(8 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberThat may not be the reason why it has been so drafted, but it is my interpretation of one of the consequences of that drafting.
The point I am making is that that construct, whereby a Minister of the Crown is a private person only for the purposes of that clause, seeks to exclude Parliament’s oversight of the actions of that person. At least Amendment 67 makes a respectable attempt to ensure that parliamentarians in both Houses can review the potential operation of certain issues under this Bill.
The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, raised the issue of numbers—very well, if I may say so. The leader of the Opposition, who was a young barrister in my chambers at one time and was noted for his determination and accuracy, told the nation that about 100 people would go to Rwanda. Others have suggested a figure of about 200. Would the Minister be kind enough to confirm the actual number of places that exist in Rwanda for people who would be sent there under this Bill? I believe it to be certainly less than 200, but that is based only on attempting to find out the figures through various articles I have read online. If we are really talking about fewer than 200 people, then what is all this about, and why is Parliament not to be allowed to draw the country’s attention to the fact that this is really a pig in a poke—a political construct designed to deceive people into believing that it will stop the boats—and take appropriate parliamentary steps? That is not what will stop the boats.
My Lords, the poke is very difficult to interrogate. One of the provisions of the treaty is about reception arrangements and accommodation, which goes to the point that the noble Lord has just made. I hope that the Minister will agree with our Amendment 76A, which is about transparency and the workings of the treaty. It is only through the joint committee that we could have any hope of understanding the day-to-day implementation of the treaty. It is only if we have something like Amendment 76A—we are not wedded to the particular drafting of it—that we will be able to understand. We need a reporting mechanism to Parliament in order to scrutinise, which is one of the major reasons that we are here, what actually happens—if it ever does happen.
My Lords, are we not in danger of simply adding to the bureaucracy of the Bill by demanding an extra measure of reporting or an extra way of scrutinising? We have Questions four days a week, we have Questions for Short Debate. There is hardly a debate I have been in that did not end with a noble Lord’s question to a Minister about one matter or another, seeking precise information.
My Lords, it is certainly the case that we ask for a lot of information, but if there is no obligation on the Government to provide the information, where do we go from there?
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this relatively short debate. Just for the record, I point out that my noble friend Lord Hailsham extended the courtesy of letting me know that he would be unavailable today, which I appreciate.
This legislation builds on the Illegal Migration Act 2023, the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, and other immigration Acts. It does not seek to replicate the provisions of the Illegal Migration Act for other case types. It is limited to the issue of the safety of Rwanda and makes some consequential changes to give proper effect to the presumption that Rwanda is a safe country.
The Government are considering plans for delivery of the provisions of the Illegal Migration Act in light of the Supreme Court judgment. Provisions in the Illegal Migration Act to support removal of people to Rwanda whose asylum and human rights claims are inadmissible will be commenced after Parliament has given its view on the safety of Rwanda.
As drafted, Amendment 67, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asks for information normally used only for internal government planning. This is not information that is normally shared since it is not Parliament’s role to examine the details of internal operational planning, nor is it necessary to meet the Government’s primary objective of ensuring that flights can relocate people to Rwanda.
However, I can confirm that, where claims are declared inadmissible for those who are subject to the duty to remove, the Government will provide support and accommodation in line with Section 9 of the Illegal Migration Act. Furthermore, in response to both Amendments 66 and 67, once the partnership is operationalised and flights commence, as soon as practicable following Royal Assent, removal data will be published online in the usual manner as part of the quarterly immigration statistics.
With regard to reporting on the current location and immigration status of any individuals relocated under the Rwanda treaty, it would be wholly inappropriate for the Government to report on personal data pertaining to the locations of relocated individuals in this manner. We believe that is also unnecessary. As we have set out, the treaty provides that no one relocated will be removed from Rwanda except, in very limited circumstances, to the UK. We have also been clear that anyone relocated who wishes to leave Rwanda voluntarily is free to do so.
The UK and Rwanda will co-operate to ensure that removal contrary to this obligation does not occur, which may include systems for monitoring the locations of relocated individuals. However, this would be with their express consent only and would, of course, not be for wider sharing or publication. This is in addition to the robust monitoring mechanisms already in place via the monitoring committee to ensure the effective operation of the partnership in practice and the well-being of those relocated, the findings of which will be reported in line with the agreed procedures set out in the monitoring committee terms of reference and enhanced monitoring plan, which, as set out earlier in this debate, are published online.
I turn to Amendment 76A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. The terms of reference set out clearly that during the period of enhanced monitoring, the monitoring committee will report to the joint committee, which is made up of both UK and Rwandan officials. This is set out in Article 15(4)(b), in accordance with an agreed action plan, which will include weekly and bi-weekly reporting, as required. As per Article 15(4)(c) of the treaty, the monitoring committee will make any recommendations to the joint committee which it sees fit to do. The monitoring committee will otherwise produce a formal written report for the joint committee on a quarterly basis over the first two years of the partnership, setting out its findings and making any recommendations.
Following notification to the joint committee, the monitoring committee may publish reports on its findings as it sees fit. At least once a year, it will produce a summary report for publication. I have set out that the treaty includes enhanced provisions to provide real-time independent scrutiny of Rwanda’s asylum procedures aimed at preventing the risk of mistreatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR before it has the chance to occur. This addresses the findings in the Supreme Court proceedings that under the previous arrangements, as set out in the memorandum of understanding, the work of the monitoring committee would necessarily be retrospective. The treaty further provides at Article 15(9) for the monitoring committee to develop a complaints system that can be used by relocated individuals to lodge confidential complaints regarding alleged failure to comply with the obligations agreed, and that the monitoring committee will investigate all such complaints received directly during the enhanced three-month monitoring period.
Since the partnership was announced, UK officials have worked closely with the Government of Rwanda to ensure that individuals relocated under the agreement will be safe and that their rights will be protected. For example, the treaty sets out at paragraph 3 of Part 2 of Annex B a new process for Rwanda’s first instance body, responsible for making decisions on claims for refugee or humanitarian protection status at first instance. These changes, which will require the introduction of a new domestic asylum law, will move Rwanda’s asylum system to a caseworker model and address the Supreme Court’s conclusions as to the system’s capacity.
The UK Government have already worked with Government of Rwanda to build the capacity of their current asylum system. This work has included agreeing detailed standard operating procedures, reviews of contracts for services the Government of Rwanda have procured—for example, with accommodation facilities and medical insurance companies—and new or revised training programmes. The Home Office has also conducted ground visits, detailed guidance reviews, table-top exercises and walk-throughs to map out the end-to-end process of this partnership and better identify prospective areas for strengthening. This is in addition to ongoing training and capacity building for Rwandan officials within the refugee status determination process. Home Office officials are working on a daily basis with the officials in Rwanda to deliver this partnership.
I do have an answer for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, as to how the joint committee can report to Parliament. It is not the answer that he will want, but it is all I can say at the moment. The joint committee is due to meet this week, when discussions on treaty implementation will continue. Senior Home Office officials will be in attendance, and I hope to have more to say on this before we get to Report.
(8 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble friend is right; I might very well want to refer to that.
My Lords, when the noble Lord, Lord Murray, referred to this in his contribution, he used the term “simply”. He said that it would simply have to be dealt with by the young person in Rwanda. Does the Minister agree that “simply” is an appropriate word to use in this context?
I am not in a position to agree or disagree, because I do not know how the judicial review process take place; I am afraid that I am not a lawyer.
Any decision on age made by the Home Office for immigration purposes is not binding on the civil or criminal courts. Where an individual is charged with a criminal offence and the presiding judge doubts whether the individual is a child, the court can take a decision on the age of an individual before them based on the available evidence or request that a Merton-compliant age assessment be undertaken.
The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, asked me a consider number of questions on safeguarding, so I will go into some detail on the safeguarding arrangements. They are set out in detail in the standard operating procedure on identifying and safeguarding vulnerability, dated May 2023. It states that, at any stage in the refugee status determination and integration process, officials may encounter and should have due regard to the physical and psychological signs that can indicate that a person is vulnerable. The standard operating procedure sets out the process for identifying vulnerable persons and, where appropriate, making safeguarding referrals to the relevant protection team. Screening interviews to identify vulnerabilities will be conducted by protection officers, who have received the relevant training and are equipped to handle safeguarding referrals competently. The protection team may trigger follow-up assessments and/or treatment, as appropriate. In addition, protection officers may support an individual to engage in the asylum process and advise relevant officials of any support needs or adjustments to enable the individual to engage with the process. Where appropriate, the protection team may refer vulnerable individuals for external support, which may include medical and/or psychosocial support, or support within their accommodation; and, where possible, that should be provided with the informed consent of the individual.
(8 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support Amendment 75, to which I have added my name. In order not to try the patience of the Committee, I will not repeat all the excellent arguments made by the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, with which I entirely agree, save to say that if global Britain is to be effective in the world, it will need to form partnerships with and gain support from people in all sorts of different parts of the world, often very difficult and dangerous parts of the world.
In order to garner such support, it will need to be seen as trustworthy. How trustworthy does anybody think we will be seen as if we have taken those who have already served us so faithfully in such difficult circumstances and sent them to Rwanda? So, for those who are not swayed by a sense of moral obligation, I ask them to consider the future effectiveness and safety of the men and women of our Armed Forces who are sent out to do such difficult and dangerous things in these parts of the world.
The noble Lord, Lord Horam, has said that the Government seek to draw very narrowly the definition of the people who are excluded from the provisions of this Bill. Surely, at the very least, those who have put their safety and indeed their very lives on the line in support of this country deserve to fall into that category.
My Lords, no one could disagree with a word of that. I of course support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Browne. It makes me ashamed every time I see stories such as those that he has related. I support the amendments in the name of my noble friend—whatever persona he speaks in—and have added my name to the noble and learned Baroness’s amendment, which is of course about victims of trafficking and modern slavery.
As my noble friend Lady Brinton said, we will come next week to the position of children, which will include the question of age assessment. I hope that somebody in that debate will draw attention to the Government’s references to the young men who are really men, not children, when they come across the channel. I am sure that other noble Lords saw on our television screens the amazing darts player Luke Littler. He looked considerably more than a child—he looked about 35, in fact. The noble Lord, Lord Horam, said that the amendments from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, drive a coach and horses through the Bill. That is an interesting choice of words; they were the words that Theresa May used about the impact of the recent migration, immigration and asylum Bills.
The noble Lord also criticised the word “might”—that people “might” be in this position. Well, that is because we have a process, which is referred to in the amendment: the national referral mechanism. That is our mechanism for assessing claims of having been trafficked or being a victim of modern slavery and so on. It has its problems, particularly in delays, but it is a careful method of assessment that is not replicated in Rwanda. It involves the support of victims of modern slavery and trafficking, which is not available in Rwanda.
I am no less worried than I was when the Rwanda proposal surfaced. Far from tackling these evils, we are expanding the market and opening it up in that country to further trafficking and re-trafficking. It is a country where modern slavery, as has been said, is a good deal more prevalent than it is in the UK. And it is not just a matter of prevalence, it is a matter of culture—something to which the Supreme Court referred. The culture in Rwanda is not to assess whether people are vulnerable in this area. It shows no demonstration of understanding what modern slavery is or how to assess possible victims. If that sounds technical, it is technical in a way, but it is also about what happens to individuals at a human level. We have heard some very powerful speeches supporting that position.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I support Amendment 75, which was moved so powerfully by the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, and supported by my noble and gallant friend Lord Stirrup.
While they were speaking, I was struck by one paragraph in the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights which I referred to briefly in our proceedings on Monday: paragraph 119 on page 33. We referred to Afghanistan, and it was in this context:
“We have observed, however, that other nations may be influenced by the way in which the UK treats its international law obligations. For example, we note that the Prime Minister of Pakistan has already referred to the UK’s Rwanda policy in defence of his country’s decision to expel from Pakistan hundreds of thousands of Afghans who have fled from the Taliban regime”.
In reflecting on that, the committee said at paragraph 120:
“The UK has a reputation for respect for human rights and the rule of law, of which we should be proud. Legislation that seeks to disapply or fails to respect international law risks damaging that reputation and encouraging other states who are less respectful of the international legal order”.
I will reinforce the point that the noble Lord, Lord Browne, has made and I am grateful to the Minister for his patience. The individual cases that I have referred to the Minister have failed to qualify under the ARAP scheme, and yet he, through his own interventions and those of other Ministers, has been able to rectify those issues; there will doubtless be similar cases in the future as well. Should we not at least have a review of how the schemes are running—an open and transparent process—and a review of some of the cases that have already been referred to the Minister, and to the MoD and the Foreign Office, so that we can see how many we are talking about and what is going wrong inside the system that those cases were turned down in the first place?
My Lords, I am not sure whether I picked up in the Minister’s response that he included the cohort listed in paragraph (b) of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Browne; that is, not people who have supported our Armed Forces overseas but
“persons who have been employed by or indirectly contracted to provide services to the United Kingdom Government”.
Regarding the applications to the ARAP scheme, clearly, I am not qualified to comment on individual circumstances as described by the noble Lord. I am afraid I do not know the precise details of who is qualified to apply under the ARAP scheme, so I will find that out and come back to the noble Baroness in due course. I cannot give any further comment at this point.
I have heard what has been said, and I will now turn to Amendments 70, 73 and 85, proposed by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and Amendments 18, 23, and 47, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord German. The UK has a proactive duty to identify victims of modern slavery, and we remain committed to ensuring that where indicators that someone is a victim of modern slavery are identified by first responders, they continue to be referred into the national referral mechanism for consideration by the competent authorities. Steps will be taken in all cases to identify whether a person may be a victim of modern slavery, and if a person is referred into the national referral mechanism, a reasonable grounds decision will be made.
Amendment 70 would act to impede the provisions already passed in the Nationality and Borders Act and the Illegal Migration Act that introduced the means to disqualify certain individuals from the national referral mechanism on grounds of public order before a conclusive grounds decision is considered. The amendment is also unnecessary—it is important to be clear on this point—as the Government of Rwanda have systems in place to safeguard relocated individuals with a range of vulnerabilities, including those concerning mental health and gender-based violence.
Regarding victims of modern slavery, Article 5(2)(d) of the treaty obliges the UK to provide Rwanda with
“the outcome of any decision in the United Kingdom as to whether the Relocated Individual is a victim of trafficking”,
and this includes positive reasonable grounds decisions, as well as positive conclusive grounds decisions. Article 13 of the treaty makes specific provision that Rwanda will have regard to information provided by the UK
“about a Relocated Individual relating to any special needs that may arise as a result of them being a victim of modern slavery or human trafficking, and shall take all necessary steps to ensure that these needs are accommodated”.
(8 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, that may be so, but I think that the point I have made stands—and I think that perhaps I have said enough to point out that the Bar Council has very real concerns about this Bill.
My Lords, I will speak mainly to Amendments 11 and 12 in the name of my noble friend Lord German. I cannot stop myself saying that it really goes against the grain to do anything that suggests that Liberal Democrats regard the Bill as requiring only some tweaking to be acceptable.
First, I would like to make a general comment about Clause 1. For many years, Governments have opposed amendments setting out the general purpose of a Bill on the basis of such a clause having no effect and being rather confusing. I used to find that understandable, although I signed such amendments; they have tended to be narratives describing hopes, rather than expectations or anything firmer. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has commented on the changing fashion—of such measures being there to make the courts wary of the direction in which they might like to go. This problem applies to Clause 1.
There is a notable omission from the exposition of the Government’s policy—and that is tackling people smuggling, which is abhorrent in itself, not only because of the smugglers’ role in bringing asylum seekers to the UK. The Illegal Migration Act has a similar introductory section. Specifically, Section 1(3) says:
“Accordingly, and so far as it is possible to do so, provision made by or by virtue of this Act must be read and given effect so as to achieve the purpose mentioned in subsection (1)”.
It is important to be clear about the legal effect of Clause 1. If it is intended that the clause is to be relied on, it needs to be sharpened up—for instance, in the case of terminology such as
“the system for the processing of … claims … is to be improved”,
an objective of the treaty, which is a pretty low bar. But my central point is that we need to be very clear about the legal effect and status of this clause, because there will be little point in amending the clause on Report unless the amendment has an effect, either as a stand-alone or by subsequent reference, such as the Act not coming into force unless a provision in Clause 1 is met. This may seem a rather technical point but, looking ahead, I do not want to be tripped up on it.
Amendment 12—I am aware that it is an amendment to the clause whose effect I have been querying—therefore probes the definition of “safe country”. The Bill refers, in Clause 1(5)(b)(ii), to a person having
“their claim determined and … treated in accordance with that country’s obligations under international law”—
that is, Rwanda’s obligations. The amendment would leave out “that country’s” and insert “the United Kingdom’s”, changing it to being the UK’s “obligations under international law”.
The treaty is predicated on Rwanda being under the same obligations, and as observant of them, as is the UK, so that the transfer to Rwanda, as I understand it, means really only a change of venue. Dr Google did not really help me yesterday in finding what conventions Rwanda has signed up to and, importantly, ratified and observed. But we are proceeding with this on the basis that everything that we would do in this country will apply under the new regime, and I will be interested in the Minister’s comments.
Amendment 11 is related to this. Clause 1(5)(a) also defines a safe country for the purposes of the Bill. It refers to the UK’s obligations
“that are relevant to the treatment in that country of persons who are removed there”.
Surely, all our obligations are relevant to the treatment of persons removed there, not just in that country. So both amendments go to the issue of safety—that is, the Bill’s compatibility with the UK’s human rights obligations, which are the obligations that are crucial as part of this whole regime.
My Lords, it is a hard act to follow so many lawyers here: I hope that my compassion and conviction might help me where I am missing legal expertise. I support the amendments to Clause 1 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, which introduce an additional purpose of compliance with the rule of law and a role for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. I apologise that I was unable to join your Lordships for Second Reading, as I was overseas. I have read the Hansard record of the debate, during which many noble Lords raised what I see as the fundamental issue at stake with the Bill and the Rwanda scheme more broadly: how it is squared with the rule of law and with the international agreements and obligations that are the bedrock and defence of our freedom and prosperity.
I come to this with a conviction that our best chance of solving the global challenges we face, illegal migration among them, is not through unilateral action but through international co-operation and standing up for the rule of law. Other noble Lords have explained how these amendments would help ensure that refugees really are safe, and the importance of this as a matter of humanity as well as of law. I suggest that recognising a role for the UNHCR is also important from an international perspective, and as a route towards the lasting solution the Government seek. It is right to want to reduce people smuggling, but, if the Bill is to have a positive impact, it will be only as part of a wider approach.
The preamble of the 1951 refugee convention is surely correct when it states that a “satisfactory solution” to the problem of supporting refugees in a fair and humane manner, without placing an undue burden on any one state,
“cannot therefore be achieved without international co-operation … the effective co-ordination of measures taken to deal with this problem will depend upon the co-operation of States with the High Commissioner”.
As I have argued in your Lordships’ House before, a lack of respect for international law and the weakness of international institutions lie behind the large number of people forcibly displaced around the world. While not the only cause, wars of aggression, indiscriminate or deliberate targeting of civilians, war crimes and crimes against humanity drive displacement. We will not reduce the number of displaced persons globally while wars and atrocities continue unchecked, and while international law is applied unevenly. At a time when we and the wider West are struggling to maintain any credibility when it comes to the rule of law and international co-operation, recognising in law a place for UNHCR in determining the safety of the Rwanda scheme would be a small step towards demonstrating our ongoing commitment to international institutions and agreements that are critical for global security.
It has become a bit of a trope to say that the refugee convention and UNHCR itself are outdated and unable to rise to the magnitude of the task at hand. In supporting a role for UNHCR in this legislation, I challenge that view. It is worth putting the scale of the refugee situation in some context. As a recent book, How Migration Really Works by Professor Hein de Haas, one of the world’s leading experts on migration, sets out very clearly, current refugee numbers are not in fact exceptional or unprecedented. There are 30 million refugees globally, but this is 0.3% of the global population, only marginally above the proportion of refugees in 1992. The vast majority of the displaced stay either in their country of origin or their immediate region; it is a small minority who come to Europe and to the United Kingdom.
We should be able to rise to this challenge. The refugee crisis is one of protection and political will, not only of sheer numbers. This Bill is all about signalling. The Government hope to signal that they are tough on illegal migration and to deter small boat crossings, but we are at risk of signalling that we are uninterested in the rule of law and in our international agreements and co-operation. That would be a very serious mistake for our ability to co-operate on refugees and other global issues, as well as for the international rules-based order.
My Lords, this is Committee, and I am speaking to the various amendments in this group. As I have just reminded my noble friend Lord Hailsham, we will get to another group which debates the clauses in the treaty—as regards the various committees and so on that are in place—later in the day.
My Lords, I know it is very boring, but could the Minister respond to my question about the legal status and the effect of Clause 1? I am still not clear what attention we should pay to it, were we to be in very formal proceedings rather than debating the situation broadly. In other words, if there is a breach of Clause 1—I do not know whether it can be called a breach; if there is no compliance with Clause 1—then what, in formal legal terms?
My Lords, it is simply the introduction to the Bill, so I am not entirely sure I get the drift of the question of the noble Baroness.
My Lords, I may have missed it, but could the Minister say whether Rwanda has drafted a refugee law?
My Lords, can I add to the Minister’s list the number of judges who have agreed to go to Rwanda and work there, and indeed the number of officials, and for how long?
My Lords, it is a matter of working towards having the safeguards in place. We have received assurances from the Government of Rwanda that the implementation of all measures in the treaty will be expedited. The point is that we are working with them to accomplish that end. We have already developed and commenced operational training—
(1 year, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, five of the amendments in this group have my name and the names of noble and noble and learned friends on them. They are designed to remove retrospectivity in relation to the duty to deport. I, and certainly two of my noble friends, have had the advantage of a meeting with the Attorney-General and officials in recent days to discuss this, and I hope I am not being too optimistic in hoping that we will hear something at least partly welcome from the Minister at the end of this debate. I shall be very disappointed if that does not happen.
Retrospectivity is the enemy of legal certainty. Legal certainty is a basic tenet of common law and of our statutory law. In order to save time, I am not going to cite various very eminent judges who have spoken on this subject. I will simply give the names of Lord Bingham, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, and the great public lawyer the late Sir John Laws. I remind your Lordships that the House of Lords Constitution Committee has emphasised that retrospective legislation should be passed in very exceptional circumstances only. The proof of very exceptional circumstances should require more than mere assertion: it should require clear evidence. The fact that the retrospectivity asked for, as in this situation, may affect a relatively small cohort of people is no mitigation for the wrong of unnecessary retrospectivity.
The Government are not offering evidence. They are offering a refrain, and the refrain is: “Stop the boats”. But they have failed to offer any convincing evidence at all as to how the present circumstances are so exceptional as to justify the Bill’s wide-ranging retrospective powers. This is wholly unacceptable, given that the proposals represent a widespread retroactive overhaul of our asylum law, founded simply on a deterrent effect—“Stop the boats”—which is unproved.
Again, for the purposes of brevity, I will not deliver the whole speech I would have wished to—and will break the habits of a lifetime thereby. But I remind your Lordships that the deterrent effect is hardly borne out by the Government’s own figures for migrants detected crossing the channel in June 2023, the very month we are in. I was surprised they did not appear in the impact statement, because they were available before it. According to those figures, up to that point, 3,506 migrants were detected crossing the channel in June this year, compared with 3,139 in June last year—some 400 more, and 1,500 more than in June 2021. If one looks at the figures for April, May and June 2023 together, the evidence that this retrospective element is stopping the boats is a fairy tale, but one of those nasty fairy tales that keeps the victims of it awake at night because of the uncertainty of what will happen to them.
Furthermore, the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 addressed the same public policy issue and was not retrospective. As Dame Priti Patel MP, the then Home Secretary, said in the Second Reading debate on that legislation, the intention was that:
“Anyone who arrives in the UK via a safe third country may have their claim declined and be returned to a country they arrived from or a third safe country”. [Official Report, Commons, 19/7/21; col. 717.]
In other words, the policy intention was the same, but although there was a little bit of retrospectivity in that legislation, the vast majority of its provisions were not retrospective.
At the conclusion of Committee on this Bill, the Minister admitted that announcing that it applied from 7 March 2023
“may not have had a decisive impact”. [Official Report, 24/5/23; col. 967.]
Well, the evidence suggests that it has not had a decisive effect at all. At best it is equivocal, which cannot be a basis for proper retrospectivity. The evidence does not justify such broad and sweeping legislation, which seeks to apply penalties to those who cross the channel to claim asylum, being retrospective in its entirety. It would set a dangerous precedent whereby the Government could legislate retrospectively, based on no more than conjecture and anecdote.
I respectfully suggest, even at this stage of the Bill, that a dangerous precedent is being set, that we should be deadly serious about the fact that we are dealing with the law and with sound and historic legal practice, and that this is not a situation in which the case for retrospectivity is anywhere near made out.
My Lords, as the noble Lord has said, brevity does not mean half-heartedness today and these Benches whole-heartedly support the noble Lord’s amendments to which my name has been added. It is not only an academic, philosophical, juris- prudential matter; retrospectivity applied to this Bill will be cited as a precedent for the future and would have an impact in the real world for individuals.
As we have heard, the Nationality and Borders Act is not retrospective. Indeed, the two classes of asylum seekers for which it provided have not even been brought into effect. Ironically, the situation and the figures that have been cited have supported our points that it will not have the deterrent effect that has been claimed. It is a very thin claim. The weather in the case of the channel crossings, and TikTok’s policy in the case of Albania, did have an effect. That puts all of us in our place.
My Lords, traffickers exercise control over their victims by convincing them that they will not receive help from the authorities if they seek it. The Bill will simply add credence to that claim.
I fully sympathise with the desire to deter people from using our modern slavery laws as a means to make a spurious claim for protection, but where is the evidence? The Government cannot point at any evidence of widespread abuse of our modern slavery system, yet they propose to remove basic protections for some of the most vulnerable people in our country. It is a basic principle of law—I can find it for you in the Book of Genesis if you want—that, in our desire to convict the guilty, we should not end up punishing the innocent. Amendment 12 is the very least we need in order to protect that vital principle.
Some 41% of referrals to the national referral mechanism relate to people exploited as children, which is why I also support Amendment 112 in the name of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. We must ensure that no child victim, whatever form of exploitation they have experienced or whatever crime they may have been coerced into committing, should be disqualified from accessing protection. We owe that to children. We have a moral responsibility at the very least to provide people with the opportunity to have their case heard through the national referral mechanism without fear of immediate detention or removal.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, told us during the last vote about the views of all the members of the Council of Europe and specifically mentioned Hungary questioning what the UK is doing—Hungary.
My name is on the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, on behalf of everyone on these Benches. The survivors of modern slavery should be protected and supported, not just because it is the right thing to do and the UK was lauded for it but to help the prosecution of criminals, of which we hear very little. The Bill indicates the extent to which the Government fail to put themselves in the shoes of victims and survivors, including those who have been trafficked here—who therefore have not come under their own steam—and particularly regarding the need for survivors to be in the UK to assist prosecutions. I could go on, but I will not.
The noble Lord, Lord Alton, is right that we need an independent anti-slavery commissioner in post. How long has it been—a year and how many months? A considerable number of criteria should be assessed, but we are where we are. We maintain our opposition to how slavery and trafficking are dealt with. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, on his filleting of the Bill. We will be with him.
My Lords, my name is on Amendment 96, along with those of my noble and learned friend Lady Butler-Sloss, who spoke earlier and with whom I agree, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. It attempts to remove Clause 21(5) and (6). Those subsections mean that a person will be removed from this country unless it is “necessary” and there are “compelling circumstances” to show that it is necessary for the person to be present in this country for the dreadful crimes that we are talking about to be prosecuted. Was the Director of Public Prosecutions asked about the effect of this provision on the likely success of prosecutions? If this clause required it to be advisable for the person to be present for the purposes of the investigation and prosecution, I would be in favour of it, but it goes much further than that and is contrary to all good prosecution practice.
I confess that I have met a lot of organised criminals in my time—as a barrister. I have also met an awful lot of victims in my time, as a barrister and occasionally as a Member of this House and the other place. It is not a level playing field. If the Crown Prosecution Service were asked what was advisable, like anybody who has ever prosecuted a semi-serious case and done cases where some witnesses were abroad, as I have, it would say that it is always advisable to have the witness in court, on a local screen or interviewed in a statutory way if at all possible, not to have them on the other side of the globe somewhere—they are unlikely to turn up and will be intimidated by the process.
Let me briefly compare the criminal we are talking about with the victim. The criminal is familiar with the legal system. He—it is usually a he—is often charming. He is often wealthy and can hire lawyers who may even be Members of your Lordships’ House. He is malign, lethal and cocky in the face of the legal system. Those are the characteristics of serious organised criminals. As for the victim, what is she going to be like? She will be frightened. She is likely to be poor. She will be vulnerable and terrified of the legal system and, to use an Orwellian word, will feel like an “unperson”. Do we really want that?
(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am unable to maintain my self-denying ordinance. I had hoped to give other noble Lords more time than has been allowed, although I cannot work out the arithmetic. Noble Lords have been particularly succinct, so having spotted the gap, I will move into it.
I have been particularly struck over the last few days by the emails that I have received from family, friends and campaigners in this area who all thought that I would be leading on this. I have thought about how much this regime brings the law into dispute and what a very serious matter that is. If somebody had written a novel about all of this, we would say that it could not happen; but it has and it must not go on.
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for introducing these amendments with such clarity and conviction and to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, for her passionate plea for the Government to have another look at these clauses. What I am going to say will repeat the points that they have made, but I think that they are worth repeating because they are serious concerns.
One of the main concerns of all those working with victims of modern slavery—NGOs, police, prosecutors—is Clause 58. It is humbling when you talk to those working on the front line to hear of the compassionate way in which they work with victims of trafficking. I have listened carefully to their concerns and I think that the Government should pay heed. I urge the Minister to talk properly to those working on the front line with these people.
Clause 58 will have the devastating effect of damaging the credibility of victims of modern slavery if they fail to disclose their trafficking experience within a set framework. The UK, as we have heard, is seen as a world leader in tackling modern slavery. We need to build on that experience and the achievements gained over the last few years, not undermine victims by starting from a position of disbelieving them and then requiring them to prove otherwise. That would be regressive. It would breach the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking by putting the onus on victims to identify themselves and removing the state’s obligation to identify victims and investigate trafficking offences.
Clause 58 will deter victims from coming forward, reduce the number of successful prosecutions and police investigations and leave the most dangerous criminals free. It is for this reason that the police and prosecutors have voiced their concerns. The Government’s own NRM supporter, the Salvation Army, which has held the victim care contract for over 10 years, has expressed grave concerns. Most worryingly, children are not exempt. That will be a significant setback for the achievements of the Modern Slavery Act and children protection legislation. As we have heard, the conflation of immigration with victims of trafficking, particularly children, is beyond comprehension. This clause goes against experience, undermines a legal principle and displays a complete lack of understanding. As we have heard, both Sara Thornton, the Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner, and Theresa May—rightly, compliments have been paid to her—have expressed concerns. This clause should not stand part of the Bill.
To tackle the problems that Clause 58 is designed to resolve requires operational, not legislative, change. The clause goes against the Government’s own aims. It will push victims away from support, hamper efforts to track down trafficking gangs and likely reduce numbers of prosecutions. What is needed is the improvement of the NRM, reductions of delays in decision-making and better funding. I am not clear how a set framework will help with abuse and I am not aware of any data published by the Government to illustrate misuse of the NRM. Perhaps the Minister can explain how a set framework will help and what evidence, if any, the Government have about the level of abuse.
The Government argue that this measure will help to ensure that victims are identified as early as possible to receive support. Speeding up the process is in everyone's interest, but I am not sure how the clause will help. The probing amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, which I support, would add a list of good reasons for late disclosure to Clause 58. There needs to be clarity in the legislation that the notice period can be extended. It needs to be stated clearly that there are circumstances when a late disclosure should not be penalised.
With regard to children, will the Government publish a children’s rights assessment and draft guidance before Report? As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said, we need that in the Bill.
My Lords, I have added my name to the opposition to both Clauses 57 and 58. The Minister will understand by now the view that has been expressed, with no exceptions, that the Bill does not advance our world-leading work to support victims of modern slavery and is a retrograde step. No one would say that all the work that is needed has been done. There is a lot of learning going on and it has to go on, but the Bill does not advance that work at all.
The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked why the Government are doing this. This had not occurred to me before but maybe it is the pervasive culture of disbelief raising its head again. I am glad that the debate on Part 5 was opened by the noble Lord and the noble and learned Baroness, both of whom I feel I should refer to as my noble friends; I have been hanging on to their coattails in this area.
I am going to say very much less than I could today. Part 5 merits—if that is not too positive a term—a whole day’s debate at least, but I, too, am aware of the pressures on time. Being constrained in the scrutiny of a Bill to which so many of us are opposed, pretty much across the board, is particularly concerning. I must investigate the procedures for moving to leave out a whole part of a Bill on Report. This is so shaming because this part of the Bill affects people whom we are so keen to support and protect.
Reference has been made to late information. I am going to give a couple of examples, both of which cases I have some particular knowledge of, not because I think that they will come as news to most people in the Chamber but because there are many of our colleagues who are not aware of all this. I refer to two victims. The first is a learning-disabled man who worked on a farm for decades in the most appalling conditions, conditions that are difficult to read about. He was not able to leave but did not even think he ought to try to do so because he did not know where else he might go. He even referred to his falling-down insanitary shed as home. The second is a young woman, who, in speaking to the police, could not get beyond the fact that in her head the perpetrator was her boyfriend. Sadly, those are both common situations. I will leave the matter there.
My Lords, for the reasons given by other speakers—particularly the last speaker, with whom I profoundly agree—I support these amendments. However, I want to raise a slightly different point on Clause 59. It appears to apply to children. I have had, over the years, numerous meetings with the Home Office, and I thought we had got to the position where the Home Office agreed that the NRM was not the right place for children to go, because anyone under the age of 18 becomes immediately, on arrival in this country, the responsibility of a local authority under Part 3 of the Children Act 1989. Consequently, local authorities take over these children.
As the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, pointed out, there are these independent guardians—advocates, who act as guardians—but the children are supposed to be cared for by a local authority with an independent guardian and should not be going through the NRM. What disturbs me about Clause 59, in addition to the points that have already been so ably made, is whether it is really intended that the Government want children to go through the NRM. Should not they in fact all be dealt with entirely through local authorities, with the help of the advocate?
My Lords, my name is to Amendment 157. This is a rhetorical question, but is not it interesting that the noble Lord, Lord Deben, who, if I am right, was not able to be here for the first group of amendments, has made points that were not rehearsed in his presence but are exactly the same points, as he says, from the point of view of the best traditions of Conservatism?
Clause 59 again prompts the question: why, and what is the problem? What is the evidence for what the Government perceive as a problem? Are there too many people claiming to be victims? Like other noble Lords, I thought the problem was that we do not know how many there are. We try to identify them, but we know that we do not manage to identify them all—but we know that all the indicators are that modern slavery goes wide and deep. The problem is that we do not identify everyone that we want to support. What underlines the Modern Slavery Act is getting people to the situation in which they can be supported.
Under Amendment 157, the Member’s explanatory statement actually refers to “current statutory guidance”, a point that was very well made in the previous debate.
I want to say a word about Amendment 173, on navigators. I am quite intrigued by this—guardians for adults, is that what is intended? Some police forces have a much better understanding of how to deal with victims, or possible victims, of slavery. I am not sure whether I have the name of this right, but I think that there was a transformation unit; the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, may remember. The police did a lot of work at one time. Can we hear about that from the Minister?
I may be able to help the noble Baroness—it was at Exmouth. I went to see it.
Indeed, it was excellent. That is why I raised it—because I wonder what has happened to it. As I say, I find the suggestion made in Amendment 173 intriguing, and I hope that it will be taken very seriously.
I rise briefly to say that we support the amendments in this group. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Deben, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, and we have said right across the Chamber, the points that he made about the contribution that Theresa May made—within the coalition Government, as I was reminded—were fantastic.
The noble Lord shrugged his shoulders, but I repeat that the justification for this is to align with our international obligations with our partners in ECAT.
My Lords, this did not stop us passing the Modern Slavery Act, which was ahead of the rest of the world.
My Lords, my name is on Amendment 160A, which is from these Benches. I fear that we are rather in lipstick on pigs territory—a phrase used a good deal earlier in our deliberations on the Bill. Clause 62 refers a “threat to public order”, which is then explained as various terrorism offences. It says that the list is not exhaustive, and I recognise what the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, said about how non-exhaustive lists are dealt with in the courts and that the longer lists are, the more rigorously they are dealt with. Our amendment refers instead to a threat to national security.
My noble friend Lord Paddick also has his name on the Clause 62 stand part notice and mine is on Amendment 169. I do not want to take the time of the Committee by repeating what has been said, very clearly, about activity “attributable” to being a victim of slavery or trafficking.
In the previous group of amendments, the Minister referred to an ability to recollect. I think, from other things he has said, in a sympathetic manner, he would agree that very often there is also, among victims, an inability to express—it is not just the inability to recollect. It might be worth saying—I am not sure it has been said before—that there is even more difficulty than in disclosing that one has been a victim of forced labour in disclosing that one has been a victim of sexual exploitation.
I agree with others about words such as “worthy” and “unworthy”. I noted “deserving” and “undeserving” —here we are again—like “deserving” and “undeserving” refugees and asylum seekers; that distinction is replicated here.
My Lords, again, as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, I shall speak very briefly. I should say how much I appreciate the contributions made by my noble friend Lord Coaker, by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, who is on the Joint Committee with me, and by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, in her very powerful remarks.
Many years ago—if I may tell a little anecdote—I heard of a certain conversation that took place in the Home Office when an official was told by her boss to justify a certain position. The official said, “But that is indefensible”. Her boss said, “Yes, of course—defending the defensible is easy. You’re paid to defend the indefensible”. I say that as a word of comfort to the Minister, who is defending the indefensible. He knows it, we know it and the officials know it—and I suppose he has to do it, unless he does what the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, did and decides to distance himself from it.
I will say this very briefly. I find it hard to remember, and keep needing to remind myself, that we are talking about Part 5 of a Bill about modern slavery. Some of these issues are so remote from the rest of the Bill, as has already been said. The amendments to which I have put my name are concerned about a number of things. One is public safety and security. The amendments seek to get the right balance between public safety and security, which of course is important, and the rights of individuals who seek safety in this country. I contend that the Government, particularly in Clause 62, have got the balance quite wrong.
As the right reverend Prelate has already said, some of the people who are victims of traffickers or slavery are under threat; they are fearful, and the fact is that some of them at least will have been compelled to take up the position that they have taken up. We should respect that. These are frightened and anxious people, who are not secure and who do not know this country at all well. They may have been in this country for some time, or they may not have been, but they do not feel all that secure. We have to be sensitive to their situation, and I contend that what the Government are doing in this section, particularly in Clause 62, is to show insensitivity to some very vulnerable people—which is why I hope they will get rid of this provision, which does not make any sense at all.
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Paddick has his name to Amendment 170. I know that he—I join him in this—is always pleased to have an opportunity to support the noble Lord, Lord McColl of Dulwich. Given that we are now past 4 pm, which, in the terminology of this House, was to be the lunch hour, I will not say anything more on this amendment. I hope that noble Lords can read between the lines.
Similarly, I particularly support Amendment 171A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord McColl, for reasons to which the noble Lord, Lord Alton, referred.
Finally, when I bumped into the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, the other day, I said, “I don’t know what you’re going to say but I’ll support you”. He said, “I thought you would”.
My Lords, we have been quicker than I anticipated but what my noble friend said is true; I must admit that I am starving.
I will speak to Amendments 171 and 172 from the JCHR, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. They aim to remove the worst of Clause 64. Leave to remain is important for victims who are vulnerable to destitution and further exploitation without welfare benefits and other entitlements but, according to the anti-slavery commissioner, the number of victims being granted discretionary leave is very low. In 2015, it was 123. In 2019, it was 70. In the first three months of 2020, it was only eight; we do not have statistics for the whole of 2020-21.
Being granted leave can improve mental health by offering stability and thus a chance of recovery, but the equivalent reference to assistance and support in the Modern Slavery Act reads “physical or psychological harm”; that includes social harm. This Bill would put the law out of line with that and raise real doubts about compatibility with Article 14 of ECAT, which uses the phrase
“necessary owing to their personal situation”.
That is wider than what is in Clause 64(2)(a), which is why I commend Amendment 171 to the Committee. I was pleased to hear the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, refer to the JCHR’s report; he also mentioned the importance of family relationships.
Amendment 172 aims to rectify the omission from Clause 64 of any consideration of the best interests of the child so as to make it compatible with ECAT and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. I seem to have mixed up my notes; I am sorry about that because I will now go back to Amendment 171.
In a case last year, the High Court held that refusing to grant discretionary leave while a slavery victim’s asylum application was being processed violated Article 14 of the European Convention on Action against Trafficking. It appears that, before amendments were made in the other place, Clause 64(2)(a) included a reference to the victim’s social well-being as well as their physical and mental health. However, it was removed on Report. Can the Minister explain why? Would the Government like to rectify this omission in the Bill regarding personal, situational and social harm so as to make me, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and the JCHR very happy?
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak to the whole group but I have co-signed Amendments 24 and 25 in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, respectively. I signed those agreements because they seemed so sensible. It is all very well making up rules and imposing limitations on people’s liberty but, if you do not have the facts and you do not actually know what the statistics are, it all seems a bit academic. Post-legislative scrutiny is incredibly important, especially for Bills such as this which implement contentious and possibly damaging and complex arrangements. They can either work very well or be disastrous.
The Government are taking a very worrying approach to counterterrorism with this sort of “tough on crime” mentality where we just lock people up and throw away the key. We need an evidence-based, multidisciplinary approach to deradicalisation. We need to rescue people from these deeply destructive ideologies, recognising that they are pretty much groomed and brainwashed until their thinking becomes so warped that violence seems like a legitimate tool.
I agreed with every word that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said earlier about prisons. I have visited prisons and have spoken to a lot of people who have been in them and, quite honestly, there is a huge risk that issues and behaviours like this can spread in prison and in fact the prisons become a recruiting ground. That is pretty much how ISIS started, in the prison camps in Iraq, so we have a precedent for some quite damaging events coming out of locking people up. We have to be very careful that the Government’s attempts to imprison people indefinitely do not just make the problem much worse. Could we please have independent reviews and get the evidence base, and compare the Government’s approach with the other options, which could be much better?
My Lords, Amendments 24 and 25 struck me as setting out a number of concerns that we would like to have seen in the Bill now. I agree very much with what the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, had to say, except that I do not think that they amount to post-legislative scrutiny. Both highlight concerns that we expressed at an earlier stage, although not all those concerns. My noble friend’s Amendment 12 is rather different in that after a year’s experience of the Bill—an Act, as it will then have been—it would assess its impact. Like him, I have had a similar impression: a kind of inconsistency between the words that we see on paper in the Bill—the impression that is given about responding with even tougher sentences, which is supported by some of the debate that we have had—while privately we have had much more nuanced conversations which have encouraged me, even though I am somewhat depressed by this legislation.
I want to say a word—well, several words—about Amendment 13, which would provide for a review of the use of polygraphs. The amendment came out of amendments in Committee, not our own but those proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, when he called for a pilot and a report to Parliament, including on specified matters. I understand that, with a relatively small number of terrorist offenders to whom the polygraph condition will apply, it is quite hard to undertake a useful pilot, but that does not negate the importance of an assessment of the polygraph condition which is published in the public domain.
Crucially, the review that we propose in Amendment 13 would be an independent review. Its report would include data, as set out in the amendment’s subsection (3), on the number of terrorist offenders subject to the polygraph condition and on the number of terrorist offenders recalled to custody following a test. I should mark those sentences as copyright of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer—I think I lifted them wholesale. It would also cover regulations, rules and codes of practice, and make recommendations regarding those, and the report would be made to Parliament. We have included the caveat that any material that the Secretary of State considered might prejudice public safety should be omitted.
The review would be within three years of the Section 32 polygraph condition coming into force. I understand, though I could not quite pin it down, that the Government are intending a review after a couple of years, which would essentially be the same; after two years is more or less the same as within three years.
I take this opportunity not only to argue for a review but to ask the Minister to confirm what is planned by the Government. not only as to the timing but as to the four elements that I have listed.
My Lords, I have one amendment in this group, Amendment 25, and my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton put his name to Amendment 24. I was very pleased that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, said that she had read our amendments and that they seemed sensible; I think that is a good start. The general point made on this whole group is that there is an appetite for reviewing different aspects of this legislation, and the amendments referred to go into particular aspects of that.
I want to make a slightly more general point. It is important that the general case for this sort of legislation is made regularly. I have had the opportunity in recent days of talking to young people who are becoming more politically active and engaged. They are very interested in terrorism legislation as a whole, particularly in how Parliament seeks to review it, change it and make it more effective. Particularly in our House, we have a duty to make sure that those arguments are remade and heard by the general public.
The specific amendment that I have put my name to concerns looking at particular impacts on prison capacity, the National Probation Service and offenders convicted of terrorist offences, as well as levels of bad behaviour in prisons—a point that I made on an earlier group. Also within my amendment are financial matters, because there is a very significant financial impact of the review of extended sentences and licence periods.
I have received a request from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to ask a short question of the Minister.
My Lords, on that last point, I take it that the post-legislative scrutiny referred to is separate from the review of polygraph testing after three years, to which the Minister referred. On that, while I take his point about parliamentary scrutiny of regulations, codes of practice may not be statutory and therefore not subject to that sort of scrutiny. Might the Minister take back the suggestion that, following the very helpful sessions that the MoJ arranged during the course of the Bill on a number of matters, for which we were very grateful, Ministers might consider communicating with—and possibly even consulting—noble Lords in framing the review in three or so years’ time? I do not expect him to make a commitment now, but I would like to put that idea in his and his colleagues’ heads.
My Lords, I assure the noble Baroness that that suggestion has lodged in my skull and will have been noted by others, and we will come back to it in due course. On her specific question on whether the post-legislative scrutiny of the Bill is distinct from the review of polygraph testing, I am happy to confirm that that is the case.
My Lords, Part 3 of the Bill raises for these Benches some considerable points of principle regarding terrorism prevention and investigation measures. I know some noble Lords may hear that as not appreciating threats posed by some and the devastation caused by actions that are more than threats. They may hear that we do not appreciate what is achieved by the agencies protecting us from harm—harm that we, the public, did not even understand we were in the way of.
None of that should be read into what we say on these amendments. What should be understood is our concern for principles regarding detention without trial and the presumption of innocence. These are principles of which our country is proud. There are principles and interests to be balanced here.
We asked to group together all the amendments regarding TPIMs, other than those regarding polygraphs, because we thought that that would be more convenient for the House and because Part 3 appears to be a package. The noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, has spoken to government Amendments 14 and 22. I will start with Amendment 22, which proposes an additional clause. We are certainly not opposing it. I wanted to understand what this proposed new clause will provide for that cannot be done now by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. On the last group the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, stressed the importance of the independent reviewer being able to set priorities, so imposing the obligation on him is interesting. Yesterday I had the opportunity, for which I thank him, to ask the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, about this. He confirmed that the reviewer can carry out an annual review and that this addition is due to the Government wanting to be certain about how all this is going; I hope I have that right. I welcome that the Government want to be clear, but I would not have thought that they needed the amendment.
We have had a series of energetic, diligent and what in current jargon is often called “curious” reviewers, all of whom have juggled the work of the reviewer with other professional commitments. Their time, resources and capacity are necessarily limited, so we do not regard this government amendment as some sort of concession. I should express the concern that this specific, quite narrow, statutory commitment could well limit the ability of the independent reviewer to undertake work on the very many other aspects of terrorism legislation.
As regards government Amendment 14 and our amendments to leave out certain clauses, our starting point is that there is no need to extend TPIMs, such that, taken together as they are intended to be, they amount to the possibility of house arrest for individuals who have not been found guilty of anything. The House heard in Committee, as did the House of Commons, that neither the current independent reviewer nor the police see the need for this change. No one could argue that the measures currently permitted—those imposed on individuals—are not stringent, and no one should argue that the measures should be more stringent so that they are more of a sanction or punishment, because investigation and prevention measures are not intended to be punishment. They were introduced as temporary measures. This is not a tool in the toolbox for which we see a justification for extending.
Amendment 14 changes suspicion to belief—a judgment which still must be made by the Secretary of State. Belief is a higher threshold than suspicion, and to that extent it is welcome. But it is not as high as satisfaction on the balance of probabilities that an individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity. I appreciate that there are other safeguards but, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, put it at the last stage, it would be a brave court that would second-guess evaluation by an elected Minister who has full access to intelligence.
The noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, may say, as he said in Committee, that the Government are given flexibility by this reduction in the threshold. I think that saying flexibility is a soft way of saying wider powers. That is why we are registering our opposition to the change in the requirement under Section 3 of the 2011 Act by our amendment to leave it out.
I cannot detach Clause 34 from Clause 35, which would effectively make a TPIM and its various measures, including “residence”—or detention—indefinite. The point was made pithily by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, in Committee. My noble friend Lord Strasburger talked about the double whammy, reminding us of the extension of the requirement as to where an individual is to live. In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, referred to “an enduring TPIM.” Enduring? Indefinite? That is what Clause 35 would allow. Having no hope is a terrible thing. My noble friend Lord Marks referred to “no-hope sentences” in the context of explaining to your Lordships' House the panel’s views on rehabilitation that we had heard. No hope can have an outcome completely opposite to what is intended. It can lead to an attitude of “What have I got to lose?” It could lead to not having anything to lose and managing to get involved in terrorism, with catastrophic effect.
The noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, said yesterday, in a discussion, that the current limit gives the subject an endpoint at which he can aim, so he can spend his experience of the measures planning what to do when he is released from them. We are not persuaded by that view.
If the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, presses the amendment of up to three extensions—six years, that is—we will support it, as that is clearly an improvement on indefinite detention. If the House agrees it, we will recognise that that is what the House wishes and not divide to leave out the clause. But if it is not agreed nor put to a Division, we will seek the opinion of the House on the clause, and this is my giving notice of that.
Clause 37, on the residence measure, changes Schedule 1 to the Act to allow for the imposition of a requirement to remain at a specified residence, which is
“applicable overnight between such hours as are specified.”
Taking away the word “overnight,” as is proposed, will mean that the requirement will be “applicable … between such hours” with no specified limit. In Committee, we heard two examples of what the Government want to address with this. The first is that if a subject is thought to be a radicalising threat to children, he should be confined during hours at which young people arrive at and leave school. Frankly, I would have thought that an individual with that in mind would be rather more subtle, but that is not the point. The second example is that if an individual is a suspected attack planner, he should be curfewed for weekends during local football games—as well as, presumably, any other big local gatherings, but football games were the example. Again, in parenthesis, given that very few major matches seem to still kick off at 3 pm on a Saturday, I wonder about this. But I acknowledge that the Minister referred to the weekend, and anyway, again, that is not really the point.
I have received a request from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to ask a short question.
The Minister just referred to the number of hours in the day for which the restriction may apply. Why have the Government decided, assuming that the decision is positive, not to include in the Bill a total limit per day? He referred to Article 5 but would it have been more convenient for the Government, let alone TPIM subjects—the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, had a good deal to say about the problems of pursuing applications to the court—not to allow the prospect of getting caught up in proceedings challenging the total number of hours?
My Lords, the simple answer for not including that in the Bill is that we do not think that it is necessary to do so. The case law exists and has established that in practice the residence measure placed on a TPIM subject could not likely exceed 16 hours a day without constituting an unlawful deprivation of their liberty. However, measures are imposed and tested in the courts on a case-by-case basis, and that is the appropriate way to proceed.
My Lords, in moving Amendment 19, I will speak also to Amendments 20 and 21. Clause 38 raises a rather different issue from the other clauses in Part 3, which deals with TPIMs. The clause introduces the use of polygraphs—so we are not affected here by nostalgia for 2011.
Amendment 19 requires the Secretary of State, after consultation, to publish a code of practice about polygraph sessions, both how they are conducted and how reports on them are used. New Section 10ZA, introduced by Clause 38, provides for regulations on limited matters, as set out in that clause. The requirement imposed is
“to participate … with a view to … monitoring … compliance with other … measures”
and
“assessing whether any variation of … measures is necessary”.
TPIM subjects are a different cohort from terrorism offenders, not having been convicted. Not everything, I would think, can be a direct read-across from the processes applied to terrorism offenders. In the case of an offender on licence, the tests are to assess compliance; in the event of a breach, the offender can be returned to custody. For a TPIM subject—of course there is no Parole Board here—it is not just about monitoring compliance but assessing necessity. This is a much less tight objective; in fact, if one were to use “objective” as an adjective, I am not sure that it would really meet that test. What if the subject’s reaction is ambiguous?
From the helpful briefings that we have had, as polygraph sessions are used currently and will be used in the case of terrorist offenders, the questions that are asked are closed questions: “Did you do such-and-such?”, or “Have you contacted so-and-so?” I had some difficulty thinking of the questions that might be asked, because so much of potential interest is likely to have been prohibited. I suppose that if there is a measure saying that a person will not visit whatever the nearest urban centre is, that is capable of a yes or no answer.
I wondered whether it is thought that polygraphs are an alternative to electronic monitoring, or a supplement. If there are to be polygraphs applied to TPIM subjects, it seems necessary that there should be a relevant code of practice—tailor-made, if you like—including a reminder that the subject is not an offender.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is not available, so I call the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
Our views are very close, but we have not actually changed personalities yet. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, asked some extremely pertinent questions as the basis for an assessment of whether it was appropriate for the clause to remain in the Bill. It is a great shame that we have not had the answers to that list of questions; I do not think any could have come as a surprise.
May I pursue one point? Because there is a regulation-making power in new paragraph 10ZA, it is not necessary to have a reference to a code of practice. I have sat through many debates when we have been told that codes of practice are so useful because they are flexible; they can be tweaked without having to go through the legislative process. I have to say that I am quite surprised by that answer. I do not know whether we are being told that the rules that apply under the Offender Management Act in other situations when polygraph sessions are used are the rules that will apply. It is my fault; I got slightly lost during that part of the debate. It may be my perception only but, as I heard the answers, there seemed to be a lot of repetition of what is in the Bill, not answers to concerns which underlie the amendments.
When we get to it, depending on who the broadcasters go to, one of us will move Amendment 21. For now, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 19.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in moving Amendment 57, I will also speak to Amendment 74.
These two probing amendments are designed to explore how the Government plan to use their regulatory powers in the Bill. I am informed on this because I am the chairman of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee of your Lordships’ House. Along with the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee—chaired by my noble friend Lord Blencathra—my committee has been concerned by the increasing use of skeleton Bills, where only the broadest frameworks are set out in primary legislation and all the practical details are left to regulation.
As a result, Parliament too often has only a general idea of what it may be approving when it passes the primary legislation. The Government may—they probably will—argue that all regulations have to be approved by Parliament, but Members of your Lordships’ House are well aware of the weakness of the scrutiny of regulations, which is that they are unamendable. The House is left with only what I call the nuclear option of complete rejection. Unsurprisingly, in these circumstances, neither House has felt able to press the button, except in the most exceptional circumstances.
Our two committees—my noble friend Lord Blencathra’s and mine—have written to Jacob Rees-Mogg, as Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons, to express our concern and make suggestions for improvement. Let me take an example from earlier debates in Committee. My noble friend the Minister and other noble Lords—notably my noble friend Lord King and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew—referred Members to the revised code of practice as providing a reassurance against bad behaviour in the operation of CCAs. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, urged every Member of the Committee to read through the code. I followed the noble Lord’s advice and read it, all 73 pages of it. I agree that, at least to my untutored and inexperienced eye, it appears extensive and comprehensive, but its weakness is that it is made by regulation—in this case, Section 71 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. So its contents depend on ministerial policy decisions and can be changed, at any time, by the tabling of an unamendable regulation.
I do not doubt for a moment the good intentions of my noble friends on the Front Bench, nor the good intentions of the Front Benches of the other parties in this House or the other place, but none of them will be in their seat for ever. Amendment 57 is designed to explore the risk of what I described in my remarks at Second Reading as “mission creep”, or, more specifically, how wide the room for manoeuvre is for a future Secretary of State using the powers available under Clause 1(5)(10) on page 3 of the Bill.
I pose three simple questions for my noble friend the Minister to answer when he replies. First, can the Secretary of State, under this clause, add to or remove bodies from the list of relevant authorities given on page 4 of the Bill? Secondly, is there any limit to the changes that the Secretary of State may make, under this clause, to the authorisation levels for CCAs, given in annexes A and B of the draft revised code of practice? This issue has been raised on a number of occasions, notably by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. Thirdly, is there any limit to the changes that the Secretary of State may make to the purposes for which a CCA is sought? That was a discussion on Amendment 22. In particular, what is meant by “impose requirements” in line 13? That issue was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
Before I finish, I turn briefly to Amendment 74. This poses the same questions for Scotland as Amendment 57 does for the rest of the United Kingdom, but there is one additional point of concern: whether, as a result of two systems existing, what is known as forum shopping can take place. Historically, in cases involving extradition, prosecuting authorities were in the habit of surveying the legal options open to them and picking the route, courts and jurisdiction that, on past experience and record, were most likely to give them a favourable result. As I see it, the two CHIS systems begin in identical form but, over time, can and probably must be expected to diverge. How far that will be is impossible to predict now, but the possibility of forum shopping emerges. Can my noble friend comment on the interchangeability of CCAs granted under Scottish law being used in the rest of the United Kingdom, and vice versa? I beg to move Amendment 57.
My Lords, I am very glad that the noble Lord decided to probe these two provisions. I have seen the correspondence published by the three committees. I was struck when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, in responding to the previous group, referred to the code of practice having the force of law. I do not dispute that, but it is of course law that can be changed by government Ministers without coming to Parliament.
The point just made by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, about forum shopping is interesting. As he said, I have asked for assistance on the meaning of some terms during the passage of the Bill. I questioned what is envisaged by the terms “conduct” and “requirements”. I read both to restrict, rather than expand, the scope of what may be done. I would be grateful to have that confirmed or, if not, to understand why not. In short, we should not be expanding opportunities for criminal conduct authorisations without, at the very least, understanding exactly what we are doing.
First, I wish the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, well in his campaign against skeleton Bills, as that issue is getting worse, not better.
The Bill provides that the Secretary of State may, by order, prohibit the authorisation of certain conduct and impose extra requirements that must be satisfied before an authorisation can be given. As the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said, Amendments 57 and 74, in his name, would remove those provisions and, as he confirmed, their purpose is to probe the extent to which the operation of criminal conduct authorisations can be amended by regulation.
Earlier in Committee, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, stated that the order-making provisions in the Bill
“allow for additional requirements to be imposed before a criminal conduct authorisation may be granted, or for the authorisation of certain conduct to be prohibited.”
He continued:
“I assure the Committee that they can only be used to further strengthen the safeguards that are attached to the use of criminal conduct authorisations. They could not be used to remove any of the existing safeguards ... The requirements that can be imposed under these powers concern matters of practicality and detail, and therefore it is appropriate that they are contained in secondary legislation.”—[Official Report, 1/12/20; col. 676.]
When the noble and learned Lord said that the order-making powers could not be used to remove any of the existing safeguards, did the Government mean that the wording in the Bill would make it contrary to law to do that, or did they mean only that the intention was not to use the order-making powers to remove any of the existing safeguards? That, of course, is a very different thing, as intentions can change.
No doubt in their response the Government will address that point and give specific examples of the purposes or intentions for which these order-making powers to prohibit the authorisation of certain conduct and impose extra requirements that must be satisfied before an authorisation can be given would—and, equally, would not—be used by the Secretary of State.
My Lords, the horse will be out of the stable again in January: refreshed, I hope. I am sure that the Minister will welcome the pause after the marathon she has had to undergo. I am not for a moment suggesting she is anything like a horse—I am sorry, perhaps I should not have followed that simile.
My noble friend Lord Paddick recently spoke to Amendment 79, and it is clear that several noble Lords have concerns in this area, so we will come back to it. Noble Lords clearly agree on the importance of evaluating what goes on and of transparency, as has already been mentioned. However, I cannot help thinking in the context of the precise formulation of this amendment of what the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, talked about a week or two ago, to which my noble friend referred: the problem of the extent to which one can report in detail without endangering those who are protecting us and whom we, in turn, do not wish to endanger. I cannot help thinking that if a lot of the material listed in Amendment 75C were to be published, an awful lot of it might be redacted. However, I am with the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, in spirit, and I think that his last point about material damage or civilian harm is an important one that we must not lose sight of. We still need to explore how best and to what extent we can achieve what is obviously troubling a number of us.
The purpose of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, is described as being to probe the adequacy of information provided to Parliament on criminal conduct authorisations and to probe the efficacy of the authorisations.
I think that this comes back to the issue of transparency. To be a little more particular, will we be told in advance, during the passage of the Bill, precisely what kind of information about criminal conduct authorisations will be provided to us and to the public by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner in the annual report or other reports? At the moment, I am not clear about what information will be provided and what it will cover, and whether it will give us a feel for what is happening over criminal conduct authorisations or whether we will be told that the information provided will be limited and that, on grounds of security, it cannot be disclosed.
I hope that, at least in their response either to this amendment or on Report, the Government will be prepared to spell out what information will and will not be provided so that we all know where we stand on this issue.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this may look like a very long group, but it almost entirely concerns a couple of points, so I hope it need not detain your Lordships too long. Amendments 1, 2, 4, 10, 13 and 38 are probing. I appreciate the need for precision in legislation, which—I hope the drafters will not take this amiss—often means the wording can be a bit clunky. I would therefore be grateful for a detailed unpacking of two points on the wording.
First, I wondered whether
“criminal conduct in the course of … conduct”
is something to do with how Section 26 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 is constructed. Section 26(1) applies to
“the conduct and use of covert human intelligence sources.”
Is there a concern that there is a need to provide for something different to that? Is there a concern that what is to be covered cannot be separated from that? For instance, there might be a need for separate authorisations. In other words, why not have a straight- forward authorisation of criminal conduct by a CHIS? It may be because it needs to be made clear that there is no wholesale authorisation of criminal conduct by a CHIS, but surely that would be only when they are acting as a CHIS. Would not the authorisation cover that? I would be grateful if the Minister could unpack that phrase for the Committee.
The second phrase is conduct “in connection with” the conduct of a CHIS. How closely connected must the second category be? I am particularly concerned to be clear whether this is to catch, or ensure that it does not catch—it occurs to me that “catch” may not be the best term here—the person giving an authorisation, the person to whom he reports and anyone overseeing that authorisation. I would be concerned if it applied to that person inciting or being an accessory to a crime, or conspiring. Would this not mean that someone is authorising himself? What is intended by this? I have omitted to welcome the Minister to what I assume is his first outing in a Committee; can he be clear about the position of those who in other situations—ordinary criminals, if you like—would be an accessory to, inciting or conspiring in a crime? Amendment 40 addresses the same point, although the phrase is conduct “in relation to” a CHIS.
Amendment 37 has been tabled to probe whether the authorisation can be retrospective, relating to past conduct. I note that Amendment 50 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, which we will come to next week, would allow for retrospective authorisation, subject to criteria. I do not want to steal his thunder; no doubt he will talk about the operational realities which will sometimes make it very difficult to anticipate what will happen on the ground. If there is to be immunity for conduct which has been authorised ex post facto, the criteria and limitations will be very important. I beg to move Amendment 1.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for each of the probing amendments in this group. Most of them, as the noble Baroness has said, are directed at essentially the same point: the intended scope of criminal conduct authorisations. I echo her remarks in finding the phrases she identified less than clear.
For me, the underlying question is whether it is intended that the conduct of any person other than a CHIS should be entitled to the protection of a criminal conduct authorisation, and if so in what circumstances. Are we talking about protections from criminal and civil recourse for the CHIS handler, controller or authorising officer, or more generally for the public authority that employs them, or are we talking about the protection of other people who are neither a CHIS nor employed by the authorising authority? I hope the Minister will make the position clear and, if he does not favour the simpler formulations in these amendments, explain why.
Amendment 37 raises a slightly different issue. It suggests that an authorisation cannot be retrospective, which is surely right and was confirmed by the Solicitor-General at Second Reading in the other place when he said:
“The Bill does not seek to enable the retrospective granting of a criminal conduct authorisation”.— [Official Report, Commons, 5/10/20; col. 707.]
A close reading of the Bill confirms that, on balance, it does not provide for retrospective authorisations: the new Section 29B(6), for example, refers to what
“could reasonably be achieved by other conduct”,
not to what could reasonably have been achieved. However, this is indirect and intricate stuff; clarification in the Bill would be welcome, and this amendment provides it.
I have received no requests to speak after the Minister, so I now call the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
My Lords, I start by apologising to the noble Lord, Lord Cormack: I do not like the term CHIS either—and I find it even more difficult when I try to render it in the plural, which I think lengthens the “i” in the middle.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and other noble Lords made my points much more crisply than I did. On the point about retrospection, I certainly do not want to rely on an imbalanced interpretation—albeit accompanied by what I would have to describe as an assertion rather than an explanation from the Dispatch Box. Of course, after this debate, I will read Hansard to see whether I have missed something, and my apologies if I have.
To take up the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, we should be able to express issues such as this in our own words, and I am still having difficulty doing that, but I am most alarmed that my points raised wider issues than I had anticipated: in particular, who is covered by the authorisation. I have not heard any argument that a person who gives the authorisation must not authorise what he himself does. I think I am right to be concerned about this rendering lawful incitement, being an accessory and conspiring—it can go much wider than membership of an organisation. Understandably, the example which the Government have chosen to put forward is something that sounds relatively mild.
I am glad that we have brought these issues out. Clearly, we will have to consider what we do at the next stage, which is not how I would have hoped to start remarks in Committee, but there we are. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 6 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, and our amendment, are directed to the same issue; I can only think that I may have drafted ours before I had seen hers. RIPA allows for the use of CHIS outside the UK, and the noble Baroness, with her very particular perspective, must not be ignored. As has been said, that experience should inform all of what we are discussing.
Quite apart from the propriety and ethics, how would extraterritorial jurisdiction work in this case? We cannot legislate for what other countries regard as a crime or how decisions about whether to prosecute are taken. My noble friend Lord Thomas listed the offences where there is extraterritorial jurisdiction and where prosecutions can take place here. It struck me as I was listening to him reading them that they are very close to the crimes that noble Lords are seeking to take out of the scope of criminal authorisations, which we will come to later—except that I was interested to hear the reference to domestic abuse.
I had wondered whether minds in the Government had been directed to the military and intelligence services outside the UK on this issue; my noble friend also mentioned the Baha Mousa case. But this is not the Bill for that. As he said, we have other legislation that we will come to soon, when we will also no doubt be considering the issue of rendition. But to leave open any suggestion that anyone should have free rein anywhere in the world because they are acting on behalf of the state is certainly something we want to see quashed.
Amendment 7 in this group would ensure that criminal conduct authorisations are not covered by the provisions of Section 27(3) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which provides that:
“The conduct that may be authorised under this Part includes conduct outside the United Kingdom.”
Amendment 9 in this group specifies that conduct outside of the United Kingdom may not be authorised under this Act and amends the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 to similar effect as Amendment 7.
As far as I can see, the code of—[Inaudible]—covert operations occurring in UK embassies, military bases and detention facilities where the subject of investigation is a UK national or is likely to become the subject of criminal or civil proceedings in the UK, or if the operation is likely to affect a UK national or give rise to material likely to be used in evidence before a UK court.
The noble—[Inaudible.]
My Lords, the House has been privileged to hear from the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, on this subject. My noble friend Lord Paddick and I have tabled Amendment 47 as an amendment to Amendment 46, which she supports. I am a little diffident about what may appear to be a challenge to the “quartet”, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, called them, of four noble Lords who all have considerable experience, in their different ways, of dealing with these issues directly. I think my points are relevant to some other amendments as well.
Our Amendment 47 explores what the next steps should be after the steps set out in subsections (8A) to (8C) in Amendment 46. My noble friend Lord Paddick will deal with what I think he might describe as the operational realities that make prior authorisation impractical. Allied to that, I note the phrase of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, “human complexities”. I take his point about aiming for what might be possible in political terms in this area.
In our view, there should be further steps after notice has been given to the commissioner. Of course, he could and should deal with notices of criminal conduct authorisations in his annual report—in addition, he can deal with them in reports to the Prime Minister—but if the notice is to have teeth, as my noble friend Lord Thomas put it, something needs to be there to follow through. Even a decision to do nothing would be an active decision.
We propose that the commissioner should consider subsection (4) of proposed new Clause 29B—one of the new provisions in the Bill—including whether the criteria of necessity and proportionality are satisfied, and any other matters introduced under subsection (4)(c) by the Secretary of State. Of course, I am aware that the question of what is believed—whether that is an objective or subjective test—is rather begged by my amendment, but we will come to that in the debate on the next group.
Perhaps noble Lords are attracted to something like our proposal. I am sure that it would need expanding—for instance, to allow inquiries by the commissioner, questioning the person giving notice and so on. If the commissioner considers that subsection (4) has not been satisfied, we suggest that two things should follow. The first should be that the conduct would be not be lawful for all purposes, which would reintroduce the question of redress, including applications to the criminal injuries compensation fund. Secondly, the matter must be reported to the head of the relevant public authority—the National Crime Agency, the Gambling Commission, whoever. In turn, the authority should refer it to the DPP, and the usual steps should then follow. For good measure, our amendment makes direct mention of the annual report.
In other words, our amendment is a development of Amendment 46, which would introduce a circle that we think needs rounding off. I hope that, to pick up on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, this is regarded as proportionate support. My noble friend Lord Paddick will have observations on the other amendments in this group when he speaks from our Benches.
My Lords, I beg to move that the debate on this amendment be adjourned.