Financial Services Bill

Lord Deben Excerpts

Monday 15th October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, Amendments 183A and 187A seek to restore the existing 28-day period for representations for principal parties and third parties. I hope that the Government will not have a problem with accepting that as a small step towards ensuring that justice is done. Amendments 185A and 186 are rather more fundamental as they seek to limit the very wide powers that the Bill presently gives with regard to the publication of warning notices.

I am not sure why it has not been included in this group of amendments but subsequently we shall come to Amendment 187AA in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, which potentially has the whole solution to the issue that I raise by providing for an independent judicial body and process for each regulator. At present, the amendment in the Bill to Section 391 will enable the PRA and FCA to publish details of their allegations immediately they are issued to individuals or firms, which seems to me to be unfair for two fundamental reasons. First, the allegations could be mistaken in fact and, if not mistaken, they could be one-sided. I think it is unfair for a regulator to publish such allegations when the individual or firm has no equally authoritative platform from which to respond. Secondly, there is the position of a senior manager; a business could become completely untenable where such a notice is issued.

Under FiSMA at present, the FSA is not able to publish its allegations against a firm or individual until they have had an opportunity to challenge them by meeting the FSA’s enforcement division. Effectively, that means appearing before the Regulatory Decisions Committee, which acts as a relatively independent judicial body. It seems wrong in principle for an individual or organisation to be publicly labelled guilty before there has been some form of independent judicial process to assess the matter. Stakeholders can also be unfairly affected. I cite the fall of 25% in Standard Chartered’s share price when something similar happened in the USA and the New York regulator gave advance notice of publicly alleged wrongdoings by Standard Chartered. It is not just the individuals or organisations that are affected but the pension funds and others who are shareholders.

The Treasury’s justification that:

“The new warning notices power is a good idea because it will increase transparency. This will mean that consumers will know at an earlier stage where things are going wrong with a firm or individual and the FCA is taking action”,

seems to me to ignore or to override the principles of natural justice and the wider interests of other stakeholders. It was particularly ironic that both the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Governor of the Bank of England should have complained about the Standard Chartered case when the FSB contains very similar provisions which will enable the same sort of thing to happen in the UK. I grant that the positions are not absolutely analogous but they are pretty similar.

The protections in the Bill are also unlikely to be effective. While the regulator is obliged to consult with the person or organisation to whom a warning notice is given and not to publish such notices if they are deemed to be unfair or prejudicial to the interests of consumers or detrimental to the stability of the UK’s financial system, the Bill is not clear as to what are the requirements to consult and it is implicit that in the event of disagreement between the regulator and the recipient as to publication, the regulator will have the power to go ahead and publish. It would be analogous to introduce a power to publicise the stage in the process which otherwise remains private until after the regulatory decisions committee has decided whether or not to issue a decision notice. Also, unlike the USA regulators in the UK have statutory immunity and cannot be sued if they have wrongly caused a damaging impact on a business as a result of their actions.

The position of the regulatory decisions committee is crucial. It is not a creature of statute but rather the system which the FSA has evolved and adopted. There is no obligation under the Bill for the FSA or PRA to adopt the regulatory decisions committee model. The Government’s proposed amendment erodes the independence of the decision-making body. While the actual decision to publish must be taken by at least one person not directly involved in establishing the evidence on which a decision is based, other decision-makers can participate who have been directly involved in the underlying investigation. I fear that is not very far from the investigators taking the decision where the Government’s proposed amendments to the existing law appear to allow the existing safeguards to be substantially bypassed. This in turn throws up the risk that a decision made by a body which includes individuals who have been involved in gathering the evidence on which it is based could be challenged by an affected party as being contrary to the principles of natural justice that no man may be a judge in his own case. Parallels have also been made with bringing charges in criminal proceedings which are public, but the code for crown prosecutors imposes a far higher standard of proof that there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction than the much lower standard of proof for a regulator issuing a warning notice.

It seems that in focusing on the value of transparency, the Treasury has ignored the equally important issues both of natural justice and of third-party stakeholder interests in business. I hope the Standard Chartered case will serve to highlight the dangers of this approach and to change the Treasury’s mind here.

[Lord Deben]

My Lords, I declare an interest as a board member of a company which might be affected by this and also as chairman of the Association of Independent Financial Advisers. It means I know a bit about what is happening here and it concerns me very considerably. The proposal is that the public will know more but I do not think that they will. It has been shown that the public will assume that if no reference has been made, then everything must be all right. Recent examples have shown that the regulator has failed to know what is going on inside organisations. If a regulator says that there may be something wrong, the public will know that there may be, but the public will assume that if the regulator does not say that, everything is all right. So I am not at all sure that there is an extension of transparency.

There is a big problem for the Government. This Bill was introduced at the same time as the Civil Aviation Bill. I listened carefully to everything that the Minister said on the Civil Aviation Bill. Very simply, he said that they were introducing all kinds of ways in which people who were affected by the regulators would be able to appeal. They would be able to make sure that they were heard, and certainly they would not be criticised before evidence had been laid. All the arguments that my noble friend made were stated in defence of the changes in the Civil Aviation Bill—yet at precisely the same time we produce this Bill, which removes all the things that we put into the Civil Aviation Bill. The Government cannot have it both ways. Either it is right for the Civil Aviation Bill and for this Bill, or it is not right for either. This is why the House of Commons has asked us to be so careful about this. It is very concerned.

There is also a question of parallels in criminal proceedings. This is a very odd argument. The reason that the police announce publicly that they are proceeding to prosecution or considering prosecution is to protect the person who is being prosecuted, so that they do not suddenly disappear. It is done as a protection of the individual against whom an allegation is made. In many other systems it has been shown that if you do not do that, people get themselves into circumstances that no one else knows about. The police in this country have to be transparent not for the general public but for the individual concerned. The situation is wholly different for financial institutions with which we are dealing. If it is said in advance that the regulator is considering action, in the world in which we live people will make immediate assumptions; the pinks will be out immediately with all the comments that one would expect. Is this fair? I think not.

Certainly there are too many examples of regulators getting it wrong—as well as too many examples the other way round when they did not intervene and got it wrong. It is much better to have a system in which the regulator goes as far as he can to establish the truth before he makes public an allegation, particularly in a country where the regulator is protected by law. If we were in a country where the regulator could be sued, that would be different—but we are not. We have a system—I agree with it—in which the regulator is able to make such allegations without any fear. I do not think that that is acceptable. It is not acceptable in terms of natural law. Therefore, it is crucial that this House defends and protects people.

This argument comes from someone who has been more critical than most of the financial services industry, and who has been critical of regulators for not intervening rather than for intervening. Therefore I am on the right side, in terms of the Government, but one should not win these battles by shortcuts—and this is a shortcut. It does not achieve anything because if it is right that an investigation should take place and that somebody should be put on notice that they are to be investigated, that is done just as well in private hands as in public—and if the charge is true it will become public. If it turns out to be something that it is necessary for the world to know, it will be known. The idea that it should be known before one knows whether it is necessary or not is not an acceptable position.

Although I have declared an interest in this, my real interest is that I have fought in this House—as I did in the other House—for the rule of law. Part of the rule of law is that nobody shall be judged guilty until they are proved guilty. The problem with this change is that it is unparalleled and not applied in any other industry, and it ends up with people being assumed to be guilty until they can prove their innocence. The length of time that the regulator takes to work means that many people will never be able to prove their innocence because they will already have gone bust. We have not recognised how serious this measure would be for companies. It is not a fair way of proceeding and it is not justified. Frankly, the regulator has not given a single example of when having this power would have improved regulation. I asked but no answer came—all I got was a statement that it will be useful. That is not a satisfactory answer for the removal of a human right.

I very much hope that the Minister will understand there is very considerable unhappiness about this; it is unnecessary and it is to act here in a way that I have not seen in any—any—legislation brought before this House since this Government took office. I would therefore like to know why what is sauce for the goose is not sauce for this particular gander. Could we please have an absolute example—even one—of a case in recent years in which this power would have helped the cause of justice? If we cannot, it seems to me likely that the cause of justice will not be helped at all.

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[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

The assumption is—it has been said a number of times—“What if it is proved wrong?”. However, many, if not most, of these will be proved right, and that transparency surely will be of enormous benefit to consumers and investors in a way that I hope to demonstrate.

[Lord Deben]

Every time it is proved wrong it will undermine the proving of right. Since when have we had a system whereby one says, “Because many people are guilty but have not yet been proved guilty, we shall assume that they are guilty”? That is what will happen if you say it only on the word of the investigator and there is no concept even of a CPS.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

Perhaps the noble Lords will let me make my case and explain that. As was suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Flight, the purpose of my amendment in the next group is to address this issue and I hope that it will get support from across the House. It is about a different way of dealing with this and bringing to that independence a much higher hurdle for exactly the reasons that noble Lords have been talking about. I hope that when we come to that amendment it will receive wide support because I share the view about a greater degree of independence and separateness being needed. Nevertheless, transparency is a particularly important issue which we, as consumer representatives, feel was very restricted by Section 348 of FiSMA and the FSA’s interpretation of this. I shall in a moment explain why we do not support the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Flight, in the present group.

Amendment 185B concerns warning notices in respect of procedures and referrals to tribunals and other issues. It would remove the requirement to consult with those about to be named before any warning notice is published. I find it hard to see why this requirement is in the Bill. It does not affect other walks of life. In criminal cases, ordinary people do not get consulted before they are arrested or charged but their names will be released. “Consultation”, I fear, is code for, “Let the lawyers loose”—I apologise to noble Lords who are lawyers—and risks injunctions, stalling and long legal arguments. Why should the person who is to be named be given special rights? If it is right to publish, why should there be a block on publication? I hope the Minister will be able to justify that, given that tremendous consultation goes on already with the firm involved before one is even at the stage of a warning notice.

On the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Flight, as I say, we have sympathy with bits of them because of the lack of a second eye, independence and separateness, if you like, from the investigators within the regulation. The Bill empowers the regulators to publish the fact that a warning notice has been issued. This is of particular interest to the issue of misleading financial promotions. For consumers, it is a significant increase in transparency to know which ads have not only been looked at by the regulator but have been seen to be sufficiently misleading for consumers to know that an ad—which they may still have; they may have cut it out of a magazine or remember it from the television and it may still influence their purchase of a product—is under review. There could be considerable consumer detriment if the ad is still in their minds and they have not had a signal that the regulator is worried by it. That is one of the most important things to consumers.

At an earlier stage of the Bill, the Government were not motivated to accept our worries about reliance on “buyer beware”—caveat emptor—but how can consumers shop around if the ads on which they are basing their choice of products are perhaps going through what can be quite a lengthy procedure? It can take very many months, and an advertising campaign can be quite short, and all that time consumers do not know that procedures are taking place that might affect their choice of product.

In other areas, we know fairly quickly. If action is taken against a food factory suspected of contaminating food, we as consumers want to know immediately, and the Food Standards Agency lets us know straightaway when it is taking action. Similarly, if a garage had fixed a coach’s brakes and was accused of doing it less than satisfactorily—some of us are grandparents—I would not want my grandchild to be on a coach where the garage was already up before the Health and Safety Executive for not having done repair work properly. Similarly, as a shareholder, I would want to know whether BP did have some liability for pollution in the Gulf of Mexico before I parted with money to invest in that company.

There can be ongoing detriment if serious accusations are made and the people involved in parting with their money, as consumers or investors, do not know about it. I am not sure it was right that we heard nothing about LIBOR and the behaviour of banks until that first case was settled. Was it right that Equitable Life went on selling products even when there was a case pending? Many of the difficulties that arose were consequences of that ongoing sale. The first time these names came out there would be a lot of coverage in the press, but once we got over that hurdle—once we had got used to it and grown up—consumers are quite able to know the difference between an accusation and a finding. Keeping those hearings in the dark is quite against consumer interest.

We hope that the Government will not accept these amendments, but that in the next group they will be rather more sympathetic to a different approach to dealing with how these decisions are taken. For the moment, I hope that they can support my amendment but hold fire on the others.

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[Lord Deben]

I hope the Minister remarked in my comments that my major criticism of regulators was that they did not intervene in a whole series of areas where they should have. My argument was that if it is in the public arena when they do intervene, the public will be even more convinced, as the history shows, that everything else is going okay. In fact, the regulator has fallen down again and again. Many of the worst examples—the ones that he and I would be most cross about—are those where the regulator has not intervened.

[Lord Sassoon]

Perhaps my noble friend could listen to the argument. He said that he has asked for examples on a number of occasions but there has not been a single case where the FSA could say, “This would have been a useful power”. I have a long list of examples that the FSA could no doubt have given him. It includes the Winterflood market abuse case, where it tackled an illegal share ramping scheme, with warning notices issued in April 2007 but decision notices not issued until June 2008; the case of Gary Lester, a fraudulent mortgage broker, in 2008 to 2010; the Swift Trade market abuse case; and Atlantic Law and Greystoke. I could go on. I am sorry if my noble friend has been led to believe that there are no examples. The FSA can certainly give me examples. Of course it is important that there should be examples.

I have made one or two remarks about the general situation—which is that the Government believe that a new power is merited and that we need to recognise that we are trying to deal with detriment to the users of financial services here while affording proper protections to market participants. However, before I come back to some broader points, let me address the amendments themselves.

The first two amendments, Amendments 183A and 187A, seek to reverse a very specific change that the Bill makes to FiSMA, namely shortening the period for making representations after a warning notice has been issued from 28 to 14 days. We made this change in close consultation with the regulator, which noted that in many cases the 28-day window is not required at all. This may be because a case is straightforward and does not require such a long time for representations to be put together, because a person admits to the contravention or because that person does not respond at all. In such cases, having a mandatory 28-day period has the effect of unnecessarily slowing down the overall enforcement process, which is not in the interest of credible deterrence and the regulator’s efficient use of its time and resource. That is why we have moved to a starting point of 14 days.

I fully agree that firms should have adequate time to make representations. Although 14 days is the new minimum, it is important to note that it remains at the regulator’s discretion to specify a longer period—for example where it knows a case is particularly complex. The regulator may decide to extend the period from the outset. The decision whether to extend the period will of course be governed by the principles of natural justice and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights concerning the right to a fair trial. I hope that that gives some reassurance to my noble friend on the narrow point; that is, it is not a blanket 14 days.

I am conscious that, in moving to the wider issue, we risk straying into the areas covered by the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, which we are going to debate next, but I repeat that my starting point is very much the same as that of the noble Baroness; namely, we need to provide the regulators with this new power but to make sure that it operates proportionately.

Amendments 185A, 185B and 186 are all concerned with the new power for the regulators to disclose the fact that they have issued a warning notice in respect of disciplinary action to a firm or individual. Amendment 186 probes an important issue relating to the disclosure of warning notices; namely, whether the new power should apply in respect of individuals or approved persons. There are two reasons why we included warning notices issued under Section 67 in the list in new subsection (1ZB). First, the warning notices concern what are very clearly disciplinary matters, relating as they do to contraventions or knowing involvement in rule breaches or contraventions of EU requirements, so it is consistent that they should be included here. Secondly, it is important to remember that this is a power, not a duty, and that the regulators will be required to consider whether disclosure would be unfair to the person concerned.

Amendment 185B seeks to remove the requirement to consult from the power. I recognise that allowing warning notices to be disclosed is a major step change in regulation. It must be underpinned by proper procedures and safeguards. Consultation with the firm or individual concerned is key, because it is an important way in which the regulator can assess whether disclosure would be unfair and consider the possible impact of its actions. But I want to be clear that a requirement to consult the person affected does not mean that the FCA needs to seek their consent. That is clear and there is no getting away from it.

Amendment 185A seeks to delete the entire new power and revert to the current arrangements in FiSMA. I restate that the power to disclose warning notices is a key part of our vision for the FCA. It enables the FCA to regulate in a more proactive and preventative way. I have given a number of examples where, in its judgment, these powers would have made a difference in the past. They make transparency and disclosure a key pillar of its regulatory approach and enable it to have a credible enforcement function and deterrence strategy.

I do not agree with my noble friend Lord Flight about the read-across from the Standard Chartered case. I certainly agree with him and my noble friend Lord Deben—my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts also touched on this—that there are real dangers in terms of the knock-on consequences which the FSA and the FCA will have to take into account, but that general proposition, which of course the regulators in the UK will have to take account of, does not make valid a direct comparison with the Standard Chartered case in the US. The power proposed in this Bill is substantially different in scope, safeguards and proposed application from the power used by the New York DFS in respect of Standard Chartered. I think that my noble friend recognises some differences, but our analysis is that the safeguards are materially different. So, yes, the FCA will have to take into consideration the impact of its notices, but I do not agree that we should pray in aid the specific details of the Standard Chartered case. It is important to be reminded and have on the record what my noble friends say—which is correct. For listed companies in particular, the share prices can and will react very negatively in these circumstances. If subsequently it happens with tax announcements that are somehow back-tracked and have been over the years by HMRC or the Treasury, the first effect on a share price is often much more negative than subsequently, when some decision or tax policy announcement is reversed. I take that point and I am sure that the FCA will be very mindful of it as it makes those decisions in the future.

A number of other points have been made by noble Lords. As to the more specific challenge of my noble friend Lord Deben about what would happen if the regulator got it wrong, there is a general danger which the regulator needs to bear in mind before putting out a notice. Where the regulator decides to take no further action after it has made public the fact that it has published a warning notice, it has discretion to publish the fact that it has issued a notice of discontinuance if the person to whom the warning notice relates consents to that issue. Where the regulator has made public the fact that it has issued a warning notice but then decides that a case will not proceed to a decision notice, it will also make public the fact that a notice of discontinuance has been issued.

There are various other questions about delay and injunctions. I do not agree that the power as drafted will cause overall delays to the enforcement process. The Bill does not require publication of the warning notice or of a decision whether or not to be published to be taken, challenged or appealed et cetera in order for the enforcement process to keep going. The only delay will be to the publication rather than to the action itself. That may not have been the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, was making, but just to be clear: if it was, the underlying enforcement process keeps on going.

Of course, the FCA might face injunctions to prevent publication and that is part of the protection in the injunction process. We also stress that, without a requirement to consult the firm or individual in question, it is more likely that that firm would seek emergency injunctions preventing publication as a knee-jerk reaction. Therefore, we have the consultation duty and the final decision is taken by the FCA. There could be an injunction process, but we think that the right balance has been struck.

I could go on for a long time on this, but let me conclude. I hope that my noble friends will listen to the next bit, because I hear that, although we believe this is an important power, the question is whether it will be exercised properly and whether any further protection is needed. We are taking a bold new step in an untested direction and it has to be used responsibly. For that reason—and listening to this debate—I can say that we intend to return to this issue on Report in this one very specific way: that is, to make provision for a power for the Government to repeal the new warning notices power if at some point in the future the Treasury considers that the power or use of it by the regulators is, or may be, contrary to the public interest. This does not weaken in any way our commitment to this policy, or our belief that if used responsibly, which we expect it to be, the new power will form a vital part of the FCA’s regulatory toolkit.

I hope that what I have just said provides my noble friend with some reassurance that we will be mindful that the power is used in a responsible way which is in the interests of the greater good. Should that not be the case, we will act under a power which we intend to bring forward on Report.

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[Lord Sharkey]

Will the Minister clarify a point in sub-paragraph (3)(b) of paragraph 28 in Schedule 9, which would survive whether or not the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, were accepted? The sub-paragraph adds to the sentence in FiSMA the words,

“, or by 2 or more persons who include a person not directly involved in establishing that evidence”.

The whole paragraph now reads:

“That procedure must be designed to secure, among other things, that the decision which gives rise to the obligation to give any such notice is taken by a person not directly involved in establishing the evidence on which that decision is based, or by 2 or more persons who include a person not directly involved in establishing that evidence”.

FiSMA already permits a procedure that allows, in certain circumstances, the decision to issue a notice to be made solely by a person directly involved in establishing the evidence on which that decision is based. Why has the Minister felt it necessary to change this? Why, in particular, regularly allow the decision to issue a notice to be made by a person directly involved in establishing the evidence for the notice if he or she can persuade just one other person to agree? Does he have a particular type of case or set of circumstances in mind that would make this desirable or necessary, or is there some now apparent defect in the current regime as exemplified within the FSA by the Regulatory Decisions Committee?

[Lord Deben]

I hesitate to return to the previous discussion, but I just remark to the Minister that his whole list of examples of what this might have prevented of course misses the point. My point was that we could have done all those things with the RDC. The real question is: who makes that decision? I have never had an explanation of why it is necessary to have a power that is never referred to any independent group. That is all I am interested in and I feel very strongly about it. We have recently been trying to complete a very valuable thing called “treating customers fairly”. I want all customers to be treated fairly, and I entirely agree with the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, who is absolutely right.

I say to the Minister very personally and directly that when one of those most likely to be a senior regulator tells the industry that he intends to shoot first and ask questions later, he should understand why the industry has some concerns. That is all I say. All I am asking is that before such a decision is made, there should be reference to an independent body, and I think that the proposals put forward—albeit, as the noble Baroness rightly said, that they might need a little tweaking here and there—would seem to everyone to be fair.

We have the same situation—parallels have often been drawn—in police prosecution when someone outside asks whether this is a proper circumstance and whether it is likely to stand up. That is all that is necessary. Do that and most of us, I think, would be perfectly happy. Our issue is that, without making things more difficult in these debates, there are too many examples of decisions made that appeared to be hasty and when people have not looked too carefully at the details. This would make sure that they do.

All I say to the Minister is that he would have pretty overwhelming support for the changes that he wants if he were prepared to do what the noble Baroness has put forward. I would certainly be happy to argue that. If he does not do that, this will be difficult to support, and I am interested in the point that my noble friend has just made that there seems to have been an attempt to move even further away from what we should have.

I have one other point. The key thing is that the murmurings that somehow the RDC will disappear would be overcome by having this measure in the Bill. It is not unreasonable to have the concerns that people have, and I have not yet seen why introducing this measure would make things more difficult or less transparent. I would be happy to take the risk of people being warned and turning out to be guiltless, if it were done with this degree of protection. Then the Minister would have us all on his side.

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[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, I am extremely disappointed. We come back to “may” and “must”, which my noble friend mentioned. He has just had a birthday and he is still talking about “may” and “must”. If the FSA had not put on its website that it would not continue with this, perhaps our trust that it would continue with the RDC would be greater.

I confess that I have some form on this. In 1981, I worked on a Royal Commission on criminal procedure which tried to persuade the police that they should take their cases to an independent prosecutor. The Committee will not be surprised to hear that they did not want that to happen. In the Labour Party, it used to be the NEC that took cases against individuals. We were taken to court and told that we could not do that, so I ended up on the disciplinary committee to ensure that that was separate and independent of the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party. The barristers did not get it right and for a time the Bar Council used to use the same body to discipline its members and was taken to court. It had to set up the BSB complaints committee—that is another declaration of interest as my partner was vice chair or something of that—to ensure that there was that independence among the people who were presenting the cases and those hearing them. Whether there are two panels—one to see whether there is a case to answer and one to hold a hearing—is an issue of detail which I did not go into. I think that is for regulator. To trust the regulator, who is, if you like, the prosecutor—I do not like using the word “prosecutor” but perhaps we can bear it for the moment—to decide what sort of committee will challenge its evidence, seems to me not quite the correct way to approach this.

[Lord Deben]

One might go as far as that had it not been for two facts: one, to which the noble Baroness refers, is the website; and the other is the fact that a senior person, who is likely to be a regulator, said that his policy was to shoot first and ask questions later. That severely worries people. Whatever happened in the past, we need to remove doubt. As the Minister suggested that it does not really make any difference because he expects that to happen, I cannot see why it would make any difference if you were sure that would happen.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I could not have put it better, although I quite like to shoot first and ask questions after, but that is just a personal preference. As my noble friend Lord Barnett has said, there is clear support for this around the House. We are obviously going to bring it back at the next stage. If it is easier for the Minister, perhaps someone not from this side but from his side could put his or her name to the amendment. But for confidence in this type of independence it seems clear that the decision cannot be in the hands of the regulator who is also the presenter. There should be some guarantee that it is an independent body. I am extremely worried that someone who has been investigating could also be the decision-maker. That seems to go quite differently from other groups. So I am afraid we will return to this but for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.