(11 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I hope that all sides of this House would at least agree with the objectives of my amendment. It seems self-evident that a healthy banking system should be competitive, and an important ingredient of that is to make it as easy as possible for individuals and businesses to move their bank accounts from one bank to another. Historically the hassle in doing so obstructs and constrains people from moving their bank accounts easily. Members will know the issues with transferring direct debits, standing orders and standard remittances, and the most tedious of the lot, the anti-money-laundering requirements. I think that the wrong territory has been addressed here. It should be focusing on money flows, not having hundreds of millions of people filling out these pieces of paper.
When I put down this amendment, I was not aware that in September 2011 the Payments Council—a collaboration between banks—had approved a £650 million project to design and implement a new and much easier account-switching service for bank customers. This is supposed to be operative by September 2013, with a guarantee that the customer process for switching will be completed within seven days. That means the customer will receive whatever they need to operate the new account within seven days, and the new bank will arrange for all their incoming and outgoing payment instructions to be redirected from the old bank to the new one. The customer’s balance will be transferred, and any payments sent to the old account on or after the seventh working day will be automatically caught and moved to the new account. The customer will not suffer if there are any bank errors and the old current account will be closed at the end of the process. My amendment includes specifically the grandfathering of anti-money-laundering requirements, which I suggest is an important ingredient of the whole process.
I should perhaps have started by declaring an interest as a director of Metro Bank. Metro Bank has cracked the whole issue of people needing to get passports endorsed and provide originals of bills. Within the legal requirements we can obtain all the evidence we want from someone’s driving licence, and they can open an account within a 15-minute period.
There are two issues within the Payments Council proposals which potentially need some degree of FCA involvement. The first is that there is no automatic agreement from all banks to participate in this scheme. I understand that 97% have said they will participate, but others that have not. Whether they will or not remains to be seen, but for it to be really efficient it seems it should be universal, with all banks participating. Secondly, there is the issue of costs. I understand from HSBC—a major participant in the Payments Council initiative—that to make switching accounts straightforward it is proposed that there will not be any charges, but there is no agreement or requirement across the board. My amendment is essentially a probing one, although I would like to see its objective implemented, so does the Minister feel that the FSA needs to be given some degree of statutory power to ensure that all banks participate, and that with regard to charges there is a level playing field or no charges at all?
My Lords, I welcome this amendment. As the noble Lord, Lord Flight, has said, competition should mean that the standards of banking are driven up by consumers walking with their feet—taking their chequebooks elsewhere. We need to change a lot of banks’ behaviour, not least because they seem to be the only organisations in the world that can take money from your account without sending an invoice. They can decide on a charge and take it from your bank account without your agreement. This is behaviour we need to change but, as consumers, we can only do this if we can move easily.
I particularly feel this as I am in the middle of trying to switch accounts. After 28 years with one bank, they refused a cheque that was made out to “Baroness Hayter” instead of “Dr Hayter”. I would have thought they could have worked out it was the same person, but there you are. What is really interesting is that First Direct would not take my account unless I showed all my resources and assets—not that there are a lot—the sources of my assets and how I had paid off my mortgages. This was just to open a current account. Needless to say I complained and, when I did, the answer was that it was anti-money-laundering—this from a bank whose big owner has maybe done rather less about big anti-money-laundering on the other side of the world, yet is worried about my tiny bank account. My suspicion is that it wants this information to find out what else it could sell me.
If those of us who find it easy to argue and complain still find it difficult to change our accounts, how can ordinary consumers use the power and drive up standards unless moving is made easy? It is difficult with direct debits and it is even harder with payments in. I am an old-age pensioner, so I now have to find out who in the DWP pays my pension so that they can change it to a new bank.
I know that the Government are very unlikely to accept this amendment, but it raises a really important issue about whether we can leave it to the banks to reach a voluntary agreement themselves. It seems the answer is no. The noble Lord, Lord Flight, has told us that the banks say they will do this voluntarily, but my own experience suggests that they will not without a firm crack of the whip. We will be looking to the new FCA for a bit of muscle on this. We look forward with interest to the Minister’s response to this amendment.
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the House can of course be assured that the FSA would not seek to recruit, let alone retain, any individuals who were not competent to carry out their duties. What I said in my first Answer was that, at the end of the probationary period, an assessment is done, so it certainly does not wait until the end of the first annual assessment.
My Lords, in his Answer, the Minister talked about technical qualifications. Surely, given where we are after LIBOR and everything else, we need a code of conduct that also covers ethical issues. Qualifications are needed for that not just, as is proposed, under LIBOR. Does he not agree that it should be provided in the Financial Services Bill for everyone working in banking?
My Lords, I am sure that they take account of the judgments that need to be made on the ethical front, but they should not be in the Bill before the House.
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI shall deal with our own amendment in this group, Amendment 187RZA, which is virtually the same as Amendment 187T. We should clarify that our idea is not to cover everything that the FOS produces. The Financial Ombudsman Newsletter is one of the best publications I have seen; it beautifully describes the cases and gives a lot of guidance, with a small “g”. The intention of our amendment is that any guidance is fully consulted upon where such guidance could lead to a “safe harbour”, and should therefore take account of all relevant interests, including those of the industry and consumer groups.
I turn to some of the other amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Flight. Two major changes are suggested that worry us. One would virtually make non-publication the default option, with the Financial Ombudsman Service having to justify in each “particular case” when it wants to publish, having given the respondent—but not, interestingly, the complainant—the right to argue for non-publication. In our view this is not in line with the Hunt report and would not amount to the transparency and openness to which consumers have a right.
The second issue is the one that my noble friend Lady Sherlock has just been talking about—cases that have wider implications, such as PPI, where it soon became evident to the ombudsman that the mischief went far wider than a particular provider. While we welcome an early alert from the Financial Ombudsman Service to the FCA that something is going amiss and that regulatory action or new guidance might be required, it seems to us quite wrong to put on hold an individual’s claim for compensation when they have clearly been mis-sold a product and might be out of pocket. We do not agree that the individual consumer’s justified complaint should be suspended while a large bureaucracy—I am afraid that that is what the FCA will be, with its need to consult and so on—gets its act together.
As we have heard, the ombudsman’s role is to resolve complaints—speedily, we hope—that have not been satisfactorily dealt with by the service provider, which is of course always the first and best option. If PPI is anything to go by, though, the banks could and should have refunded the money themselves pretty speedily and stopped selling the product unwisely. It is this that would have stopped the consumer detriment, and incidentally saved the banks a lot of money further down the track.
Other amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Flight, in this group seek to include the rationale for each published decision to be explained. However, our fear is that this would add considerably to the process for handling cases and undoubtedly to the costs, and we would be surprised if the industry were in favour of that since it funds all this.
By including “operations, policies and procedures”, Amendment 189P would appear to us, as my noble friend Lady Sherlock said, to risk undermining the independence of the ombudsman service. We hope that that was not the intent, but we have a similar concern about Amendment 187S, which would appear to give the regulator the power to decide not only which complaints the ombudsman can decide on but, worryingly, how the ombudsman should do so. That would undermine the very independence of the ombudsman, which is of course meant to serve as an informal alternative to the courts.
With regard to Amendment 187Q, as my noble friend Lady Sherlock also reminded us, the FSA—or, as it will be, the FCA—is already able to make a redress scheme under Section 4 of FiSMA, the effect of which is to bind the ombudsman, so there is probably no need for it.
My Lords, I am very tempted to say that I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, and sit down.
Sadly, however, I ought to explain the Government’s view of these amendments. Amendment 187E would require the FOS to exercise its functions in a manner consistent with the FCA’s strategic and operational objectives and the regulatory principles. Obviously the FCA will have an important role making and approving the rules of the ombudsman scheme, and must comply with its regulatory objectives and principles in doing so, but I do not believe that the regulator and the FOS should share the same objectives or be held to the same regulatory principles.
The FOS is not a regulator and should not be expected to act like one. Its role is to provide an impartial alternative dispute resolution service for consumers and firms. It is not a consumer protection body, and I would be concerned that by giving the ombudsman consumer protection objectives we would put that impartiality at risk. Moreover, in practice such a duty would be burdensome and difficult to interpret.
Amendment 187P is similar to Amendment 187, in that it seeks to hold the FOS to the FCA’s objectives and principles. However, it goes further by giving the FCA a role in ensuring that the FOS complies with those objectives and principles, and in carrying out an annual review of the FOS operations, policies, and procedures. The FSA already has a role in overseeing the FOS, which the FCA will retain—appointing and removing the board of the scheme operator, for example. However, the FOS’s claim to impartiality, and hence its legitimacy in making determinations that are binding on firms, is credible only if it is operationally independent of the regulator. This does not mean that it should be unaccountable or free from scrutiny—this is why we have brought in provisions requiring the FOS to be audited by the NAO. Associated with these new powers, the NAO will be able to launch value-for-money studies of the FOS. However, to require the FCA to ensure that the FOS complies with its objectives would require detailed oversight and control of the FOS’s day-to-day operations, which in our view would not be compatible with the FOS’s independence.
Amendments 187F to 187L relate to the new transparency requirements for FOS, under which the ombudsman scheme operator will have a duty to publish a report of determinations unless, in the opinion of the ombudsman, it would be inappropriate to do so. Amendments 187F, 187G and 187H seek to reverse the proposed new provisions, leaving the scheme operator merely with a power to publish determinations if it decides that it is appropriate, and a duty to explain the rationale for publication in that case.
Previously, ombudsman decisions have been published by one or other of the parties involved, leading to a partial and sometimes misleading picture of the way in which the FOS made decisions. Now that the FOS is subject to the Freedom of Information Act, ombudsman decisions may also be published in response to requests for information under that Act, so there is clearly a need for change.
Amendment 187J seeks to modify the transparency arrangements to provide anonymity for the respondents except where they agree to be identified. However, in many cases it will not be possible to redact all the information by which a firm could be identified without thereby withholding key elements of the substance of the decision—for example, the content of a firm’s advertising material, policy wordings, and product names—and there is no reason to think a firm’s reputation should be unfairly tarnished by the publication of a decision. However, I entirely agree with my noble friend that there is a case for withholding genuinely commercially sensitive information. The FOS will have the power to do that, and has made it clear in its consultation on transparency earlier in the year that it intends to protect commercially sensitive information.
Amendments 187K and 187L would provide for a minimum period of 28 days between the scheme operator considering a determination for publication and its taking the decision to publish, during which the respondent may make representations. It is of course important that firms get a fair hearing but, as I have said, by the time a decision is published, firms have had many opportunities to explain their side of the case already, and the ombudsman scheme rules already provide for firms to be able to provide sensitive information to the ombudsman in confidence. Given that this route already exists for the firm to identify information that it would be inappropriate to make public, I would be concerned that firms may see a process to make further references, as the amendments propose, as an opportunity to appeal the substance of the decision itself. However, I reassure my noble friend that the FOS would be very open to listening to proposals from firms about how best to ensure that it does not publish sensitive material.
Amendment 187N would require the FOS to suspend cases and refer the matter to the FCA when it encounters an issue with wider implications. Obviously the FOS will encounter issues that demand a response from the regulator, and there need to be clear duties and routes for the FOS to raise these issues with the FCA. I draw my noble friend’s attention to the measures in the Bill that provide for this. In future the FOS will be required to share information with the FCA that it considers relevant to the FCA’s objectives. The FCA is in turn required to take account of this information. In addition, the Bill introduces a mechanism whereby the FOS and the firms concerned can refer issues of mass detriment to the FCA, and the FCA will have to publish a response within 90 days, which is a very much improved procedure over what has obtained in the past. The response from the FCA might set out a timetable for regulatory action that would allow the FOS to consider whether or not to place a hold, or stay, on complaints. I reassure my noble friend that the Government share his concerns, and we think that we have taken measures in the Bill to address them.
Amendment 187Q seeks to require a clarification procedure for regulatory matters arising from complaints to be resolved by the FCA or for the FCA to provide guidance. While supporting the spirit of these amendments, my concern about the clarification procedure proposed is that it would be overly bureaucratic and could blur the distinct remits of the regulator and the ombudsman. The FOS’s role is to provide swift and low-cost dispute resolution. In doing so it must of course take into account, among other things, the relevant law and the regulators’ rules and guidance. It cannot, in practical terms, be expected to refer an issue to the regulator every time it encounters regulatory matters, any more than it could be expected to refer a matter to the courts every time it encountered a legal matter. We have included a package of measures in the Bill to improve co-ordination and co-operation between the FCA and the FOS. These include the new information-sharing and co-ordination provisions, as well as a new mechanism for the FOS and firms concerned to refer issues of mass detriment to the FCA.
Amendment 187S would require the FCA to make the detailed procedural rules for the ombudsman scheme rather than approve rules made by the FOS itself as at present; and to define the factors the FOS must take into account in its “fair and reasonable” test in legislation. On the first part of the amendment, the FSA already makes rules concerning key elements of the FOS’s compulsory jurisdiction. The more detailed rules of the ombudsman’s procedures are made by the FOS itself with the FSA’s consent. This strikes the right balance. As part of its operational independence, the FOS is responsible for preparing the detailed procedural rules which the regulator must approve. The alternative would be for the regulator to be directly responsible for running the ombudsman.
My Lords, in previous debates on the Bill we strongly welcomed the super-complaints process included in Clause 40. Particularly in a market such as this, it is important that independent consumer bodies, expert in intelligence-gathering and in touch with clients, can bring a complaint about something which is causing general consumer detriment.
However, it is not only the FCA which will regulate issues with the potential to cause consumer detriment. The PRA, via its role over with-profits policies and bank-lending ratios, might also be the regulator to intervene in particular cases of market failure. We are therefore asking that in such cases the super-complaint can be made to the PRA where appropriate. There are 25 million customers in this market, with some £330 billion of with-profits policies, so we are talking about significant consumer questions. The Bill transfers responsibility for these to the Prudential Regulatory Authority but without giving consumer bodies the ability to call conduct issues to account via a super- complaint. Why should the voices of consumers not be properly heard given the size of the market and the chequered history of some of those policies and, indeed, regulatory failures?
In the other place, the then Minister, Mark Hoban, agreed that,
“the super-complaints power should be wide enough to cover complaints about with-profit policies”,
although he did not agree that,
“the PRA should be designated as a recipient of the super-complaints”.—[Official Report, Commons, Financial Services Bill Committee, 15/3/12; col. 519.]
He seemed to think that such super-complaints should be taken to the FCA, even though it had no responsibility in this area. Despite reading that exchange and what he said very carefully, I do not understand how a complaint to one body could affect the regulatory actions of another, no matter how good the dialogue or the MoU between the two. Therefore, we again ask that, for with-profits insurance policies, the super-complaint should be made to the PRA.
On the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Flight, in this group, we would not want to see the FCA lose this power and are content with the way it is set out in the Bill. I beg to move.
My Lords, I shall not move Amendment 189A. I am now satisfied that the powers here do not contradict or are not repeated by powers under Section 404 and that the potential arrangements of the ombudsman’s power to refer to the FCA are quite helpful. Similarly, I shall not move Amendment 189B.
Perhaps we can suggest that the noble Lord, Lord Newby, answers all the amendments. We seem to have slightly more success with him than with his colleague on the Front Bench. Obviously, I am delighted by that assurance and we look forward to seeing exactly how the Bill will do that, but it sounds as though it will meet our aim. With that in mind, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I should like to know which Minister is going to respond to this—it may help.
We are pleased that the FCA now has a new competition objective and wider competition powers. However, these powers do not go far enough to enable the FCA to deliver its objectives. As the Bill stands, the FCA will still have to refer cases to the OFT, or its successor body, which will then conduct a market analysis before being able to take further action. This looks like a slow and rather unfair regulatory process, even after the merger of organisations that will take place under another Bill.
We therefore support the view of the Joint Committee that the FCA should have concurrent competition powers in respect of a market investigation reference, together with the OFT. That would empower the FCA to conduct its own economic analysis and deal with distortions in the market without the need for any delay.
We have heard a lot about the lessons learned from PPI, which highlight the need for the FCA to have the market investigation reference powers. In 2005, the FSA signalled its concerns about the PPI market and began an investigation. After the investigation, the FSA took its concerns to the OFT, which had to look at the issues before passing the case on to the Competition Commission. Eventually the Competition Commission passed the issue back to the FSA. The process took far longer than necessary and allowed the banks and other credit providers to continue selling PPI to their unsuspecting customers.
Giving the FCA concurrent MIR powers would allow the FCA to escalate concerns about competition failures quickly and efficiently, with any failures addressed before consumer detriment crystallised. By giving the FCA powers equivalent to the OFT under Section 131 of the Enterprise Act 2002, a single organisation would be able to tackle significant market issues such as PPI without the substantial delay through referral to another body. We therefore seek to amend the Bill accordingly and I beg to move.
My Lords, since my noble friend is a bit lonely on the Front Bench just now, I intervene very briefly to support her on this. Quite often in regulatory structures the sector regulator is very nervous of referring anything to the competition authorities because it regards that as part of its failure. Under the terms of this amendment, it would be part of the process that was available—I will not say normally, but if necessary—to the FCA to refer things to the competition authority, having itself examined the structure of the market with its concurrent powers.
I am very mindful of an equivalent sector—namely, energy—where one of the problems has been that Ofgem has always refused in effect to refer the structure of the energy market to the competition authorities, even though, I happen to know, at the time the competition authorities or the members of the Competition Commission were very anxious to look at it. We might have to change the form of words slightly but I think this is the better formulation—that the FCA has concurrent powers but that it is not seen as a complete departure for a case to be referred to the competition authorities themselves and that the process is not prolonged.
My Lords, I can see that the noble Baroness is delighted that I am on my feet. I listened to the very clear and detailed arguments that the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, gave in an earlier session, to which we have come back today. I may not always respond there and then but I listen very carefully to everything that is said. However, I do not want to raise the expectations of the noble Baroness on this one.
This amendment seeks, as we have heard, to give the FCA a power to make a market investigation reference to the Competition Commission. I am sure that the Committee is aware that the Joint Committee that scrutinised the draft Bill recommended that the FCA should be given concurrent market investigation reference powers. However, noble Lords will also be aware that the Treasury Select Committee, in its report on the FCA, concluded that the case for the FCA to have market investigation reference powers has not yet been made, and that the issue should be reviewed when the FCA has bedded into its new role.
Having considered the matter very carefully, the Government have adopted the proposal of the Treasury Select Committee. The FCA’s competition objective will require it to keep the markets it regulates under review and it may of course perform its own competition analyses as part of that. The evidence-gathering and analysis carried out by the FCA will support any subsequent intervention by the OFT. For example, on a referral from the FCA, the OFT may have sufficient evidence to launch a market investigation reference almost immediately. There is precedent for this in the OFT’s response to the report of the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee on the audit market. In the light of the evidence collected by the committee, the OFT felt able to consult on a reference to the Competition Commission without conducting its own market study.
As the Government have made clear in their response to the Treasury Select Committee, we will review the question of the FCA competition powers when it has bedded in to its new role, five years after it comes into being. I hope that with that reassurance, and confirmation that we are following the Treasury Select Committee’s recommendation, the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Whitty for his support for the amendment. His experience in this field is much greater than mine. I am surprised by the Government’s lack of interest in the relationship between the OFT and the FCA, given its new competition powers. In an earlier debate, the Government would not even agree to an MoU between the FCA and the OFT. I am pleased that the Government will keep the matter under review and therefore accept that there are some issues here. Part of the concern is that, with the merger under the other Bill of the OFT with the Competition Commission, those organisations, as all organisations are when they get together, will be tied up with working that out just at a moment when the FCA has these new competition powers and perhaps would like to use them in the way described. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, in addition to all the comments made by my noble friend Lord Whitty, which we obviously support, I would like to speak for a few moments to Amendment 189BC, which stands in my name. Had that been in place, it would also have provided a route for small firms that were sold totally unsuitable interest rate swaps to have reached a speedy cross-industry solution.
The committee will know that many SMEs took out loan agreements, having been told that they also needed to take out an interest rate swap. Those SMEs, usually with no professional legal or accountancy staff, are sitting targets for financial services companies out to make a fast buck. They need the protection that this amendment could provide. I hope that the Minister will accept it, or a suitable alternative, to ensure that small and medium-sized companies, on whom we all depend to kick start our economy, get easy access to complaint resolution where their interests are damaged.
The amendment would give small firms the ability to complain and bring proceedings—court proceedings if necessary—to ensure that they could get proper adjudication on whether they were indeed mis-sold a particular product. As we have heard, the amendment would require the Government to introduce proposals within three months of Royal Assent to make it easier for groups of small firms to bring collective proceedings before the courts in respect of financial services claims, with the right to opt out for companies not wanting to be party to the outcome of the cases.
The amendment would also empower SMEs to complain to the regulators and to give their representative bodies the right to complain about market failures to the FCA, in the same way in which individual consumers can.
There is a gap in the legislation for small firms wanting to make complaints in their role as consumers of financial products. A case can be made for the representative bodies of small firms being able to take civil complaints. On 22 May this year, the Minister in the Commons, Mr Hoban, said that,
“the provisions in the Bill will not prevent bodies representing small and medium-sized enterprises which fit the relevant definition of consumers from making super-complaints”.
We therefore seek clarity in the Bill to that effect through the amendment.
Mr Hoban also said that:
“what type of consumer body should have access to super-complaints is complex and will require more detailed criteria than can be set out in the Bill.”—[Official Report, Commons, 15/10/12; col. 1031.]
He announced that the Treasury would publish draft criteria “later in the year”.
I might have missed it, but it is now later in the year and I think it is yet to appear. Perhaps the Minister could provide those further details.
The Government believe that collective proceedings, in the appropriate circumstances, can deliver access to redress and a potential deterrent effect. That is why the Government have been consulting on a range of proposals to make it easier for consumers and small businesses to bring private actions in competition law—including whether to extend to businesses the current right of consumers to bring a collective action following a breach of competition law, and whether to make it easier to bring such actions. The Government are considering the consultation responses and hope to publish their response before the end of the year. We want to take the opportunity to learn from the outcome of that consultation and reflect on the implications for the financial services sector before proceeding to legislation.
The noble Baroness may say that her amendment would provide adequate time for consultation. However, her amendment specifies that small businesses should be able to bring collective proceedings on an opt-out basis. The type of persons who might bring collective actions, whether on an opt-in or opt-out basis, are substantive questions on which BIS has been consulting. We think that it is a lot better to await the outcome of the BIS consultation and reflect on the implications for financial services than to seek to pre-empt that process and require a particular model now. If the Government were to conclude from this exercise that it would be appropriate to bring forward legislation on collective proceedings for the financial services sector, any proposals should then be subject to proper consultation.
As an addendum to the second part of Amendment 189BC, I note that the Bill would not prevent bodies representing small and medium-sized enterprises that fit the relevant definition of “consumers” from making super-complaints. As was explained in another place, the issue of what type of consumer body should have access to super-complaints is complex and will require more detailed criteria than can be set out in the Bill.
We have considered this matter carefully, and I can inform the House that the consultation document that the Government will shortly publish covering this issue will include the proposal that the Treasury should be able to designate bodies that primarily represent the interests of small to medium-sized enterprises as super-complainants and that this will be reflected in the draft criteria.
I hope that, with the reassurance that the Government will consider proposals on collective proceedings carefully and that they will shortly consult on allowing SME representatives to make super-complaints, the noble Lord and the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw their amendments.
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise to support the amendments of my noble friend. In Committee, I said I believe that the regulatory philosophy, culture and approach has shifted and that far from it being an attempt by both sides to achieve the best and right way forward it has become an entirely aggressive, uncontrolled approach by the regulator without any thought to the consequences of how his actions will impact on the firm in question or the City as a whole.
I have also spoken about the increasing use of Section 166; the way that the significant influence function committee has used its powers to damage people’s careers and leave them absolutely no redress at all. They are left in limbo. My noble friend says that people can go for judicial review, but if he believes an individual is going to take on a regulator in this way, he cannot be doing anything other than reading the Treasury briefing note. I cannot believe, with his experience of the City, that he really believes an individual is going to be able to take on an organisation like the FCA, or the FSA as it now is, with its limitless resources, limitless amount of time and limitless access to legal expertise. I believe my noble friend raises a very serious point.
I understand the argument about transparency and it is an attractive one but the fact of the matter is we may be having transparency about inaccurate or wrong information. That cannot be sensible. We owe it to all sides for transparency to be about things that are correct in every sense. When a regulator, with all its authority, is able to put out its view it means that the person about whom the allegations are made never has a chance to obtain proper redress. In the eyes of the public there is no smoke without fire, people will say there must be something or the regulator would not have put the information out there. Even if it is proven in the end to be absolutely wrong, and even if it has not gone bust in the meantime, the firm will be immensely damaged. People will say that there must have been a case to answer because such a great authority, which has all the power of the state behind it, would not put out a notice without a reason.
I really feel that we have to be much clearer about who makes the final call about whether to publish. Judging from the Bill, it seems to me that it is far too cosy and far too easy for the regulator to be making these decisions to publish. There are not nearly enough outside checks and balances to ensure that a proper assessment of the information and evidence is made available and assessed before a very precipitous, potentially exceptionally damaging disclosure is made. I hope the Minister will be able to go a long way to meet my noble friend’s amendments.
My Lords, the starting point for my intervention on this group of amendments is our belief that consumers will benefit from transparency, contrary to the suggestions made by the noble Lords, Lord Deben and Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, to help them make—
I do not think my noble friend Lord Deben and I said that we were against transparency. We said—or, at least, I said and I think my noble friend Lord Deben said—that we wanted to make sure that what was made transparent was accurate. Inaccurate transparency does not help anyone.
The assumption is—it has been said a number of times—“What if it is proved wrong?”. However, many, if not most, of these will be proved right, and that transparency surely will be of enormous benefit to consumers and investors in a way that I hope to demonstrate.
Every time it is proved wrong it will undermine the proving of right. Since when have we had a system whereby one says, “Because many people are guilty but have not yet been proved guilty, we shall assume that they are guilty”? That is what will happen if you say it only on the word of the investigator and there is no concept even of a CPS.
Perhaps the noble Lords will let me make my case and explain that. As was suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Flight, the purpose of my amendment in the next group is to address this issue and I hope that it will get support from across the House. It is about a different way of dealing with this and bringing to that independence a much higher hurdle for exactly the reasons that noble Lords have been talking about. I hope that when we come to that amendment it will receive wide support because I share the view about a greater degree of independence and separateness being needed. Nevertheless, transparency is a particularly important issue which we, as consumer representatives, feel was very restricted by Section 348 of FiSMA and the FSA’s interpretation of this. I shall in a moment explain why we do not support the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Flight, in the present group.
Amendment 185B concerns warning notices in respect of procedures and referrals to tribunals and other issues. It would remove the requirement to consult with those about to be named before any warning notice is published. I find it hard to see why this requirement is in the Bill. It does not affect other walks of life. In criminal cases, ordinary people do not get consulted before they are arrested or charged but their names will be released. “Consultation”, I fear, is code for, “Let the lawyers loose”—I apologise to noble Lords who are lawyers—and risks injunctions, stalling and long legal arguments. Why should the person who is to be named be given special rights? If it is right to publish, why should there be a block on publication? I hope the Minister will be able to justify that, given that tremendous consultation goes on already with the firm involved before one is even at the stage of a warning notice.
On the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Flight, as I say, we have sympathy with bits of them because of the lack of a second eye, independence and separateness, if you like, from the investigators within the regulation. The Bill empowers the regulators to publish the fact that a warning notice has been issued. This is of particular interest to the issue of misleading financial promotions. For consumers, it is a significant increase in transparency to know which ads have not only been looked at by the regulator but have been seen to be sufficiently misleading for consumers to know that an ad—which they may still have; they may have cut it out of a magazine or remember it from the television and it may still influence their purchase of a product—is under review. There could be considerable consumer detriment if the ad is still in their minds and they have not had a signal that the regulator is worried by it. That is one of the most important things to consumers.
At an earlier stage of the Bill, the Government were not motivated to accept our worries about reliance on “buyer beware”—caveat emptor—but how can consumers shop around if the ads on which they are basing their choice of products are perhaps going through what can be quite a lengthy procedure? It can take very many months, and an advertising campaign can be quite short, and all that time consumers do not know that procedures are taking place that might affect their choice of product.
In other areas, we know fairly quickly. If action is taken against a food factory suspected of contaminating food, we as consumers want to know immediately, and the Food Standards Agency lets us know straightaway when it is taking action. Similarly, if a garage had fixed a coach’s brakes and was accused of doing it less than satisfactorily—some of us are grandparents—I would not want my grandchild to be on a coach where the garage was already up before the Health and Safety Executive for not having done repair work properly. Similarly, as a shareholder, I would want to know whether BP did have some liability for pollution in the Gulf of Mexico before I parted with money to invest in that company.
There can be ongoing detriment if serious accusations are made and the people involved in parting with their money, as consumers or investors, do not know about it. I am not sure it was right that we heard nothing about LIBOR and the behaviour of banks until that first case was settled. Was it right that Equitable Life went on selling products even when there was a case pending? Many of the difficulties that arose were consequences of that ongoing sale. The first time these names came out there would be a lot of coverage in the press, but once we got over that hurdle—once we had got used to it and grown up—consumers are quite able to know the difference between an accusation and a finding. Keeping those hearings in the dark is quite against consumer interest.
We hope that the Government will not accept these amendments, but that in the next group they will be rather more sympathetic to a different approach to dealing with how these decisions are taken. For the moment, I hope that they can support my amendment but hold fire on the others.
My Lords, this has been a particularly interesting debate. These are very important matters because we are talking about important new powers that the Bill gives to the regulators.
Of course I have some sympathy with what my noble friends are saying, but we have to recognise that the starting point is that there has been a huge amount of detriment over the years caused by the mis-selling of financial services. To talk in dramatic terms about human rights and people being proved guilty before they had had a chance to go through natural justice and so on is painting the picture from a completely wrong starting point. To be fair to my noble friend Lord Flight, who kicked off this group of amendments, those are not remotely the terms in which he came at this, so I do not bracket him in this. However, we have people who are quite properly setting out their interests but talking as if somehow everything was fine. It was not fine before.
Certainly the regulators equally fell down on the piece, and we may be giving them a power that is difficult for them to handle. I recognise that, and I will deal with that as I go through the argument. However, I think that we must start from a recognition that things need to change and that we have to think whether we can do better than trying to sweep things up after people have lost very significant amounts of money. We need to tilt the balance slightly in these matters, but I completely agree that there need to be safeguards in place and that whenever you create a new power for a regulator, there are dangers if that power is not properly exercised.
My Lords, let me stress again that we are not backtracking at all. Our commitment to the new policy instrument remains extremely firm. It may be that the industry will come to take the view expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Peston. We will see. I have been struck by not only our debate this afternoon but our conversations in the run-up to it that because we are taking such a bold step, which I believe to be the right one and which I believe that the FCA will exercise properly, we should have the reserve power, which we do not have in the Bill, should things not turn out as I and the noble Lord, Lord Peston, expect.
I hope, on the basis of that explanation of our intention, that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, would that happen by an order that would come back to this House, or would it just be by Treasury decision? That is a big power to take away without parliamentary scrutiny.
My Lords, I said that we intend to come back to the House on Report with a power to reflect the concerns that have been expressed. As to how the power will operate, noble Lords will see a draft of what we are considering in good time before our debate. For a power of this importance, I would expect it to be in secondary legislation subject to the affirmative procedure, so there will be an opportunity to discuss the repeal in this House, but let us see it when it is drafted.
My Lords, in addition to the reasons that we debated in the last group, there are two main reasons behind this amendment. I hope the Government will consider this amendment seriously, as I believe it will have widespread support across the Committee, as well as from the industry and the wider public.
One reason is to give some certainty that regulatory issues, or discipline, will be dealt with in an open and transparent way and not simply according to procedures chosen and operated within and by the regulators who are themselves bringing cases to a body for determination.
The second reason is to bring some independence to these hearings to give confidence to those against whom regulatory measures are to be taken that they will have a chance for a fair, objective second hearing—a hearing by people who are apart from, and indeed independent of, the regulator’s staff. We know from the FSA’s history that such independence was not always there. Although there is now the Regulatory Decisions Committee, it is not guaranteed in statute. Indeed, I know that, partly thanks to some ideas floated on the FSA website, there has been much concern that the RDC may not even continue under the new architecture. However, surely the existence of such a body should be clearly set out in the Bill so that it cannot simply be abolished or amended by the regulators.
I should add, reflecting what happened in the previous debate, that the fairness of the new power of the FCA to publish its warning notices—a power which, as the Committee will have heard, I strongly support—has been made explicitly contingent on the continuing existence of the RDC’s involvement in decision-making; hence the concern that such a committee might be abolished without parliamentary agreement. In defending the proposal to allow it to publish warning notices before the formal enforcement process had taken place, the FSA noted that all proposals to exercise regulatory powers are currently taken to the RDC to determine whether there is a case to answer. That is just the first stage—having a case to answer. Furthermore, the FSA’s then head of enforcement, Margaret Cole, said that a warning notice is,
“quite some significant way down our process for holding people accountable. It is a moment when we have looked at the case in detail, taken it to an internal committee and reached a conclusion that there is a case to answer”.
That is the process on which I am focusing.
The central role of the Regulatory Decisions Committee in providing an independent source of challenge to the FSA’s executive was regularly cited in evidence to the pre-legislative Joint Committee and to the Treasury Select Committee. The FSA’s current arrangements are, I believe, robust and effective, having been refined by experience and as a result of the Strachan review of its enforcement processes. However, we cannot assume that the protections afforded by the current framework will simply be transposed into the new regulator’s governance arrangements. The current FSA proxies for the new regulators have shown a keen appetite for exercising their judgment and discretion to intervene swiftly and decisively. I welcome that but I am aware that within the industry there are serious concerns that the FSA has, in anticipation of its new powers, begun to exploit the absence of a specific statutory requirement for the RDC.
Any erosion of these profoundly important checks and balances will not benefit consumers and will risk eroding confidence in our regulatory system. Given the explicit significance that has been attached to delivering fairness in respect of the new powers, they should not be left to the discretion of the regulators to carry forward but be embedded in statute and endorsed by Parliament. It is for this reason that I propose that the essence of the FSA’s regulatory decision-making processes should be captured and embodied in legislation.
The proposal in Amendment 187AA, as the observant among the Committee will notice, follows the model of the Pensions Regulator set out in the Pensions Act 2004. Although I was not in the House at the time, I believe that drew partly on the lessons of the slightly less than satisfactory FSA model. I have to declare a past interest as a former member of the Pensions Regulator’s determination panel. However, I know from discussions with present and past RDC members and from one who has served both on that determination panel and the FSA body that the pensions model is seen to offer greater independence and scrutiny of cases brought by the respective regulators. That is partly because it cannot be abolished, partly because its members have to be independent of the regulator and partly because it is in primary legislation.
The exact formulation of the equivalent formats for two such bodies as the PRA and the FCA may need a trifle more perfect drafting than I have managed in this amendment. However, for today, will the Minister consider carefully the principle that these big decisions, which can have great impact on individuals or financial firms, should be taken by a specialist independent panel, albeit appointed by the relevant regulator, to ensure a highly knowledgeable and expert group of decision-makers? I beg to move.
I am sorry that I have not been sufficiently clear. Yes, that is exactly what I am saying. In fact, I am saying more than that. Within the very similar provision for FiSMA, that is exactly what the FSA did. Not only can it do it but it has a track record of having done that. I think we should trust it to do whatever is appropriate again.
My Lords, I am extremely disappointed. We come back to “may” and “must”, which my noble friend mentioned. He has just had a birthday and he is still talking about “may” and “must”. If the FSA had not put on its website that it would not continue with this, perhaps our trust that it would continue with the RDC would be greater.
I confess that I have some form on this. In 1981, I worked on a Royal Commission on criminal procedure which tried to persuade the police that they should take their cases to an independent prosecutor. The Committee will not be surprised to hear that they did not want that to happen. In the Labour Party, it used to be the NEC that took cases against individuals. We were taken to court and told that we could not do that, so I ended up on the disciplinary committee to ensure that that was separate and independent of the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party. The barristers did not get it right and for a time the Bar Council used to use the same body to discipline its members and was taken to court. It had to set up the BSB complaints committee—that is another declaration of interest as my partner was vice chair or something of that—to ensure that there was that independence among the people who were presenting the cases and those hearing them. Whether there are two panels—one to see whether there is a case to answer and one to hold a hearing—is an issue of detail which I did not go into. I think that is for regulator. To trust the regulator, who is, if you like, the prosecutor—I do not like using the word “prosecutor” but perhaps we can bear it for the moment—to decide what sort of committee will challenge its evidence, seems to me not quite the correct way to approach this.
One might go as far as that had it not been for two facts: one, to which the noble Baroness refers, is the website; and the other is the fact that a senior person, who is likely to be a regulator, said that his policy was to shoot first and ask questions later. That severely worries people. Whatever happened in the past, we need to remove doubt. As the Minister suggested that it does not really make any difference because he expects that to happen, I cannot see why it would make any difference if you were sure that would happen.
I could not have put it better, although I quite like to shoot first and ask questions after, but that is just a personal preference. As my noble friend Lord Barnett has said, there is clear support for this around the House. We are obviously going to bring it back at the next stage. If it is easier for the Minister, perhaps someone not from this side but from his side could put his or her name to the amendment. But for confidence in this type of independence it seems clear that the decision cannot be in the hands of the regulator who is also the presenter. There should be some guarantee that it is an independent body. I am extremely worried that someone who has been investigating could also be the decision-maker. That seems to go quite differently from other groups. So I am afraid we will return to this but for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Let us hope I have a little more success with this one, which is completely different. Amendment 187AB concerns the limits—currently £85,000—for compensation which can be awarded by the Financial Services Compensation Fund. As the Committee will know, this is not a complaints-type award for mis-service but compensation following the insolvency or similar of a financial service company. While £85,000 may be suitable as a limit for individuals, since not many of us have that much in our bank accounts, it is clearly insufficient for charities. Charities are greatly at risk but normally being only the holders of cash rather than other sorts of fixed assets they are unable to protect themselves against the risk of losing all their money. Under the Government’s proposed banking reforms in the draft Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill published on Friday one change would put a significant number of charities at financial disadvantage. The depositor preference principle would ensure that all deposits which are eligible for compensation under the FSCS would be made preferential debts—although most charities will not fall into that category—so that if there was an insolvency of a bank these smaller ones would rank ahead of the claims of other unsecured creditors. This means that charity deposits will rank further down the creditor hierarchy. Thus charities would risk losing a higher proportion of their deposits should a bank go under so, clearly, alternative ways are needed of granting fairer protection for charities.
The NCVO and the Charity Finance Group have considered the matter carefully. Ideally, they would like charities to be preferred creditors—which I recognise would not be an issue for this Bill—or else for there to be a different limit for charities. However, the advice of Her Majesty’s Treasury is that that would break EU fiscal rules—hence the particular wording of Amendment 187AB to ascertain whether that objective could actually be achieved. One way would be to introduce a higher compensation limit for charities. The current £85,000 may be suitable for small charities but clearly it is pretty meaningless for ones such as Oxfam or Save the Children which have millions of pounds in the bank. It is really not big enough. The sector as a whole probably has about £18 billion in cash deposits, so the consequences and impact on beneficiaries would be extremely serious if even a small proportion was lost.
Earlier this year in response to the White Paper on banking reform the voluntary and charity sectors called on Government to grant registered charities preferred creditor status so that charities’ liabilities are prioritised alongside those of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme in the event of a bank failure, but the Government felt unable to accept that proposal. Perhaps there should be no cap at all for charities, although we also understand the effect on levies that that option would have.
Any losses to charities would have a devastating impact on those they support, who are usually the most vulnerable in society. The Icelandic bank experience caused ongoing concern to charities and their trustees. In tabling this amendment we seek to ask the Government to find a way forward to protect this vital part of the big society and the third sector. I beg to move.
My Lords, it is extremely helpful—and it will be done over the coming months. First, it is a single-market measure, not a eurozone measure. The aim is to establish a level playing field for consumers across the EU that is funded not by the state but by the financial services sector wherever the scheme is in operation. This means that as people move around the EU, as they increasingly do, they will know that they will get broadly the same degree of consumer protection wherever they are. That is a good idea, not a bad one. However, whether it is a good or a bad idea, this is the framework within which the deposit protection level operates in the EU, and therefore in the UK. Within the discussions about the directive that are going on at the moment, the level of compensation and the bodies that are eligible for it are being considered.
I say to the noble Baroness that we have listened very carefully to her concerns, and that the Government will consider whether it is appropriate to review the eligible limit to charities in the context of our overall negotiating priorities on this proposal. This is just one of a number of issues that we are considering in the round and as part of the negotiating posture we will take up. I assure her that we will give careful consideration to whether this is the way of achieving what she wants to achieve.
I move on to Amendment 187CA in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts. This amendment would amend FiSMA to require the regulators to ensure that levies imposed on a particular class of firm reflect the claims made, or likely to be made, on that class. Before I address this amendment directly I would like to use this opportunity to draw noble Lords’ attention to the fact that a draft of the statutory instrument allocating rule-making responsibility for the FSCS between the two regulators will be published on the Treasury’s website this week as part of a broader consultation on draft secondary legislation required by the Bill. I will place copies of this paper in the Library of the House.
I am not entirely convinced by the case for Amendment 187CA. FiSMA already requires the regulators, as the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said, to take account of the desirability of ensuring that the amount of levies imposed on a particular class reflects, so far as practicable, the amount of claims made, or likely to be made, in respect of that class. Ensuring that classes are levied in a way that fully reflects claims, or likely claims, as proposed in the amendment is likely to be an impractical and disproportionate approach to evaluating how the fund should be funded. The current drafting in FiSMA reflects my noble friend’s concern but also leaves sufficient flexibility for the expert regulators to use their judgment.
The FSA’s recent consultation document on its funding model in the new regulatory system gives a good indication of the complexity involved in determining the funding model of the FSCS. I have it here, and its 100-odd pages demonstrate that this issue is somewhat more complex than might immediately be apparent. It demonstrates, among other things, how difficult it would be to ensure, in any strict sense, that levies fully reflect claims, or likely claims, on a particular class while delivering a fair and equitable scheme.
I suggest to the noble Baroness that the correct way to address her concerns is to contribute to the consultation on this document, which is open until 25 October. On that basis I would ask her to withdraw her amendment.
I thank the Minister rather more positively than I did his colleague on the previous amendment. It appears clear that he and the Government have understood the problem and I thank him for agreeing to look at this again. Charities of course, unlike people, do not move around; British charities are only in this country. I thank the Minister for saying that they will look at that. If it is not possible by that method, perhaps he could ask others in the Government if there is another way to assist. That would be extremely helpful. On the basis of that offer I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.
(11 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, there are 14 amendments in total here, and I will not be speaking to them all; but if I could characterise them, the three words I would use would be investigation, consultation and reasons for the Financial Conduct Authority. Underpinning that are the concepts of natural justice and the law of judicial review. Given the problems that the FCA has experienced with investigations in the past, both with the Royal Bank of Scotland and the HBOS decision, there are many questions arising from that, not least on the HBOS decision. The FCA needs to be clearer and have more consultation on its relations with financial service companies because the status of the FCA is at stake here. These amendments refer to FCA investigations and providing the reasons and the consultation for them.
My Lords, I rise to speak on the amendments in this group, and in particular on Amendment 165ZA, standing in the name of my noble friend Lord Davies of Oldham, and Amendment 170ZA in my name. As my noble friend Lord McFall has said, these amendments are essentially about transparency, before and after the event, and consultation. They are also about the publication of findings and reasons, including to Parliament.
Amendment 165ZA would require, where a prohibition order is made, that the regulator publish the reasons for this and that the individual appears on the list of people subject to prohibition orders on the Treasury website. This is key. It is not simply to promote good practice by making clear what constitutes the contrary, but also to enable investors and others easily to identify who has been subject to such an order.
My family recently had to check out a hitherto chartered accountant, only to find it impossible to discover from the ICAEW’s website whether he had actually been removed from the register—which, in fact, he had been. The institute finally said it would sell us a list of those who had been so removed, but it should not really be necessary to go through that to discover who has been struck off. We certainly do not want that sort of opacity from the new regulators.
The amendment is really about open access. I assume that it will not divide us across the Committee. On this very proposal, Matthew Hancock—admittedly before he was a Minister, albeit that he was very close to a certain senior one—in the other place said that,
“the principle that prohibition orders on people who are not fit and proper persons should be published is crucial … Prohibition must not only be a sanction for past irresponsible behaviour, but a deterrent for future irresponsible behaviour. That change in behaviour, by ensuring that sanctions are strong enough to change the culture within finance, is … extremely important. It is one of the key lessons from the financial crisis. … the point of prohibition is not only … to stop the actions of those who have … committed acts that make them not fit and proper, but to demonstrate the bounds of behaviour that are deemed responsible and reasonable within authorised firms”.—[Official Report, Commons, Financial Services Bill Committee, 6/3/12; col. 384.]
The then Minister, Mark Hoban, agreed,
“that prohibition is both a punishment and a deterrent, and that the risk of being deprived of one’s livelihood is a deterrent to those who transgress”.—[Official Report, Commons, Financial Services Bill Committee, 6/3/12; col. 387.]
Clearly, publicity is key to that.
Amendment 170ZA in my name requires the FCA to give a copy of its policy on penalties relating to the discipline of sponsors not just to the Treasury but also to Parliament. Clearly, this is about improving parliamentary accountability and scrutiny of the FCA, its reports and how it carries out its functions. It is not enough to leave the FCA or the Treasury to publish statements to the wider public without laying them before the public’s elected representatives in Parliament. Furthermore, we do not want the new regulators simply to become creatures of the Treasury but we want to submit their work also to parliamentary scrutiny.
The amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord McFall of Alcluith are similarly about openness and transparency. They require appropriate consultation by the authorities, proper investigation before action is taken and then explanations provided in due course. We commend these amendments to the Committee. There is also an amendment in this group in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, which appears to make good sense. We look forward to the Minister’s response to that.
My Lords, three different sets of amendments that I have tabled are grouped together here and they cover rather different territories. I will be as organised as I can in presenting them.
Amendment 173AA is about fair process for product intervention powers. I understand, and have a deal of support for, the regulator being able to ban promptly products that are clearly undesirable. However, if additional product intervention powers are put in place, there ought to be legislative safeguards to ensure that the powers are used as a last resort and not regularly. Amendment 173AA seeks to put in place safeguards for the use of product intervention powers, such as those set out in the EU markets in financial instruments directive.
Many noble Lords may have noted that Martin Wheatley, the designate head of the FSA, had made statements about shooting first and asking questions later and had perhaps over-made his point. One of the issues I want to speak about on Report regarding the new regulatory order is that I have encountered reluctance by the industry to raise criticisms with the regulator for fear of unpleasant reciprocal action. I fear we are slightly swinging from an era where regulation was very lax to one in which there may not be enough open debate between the regulator and the industry.
My Amendments 173ACA to 173AE seek to remove the requirement to publish details of directions prior to the conclusion of the representation process. There is an analogous issue that will come up in due course with regard to warning notices. In a world where anything published is a label of guilt, I am inherently opposed to the publication of notices before there has been fair representation and a fair judicial process.
My Amendment 173AF covers slightly different territory. The Bill already gives the FCA the right to introduce rules without consultation where it would be considered that a delay would be prejudicial to the interest of consumers. This additional power, which my amendment seeks to block, is unnecessary and provides the FCA with excessive powers without appropriate checks and balances.
Amendment 173AG raises the issue that very little detail is included about what should be covered by the statement of policy. It would be better if the statement of policy were clear and transparent, particularly if there is no consultation on the specific use of the powers. Finally, the statement of policy should be used for production intervention powers generally.
I cannot find the appropriate notes. Amendments 187RA and 173AAC both cover completely different territory. As noble Lords will be aware, financial advisers are the only category of people who do not have protection from the statute of limitations for a period beyond 15 years. In practice, this means that if there are any outstanding issues when a financial adviser retires, there is no closure. There are many such situations. Sometimes issues may be with the ombudsman or the regulator from way back and there is no indication whether any action will be taken. This is a messy situation and it is ultimately unfair to financial advisers, and not helpful to clients, as it stops financial advisers being able to hand on or sell their businesses to others in the industry. I can see no really fair justification why financial advisers should not enjoy the same protection as those in other industries. I may add something further after the Minister’s response.
My Lords, I am sorry that we do not have the other amendments in order to be able to have a long discussion about “may” and “must”, but such are the events of the evening.
There are two major areas of concern for us in this set of amendments, and I am afraid that they are found in the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Flight. Unsurprisingly, one involves the so-called toxic products powers, and the other financial promotions. We have already congratulated the Government on their initiatives in this Bill on both of these issues, so it will come as no surprise that we would not support any weakening of their well chosen tools. Product intervention powers are absolutely key. They will allow the FCA to take prompt action to prohibit the sale of a particular product or to counter a product feature either on a temporary or permanent basis. There has been widespread mis-selling of endowment mortgages, PPI, interest-only mortgages and self certified mortgages; we all know the list. It demonstrates that the FSA failed to act swiftly enough to prevent widespread consumer detriment. It is highly unlikely, despite some of the lobbying that I know we have been receiving, that the retail distribution review would have had an effect on any of those, and nor indeed the TCF initiative. After all, treating customers fairly was always a part of FiSMA.
Product intervention needs to be seen as more than just a decision on whether to ban a particular product. It can also be used to control the way banks vary the terms or other specifics. Many products are not in themselves toxic. Even PPI was a very good product for a certain group of people, as were interest-only mortgages. The issue arose over the way they were sold—their packaging and their terms. That is what made them toxic. We would not want to see any weakening of what the Government have already put in the Bill.
With regard to the new and, I think, long overdue powers on financial promotion, these will allow the FCA to publish details about misleading adverts once they have forced their withdrawal. It seems extraordinary that that is not already the case. Surely if an advert is found to be misleading, every consumer who might have seen it or been influenced by it should know that it was not all that it sounded. Making public the findings on financial advertisements will also encourage other consumers to report anything that they think is a little suspicious. The power to publish will provide a real incentive for firms to improve standards and, I think, to be wary of allowing their marketing departments to push the boundaries. Research by Which? shows that many adverts for financial products have been in breach of consumer law. The organisation asked consumers about this, and two-thirds responded saying that they want the financial regulator to be proactive in taking misleading financial adverts off the market. We know some of the numbers in this area. Which? asked the FSA how many adverts it had removed. In 2010 the authority removed 262 misleading adverts, and last year it removed 327, which is almost one for every working day. However, we do not know what the adverts were because no details are available to us as consumers. So the fact that in future the FCA will be able not just to take action but to publicise it is a power that we welcome. We would not want to see it diminished in any way.
We are sympathetic to the quite different amendments spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and again we look forward to the Minister’s response.
(12 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I can assure the Minister that this amendment will not increase his blood pressure. We have a common aim here. Quite simply, it is for the FCA to appoint individuals to the smaller business practitioner panel. Given that the membership of the FPC adequately reflects the four constituent parts of the United Kingdom, we wish this to mirror what happens with the FPC. Given that more people work in financial services outwith London than in London, it is important to reinforce that the financial services industry is not London-centric but is a UK financial services industry. It says that in the Bill on page 20 at new Section 1I:
“In this Act ‘the UK financial system’ means the financial system operating in the United Kingdom”.
I feel that it is important to reflect the four constituent parts of the United Kingdom. I beg to move.
My Lords, I support the amendment with, predictably, an interest in ensuring that Wales is well represented on panels. Too often these westerly people are forgotten, especially as they have rather less of a financial sector. The needs of Welsh citizens are perhaps greater, given how poorly served they are in rural areas. The financially excluded, many of whom are found in Wales, are also poorly served by financial services. I thank my Scottish friend, my noble friend Lord McFall, for his concern for my country and, I am sure, for Northern Ireland.
I turn to Amendment 128 in this group, which provides that the panel should represent households using products. That seems to be key, if only to emphasise the importance of the financial services sector to the whole community. In effect, it is a public utility with some of the same obligations on the industry to provide a universal service even in non-profitable areas. It is equally important to ensure that users of the less profitable services are part of the system of regulation or its scrutiny. It is individuals and families who often rely most heavily on the financial services, even if they do not feature on a CEO’s radar.
Perhaps I should fess up at this point that I was vice-chair of the Financial Services Consumer Panel, so I am acutely aware of the absolute necessity of a broad range of experienced views and backgrounds on the panel. The new panel would deal with a range of issues that impact on a wide variety of consumers. That is part of the reason we so need a panel, because consumers are not a homogeneous group. Their needs, capabilities, life experience and expectation, as well as their interaction with the sector, cannot easily be slotted into a “consumers” box and ticked off by the regulator. The panel would need to draw on the policy, research, intelligence and expertise of those people long embedded in the consumer world, who bring with them in-depth knowledge and understanding of consumer behaviour, consumer detriment and—equally important—consumer law, debt management, credit, insolvency, complaint handling, redress, retail sales, the financial world and possibly even Europe. I am particularly pleased that the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, who is very experienced in consumer matters, particularly when speaking on redress, is in the Chamber at the moment. However, aside from that expertise, the panel will also need some streetwise input, perhaps from people less exposed to the intricacies of regulatory regimes, Europe, consumer law and research, but who know what the world feels like from less exalted heights than the portals of Canary Wharf.
I now turn to the major issue, which is Amendment 136ZA standing in the names of my noble friend Lord Eatwell and myself. It is about the need to balance the caveat emptor principle—buyer beware—with an equal responsibility on those advising or providing services to consumers to act in the “best interests of clients”. We have heard of the challenge facing consumers in judging whether a company is prudentially secure, or whether the product they are buying is fit for purpose, presents value for money or even covers the risk they assume it will. Added to that, as mentioned earlier today, the very pricing of products, their complexity and people’s lack of understanding of their own risks, let alone the risks inherent in products, makes it very hard for consumers to have the knowledge to take responsibility for the choices they make. The level of risk left with consumers is often unclear. The meaning of “guaranteed” or “tracker” may differ quite substantially from their common-use meaning. Consumers often bear a level of risk unknown to them and seldom explained; they are effectively making choices blindfold.
In an ideal world, of course, we support the responsibility principle. Markets are made to work by consumers shopping around and driving up standards. However, in this market, with those long-term “credence” goods, opaque structures and the asymmetry of information, we need to reintroduce some trust and transparency by balancing consumer duties with provider duties. It is an industry beset with low levels of compliance and high levels of complaints; there are no agreed standards for complex long-term products, so it is hard to expect consumers to adopt a higher degree of responsibility than is already legally acknowledged.
I have concerns, therefore, that by writing consumer responsibility into the Bill, new section 3B(1)(c) appears to “up” the existing situation. In law there are no obligations placed on consumers other than to act honestly. It is not clear what a greater emphasis on consumer responsibility might achieve. Why impose this possibly new principle of consumer responsibility without any countervailing responsibility on the service provider? Amendment 136ZA expresses the need for that balance, at the point where the industry might otherwise grab hold of this wording and say, “See—it was their responsibility and their choice”. The noble Lord, Lord Turner, whose chances of becoming Governor of the Bank of England I might now damage by quoting him approvingly, said yesterday that people,
“doubt banks’ values; and they doubt whether banks have their interests at heart”.
He went on to say that the boards of directors and managers must introduce,
“effective controls against dishonest behaviour”,
in order to change the perception of bankers. This amendment seeks to ensure that providers act in the best interests of clients, which would be just one way of guaranteeing the good behaviour for which the FSA chair awaits. Why should only consumers accept responsibility for their own decisions? Why not regulated firms, and authorised firms? It is as if the Bill’s draftsmen are at pains to ensure that consumers should have only themselves to blame. If this phrase “consumer responsibility” is to mean more than the current legal position, then the Minister needs to explain that to us. If it is only common law, then why include it?
My Lords, I will take Amendments 122 to 127 and 128 first of all. As the noble Lord, Lord McFall of Alcluith, has explained, these would require the FCA to appoint persons representing the constituent parts of the United Kingdom to each of its consultative panels. The role of the panels is to provide a forum for focused consultation. I believe that the current provisions, which require the persons appointed to be representative of consumers and practitioners in particular sectors, provide the right focus here. To do this requires the FSA now, and the FCA in the future, to seek a diverse range of panel members. I am satisfied that the FSA already takes account of these matters in making appointments. For example, as a matter of practice in making appointments to the consumer panel, which is done through a fair and open process, the FSA aims to make sure that the panel as a whole not only encompasses a broad range of relevant expertise and experience but also represents the constituent parts of the UK. That is as it already is.
The FSA also looks for some geographical spread in the smaller business practitioner panel membership, where that is possible. The large retail firms that sit on the other practitioner panel, by definition, tend to have a large geographical spread that they bring to the table as national firms. Diversity in terms of geographical spread of representation can, therefore, be achieved in the existing model where members are appointed to represent the interests of consumers and practitioners rather than to represent parts of the UK.
For these reasons, although it is important to have on the record how this operates now and how I would expect the FCA to operate in the future, I would be concerned that these amendments could reduce the effectiveness of the panels as forums for focused consultation on the issues which matter most to those most affected by the FCA regulations. I would not want in any way to either dilute or change the focus of the panels on what they are ultimately there to represent.
My Lords, I shall speak in support of Amendment 128AB in the name of myself and my noble friend Lord Eatwell. I shall also speak to Amendments 128AAA and 130ZB. Accountability means not just listening, but a dialogue: a conversation which hears and responds, and gives written reasons for disagreements. As the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said, they will not always agree, but that is quite healthy: we just want to know why. It has really worked very well with the FSA panels under the old Section 11. The proposal would just take that forward and continue it in the new Bill. This encourages transparency and forces the panels to think very hard about what they say and to do their homework well. It also makes the regulator consider submissions carefully and set out where and why they have problems, either with the analysis or with the conclusions. This adds to the openness of the regulator’s thinking, but also to that of the panels, so that consumers and practitioners can also track the record and impact of those who purport to represent their interests, and know how well they are impacting on the regulator’s work. I hope this is one of the areas where the Minister is able to “say yes”.
My Lords, to manage expectations before the break I attempted to say that I was not going to be as accommodating all through the day. In qualitative terms I will be as accommodating, but I can only work with the material that is in front of us. In this case, it is possibly a matter of explanation and reassurance. I hope that some, if not all, of the matters here are going to be covered satisfactorily.
Amendment 127ZA to which my noble friend Lady Noakes spoke would mandate some quite complicated arrangements for the Bank of England to consult the markets practitioner panel of the FCA, in certain cases. I do not make a comment about the drafting, but the general arrangements here would be quite complicated. In addition, the markets practitioner panel would also have the ability to request information from the Bank, but only via the FCA and only for the purpose of assisting the FCA. I had not been quite sure what the amendment was trying to achieve, but I now understand from my noble friend that it is a matter of strengthening the co-ordination between the Bank and the FCA in relation to market infrastructure, as well as strengthening the consultation arrangements in relation to infrastructure matters. I understand why this is important, but will attempt to explain why I believe it to be unnecessary.
There is of course nothing to stop the Bank of England consulting the markets practitioner panel or any other panel, or their members or anyone else. It is worth remembering that. It is also important to bear in mind—it may be more important in this case—that the Bank of England will be regulating only a very small number of institutions in this highly specialist area. That really is the key point. I suggest that there is not a lot to be gained by trying to institutionalise consultation arrangements in this way because of the small number of specialist players.
The Bank will indeed be able to consult each of the entities that it regulates individually, should it wish to do so. That is of course an inconceivable position for most of the other subsectors of financial services, where a panel arrangement is therefore necessary to corral views efficiently. I am not sure what a requirement to consult the markets practitioner panel would necessarily add here. More generally, the Bill already introduces a requirement for the Bank and the FCA to have a memorandum of understanding relating to infrastructure regulation, while there is of course nothing to stop the Bank and the FCA working together in any way that they want, subject to the framework of the Bill.
I think that panels are not required in this area. I hesitate a bit because my noble friend Lady Noakes may come back at me on the settlement question. I accept that on that aspect I should possibly take a bit more time to reflect on my noble friend’s views, just to make sure that all angles have been covered in what I have said and in what has been indicated by the Bank and the FCA, so far as it is relevant to them. However, specifically on settlements, I appreciate that I might reflect a little further.
I turn to Amendments 128AAA, 128AB and 130ZB, the first two of which require the FCA to provide a statement in writing to any panels it establishes where it disagrees with any of the representations. Amendment 130ZB would make a similar provision for the PRA. I note that these amendments replicate the existing provisions in FiSMA. It may help if I explain the thinking behind why the Government consider it right to depart from the existing approach in FiSMA. It is because the Bill imposes a general duty on the regulators to publish responses to the representations they have received, which is wider than the current requirement in FiSMA. The regulators must respond to all representations, rather than simply those with which they may disagree. That was a conscious change because it did not seem right that the only responses the regulators should have to give to the panels are where they disagree with them.
We do not want to promote an antagonistic relationship between the regulators and any of the panels that they may establish. We have also required the regulators to publish their responses to help inform public understanding and enhance accountability. I reassure the Committee that this duty will, in practice, require the regulators to give their reasons for rejecting or departing in any significant way from a recommendation of one of their panels. With those explanations, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, in moving Amendment 128BC I shall speak also to Amendment 143B in this group. These amendments are in the name of the noble Lord, Lord McFall, and myself and are part of the suite of amendments we have tabled to ensure that the views of the Treasury Select Committee in another place are given a proper hearing and receive a proper government response.
Amendment 128BC introduces a new Section 1SA which requires the FCA to review its own policy and performance, if requested by the Treasury Select Committee, and to send a written report of the review to the TSC. We have just debated the Government’s powers to initiate value-for-money reviews of the FCA. This amendment goes further and allows Parliament, through the TSC, to require reviews.
The cause célèbre which underpins this amendment is the FCA’s review of the failure at RBS and its own role in that. I should remind the Committee that I am a director of RBS, but, thankfully, I was not involved at all during the period covered by the report. It took huge pressure from the Treasury Select Committee to get that report into the public domain.
The Government’s response has been that such reviews and their publication are a matter for the Executive, rather than Parliament. However, the problem that the Government have is that it did not work in the case of the RBS report, which leaves Parliament without any direct means of dealing with any similar cases in future. It is not always self-evident that the Government of the day have the same interest in transparency and accountability as Parliament, especially when the Government have themselves been so closely involved in a particular event or series of events.
Amendment 143B features another aspect of the role of the Treasury Select Committee—this time in relation to the appointment of the chief executive of the FCA. Under the new Schedule 1ZA of FiSMA the chief executive is to be appointed by the Treasury and the amendment would add the words,
“following consideration by the Treasury Select Committee of the House of Commons”.
On our first Committee day, which I was unable to attend, there was much discussion of the role of the Treasury Select Committee in relation to the appointment of the Governor of the Bank of England. The Government’s position appears to be that the Treasury Select Committee is to have no role whatever in the appointment but that it may hold pre-commencement hearings. My noble friend Lord McFall—sorry, he is not my noble friend; it feels like he is my noble friend but he is actually the noble Lord, Lord McFall—asked the Government to think again about that.
The reasons usually trotted out by the Government are unproven assertions. In particular, the role of the governor is said to be so market sensitive that it has to take place without any parliamentary involvement. I am not sure that there has been any empirical evidence to back that up, but it is much more extraordinary that the Government are citing market sensitivity for the appointment of the chief executive of the FCA. The Treasury Select Committee does not accept this assertion, and it calls into question exactly how the Government think that markets work in practice.
The age of parliamentary examination of candidates for major public offices is already upon us. In general, they go well; but there have already been reports of cases from committees in another place which have not gone well. In at least one pre-appointment hearing the candidate withdrew because the hearing did not go well. Provided that this can be handled with dignity, it seems to me that this is a sensible part of a parliamentary democracy. However, post-appointment and pre-commencement hearings raise quite different issues. I recall a distinctly lukewarm if not completely damning report by the Treasury Select Committee in respect of one of the MPC appointees. It did not invalidate the appointment but it got off to a difficult start and certainly undermined the credibility of the individual involved.
If the Government stick with post-appointment hearings only for posts such as chief executive of the FSA, it is only a matter of time before the Treasury Select Committee, or a similar committee, reaches a different conclusion from the Government and makes its views plain, as indeed it should do. Where does that leave the position of an appointed but disapproved of chief executive of the FCA?
The Government need to think this through again. If, as I suspect, the evidence which stacks up shows that the case for market sensitivity is not convincing, it would be wise to ensure that Parliament’s view is taken fully into account before executive decision-making. I beg to move.
My Lords, I rise to give particular support to the second amendment to which the noble Baroness has spoken. I shall not repeat the very strong arguments that she made about the need for this to be pre rather than post-appointment. I would just add a few comments about the importance of the role of the chief executive of the FCA to consumers—as may be a bit expected of me now. After all, consumers are the people on whose savings, or need to borrow, this industry depends.
The Financial Conduct Authority has been called the consumer champion, albeit the word “consumer” no longer appears in the title. That is how, I am delighted to say, the newly appointed chair described it to me. I know that that is what consumers will want it to be. We need this new architecture to have the confidence of the public—some of whom undoubtedly hold financial products at the moment, while some may have done so in the past, and some might do so in the future. Without the confidence that this sector will behave and conduct itself in their interests—with integrity, professionalism and high standards of behaviour—what chance is there that those individuals will save for their homes or pensions, or that small businesses will borrow to produce growth and jobs?
The people who can hold the FCA to account and to scrutiny on behalf of all those millions of small savers, borrowers and those with simply a bank account are, of course, our Members of Parliament. They should, therefore, through their Treasury Select Committee, hold a pre-appointment hearing of the chief executive. This will establish in successful candidates’ minds that they are responsible to the people for the performance of their organisations. Chief executives will know that they will return to the Treasury Select Committee from time to time to account for their record and explain their decisions. That will be a healthy relationship. It does not give the Treasury Select Committee a veto, but it makes clear that the candidate needs to establish the confidence of that committee before taking up the post, and that before appointment she or he has the capability and the vision to stand in the shoes of clients and safeguard their interests. That is not too much to ask.
My Lords, my noble friend’s Amendment 128BC would require the FCA to conduct reviews of its policy and performance if requested to do so by the Treasury Select Committee, and to report to it on that review. It is clear that, under the current system, the regulator is not sufficiently accountable when things have gone wrong, so the regulator itself needs to take primary responsibility for initiating reviews. The Bill provides a much clearer framework for when the FCA should initiate a review into regulatory failure. It includes a number of measures intended to rectify this.
In future the FCA will be required to conduct an investigation and report on possible regulatory failure with the triggers set out in statute. This is supplemented by the power of the Treasury to order an investigation when it considers that an investigation would be in the public interest. The Treasury must, subject to limited exceptions, then lay such a report before Parliament. There are also the value-for-money and NAO audit powers to which my noble friend referred in the previous group. This is an extensive framework that should significantly enhance the ability of Parliament to hold the regulators to account in future.
I understand that the Treasury Select Committee has recommended that the Bill should go further, and clearly Parliament has an important role in calling for reviews. However, it does not need additional powers to do so. If the Treasury Select Committee believed that a review under Clauses 69 to 76 was required but was not being conducted, it could request such a review. The FCA will in any but the most unusual circumstances comply, as is the convention. Of course, the FCA would be available to report back to the Treasury Select Committee. This is, in fact, what happened in the case of the FCA’s report on the failure of RBS. Additional wording in the Bill is not necessary.
Amendment 143B seeks to create a statutory requirement for pre-appointment scrutiny of the FCA chief executive. This is something that the TSC recommended in its report on the FCA. The Government believe that it is more appropriate that the appointment should be subject to a pre-commencement hearing. Let me explain why. This is the same approach that has been taken for the appointment of the chair of the FSA, and appointments to the MPC. Pre-appointment Select Committee hearings are not convened for all public appointments and, indeed, have seldom been held for chief executive posts. They are not held for the appointment of chief executives at other sectoral regulators such as Ofcom and the Office of Rail Regulation. They are generally used for appointments where the post plays a key role in regulating government itself, or in protecting public rights, or where independence from Ministers is particularly vital to the credibility of the post.
Although this process is appropriate for some offices and non-executive appointments, it introduces scope for delay and public disagreement over whether a candidate is fit for an appointment, which risks damaging confidence and undermining the effective operation of the ultimate appointee. It would not be appropriate for appointments to a regulator of financial markets and services, which is, additionally, a market-sensitive appointment. Pre-commencement hearings will provide the right balance between allowing for TSC scrutiny and protecting markets from undue uncertainty.
I therefore hope that noble Lords can accept that the Government’s proposal will significantly enhance the Parliament’s ability to hold the regulators to account, and that I have explained why I do not believe that it is necessary or appropriate to go further in the way that the amendments suggest. I therefore hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I trust that the first amendment in this group, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Flight, will not find favour in the Committee as it would substantially weaken the thinking, role and responsibility of the PRA.
First, it would exclude consideration of those currently excluded altogether from financial products, especially in insurance but also in banking. Unless the regulators take exclusion from financial products seriously, we will be failing in our duty to a large section of our community. Our regulators should act in the interests of the whole community, not just those who are already within the charmed circle.
Secondly, there may be issues of promotion and advertising of financial services or products—indeed, to the sophisticated as well as to the earlier group—which must be taken into consideration by the regulators.
Thirdly, it is now acknowledged, including by your Lordships’ House, that regulation should cover future as well as present consumers so that it can take account of changes in consumer needs, the environment and product development. This is the case with, for example, legal services. The Legal Services Act 2007 specifically adds in,
“those who are using (or are or may be contemplating using)”,
legal services.
Amendment 141 in the name of my noble friend Lady Drake is clearly an essential addition to the Bill if those who have bought with-profits policies are to have any confidence in their outcome. The funds must be husbanded in their interests, the profits must be shared according to the policy’s rules, profits must be justly distributed and any discretion must be used fairly and equitably.
There is surely not a word about this amendment with which the Minister could argue. As John Kay wrote in his report this week:
“Financial intermediation depends on trust and confidence: the trust and confidence that savers who invest funds have in those they choose to manage these funds”.
Amendment 141 is part of recreating that trust and confidence, and we are happy to support it.
My Lords, let me first speak to government Amendment 140E. When considering the regulation of discretionary payments in with-profits business there is no easy split between prudential and conduct issues. The Bill deals with this by giving the PRA sole responsibility for issues relating to discretionary payments. The FCA remains responsible for all other conduct regulation. However, under the Bill as drafted, use of “includes” in new Section 3F(1) could be interpreted to suggest that the PRA is responsible for other elements of conduct regulation as well. This amendment simply clarifies the drafting, by removing the implication that the PRA could be responsible for other conduct issues.
I turn to the non-government amendments in this group. Amendment 128BH would remove the reference to those “who may become policyholders” from the PRA’s insurance objectives. However, I can assure my noble friend that the inclusion of this reference to future policyholders is both deliberate and important. It is there for completely different reasons from those advanced by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, with whom I agree in rejecting the amendment but for much narrower and more technical reasons related to the nature of a with-profits fund.
Let me give an example of what we are thinking about here. If one considers the scenario where the PRA is considering whether a with-profits insurer should be permitted to make a very large distribution to its policyholders, and if the PRA is only required to consider the interests of current policyholders, it might be inclined to allow the distribution. However, that might leave insufficient assets in the fund to ensure that policyholders coming into the fund—if it is operating on a going-concern basis—obtain fair and adequate payments from the fund.
I should reassure my noble friend that the reference to those becoming policyholders does not require the PRA to go out in some proactive way to protect those who have no current plan to take out a contract of insurance, but who might at some point decide to do so. The PRA is only obliged to provide an appropriate degree of protection and what is appropriate will depend on the facts of the case. In this case, it is the needs of a person who is about to sign on the dotted line for a with-profits policy who needs to be assured by the regulator that the fund to which they are about to subscribe is appropriately strong according to the rules. This provision allows for that.
Amendment 141 would require the PRA to regulate with-profits funds on the basis that the fund should be managed for the purpose of distributing profits to policyholders, as opposed to any other purpose. This is an important issue and I welcome the opportunity to set out broadly how with-profits will be regulated under the new system. It might be worth just pointing out to the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, that new Section 3F—the “With-profits insurance policies” section on page 31 of the Bill—makes it quite clear that the PRA must secure an appropriate degree of protection for policyholders. That is very clear. It is different from the looser wording, to which she referred, about the insurance objective “contributing” to securing protection. It is clear that the language in new Section 3F for with-profits is stronger than in new Section 2C on the insurance objective. That is an important background to the consideration of this amendment, and a point to which the noble Baroness drew attention.
When regulating a with-profits firm, the regulator is concerned with ensuring that the firm recognises a proper balance between the different interests in the fund. These interests include one that is highlighted in this amendment—the interests of with-profits policyholders to the distribution of profits made by the fund. However, there are other legitimate interests in a with-profits fund. They include the interests of the members of the insurer in the case, for example, of a mutual. In a proprietary firm, the shareholders also have an interest in the profits to be distributed. There are also considerations to be balanced between different types of policyholder. I do not suggest for a minute that the noble Baroness seeks to disapply all these other interests in the with-profits fund. Maybe she does—no, I see that she does not. I am glad about that as we would be fundamentally rewriting the law. That would be the effect of the amendment.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for bringing up this issue. I must say that a balance needs to be struck between the interests of current policyholders, who will be keen to see all available funds distributed, if they are distributed to them, and the interests of future policyholders, which we have discussed, who will pay the price of excessive generosity to previous generations of policyholders. There is also the overriding concern to ensure that the fund remains solvent and able to make distributions.
As I said, under the Bill, the PRA is required to secure an appropriate degree of protection for with-profits policyholders in new Section 3F, and it will have to take all of these factors into account. Although the factors to be taken into consideration are complex, in essence the objective of regulation remains the same for with-profits as for any other type of business. The objective fundamentally is to ensure the firm’s safety and soundness, while ensuring its proper conduct, including the fair treatment of consumers. In asking the Committee in due course to support the Government’s amendment, I ask my noble friend Lord Flight to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I support the noble Baroness’s amendment and will also speak to my own Amendment 129B, which goes slightly further. As well as calling for practitioner panels, my amendment argues that there should be PRA consumer panels,
“and where appropriate consumers falling within the scope of the insurance objective”.
It is a mistake to leave the decision as to whether to have panels simply to the PRA, rather than being a requirement in the Bill. This is a fair point; it is appropriate to provide proper safeguards for regulated persons and for consumers. Although it is at a slight tangent, the Treasury Select Committee has made valid points about the tendency to too much arbitrariness on the part of the Bank of England, and the structure. I can see no reason why appropriate panels should not be provided for.
Further—the noble Baroness also raised this point—where the PRA disagrees with the representations made to it by such panels, as under the FSA, I cannot see why it should not be required to have the courtesy to explain why that is the case.
My Lords, in a way these amendments ask for quite simple things. First, the PRA must have arrangements in place to consult consumers or their representatives and report annually on these arrangements. Secondly, the PRA should consider any representations from the FCA’s practitioner or consumer panels. Thirdly, practitioner representatives should similarly be hardwired into the PRA’s working practices. We welcome Amendment 130ZAA in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Northbrook. It is key to have practitioners involved, but for their expertise, not as representatives. On our side we are content that no new panels need to be created either for practitioners or for consumers, provided that the PRA is committed to enter into dialogue with the FCA panels and respond to other relevant submissions.
However, the need for the amendments in our name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, are more important perhaps, given the paper released on Monday. I do not know whether that is the same one referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, but I think not. This one is entitled The PRA’s Approach to Consultation. This is a slightly different concern from the one she has, but to have a whole paper on consultation in which the word “consumers” is not mentioned seems a particularly alarming reflection of its approach.
The probing amendment in our name—Amendment 130ZZB, which proposes an annual report of the arrangements, rather than the content, of consultation activities—now becomes rather more of a real than a probing amendment. We have grave doubts as to how a paper on the PRA’s consultation could omit any reference to consumers, concentrating only on regulated firms. That is not even-handed or very sensible.
In response to the query from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I will just say why consumers do have an interest in the role of the PRA. This is not of course simply about the prudential issues but about some of those raised by my noble friend Lady Drake earlier. Consumers have many interests in issues that are the responsibility of the PRA, particularly, as the noble Baroness mentioned, with-profits policies but also leveraged ratios and even bank charging policy, about which we have heard things from the putative head of the PRA. It would be strange for the PRA not to hear input from consumer representatives on these matters and simply for it to respond to the panel when it takes a different view. Unless the Bill is amended as suggested, consumers will be excluded from the PRA’s decisions on prudential matters. The PRA will lead on regulation of with-profits policies, but there is no requirement on it to consider representations from anyone representing the consumer interest on that. There are a number of issues relating to with-profits policies, orphan estates and others, which they do have an interest in.
My noble friend Lady Drake talked earlier about £330 billion, I think, being under management in with-profits funds. That is 25 million policyholders, and it is essential that the interests of these policyholders are properly considered, which can only be achieved by working with consumer groups and not simply seeking the views from the FCA. It is the same issue with mortgages, where prudential requirements can have huge implications for consumers. Decisions about the stability of the market potentially restrict the availability of mortgages to a large number of people who, up until that moment, had been servicing their mortgages without any problem. It is vital that the application of any prudential controls treats all customers fairly. The existing consumer panel has been involved in the regulation of insurance and prudential issues in relation to the mortgage market review, and I understand that its advice has been acknowledged as particularly valuable. All we are asking is that consumers get a hearing, which does not seem too much to ask, but also that the expertise of practitioners similarly gets an appropriate hearing.
I support the amendments proposed by my noble friend Lady Hayter and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. Both consumer panels and practitioner panels are extremely important and it is very difficult to see an argument against them, particularly because the PRA will be regulating insurance companies. I declare at this point that my own background includes being a non-executive director of a couple of smaller insurance companies in the 1990s. The accounts and concepts are difficult, but such firms are of enormous importance to the economy and to everything that matters to us. Pensions, whole-life policies and insurance in general are important to us all, and it seems quite irrational not to have a consumer panel and, indeed, a practitioner panel, which should include people who really know about insurance policies. It could be the next disaster waiting to happen in financial services, simply because people do not know very much about insurance companies. Their accounts and the way they are managed are quite difficult to understand. For that reason, I support both amendments.
No, my Lords, of course it is not because it is the Bank of England and it says that it has to have discretion. This is government legislation and the Government are presenting a Bill that we believe is appropriate to the new financial architecture. Of course we consult the Bank of England, the FSA and all sorts of other people. We have also had the input of the Joint Committee. My noble friend is quite right to challenge me on this but I am quite clear on it. As I have tried to explain, it is understandable but simplistic of people to read across that there are panels now that would like to continue to be engaged with both new regulators. I can understand where the panels come from and why, as I have explained, since consumers have a considerable interest in the decisions taken by both bodies, consumers superficially may say, “Actually, we would like to be engaged directly with both”.
If the noble Baroness will allow me a moment, the PRA is a very different animal. We risk, in some of this discussion, slipping into a frame of mind of thinking that the FCA and the PRA are somehow going to be two peas popping out of the same sort of pod. They will be very different regulatory and supervisory bodies with very different mandates and very different numbers of firms that they are regulating. It would be quite wrong to have a one-size-fits-all approach to consultation in these circumstances.
But consumers are not asking for this superficially. It is their money that is being looked after and overseen by bits of the PRA, and they make a very serious request. As I said, we are relaxed about it not being a specific panel, but the existing panels should have a right to be heard. It is simply not enough to depend on the FCA, whose chief executive comes from the industry—as does its new chair, with 27 years in banking and enormous experience. However, they do not represent the consumer interest.
Finally, my fear is that if there is no right to be heard, consumers, and maybe practitioners as well, will retreat to the other way of getting a hearing: to go to the press. One of the great things about the consumer panels is that you very rarely hear about them because they have a back-door entrance. They can go in and have early dialogue. Deny them that and I am afraid that we will revert to the other way, which is an open dialogue through the press.
I understand all that and I know very well that the consumer panel in which the noble Baroness played an important part has had and continues to have an extremely important role. It is not as if the PRA will not be consulting consumers and the public; it must consult publicly on draft rules, for example, and that would involve consulting not just practitioners. Generally, however, the FCA will be the expert on consumer issues and it is right that it should be the primary channel to focus the PRA’s approach.
I repeat that the PRA will be a supervisor with a much more firm-specific, prudential decision-making focus—as opposed to the FSA and the FCA, which will have a much broader rules-based approach. We are talking about very different animals. Indeed, it is worth recognising that, if we are talking on the practitioner side, the FSA tends not to consult the current practitioner panel on firm-specific prudential decisions any more than I would expect the PRA would or should. The dynamic is very different. Therefore, for the reasons that I have given and will continue to give in going through the rest of these amendments, and for the reasons that my noble friend Lord Flight put very clearly in relation to consumers, I believe that what we have put in the Bill is right.
I believe that we are at Amendment 129A. There is no more that I can usefully say on that amendment, so I will move on to Amendment 129B, which would require that the PRA’s consultation arrangements should include industry panels and, where appropriate, a panel representing insurance policyholders. I should start by being clear that where the PRA consults on issues with particular impact on insurers, the Government agree that it should ensure that it engages with insurers in order to understand their views. Such consultation might be done as part of its general consultation under new Section 2K or through consultation on specific rules. Regarding consultation with insurance policyholders, as I have said, where consumer interests are engaged, the PRA will be provided with advice and expertise by the FCA. The Government do not expect it to be necessary for the PRA to make specific arrangements for consulting policyholders any more than other consumers.
Amendment 130ZZZA would require the PRA, as part of its consultation arrangements under new Section 2K, to establish a panel for policy debate with senior representatives of firms and to consider the cumulative impact of regulation by the PRA and the FCA. Policy debates about regulation take place in many forums—for example, between regulatory authorities at the European level, in the FSB and at the IMF, and of course in your Lordships’ House. However, I do not think that it would be right for the PRA to be engaged in policy debate with those that it regulates. Regulated persons are free to make representations to the regulator. There are mechanisms for this is in the Bill. However, to enshrine in legislation the idea that firms should enter into a policy debate with the regulator is contrary to the concept of judgment-led regulation. The PRA will listen to firms but it will form a view based on its own regulatory objectives and priorities, not on the commercial objectives and priorities of firms.
On the second element of the amendment, I agree that the PRA should consider cumulative regulatory burden. It will do this as a matter of course when it considers proportionality under the general duty to co-ordinate. There are already numerous opportunities for industry to comment on the effectiveness of co-ordination. In particular, the PRA and the FCA are required to include in their annual reports an account of how they have complied with the general duty to co-ordinate. Industry and the general public will be able to make representations, for example, at the annual general meeting of the FCA, and as part of the PRA’s annual consultation on the effectiveness of its strategy.
Amendment 129ZD would amend new Section 2K to require that:
“When carrying out a consultation, the PRA”,
should,
“have regard to the desirability of ensuring a broad representation of practitioners and consumers”.
I have some sympathy with the sentiment. I agree that, in order for the PRA to regulate effectively, it will need to consult widely. For example, if it is considering putting in place a new framework for the purposes of supervising credit unions, I would expect it to form a comprehensive view of the sector by talking to credit unions, large and small, based in different parts of the United Kingdom. Where appropriate, I would also expect it to talk to academic experts and other interested parties. However, I do not think that this needs to be underpinned with a specific provision in legislation. The PRA will need to consult effectively if it is to deliver its statutory objectives, and it will be held to account by Parliament for doing so. New Section 2K already requires the PRA to consult the full range of PRA-authorised persons and not just those who are practitioners.
Amendment 130ZZA would provide that the arrangements for consulting PRA-authorised persons may include consultation with persons with specialist knowledge of PRA-regulated activities. Again, I agree entirely with the sentiment. As the Government have made clear, the PRA will consult expert individuals when developing policy. It need not rely solely on industry experts, but also those in academia and other experts. At present, new Section 2K makes express reference to consultation with industry because industry will be directly affected by regulation. It is appropriate to recognise that fact in the Bill, while making it clear that the PRA may decide how to engage with them. But consulting industry is different from consulting “persons with specialist knowledge”. The PRA may of course consult such individuals, whether as part of a public consultation or for a specific purpose, if it will help it to better deliver its objectives. It might also wish to consult all sorts of other categories of person—for example, international organisations such as the FSB and Basel committee. It seems unnecessary to include that level of prescription in the Bill.
Amendment 130ZAA would clarify that the PRA is not to be deemed to be accountable to those firms that it regulates. I am glad that my noble friend has raised this point, as it is an important one. The Government and the Bank of England have been absolutely clear that the PRA should not be seen as accountable to those it regulates. We agree. Firms are accountable to the regulator, and the regulator is accountable to Parliament. However, the lines of accountability are clear in the Bill, and it is not clear what such a declarative statement would add.
Finally, Amendment 130ZZB would require the PRA to report annually on its consultation activities. The Government fully agree with this intention, and indeed the PRA is already required to so do as part of its annual report by new Schedule 1ZB, in paragraph 18(1)(c) on page 186.
I come back to the fundamental point. We have considered carefully the separate consultation requirements for the two regulatory authorities. I understand all the concerns, some of which I hope I have been able satisfactorily to address. But others have consciously been left on the table, reflecting the very different nature of the beast, which the PRA will be as a focused regulator with its small community and one very clear objective. On the basis of that rather long canter through the group of amendments, I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
(12 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I do. I was looking at the Marshalled List and saw the name of the noble Lord, Lord Flight, to the next amendment. I beg the pardon of the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard.
When faced with issues of consumer care and consumer protection, the FSA, in its early days and for much of its time, tended to resort to stipulating the information that the consumer needed to be given. By the time that had gone through the corporate lawyers of the various banks and insurance companies, it amounted to five, six or sometimes 25 pages of close 10-point type, which was even more difficult for the average consumer to understand than it is for the average Member of the House of Lords to understand this Bill.
That is a very passive form of consumer protection and it is a very passive definition of customer care. The amendment attempts to put an obligation on the FCA to ensure that companies operating in this sector operate positive customer care, not simply passive provision of information which a large number of consumers cannot understand. To answer the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, one reason why I believe that it is appropriate for it to be in the competition area is that when the FCA looks at where competition is succeeding, one of the measures of the proper outcome of competition that it considers is the way in which companies compete, as regards customer care, for their consumers.
Competition is not an end in itself. Competition policy and the enforcement of competition should protect and enhance benefits to consumers. One of those benefits is that the truly competitive company looks after its customers in a positive way and competes with its competitors in that regard. The passive provision of information is not customer care. This clause goes a significant way towards ensuring that customer care is seen as an objective both of consumer protection and of competition policy.
My Lords, along with most other speakers, I support the amendment moved by my noble friend Lady Drake. As I have argued in Committee before, it is no good having a competitive market for banking and insurance—not that we have one—if consumers effectively cannot enter the market, if they cannot identify what they need and if they cannot get value for money. As we have heard, all sorts of people find it challenging to know what services are suitable for them. How else could HSBC have sold bonds designed to be held for five and more years to 2,500 with an average age of 83? It is a little like people trying to sell PPI to my noble friend Lord McFall, or Barclay, HSBC, Lloyds and RBS mis-selling interest rate swaps to 28,000 businesses.
My hope is that Amendment 117 will give the FCA an explicit mandate to put a stop to unfair overdraft charges, excessive fees and complicated price structures, all of which hinder competition, which is probably why I think the amendment belongs within this area. The FCA has to be able to tackle hidden charges if it is to promote effective competition, given that, as we have heard, individual consumers simply cannot do this for themselves. If we, as consumers, buy a theatre or an airline ticket, there is a pernicious little booking fee—at least we can see it. I have just had to pay £2 on a £10 ticket to go to the Noel Coward Theatre, which seems a bit high. At least we can see such a charge and we can choose whether to pay it or not to go to the theatre, but that is not the case with bank charges.
A recent Which? survey found that 60% of those polled said that they paid what they felt to be an unfair bank charge and half paid a charge which they thought was disproportionate to whatever benefit they received. It is not clear, from the current language in the Bill, that the FCA will have the necessary mandate to tackle hidden charges. I know—and my noble friend Lady Drake quoted it earlier—that the Financial Secretary in the other place said that the FCA had,
“the powers and the mandate to intervene on matters of price and value for money”.—[Official Report, Commons Financial Services Bill Committee, 1/3/12; col. 261.]
The Financial Secretary argued that the FCA does not need these bespoke powers, given that it can take action under the competition and consumer protection objective. However, a Queen’s Counsel advised Which? that the current wording of the objective could allow the industry to challenge the FCA’s mandate to tackle hidden charges, which could lead to a repeat of those failed and expensive test cases to which my noble friend referred. Any such uncertainty would make the FCA very risk-averse; it would be reluctant to take action for fear of being challenged. Unless the FCA has a really clear, unambiguous mandate to tackle hidden charges, I can share its reluctance to be at risk of legal challenge from the industry. Therefore the Bill must give this power to the FCA; it is absolutely key to promoting competition. At present there is insufficient responsibility on firms to ensure that products are appropriate for the consumer in terms of meeting their needs, accessibility and reasonable value for money, as Consumer Focus argued to the Joint Committee. The Council of Mortgage Lenders said that the regulator,
“should have an appropriate degree of protection for consumers and should reflect a differential approach not only between market and retail consumers, but within the retail market itself”.
The amendment is simple; and can only promote confidence in the industry. Who, after all, could argue with appropriate services and value for money? Not even, I think, the Minister. We need to get back to trusting the banks and the pension providers, as the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, said. Therefore we trust that the Minister will accept Amendment 117. In the words of my noble friend Lord Barnett, it can do no harm; it can do good.
My Lords, this has been an interesting and wide-ranging debate to kick off today’s Committee session. I will deal first with the amendment on its own terms and then pick up some of the wider important points, although perhaps they may not be directly relevant to the key reason why I cannot accept it.
As we have heard, this amendment seeks to add a new have-regard to the FCA’s competition objective. I know that it has been promoted by the consumer group Which?. As we have heard, it drives at the same issues as a number of amendments discussed in another place—namely, that the FCA should have, in the words of Which?—which were quoted by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town—an explicit mandate to,
“put a stop to unfair overdraft charges, excessive fees and complicated pricing structures where they hinder competition”.
I agree, of course, with what lies behind this amendment. Consumers should have access to the right financial services and products; they should be able to buy in the confidence that they know what they are getting and what they are paying for. That must be clear and transparent; there ought to be no place in financial services for a culture where consumers are kept in the dark.
However, let me put on the record what the Government have said a number of times before—both in publications and during discussions in another place—which is that if the FCA finds problems in pricing, charging or in the ability of the consumer to obtain value for money that cause it concern, it will have the mandate and the powers to act. It has the mandate both under the effective competition and the consumer protection objectives, a point that has been made by a number of my noble friends and other noble Lords in this debate. It can apply its extensive regulatory toolkit in pursuit of price intervention, should it think it appropriate to do so. The FCA does not need new powers nor do its objectives need expanding. We simply do not agree with Which?’s legal analysis. Fundamentally, it is a narrow legal point.
Having said that, a range of important issues have been raised which I will spend a minute or two addressing. The noble Baroness, Lady Drake, in introducing this amendment, talked among other things about the OFT bank charges case. It is important that the Committee understands that the powers available to the FCA are far broader than those available to the OFT at the time of the bank charges case. The OFT was in fact relying on the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations. I suggest it is incorrect to draw a line somehow between what the OFT was or was not able to do and what the FCA will be able to do, because the FCA has much wider powers.
In terms of what the FSA can do now and what the FCA might do in future, first, as we discussed in Committee on previous occasions, the FCA will have additional product intervention powers. The noble Baroness I think gave an example of a low headline price to attract new customers that is then offset by high ancillary charges. That is a very good example—and one that I might have given if challenged—of precisely the sort of situation where the FCA might well intervene and where the FSA has already begun to take a similar approach, as set out for example in its consultation paper on the mortgage market review. I do not think there should be anything between us there.
Looking more widely, I think the noble Baroness said at one point that the FCA “must” be required to have regard to ease of access to value for money. However, the amendment does not achieve this—it simply adds to the list of matters to which the FCA may have regard. Linked to that, I can assure my noble friend Lord Trenchard that the have-regards listed in this new Section 1E are of course not exhaustive. The FCA is not precluded from taking other matters into account in assessing the effectiveness of competition. That takes me to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, where we would get into difficulties. The easiest thing would be to say, “I agree with the sentiment behind this, let’s put it in”. One of the arguments in favour of putting it in is that the FCA would be vulnerable to legal challenge if it is left out. However, as I have clearly stated, our legal analysis is simply different—I have not seen what lies behind Which?’s legal analysis but we disagree on that. If we were to go down the line of putting in a longer list of have-regards, we get more and more into the difficulty of suggesting somehow that the list is exhaustive and that the FCA cannot do things that are left off the list. Potentially, the more we add to the list, we risk getting into legal difficulties that we are not in at the moment, because the FCA will have all the legal powers it needs. The noble Lord, Lord Barnett, put it as a reasonable challenge, as he always does to me, but I think there is a danger in going down the route of this amendment.
(12 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am impressed that I will be standing opposite an immaculate Whip, which I am sure will make for a good day’s work on the Bill.
The amendments in the first group—
My Lords, I hesitate to interrupt the noble Baroness who is carefully moving her amendment, but I remind noble Lords that a substantial number of Peers wish to take part in the Committee stage of the Bill. Will noble Lords please leave the Chamber a little more quietly so that we can hear the noble Baroness?
I thank the noble Baroness for that assistance.
The amendments would raise the standards of professionalism in the financial industry; partly by adding professional standards to the definition of integrity, partly by introducing a code of conduct and partly by mandating a training and competence regime. That is only what other professions expect: training, a code, a qualification, CPD and proof of competence.
Part of the reason that we trust lawyers and doctors, architects and surveyors, is that they meet these requirements with proof of competence. That is why we trust them with our wills, our conveyancing, our divorces and our lives. A code of conduct enables us to know what is expected of them in terms of behaviour, ethics and integrity, as well as in particular skills and standards.
Let me quote from just one such code—that for solicitors. It reads:
“You must: …act with integrity ….act in the best interests of each client … provide a proper standard of service to your clients”—
—although, having checked lots of codes of conduct, I find that surveyors have to,
“always provide a high standard of service”,
so perhaps we could have some trading up there.
So you have to act in the best interests of clients, provide a good standard of service to your clients and not behave in a way that is likely to diminish the trust that the public places in you or the profession. If only bankers and the rest of the industry had signed up to that and it had been enforced by their professional body or regulator. Sadly, we have learnt the hard way that the culture and behavioural traits of those working in the financial services sector have not been sufficient with regard to professionalism, integrity and competence.
Is that it?
I will start with a small correction. The Minister said that these amendments arose from LIBOR. If he had picked up my hints when I anticipated him—code for “That’s what his friend said in another place when it was going through Committee in March”—he would know that two of these amendments predated LIBOR.
Just to be clear, I said that these relate to concerns that have arisen in connection with the recent LIBOR scandal. Of course, they arise in relation to the conduct of the industry more generally. I fully recognise that and I did not in any way exclude that from my remarks.
Not purposefully; I did not mean it like that. But these amendments are built on many other things. I thank those who have contributed to this debate—the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, as well as my noble friends Lord Peston, Lord Davies and Lord Barnett. On a small issue, if there are new requirements on the Treasury website today, perhaps they could be shared with Members of the Committee.
I think the Minister gave us the ammunition that we are asking for. In talking about his role as chair of a training organisation or an accreditation organisation, he said that he wished more banks did structured training. That is the point we are trying to make. Because they do not all do it, we want it mandated. He also said that there will be a higher entry bar for new approved persons. But this is not just about people coming into this industry; something needs doing now. That is also what these amendments are about.
Most worrying, however, is that there was no reference to a code of conduct. That is why I was slow to get to my feet; I was awaiting another page. Obviously, the Government do not feel that is needed in this industry for financial professionals on whom we rely as clients and consumers. It is highly regrettable that the one thing the Minister did not bother to answer on was the need for a code of conduct. I do not know what it is about that that he cannot accept. I do not know why he cannot accept the demand for proof of competence. As was made clear, there need not be one proof of competence for everyone in this field; there can be a range of them. We are not asking for a single mandate; we are asking for the FCA to come up with a regime that would have competence requirements.
Finally, my question, like that of my noble friend Lord Barnett, is this: what will improve without such amendments? If this is just the FSA becoming the FCA, will we see anything different? I believe we need some signals about a code of conduct and raising standards. This may be something we need to return to later but for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 104BA stands in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Eatwell. Much will change in the OFT, partly as a result of the Public Bodies Act, the forthcoming Enterprise Regulation and Reform Bill, and this Bill, with responsibility for consumer credit moving from the OFT to the FCA.
This amendment is not so much about that but about the all-important competition role of the OFT, until that, in due course, moves to the CMA. That includes competition references and market studies, as well as super-complaints and promoting competition. Meanwhile, as we know, and welcome, the FCA has also taken on a new remit to promote competition in financial services.
On 14 June in another place, Mark Hoban for the Government welcomed the fact that the Office of Fair Trading and the Financial Conduct Authority will take forward the ICB recommendations to improve transparency across all retail banking products. If the OFT retains the right to conduct market studies in relation to financial service markets, the ABI is concerned about the risk of duplication and/or the lack of co-ordination between the FCA and the OFT. Therefore, the ABI feels that the OFT should be subject to a statutory duty to cooperate and to produce an MoU. It would certainly be the preference of the ABI for the FCA normally to take the lead on competition matters, and for the OFT to undertake market studies only in exceptional circumstances.
Meanwhile, the consumer world, not dissimilarly, would like the relationship between the FCA and the OFT changed from that set out in the Bill. The consumer world would like the FCA to have the same powers as a number of other sectoral regulators to make competition referrals themselves—that is, the equivalent of Section 131 powers. I am attracted to that but have not tabled an amendment specifically on that at this stage, in the hope that this amendment will give the Minister the chance to explain why he has not replicated such an enabling power within the present Bill. Without such a power, the FCA will still have to refer cases to the OFT for market analysis before a referral to the Competition Commission can take place. It sounds—and I guess it will be—a bit slow. It also adds additional, possibly unnecessary, hurdles. The Joint Committee agreed. It said:
“The Government should review its decision on the FCA’s competition powers. The FCA should be given concurrent powers alongside the OFT to make market investigation references to the CC. The FCA will need greater competition powers to achieve its recommended objective than is currently set out in the draft Bill.”
We know from the debate in the other place that the Government, however, prefer the FCA to continue to have to make a referral to the OFT, which would allow the FCA to draw on the expertise of the OFT. However, the Government have agreed that they will review whether the FCA should have specific competition powers in five years’ time.
It is hard to see why a new authority, set up with a specific and new remit to promote competition, should not have the requisite powers. But perhaps we will hear the rationale when the Minister replies. Meanwhile, the OFT is itself keen to establish greater clarity for interested parties on how the OFT—and subsequently the CMA—and the FCA will work together, and the OFT is very happy for this issue to be raised today. The OFT judges it important for effective debate on the Bill that there is an understanding of how the OFT and FCA will work together.
There is, of course, also the matter—a smaller matter, perhaps—of the handover of consumer credit responsibility from the OFT to the FCA, and various transitional issues. The handling of these should no doubt also be included in any MoU.
The current OFT acknowledges that a key issue will be the publishing of a memorandum of understanding setting out the respective roles of the OFT and the FCA, their responsibilities and how they will work together. Indeed, I understand that the OFT has already begun working with the FSA on a draft MoU and is keen to establish greater clarity for those two parties and for those of us looking from the outside.
I am aware, although my eyesight is not that good, that the Minister has a file entitled, “say no to everything”. I hope in this case that he might drop that and just agree that an MoU may be without that remit. I beg to move.
My Lords, my Amendment 173D covers essentially the same point, but is in that part of the Bill that deals with the practical operation of the competition objective for the FCA. There is clearly a risk of duplication or lack of co-ordination between the OFT and the FCA, so Amendment 173D proposes a legally binding MoU setting out how the two bodies will co-operate together and who will do what. It should be made clear that the FCA would normally take the lead on competition matters in financial services and the OFT would undertake market studies in exceptional circumstances. The competition objective for the FSA is very well worded, very clear and extremely appropriate. Consumers need a healthily competitive market. I am still of the view that the PRA should have a competition objective. It is the lack of competition that led to a cartel in banking. Whenever you get a cartel you get bad habits, so, in my book, a major aspect of having a much healthier banking system is having more competition.
I am pretty sure that the noble Lord is correct in his analysis, but if there is any change to that, I will write to him.
My Lords, the fact that the Minister does not know the answer to that seems to me to make the case for why we need an MoU. In fact, in his answer he went through the sorts of things that the OFT and the FCA would need to look at—their objectives, their resources and their method of working. We are not setting out what those should be. We are simply saying that there should be an MoU that sets out those sorts of things, things such as when one will take the lead and when the other will.
I accept, sadly, that the specifics in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Flight, which we were attracted to, are probably more than we could hope for from the Government. However, as the Minister has admitted that there need to be MoUs for all the other key players—the Treasury, the Bank of England, the FOS, the compensation schemes and so on—it would be extraordinary not to have one for what he now accepts is the prime competition authority: the OFT currently, but the CMA eventually. I hope that the Government will think about this again. The lack of an MoU for the prime competition authority would seem to create a slightly opaque situation for the other market players that want to know who leads on certain items. In the hope that the Minister will think about that, although he did not promise to, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I very much support the amendment, as I said when speaking to my noble friend’s amendment a few minutes ago. There is a real danger of failing to distinguish between risk and fraud. They get intermingled in the public’s mind. Clearly, fraud is absolutely unacceptable and needs to be chased down and prosecuted with all possible vigour. Too often, in this compensation-culture era, a risk that goes wrong is seen as fraud: “I should not have lost money”. One difficulty with the interesting concept, proposed by the noble Lord, of duty of care is that although you can explain very clearly to people the risks that they are taking, when it does not happen as you and they hope—things are volatile—they are inclined to forget that they were given the appropriate warnings. Our emphasis must be on making sure that risk is understood; and that fraud is unacceptable; but that the two are completely distinct. There is a confluence in the public mind, sometimes encouraged by the way that the newspapers report it, of two issues. There are plenty of cases where fraud has happened—that is wrong—but there are also cases where people have taken risks which they anticipated would deliver them huge returns. When they did not, because they were highly risky, they did not see themselves in any way responsible; they sought someone else to blame.
My Lords, I was particularly grateful to hear the words of the noble Lord, Lord May of Oxford. We will shortly come to a specific amendment about a duty of care. I hope that he will be here to repeat his words in 20 minutes or whenever we reach the amendment. I also hope that the Minister can pick up a briefing note that says “support”. His face tells me possibly not.
At Second Reading, I talked about caveat emptor, not having realised that it is no longer the accepted term. I have concerns about it because it is rarely used as an excuse for ordinary consumers to say, “Oh, I lost money”; it is far more used by producers to say, “Well, we told you so”, even if it was, as the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said on an earlier amendment, on page 4 of small typed script of something that had been sent to them. I remain of the view that responsibility for ensuring that consumers know what they are buying rests with the provider by producing intelligible and appropriate information. We will turn to the issue of duty of care shortly.
The Joint Committee on the Bill wrote that, should it be essential for the FCA to have regard to the behaviour of consumers, the FCA duty should be amended as set out in Amendment 105, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Eatwell. As the Joint Committee stated,
“provision of information alone will not significantly improve consumers’ ability to make well-informed decisions. The information needs to be easily understandable and accessible”.
There is widespread suspicion that many purveyors of financial products deliberately try to keep certain customers in the dark. That confusion can mean that some, blinded by graphs and numbers, sign up to a product and later down the track find themselves caught by certain clauses and conditions of which they had, sadly, been unaware.
An issue just as difficult, of course, is the ability to compare prices and thus to shop around—an essential element of the much-vaunted caveat emptor, or competition, on which the Government rely to improve services. Martin Wheatley, the chief executive-designate of the FCA, has described the difficulty for consumers in comparing products such as bank accounts, which are structured in a way that makes it really difficult to establish whether the product is good value. We all know of practitioners who talk in terms so remote from the common-sense understanding of contractual agreements that people are unaware of what they are signing up to. This was undoubtedly the case with the recent interest rate swaps.
Asked whether firms had a duty to go beyond their legal responsibility to consumers, Mark Hoban MP said in another place:
“It is in the interests of firms to ensure that consumers do understand the products that they are buying because it then minimises the risk of problems further down the track”.
Although I agree with those sentiments, that answer seems to be about not having to pay redress later, rather than trying to prevent the mischief in the first place. Unless we do something to reduce such occurrences—today we have already mentioned PPI, personal pensions and mortgage endowments—we will have learnt nothing from what has gone wrong.
However, as the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Peston makes clear, it is not simply language—the “crystal mark” of plain English—that is important. This is about explaining the risk to which the consumer is signing up, or for which they are paying money so that someone else takes that risk in exchange for the payment. So they might buy a product that covers the risk of inflation but does not cover longevity, or vice versa. Or a product might cover their life expectancy but not that of their surviving spouse. The permutations are endless. What is key is that, in addition to the language being clear, the limits of the product should be clear so that—in the famous words—there are “no surprises”. If I buy a bottle of Coke I will know its size, volume, sell-by date and taste. Regulation has sorted out much of that. We need to give this regulator the ability to expect no less from the providers of services which they are selling to largely unsuspecting customers.
In the other place, the Minister said:
“The Government recognise that there can be significant information and capability asymmetries between firms and consumers”,
and that poor “provision of information” could be a key factor in,
“a consumer ending up with an unsuitable product”.
He therefore fully supported,
“the intention behind the amendments”—[Official Report, Commons, Financial Services Bill Committee, 1/3/12; col. 261]—
in the other place, and therefore the intention behind the amendment that is in my name in this group. I hope that the Minister will now go further than his colleague in the other place, who accepted only the intention behind the amendments, and that he will accept the amendments as they stand. If it would make him feel better, perhaps he could agree to the intention now and bring back a suitably worded amendment on Report.
My Lords, this group of amendments is concerned with the information provided to consumers, so that they are able to make empowered choices and decisions. Amendment 104C seeks to add a new ‘have regard’ subsection to the list of matters that the FCA must consider in advancing its consumer protection objective—namely,
“the need to inform and educate consumers with special emphasis on the unavoidability of some risk”.
I agree with the noble Lord that consumers need to understand that there will necessarily always be an element of risk involved in engaging in a financial transaction, and that they must consider carefully their own risk appetite and the ability of their personal finances to absorb any loss, and enter in to any contract with full information. We cannot pursue a zero-failure regime in financial services, and consumers must understand this. The regulator cannot shoulder the responsibilities that consumers should take for their own decisions and actions, but it can take steps—as my noble friend Lord Hodgson said—to ensure that consumers have the best possible information when they make those choices.
Both financial education—which we spoke of earlier—and effective conduct of business regulation have a role to play in educating consumers about risk. The Money Advice Service will have a key role in improving financial literacy so that consumers understand the difference between available financial products and their uses, what information they should seek out before entering into a contract or transaction, and what rights they have when things do not go to plan. We covered the role of the MAS when we discussed Amendment 104.
My Lords, I think that I have given the right answer but I am happy to write to the noble Lord, Lord Peston, if I can express it in a way that he might find more acceptable.
On Amendments 105A and 106, it is important to note that if we are to create the conditions in which consumers can make better choices for themselves, we need to address some of the asymmetries of information between consumers and providers that still prevail in financial services. I think that that is a point that noble Lords are making. That is why the Government added new subsection (2)(c) to new Section 1C, which will be inserted by Clause 5, before the Bill’s introduction to the parliamentary process. This provision requires the regulator to consider,
“the needs that consumers may have for the timely provision of information and advice that is accurate and fit for purpose”.
This provision complements the FCA’s new power to require firms to withdraw a financial promotion and disclose the fact that it has done so, as well as a new power to disclose at an early stage to the public that disciplinary enforcement action has commenced against a firm or individual. The FSA will carry out a root-and-branch review of transparency and disclosure on the part of firms and the regulator to be completed ahead of commencement of the Bill.
I agree with many of the points made by the Committee in terms of the improvements that we want to see, but I do not agree that Amendments 105A and 106 are necessary. I argue, for example, that referring to information being “fit for purpose” is, in modern idiom, a better way of achieving the aims that we all share. “Fit for purpose” is an umbrella term that includes, for example, information being legible, intelligible and appropriately presented. Information could not be fit for purpose if it was not also those things.
“Fit for purpose” is also broader and allows the regulator to differentiate between the needs of different consumers, to adapt its approach and perhaps to place additional requirements on firms where it considers this necessary. There may be requirements that we cannot anticipate at this point. Using a broad term such as this therefore gives flexibility and allows the regulator to be responsive to changing circumstances and market conditions. Being too exhaustive in the Bill could be unhelpful. However, it is also not appropriate, as the detailed requirements will be set out by the FCA in its rulebook.
I therefore argue that Amendment 105A is unnecessary, as fit for purpose already captures information being intelligible and appropriately presented. Amendment 106 could restrict the FCA’s ability to design a regime on the provision of information to consumers, as “intelligible” is a narrower term than “fit for purpose”.
Before the noble Lord moves off that particular amendment, perhaps I may point out that the provision also uses the word “advice”. He has covered only the information that has to be clear, but not the point about access to advice.
My Lords, I apologise if my argument covered only one aspect, but it should be taken to cover both.
The noble Lord, Lord May of Oxford, to whom I am grateful for his intervention, asked about a duty of care. Subsection (2)(e) of new Section 1C, which is headed “The consumer protection objective”, states that providers should,
“provide consumers with a level of care that is appropriate … to the … risk … [of] the investment … and the capabilities of the consumers”.
I hope that that is helpful.
I hope that I have made it clear that the Government are fully committed to improving the provision of information to consumers, and that I have succeeded in convincing the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, the amendment concerns a subject raised by the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, at Second Reading. With his consent, I raise the matter now in his absence.
The issue of consent to the use of information on the internet is greatly confused at the moment. We have the principle of caveat emptor, as far as possible; we have a set of data protection regulations which are of variable application; and we have a daft system doing the rounds at the moment under which every website pops up with the message, “Can we use cookies?”, to which you answer, “Yes”, because the website will not function without that. That is a complete waste of time which has been foisted on us by Europe.
The question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, is interesting and I shall be interested to see where the Government find themselves. When you have a regulated institution with financial data on people, under what circumstances is it allowed to share those data with other bits of the same company which are not regulated? This may apply to Tesco with all the data which it has on Clubcard. Is the retail side of Tesco allowed to look at what people are doing in their bank accounts and to understand what they should be marketing to them? Vice versa, is the banking side of Tesco allowed to look at all the Clubcard data and say, “Hang on, this guy looks as though he is going bust because he is starting to buy cheap orange juice, so we really ought not to be offering him the degree of credit that we are”. If we are to allow such sharing, what degree of information should be offered to consumers about what is happening? There is a standard practice on the internet—I rather suspect that we have all done it—where we are presented with a little form saying, “Have you read the agreement? Tick ‘yes’”, and the agreement is 154 pages long. As it is not really clear where the changes are from the previous one you signed, you tick “Yes” because you want to use the thing. You sort of trust the people you are dealing with.
Are we in the territory where the consent to share information will be hidden away in that kind of automatically signed agreement on the web, or are we in the territory where things would have to be made clear in the preamble to the consent form that this sort of sharing was being permitted and that no disadvantage would be incurred by the customer if they refused to share? I find this a puzzling area and I shall be very interested to know what the Government intend that the FCA should do. I beg to move.
My Lords, the British banking market is changing, thanks, partly, to the ongoing regulatory reforms, as new competitors enter the market. Clearly, that new competition is very much to be welcomed. Consumers need greater choice both for themselves and to drive up standards. However, we should be aware, as the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has spelt out, that potentially some of the new entrants to the financial sector happen to possess a large amount of data on their customers from the non-banking activities. Therefore, it will be important for safeguards to be put in place to prevent any abuse of that information.
Clearly, supermarket banks own some of the largest consumer databases in the world, with item-level purchase data on each of the millions of members of their loyalty card schemes. Should that information be used by the banking arms of those conglomerates, it would clearly raise concerns for consumers about their personal privacy and about the potential for misuse. The concerns are fairly obvious. What about invasion of privacy? A consumer’s lender will know everything about what they had purchased and when. For example, imagine that a bank learnt from the supermarket side when a consumer started to buy cheaper food, they would know exactly when payday loans might be welcome. Similarly there is a possibility of the use of that ordinary supermarket data as a credit rating mechanism.
My Lords, I am pleased to speak in support of Amendment 107, which was spoken to so well by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, and I also have sympathy with the other amendments in this group tabled by my noble friend Lord Sharkey.
My personal interest in the success of the coming revolution in pension policy through auto-enrolment makes me especially keen to support this group of amendments. We have to rebuild trust in the financial services sector, where culture is currently suspect, to encourage greater pension savings. An explicit “consumer’s best interest” principle in the Bill would be a powerful tool for the FCA to ensure consumer interests are protected. Fiduciary duty requires those entrusted with other people’s money to put those customers first and provide appropriate stewardship, not to exploit their position to make an unfair profit or to get involved in undue risk where it is inappropriate. If duties were properly observed and enforced, it would provide a sea change in the prevailing culture of the financial services industry and lead to a much better outcome for consumers.
The problem is to get the balance right between consumers and firms. Concern was expressed in pre-legislative scrutiny that the draft Bill was unbalanced, enshrining the principle that consumers are responsible for their decisions but not placing an equivalent responsibility on firms. The new principle, inserted by the Government, to which the FCA must have regard, is that,
“those providing regulated financial services should be expected to provide consumers with a level of care that is appropriate having regard to the … risk involved”,
and the consumers’ capabilities.
The question is whether we are prepared to leave this so vague and open to interpretation that it would provide very weak guidance. With respect, it leaves open the question that it was intended to resolve. For those managing long-term savings, the problem is precisely that there is confusion and misinformation about the appropriate level of care. Explicit confirmation that those managing other people’s money must act in their best interests would be a clear and effective way to get the balance right in the equivalent responsibility for consumers and firms.
When the Bill was considered in the other place, the Minister argued on this clause, as amendments were submitted for an explicit reference to fiduciary duty in the Bill, that:
“Customers should not have to dust down the old statute books and dig out their dictionaries … to identify what standards they can expect from providers”.
He said that it was better for the FCA to set out clear and specific standards via its rules. He also said that he was not convinced that fiduciary duty,
“is the right standard to impose across the board between providers and consumers”.—[Official Report, Commons, 1/3/12; cols. 271-72.]
Our Amendment 107 tries to address these objections. First, it does not rely on the term, “fiduciary duty”; it simply enshrines the common-sense principle that underpins these duties. Where consumers rely on a firm’s discretion, that discretion must be exercised in those consumers’ best interests. Secondly, it would not supersede or restrict the specific standards to be laid down in FCA rules, but rather provide an overreaching principle that the FCA should bear in mind when setting those rules. Thirdly, it would not apply across the board but only where appropriate, particularly where consumers have a relationship with providers that justifies a best-interests standard. I hope that the Minister will closely consider this matter and strengthen Clause 5 by accepting these amendments.
My Lords, this is perhaps the most important debate today—perhaps the most important of the whole clause—because these amendments are about requiring savings to be managed in the interest of savers, not financial intermediaries. As we have already heard, the Joint Committee recommended that the Bill,
“place a clear responsibility on firms to act honestly, fairly and professionally in the best interests of their customers”.
That should not be too much to ask. As my noble friend Lady Drake said, the Law Commission confirmed that where firms are managing other people’s money, or giving financial advice, they have fiduciary duties to act in those people’s interests, both individuals and institutions such as pensions that represent, after all, large numbers of individual savers. That fact is, sadly, not generally reflected within the industry. Because these are common-law duties, as we have heard, they do not form part of the FSA’s regulatory approach, hence they need to be repeated in the Bill, partly to comfort consumers that the Bill does not trump these common-law protections, partly to give the FSA a powerful tool to ensure that consumers’ interests are protected and partly to ensure that this duty of care is absolutely entwined in the industry’s DNA, where it has, until now, been lacking.
I am not quite clear, despite all the noble Lord has said, how conflicts of interest will be dealt with. This is not about timely advice or all those other things he mentions, but it is absolutely central to the issue of duty of care.
To be absolutely clear, the regulators—and the FCA in particular—will have very clear powers to make any further rules on top of those that already exist in the FCA’s rulebook in order to deal with conflicts of interest. I can be completely clear and unequivocal on that point. The powers are there and further rules can be made in this area if the FCA at any point regards them as necessary.
Amendment 106B stands in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Eatwell. Oddly, there is no mention of the Financial Reporting Council in the Bill, despite its central role in the regulation of financial services. Equally absent is the FRC’s stewardship code, although it is clearly relevant to the objectives of both the PRA and the FCA. In the case of the stewardship code or the UK corporate governance code—also strangely lacking; perhaps it is my fault that it is not mentioned in the amendment—the Bill’s drafters may say that that absence is due to the fact that the precise name of the codes may change over time. I think that it was the Cadbury code, then the combined code, then something else, and now it is the governance code. I understand that the drafters may say that they do not want the precise wording of the stewardship code or the corporate governance code included, but I am sure that it is not beyond the wit of drafters to include something such as, “such codes agreed by the FRC as are currently in force”.
The issue of codes and their enforcement is central to the behaviour, standards and culture that we expect of the industry. The Minister has already rejected a code of conduct, but these are separate to that. Since 2010, there has been reasonable progress with the introduction of the stewardship code. About 230 asset managers, asset owners and service providers signed up in the first 18 months of its existence. The stewardship code is addressed to firms which manage assets on behalf of institutional shareholders, although perhaps it was not top of the thoughts of those fixing the LIBOR rate: people who were dicing with money which belonged to others.
Amendment 106B would ensure that the Bill gives regulators a proper, clear mandate to strengthen the stewardship code if needed and, importantly, sufficient teeth to ensure that it is adhered to so that culture changes can happen. In another place, Mark Hoban noted that the FSA supports the FRC’s stewardship code through mandatory requirements on asset managers either to comply with the stewardship code or explain their alternative investment strategy. He said that such powers would transfer to the FCA, but that power is not laid down in the Bill. Surely we need to ensure, via the stewardship code and its monitoring by the FCA, that asset managers must demonstrate their commitment to the code. It needs the force of law to make it happen, because that has clearly not been the case so far.
I turn to the other two amendments in the group, which deal with co-ordination between the FCA and the Financial Reporting Council. Amendment 121B is intended to ensure such co-ordination and Amendment 121C would require a memorandum of understanding. I hope that we do not go back to the briefing from the Box that says, “Say no to memorandums of understanding”. It makes no sense for the Bill to ignore the Financial Reporting Council. It is the UK’s independent regulator to promote high-quality corporate governance. Again, in the other place, Mark Hoban emphasised that the matters of stewardship and corporate behaviour are predominantly the responsibility of the FRC via its codes and the Bill should be about corporate behaviour. Thus, we require to see co-operation—indeed, an MoU— between those two parts of the new regulatory architecture. The two codes need the impetus of an FRC requirement to comply or explain if they are not just to be left on someone’s shelf.
My Lords, I am sorry to say that this is one of those groups of amendments where I do not think that the Committee’s time will be well served. I have repeatedly made public and private offers to the opposition Front Bench to talk to us in the Bill team at any time about any of their amendments. Not once in the process of this—now long—Committee stage, or before it, have the Opposition taken up the offer of talks to discuss amendments.
If the noble Baroness will let me, I will complete my sentence before letting her in. She herself began by saying that these amendments are defective, and that is indeed the case. As I shall explain, however, they also do not reflect one or two of the simple facts of the situation. Although there is, of course, a proper concern in this area, if the party opposite were prepared to discuss those facts, we might not be talking about some of these amendments in the way that we are.
My Lords, that offer has not come to me. I was at one meeting with the Bill group and asked whether I had access to the Bill team, but I have yet to be given its e-mail address. I had an e-mail from the team about one of our amendments earlier this week, and I have written to it on another issue. I have not had repeated offers. I have talked to the FRC about this amendment, and it knows all about it. I am therefore slightly surprised by the Minister’s comment.
My Lords, I believe that I made the offer in the last Committee session, on the Floor of the House. Hansard will record when I last made the offer in this Committee. I cannot speak to every member of the opposition Front-Bench team but I have made the offer repeatedly to the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. Indeed, I know that the Bill team has made quite clear to the opposition research team how it can be reached. I make the offer again because I think that there are many things around which we could clear the ground, and that would be helpful for everybody. I can quite understand that there may be issues here, but there are many interested parties who put forward all sorts of good ideas for amendments which, on scrutiny, might not be reflective of the situation as it exists.
Let me help the noble Baroness with a couple of the facts of the situation. First, the FCA has already brought in a rule with which she may be familiar but to which she did not allude: rule 2.2.3 of the current Conduct of Business Sourcebook. This requires UK-authorised asset managers to put statements of commitment to the stewardship code on their websites, or—if an asset manager does not commit to the code—to provide its alternative investment strategy there. I would of course expect the FCA to carry forward this important rule in its own rule book. So I would suggest to the Committee that the suggestions underpinning the discussion we have just had—the contentions around the lack of joined-upness—are not reflected in the way in which the FCA Conduct of Business Sourcebook already explicitly refers to the stewardship code.
I agree with the noble Baroness completely about the need for an MoU. However, what she does not do in her speech this evening is to recognise that the FSA already has an MoU with the FRC. I believe that it covers all the relevant matters. We have discussed the subject of MoUs before. The Bill provides explicitly only for MoUs between the key players in the regulatory system: the Bank of England, the FCA, the PRA and the Treasury. We have discussed why that should be. That does not mean that there will not be—and are not already—MoUs between the new regulators and other bodies; we have talked about the OFT, and there is already an existing MoU with the FRC.
So I understand where the noble Baroness is coming from in this group of amendments. I believe that the matters are already properly accommodated within the Bill. I wish that we could have had a discussion about this outside the Committee, but I am glad to have now got that on the record. I would ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, it would not be very satisfactory not to consider such an important issue in Committee. Concern about it is shared not just by the FRC but by the ICAEW, which last night again expressed its support and its belief that the issue is important. As the Minister will know, there are vital and urgent requirements to improve client asset audits. Those can be undertaken only by regulated professionals overseen by their recognised professional bodies, such as the ICAEW, and these are overseen by the FRC rather than the FSA. So this is key stuff. This is not—this will sound awful but I will say it—“a little discussion with the Baroness, who does not really understand it but can be well briefed outside this House”. I think that that was the tone of the Minister’s comments. I am speaking on behalf of organisations such as the ICAEW, which feels very much that it has a key role to play, which it wants to play, in the regulation of this industry. We know that we need improved rules and guidance about how auditors should work. We know that this is in the hands of professional bodies, not the FCA. If there is already an MoU with the FSA, it seems to me that there will be one with the FCA. So I do not think that writing it in legislation will cause a revolution, nice though that would be. There are important issues of discipline in the hands of ICAEW and other professional bodies overseen by the FRC. It would be inadequate for those to be free-floating and not in the Bill. For the moment, however, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(12 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support Amendment 101A in the name of my noble friend Lord Flight about the importance of maintaining the competitive position and that that needs to be uppermost in our minds. But I am also attracted by Amendment 139A which has drawn in the regulatory principles that are to be followed by both regulators. It seems to me that here we will be starting to set the culture. It is the culture of the regulator that will have such an important impact on the way our financial services develop and the way the people who work in them behave. As my noble friend Lady Noakes said, it is important not just to see this through the prism of City eyes but to realise that there are a wide range of financial services in Edinburgh and the provinces of this country which require the appropriate regulatory framework.
Competition, by its nature, introduces novelty—novelty being something that the regulators tend to fear. It carries risk, but of course what is old and familiar is much easier to deal with. In a way, that is liked. But, particularly when established firms tend to draw attention to the risks of novelty, the regulator tends to back down. I am not suggesting that we should not take risks. We need to be risk aware but we must not be risk averse. There is a danger that in the pendulum within the Financial Services Authority and, no doubt, driven by the criticism that it has faced, we have gone to the end of the risk-averse scale. There is a great deal we still need to do in this Bill to provide the right framework and culture. I shall look forward to returning to this in amendments to which we will come shortly. For the time being, I am delighted to support my noble friends’ two amendments.
My Lords, this side of the House has already acknowledged the role of competition in serving the consumer. Indeed, we could do with rather more of it in the retail banking sector. A rather more creative vision of competition could address some of our concerns in that regard. For example, Age UK has suggested shared branches which offer a perfectly competitive environment, ease of comparison, and switching from one customer to another within the same location. We are wholly in favour of a competitive environment for the benefit of consumers.
That being so, I obviously support most of the amendments in this group. However, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Flight, why the first amendment is needed, given that it seems to put competition as a brake on the FCA. I worry what the driver is behind this. I hope it is not to protect bankers’ bonuses, given there are still some in the City who seem to believe that high wages and bonuses are a vital aspect of what makes the UK competitive in this sector. I would instead call on the coalition programme, which says the Government will bring forward detailed proposals for robust action to tackle unacceptable bonuses in the financial services sector. Amen to that, although I am rather sad that—I think it is today—the Chancellor of the Exchequer is in Brussels voting against such an amendment.
Or is the amendment drafted because there is a feeling that regulation is too burdensome? I hope it is not for that reason, but the Prime Minister has form in this regard. In 2008, he said he thought that the problem of the past decade was too much regulation. The current Chancellor also said, in 2006, that financial regulation was,
“burdensome, complex and makes cross-border market penetration more difficult … and it threatens the global competitiveness of the City of London”.
I hope that the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer are now grown up enough to accept that it was too little rather than too much regulation from which we suffered.
I hope it is not—maybe we can get some assurance on this—the idea that international competitiveness should trump consumer protection. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, was much more concerned about the wholesale market. I think she will also understand the concern of consumers that this might trump the consumer protection aspects. Although we very much want this to be an internationally competitive industry, we do not want it at any price. We do not want a race to the bottom for moving wherever regulation is cheapest or less obvious.
In respect of Amendment 104A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I know that Martin Wheatley, the CEO designate of the FCA, is very unkeen to have this duty. He does not think that in its intervention it is the function of a regulator to have to have regard to that as well as to consumer protection, and is concerned that it would create a set of conflicts. He said that,
“to have a specific UK competitiveness competition point can only lead to compromises in regulation”.
Perhaps the Minister can indicate whether the Government have the same concerns. Perhaps the “no regard” comment of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, is a better way of describing this, rather than making it trump some of the other aspects. I imagine the Minister will say something similar, because I know the Government, in responding to the Treasury Select Committee on this issue, while recognising the importance of a competitive sector, do not feel that these words would add much to the Bill.
Amendment 129 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Flight, is rather easier. It requires the PRA to consider the desirability of promoting the UK’s competitive position within financial services. We have no argument with that. London First I know is particularly supportive of this, stressing also the stability of regulation in financial services, which means no more change after this.
Amendment 110 in the name of my noble friend Lord McFall refines the FCA’s objective so that the integrity of the UK’s financial system includes the confidence that it generates within the UK, as well as in foreign financial markets. This would encompass consumer confidence, which would clearly be vital in rebuilding trust in savings and investment, so we are happy to support this amendment.
Finally, Amendment 139A in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and my noble friends Lord McFall and Lady Cohen of Pimlico provides that the objectives of both the PRA and the FCA should include consideration of the capacity of the sector to contribute to the UK’s economic growth, also supported by the CBI. As the coalition programme said:
“We want the banking system to serve business, not the other way round. We will bring forward detailed proposals to … create a more competitive banking industry”.
I am pleased to say that this is one element of the coalition programme that, again, we are very happy to endorse. Given that, sadly, growth continues to flatline under this Government, if ever there was a time to ensure that these new and powerful institutions focused on job creation, this surely is it, and we happily support that.
My Lords, this group of amendments seeks to ensure that the FCA and the PRA consider the impact that their actions could have on the competitiveness of the UK financial services sector or on the growth of the wider economy. We clearly all recognise the importance of a thriving financial services sector to the wider UK economy. Equally, we all agree that the financial services sector needs an appropriate level of regulation, and I recognise that this is a difficult balance to achieve. I hope we would all agree that in the run-up to the financial crisis this balance was wrong.
In resolving the balance, I listened very carefully to the concerns raised at Second Reading and I have also carefully considered the representations from the industry, including from the London Stock Exchange. I am going to explain why I feel that these amendments go too far, but I want to make it clear to the Committee that we are looking at alternative options to address noble Lords’ concerns that excessive regulatory action may unduly impact on the ability of the financial services sector to contribute towards the prosperity of the wider economy, and we will conclude on this ahead of Report. I see one puzzled face. I always try to be helpful to the Committee, and we brought forward some major concessions on each of the first two days. This is a very difficult area. I cannot accommodate all the concerns but I say up front that we want to see what we can do on this ahead of Report.
As these are important amendments, I shall try to do justice to them by talking through each of them relatively briefly. First, Amendment 104A, in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes, would require the FCA to have regard to the same competitiveness principle as the FSA is currently required to do. The FSA’s report into the failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland made it clear that this competitiveness principle severely impacted on its ability appropriately to regulate the financial services sector. I have said this before but I hope that the Committee will understand why we cannot similarly constrain the FCA, and for this principal reason I am unable to accept this amendment.
Amendment 101A, tabled by my noble friend Lord Flight, would go further by requiring the FCA to carry out its general functions in a way that did not harm the competitive position of the UK financial services markets. As identified by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, this would operate as a brake on the FCA’s actions—along similar lines to the economic growth brake on the FPC, which we have already discussed. It would prevent the FCA from taking any action if that action could be seen as damaging to the UK’s competitiveness. I have already raised the negative impact of the FSA’s competitiveness “have regard”, so it would be impossible to accept an amendment that went even further in preventing the FCA from taking regulatory action to protect consumers, enhance competition and ensure integrity.
I think the noble Lord, Lord Turner, and other noble Lords have made the point about how often this particular definition of risk and reward did not align with the interests of consumers, or, indeed, often with employing organisations. There is nothing wrong with rewarding risk, but when that is not aligned to other people’s interests, that is to the detriment.
I completely agree, which is why we only very recently brought forward proposals including mandatory shareholder votes on board pay. There is, and will continue to be, a big agenda here on which this Government have been working very actively but which the European Parliament proposal would, I suggest, work against. That is why we are fighting hard in Europe, as we do on all matters, to get a result that is more desirable for the health of our industry.
I will just say a few words about Amendment 139A, which is another very important one. It would require both the PRA and FCA to consider the impact on the financial sector’s ability to contribute to the UK economy in the medium or long term, having regard to the principle of proportionality. The PRA and FCA must consider whether their actions are proportionate. That will act as a check on the FCA acting in a way that is excessively burdensome, which would prevent a subsequent negative impact on economic growth if there was not a greater benefit from taking the action. Similarly, if the PRA is being proportionate, it would be difficult to envisage a situation where the firms that it supervises could be required to be too safe or too sound.
I have listened to the valid points made by my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lady Kramer, and the noble Baroness, Lady Cohen of Pimlico, and I understand their concerns. It is essential that the UK financial services sector is not excessively constrained in its ability to contribute to economic growth. As I said at the beginning, in advance of Report, I will consider whether a more explicit consideration of the wider economic impact of the actions of the regulators should be included in the Bill. I should stress that in making changes there must be nothing that would seriously encroach on the regulators’ ability to take the action that may be necessary in furtherance of their objectives. Particularly in the light of that assurance I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, Amendments 102, 118 and 121 are very dear to my heart. They are perhaps some of the most important amendments to the Bill that have been brought forward. I have been interested in financial services for deprived communities for more than 20 years, partly from living in Chicago and seeing the impact that community development banking had on the revival and regeneration of Chicago’s south side. It was an area once written off because it was both black and impoverished and, in the end, it was only action by the banking regulator, under legislation, that drove forward change which was, and continues to be, dramatic.
The noble Lord, Lord McFall, who is not in his place today, will remember the visits that the Treasury Select Committee made to community banks in the United States in 2006—I take some credit for nagging the committee into making some of those visits—which made clear how much we are missing in this country. Both individuals and small and new businesses in the United States have a degree of access to financial services and credit that we cannot rely on in the UK.
The changes in the United States came through a piece of civil rights legislation, the Community Reinvestment Act. This amendment is not a copy of that Act, but it attempts to repeat its achievements. The data that the Act forced banks to publish exposed vacuums in lending across the United States and, to no one’s surprise, they matched very much with the boundaries of deprived communities and—I hope that we would not see the same thing here—the boundaries of communities of ethnic minorities. The regulator then stepped in and required those banks to meet the target of serving those communities, or to fund someone else who would, before allowing them to engage in mergers and acquisitions. It was an extremely effective strategy and continues to be so to this day.
The amendment is also a read-over from the banking reform White Paper, because it would allow the regulator to play a significant role that is described in paragraph 4.4 of that White Paper as,
“a more diverse banking sector”.
Surely the areas where banks are failing to play a role should be at the top of the list for new and diverse participants.
On our previous day in Committee, I said that the role of the regulator nowhere seems to touch on a responsibility to make sure that financial services are available all across our complex communities. Competition is focused on making sure that there is multiplicity of products, not that there is coverage of the full range of demand. Surely if we wish all our citizens to be able to participate in the economic growth of the country and want small businesses to become established, to grow and to build our economic future, we have to pay attention to that access and coverage issue as well. The requirements set out in these amendments get us to that point.
My Lords, I rise to support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and to speak on other amendments in this group. I believe that the Minister received a letter from the Community Development Finance Association which specifically supports the amendment. It is a powerful case and I trust that he will respond positively at the end of this debate.
Although the Bill grants the FCA significant powers, it makes little mention of consumer access to financial services and products. Access to such services is essential in a 21st-century society, but the Bill makes no mention of it. It would be extraordinary for a competition authority, as the FCA will be, to be required to judge the effectiveness of competition in the markets which it regulates without taking into account whether the market is delivering products and services that are good value for money.
There is not much point talking about a fairer, more competitive market if consumers are unable to access the services on offer, yet uncertainty as to whether the FCA can have regard to affordability might make it reluctant to take action on a fundamental aspect of competition for fear of being challenged. Amendment 104AA, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Eatwell, is about access by consumers to financial service products and the need for good value for money, including for the financially excluded in society.
In many parts of the country, there are individuals who struggle even to open basic banking facilities or to gain access to small levels of credit, yet credit is a necessity of life for many people, bridging the gap, as we know, between when one has to spend and when paydays arrive. I know that in another place Mark Hoban has said he fully agrees that consumers should have access to financial services that meet their needs, but he prayed in aid the FCA’s new competition objective, which he said would give it an explicit mandate to consider the needs of consumers and to act to improve competition. However, that does not necessarily bring people into the market; it is probably only competition for those who are already there.
Amendment 104AA would remove any uncertainty by spelling out accessibility and affordability. Amendment 102 offers a way forward for financial institutions which reflects a decent, responsible approach to the needs and ambitions of communities in a way that would benefit not just them but the economy as a whole. The amendment would promote an appropriate level of services in deprived communities, as we have heard, and ensure that the FCA plays its role in that by its interventions in affordable loans, savings and insurance products. As we have heard, that is crucial for small businesses and social ventures as much as for individual consumers. It is estimated that more than 4.5 million small businesses and social ventures and more than 3 million households are unable to access the fair and responsible finance that they require. It is particularly apposite in the context of the current revulsion—one has to use that word—felt about some parts of the banking community. This is the chance for them to rise to the challenge and show what the good side of banking can be.
All of us have heard of small shops or service providers going to the wall thanks to the inappropriate policies of banks. It is not simply about mis-selling of interest rate swaps, important though those were; it is also about the unavailability of financial products for small entrepreneurs or, sometimes, for larger ventures that want to locate in some more deprived areas. There needs to be a proper investment strategy for social enterprise and small businesses, especially where they work in those difficult areas.
In the past, I thought that encouragement alone would work in making banks be socially responsible in such a way as to help consumers and potential consumers in difficult areas. I no longer think that. When the previous Government were trying to set up basic bank accounts, we tried very hard, along with the FSA, but people were still denied access. People need a bank account and insurance these days; they have become essentials rather than nice- to-haves.
Amendment 104AA would make the FCA have regard to consumer access to affordable and appropriate financial services, and Amendment 118A requires an access and choice code to make clear what the FSA expects of those it regulates. I hope that the Minister will be able to accept the amendments and enable the FCA to play a role not just in promoting competition for existing consumers but for those whom we all want to be consumers.
My Lords, I will add only a few words, because of the powerful speeches that have preceded me. After hearing the noble Lords, Lord Phillips and Lord Hodgson, who have spoken with such enthusiasm, the Minister may have the wrong impression that this sector is taking off with great and roaring strength, so why on earth should we worry about the role of the regulator? However, if he looks back at the numbers that have been quoted to him, the amounts of money that are being raised or proposed are extremely small compared to the demand and the need. The regulator needs to act in order to release the energy of this whole sector.
I know that the Government are constantly concerned that no one sector should be favoured above the other, but it is important to recognise that this sector is distinctively different. I draw his attention to one example that may help clarify the matter—and which I have raised with the regulator, which acknowledges that it is clearly a problem. This is based on a communication that I received from someone involved as a financial adviser, who directed me towards a report done by Nesta in collaboration with Worthstone called Financial Planners as Catalysts for Social Investment. The response that they got back in the course of this work made it clear that the regulatory environment is not yet appropriate for this sector. The report contains quotes such as:
“The social investment asset class, due to its early-stage of development lacks the regulatory clarity of other markets”.
That lack of clarity is turning into a real problem. It is not clear, for example, that an independent financial adviser can advise a client on a social investment because the return is a combination of some sort of more traditional manner of financial return, but also of a social benefit—and how is that to be measured? More to the point, how is it to be set within the suitability requirements that financial planners have to observe when they advise clients? The report states:
“Ultimately, there is a need for the FSA”—
which I suppose is the FCA now—
“to establish clear guidelines around suitability to provide financial planners with a frame of reference. Consistency is required, together with a set of understood and agreed practices and procedures”.
That is one small example. Rather than tackle this issue by issue and try to hoe the ground in the most difficult kind of way, we should make sure that the regulator clearly understands that they need to act in a way that would enable this industry to develop to its full potential. That would accelerate the flow of funding, and I believe that as an economy we would only benefit from that.
My Lords, I first apologise to the Committee, because I would like to degroup Amendment 128AA, which is in this group. I know that the Minister has had minutes’ notice of this, but I apologise to others. It is an important issue, and clearly we will return to that.
I support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, and I will also speak to Amendment 104ZA. As we have heard, social enterprises are businesses that trade to tackle social problems and improve communities, people’s life chances, or the environment. They make their money from selling goods and services in the open market, but they reinvest their profits back into the business or the local community. So when they make profits, society profits. They do not make profits for the shareholders. In future, perhaps we should adopt the words of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, and call them not-for-profit distribution, NFPDs, which may be the new word for them.
Funding is certainly needed to start up enterprises but, just as critical is the need to scale up and sustain them. That means getting access to modest and responsible sources of finance which will grow profits and jobs in this case, and make the local and national economy work. Appropriately funded social enterprises can lead an economic fight-back in the most deprived communities. The more deprived the community, the more likely you are to find social enterprises working there. They reinvest in the community. Indeed, 39% work in the 20% most deprived communities. They employ more people relative to turnover than mainstream small business and are outstripping other SMEs in terms of growth and sustainability. Just as access to funding can unlock the social enterprise sector’s potential, so it is the single largest barrier to the sustainability of this sector. Last year, 44% of respondents to a survey said that they were hampered by the availability and affordability of finance.
I make no apology that our Amendment 104ZA asks the FCA to discharge its general functions in a way that promotes growth and development of social finance and social investment. We ask that it should promote competition. This is, if you like, an emerging market, which needs a little help at the moment. I think that the word “promote” is not too dangerous but if the Minister would accept “enable”, I would settle for that. There is a distinctive difference to this sector. I hope that our regulatory system is big enough to engage with it.
My Lords, one of the reasons why the likes of Wonga charges high rates of interest is that its formula for doing business is mechanical. What is required in order to be able to offer proper rates of interest on small amounts of money to people who are not well off is trust, knowledge and community. That is what this sector sets out to provide. Armed with that, it is capable of giving a much better deal to borrowers without imperilling those who are lending money. It is a thoroughly worthwhile sector of the financial industry.
We need to ask the FCA not to promote it but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, says in her late revision, to enable it. The Government and regulation stand in the way. They give the big banks privileges which are not extended to small lenders. Some of them probably cannot be. I do not know that there is any way in which the £85,000 guarantee can be got down to these sorts of institutions. But they impose immense tax differentials so that you can end up not being able to offset losses if you have made them in community lending. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, says, you can end up not knowing as a financial adviser whether you are allowed to mention these sorts of investments. We need a financial regulatory structure that gets out of the way, levels the playing field and gives these businesses a fair opportunity.
(12 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 96A stands in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Eatwell. Despite the increasing importance and powers of the new European Systemic Risk Board and its three ESAs—including, on occasion, the power to override our own regulators—the Bill’s new architecture does not map with theirs. So while Europe cuts by area—with a committee for banking, one for securities and markets and one for insurance and occupational pensions—the Bill divides between prudential and conduct. As AXA warns,
“There is a significant danger that the new structure will diminish the UK’s capacity to influence European regulators as”,
our,
“new ... bodies will be organised along different lines to the European Supervisory Authorities”.
London First, which represents over 200 of London’s leading employers, including many in the financial world, expresses similar concerns about the new framework not mapping onto that of Europe. While it welcomes the establishment of an international co-ordinating committee, it remains worried about the committee’s effectiveness unless it is appropriately resourced and staffed.
We have ceded powers to the EU on many areas of financial services regulation, but there are areas where we may want to retain powers; for example, to impose higher capital requirements on banks. There are also areas for future negotiation where it is imperative that we give leadership and have a good negotiating stance and team in order to have a good outcome. That depends on good preparation within domestic regulators—and that will require considerable co-ordination, which we will rely on a committee to produce.
Our own European Union Committee warned about the mismatch between our new structure and that of the ESAs last July, but the Government did not appear to take much heed of the potential problem. Perhaps the Government are right, and whichever way one cuts and divides, there will not be a brilliant fit. However, given the Government’s commitment to,
“ensuring that the UK authorities … take a leadership role in the ESAs”,
and given the importance of Europe in regulating, in standard setting and in influencing our financial regulators, it might be wise to have a built-in review to check whether we have got it as good as it could be, and to give this House and the other place a chance to see whether any adjustments are called for in the light of experience.
The Governor of the Bank of England has said that the new architecture is,
“a bit by way of an experiment”.
He went on to say that we,
“need to experiment and see how it evolves”
in regard to the whole schema, which he thought should be revisited after five years. In the case of our relations with the European bodies, however, we cannot wait that long. Decisions are being taken even as we meet.
These overlaps—or underlaps—are not theoretical. We know that Michel Barnier, the EU Commissioner overseeing financial services, is to amend EU market abuse rules in the light of the LIBOR scandal. Much of this work will overlap with the probe led by Martin Wheatley of the FCA which is examining almost the same issues. While the EU initiative is likely to complement Mr Wheatley’s conclusions on whether to apply criminal penalties to the manipulation of LIBOR or any other indices, there is potential for a clash over whether to regulate this or other indices.
Clear, focused input into EU thinking is therefore essential for the UK markets. We must ensure that we have the processes and structures right to make sure that those decisions suit our needs. This amendment seeks the information needed to help us assess what adjustments might have to be made to ensure that the decisions taken both here and in Europe really are as good as they can be. I beg to move.
My Lords, I completely take the main thrust of the noble Baroness’s amendment, which is that the lack of mapping of our structure onto the European regulatory structure potentially creates problems. We have certainly heard from bodies in the City that they also are concerned that the particular issues that arise in their areas might not be well represented. There is a particular concern about the FCA and ESMA, given the FCA’s inevitable consumer centre-of-gravity and the perceived problem of issues relating to proper representation of the markets in Europe. So I completely buy the need to keep this under review. I question, however, whether the Bank of England is the right body to do that. If we need to hard-bake some kind of review process into the Bill, the review ought to be done by the Treasury, because it is the Treasury that could do something about it if it is not working well.
First, I thank those who have contributed to the debate and have spoken very much, I think, in support of what I have been saying. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, the noble Lords, Lord Flight and Lord Neill of Bladen, and my noble friends Lord Liddle, Lord Davies and Lady Cohen.
I am surprised that the Minister did not quite know what was coming. I said all this in my Second Reading speech, which I thought would be a little clue to what this was going to be about. However, I think that there is wide acceptance of the mismatch between the new architecture and what exists across the water. The Minister said that there were divergent voices. I do not agree. I think everyone is saying that we need to look at this issue. The noble Lord, Lord Flight, may be right that it would be better for Her Majesty’s Treasury to do it rather than the Bank of England, but that is quite a small point compared with the thrust of the amendment, which is that this matter needs to be reviewed.
This issue raises quite important questions, as I saw when I helped to regulate actuaries. Many of the rules were written down in Europe through CEIOPS, as it was called at the time. We did not have direct access to CEIOPS; we had to go to the FSA, which was our representative on it, and that made the negotiation much more difficult. Therefore, this is not an easy matter and it will be very important to review how the international co-ordination committee is coping, how effective our input is, whether what we are doing really is sustaining and enhancing the single financial market and whether we are properly, adequately and well represented on it.
The noble Lord, Lord Neill of Bladen, may well be right that a regular review is needed. We proposed a one-off review because our domestic architecture is new and it may need some adjustment. However, the Minister is right: it is an EU moving target, so it may well be that a review will be required more often.
I hear what the Minister says about the NAO looking at this and the possibility of reviews by the Treasury Select Committee. However, it seems to me that the commitment to produce the evidence should come from the Treasury rather than the Bank of England, and any of those bodies could then take a view on the information. In particular, it needs to be automatically brought before Parliament so that this House and the other place are able to opine on whether adjustments should be made.
I am very happy to withdraw the amendment at this stage but I hope that we will be able to come back to this matter to look for an appropriate way of building in a review. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this is a large group of minor and technical government amendments that I hope we can dispatch very quickly. The amendments address a number of technical issues such as updating the Bill to accommodate changes in European law made since the Bill was introduced, amending some rogue references to the FSA in FiSMA, making consequential amendments to enactments that have been passed since the Bill was introduced and making other technical improvements. I am happy to discuss them, or write in more detail, if any Member of the Committee would like to discuss them. I beg to move.
I will just say that I am very happy to accept the assurances from the Minister that, first, these are technical amendments and, secondly, that he would be very brief in what he said today. I have tried to see whether I could speak for longer than he did. I have not been through every amendment but did look at a sample. Each one I sampled was, indeed, technical and minor.