultation and guidance is pragmatic and proportionate, because policy in this area must be rooted in the lived experience of mental health professionals and legal practitioners, so guidance that distinguishes criminal intent from legitimate activity will be vital to avoid unintended consequences. For those reasons, we lend our support to the principle behind this amendment and look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I too had a speech that started off thanking the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I too crossed that out and wrote in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. I also now thank the noble Lord, Lord Addington, for moving this amendment.

I am, however, grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, who is not in his place now, for meeting me to discuss his amendment. I think I was able to persuade him and to reassure him that guidance on the application of Clauses 115 and 116 is not necessary. I also wrote to him—I know I cleared the letter, and it may even have been the day before yesterday; I think I have just received a message saying that it may not have been sent until this afternoon, but it has definitely gone. We have placed a copy in the House Library. The letter was written with the intention that it could be sent to the various charities so that they could see exactly what I was saying.

As the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and I discussed, the existing offence that these amendments seek to broaden, which is under Section 184 of the Online Safety Act, is already in active use by the CPS and law enforcement. We are not aware of any cases involving therapeutic support where prosecutors have struggled to determine whether a prosecution was appropriate. The CPS guidance is clear about the requirement of intention, which must be present to meet the threshold of the offence, and the CPS legal guidance will be updated to reflect the widened scope of the offence, which now covers conduct both online and in person.

The offence also contains two important safeguards. First, the defendant must intend to encourage or assist the serious self-harm. Secondly, their act must be capable of doing so. These safeguards ensure that vulnerable individuals and those providing mental health support are not also inadvertently captured.

I should make it clear that it is absolutely not the Government’s intention to target either vulnerable people or the therapeutic services that support them. The Government believe the offence as it operates now and as it will be expanded in the Bill is proportionate and targets only the most serious and culpable offending. I hope that the noble Lord is content with these reassurances and will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Addington (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for giving that assurance. Having it repeated again at the Dispatch Box makes it easier for people to feel secure about this. That, along with the letter, which I am sure is a work of great wisdom, will add to the fact that we will have a defence in place, just in case there are misunderstandings. With that, I am prepared to withdraw the amendment.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 27th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak very briefly to the amendment in this group in the name of my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar. His Amendment 913A seeks to probe an issue raised by a number of noble Lords in this debate: namely, the means by which the assisted dying commissioner may be held accountable. As the Bill is drafted, and as we have heard, the commissioner is appointed by the Prime Minister. In his amendment 124, my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier would have them appointed by the Crown on the advice of the Lord Chancellor. The point that the amendment addresses is that, whoever appoints the commissioner, there ought to be a clear accountability mechanism and a process whereby concerns about the conduct of the commissioner can be investigated in response to formal representations. My noble friend suggests that representations might be made to the Prime Minister, but I would be very interested to hear from the noble and learned Lord what thought he and his co-sponsor have given to the way in which the commissioner will be held to account.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, given the size of this group and the need to keep my remarks within the speaking limit, I have taken a rather different approach to the structure of my speech, which I hope your Lordships will find helpful. Rather than going through the amendments thematically or in chronological order, I will structure my speech by first setting out some observations about the legal implications of some of the amendments. Then, I will outline what the Government see as operational workability issues presented by some amendments and, finally, I will turn briefly to drafting considerations. Essentially, I will be flagging issues by theme, but if your Lordships have any further questions relating to the workability of any amendments, I will be very happy to write to set out the Government’s views in more detail and place a copy in the House Library. I will not comment on all the amendments. If I say nothing about a particular amendment, it is because the Government have no concerns.

As my noble friend Lady Merron, the Health Minister, and I have set out many times, the Government’s position remains that it is for Parliament to consider the policy, so I will not be providing a government view on the merits of any proposed changes or make any observations in a personal capacity.

In other debates on the Bill, your Lordships have asked how the Government plan to implement it. I will set this out at the outset. The Government have not undertaken any detailed implementation work that would precede the parliamentary process. Should Parliament pass the Bill, the Government will then undertake detailed work to develop a delivery model, which would involve engaging with stakeholders and delivery partners, including the judiciary. To answer the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, this relates also to NHS England and providers, although your Lordships may wish to note that the Bill does not specify where the provision of assistance may or may not take place.

A number of your Lordships, including the noble Lords, Lord Harper and Lord McCrea, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe, asked about the role of the Prime Minister. I remind the Committee that this is a Private Member’s Bill, so the proposal to designate the Prime Minister as the person who is to appoint the voluntary assisted dying commissioner was made by the sponsor, not the Government. It has nothing to do with the Government. It is up to noble Lords whether they wish to retain that provision.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, asked me to confirm whether the standards in the Cabinet Office governance code would be adhered to. If it is the will of Parliament that the Prime Minister is the person who is to appoint the commissioner, the standard recruitment arrangements for prime ministerial appointments will be followed. These are made through an open, regulated appointments process, which includes selection by an assessment panel containing an independent member. Whether or not the Select Committees are involved will be a matter for the sponsor. The reason I shook my head at the noble Lord, Lord Harper—I meant no discourtesy to him as I did so—was that I thought, and continue to think, that it is a shame that he did not pass by the opportunity to make a party-political point, when, for example, his noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Deben, was assiduous in ensuring that he did not. I felt it did not help and was not constructive, but I did not mean it discourteously.

I turn to the first of the three groups in my speech, on legal considerations and, specifically, the compatibility of some proposed amendments with the European Convention on Human Rights. The articles in question are Article 14, on protection from discrimination, and Article 6, on the right to a fair trial. On Article 14, Amendment 913 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, would prevent the employment of a person as commissioner, or a member of their staff, should they have links with any agency promoting assisted deaths. The Government wish to highlight that the amendment as drafted is unbalanced, creating a risk of breach of Article 14 of the convention. This would be avoided if it also prevented the employment of individuals who campaigned against assisted dying. In addition, the amendment as drafted would prevent the employment of a person in the commissioner role, or a member of their staff, should they have links with any agency that provides assisted deaths. But, if assisted dying were to be provided through the NHS, that would prevent the commissioner employing staff with relevant NHS experience.

Amendment 496C in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Weir, would involve differential treatment as between how reconsiderations of panel decisions would be made in the cases of, on the one hand, identified groups of people in the amendment and, on the other, those not belonging to those groups. If that is the intention behind the amendment, consideration would need to be given to whether the approach is proportionate and justified to avoid a risk of breach of Article 14. But if the intention behind the amendment is to afford everyone a right to hearings with the commissioner, but for only remote hearings to be permissible in the circumstances specified, then drafting changes would be needed.

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[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser, for these amendments. There is a very serious issue here, evidenced by the nature of the conversation we are having, because it is a conversation about realities. The noble Lord, Lord Empey, said that it was time we started using the language that described exactly what we are doing. I think that is what we are doing now. We are talking about how this is going to be paid for and who should pay for it. How should it be managed?

We have seen the Canadian experience. The noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, spoke about wheelchair access. In Canada, it is regularly reported that people who cannot get wheelchairs are offered assisted dying instead. I grant you that that would not necessarily apply in this particular Bill, but you can see how, with mission creep and with changes, this could happen. We could end up in a situation in which we are making the kind of decisions that the noble Lord just referred to in this matter.

I must declare that I have an interest, because I am a trustee of a hospice—an unpaid trustee, I would add, and it is not in my register of interests for that reason, but it is relevant to this debate.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, defined the variety of costs attached to the proposals quite clearly. I have to ask, following the noble Lord, Lord Deben, if the estimate of £2,000 is in any way realistic for providing a service which requires for each individual the cost of clinicians, the commissioner, panels, admin staff, communications, monitoring and audit, et cetera. That is to say nothing of maybe a national help service, independent advocates and all sorts of other things. We know that to die at Dignitas and places like that costs an average of £10,000, not £2,000. I would like the noble and learned Lord to ask the Minister if we can have a proper assessment of what is currently planned might cost and where it is to come from.

I have another question for the noble and learned Lord, because it is not the Government who pay; it is us. It is taxpayers who pay. If the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, rejects these proposals or something which approximates to taking the cost away from the National Health Service—as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, says, it is in such a parlous state that palliative care services are being extinguished or diminished very significantly—does he think that the public and the voters will think well of a Government who fund suicide while not funding hospices properly? Does he think it will enhance trust and confidence in the Government?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak only to the amendments about which the Government have significant operational workability concerns. Before I do so, I want to say a few words on the general points about funding raised by a number of noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Harper, the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Grey Thompson, and others.

I make it absolutely clear that I entirely understand the point that the noble Lord, Lord Deben, is making and why it might seem as though the choice is being restricted if you do not actually know the amounts involved, but I reiterate that it is for Parliament to decide whether this service should be provided and, if so, whether it should be publicly funded. If that decision is made, the Government will fund it. I am not evading the issue when I say that I simply cannot explain how that will be done, because that would be to put that ahead of Parliament’s own decision. We cannot possibly start, for example, putting aside a war chest for something that Parliament may decide that it does not want. As far as priorities are concerned, as I say, it is not a matter of evasion; it is a matter of principle.

It is also not right to assume that funding this, if that is the will of Parliament, will involve taking money away from other parts of the health service. That is not what the Government are saying; we are simply saying that the funding will be made available if that is what Parliament wants. My noble friend Lady Merron, the Health Minister, has written twice on this subject, and those letters are available in the Library for anybody who is interested. As for palliative care, there is an absolute commitment by the Government to increase funding for palliative care and make sure that palliative care is offered properly, irrespective of what happens in relation to this.

As for the noble Lord, Lord Deben, of course I am not upset by what he says about the impact assessment—as if I would ever be upset by anything that he says—but we are doing what is usual, which is to deliver the impact assessment at the outset and, as with other Bills, a further updated impact assessment will be provided following Royal Assent, if we get to that stage. There is a logic to this, because there are so many different elements to what has been debated in Committee that to provide a costing for each and every one would probably keep us here for as long as we are here debating all these amendments anyway. It simply cannot be done. It is not practical. I am not upset, but I am simply saying that we cannot do it and we will not do it until Royal Assent.

Turning to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, these are collectively intended, as we have heard, to prevent the establishment and running of this service being publicly funded. Your Lordships may wish to note that, if passed, these amendments would create an internal inconsistency with Clause 41(5), which requires that the provision of voluntary assisted dying services must be provided free of charge.

Amendments 835 and 868, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser, propose a delivery model whereby the Secretary of State must make regulations for the assisted dying service, which would be delivered only by private providers. The key workability risk here is that the new clause created by Amendment 835 would duplicate Clause 41, but with additional constraints, and that would create legal uncertainty, when the Act is looked at in the round, about the limits on the Government’s powers when commissioning a service. The Committee may also wish to note that this amendment may have implications for the devolution settlement, as Wales and the Welsh NHS trusts are implicitly included, which potentially constrains the powers for Wales in Clause 42.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

This group concerns the question of funding. First, the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, raised the question: should the people who benefit from this have to pay for it? Secondly, the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser, raised the question of whether it should be free to the patient. Could it be provided by private providers? Separately, there were questions along the lines of: will this change the nature of the relationship between the doctor and the patient? Finally, there were questions over whether this might lead somebody to urge people to take an assisted death.

I start with the provisions of the Bill at the moment, which, subject to the amendments to Clause 41 that I propose, require that the integrated care board, or NHS England or the Secretary of State, commission the services. A separate provision, in Amendment 753A, makes provision that, in practice, they have to be free for the person getting them.

The principle that underlies that approach—my noble friend Lady Levitt is right and this is the choice that the Bill makes—is that it will be available free to somebody who wants it and who satisfies the conditions. The reason for that is that we do not want to create a two-tier system where you can have an assisted death only if you can afford to pay for it.

In evidence to the Commons Public Bill Committee, Dr Michael Mulholland, the honorary secretary of the Royal College of GPs, said:

“Whether it occurs in the NHS is not our decision, but we would be very concerned about health inequalities creeping into any part of the health service … If the Bill comes through, we will want to make sure that there is not a differential in who is able to access it”.—[Official Report, Commons, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Committee, 30/1/25; col. 278.]


The amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser, do not affect that. The amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, do, and it is for that reason that I oppose them.

I will first deal with the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser, which would restrict the model that could be used to private providers only—albeit that she is not saying that it should not be free. I agree with what my noble friend Lady Levitt has said, to the effect that the way it is delivered should not be restricted. I would therefore not be in favour of the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser, in that respect.

Public Office (Accountability) Bill: Exclusion

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Thursday 26th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, it is customary to begin by thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for securing this debate, but I am sure she would agree that I should start by paying tribute to the victims of the Hillsborough disaster and their families. In doing this, I make it clear that the victims and bereaved must always be front and centre of the Government’s mind as the Bill makes its long overdue way through Parliament.

I hope your Lordships will understand what I mean when I say that the Bill is not just about justice for Hillsborough victims and families, and those of the other disasters; it determines what kind of a society we are. Do we protect vested interests, or do we believe in the importance of rights of and protections for our fellow citizens as individuals? To that extent, I entirely understand the points made, very forcefully, by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and my noble friend Lord Knight.

The noble Baroness and I had a very short discussion yesterday when she explained her concerns to me. I am grateful to her for that. I hope she knows that my objective in this matter is not to make partisan points or to be stubborn about legislation but to make sure that, as we go through the process of introducing a new law, we get it right. By “right”, I mean that the law captures the behaviour that we think is so egregious that it merits being criminalised while not trespassing on other important issues, which will include convention rights. By securing today’s debate, the noble Baroness and all the other Members of your Lordships’ House who have spoken have given the Government food for thought, and I have treated everybody’s contributions as, in effect, being those of critical friends.

The offence of misleading the public is a brand new offence contained in the Public Office (Accountability) Bill. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said, your Lordships will have the opportunity to scrutinise it fully when it is sent to us from the other place. My intention today is to explain the policy reasoning behind the Government’s decision to limit the offence to the Executive rather than extend it to all MPs and Peers. To do this, I need briefly to outline what the Bill in general, and this clause in particular, intend to do.

The Government are clear that what happened following the Hillsborough disaster must never happen again. In that case, police lied and changed witness statements to protect their reputations. Bereaved families from Hillsborough, and too many other examples over many years, faced an inquest process with no funding for legal representation. All of that was underpinned by a lack of a duty of candour. The Bill contains a powerful new package of measures to address these failings and others, such as the infected blood and Horizon scandals.

As part of the measure, the Bill creates not one but four new criminal offences, and they fall into two groups. There is plainly some level of misunderstanding about this. That was articulated most clearly by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton; I owe him an apology because, in a recent letter on the Crime and Policing Bill, I addressed him as “Lord Young of Action”, although perhaps he will not have minded too much.

The first group of these four offences includes two offences to replace the common-law offence of misconduct in public office, which will be repealed. The first of those new offences is committing seriously improper acts and the second is breaching the duty to prevent death or serious injury. These new offences broadly replicate the effect of the common-law offence, and they have a very wide reach. They cover a much broader range of behaviour than the kind that was seen at Hillsborough; for example, misconduct in public office has in the past been used to prosecute for offences such as corruption in public office—that is what these two new offences are intended to replicate.

We are replacing the old common-law offence because there was a lack of certainty about it. One of the issues with it was the lack of a list of those to whom the law applied. To deal with that, those two new offences do have a list. Both those two very broad offences do apply to MPs and Peers, as well as to a number of other public office holders, including judges.

Secondly, we have created another two new offences, which are completely separate from the old misconduct in public office offence. They were designed specifically to deal with a narrower range of circumstances and to deal with the situation that has arisen in these large-scale disasters. These two new offences are: first, a breach of the new duty of candour; and, secondly, the offence of misleading the public contained in Clause 11. It is only the latter offence, out of the four new ones, with which we are concerned today.

As I have already said, this offence is designed to be much narrower than the ones designed to replace misconduct in public office. It was designed specifically with what happened at Hillsborough in the front of our minds, and I will explain the reason for that. As the scale of the disaster at Hillsborough was becoming apparent, the police lied about its cause, saying that Liverpool fans had broken into the stadium. However, as we now know, and as the Taylor inquiry uncovered, in fact the main reason for the disaster was the failure of police control.

This new offence is aimed squarely at those who intentionally or recklessly aim to mislead the public and cover up the truth. It is intended to capture only the most serious instances of public officials or authorities misleading the public. An example might be a chief executive of a hospital instructing the staff to lie about a major incident to avoid criticism of the hospital. It is not intended to apply to instances of accidental or inadvertent misleading.

To reassure the noble Lord, Lord Young, prosecutions cannot be brought without the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, specifically to avoid vexatious private prosecutions. The noble Lord mentioned judicial review, but the doorway to a judicial review is a narrow one—it is a very restricted set of circumstances and is subject to a permission stage from the High Court.

The Government thought very carefully about to whom this offence should apply. It applies to public officials and public authorities, so it captures those working in government and the wider public sector who take decisions on behalf of the state. That includes Ministers and other politicians in executive roles, but not MPs and Peers.

Our thinking was this: Parliament has a unique role in our society. Parliamentarians are responsible for legislating, scrutinising legislation and holding the Government to account. In addition, MPs are responsible for representing their constituents. However, individual MPs and Peers do not directly take decisions on behalf of the state, nor do they have access to the kind of government information that would be available to Ministers. For that reason, we have come to the conclusion that it would not be appropriate to extend the offences in the Bill to all MPs and Peers—and they are not extended to judges either. We have the wide group of offences designed to replace misconduct in public office, which applies to Back-Benchers, the Opposition and the judiciary, and this narrow offence designed to cover those who take decisions.

Of course, the Government agree that misleading the public in any capacity is not acceptable, and there should be consequences for parliamentarians who do so, but this new offence is not the appropriate vehicle for regulating political speech. Parliament has its own arrangements for ensuring accuracy and truthfulness in proceedings, including processes for determining whether MPs have misled the other place, and it is for the House of Lords Procedure and Privileges Committee to consider any instances where a Member of your Lordships’ House is alleged to have misled the House. This reflects the important principle that parliamentary proceedings are rightly privileged and cannot be questioned in a court of law. Each House is responsible for determining the right sanctions when it is alleged that someone has misled the House.

Members of both Houses must also act in accordance with the Nolan principles in all their public functions, and the very high standards expected of public office holders, conducting themselves with honesty and integrity. It is for each House to determine the procedures for investigating and sanctioning those who break the rules. The Government are confident that the scope of the new offence, combined with the existing arrangements and the codes of conduct for parliamentarians, strike the right balance between capturing the most serious wrongdoing while not infringing the tried and tested procedures that govern all noble Lords and all those in the other place to ensure that we conduct ourselves to the highest standards.

This has been an interesting and important debate and I will of course meet the noble Baroness, any lawyer she wants to bring with her and indeed any other Members of your Lordships’ House who would like to discuss this further.

Victims and Courts Bill

Baroness Levitt Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, for outlining the detail of the amendments in this group. I was slightly surprised by what he said, because I understood that it was not about whether a prison term was suspended or not, it was the conviction itself that acted as the trigger for the victim’s rights. I see the Minister is nodding. Just to double-check, I went to the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime. This makes it absolutely clear that the moment there is a possible crime against somebody which falls within something that could be considered by the code, the victim is entitled to support and help. For certain particular crimes, they are entitled to enhanced rights and help. I am sorry: I printed it off the web and it does not have a page number, but it states that victims of the most serious crimes are eligible for enhanced rights under this code. There is no question at all of them being reduced or stopped if a conviction is suspended. Once again, I repeat that this is exactly what happened to me. In my particular case, the offender was given a prison sentence and it was suspended, but the victim support continued in spite of that.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity of setting out the Government’s position. Our approach is carefully considered. I regret that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, seeks to make party-political points out of this by using language such as “insult to victims”, particularly when, in relation to the principal part of his argument, he is just plain wrong.

The starting point is that we must prioritise public funds to ensure that they go where they are most needed. We have done this by providing proactive support to those victims where the court has imposed a longer sentence, because a longer sentence reflects the seriousness of the offence. Of course we recognise that all victims of crime will want information about the offender in their case. For that reason, we are introducing a new route for all victims—the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, is quite right about this—to request information via a dedicated helpline.

This is why new Schedule 6A is in three parts. Part 1 ensures that the most serious cases, involving victims of violent, sexual, and terrorism offences where the defendant has been sentenced to a custodial sentence of 12 months or more, can receive proactive support through the victim contact scheme.

Part 2 ensures support for victims of stalking and harassment offences, regardless of sentence length. We recognise that, even where there is a short sentence, this cohort of victims needs and will receive proactive support through the victim contact scheme.

I am just trying to ensure that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, can hear the information I am giving him back, because we think that what the noble Lord said is not right, so I thought he might be interested in hearing what I have to say about it.

Part 3 ensures that victims of other sexual and violent offences, and breach offences linked to violence against women and girls, will be able to get information through the helpline should they request it, including for those offences in Part 1 where the sentence for the offence is less than 12 months. We consider that this is the right place to draw the line, but we will keep eligibility under review to make sure that we are reaching the right victims.

The Bill includes regulation-making powers for the Secretary of State to amend the list of offences, and the specified lengths of sentence of such offences, which determine eligibility for either service. The Bill also includes a discretionary power that enables victims of any offence, where the offender is serving a sentence of imprisonment, to be provided with either service, where they request it and probation deem it to be appropriate.

The victim contact scheme and the victim helpline will apply only where there is a custodial sentence. That is not only because of the consideration of public funds but because the information provided via these routes, such as the date of release on licence and conditions of licence, self-evidently does not apply unless there has been a custodial sentence. Where a suspended or community sentence is imposed by the court, under the victims’ code, the police witness care unit will explain the sentence to the victim.

Finally, regarding Amendment 54, I am pleased to reassure the noble Lord that there is already a route for victims to request a senior probation officer review of a decision about what information to provide, so this is already catered for. In the circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I addressed this at some length in opening. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the Minister for correcting my errors. I shall add nothing more. I am also grateful for the Minister’s explanation of how—she hopes, at least—this will work in practice. On that basis, I shall withdraw the amendment.

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I support the Government’s intention in Clause 8 to expand the role of the commissioner to considering the cases of particular victims or witnesses when those raise issues of public policy that are of relevance to other victims or witnesses—in other words, the function is a general function—but I do not support what the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, is seeking in Amendment 59, if I have understood it correctly, that the limitation that it must be a case that raises general issues of importance should be removed. It seems to me quite right that that is what the Victims’ Commissioner should be focusing on.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government firmly believe that the Victims’ Commissioner—I have known the current occupant of the role for many years and have the utmost regard for her—has a crucial strategic role in representing the interests of victims and the witnesses of crime and anti-social behaviour.

Amendment 58 would significantly widen the commissioner’s remit by requiring her to support and protect individuals who assist victims. Of course, we agree that the work of those who dedicate their efforts to supporting victims is crucial, but the proposed widening of the Victims’ Commissioner’s statutory functions would, in the Government’s view, dilute the fundamental purpose of the Victims’ Commissioner; that is, to promote the interests of victims and witnesses themselves. In fact, the commissioner’s statutory function of promoting the interests of victims and witnesses already allows her to work with and support those who themselves support victims, and she does not need an explicit statutory function to continue with that.

Since the definition of “those assisting victims” could be interpreted broadly, this amendment also risks heavily extending the casework burden that would be imposed by the two other amendments, to which I now turn.

The Government have already brought forward Clause 8, which proposes to amend the existing statutory limitation on the exercise of the commissioner’s functions in relation to individual cases to allow her to exercise her functions in relation to cases that indicate a wider systemic issue. But Amendments 59 and 60 would go further—either entirely removing or narrowing the existing limitation. We understand the amendments to be creating an alternative. We do not believe that this is the right approach and consider that our carefully designed Clause 8 achieves the right balance.

The Victims’ Commissioner is not a complaints body, and it is important to maintain this distinction. Her role is to advocate for victims as a group and to address system-wide issues—that is what Clause 8 does. It is up to her to decide which cases she believes create those system-wide issues.

Individual victims already have a clear escalation route through the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman if they are dissatisfied with their experience of the criminal justice system. Expanding the commissioner’s involvement in individual casework to this extent would shift his or her role towards handling complaints rather than overseeing the system as a whole.

It is also vital that decisions of the judiciary and other independent public bodies that support victims of crime remain free from external influence. The current legislative bar, and the amendment to it that we have proposed through Clause 8, safeguards that independence and avoids any uncertainty about the commissioner’s role in such processes. We do not believe that Amendments 59 or 60 achieve that.

The point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, which she has raised and discussed with me before on the many occasions on which we have now met—obviously, I look forward to many more—is a good point and one that we need to keep under review. Perhaps the noble Baroness and I can discuss it further the next time we meet. As I say, I very much look forward to that.

I hope the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, agrees that preserving the Victims’ Commissioner’s strategic function is essential to holding the system to account effectively, and I invite him to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I listened with interest to what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, had to say, and indeed to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I encourage the Minister to listen with care to what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said and perhaps to move our way on certain aspects.

Dealing with Amendment 58, the law should not leave people such as Mr Hehir exposed to detriment for acting courageously. It may be that the Victims’ Commissioner is not the right person, but we put this forward in the hope that it would allow consideration of what to do in such situations. The amendment sends a clear message that civic responsibility and bravery should not be met with silence or indifference on the part of authority.

Amendment 59 would remove the restriction on individual cases. We appreciate that the commissioner has a strategic role to promote the interests of victims and witnesses generally, but that cannot be done effectively if individual cases are placed beyond reach. We accept that Clause 8 enables the commissioner to act in cases relevant to public policy, and we are grateful for that, but individual cases often reveal systemic failings. Removing the restriction entirely would enable oversight and the identification of patterns that will require reform. If we are serious about learning lessons, we suggest that the commissioner should be able to look at cases from which those lessons arise, but do so with discretion.

If the Minister considers that Amendment 59 is too broad, Amendment 60 would provide a possible balanced alternative. It would preserve the integrity of live criminal proceedings, it would allow engagement in individual cases once proceedings have concluded, and it would ensure that the commissioner can examine outcomes, seek information and promote improvements without interfering with the courts. It reflects a sensible constitutional boundary.

In summary, these amendments would not unduly expand the commissioner’s role but would clarify and strengthen it. They would ensure that individual experiences inform systemic reform and that statutory restrictions do not undermine the purpose of the office itself. A Victims’ Commissioner who cannot meaningfully engage where necessary with individual cases is constrained in fulfilling the commissioner’s core duty.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

The noble and learned Lord has said what I wanted to say much more sensitively and tactfully, but I will say what I was going to say.

There is a danger that lawyers of my generation— I shall just apply it to my generation and not suggest which generation other Members of the House belong to—are prejudiced against lawyers who do not have standard qualifications, if you like, or the backgrounds that many of us come from. I understand from CILEX that there are 133 members working as associate prosecutors who cannot progress or get promotion. That is a real shame. It is a much wider issue than just prosecution.

I think the noble Lord answered his own point because he was talking about members of the Bar progressing. The Minister will tell us—I cannot believe it is not the case—that no one joins the CPS and prosecutes a murder the next day. Every profession has its hierarchy, and one progresses in the hierarchy dependent on both skill and experience. The current position is out of date, so, even if it were not to solve an immediate problem, what is proposed in the Bill is a good idea. I am afraid that we cannot support the opposition to the clause.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, it is vital to ensure that the Crown Prosecution Service can recruit and retain a sufficient number of qualified Crown prosecutors. We suggest that Clause 11 supports this aim by increasing the CPS’s recruitment flexibility through the removal of an unnecessary legislative barrier. In turn, this will help increase the pool of eligible candidates for appointment as Crown prosecutors. It is axiomatic that a shortage of Crown prosecutors adds to the backlog because it cannot make decisions quite as quickly about prosecutions as it could if there were more of them.

Currently, the Crown Prosecution Service is restricted in who it can appoint as Crown prosecutors due to an unnecessary legal requirement. This is set out in the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, which provides that Crown prosecutors and those who prosecute cases on behalf of the CPS must hold what is known as the general qualification. The general qualification is a term of art, having a very specific meaning in this context. It means that a prospective Crown prosecutor must have

“a right of audience in relation to any class of proceedings in any part of the Senior Courts, or all proceedings in county courts or magistrates’ courts”,

even though most of those rights of audience—for example, before the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court—are never going to be exercised by a Crown prosecutor in a million years.

This requirement can exclude certain qualified legal professionals, including CILEX practitioners—from the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives—who have relevant criminal practice rights but are prohibited from becoming Crown prosecutors. These legal professionals, including CILEX practitioners, often hold the right skills and specialist qualifications required to perform the Crown prosecutor role, including having rights of audience for the courts in which they will actually appear, as opposed to rights of audience for the courts in which they will not, but they do not meet the general qualification criteria. This restriction limits the DPP’s ability to consider a wider pool of legal talent and reduces the CPS’s flexibility in managing existing and future recruitment challenges.

The purpose of this clause is to remove the requirement for the general qualification and, in doing so, give the DPP the discretion to appoint appropriately qualified legal professionals, such as CILEX practitioners, as Crown prosecutors for the CPS. I can reassure the Committee that the removal of the general qualification requirement will not in any way dilute professional standards; there are appropriate safeguards to preserve standards.

Prospective professionals eligible to be a Crown prosecutor who do not at the moment hold the general qualification must still meet the authorisation requirements of the Legal Services Act 2007—they have to be appropriately qualified, authorised and regulated, and be able to exercise rights of audience and conduct litigation, both of which are reserved legal activities under the Act. It is a criminal offence under the Act to carry out reserved legal activities unless entitled to do so.

In addition, it is important to note that the measure does not require the CPS to appoint any specific type of legal professional. Instead, it gives it the flexibility to do so where appropriate and ensures that recruitment decisions remain firmly within the DPP’s control. The DPP will retain full discretion over appointments, ensuring that only suitably qualified and experienced individuals become Crown prosecutors. Newly eligible professionals must meet the same Crown prosecutor competency standards as those who qualify through more traditional routes. I also emphasise that those appointed following this change will, like all Crown prosecutors, be subject to performance monitoring by the CPS, including case strategy quality assessments focused on the application of the Code for Crown Prosecutors.

This change reflects the modern legal services landscape, spoken to powerfully by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. Alternative routes to qualification are increasingly common, where professionals from non-traditional backgrounds play a growing role in the justice system. By removing this unnecessary legislative barrier, the clause may also support the recruitment of a diverse and representative cohort of Crown prosecutors.

I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has ever met any CILEX practitioners; I certainly have, and they are an amazing cohort of people. I am sure he absolutely did not intend to suggest that somehow those who have qualified through an alternative route are, by very definition, less competent than those who have gone through the traditional route. If that is the suggestion, then it is not one this Government can support. I therefore hope that the Committee will join me in supporting Clause 11 to stand part of the Bill and I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his opposition to it.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, this has been an interesting debate. At the heart of it lies the underfunded state of our criminal justice system—something which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, has highlighted. Looking forward, the criminal justice system needs more money and the prosecution service needs proper funding, as of course do those who defend in the criminal courts; but Clause 11 does propose a significant shift, extending the right to prosecute to individuals who do not hold the long-standing qualifications of solicitors and barristers. I cast no aspersions on CILEX, but I make that observation. There is a difference in their training and educational background. This clause will expand capacity, there is no doubt about it—and there is no doubt that the system requires it, for the reasons that others have outlined in this debate—but it will not address the underlying cause of problems faced in the criminal courts. We must not go down a route which results in weakening of standards, undermining of public confidence, and unfairness to victims and witnesses involved in the criminal courts.

A central issue remains the absence of clear evidence in support of Clause 11. We have sought clarity from the Minister on what assessments were undertaken on the impact of this change, whether risks to standards were considered, and whether safeguards are in fact in place to maintain standards over time. Without clear evidence, Parliament cannot truly judge whether the proposed reform protects the quality of prosecutions. We must not embark on a position where there are unclear professional boundaries and variations in training and oversight.

We recognise the pressures facing the criminal justice system and the need for more good people to embark on careers in the criminal courts, whether in defence or in prosecution; in this case, we are talking about prosecutors. We share the desire for a stronger, more resilient system, but Clause 11 does not, we suggest, properly address the causes of these pressures. We urge the Minister to reflect carefully on the concerns which I have raised and to consider whether Clause 11 provides the assurance and evidence that this House, our justice system and, indeed, victims deserve. That said, I will not pursue my opposition.

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[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord has inevitably given us a very brief tour d’horizon of the problems of the costs and charges of the legal profession getting out of hand. Looking at the Bill over the weekend, I had to turn up the 1985 Act and write into it the changes that would be made by the Bill. It seems that the one to focus on is making the provisions subject to regulations, which boils down to the Lord Chancellor setting rates—at least that is how I read it. It is not much of a stretch to think that those are going to be linked to legal aid rates, and one can see the problem.

The noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, who explained some of the problems very clearly, mentioned consultation and rather dismissed it as being helpful, but it is important that the Committee should know what is planned by way of consultation. I hope the Minister can help us on that, because so much turns on its outcome.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, in the view of the Government, Clause 12 provides a modest enabling power for the Lord Chancellor to set through regulations the rates at which private prosecutors may recover expenses from central funds where a court has ordered that such costs be paid. To be clear at the outset, this clause does not set any rates, and it does not affect the long-established right to bring a private prosecution, which remains protected under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.

I should say at this stage that I have a great deal of experience in the area of private prosecutions, both as a state prosecutor working for the Crown Prosecution Service, where I oversaw all the private prosecutions that came to the CPS for consideration, and in private practice, where I brought a number of private prosecutions on behalf of clients and advised on many more.

The Justice Select Committee, in its 2020 report, Private Prosecutions: Safeguards, invited the Government to take a closer look at the private prosecution landscape, particularly where public funds are engaged. Taking an enabling power of this kind allows us to do precisely that in a careful and evidence-based way. The committee highlighted three key principles, which this Government agree should underpin reform: first, addressing the disparity between defence resources and those of private prosecutors; secondly, safeguarding the right of individuals to bring a private prosecution; and, thirdly, ensuring the proportionate and responsible use of public funds.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and her eminent supporters for bringing forward these amendments, and to all noble Lords for their contributions in respect of Amendments 61 and 62. I think I can deal with Amendment 61 quite shortly. We have had powerful and compelling speeches on the amendment from its proposers. It seeks to remove a presumption that a computer and software system on which a prosecution relies is working and reliable. We all know what has prompted this: the terrible Post Office scandal.

It is absolutely plain that prosecutors must no longer be able to rely on the systems being necessarily in working order as evidence for the purpose of criminal cases. The Government have had long enough now—and officials even longer than this Government—to look at this problem. If they have not, they have been prodded with a sharp stick by these amendments, and I am confident that, prodded with that sharp stick, they will come up with a solution. They will have to do so by Report, because otherwise I think this amendment will be carried then. I need not say any more.

Amendment 62 proposes a new clause to prevent an overreliance on a person’s musical taste as probative of criminal proclivity or intent. On this side we agree that a person’s creative or artistic taste should not result in them being treated prejudicially by the judicial system. We have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, the noble Baronesses, Lady Lawrence of Clarendon and Lady Chakrabarti, and others in support of this amendment.

We have some reservations about this amendment as it is currently drafted. We accept the good intentions behind it. We understand the danger it is designed to meet, namely that people are treated prejudicially for their creative and artistic tastes, and it is undoubtedly the case that those from particular backgrounds are vulnerable to this and may in effect suffer, or risk suffering, mistreatment in our courts. Against that, we fear also that the amendment might create other difficulties, creating genre-specific shields for certain evidence and thereby treating some expressions differently from others—in other words, shifting the balance too far and creating another class that is not protected. While we are sympathetic to this amendment, for those reasons we cannot support it.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I get to my feet with some diffidence, given the range of eminent speakers, many of whom I have the most utmost respect for, who have spoken in favour of this group of amendments. I start with Amendment 61 in the names of my noble friends Lady Chakrabarti and Lord Beamish, my other friend, who is in fact also noble—the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot—and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. This is a powerful group, and I entirely accept what they say about the difficulties created when there is a presumption that a computer is working properly unless the defendant is able to produce evidence that it is not. That can create an enormous obstacle for defendants. It is extremely difficult to prove that something is not working in those circumstances, so I accept that. I also understand that what is sought here is to reverse that position and to take it back to the position of Section 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act.

I have already discussed this briefly with my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. The difficulty I have with this amendment is that it is extremely broad, and the problem with that is that, since Section 69 was introduced, what constitutes digital material has evolved significantly. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, says that it is no answer to say that computers are everywhere, but I am afraid we have to be realistic about this. The computer evidence that is adduced in the criminal courts is, for example, the extremely complicated accounting software that is relied on by banks. That is at one extreme. But there is also the routine evidence that comes into criminal courts every single day, which can include text messages from mobile telephones, email chains, social media posts, DVLA printouts, medical records from GP surgeries and even criminal records themselves from the police national computer.

There is a real risk that if the amendment in this broad form were introduced, it could bring the criminal courts to a standstill. I know that is obviously not the intention, but I am concerned about whether there is a way of finding that we can limit it so that it excludes the routine use of computers—often things that people would not even think of as computers at all; the law recognises that a mobile phone is a computer, but most people would not think of it that way—and is limited to the cases that have caused real concern to those in your Lordships’ House, where a conviction is often based solely or mainly on the evidence of a computer. I can see a very different case to be made for that kind of evidence as well.

I entirely understand the intention behind this amendment, and I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Beamish and the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, for the work that they have done in relation to Horizon. It is humbling to stand here and talk about the Horizon victims and survivors and what happened to them, and I would not want anyone to think that the Government are not listening in relation to this.

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[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

I am not opposed to consultation, but, I am sorry, this Government are hiding behind consultation. Once the consultation is finished, we then need action, but that is not happening, not just in this area but in a whole host of other areas.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I do not accept that. My noble friend should think carefully about making accusations such as that.

The point is that we are looking at the evidence that we have received in order to evaluate it to ensure that we make evidence-based and informed changes. The Government are considering this matter carefully. I am not announcing another review or another consultation; I am simply saying that we are looking at the evidence that we have.

I hope that my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti will hear the words that I am using. She knows that I understand the problem and that I am not unsympathetic, but we need to find a way that does not create a lot of unintended consequences.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The noble Baroness is competing with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

I would never compete with the noble and learned Lord.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I will answer the noble and learned Lord and then I will give way to the noble Baroness, because, as she knows, we do not permit interventions on interventions.

The answer to his question is that this is not the only thing we are doing. Your Lordships know how much legislation is passing through this House. It is a question of bandwidth and having time to do things. I am trying to assure the Committee that our intentions are good ones and that we are listening.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

The words that the Minister used, which I believe her to believe, are exactly the same words that we have heard from several other Ministers. The only words that would give succour to members of the Committee are, “We will have something on Report”. While I take her point about broad and narrow, that is not an excuse that can last for years. That consultation was not the first consultation, so we have been waiting for years.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I entirely understand the point that the noble Baroness is making, and I pay great tribute to her expertise. She can imagine just how popular I would be if I gave that undertaking from the Dispatch Box right now. All I can say is: leave it with me.

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

Having been a Minister myself, I know that the Minister can do that tonight. She knows what will happen if she does not bring it forward: an amendment will be tabled, and it will get passed.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I think I have already said that I am listening carefully.

[Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom (Con)]

Before the Minister moves on to Amendment 62, would she please comment on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Russell, about the Law Society’s contribution to the consultation about a system of assurances? That may be a way forward that might allow her to bring forward her own amendment on Report.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

That is exactly what the Government are evaluating. I cannot go any further than that today, but those are all the things that are being considered. I cannot go any further than to say that I am listening.

I turn to Amendment 62, in the names of my noble friends Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Lawrence. I am very aware of these issues, particularly in relation to rap and drill. I knew about this amendment, but in the course of my practice and when I was a judge I have been to a number of lectures on the subject and read a number of articles, including some by Keir Monteith, King’s Counsel, who I see is sitting below the Bar today.

The question here, on the use of this material, is one of relevance. Like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, I do not want to go into a boring exegesis of when evidence is admissible and when it is not. The real concern here is to make sure that if—and it is a big if—this evidence is to be used then it has proper probative value, on the basis that it goes further than either that this defendant is a bad person because they like rap and drill music or, even worse, some spurious and crude racial stereotypes. Judges have a duty to ensure that only evidence meeting these standards is adduced and they should exclude any evidence that does not meet the required threshold—that is not a matter of discretion. However, I understand the concerns about the fact that that has not happened in all cases.

It is axiomatic to say that creative and artistic expression is of itself not a crime, and it is rare that it would feature in the evidence of a prosecution unless it inherently involved criminal activity, such as damaging another person’s property with graffiti or drawing sexual images of children. As for musical expression, the Crown Prosecution Service is clear that creating or listening to music is not a crime, but it says that, on occasion, it has encountered cases where, upon investigation into a violent offence, it became clear that drill and rap music had been used in the build-up to encourage or incite violence or to reveal information about a crime that only the attackers would know. These instances are rare and, importantly, are already subject to rigorous scrutiny under existing evidential rules. However, I am aware of the disquiet, and we understand the community concerns.

I take the point made by my noble friend Lady Lawrence. I am a lover of crime fiction but I do not think anyone is ever going to use that in a prosecution against me—well, I hope they do not. She makes a valid point.

The Crown Prosecution Service is actively consulting on this matter through a public consultation, seeking views on whether formal prosecution guidance should be issued regarding the use of musical expression evidence. We want to ensure that any future approach is clear and informed by a wide range of perspectives.

It is the Government’s view that, as currently drafted, the amendment would be unduly restrictive and would, in effect, frustrate the ability of the Crown to adduce relevant and probative evidence before the court, with the potential consequences of frustrating justice for victims in some serious cases. The Government intend to await the outcome of the CPS consultation and announce next steps in due course. I invite all noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I did not speak to Amendment 62 when I briefly got up but I did some research on it. I think it is usually the case in a particular area of law that, where you have a body of experts in particular areas of evidence, it is not uncommon for those experts to be used by both the prosecution and the defence. In doing my research on Amendment 62, I found that that is not the case. The so-called experts who are used by the prosecution are solely used by the prosecution, while the experts who are used by the defence—who would be able to talk knowledgably in the sort of detail that the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, was able to give us—are used only by the defence. That in itself tells you that there is something wrong.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I do not disagree with the noble Lord. I have already made it clear that I understand the disquiet, the concerns about it and the very real possibility for something that is in fact crude racial stereotyping to look as though it is evidence. That is why we need to await the outcome of the CPS consultation.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in what was a very important debate that did credit to the whole Committee. I am most grateful to my noble friend the Minister, who is a distinguished criminal lawyer and a distinguished former member of the CPS, but, with all due respect, no one should mark their own homework. It is not for the Crown Prosecution Service to mark its own homework, nor any other lawyers even.

In relation to Amendment 62, to go in reverse order, I urge my noble friend to consider what the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and others have said about what is happening in practice—the University of Manchester study and so on—because just reading out the official statement from the CPS is hope-sapping—I know that my noble friend would not want to sap my hope in difficult times. In relation to Amendments 62 and 61, she suggested that she is listening and said it with some personal input. She is not AI. She is not a projection from the Government. She will forgive me for saying that she is one of our best advocates on these Benches and the Government are very lucky to have her. However, as I know our noble friend Lord Timpson has said, publicly and privately, many times, we are not all here for ever; we are not on this earth for ever; we are not in this Chamber for ever; we are not in positions of power and influence for ever. We must make the most of our opportunities to make change, as was promised, and make it for good. Race equality surely must be one of the foundations of any Labour Government, specifically one that has promised so much.

In relation to both amendments, I heard no proper pushback from any side of the Committee. On Amendment 61, I have to defer to the noble Lords, Lord Beamish and Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. The time is now; the vehicle is this Bill. Finally, I say gently to my noble friend that when she walks into rooms in the Ministry of Justice with officials or even Commons Ministers, I hope she realises that she is the cleverest person in the room or at least the one with the most direct experience of practising criminal law in the courts. If anyone can find a way through, I trust that that is my noble friend.

Amendment 62 could theoretically be dealt with by rules of court—but it must be dealt with—but with Amendment 61 we need an urgent legislative amendment in this Bill. My noble friend foreshadowed the possibility of a way through, partly on her concerns about sole and determinative evidence and partly responding to the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool. I urge her to deliver for the Committee and for the people of this country, for the past victims of miscarriages and for all those who might come. I say that as respectfully and positively as I can to my noble friend. I hope she knows how much respect I have for her, but we are looking for something on Report in respect of both Amendments 61 and 62. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I can be brief. I support Amendment 63 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool. We have already spoken about the need for consistency across our justice system. That includes extending the powers to compel offenders to attend their sentencing in the Crown Court to magistrates’ courts. This amendment would also bring the periods in which a case can be discontinued into alignment; indeed, I am interested to see what justification exists for the difference between the two. We have heard a compelling speech also from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, with a particular example. I know that one should be wary of individual examples, but it is a compelling example and we should listen to it carefully.

Apart from making the system more consistent in its procedures, this amendment would allow prosecutors in the Crown Court to discontinue a case at a late stage, preventing unnecessary, costly and time-consuming trials. In the context of a court backlog and the need for efficiency, allowing this more flexible mechanism for bringing prosecutions to an end appears to us to be a measured and sensible improvement. To be clear, Amendment 63 still allows the option to reopen a case following a successful victim’s right to review request, if it is concluded that the CPS has made an error in stopping the prosecution. This amendment would not do away with this important scheme which is available to victims. We thank the noble Lord for his efforts and look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I will start with a little trip down memory lane. In either 2010 or 2011, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, when sitting in the Court of Appeal, heard a case called Killick. That was a case where prosecution had been restarted and, as part of his judgment in relation to it, the noble and learned Lord said that the Crown Prosecution Service needed to come up with a system that would allow victims to challenge a decision not to prosecute, without them having to bring judicial review proceedings. As he may remember, I was the prosecutor who remade the decision to charge in that case and, as a result, the Crown Prosecution Service—under a certain Director of Public Prosecutions, who may be known to your Lordships in another context at the moment, and I, working as his principal legal adviser—devised the victims’ right to review scheme.

I wrote much of the legal guidance, so the noble Lord, Lord Russell, is correct when he says I know quite a lot about it. I am a huge fan of the victims’ right to review scheme, because although the Crown Prosecution Service is in many ways a completely wonderful organisation, everybody is human and sometimes people get things wrong—and when we get it wrong, we want to put it right. Obviously, a right is not a right unless it has a remedy attached to it, and that is a real problem in some of these cases. The noble Lord knows, because I discussed this with him when we met, that my practice when I was dealing with reviews of cases was always that if I took the decision to offer no evidence, I would write to the victim and say, “In 14 days I am proposing to do this, unless you want to make representations to me as to why I should not, or seek judicial review proceedings”. I completely get the issue here.

The only note of caution I will sound is this. It would be a substantial change, with wide-ranging implications for both victims and defendants. For that reason, it needs to be considered carefully, because discontinuing a case is not simply putting a pause into proceedings. Restitution requires fresh proceedings, starting back in the magistrates’ court, which risks delay and uncertainty for both victims and defendants. It does not go straight back into the Crown Court as a restart. That is why robust safeguards and controls, which are not in this amendment, are essential when making these decisions.

For example, in the magistrates’ court procedure, which this amendment seeks to replicate, the defence can refuse to accept a discontinuance and insist on no evidence being offered, or insist that the Crown Prosecution Service makes a decision as to what it is going to do. We are anxious to ensure that discontinuance is not, for example, used in the Crown Court as a way of getting an adjournment that would not be got under other circumstances, as in saying: “We don’t have enough evidence here. We need another three months to get it, so we’re going to discontinue and then restart”. That could create awful uncertainty, both for victims and defendants, as to what is going on. There are, for example, cases where somebody is a youth at the time they are charged and, if the case is then discontinued, they may then be tried as an adult later on.

I am not saying that I do not understand the problem or that this may not be part of the solution, but it needs to be considered carefully. What we plan to do is to consider this proposal further in the context of the wider court reforms and Sir Brian Leveson’s most recent report, with his recommendations for improving efficiency. I also welcome the expansion of the CPS pilot, strengthening victims’ voices before final decisions to offer no evidence are made. The outcome of that pilot will also inform our thinking. For the time being, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

I thank the Minister very much for her response. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for adding her name and for the examples she put forward. As I surmised, the Minister does indeed know what she is talking about—on a 24 hours a day, seven days a week basis, from what we have heard—and she is looking remarkably well on it.

I thank the Minister very much for the broadly positive way in which she has responded. I think she acknowledged, as we have all acknowledged, that there is an issue and an inconsistency here. But putting it right is not a matter of just snapping one’s fingers and changing one thing, because that has knock-on effects. I am hoping that the Minister will agree to have some follow-up discussions between now and Report, to see either what it will be possible to do by Report or what changes one can start instituting or committing to look at carefully, which can then be enacted later. But on that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, when I say that I will be brief, I will be very brief. I have listened carefully to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. He is quite right in his observations, and particularly about the ultimate test of whether a sentence is set aside because it is unduly lenient. However, I think the answers have already been made by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell: this is a notification. The CPS is not taking a position on the merits of making the application; it is just setting up a timetable.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I will deal first with the existing time limit. We are listening—I am making a “we are listening” speech—not just to the strength of views in this Committee and in the other place on the time limit for the unduly lenient sentencing scheme but to the victims themselves. We are consistently hearing that this time limit is simply not long enough when victims are processing the outcome of the case, and I am extremely sympathetic to their representations. A ticking clock is the last thing that they need at a difficult time. The Government have been persuaded by arguments that something needs to be done, but we want to make sure that we get this right. Currently, we have been given a number of conflicting views on the best way to go about this. I would like to meet all noble Lords who have tabled amendments, and indeed any other interested Members of your Lordships’ House, to discuss the best way forward.

Turning to the question of notification, it goes without saying how important it is that victims are made aware of the ULS scheme. It is another subject that comes up over and again; it is not much of a right if you do not know that you have it. I am afraid that I am not persuaded by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, saying that we should not tell people that they have this right in case they want to use it—if that is not what he meant to say, I apologise and withdraw the remark. The way it is supposed to work is this. Under the victims’ code, police-run witness care units are required to inform victims about the unduly lenient sentencing scheme within five working days. However, we are hearing that this is not happening, so we need to ensure that it does. The question is how best to go about it.

At present, I am not persuaded that putting the obligation into primary legislation is the best way. The first reason is that, usually, if you create an obligation, you have to create a penalty for the breach. The second is that if you want to change it, you have to amend primary legislation in order to do so. The victims’ code is a statutory code of practice. Last week, we launched a consultation to ensure that we get it right and that the code is fit for purpose. Again, we would welcome your Lordships’ engagement with that consultation before it closes on 30 April, and any other ideas before we reach our final conclusion. For now, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Sater, my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, for tabling Amendment 68. We agree with the principle that children who commit crimes should thus be charged as children, even if by the time of their court appearance they are above the age of 18. What matters is the mental state of the offender at the time the offence was committed, not the lottery of when he or she comes to court. The amendment seeks to ensure that there is no loophole preventing this being the case, and we therefore hope that the Government will agree with that aim.

Amendment 70 in my name concerns the collection and publication of data relating to offenders’ immigration history and status. This is a sensitive issue. Illegal immigration has long been a core political issue for voters and has become even more salient in recent years. There continues to be widespread misinformation and unfounded assertions, both in person and online. That is because empirical evidence concerning immigration has not always been readily available. People perceive changes occurring as a result of policy, but often operate under the assumption that the Government are shielding themselves from transparency. That is not the case, of course, but it must be dealt with.

Nowhere is this phenomenon more evident than with crime rates. The public feel less safe, they see the demographic change and they link the two. This is problematic. It can lead to misguided opinions about certain parts of society. There is no available data to inform opinions of what the true position is. Non-governmental studies and disjointed data releases have repeatedly justified this connection, but the lack of clarification from the Government still leaves room for the general public to be decried as fearmongering or bigoted. It is not just policy: people deserve to know the impact that government policies are having on their everyday lives, especially when they can have immediate impacts on their safety.

We say that there is a clear case to publish crime data by immigration status. Accurate and comprehensive data allows for informed debate and evidence-based policy. At present the information is scarce, it is fragmented and it leaves the public, and indeed policymakers, reliant on conjecture. If transparency and open justice are priorities, to release offender data by foreign national status and immigration history would provide clarity, support public confidence and allow all sides to address the facts without speculation.

The Minister will be aware of the time we have previously spent on the topics in Amendments 71 and 74. Amendment 71 would exempt sex offenders and domestic abusers from being eligible for early release at the one-third point of their sentence, while Amendment 74 would reaffirm the Government’s policy of favouring suspended sentences but once again seeks to exclude sexual offences and domestic abuse from the presumption. Custodial sentences should of course by judged by the extent to which they deter reoffending. We accept the Government’s belief that short custodial sentences often do not serve this end, but reoffending cannot be the sole metric by which the nature of a punishment is decided. The prison system at least prevents individuals from offending while they are incarcerated.

For sexual offences and domestic abuse, these considerations are not abstract, certainly for the victims. Victims’ lives, safety, sense of security, the opportunity to reorganise their lives and perhaps move or otherwise change their way of living, are directly affected by whether an offender is at liberty or in custody. In 2019, the first year for which comparable data is available, there were 214,000 arrests for domestic abuse and 60,000 convictions, a conviction proportion of 28%. In 2025—six years later and under this Government—there were 360,000 arrests for domestic abuse but only 41,000 convictions, a drop from 60,000 and a conviction rate of just 11%. Something must be done.

The Government have highlighted the scale and seriousness of sexual offences and domestic abuse. They have described violence against women and girls as a “national emergency”. They have committed to strategies including specialist investigative teams and enhanced training for officers, and demonstrated recognition that these crimes demand careful handling. It would be inconsistent to promote such measures while making it easier for offenders of these crimes to avoid immediate custody.

This principle also extends to early release. It becomes a moral question rather than a purely empirical one when an offender has drastically altered the life of a victim by means of their crime. I do not think it reflects who we are as a society if we say that those who commit as invasive and exploitative a crime as sexual assault or domestic abuse should not serve the full extent of their sentences.

I end by saying I hope the Liberal Democrats will support these amendments. They have made it a point of principle, as have we, that victims of domestic violence deserve targeted measures to prevent them suffering further harm. Their justice spokesman in the other place, Josh Barbarinde, tabled a Bill last year to prevent domestic abusers from being released early under the Government’s SDS40 scheme. They now have a chance to put their principle into practice, as Amendment 71 would have exactly the same effect. I hope they will be able to offer their support.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I start with Amendment 68 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Sater. She spoke passionately about this issue during the passage of the Sentencing Act and I pay tribute to her wealth of experience on this topic. As a former youth magistrate and a member of the Youth Justice Board, I have a lot of sympathy for the issues raised.

However, this amendment would radically change the youth justice landscape. As the noble Baroness knows, sentencing guidelines already make it clear that, when an individual is dealt with as an adult for crimes that were committed when they were a youth, they are to be sentenced as though they were being sentenced at the time that they committed the offence and not when they appear before the court. They also state that the courts have got to consider not only the chronological age of the offenders but their maturity and other relevant factors that remind the court they are not just mini-adults and need to be treated differently. Our position is that we remain concerned about the operational and legal complexity associated with a proposal like this. We are worried that we may not be able to achieve this during the passage of the Bill. However, I would like to speak to the noble Baroness, if she is willing to meet with me, and let us see what we can do.

Amendment 70, in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, aims to place statutory duties on the Crown Court, HMCTS and the Secretary of State in relation to collecting and publishing data on sentencing. This Government remain committed to developing the data we publish on foreign national offenders. The Ministry of Justice has already taken action to increase transparency on the data published and, notably, in July, for the first time the offender management statistics included a breakdown of foreign national offenders in prison by sex and offence group.