My Lords, I support the amendment with, predictably, an interest in ensuring that Wales is well represented on panels. Too often these westerly people are forgotten, especially as they have rather less of a financial sector. The needs of Welsh citizens are perhaps greater, given how poorly served they are in rural areas. The financially excluded, many of whom are found in Wales, are also poorly served by financial services. I thank my Scottish friend, my noble friend Lord McFall, for his concern for my country and, I am sure, for Northern Ireland.
I turn to Amendment 128 in this group, which provides that the panel should represent households using products. That seems to be key, if only to emphasise the importance of the financial services sector to the whole community. In effect, it is a public utility with some of the same obligations on the industry to provide a universal service even in non-profitable areas. It is equally important to ensure that users of the less profitable services are part of the system of regulation or its scrutiny. It is individuals and families who often rely most heavily on the financial services, even if they do not feature on a CEO’s radar.
Perhaps I should fess up at this point that I was vice-chair of the Financial Services Consumer Panel, so I am acutely aware of the absolute necessity of a broad range of experienced views and backgrounds on the panel. The new panel would deal with a range of issues that impact on a wide variety of consumers. That is part of the reason we so need a panel, because consumers are not a homogeneous group. Their needs, capabilities, life experience and expectation, as well as their interaction with the sector, cannot easily be slotted into a “consumers” box and ticked off by the regulator. The panel would need to draw on the policy, research, intelligence and expertise of those people long embedded in the consumer world, who bring with them in-depth knowledge and understanding of consumer behaviour, consumer detriment and—equally important—consumer law, debt management, credit, insolvency, complaint handling, redress, retail sales, the financial world and possibly even Europe. I am particularly pleased that the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, who is very experienced in consumer matters, particularly when speaking on redress, is in the Chamber at the moment. However, aside from that expertise, the panel will also need some streetwise input, perhaps from people less exposed to the intricacies of regulatory regimes, Europe, consumer law and research, but who know what the world feels like from less exalted heights than the portals of Canary Wharf.
I now turn to the major issue, which is Amendment 136ZA standing in the names of my noble friend Lord Eatwell and myself. It is about the need to balance the caveat emptor principle—buyer beware—with an equal responsibility on those advising or providing services to consumers to act in the “best interests of clients”. We have heard of the challenge facing consumers in judging whether a company is prudentially secure, or whether the product they are buying is fit for purpose, presents value for money or even covers the risk they assume it will. Added to that, as mentioned earlier today, the very pricing of products, their complexity and people’s lack of understanding of their own risks, let alone the risks inherent in products, makes it very hard for consumers to have the knowledge to take responsibility for the choices they make. The level of risk left with consumers is often unclear. The meaning of “guaranteed” or “tracker” may differ quite substantially from their common-use meaning. Consumers often bear a level of risk unknown to them and seldom explained; they are effectively making choices blindfold.
In an ideal world, of course, we support the responsibility principle. Markets are made to work by consumers shopping around and driving up standards. However, in this market, with those long-term “credence” goods, opaque structures and the asymmetry of information, we need to reintroduce some trust and transparency by balancing consumer duties with provider duties. It is an industry beset with low levels of compliance and high levels of complaints; there are no agreed standards for complex long-term products, so it is hard to expect consumers to adopt a higher degree of responsibility than is already legally acknowledged.
I have concerns, therefore, that by writing consumer responsibility into the Bill, new section 3B(1)(c) appears to “up” the existing situation. In law there are no obligations placed on consumers other than to act honestly. It is not clear what a greater emphasis on consumer responsibility might achieve. Why impose this possibly new principle of consumer responsibility without any countervailing responsibility on the service provider? Amendment 136ZA expresses the need for that balance, at the point where the industry might otherwise grab hold of this wording and say, “See—it was their responsibility and their choice”. The noble Lord, Lord Turner, whose chances of becoming Governor of the Bank of England I might now damage by quoting him approvingly, said yesterday that people,
“doubt banks’ values; and they doubt whether banks have their interests at heart”.
He went on to say that the boards of directors and managers must introduce,
“effective controls against dishonest behaviour”,
in order to change the perception of bankers. This amendment seeks to ensure that providers act in the best interests of clients, which would be just one way of guaranteeing the good behaviour for which the FSA chair awaits. Why should only consumers accept responsibility for their own decisions? Why not regulated firms, and authorised firms? It is as if the Bill’s draftsmen are at pains to ensure that consumers should have only themselves to blame. If this phrase “consumer responsibility” is to mean more than the current legal position, then the Minister needs to explain that to us. If it is only common law, then why include it?
My Lords, I will take Amendments 122 to 127 and 128 first of all. As the noble Lord, Lord McFall of Alcluith, has explained, these would require the FCA to appoint persons representing the constituent parts of the United Kingdom to each of its consultative panels. The role of the panels is to provide a forum for focused consultation. I believe that the current provisions, which require the persons appointed to be representative of consumers and practitioners in particular sectors, provide the right focus here. To do this requires the FSA now, and the FCA in the future, to seek a diverse range of panel members. I am satisfied that the FSA already takes account of these matters in making appointments. For example, as a matter of practice in making appointments to the consumer panel, which is done through a fair and open process, the FSA aims to make sure that the panel as a whole not only encompasses a broad range of relevant expertise and experience but also represents the constituent parts of the UK. That is as it already is.
The FSA also looks for some geographical spread in the smaller business practitioner panel membership, where that is possible. The large retail firms that sit on the other practitioner panel, by definition, tend to have a large geographical spread that they bring to the table as national firms. Diversity in terms of geographical spread of representation can, therefore, be achieved in the existing model where members are appointed to represent the interests of consumers and practitioners rather than to represent parts of the UK.
For these reasons, although it is important to have on the record how this operates now and how I would expect the FCA to operate in the future, I would be concerned that these amendments could reduce the effectiveness of the panels as forums for focused consultation on the issues which matter most to those most affected by the FCA regulations. I would not want in any way to either dilute or change the focus of the panels on what they are ultimately there to represent.
My Lords, I shall speak in support of Amendment 128AB in the name of myself and my noble friend Lord Eatwell. I shall also speak to Amendments 128AAA and 130ZB. Accountability means not just listening, but a dialogue: a conversation which hears and responds, and gives written reasons for disagreements. As the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said, they will not always agree, but that is quite healthy: we just want to know why. It has really worked very well with the FSA panels under the old Section 11. The proposal would just take that forward and continue it in the new Bill. This encourages transparency and forces the panels to think very hard about what they say and to do their homework well. It also makes the regulator consider submissions carefully and set out where and why they have problems, either with the analysis or with the conclusions. This adds to the openness of the regulator’s thinking, but also to that of the panels, so that consumers and practitioners can also track the record and impact of those who purport to represent their interests, and know how well they are impacting on the regulator’s work. I hope this is one of the areas where the Minister is able to “say yes”.
My Lords, to manage expectations before the break I attempted to say that I was not going to be as accommodating all through the day. In qualitative terms I will be as accommodating, but I can only work with the material that is in front of us. In this case, it is possibly a matter of explanation and reassurance. I hope that some, if not all, of the matters here are going to be covered satisfactorily.
Amendment 127ZA to which my noble friend Lady Noakes spoke would mandate some quite complicated arrangements for the Bank of England to consult the markets practitioner panel of the FCA, in certain cases. I do not make a comment about the drafting, but the general arrangements here would be quite complicated. In addition, the markets practitioner panel would also have the ability to request information from the Bank, but only via the FCA and only for the purpose of assisting the FCA. I had not been quite sure what the amendment was trying to achieve, but I now understand from my noble friend that it is a matter of strengthening the co-ordination between the Bank and the FCA in relation to market infrastructure, as well as strengthening the consultation arrangements in relation to infrastructure matters. I understand why this is important, but will attempt to explain why I believe it to be unnecessary.
There is of course nothing to stop the Bank of England consulting the markets practitioner panel or any other panel, or their members or anyone else. It is worth remembering that. It is also important to bear in mind—it may be more important in this case—that the Bank of England will be regulating only a very small number of institutions in this highly specialist area. That really is the key point. I suggest that there is not a lot to be gained by trying to institutionalise consultation arrangements in this way because of the small number of specialist players.
The Bank will indeed be able to consult each of the entities that it regulates individually, should it wish to do so. That is of course an inconceivable position for most of the other subsectors of financial services, where a panel arrangement is therefore necessary to corral views efficiently. I am not sure what a requirement to consult the markets practitioner panel would necessarily add here. More generally, the Bill already introduces a requirement for the Bank and the FCA to have a memorandum of understanding relating to infrastructure regulation, while there is of course nothing to stop the Bank and the FCA working together in any way that they want, subject to the framework of the Bill.
I think that panels are not required in this area. I hesitate a bit because my noble friend Lady Noakes may come back at me on the settlement question. I accept that on that aspect I should possibly take a bit more time to reflect on my noble friend’s views, just to make sure that all angles have been covered in what I have said and in what has been indicated by the Bank and the FCA, so far as it is relevant to them. However, specifically on settlements, I appreciate that I might reflect a little further.
I turn to Amendments 128AAA, 128AB and 130ZB, the first two of which require the FCA to provide a statement in writing to any panels it establishes where it disagrees with any of the representations. Amendment 130ZB would make a similar provision for the PRA. I note that these amendments replicate the existing provisions in FiSMA. It may help if I explain the thinking behind why the Government consider it right to depart from the existing approach in FiSMA. It is because the Bill imposes a general duty on the regulators to publish responses to the representations they have received, which is wider than the current requirement in FiSMA. The regulators must respond to all representations, rather than simply those with which they may disagree. That was a conscious change because it did not seem right that the only responses the regulators should have to give to the panels are where they disagree with them.
We do not want to promote an antagonistic relationship between the regulators and any of the panels that they may establish. We have also required the regulators to publish their responses to help inform public understanding and enhance accountability. I reassure the Committee that this duty will, in practice, require the regulators to give their reasons for rejecting or departing in any significant way from a recommendation of one of their panels. With those explanations, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Trenchard and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, for their contributions to the short debate and I thank my noble friend the Minister for his response. I note that he will look again at the settlement system, which raises slightly different issues because of the different way that it is dealt with legislatively. I doubtless await a letter from him during the summer, which I shall look forward to.
The Minister said that there was nothing to stop the Bank of England from consulting anybody—it may be that he was playing that for laughs. The real purpose of tabling this amendment was because there is no specific mention of panels, and there is a concern that the Bank of England will not use its general obligation to consult the right people. The right people are not necessarily just the people they are regulating but also those who are impacted by regulation, such as the people you would find on something like the markets panel. That is also why I tried to press my noble friend the Minister on why the Bank did not have to consult the FCA when dealing with regulatory matters in this area. I put it to my noble friend that he has not quite addressed those issues. I hope that he will think further on this before we get to Report, and I will certainly reflect on what he has said.
In respect of the second amendment in this group relating to explanations in writing, the Bill states:
“The FCA must from time to time publish in such manner as it thinks fit responses to the representations”.
This does not convey the sense of what the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, referred to, which is dialogue. At the moment the panels operate in a much more collaborative mode, feeding through ideas as well as making formal representations, and they are being seen here, I think, as just another consultee to be dealt with along with responses from any other consultee. The sense that the practitioners have is that the quality of relationships will deteriorate going forward, and that is a matter of concern.
These amendments were tabled by my noble friend, as I said, following the comments made by the financial services. I know that my noble friend will want to talk to them before we return to this Bill at Report. I thank my noble friend the Minister for his reply today but I do not think that I can regard the issues as settled. However, I am prepared to withdraw the amendment today.
My Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in the amendment that she proposes. I have added my name, as has my noble friend Lady Hayter. It is clear that there must be a satisfactory set of amendments for reviewing the effectiveness of this new regulatory structure and whether it provides value for money as conceived, particularly given the added complexity of what the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, referred to as the multiplicity of regulators now created out of this single structure.
I speak, too, to Amendments 128BB and 130AA in the name of myself and my noble friend Lady Hayter. Amendment 128BB adds to a definition of an independent person that a person appointed to review the FCA must be independent of the FCA but also of the Bank of England. We should have somebody standing outside this regulatory complexity who should be deemed to be independent. I suggest that if the person appointed is a staff member of the Bank of England, the notion of independence will be compromised, even though the FCA stands outwith the Bank of England. I hope that none the less there will be continuous regulatory dialogue between all the elements in the regulatory apparatus that we are designing here and that it will therefore be necessary, if somebody is independent, that they should stand outside that regulatory community, of which the Bank of England will be a leading part.
The point with Amendment 130AA is that the Treasury in appointing an independent person to conduct a review should inform the Treasury Select Committee of the nature and arrangements of the review, the idea being that that committee itself conducts reviews of the operations of regulatory institutions and will greatly economise on and facilitate the overall operation of a review procedure if there is no duplication and if there is clear communication and understanding between what the Treasury Select Committee and the independent person are doing. These two scrutiny agents should be co-ordinated and we should not have further segmentation; we have too much in this Bill already, and we should not have further segmentation in the procedures that we are designing.
My Lords, first, I will make some comments on Amendments 128B and 130A, and explain who can initiate reviews. One of the main points made by my noble friend was essentially about how things are different from the way they have been up until now, and who can initiate reviews. I am sure we all agree that the Treasury’s power to appoint a person to carry out a value-for-money review is important to support accountability to the Government, to Parliament and to the public, not least because those reports of reviews must be published and laid before Parliament.
However, regarding my noble friend’s particular point, in future the NAO will also be able to initiate its own VFM reviews. As she identifies, that flows as a result of the Bill making the regulators subject to the NAO audit. I hope that provides reassurance to her on that important point. Clearly our expectations should be in the right place. The NAO can only conduct a certain number of VFM reviews each year across the whole of the public accounts which they audit, but I think my noble friend explicitly said—and I agree with her—that it would not be a question of an annual review. At the same time, the Government need to be able to order a review of the FCA at any time, with the option to focus on areas of the FCA’s activities they see as a priority, and be accountable for the way they exercise this power. In practice, the Treasury is likely to choose to appoint the NAO to carry out such a review. As such I do not see what would be added by placing an obligation on the Treasury to order reviews under new Section 1S, particularly as the amendment does not specify the time period or any of the other circumstances in which a review should be held; I think my noble friend recognises that. Particularly in the light of the fact that the NAO itself will be able to initiate VFM reviews, it would be too early to say how frequently the Treasury will use its power, because it will clearly dovetail to some extent with what flows from the audit. However, in response to my noble friend’s key point—she quoted my honourable friend the Financial Secretary—I am confident that the arrangements we have proposed will deliver a step change in the FCA’s accountability to Parliament, as compared to the way it has been with the FSA, for the way in which the FCA uses its resources to achieve value for money.
Amendment 128BB seeks to amend the requirement that a person appointed by the Treasury to conduct a review must be “independent of the FCA”, by adding the requirement that they must also be independent of the Bank of England. I absolutely agree that it is important that VFM studies of the FCA are carried out by someone independent of the FCA itself. That is what is proposed in the draft of the Bill itself, not least to provide assurance that they are objective and impartial. As I have said, in practice the Treasury is likely to choose the National Audit Office to carry out such a review. However, the Treasury will have the discretion to appoint an independent expert or a commercial firm with relevant specialist expertise to conduct a review. In that context the amendment is too wide, in that it could prevent any firm or expert which had done any significant amount of work for the Bank of England from carrying out such a role. From what the noble Lord said I appreciate that that was not the intention, but ruling out that population of firms or experts would be the effect of requiring the FCA reviewer to be independent of the Bank.
If I may say so, that is absolute nonsense. Are we actually suggesting that any independent firm or individual who has done work for a government department is thereby compromised and no longer an independent person? Are we saying that an independent person who has happened to write a few papers for the research department of the Bank of England is now no longer an independent person and is thereby compromised because he is not independent of the Bank of England? That is a misuse of language.
First, I am not sure why the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, talks about advisers to government departments. Here, we are talking about finding firms to carry out value-for-money reviews of the FCA, and independence from the FCA would seem to be the overriding concern. We are not talking about the Bank of England itself or some part of the Bank of England’s wider group doing the review. As I am sure the noble Lord knows, with all the increasingly tough professional codes that exist, the definition of independence is becoming ever tougher. Therefore, although the noble Lord and all of us might like to go back to a sort of common-sense, gentlemanly world that once existed, I absolutely stand by what I said. The amendment—whose effect incidentally goes wider than the noble Lord indicated in speaking to it—would capture a range of firms just because of the way that professional independence has come to be defined these days. Therefore, I stand by my analysis of the amendment.
Amendment 130AA would require that when the Treasury orders a review of the economy and efficiency of the PRA, it informs the Treasury Select Committee of the nature of, and arrangements for, the review. I understand that the amendment is driving at the importance of accountability to Parliament. The Government agree that that is important, which is why there is already a large amount on this subject in the Bill, including the provision for NAO audit, which we have discussed.
Requiring the Treasury to inform the Treasury Select Committee of the nature of, and arrangements for, the review at such an early stage might have some benefits of the sort that the noble Lord identified but I fear that it is more likely to be seen as an invitation for the Treasury Select Committee to comment on or even attempt to change the remit of these important reviews. I suggest to this Committee—I would not suggest anything to the Treasury Select Committee—that adding another political hurdle could slow up the process of producing these reviews. It may even make it less likely that they will be commissioned in the first place if there has to be a negotiation of the sort that I fear.
I hope that those explanations are sufficient for my noble friend to be able to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful for the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, to this debate and for my noble friend’s reply. Perhaps I may comment on Amendment 128BB in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, concerning independence. I think that my noble friend has stretched even the most stringent modern interpretation of independence way too far. On his interpretation, the NAO might not be independent of the FCA and therefore might not be able to carry out any further reviews of the FCA. I hope that my noble friend will reflect on the need for independence. We have to remember that when the Bank of England, rather belatedly, appointed people to carry out reviews of itself recently, independence was not exactly plain in the appointments that were made.
I thank my noble friend for his responses on value for money. It is slightly odd that the Government intend to use the NAO to carry out value-for-money studies, but they have set up the NAO to be appointed the auditors, so it might carry out value-for-money studies. I am still left with the feeling that the carryover of the ability to appoint somebody to do a review is just repeated legislation which might lay fallow, as the FiSMA legislation largely lay fallow. However, I thank my noble friend for his response and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Flight is, of course, completely correct in his assertion that the proposed new regulatory framework makes far too little mention of the need to preserve competitiveness of the marketplace, not just competitiveness from the point of view of the consumer but the very competitiveness of the marketplace for practitioners to participate in. For that reason, financial services companies from all over the world have come into London and that has helped to provide more consumer choice, and it will continue to do so in the future, as well as providing the Exchequer with a very large proportion of its annual revenue. It is a huge pity, as my noble friend has pointed out, that the Treasury mistakenly believes that preservation of international competitiveness implies approval of inappropriate or inadequate regulation.
All three amendments have some merit but of the three I tend to prefer the amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord Hodgson because it gives a duty to the PRA to have regard to competition. I would have preferred that the PRA had an objective to protect the competitiveness of the marketplace as well but I realise that there are some valid arguments against that. To have a duty—“duty” is a strong word—to have regard to competition is the preferred of the three amendments put forward. The points in my noble friend’s amendment are all to do with minimising adverse effects, or avoiding restrictions or unnecessary regulatory barriers to entry; they are all negatives rather than positives. I would prefer this issue to be expressed in a more positive manner. I have worked for a Japanese-owned financial institution; I am not sure whether this is a UK institution under proposed new paragraph (d) in my noble friend’s amendment. It is, of course, a UK-incorporated plc. Could my noble friend clarify what “UK institutions and companies” means? It is very important for London that the level playing field for all participants is preserved and I hope that the amendment refers to UK incorporated or UK resident financial institutions and companies.
My noble friend’s amendment also makes it very clear how necessary it is to have collaboration and co-operation between the PRA and the FCA. Proposed new paragraphs (b) and (c) impact on matters that are of great concern to the FCA. I hope that these matters will be properly covered in the memorandum of understanding to be drawn up between the PRA and the FCA.
My Lords, the most important issues to be addressed in this group of amendments are those around barriers to entry linked to resolvability. A sea change is needed and is coming. If the Committee bears with me, I will get to this issue, because it is at the heart of the concerns in this area, as identified in particular by my noble friends Lady Kramer and Lord Flight.
Let me start with Amendments 128BF and 128BG in the terms in which they are drafted. My noble friend Lady Noakes says that in some respects they go too far in terms of the duty to promote competition. However, I should do the amendments justice by speaking to them as drafted, although I accept that my noble friend put somewhat of a qualification around her amendment.
There are three reasons why the Government do not agree with the proposition in the amendments. First, all PRA-authorised firms will also be regulated by the FCA according to their objectives, and will therefore fall under the FCA’s objective to promote effective competition in the interests of consumers. To correct one point, it is also the case that authorisation has to be carried out by both the regulators. For those that are seeking a PRA authorisation, the PRA will lead, but others will be led by the FCA.
Secondly, the Government’s view—this goes to the heart of the new structure—is that the FSA simply has an impossible job in trying to balance so many competing objectives, which has led to its lack of institutional focus on prudential matters. In order to avoid repeating this mistake, we have decided that the PRA should have a single, general objective, supplemented by tailored, focused objectives, which are specific to particular regulated activities, such as the insurance objective set out in new Section 2C.
I ask my noble friend one practical question. I entirely understand what he says about the competition objective of the FCA on page 17. In his argument, that is a reason why it should not be on the PRA. There is no way that the PRA, without its competition objective, can overrule the FCA: that is, there must always be a competition objective in all cases where the PRA cannot outgun the FCA. If there are any occasions where the PRA can outplay the FCA, then of course the competition objective falls away, if there is not one for the PRA. Reading this, it looks to me as though there is a danger that the PRA will be the established centre—the capital centre and so on—and the FCA will be, in some senses, implementing what has been decided as a strategic framework by the PRA. If I have got that wrong, I am delighted to be put right.
I do not think that my noble friend has got it quite right. However, I cannot hide from him the fact that we believe that, because it is right and goes to the heart of the flaws in the present tripartite arrangements, the PRA should have as its single objective the one that I have described. Therefore, the nub of his concern remains, and I cannot pretend that it is not there. All I can say is that we consciously want to have the architecture as I have described it. However, the mitigation—and I think it is an important one—is that the PRA must consult the FCA before taking any steps that could in any way harm the FCA’s objectives, including, in this case, the competition objective. I think it is a reasonable check on the PRA’s action, given the basic architecture which we think is important.
One issue that I have raised to which I have never had an answer, no matter whom I have asked, is where the PRA is expected to move in terms of the cost of getting regulatory approval. The Minister made mention of the capital requirements—and there is a whole set of issues around that—but one does not even get to the capital requirements if one cannot get through an approval process without a phalanx of lawyers, accountants and submissions which frankly act as a complete barrier to any potential small and local banking institution. I do not understand where there is any commitment from the PRA to tackle that set of problems.
The fact that it has already started on the work which will lead to the document in the autumn and which goes to the most expensive element of getting authorised—namely, the amount of capital required—is a fundamentally important and good start. I do not pretend that that completes the business, but it tackles first the most expensive element: the cost of putting that capital aside. This is a start. It is not before time, but it is happening as we speak.
My Lords, I start by apologising to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for having appropriated her amendment incorrectly in my opening remarks. I do not quite know when I made the mistake, but I made it quite early and perpetuated it. I latterly discovered that I did not quite like the drafting, and so was slightly disobliging about the amendment of the noble Baroness, which I thought was my own. With apologies to the whole Committee and particularly to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, I did not intend to add my name to her amendment. I would not have signed up to the precise wording but, as has come out in this debate, I think we are all speaking from the same territory.
That apart, I believe that there has been quite a lot of agreement among those who have spoken that the Government have not quite got this right. I am concerned that the Government keep saying that they will not repeat the mistake of giving conflicting objectives, which is alleged to have been one of the causes of the problems of the FSA, so this body has to have a single focus. However, I cannot see that a single focus is going to be good for the financial services industry or for the consumer, particularly where competition is just not in its lexicon. If it is not good for them I cannot see how it is good for the UK, so it seems to me to be bad policy.
The amendments that we have put forward today, in varying ways, have been trying to make it a slightly better policy by giving the PRA a broader remit. My noble friend the Minister said that he had undertaken to come back at Report to give a wider economic context, as he had already undertaken to do on the FCA. With respect, that does not meet the points that have come out from the debate today. I believe that there was quite a lot of agreement between my noble friends Lord Flight, Lord Trenchard and Lord Hodgson and I on the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Hodgson. When my noble friend the Minister thinks carefully about what to come back on Report with, I hope that he will look again at this issue. Expecting the FCA’s objectives to bear all the burden of reflecting competition in the way that the PRA operates is just bonkers. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this amendment and Amendment 128BFB seek to ask the Government to clarify their definitions of the scope of the markets in which UK financial institutions operate. We have already seen some very peculiar UK-centric views in proposed new Section 9C of the Bank of England Act 1998, which I hope we will see extensively modified on Report. In this clause, however, the Bill currently refers to having,
“any adverse effect on the stability of the UK financial system”.
This fails to recognise the global nature of UK banking, and that risks may arise anywhere in the world where UK financial institutions operate.
We want to ensure that the actions of UK financial institutions are such as to sustain the stability of the entire financial system in which they operate. Why? It is because destabilising actions in foreign markets may destabilise subsidiaries of UK financial institutions and, ultimately, the home institution. However, this could not be said to refer to the UK financial system. I will put it again: if in a foreign market a subsidiary is destabilised by actions here, that subsidiary ultimately destabilises an institution here—not the system but an institution. Can the noble Lord please explain how the current wording of the Bill deals with the fact that the balance sheets of UK financial institutions are typically written on a global scale?
My Lords, these amendments seek to give the PRA a global financial stability remit. Instead of the PRA looking at UK financial stability, the amendment would have it looking at the financial stability of every market around the world in which any PRA-authorised person operates. The PRA would have a new responsibility for the financial stability of many markets where it has no powers, no jurisdiction and no tools. I suggest that this is plainly an absurd position. Although cross-border co-operation is vital to ensure the effective supervision of international firms, it is ultimately for each country and its regulators to ensure its own financial stability, or a single currency bloc may decide that financial stability needs to be supervised ultimately on a currency bloc basis.
My Lords, I think that the noble Lord has misunderstood the amendment. If he inserts the amendment and looks at subsection (3)(a), it would refer to,
“seeking to ensure that the business of PRA-authorised persons is carried on in a way which avoids any adverse effect”,
on markets in which PRA institutions operate. The noble Lord is suggesting that the PRA would not have jurisdiction, whereas the PRA does have jurisdiction over PRA-authorised persons.
I have read and reread these amendments and discussed them with officials on a number of occasions because I cannot believe that this was the effect that the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, wanted. Actually, it is entirely the effect of his amendments to require that the PRA’s general objective is to be advanced by,
“seeking to ensure that the business of PRA-authorised persons is carried on in a way which avoids any adverse effect on the stability of the”—
if amended—
“financial markets in which UK financial institutions operate”.
They would have to regulate in a way that had regard to the financial stability of all these markets around the world, which does very directly get the PRA into the protection of financial markets way beyond its own control in the UK.
I will explain why I think the Bill adequately covers the noble Lord’s justifiable concern. What I have said so far in no way means that the PRA will ignore the stability of any financial market outside the UK that is relevant to PRA-authorised firms. The PRA will take an interest in the stability of any market that has a significant impact on the safety and soundness of one or more PRA-authorised persons. It will do this not in order to improve the stability of this market but to understand the potential or actual impact on regulated firms and to take steps so that this impact is minimised using all the powers available to it. I cannot identify anything in the Bill that limits the PRA or prevents it from taking account of all those factors. It is quite a different thing to put in wording, as suggested in these amendments, that would make the PRA in some way responsible for the effects on the stability of financial systems outside the UK. With that explanation and reassurance, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, it is very difficult to be reassured by a statement that the PRA would sit back quite happily and watch PRA firms take actions that would destabilise foreign markets. However, given that the Treasury seems to have no concern about PRA firms destabilising markets outside the UK, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this amendment reflects a recommendation from the Joint Committee that a secondary general microprudential objective be given to the PRA. It seeks to specify a further means by which the PRA’s general objective should be achieved, by minimising the costs to the FSCS or the use of public funds to support or rescue parts of the UK financial services industry. A similar amendment to this was tabled and debated in another place.
The Government acknowledge that there are some attractions to reframing the objective in terms of the prudential outcomes that the PRA will seek to achieve, as the Joint Committee suggested. However, specifying particular desired outcomes creates difficulties. For example, whether the failure of a firm results in a call on public funds will depend to an extent on the actions of the Government of the day—for example, in taking a decision to nationalise or recapitalise a failing institution. In some circumstances, the orderly failure of a firm followed by an FSCS payout may be the best way of protecting depositors and taxpayers while maintaining market discipline. The effect of specifying such outcomes could be to encourage the PRA to take a highly aggressive and expensive approach to supervision with an end goal of ensuring that, if a firm failed, its potential costs of failure to the FSCS and public funds would be zero or negligible. To ensure this outcome, the PRA would need to intervene extensively in a firm’s day-to-day affairs, undermining the responsibility of firms’ management for running their firm. Ultimately, in an extreme case, it could turn PRA supervisors into shadow directors.
To place such a duty on the regulator would be against the Government’s intention, endorsed by the Joint Committee and confirmed in new Section 2F inserted by the Bill, that the new regulatory regime should not be a zero-failure regime. The amendment would bias the PRA towards a zero-failure regime. On balance, the Government believe that it is better to frame the objective more broadly, requiring the PRA to focus on the safety and soundness of individual firms, so as to improve financial stability. This objective gives the PRA a clear mandate to intervene to address risk-taking by firms.
I hope I have been able to make clear to the Committee why I cannot accept this amendment, and why I ask the noble Lord to withdraw it.
The Minister has exposed some very interesting arguments here in the relationship between the degree of protection which should be provided to consumers and the public purse, balancing that against the degree of supervision of firms. The Government seem to want to err on the side of jeopardising the public purse a little rather than providing supervision that would protect the public purse. However, in the context I can see that a balance is being discussed here, and the Minister has made clear where the Government’s view of that balance lies. In that light, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I trust that the first amendment in this group, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Flight, will not find favour in the Committee as it would substantially weaken the thinking, role and responsibility of the PRA.
First, it would exclude consideration of those currently excluded altogether from financial products, especially in insurance but also in banking. Unless the regulators take exclusion from financial products seriously, we will be failing in our duty to a large section of our community. Our regulators should act in the interests of the whole community, not just those who are already within the charmed circle.
Secondly, there may be issues of promotion and advertising of financial services or products—indeed, to the sophisticated as well as to the earlier group—which must be taken into consideration by the regulators.
Thirdly, it is now acknowledged, including by your Lordships’ House, that regulation should cover future as well as present consumers so that it can take account of changes in consumer needs, the environment and product development. This is the case with, for example, legal services. The Legal Services Act 2007 specifically adds in,
“those who are using (or are or may be contemplating using)”,
legal services.
Amendment 141 in the name of my noble friend Lady Drake is clearly an essential addition to the Bill if those who have bought with-profits policies are to have any confidence in their outcome. The funds must be husbanded in their interests, the profits must be shared according to the policy’s rules, profits must be justly distributed and any discretion must be used fairly and equitably.
There is surely not a word about this amendment with which the Minister could argue. As John Kay wrote in his report this week:
“Financial intermediation depends on trust and confidence: the trust and confidence that savers who invest funds have in those they choose to manage these funds”.
Amendment 141 is part of recreating that trust and confidence, and we are happy to support it.
My Lords, let me first speak to government Amendment 140E. When considering the regulation of discretionary payments in with-profits business there is no easy split between prudential and conduct issues. The Bill deals with this by giving the PRA sole responsibility for issues relating to discretionary payments. The FCA remains responsible for all other conduct regulation. However, under the Bill as drafted, use of “includes” in new Section 3F(1) could be interpreted to suggest that the PRA is responsible for other elements of conduct regulation as well. This amendment simply clarifies the drafting, by removing the implication that the PRA could be responsible for other conduct issues.
I turn to the non-government amendments in this group. Amendment 128BH would remove the reference to those “who may become policyholders” from the PRA’s insurance objectives. However, I can assure my noble friend that the inclusion of this reference to future policyholders is both deliberate and important. It is there for completely different reasons from those advanced by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, with whom I agree in rejecting the amendment but for much narrower and more technical reasons related to the nature of a with-profits fund.
Let me give an example of what we are thinking about here. If one considers the scenario where the PRA is considering whether a with-profits insurer should be permitted to make a very large distribution to its policyholders, and if the PRA is only required to consider the interests of current policyholders, it might be inclined to allow the distribution. However, that might leave insufficient assets in the fund to ensure that policyholders coming into the fund—if it is operating on a going-concern basis—obtain fair and adequate payments from the fund.
I should reassure my noble friend that the reference to those becoming policyholders does not require the PRA to go out in some proactive way to protect those who have no current plan to take out a contract of insurance, but who might at some point decide to do so. The PRA is only obliged to provide an appropriate degree of protection and what is appropriate will depend on the facts of the case. In this case, it is the needs of a person who is about to sign on the dotted line for a with-profits policy who needs to be assured by the regulator that the fund to which they are about to subscribe is appropriately strong according to the rules. This provision allows for that.
Amendment 141 would require the PRA to regulate with-profits funds on the basis that the fund should be managed for the purpose of distributing profits to policyholders, as opposed to any other purpose. This is an important issue and I welcome the opportunity to set out broadly how with-profits will be regulated under the new system. It might be worth just pointing out to the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, that new Section 3F—the “With-profits insurance policies” section on page 31 of the Bill—makes it quite clear that the PRA must secure an appropriate degree of protection for policyholders. That is very clear. It is different from the looser wording, to which she referred, about the insurance objective “contributing” to securing protection. It is clear that the language in new Section 3F for with-profits is stronger than in new Section 2C on the insurance objective. That is an important background to the consideration of this amendment, and a point to which the noble Baroness drew attention.
When regulating a with-profits firm, the regulator is concerned with ensuring that the firm recognises a proper balance between the different interests in the fund. These interests include one that is highlighted in this amendment—the interests of with-profits policyholders to the distribution of profits made by the fund. However, there are other legitimate interests in a with-profits fund. They include the interests of the members of the insurer in the case, for example, of a mutual. In a proprietary firm, the shareholders also have an interest in the profits to be distributed. There are also considerations to be balanced between different types of policyholder. I do not suggest for a minute that the noble Baroness seeks to disapply all these other interests in the with-profits fund. Maybe she does—no, I see that she does not. I am glad about that as we would be fundamentally rewriting the law. That would be the effect of the amendment.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for bringing up this issue. I must say that a balance needs to be struck between the interests of current policyholders, who will be keen to see all available funds distributed, if they are distributed to them, and the interests of future policyholders, which we have discussed, who will pay the price of excessive generosity to previous generations of policyholders. There is also the overriding concern to ensure that the fund remains solvent and able to make distributions.
As I said, under the Bill, the PRA is required to secure an appropriate degree of protection for with-profits policyholders in new Section 3F, and it will have to take all of these factors into account. Although the factors to be taken into consideration are complex, in essence the objective of regulation remains the same for with-profits as for any other type of business. The objective fundamentally is to ensure the firm’s safety and soundness, while ensuring its proper conduct, including the fair treatment of consumers. In asking the Committee in due course to support the Government’s amendment, I ask my noble friend Lord Flight to withdraw his amendment.
There is an issue that I am not sure the Minister has addressed. The PRA will be focused on prudential regulation, so its approach on how discretion should be applied on with-profits policies could be influenced by a preoccupation with the prudential responsibility, and through that focus may become unfair in how it has balanced the consumer’s interests.
My Lords, I do not believe that to be the case but it might be helpful if I write to the noble Baroness, copying in the Committee, with a fuller explanation of how that will be taken care of.
I thank the Minister for answering what in essence was a question. In my view, with-profits policies have been and continue to be useful instruments for the man in the street, and I now understand the reason for the phrasing as it is. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, raises an important point here that we want to on one hand future-proof the Bill, and on the other hand make sure that the future ring-fence around regulated activities—the regulatory perimeter—is not widened on a whim. It is not an easy line to draw. If it required primary legislation—not that the noble Lord was suggesting that—to extend the PRA’s objectives to bring other activities within the regulatory perimeter, that would be a complicated 12-to-18 month process that would not allow for a timely response.
The situation that I generally envisage is one where the FPC would ask for the regulatory perimeter to be widened. That, I suggest, is sensible and necessary future-proofing that enables the authorities to react to changes in financial markets and financial risks in a pragmatic way, whether it is to allow for innovation, or for any other reason. To give a couple of examples which could come up where the FPC could recommend such an extension of the perimeter, it might relate to some or all shadow banking activities or to peer-to-peer platforms or activities, which we have discussed fairly regularly.
I am looking to see whether my noble friend Lord Lucas is here, or some of my other noble friends—the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, among them—because at some point activities like this could well be recommended by the FPC to the Treasury to be brought within the regulatory perimeter. The Treasury would then make an order to make these activities PRA-regulated ones, and if necessary apply additional objectives to these activities.
I assure the noble Lord that in this context, in accordance with convention and Cabinet Office guidance, the Treasury, as the relevant department, would of course conduct the consultation in the normal form at that point. I hope that explains why this part of the Bill is drafted in the way that it is, and that there are protections in there.
My Lords, that was very interesting because the FPC has not been mentioned at all and it is suddenly being prayed in aid in support of this section. I remain puzzled as to why the Government are willing to risk the Bill appearing to be so restrictive by not including some notion of general consultation. Of course, if the FPC were involved there would be consultation issues around which the FPC itself is hedged. But changes could appear on a whim, as the noble Lord himself put it. I would not expect the Treasury to behave on a whim, but it might appear that way to the industry.
I am sorry, but I am pretty sure that I did not say that the Treasury would do anything on a whim: far from it. I would not like the record to say that. Of course the Treasury would not do something on a whim. I would expect recommendations to come from the FPC, which, as the noble Lord said, has its consultation procedures. It does not need a reference in the Bill to say that if the Treasury makes recommendations or an order under this clause nothing else needs to be said. Of course the Treasury will follow the normal consultation processes applicable to this form of order.
One should hope so too. One would have hoped that new Section 22A and other relevant sections, perhaps to be added, would recognise that fact. However, having had an interesting discussion of responsibilities and whims, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this is a big group to do justice to, but I will make a start with Amendments 129ZB and 129ZC, which would require the PRA to make and maintain arrangements for consulting consumers as well as practitioners. I agree that consumers have a key interest in the outcome of the PRA’s decisions. In particular, consumers will be one of the beneficiaries of a safer and more stable financial system. However, the PRA will not focus on consumer protection as an end in itself—that will be the job of the FCA. In its regulation of insurance outside the special arrangements for regulation of with-profits business, the PRA will deliver its policyholder protection mandate through effective prudential regulation. Of course, consumers will be able to respond to public consultations on rules and to the PRA’s annual consultation following publication of its annual report. However, the main way in which the consumer interest is represented will be through the FCA. The FCA will provide the PRA with advice and expertise wherever consumer interests need to be taken into account. The draft MOU that has been published by the Bank and the FSA makes clear that such consultation will take place at an early stage.
Amendments 130ZC and 130ZZC would require the PRA to make and maintain arrangements for consulting consumers, and to consider representations made to it by the FCA consumer panel and practitioner panels. On the first element of this, as I have explained, where the PRA needs input on an issue of consumer protection, this will be provided by the FCA. I therefore do not think it necessary to require the PRA to consult consumers or their representatives directly. However, just because the FCA will advise the PRA on consumer issues, that does not mean that the FCA panels should be tasked with a formal role to advise both authorities.
Under the Bill, the FCA panels rightly focus on issues of concern to the FCA and will not have the expertise or mandate to examine the PRA’s approach. The PRA and the FCA will develop different approaches to regulation, consistent with their different objectives and the fact that the PRA will be regulating a much smaller number of firms. The panels are free to make representations when the PRA consults on rules, or indeed at any other time. However, I do not think that it would be right to require the PRA to give special attention to representations made by bodies designed and maintained for the purpose of advising the FCA on its work.
Amendment 130ZA would require the PRA to consider representations from the FCA’s consumer panel. The Government value the work of the panel and its important contribution to the development of consumer protection policy. However, as I have explained, the Government’s view is that it should continue to play this role through engagement with the FCA rather than the PRA.
Amendment 141A would require the PRA to make and maintain effective arrangements for consulting the consumer panel, consumers, or their representatives in relation to the PRA’s responsibility for with-profits insurance policies. The Government acknowledge that there are particular issues around with-profits regulation, balancing questions around the fairness of with-profits policies with the effect of making payments from with-profits funds on the safety and soundness of the firm. The PRA will have to consider these carefully and put in place appropriate arrangements for consulting others with relevant expertise, and is specifically required to seek the FCA’s advice in discharging its sole responsibility for with-profits regulation to ensure that it is taking account of the FCA’s consumer protection expertise. In giving its advice, the FCA is of course at liberty to consult consumer protection experts and panels as it sees fit. Taking all this into account, the Government do not think that a separate consumer panel for with-profits regulation is either needed or proportionate.
I now turn to the amendments in the group that would require the PRA to maintain consultative panels. Amendment 129A would require that the PRA’s arrangements for consulting practitioners under new Section 2K must include the establishment and maintenance of one or more panels. The Government agree that in order to carry out effective regulation, the PRA will have to consult industry in order to gather information, expertise, and outside perspectives on its work. That is why new Section 2K puts the PRA under a high level requirement to consult. However, the Government remain of the view that the PRA should have discretion as to how it goes about this consultation.
Given the PRA’s greater focus on firm-specific prudential decisions, a standing panel might not be the most effective way of ensuring a productive dialogue with industry. I should be clear that the future management team of the PRA have made clear that it does not envisage that maintaining a panel would be the most effective way of gaining the information that it needs to deliver judgment-led prudential regulation. The PRA will also have a much smaller community of regulated firms than the FSA, or indeed the FCA, and so may wish to tailor consultation exercises on individual rules or measures more precisely to the firms most affected by them. A single, industry-wide panel is not ideally suited to this kind of consultation.
My Lords, can the Minister explain in a little more detail why the FCA is not allowed any discretion about whether it has panels but the PRA does have discretion? Is it just because it is the Bank of England, and the Bank is saying that it has to have discretion?
No, my Lords, of course it is not because it is the Bank of England and it says that it has to have discretion. This is government legislation and the Government are presenting a Bill that we believe is appropriate to the new financial architecture. Of course we consult the Bank of England, the FSA and all sorts of other people. We have also had the input of the Joint Committee. My noble friend is quite right to challenge me on this but I am quite clear on it. As I have tried to explain, it is understandable but simplistic of people to read across that there are panels now that would like to continue to be engaged with both new regulators. I can understand where the panels come from and why, as I have explained, since consumers have a considerable interest in the decisions taken by both bodies, consumers superficially may say, “Actually, we would like to be engaged directly with both”.
If the noble Baroness will allow me a moment, the PRA is a very different animal. We risk, in some of this discussion, slipping into a frame of mind of thinking that the FCA and the PRA are somehow going to be two peas popping out of the same sort of pod. They will be very different regulatory and supervisory bodies with very different mandates and very different numbers of firms that they are regulating. It would be quite wrong to have a one-size-fits-all approach to consultation in these circumstances.
But consumers are not asking for this superficially. It is their money that is being looked after and overseen by bits of the PRA, and they make a very serious request. As I said, we are relaxed about it not being a specific panel, but the existing panels should have a right to be heard. It is simply not enough to depend on the FCA, whose chief executive comes from the industry—as does its new chair, with 27 years in banking and enormous experience. However, they do not represent the consumer interest.
Finally, my fear is that if there is no right to be heard, consumers, and maybe practitioners as well, will retreat to the other way of getting a hearing: to go to the press. One of the great things about the consumer panels is that you very rarely hear about them because they have a back-door entrance. They can go in and have early dialogue. Deny them that and I am afraid that we will revert to the other way, which is an open dialogue through the press.
I understand all that and I know very well that the consumer panel in which the noble Baroness played an important part has had and continues to have an extremely important role. It is not as if the PRA will not be consulting consumers and the public; it must consult publicly on draft rules, for example, and that would involve consulting not just practitioners. Generally, however, the FCA will be the expert on consumer issues and it is right that it should be the primary channel to focus the PRA’s approach.
I repeat that the PRA will be a supervisor with a much more firm-specific, prudential decision-making focus—as opposed to the FSA and the FCA, which will have a much broader rules-based approach. We are talking about very different animals. Indeed, it is worth recognising that, if we are talking on the practitioner side, the FSA tends not to consult the current practitioner panel on firm-specific prudential decisions any more than I would expect the PRA would or should. The dynamic is very different. Therefore, for the reasons that I have given and will continue to give in going through the rest of these amendments, and for the reasons that my noble friend Lord Flight put very clearly in relation to consumers, I believe that what we have put in the Bill is right.
I believe that we are at Amendment 129A. There is no more that I can usefully say on that amendment, so I will move on to Amendment 129B, which would require that the PRA’s consultation arrangements should include industry panels and, where appropriate, a panel representing insurance policyholders. I should start by being clear that where the PRA consults on issues with particular impact on insurers, the Government agree that it should ensure that it engages with insurers in order to understand their views. Such consultation might be done as part of its general consultation under new Section 2K or through consultation on specific rules. Regarding consultation with insurance policyholders, as I have said, where consumer interests are engaged, the PRA will be provided with advice and expertise by the FCA. The Government do not expect it to be necessary for the PRA to make specific arrangements for consulting policyholders any more than other consumers.
Amendment 130ZZZA would require the PRA, as part of its consultation arrangements under new Section 2K, to establish a panel for policy debate with senior representatives of firms and to consider the cumulative impact of regulation by the PRA and the FCA. Policy debates about regulation take place in many forums—for example, between regulatory authorities at the European level, in the FSB and at the IMF, and of course in your Lordships’ House. However, I do not think that it would be right for the PRA to be engaged in policy debate with those that it regulates. Regulated persons are free to make representations to the regulator. There are mechanisms for this is in the Bill. However, to enshrine in legislation the idea that firms should enter into a policy debate with the regulator is contrary to the concept of judgment-led regulation. The PRA will listen to firms but it will form a view based on its own regulatory objectives and priorities, not on the commercial objectives and priorities of firms.
On the second element of the amendment, I agree that the PRA should consider cumulative regulatory burden. It will do this as a matter of course when it considers proportionality under the general duty to co-ordinate. There are already numerous opportunities for industry to comment on the effectiveness of co-ordination. In particular, the PRA and the FCA are required to include in their annual reports an account of how they have complied with the general duty to co-ordinate. Industry and the general public will be able to make representations, for example, at the annual general meeting of the FCA, and as part of the PRA’s annual consultation on the effectiveness of its strategy.
Amendment 129ZD would amend new Section 2K to require that:
“When carrying out a consultation, the PRA”,
should,
“have regard to the desirability of ensuring a broad representation of practitioners and consumers”.
I have some sympathy with the sentiment. I agree that, in order for the PRA to regulate effectively, it will need to consult widely. For example, if it is considering putting in place a new framework for the purposes of supervising credit unions, I would expect it to form a comprehensive view of the sector by talking to credit unions, large and small, based in different parts of the United Kingdom. Where appropriate, I would also expect it to talk to academic experts and other interested parties. However, I do not think that this needs to be underpinned with a specific provision in legislation. The PRA will need to consult effectively if it is to deliver its statutory objectives, and it will be held to account by Parliament for doing so. New Section 2K already requires the PRA to consult the full range of PRA-authorised persons and not just those who are practitioners.
Amendment 130ZZA would provide that the arrangements for consulting PRA-authorised persons may include consultation with persons with specialist knowledge of PRA-regulated activities. Again, I agree entirely with the sentiment. As the Government have made clear, the PRA will consult expert individuals when developing policy. It need not rely solely on industry experts, but also those in academia and other experts. At present, new Section 2K makes express reference to consultation with industry because industry will be directly affected by regulation. It is appropriate to recognise that fact in the Bill, while making it clear that the PRA may decide how to engage with them. But consulting industry is different from consulting “persons with specialist knowledge”. The PRA may of course consult such individuals, whether as part of a public consultation or for a specific purpose, if it will help it to better deliver its objectives. It might also wish to consult all sorts of other categories of person—for example, international organisations such as the FSB and Basel committee. It seems unnecessary to include that level of prescription in the Bill.
Amendment 130ZAA would clarify that the PRA is not to be deemed to be accountable to those firms that it regulates. I am glad that my noble friend has raised this point, as it is an important one. The Government and the Bank of England have been absolutely clear that the PRA should not be seen as accountable to those it regulates. We agree. Firms are accountable to the regulator, and the regulator is accountable to Parliament. However, the lines of accountability are clear in the Bill, and it is not clear what such a declarative statement would add.
Finally, Amendment 130ZZB would require the PRA to report annually on its consultation activities. The Government fully agree with this intention, and indeed the PRA is already required to so do as part of its annual report by new Schedule 1ZB, in paragraph 18(1)(c) on page 186.
I come back to the fundamental point. We have considered carefully the separate consultation requirements for the two regulatory authorities. I understand all the concerns, some of which I hope I have been able satisfactorily to address. But others have consciously been left on the table, reflecting the very different nature of the beast, which the PRA will be as a focused regulator with its small community and one very clear objective. On the basis of that rather long canter through the group of amendments, I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
Of course, I note what my noble friend says. She is always very clear and direct. I absolutely refute that the PRA has anything approaching a free-for-all. I have explained the many general and specific requirements it has to consult on, whether they are individual rules or setting things out on an annual basis and so on. Earlier on, I think she promised to send me a letter setting out some of the concerns, which she has just summarised, on the recent consultation. I will be very happy to receive that, and the Treasury will of course look at it as well.
My experience in commercial life has left me with a deep respect for the wisdom of consumers, and a deep conviction that consumer groups, properly constituted and properly consulted, are a source of sound guidance, and a vital way of making sure that decisions are properly grounded in current experience, views and expectations. Critically, this wisdom and this learning is always best delivered directly and not through an intermediary. I continue to think that the Government are mistaken in excluding consumers from direct consultation with the PRA, and I think it is unwise to rely on second-hand unmediated input. I suspect, given the comments around the Chamber this evening, that this is an area we might well return to on Report. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw.
My Lords, I have little to add to this debate. I will keep my remarks very brief, but they are remarks of some cheer. I never thought that I would from this Dispatch Box congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Flight, on an amendment, but I very much approve of his Amendment 130B, and the precision with which he spoke, as well as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, who has made such a contribution to our proceedings today.
My Lords, I fear that again this is going to be relatively long one in which I will not be able to satisfy all my noble friends. I hope that my arguments will speak for themselves, but I have a suspicion that I might not quite be able to do it. Let me give it a go, because this is a series of important amendments.
Amendment 130B would add to the efficiency principle to which both regulators will be required to have regard when carrying out their general functions. The efficiency principle ensures that the regulators should have regard to using their resources in the most efficient and economic way. This is the principle in FiSMA at the moment, but we are going further. We have made the accounts of the FCA and the PRA subject to audit by the National Audit Office and provided that the NAO will be able to carry out value-for-money studies into the new regulators, as we discussed earlier today. This ensures an important line of accountability for the regulators to Parliament, through the Public Accounts Committee, in how they use public money.
If the regulators are required to consider minimising burdens on firms without any counterbalancing provision, they may be distracted from pursuing their focused objectives, particularly if one considers that minimising burdens on firms could be used as a rationale for inappropriate regulatory forbearance. Instead, the proportionality principle ensures that costs of individual regulation are balanced against the pursuit of regulatory objectives that will benefit the whole financial system and its consumers, by requiring the regulators to consider whether the burdens imposed on firms will be proportionate to the benefits brought about by that imposition.
Amendments 131 to 135, in the name of my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, look to amend the proportionality principle to which both regulators will be required to have regard when carrying out their general functions.
Given the importance of the proportionality principle to the new structure, I am very glad to have the opportunity to discuss it further via this series of amendments. Amendments 131 and 135 would add to the proportionality principle a requirement on the regulators to consider whether an operational rule or operational requirement is proportionate to the benefits which result from that rule.
I can assure my noble friend that the existing reference to a burden or restriction already includes burdens or restrictions which relate to operational matters. So when the regulators make rules or impose requirements which require firms to alter the manner in which they operate their business, they will be required to have regard to the proportionality principle.
In fact, my honourable friend, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, tabled amendments to the Bill on Report in another place to ensure that the regulators will have to demonstrate how they have considered such matters when making rules.
Specifically, they will have to set out in the compatibility statements that they are required to publish when consulting on new rules, how they consider the proposals to be consistent with the principles of regulation in new Section 3B, including the proportionality principle. Amendments 131 and 135 pick up the important point that much of it comes in the operational matters but that it is picked up, and specifically that the requirements of the Bill were extended in another place, which makes Amendments 131 and 135—and Amendment 132, which is consequential—unnecessary.
Similarly, Amendment 133 seeks to add “firm” to the proportionality principle, so that the regulators will have to consider the burdens and restrictions placed on firms, adding to the current wording which uses the term “persons”. We may have touched on that before, but again, for the avoidance of doubt, if we have not mentioned that in Committee, I would like assure my noble friend that “person” is defined in the Interpretation Act 1978 as including,
“a body of persons corporate or unincorporate”.
Thus “person” includes individuals and other forms of legal person such as companies, partnerships and unincorporated association. So Amendment 133 is unnecessary.
Finally, Amendment 134 would add the words “reasonable and fair” to the proportionality principle. I agree that the regulators should be both reasonable and fair in the way that they pursue their objectives. I understand my noble friend’s concerns. He has taken us through a number of examples where he feels that the current regime is operating unfairly. I will certainly not detain the Committee by giving the other side of the case in each of those examples, but there is one. Part of what we are doing will work right through the structure only if there are changes of attitudes in lots of ways in which people go about their business.
I appreciate the argument that the best way of making people change their attitudes is to include certain things in the Bill. However, I know that the FSA and the PRA are reading these debates carefully and understand the spotlight that they are under. All these exhortations to them to do what, in this case, is my noble friend’s direction of travel, which I fully appreciate, are being listened to carefully. But the provision itself in Amendment 134 is unnecessary. The regulators have a duty under public law to act reasonably and can be challenged in the Upper Tribunal or by way of judicial review if they fail to discharge that duty, which would be broadly the case if the requirement were on the face of the Bill. The regulators are already under a duty to comply with the rules of natural justice—in other words to follow procedures and processes which are fair.
Amendments 144A and 147C would require the regulators to set out the costs and benefits of the regulation for which they are responsible in their annual reports. The regulators are already required to include in their annual reports a significant amount of information about how they have adopted a proportionate approach to delivering their objectives for the FCA, in new Schedule 1ZA(10) and for the PRA Schedule 1ZB(18). They must set out how they have complied with the regulatory principles, including the proportionality principle.
The financial services regulators are being brought within the statutory remit of the NAO, which I have said before, which will be able to carry out its own value-for-money studies. It would be excessive to add to this an annual requirement for the regulators to conduct their own cost-benefit analysis of the entirety of their regulatory activity.
Amendments 147D and 147E would require the PRA to hold an annual general meeting, as is required for the FCA. Amendments 144C to 144E would require the FCA to put in place arrangements to consult on its annual report, as is required for the PRA.
The Bill provides for the PRA and FCA to take different approaches to annual consultation on the effectiveness of their regulatory approach, and I welcome this opportunity to explain why that is the case. The provisions for an annual meeting under FiSMA provide a useful opportunity for stakeholders to make high-level comments on the FSA’s strategy and approach. Like the FSA, the FCA will supervise the conduct of all financial services firms. Given the wide range of issues under consideration, and the large number of firms, it is useful to have a single annual forum where stakeholders can voice their views. But as I said in discussing the last group, the PRA will be looking in much greater detail at a much smaller number of firms, and will be focused on complex issues of prudential risk. Given the PRA’s narrow focus and the complexity of the prudential issues it will tackle, a written consultation will be a more effective way of obtaining input from industry about how it has performed against its objectives. This will enable firms, consumer groups and others to put in detailed submissions addressing the PRA’s prudential approach in a level of detail that they would not be able to do in an annual meeting.
These are alternative, rather than complementary, mechanisms—horses for courses—and it does not seem necessary to subject both regulators to both mechanisms, and in doing so create additional cost.
My Lords, I understand that argument about the PRA and a public meeting, but it seems to me that all of us that are in public bodies, in politics or whatever, know that there is nothing that makes you feel more accountable than knowing that you have to face an audience face to face once a year and people can turn up and ask you live questions. That is why corporate annual general meetings are not perfect, but at least they can be effective in that way and be quite focusing for the board of that company, or, in this case the members of the prudential regulation authority. It seems to me that since prudential regulation is so important to the financial health of the country, it would be a good thing for that reason.
I well understand my noble friend’s argument. It is, of course, far from the case that the PRA and the Bank of England will be able to hide from direct questioning of what they do because I am sure that they will be in front of the Treasury Committee much more frequently than annually, under the full spotlight of television cameras and so on. It is not like a normal corporate situation in which the board may be able to hide away from that sort of scrutiny except annually. There will be very regular public challenge, principally through the Treasury Committee, and I can only repeat that it would have been the simple, easy answer to just put both requirements on both the successor bodies, but I come back to the underlying point: we must remember that we are creating two bodies that have to be, in very many respects, different from what we have with the FSA at the moment. If it is merely shifting the chairs around, we need not be spending the many hours that we are spending over the Bill.
Well, that is why we are not merely shifting the chairs around; there will be a very fundamentally better structure in place for all sorts of reasons that we have debated, but as a consequence of that, some of the easy solutions of “one size fits both regulators” is not the right way to go and in this case it is essentially a disproportionate imposition of the public meeting on the PRA, for the reasons I have given.
Amendment 144B seeks to require the FCA to account in its annual report for how often the FCA used the product intervention power in Section 137C and financial promotions power in Section 137P, what the outcome of each intervention was, and how the FCA complied with the statement of policy concerning the temporary product intervention rules in Section 137N. Both powers are very important, but they are also a departure from the current regime and therefore it is important that the regulator accounts for how it uses them. As such, I fully agree with the sentiment behind this amendment, but I reassure my noble friend that it is not necessary. Paragraph 10 (1)(a) of Schedule 3 requires the FCA to report on the discharge of its functions and the FCA’s general functions include making and policing of the rules. The Government therefore fully expect the regulator to account, in this area, for how it has used these powers.
I think that I have dealt with all the amendments in the group.
I return momentarily to Amendments 131 to 135. I am extremely grateful for the Minister’s comments and the comfort that he gave on operational rules and the exchangability of “person” or “firm” under the Interpretation Act 1978, of which I was not aware. On the point about “reasonable and fair”, I think that he said the firm could always take the regulator to the Upper Tribunal. That is not an answer at all. No firm, particularly not a small one, will want to take the regulator to the Upper Tribunal. That is only in theory an answer. There is no way that any firm will want to go through the risks—in publicity, time and reputational damage—to ensure that the regulator has been reasonable and fair. I am not asking my noble friend to come back on this; I understand his point; but his officials should not think that that is an answer, because it is not a practical answer in the real world.
My Lords, I appreciate that the processes of challenge, whether it is by the Upper Tribunal or under the rules of natural justice, are very much back stops and expensive and difficult for firms. That does not mean that large firms have not challenged the FSA and in some cases been successful over the years. I am not sure that it would be any cheaper and easier if such requirements were written into the Bill.
It just remains for me to ask my noble friend Lord Flight to withdraw his amendment.
I thank my noble friend for his response. With regard to my Amendment 130B, I hope that, by the time we get to the end of the process, he may have some more effective thoughts as to how to ensure that costs are managed economically. I observe that, since the FiSMA, a great deal of forest wood has been cut down, a great deal has been added and little achieved for the consumer as a result. It is a difficult nut to crack, but, in the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.