Policing and Crime Bill
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen ExcerptsWednesday 16th November 2016
(8 years ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 55-V Fifth marshalled list for Committee (PDF, 129KB) - (14 Nov 2016)
Baroness Deech (CB)
My Lords, I did not put my name to this amendment because there were enough people already, but I used to teach family law, including the law of marriage. In this country, it is very easy to get married in a registry office or in a properly registered religious place. You can get married in a hotel if you want to or you can have a civil partnership. There are all sorts of official unions that you can make very easily, but the worst of all possible worlds is to be duped into believing that you are married in a religious ceremony and then find that you are not, because you lose any protection that English law gives you, while at the same time, stereotypically, your husband—if he is really your husband—can abandon you or take another wife.
This is not just a question of running parallel systems of law: it is about the protection of women and the need to preserve transparency and regularity in people’s marital status. All that is necessary is for more mosques to become registered as proper places of marriage, just in the way that synagogues are, and all would be resolved. I see no arguments against this amendment at all. It is overdue.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)
My Lords, I have listened carefully to the arguments made by the noble Baronesses, Lady Cox and Lady Deech, my noble friend Lady Buscombe—who made an excellent speech—and the noble Lord, Lord Alton. As has been said, the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, has done so much to raise in this House the problem of marriages that are not legally binding and that therefore do not carry the legal rights and responsibilities of a legally binding marriage. I recognise that she has spoken to many women in this situation and has sensitively presented their evidence to your Lordships this evening and on other occasions. There is particular cause for concern if one or both of the parties is unaware of their lack of rights or coerced into a marriage.
There is a strong tradition of religious marriages in England and Wales, with a long-established right that couples are able, in their place of worship, to enter into a marriage that is legally contracted, provided that the requirements of the law are met. Some people, for religious or other reasons, have preferred to enter into a marriage that is not capable of legal recognition. To make it illegal to conduct, or enter into, religious marriages that are not legally contracted is likely to be an overly complex solution and one that restricts personal choice. It is also unclear how many unregistered religious marriages would take place in breach of any change in legislation, since, by their nature, public notice of these marriages would not be given. I am sure that noble Lords appreciate the complexity of legislating in people’s private and religious lives.
We are conscious that there are complex issues behind religious marriages that are not legally valid, including where people use a religious ceremony to give recognition to an additional spouse, and so we do not consider that any one approach to Muslim or other faith communities can work in isolation. Of course, we are also aware of concerns that some women can be put under pressure to use the services of religious councils, including sharia councils, to arrange matters on the break-up of the relationship and that these women are not always treated equally when recommendations are made.
One of the issues that the noble Baroness highlighted was that of child custody, a matter raised by women to whom she has spoken. In fact, it is not the case that women have few or no rights in this matter, although they may well not be aware of their rights. In England and Wales, where there is any dispute between parents about arrangements for their children, either parent may apply to the family court for one or more types of order under the Children Act 1989. Most commonly, this will be a child arrangements order determining who a child is to live with or spend time with, and where and when this is to happen, referred to respectively as custody and access in many other jurisdictions. These proceedings are free-standing. This means that a parent is entitled to make an application to the court at any time, simply by virtue of being the parent of the child concerned and regardless of the status of their relationship with the other parent. There is no distinction for this purpose between legally married parents, unmarried parents, parents in a religious marriage that is not legally binding, parents who are otherwise cohabiting or, indeed, parents who are living apart.
On the issue of polygamy, noble Lords will be aware that polygamous marriages cannot be legally contracted in the UK. Attempting to enter into a polygamous marriage under the law of England and Wales is a criminal offence which carries a maximum sentence of seven years in prison. Nor is it possible for anyone domiciled in the United Kingdom to enter into a polygamous marriage abroad. Where a polygamous marriage is contracted within the law outside the United Kingdom between parties neither of whom is domiciled in the United Kingdom, it will be recognised by the court. The Government continue to support the law preventing polygamous marriages from being entered into in England and Wales.
The Law Commission has also given initial consideration to the issue of religious marriages that are not legally valid. It published its scoping study in December last year setting out the parameters of a potential review of the law concerning how and where people can marry in England and Wales, following consultation with a wide range of religious organisations and other interested parties. The scoping study concluded that this was one of a number of issues that might be ameliorated through a fairer and more coherent framework for marriage. The Law Commission also considered that offences relating to the celebration of marriage should be reviewed. It would not make sense for the Government to introduce a new criminal offence, such as that proposed by this amendment, without evidence of the scale and nature of the problem and without consideration of how the new offence would fit within existing marriage law.
The Government are carefully considering the Law Commission report and will respond in due course. We will also wish to consider the issue of unregistered religious marriages in light of the findings of the independent sharia review, launched in May by the current Prime Minister. The Government share the noble Baroness’s concerns and take them very seriously indeed. These concerns are central to the independent sharia review and involve the equalities, justice and faith and integration agendas across government. I thank the noble Baroness for raising again this important issue and the very real consequences for people’s lives.
My noble friend Lady Buscombe asked how many sharia councils there are across Europe. I do not have a number; I will have to go away, look into it further and write to my noble friend. I trust that the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, will understand the need to wait for the Government’s response to the Law Commission report and the sharia review and, on that basis, will withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Cox
My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate and those who have supported this amendment and made some very powerful additional arguments. I thank the Minister for the sympathy that is there in her response, but I feel some concern over the apparent lack of a sense of urgency about the need to address the real suffering that is going on at the present time. To wait for the outcomes of the reviews leaves these women in a terrible situation. The gap, the chasm, between the de facto realities and the de jure realities is one into which these women are falling and suffering in ways that should not be allowed in our country today. These issues are urgent: women are suffering on a large scale. I intend to take this debate back to my colleagues, with whom I am sharing these concerns, to consider the most appropriate ways forward. I am very grateful for what has been said tonight; we can learn from it ways to proceed to help the women suffering in these appalling situations. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, we on these Benches support our noble friend Lady Brinton. I do not want to detain the Committee so will make just a couple of comments. When discussing matters such as trafficking and slavery, I often hear that these issues are where domestic violence was 20 years ago. It is very concerning to hear about the treatment of women—and men—who have suffered domestic violence in the way that my noble friend has described. That is not progress over the past 20 years.
There is another argument for my noble friend’s various amendments, which I do not think she mentioned; that is, obtaining the best evidence from victims who are also witnesses. These are very sensitive issues and one hears of very good practice by some police forces and some members of the judiciary. It is a question of spreading that good practice. There is an awful lot raised in these amendments, including the very delicate issue of ticketing for the judiciary dealing with certain cases. This is not the moment to go into that but the implications of the amendments need to be taken on board over a very wide area of practice. The Committee should be grateful to my noble friend and the noble Lord for ensuring that they are raised. It is a pity that, coming to the end of Committee, we are not able to do them the justice that we would all like to do them.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and other noble Lords who have spoken, for raising the important issue of victims’ rights.
It is crucial that the needs of victims of crime are given proper consideration at every stage of the criminal justice process. We published a revised Code of Practice for Victims of Crime, which came into force in November 2015. As a result, victims of all criminal offences, not just victims of more serious offences, are entitled to support under the code. The code provides victims with a range of entitlements, including information about their case, interpretation and translation, and for them to be treated in a respectful and professional manner without discrimination of any kind. Furthermore, the code requires police and other service providers to have a complaints procedure. If victims are dissatisfied with the outcome, they are able to refer their complaints to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman via their Member of Parliament.
It is essential that victims receive the best possible support to help them cope with and recover from what they have been through. We have a raft of arrangements in place which ensure that victims have access to a wide range of emotional, practical and specialist support determined by and tailored to their needs; wherever possible, this support is accessible locally. We are committed to ensuring that victims get the support they need and have protected the overall level of funding for victims across the spending review period, with over £95 million being provided in 2016-17 to fund crucial support services, including £7 million for the provision of support for victims of child sexual abuse, in recognition of increasing demand. Of the £95 million, we allocated over £67 million in grant funding to police and crime commissioners, who are using that funding to commission local services. The Justice Secretary has recently agreed to extend grant funding to all the nationally funded organisations for 2017-18 while we consider the current mixed model of commissioning national and local services.
We recognise the importance of training for professionals who work with victims. Organisations are responsible for ensuring the highest-quality training for their staff to ensure that victims receive the best possible service and support. However, we also recognise that more can be done. That is why we are working to place victims and witnesses at the heart of a justice system that works for everyone. We recently announced the national rollout of pre-trial cross-examination in 2017 to improve the support available for vulnerable witnesses. We are also investing close to £1 billion to reform and digitise our courts and tribunals. This will improve the experience for all court and tribunal users, including vulnerable victims and witnesses. Furthermore, we have committed to introduce further measures to strengthen the rights of victims of crime. It is important that we take the time to get this right, and we will announce our plans in due course.
Finally, the proposal for homicide reviews is also unnecessary. If the family of a victim has concerns about a closed homicide case, this can be looked at again under the Crown Prosecution Service’s recent guidance, Reviewing Previously Finalised Cases, to determine whether or not a review should be conducted.
Having had this opportunity to debate these important issues, and in the knowledge that the Government will be bringing forward proposals to strengthen the rights of victims, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Brinton
I thank the Minister for her reply, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and my noble friend Lady Hamwee for their contributions. I am pleased that the Government will be looking at this but the difficulty is that much of what we have heard from the Minister does not address the soft issues that face the day-to-day running of any case in the criminal justice system, which are causing many of the problems. I wonder if the Minister would be prepared to meet over the next few weeks to talk through some of these issues. I see she is nodding. I am very grateful. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for raising the issue, and all noble Lords who have taken part.
The Government acknowledge that it is of great importance that ethnicity classifications of children and young people in the youth justice system are robust and accurate. Noble Lords will recall that the Prime Minister announced in August an audit of public services to reveal racial disparities and to help to end the injustices that many people experience. At present, youth custodial establishments and youth justice agencies, such as youth offending teams and the Youth Justice Board, are not required by legislation to use a particular system of ethnic monitoring; these amendments would change that.
In 2011, the National Offender Management Service adopted the 18+1 system on the centralised operational database used in prisons and young offender institutions for the management of offenders, following the change of classifications for ethnicity within the national census. However, it is the case that the new classification is not consistently used by secure children’s homes, secure training centres and youth offending teams. In principle, we agree with the aim of using the 18+1 classification, and the Government are ready to examine whether and how this could be done consistently across youth justice agencies and custodial establishments. I should point out, however, that such a change can be delivered through administrative means rather than through legislation. We feel that such an approach is preferable, given that to enshrine the 18+1 code in legislation would inhibit future flexibility in the event that the Office for National Statistics were to decide to change the 18+1 code system and introduce a new system of ethnicity classifications.
Although we support working towards consistency in terms of the data that we are recording, I hope that the noble Baroness would recognise that the universal adoption of the 18+1 code would require youth justice agencies to make a significant number of technical changes to a range of data systems, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, mentioned. This is because many existing IT and data collection systems are designed only to accommodate the 16+1 classification. For this reason, we believe the impact on agencies and custodial establishments must be explored and analysed and appropriate approaches identified.
I do not have costings at the moment, and will have to get back to the noble Lord on that point—although, interestingly enough, inspiration has appeared over my left shoulder. However, I am not sure that it is going to be that helpful. I have no information on the cost of the necessary IT changes. Clearly, they would need to be identified and factored into the work that would need to be done as youth justice agencies moved to the 18+1 system. I shall make inquiries as to whether further information is available and write to noble Lords. I am afraid that I do not have much more to add.
In conclusion, the noble Baroness has highlighted a valid issue. We support the broad aim of these amendments and will consider further the practical implications of embedding the 18+1 code system throughout the youth justice system. I hope that, on this basis, the noble Baroness would be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Brinton
I thank all those who have contributed to this debate on this very important issue, including the noble Lord, Lord Alton, the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser—and particularly the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for highlighting in detail the issues that I felt that I did not have time to go into on what is happening with the IT system. I put it on record, too, that the noble Lord, Lord Ouseley, the noble Baroness, Lady Young of Old Scone, and the noble Lord, Lord Judd, wanted to speak in this debate but, because the date has moved on, were unable to be in their places.
I thank the Minister for her comments, although I was slightly startled by her opening statement about this new system of ethnicity. It is new only to the youth justice system. It is in use absolutely everywhere else. I am not intending to suggest that the Minister was saying anything else, but that is the whole problem—that there is a particular section of the criminal justice system that is not using the same databases as everybody else. We know from the example that the Minister quoted of the W3 Gypsy or Traveller code being added to P-NOMIS that the Irish chaplaincy has reported that many prisons are holding Traveller groups, appointing Traveller reps and holding Traveller history months—and, what is more, there is an increase in uptake of education by more than 10% among Traveller prisoners. That is a sign of real success. Surely young Gypsy and Traveller children who are in the system early on deserve that support the moment they come into the system. I hope that we can keep the doors open to discuss the matter as a matter of urgency. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, Amendment 228C in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Wigley and Lord Ponsonby, and the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, seeks to insert a new clause into the Bill. As we have heard, its aim is to provide additional protection for victims or witnesses of a serious sexual offence, using the test of whether it is reasonable to assume that a disclosure of the person’s identity,
“would put the victim or witness at risk of further harm”.
It is right to include the rights of victims and witnesses in primary legislation where possible, and this is what the amendment seeks to do. Both victims and witnesses of serious offences can be very traumatised by what has happened to them or what they have witnessed. The disclosure of the name of the victim or witness to the person alleged to have committed the offence could put them at risk of further harm, as we have heard, or of fear of further harm. That, in itself, can cause additional stress and trauma for the victim or witness. Therefore, this amendment would place a specific duty on the police, when considering releasing the names of victims or witnesses to the accused person, to take into account the matters listed in new subsections (2) and (3) of the proposed new clause. That would be a sensible and welcome move, and I hope the noble Baroness will respond positively to the amendment.
I fully endorse the comments of all those who have spoken to the amendment. I was particularly surprised to hear my noble friends Lord Ponsonby and Lady Cohen say that the police have no idea what the policy is in this area. I am amazed by that. I certainly fully endorse the amendment.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, explained, this amendment seeks to grant victims or witnesses of sexual or violent crime anonymity in cases where it is reasonable to assume that disclosure would put them at risk of further harm. The noble Lord has indicated that he is particularly concerned with cases of so-called “stranger rape”.
I say from the outset that I agree wholeheartedly that the criminal justice system must support and protect victims and witnesses, particularly victims of sexual offences who are especially vulnerable. There are already a number of means whereby those at risk of further harm can be safeguarded and I will briefly itemise these in a moment but, before doing so, I must point to a central difficulty with the noble Lord’s amendment. The overarching principle of our criminal justice system is that the defendant must be given a fair trial. This is clearly stated in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Fundamental to this is the right of the accused to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. I am sure the noble Lord accepts that the accused cannot be expected to defend himself properly at trial if he does not even know who is accusing him of the alleged crime. This amendment would fundamentally undermine that cornerstone of our justice system.
That is not to say that there should not be crucial safeguards in place for victims and witnesses who have had the grave misfortune to experience violent or sexual crimes. As I have indicated, there are already multiple mechanisms the police and courts can employ to protect victims. Where necessary for the purpose of the investigation, the police can seek to detain the accused for up to 96 hours pending charge and seek to have him or her remanded in custody post-charge. If it is not possible to bring charges within the time limits on pre-charge detention, the suspect can be bailed subject to conditions which prohibit contact with the victim.
There are also established provisions in legislation for witness protection programmes and the provision of special measures during criminal proceedings; for example, a complainant can give evidence via a live link or behind a screen.
There is already provision for anonymity of complainants or witnesses, to be used as an exceptional measure of last practicable resort. A witness anonymity order can be granted by the court if it is satisfied that their identification would adversely affect the quality of evidence given by them, or their level of co-operation with the prosecution. The Director of Public Prosecution’s guidance on witness anonymity is clear that where the prosecution cannot present its case in a way that allows the defendant to defend themselves, it is under a duty to stop the case, no matter how serious the allegations may be. Hence, this must be very carefully considered when deciding whether to grant victim or witness anonymity—fair, equal and open justice for all must be the imperative.
While I have every sympathy for the noble Lord’s objective of protecting vulnerable victims and witnesses, I hope he will accept that the blanket approach provided for in his amendment is fundamentally at odds with our system of justice and the right of the accused to a fair trial. It is important to remember that the accused is just that: accused. He or she is not convicted, and is presumed innocent until proved guilty. This amendment arguably assumes guilt and undermines the protections and safeguards against miscarriages of justice of which this country is justly proud. Moreover, there are already a number of mechanisms available by which victims and witnesses can be supported through the criminal justice process. Given these points, I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
My Lords, I thank the Minister and her officials for their time and help over the issue of this amendment. I declare my interest as independent chair of the National Mental Capacity Forum, and it is in that role that I have heard repeatedly about a problem relating to people who die when subject to deprivation of liberty safeguards. This new clause amends the meaning of state detention in Section 48 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 to correct the problem that I will now explain. I want to explain first how the amendment works and then some of the background as to why it really is needed.
The amendment removes the duty on coroners to conduct an inquest in all cases where the deceased had an authorisation for the deprivation of their liberty in place either under deprivation of liberty safeguards or a Court of Protection order or because the deprivation of liberty was otherwise authorised by the Mental Capacity Act 2005.
Subsections (2) and (3) of the new clause amend Section 48 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 to provide a new definition of state detention. To do this, there is a new subsection inserted into the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 to provide that a person is not considered to be under state detention for the purposes of that Act when they are deprived of their liberty under the relevant sections of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. This covers the deprivation of liberty safeguards, which can be from a Court of Protection order, from a DoLS authorisation or, where the deprivation of liberty was urgently required, pending a decision by the Court of Protection on the authority to restrict the person’s liberty. The second amendment makes a consequential change to the Long Title of the Bill.
Let me explain why this new clause is needed. After the Cheshire West judgment, the number of DoLS applications has risen enormously. This was the subject of a debate in this House on 16 March 2015. Prior to the Cheshire West judgment, in 2012-13, there were 11,887 DoLS. In 2014-15, 122,775 individuals had an active DoLS application either granted or in process. That is more than a tenfold increase in the number of DoLS. Some of these people were seriously ill and some died. In 2015, there were 7,183 such deaths. The vast majority of those were expected, anticipated and accepted by the family and those responsible for care. These were not deaths that came as a surprise to anyone. When that family was then told that the death must be referred to the coroner for an inquest they were often shocked and worried, as if there were some sort of accusation against them or others. They could not progress with their grieving and arrange the funeral, as they then had to wait for the inquest.
In 2015 the average time for inquests was 20 weeks, although coroners tried very hard to ensure that deaths under DoLS, when clearly of natural causes, were dealt with more quickly. To put the numbers in context, of the more than 7,000 deaths under DoLS, 6,760—or 94%—were found at inquests to be natural.
The distress to the bereaved has become a common cause of complaint to the Department of Health. In addition, it is not a good use of coroners, who should be investigating deaths where there is any suspicion whatever. Indeed, I remind the House that the Ministry of Justice’s Guide to Coroner Services states:
“Registrars of births and deaths, doctors or the police must report deaths to a coroner in certain circumstances. These include where it appears that: no doctor saw the deceased during his or her last illness; although a doctor attended the deceased during the last illness, the doctor is not able or available, for any reason, to certify the death; the cause of death is unknown; the death occurred during an operation or before recovery from the effects of an anaesthetic; the death occurred at work or was due to industrial disease or poisoning; the death was sudden and unexplained; the death was unnatural”—
so that includes all suspected suicides—
“the death was due to violence or neglect; the death was in other suspicious circumstances; or the death occurred in prison, police custody or another type of state detention”.
The Ministry of Justice document goes on to say:
“If you believe that a death of this kind has not been reported to the coroner, you may report it yourself”.
In other words, relatives who have any concern can themselves report to the coroner. It goes on to say:
“You should do this as soon as possible and before the funeral. The coroner will then inform you of the action he or she proposes to take”.
Nothing in the amendment removes the obligations to inform the coroner if there is any suspicion whatever around a death. The amendment is to remove the mandatory requirement to hold an inquest where the deceased was deprived of their liberty under all relevant sections of the Mental Capacity Act—or, indeed, where the deprivation of liberty was to provide care to them.
Under the Mental Capacity Act a person who lacks capacity may be detained in circumstances which amount to deprivation of liberty. No detention amounting to deprivation of liberty may be permitted without lawful authorisation, because it would otherwise constitute false imprisonment. The Mental Capacity Act provide safeguards known as DoLS and Court of Protection orders to be made depriving a person of liberty for their care. It also allows for the deprivation of liberty of a person for the purpose of giving life-sustaining treatment only where a decision of the court is pending.
I want to address a concern that has been raised with me in relation to anyone who dies under the care of a mental health trust. A suicide or an unexpected or a sudden death must always be referred to the coroner, but I would expect there to be a routine review of any death in a mental health trust or similar organisation. Such a review should be available to the Care Quality Commission inspectors and I would expect the inspectors to ask about the number of deaths that had occurred in people subject to a deprivation of liberty safeguard application or authorisation. They should look in depth at the quality of the review of care that had taken place. Additionally, anyone who has concerns at any stage should raise those concerns, whether through whistleblowing or through the complaints process.
Complaints and how they are handled also form part of CQC inspections and I believe that such searching questions are far more likely to detect poor care than relying on a referral to the coroner, who is only looking at one instance and cannot see how care is delivered across a whole organisation. The recent incidents of poor care of those with learning difficulties that have come to light are certainly alerting inspectors that they must be more rigorous in their inquiries than before. To summarise, I hope that this amendment will correct an anomaly that has caused more than 6,500 bereaved families unnecessary distress in the last year alone. I beg to move.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for this amendment. The Government are pleased to be able to offer our support for this amendment, which will minimise the stress on bereaved families at a very difficult time for them. The amendment will fully address the concerns that no family, having watched and comforted their loved one through his or her final days, should then be unnecessarily subject to the anxiety and confusion of having their death investigated by a coroner. I thank the noble Baroness for raising the profile of this important issue and for her valuable input, which the Government very much welcome and support. I commend her amendment to the Committee.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, these are technical and consequential amendments to the Extent clause and I beg to move.
Policing and Crime Bill
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen ExcerptsWednesday 9th November 2016
(8 years ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 55-IV Fourth marshalled list for Committee (PDF, 263KB) - (7 Nov 2016)
“(a) either the conditions in subsection (2AA) are met or the condition in subsection (2AB) is met, and(b) if an additional condition is specified in regulations under subsection (2AC), that condition is also met.(2AA) The conditions in this subsection are that—(a) the firearm’s chamber or, if the firearm has more than one chamber, each of its chambers is either—(i) a chamber that the firearm had when it was manufactured, or(ii) a replacement for such a chamber that is identical to it in all material respects;(b) the firearm’s chamber or (as the case may be) each of the firearm’s chambers is designed for use with a cartridge of a description specified in regulations made by statutory instrument by the Secretary of State (whether or not it is also capable of being used with other cartridges).(2AB) The condition in this subsection is that the firearm’s ignition system is of a description specified in regulations made by statutory instrument by the Secretary of State.(2AC) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument specify either of the following conditions for the purposes of subsection (2A)(b)—(a) a condition that a number of years specified in the regulations has elapsed since the date on which the firearm was manufactured;(b) a condition that the firearm was manufactured before a date specified in the regulations.”
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)
My Lords, Great Britain has some of the toughest gun control laws in the world. However, as matters stand, the Firearms Act 1968 exempts antique firearms held as a “curiosity or ornament” from the scope of firearms legislation, which means they can be held without a firearms certificate. The problem with the current situation is that “antique” is not defined and it is this ambiguity that Clause 112 is designed to address. The law as currently constituted places too much emphasis on how the firearm is possessed—as a curio or ornament—and not on the characteristics and definitions of what constitutes an antique firearm. To resolve these difficulties we propose to define an antique firearm by reference to functionality and will do this in two ways: first, if its chamber is capable of being used only with a cartridge of a specified description and, secondly, if its ignition system is of a specified description.
However, concerns have been raised that instead of bringing the desired certainty to this area of firearms legislation, our definition could create further uncertainty about the status of old firearms because it would be difficult, if not impossible, to rule out the possibility that some antique firearms may be capable of being used with cartridges other than those for which they were originally designed. This would mean that a significant proportion of antique firearms currently regarded as exempt would not be covered by the new definition and in consequence could become prohibited. The amendment therefore sets out that antique firearms should be defined by reference to the chamber they had when manufactured, or an identical replacement chamber, which will allow them to be subject to the exemption. If the chambering has been altered in any way to accommodate ammunition which would otherwise be a loose or imprecise fit, then the firearm will not be subject to the exemption. A firearm may still also achieve antique status based on its ignition system.
The amendment also creates a further regulation-making power to enable the Secretary of State to specify a number of years since the date of manufacture which must have elapsed for a firearm to be antique, or that the firearm must have been manufactured before a specified date. This will guard against modern reproductions benefiting from antique firearms’ exemption from the controls in the legislation. I beg to move.
“Possession of pyrotechnic articles at musical events
(1) It is an offence for a person to have a pyrotechnic article in his or her possession at any time when the person is—(a) at a place in England where a qualifying musical event is being held, or(b) at any other place in England that is being used by a person responsible for the organisation of a qualifying musical event for the purpose of—(i) regulating entry to, or departure from, the event, or(ii) providing sleeping or other facilities for those attending the event.(2) Subsection (1) does not apply—(a) to a person who is responsible for the organisation of the event, or(b) to a person who has the article in his or her possession with the consent of a person responsible for the organisation of the event.(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks (or, in relation to offences committed before section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 comes into force, 3 months), or to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale, or to both.(4) In this section, “pyrotechnic article” means an article that contains explosive substances, or an explosive mixture of substances, designed to produce heat, light, sound, gas or smoke, or a combination of such effects, through self-sustained exothermic chemical reactions, other than—(a) a match, or(b) an article specified, or of a description specified, in regulations made by statutory instrument by the Secretary of State.(5) In this section, “qualifying musical event” means an event at which one or more live musical performances take place and which is specified, or of a description specified, in regulations made by statutory instrument by the Secretary of State.(6) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, Amendment 209 provides for a new offence of possession of pyrotechnic articles at live musical events in England. The amendment is in response to one tabled by Nigel Adams on Report in the House of Commons. The misuse of fireworks, flares and smoke bombs at festivals and other live musical events by members of the public is an increasing and deeply concerning problem. Fireworks and other pyrotechnic articles covered by the amendment are dangerous when misused. Fireworks can burn at in excess of 2,200 degrees centigrade; flares can reach temperatures of 1,600 degrees centigrade and can burn for as long as an hour. Smoke bombs also burn at high temperatures, and in enclosed or crowded spaces the thick smoke that they release can cause breathing difficulties, particularly for asthma sufferers.
In the 1980s, it was recognised that the misuse of pyrotechnic articles in crowded football stadia posed a specific public order risk. As a result, the Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc.) Act 1985 provides for an offence of possession of fireworks and flares at a football match. However, current firework and explosives legislation does not provide the police or prosecutors with an appropriate offence to tackle the possession of pyrotechnic articles at music festivals. While the majority of festival organisers have their own rules banning festivalgoers from bringing fireworks and other pyrotechnic articles on to festival premises, no statutory regulation exists. There is no offence for the use of a firework, flare or smoke bomb in a crowd on private property unless it can be proved that it was used with the intent to cause injury or that its use was likely to endanger life or seriously damage property.
Amendment 209 therefore makes it an offence for a person to be in possession of a pyrotechnic article at a qualifying musical event in England. The offence has been so constructed as to apply also where a person is in possession of such articles at a point of entry into, or exit from, the place where a qualifying musical event is taking place, or at a campsite provided for those who are attending the event.
A qualifying musical event will be defined in regulations, subject to the negative procedure. The amendment itself provides that such musical events must involve live musical performances and, in defining a qualifying event, we will want to further target the offence at those events where there is evidence of harm being caused by the misuse of fireworks, flares or smoke bombs. The maximum penalty for the offence is three months’ imprisonment, which is the same as that applicable to the existing football-related offence.
The effect of Amendment 234 is that the offence extends to England and Wales. As I indicated, it applies to England only. However, we are considering further its territorial application in consultation with the Welsh Government. Amendment 245 makes a consequential amendment to the Long Title.
This offence will help prevent the harm that can come from the misuse of such dangerous articles and allow everyone to enjoy live music events safely. I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am grateful to officials for explaining the origin of the amendment to me. They commented that the Government’s view is that we should not extend the criminal law unless there is a well-founded case for doing so. I agree with that, but I have instinctive concerns about this proposal. First, what consultation has there been with the entertainment industry? This must be a matter of widespread interest. I cannot say that I go to musical events usually held in the open air—I go to rather staider events—but a lot of people will feel that they are being targeted by the measure. What consideration has been given to, first, whether there should not be a focus on the venue organiser rather than the individual, as this seems to be a matter of crowd control? Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, is there no other way than creating a new specific offence? If fireworks and flares are dangerous—I accept that they are—is this not about the misuse of fireworks rather than the place or event where they may be misused? As for it being a musical event, which is to be determined by regulations, that seems to raise all sorts of problems.
I appreciate that this comes from legislation about football matches, although the 1985 Act cited by the Minister seems a little narrower, unless I have misunderstood it, because the places where the person is found to be in possession are very closely defined, including an area,
“from which the event may be directly viewed”.
When looking up that section, I came across a petition to Parliament to legalise the use of pyrotechnics at football grounds. I could not find its date, but it was rejected on the basis that it was,
“a matter for individual Local Authorities”.
That confused me even more, but I wonder what relation that point has to the amendment.
I am sorry to throw a number of questions at the Minister, but I am sure that the Government considered them before proposing the amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, this new clause is in general most welcome and I am happy to support it from these Benches. It seeks to ban the possession of fireworks, smoke bombs and flares by those attending live musical events. As we have heard, these are extremely dangerous and can burn at more than 2,000 degrees, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chisholm, outlined. There have been a number of injuries, and perhaps we may hear more about that when she responds.
I was surprised to learn that while these items are banned at football matches, it is not the case at musical events. A valid point has been made about widening the ban to other events. That should be considered, too, rather than just picking one area of a problem that may be more widespread. If I am correct, the amendment does not stop the organisers of the event using these articles but just protects the people attending, and prevents people putting them in their bags and setting them off recklessly in the crowd.
The other amendments are consequential. I am generally supportive of them but the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made valid points that require a response from the Government.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I thank noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate and hope that I can answer their questions.
On the point regarding consultation, the proposed new offence is supported by the music industry. The national policing lead for festivals, Assistant Chief Constable Andy Battle of West Yorkshire Police, who is in charge of dealing with these sorts of events countrywide, has also welcomed the proposed legislation. Therefore, we have indeed consulted. In fact, organisers have already made it clear that fireworks should not be brought into festivals but feel that an offence is needed to provide better and greater deference to this understanding and to concentrate people’s minds.
Why does this apply only to music events? The data gathered by the crowd management organisation Showsec on behalf of Live Nation recorded 255 incidents involving pyrotechnic articles at live music events in 2014. This covered seven music festivals and other, smaller venues. This new offence is being created to target the specific problem of pyrotechnics at live music events. There is no evidence to suggest that pyrotechnic articles are a problem at other kinds of events, with the exception of football stadiums, which are covered under sporting events control.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, also asked about extending the ban outside the event. Extending the offence to include travel to a music event or festival would not only widen the scope of the offence considerably but put it at odds with current legislation on the possession of fireworks and flares. There are also practical considerations regarding how such an extension could be enforced. Police officers would need reasonable grounds to believe that individuals were travelling to a musical event with pyrotechnic articles in order to search them. In our view, this would be an onerous demand on police time. The national policing lead for music festivals, Andy Battle of West Yorkshire Police, agreed that any provision around travel would not be helpful and be problematic to enforce.
A noble Lord asked why fireworks could be included in the general celebration of the event by the organisers. We accept that pyrotechnic articles are often used as part of a performance, and we would not want to restrict that. The new offence will maintain the distinction between pyrotechnics authorised for use as part of a festival or event and those misused by the public. I hope that that has covered everything.
Baroness Hamwee
I did not express myself very well. I was not concerned about travel to the event. I was comparing the amendment with Section 2A of the Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc.) Act 1985, under which the offence applies when a person,
“is in any area of a designated sports ground from which the event may be directly viewed”.
I was comparing the two matters. That probably highlights the fact that musical events are different.
After hearing the response, I cannot help thinking that this is a matter of how people may use or misuse fireworks and flares in a much more general way. Does the noble Baroness know whether the regulations will address the definition of a qualifying musical event, or will they actually list particular events? She referred to the national policing lead for musical events; I had not realised there was such a post. By definition, that officer will not have given comments about events that are not musical events. If the noble Baroness has no further information—I appreciate that she may not, as we are becoming quite detailed—perhaps it is a matter for another day. But they are not invalid questions.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I might have inspiration from over my left shoulder. The offence will apply to a campsite adjacent to a festival and the regulation-making power will include a generic definition of a live musical event.
Policing and Crime Bill
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen ExcerptsWednesday 2nd November 2016
(8 years ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 55-III(a) Amendments for Committee, supplementary to the third marshalled list (PDF, 64KB) - (1 Nov 2016)
“( ) Where an offence under this section is committed by a person released without charge and on bail under Part 4 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the offence is to be treated as having been committed in England and Wales (whether or not the conduct constituting the offence took place there).( ) Where an offence under this section is committed by a person released without charge and on bail under Part 5 of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/1341 (N.I.12)), the offence is to be treated as having been committed in Northern Ireland (whether or not the conduct constituting the offence took place there).”
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)
My Lords, these amendments principally relate to the cross-border enforcement provisions in Chapter 7 of Part 4. Those provisions strengthen the existing cross-border powers of arrest contained in Part 10 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. In particular, these provisions close a gap in the cross-border arrest powers to ensure that a person who commits an offence in one UK jurisdiction can be arrested without a warrant by an officer from the jurisdiction in which the person is found. The provisions in new Section 137A of the 1994 Act include a number of safeguards, one of which is that the arresting officer has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the suspect has committed a specified offence in another jurisdiction—that is, an offence specified in regulations.
In the interests of greater clarity and to ensure that the police are able to exercise these powers as soon as possible after Royal Assent, Amendments 201B, 201C, 201G and 201T insert a list of “specified offences” in the 1994 Act, instead of setting out the offences in regulations. As a consequence of this new approach, Amendments 201D to 201F modify the regulation-making power in new Section 137B of the 1994 Act so that it becomes a power to add an offence to or remove an offence from the list of offences for the time being specified in new Schedule 7A to the 1994 Act. This revised power is necessary to ensure that the list of relevant offences can be kept up to date; for example, to take account of new offences being created or reductions in the maximum penalty for a specified offence such that it is no longer in the interests of justice for it to remain on the list. As befitting a Henry VIII power, the regulations continue to be subject to the affirmative procedure.
The list of relevant offences specified in new Schedule 7A to the 1994 Act includes that in Clause 67: namely, the offence of breach of pre-charge bail conditions relating to travel. The related Amendment 187A to that clause clarifies that if a travel-related breach of pre-charge bail conditions is committed anywhere in the United Kingdom, it will be regarded as having been committed in either England and Wales or Northern Ireland, depending on where the bail was granted. This will ensure that the breach can be prosecuted in the relevant UK courts and will also make sure that the cross-border powers set out in Clauses 105 to 107 are available to enforce the offence.
Amendments 201H to 201S relate to the rights of persons arrested under new Section 137A of the 1994 Act. New Section 137D of the 1994 Act applies certain existing statutory rights to persons arrested under the new power of arrest—for example, in respect of the information to be given to the arrestee—but includes a power to disapply or modify the specified enactments. Again, in the interests of greater clarity, new Schedule 7B to the 1994 Act, which is inserted by Amendment 201U, sets out the necessary modifications in the 1994 Act. As a consequence of this change of approach, the regulation-making power is retained but modified so that it becomes a power to add, remove, alter and disapply statutory rights. Amendment 233A makes a consequential change to the extent clause.
I trust noble Lords will agree that this revised approach will provide greater clarity as to how the new cross-border arrest powers will operate. I beg to move.
Lord Thurlow (CB)
My Lords, I rise to support the amendments tabled in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Walmsley and Lady Hamwee, and my noble friend Lady Howe. They mark important steps across the board to bring the treatment of mental ill-health in line with our 21st-century understanding of that arena. I have, perhaps regrettably, close personal experience of dealing with and attempting to cope with people suffering a mental health crisis. I bring to bear that experience as well as the advice offered by the Mental Health Alliance and specifically the charity Mind, both of which have been referred to, in my endorsement of these amendments.
The amendments regarding the use of police cells and homes as supposed places of safety—neither are appropriate, I agree—and concerning the period of detention in those places awaiting a mental health assessment are most important. I acknowledge the positive steps that this Bill in its original form recommended in both of these areas, but they do not go far enough. Perhaps I may reflect for a moment on who it is that these clauses are designed to protect. It is the vulnerable, the needy and those less able to help themselves. We have a special duty to those people in our society. These amendments are an important step of progress in improving their treatment at the hands of the police in times of crisis. That said, I am not criticising the police. I have seen at close quarters the awkward circumstances of the police having to enforce the rules. I admire the sensitivity and empathy I have seen displayed.
When a person is in a mental health crisis there is a very high risk of private anxiety, emotions of distress, confusion, aggression and perhaps threatening behaviour. What is required is probably support and compassion. Confinement in a cell is bound to add to this distress. Surroundings matter.
As we have heard, the Government have begun to dedicate funds to mental health services, improving the provision of suitable places of safety and achieving parity of esteem between mental and physical health. These are important steps and this work must continue. We must step up to this challenge on the behalf of those affected. This disadvantaged group, unlike most in our society, seldom makes its own case for better care. The reality is, of course, that they cannot—they are confused and they are not organised—but we can. They rely on us, and on the charities and other groups that work with them.
We must be sure to try our best to legislate so that the trend continues and relevant investment goes toward providing for those in need. The amendments tabled by the noble Baroness would do exactly that. This is legislation that will help bring the Mental Health Act 1983 into the 21st century. If we think for a minute, that Act was enacted more than 30 years ago. The quantum leaps of progress in medical understanding of mental health issues have been huge. Yet, the Act on the statute book is more than 30 years old. We must take every opportunity we can to improve the terms of the Act wherever we can.
I thank the noble Baronesses for their work in tabling the amendments and request that the Minister accepts them.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I thank noble Lords for this important debate. As the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, explained, these amendments seek to restrict, in different ways, the premises that can be used as a place of safety for persons detained under Sections 135 or 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
Of course it is important that people detained at a time of crisis be taken to the most appropriate place of safety for their medical needs. That principle is behind these amendments and also represents the Government’s position. Where we differ is on how this should be achieved in terms of the full range of options that should be available to professionals. Amendments 189 and 190 to Clause 79 would completely prohibit the use of police stations as places of safety. The Bill provides that police stations cannot be used as places of safety in the case of children or young people aged under 18. The issue for the Committee is whether this prohibition would also apply to adults.
The noble Baroness and other noble Lords who have spoken are concerned that a police station should never be an appropriate place for a person of any age to be taken at a time of such distress. The Government accept that police stations have been used to detain people under Section 136 far too often. Although much progress has certainly been made to address this, including a 54% reduction between 2014-15 and 2015-16, there is no doubt that police cells are still used inappropriately in some areas.
This will be addressed through regulations governing the circumstances in which a police station can be used for an adult. We have heard from experts that there are occasions when the behaviour of adult detainees can be too violent to be safely managed in a health setting. I expect the regulations to also set out the expected standards of care to be provided to any adult taken to a police station. These decisions will be determined on a case-by-case basis, but I stress that the emphasis is on the exceptional nature of such situations, with health-based places of safety used for the vast majority of cases. The Government have engaged experts and other interested parties in the development of those regulations. I expect to be in a position to say more about our approach ahead of Report.
Baroness Walmsley
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply. I have a few points to make in response but want first to apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, for not mentioning his excellent report. I congratulate him and the Government on the recommendations in the report that have been achieved on the ground. The street diversion teams are particularly good and would certainly come into play were a person found to be violent and in danger of hurting themselves or somebody else. The teams have had a fantastic effect and I look forward to their being rolled out universally.
It has been suggested that the amendment is a little premature and that we do not yet have the infrastructure in place to enable us to have a complete ban on the use of police cells. As with every other Bill, it would be perfectly possible for the Government to accept such a measure and then delay its implementation until such time as the review suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, had taken place and the extra beds had been put in place. That would not be an impediment to the Government accepting my amendment.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked what would happen if no health-based place of safety was available, the implication being that only use of a police cell was possible. Every local authority has hundreds of care homes and the lucky ones have nursing homes, too. Not all beds are occupied all the time; indeed, a recent report in the media cited instances where the contract with the family concerned stated that after the person in question had died, the family would have to carry on paying for two, three or four weeks while the home found another occupant for that room. That means that vacant rooms will be available. Some of them would be perfectly suitable for some patients, because they are acceptable and legal places of safety. If Hertfordshire and Merseyside can do it in those circumstances, then why not everywhere else?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
Is the noble Baroness suggesting that mental health patients are able to go to care homes as places of safety?
Baroness Walmsley
I beg the Minister’s pardon. I should have said that there are care homes in every local authority where staff are specially trained to deal with people with mental health problems.
If Merseyside and Hertfordshire can do it, why not everywhere? Do they not have any patients who are in exceptional circumstances? I am sure they do.
On funding, the Minister suggested that the LGA was incorrect in briefing us that none of the money was going to local authorities. That is where my statement came from, and it should know.
On Amendment 191, about use of the home, it is important that somebody in a mental health crisis be able to see someone who is trained to assess and treat them as soon as possible, and as soon as would happen if they had a physical problem. They will not get that in their home. I do not believe that those choosing to take them home would be in a position to assess whether that home was really safe. Even members of the family would not know whether the home was safe, so getting their agreement is no guarantee that the home is a real place of safety. Many mental health patients have said that they would find it a serious intrusion on their privacy if the police brought them home and stood guard over them while they were there. I accept that it would be for only a short period, but to have a policeman outside the door would have a great effect on how they felt they were seen. As the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, said, they already feel stigmatised by a link being made between mental health and criminality, which there really is not. We should therefore pursue these issues on Report. Of course, this is Committee stage, so for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Viscount Hailsham
My Lords, I have great sympathy with the points just made. The clock should start ticking when a person is taken into custody and not when he or she arrives at the place of safety.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, the amendment would provide for the permitted period of detention of a person detained under Section 135 of the Mental Health Act 1983 to commence at the point at which they were removed to, rather than the point at which they arrived at, a place of safety.
The Government wholeheartedly support the aim of minimising the period during which a person is detained under either Section 135 or Section 136 of the 1983 Act. That is why Clause 80 reduces the maximum detention period from 72 hours to 24 hours.
I also agree that every effort should be made to minimise the time taken to remove and transport a detained person to a place of safety. However, I put it to the noble Baroness that securing that outcome cannot best be achieved through legislation. Indeed, the amendment could well have unintended consequences which were detrimental to the best interest of detained persons.
I fear that the practical effect of the amendment would be to penalise those in need of care and the professionals assessing them in circumstances where the detained person needed to be removed from an isolated location, or if it was difficult to remove that person. For example, if someone needs to be removed from a place that is isolated or difficult to access, it may take some time for professionals to be able to get that person to a place of safety. We do not want the police or mental health practitioners to have one eye on the clock in such circumstances.
There is a balance to be struck between taking positive action to keep periods of detention as short as is reasonably possible and giving mental health professionals sufficient time for the necessary arrangements to be made for mental health assessments to be conducted during the 24-hour window provided for in the Bill. We believe that the combination of reducing, by two-thirds, the period of detention and starting the detention clock only when the detained person arrives at the place of safety—which is, incidentally, how the time limits work now—achieves that balance.
In practice, the vast majority of detained persons will be assessed well within 24 hours of their removal, but the legislation needs to allow not just for the generality of cases, where a person can be taken quickly to a place of safety, but also for that small minority of exceptional cases where this may not be possible. I hope that, on reflection, the noble Baroness is persuaded that the approach taken in the Bill is in the best interests of those suffering a mental health crisis and in need of immediate care. I accordingly invite her to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Walmsley
Amendment 193 would ensure that people detained under Section 135 or Section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 have access to an appropriate adult. Such access is key to providing people in crisis access to advice while under emergency detention. It is a uniquely distressing and confusing time, as we have heard, and one where independent advice from someone with knowledge and skill who can handle the situation calmly is crucial.
At the moment detained people only have the police, who were involved in detaining them, and the person doing their mental health assessment as their key contacts. Clearly, neither of these can be seen as impartial to their situation. The person doing their assessment, although qualified, is going to be deciding what happens to them next, and so cannot really be described as impartial. There is a huge gap here, since people under most other sections of the Mental Health Act have the right to access an independent mental health advocate. People who are under arrest also have the right to access an appropriate adult. The National Appropriate Adult Network says about people detained or questioned by police:
“While both children and mentally vulnerable adults are required to have an Appropriate Adult under the PACE Codes of Practice, there is only statutory provision for children. As a result many people aged over 17 who are mentally vulnerable do not get the support that they are entitled to. This includes people with mental ill health, learning disabilities and autistic spectrum disorders”.
I recognise the concern of local authorities that they are strapped for cash, but I feel that making this provision statutory will put pressure on the Government to provide the necessary resources. The JCHR shares my concerns about this gap, as we read in its third report of the 2016-17 Session. It wrote to Mike Penning MP, then Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice. He replied on 1 July 2016 to the effect that persons detained under Sections 135 and 136 were only there in order to allow for a mental health assessment and he was keen,
“that we do not inadvertently build unintended and unnecessary delay and bureaucracy into this process or as a consequence of having to await the arrival of a formal advocate or independent representative”.
He also pointed out that the person could request the presence of a legal adviser or a relative or friend. This did not satisfy the JCHR and it does not satisfy me.
The JCHR said:
“We believe that additional safeguards are required to ensure that a person detained in a place of safety under s 135 or 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 should have access to an ‘appropriate adult’, particularly in circumstances where they are detained in their own home”.
It drafted an amendment very similar to my Amendment 193, which I think it proposes to bring forward on Report, unless the noble Baroness can satisfy us all this evening. Given the state a person is likely to be in when they are detained, I believe it would be a breach of their human rights not to allow them the right to access an appropriate adult. I beg to move.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, it is absolutely right that people detained under Sections 135 or 136 should have the help and support they need to understand what is happening to them, and the current arrangements already allow for that. Detention under Sections 135 and 136 is for a short period of time and for the specific purpose of assessing the need for care and treatment, and making the necessary arrangements for its provision.
This amendment calls for each person detained to have access to an appropriate adult; an issue which was also raised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its report on the Bill. It is true that appropriate adults provide an incredibly valuable service, providing support and advocacy for children and vulnerable adults detained in police stations, usually when they are under arrest in connection with a criminal offence. Appropriate adults are not currently required to be provided by the police to support people detained under the Mental Health Act, nor are they trained to meet their particular needs. We must be cautious of the potentially stigmatising effects of conflating the support services provided to people suspected of an offence with those needed by people detained in connection with their mental ill health.
In the majority of cases under Sections 135 or 136, the person will be taken to health-based places of safety, where appropriate adults do not operate, rather than to police stations. In 2015-16 police stations were used in only 7% of Section 136 cases in England and Wales. The provisions in the Bill mean that police stations will be used even less than they are now; in fact, quite rarely, I expect— we hope, not at all. These rare cases require particular attention and I expect that the regulations on the use of police stations as places of safety for adults will give very clear direction about the level of support that will need to be in place.
I recognise that this amendment is about all people who are detained under Sections 135 or 136, regardless of which place of safety they are taken to. It is about supporting them, informing them and speaking for them if necessary. The Government are clear that the mental health professionals involved in the detention and assessment process are best placed to do this. Also, mandating the attendance of an appropriate adult, or some other person with a similar role, could very easily cause avoidable delays in getting on with the mental health assessment that is the proper purpose of a detention under Sections 135 or 136. Given that the Bill reduces the maximum period of detention from 72 hours to 24, it seems unhelpful to then introduce additional requirements that would, in all likelihood, impinge on that reduced period of time.
Guidance is now being developed on the changes the Bill makes to the 1983 Act. It will make clear the expectations on healthcare staff—those whom people detained under Sections 135 and 136 will encounter—to ensure that detainees have the support and advice they need while awaiting and undergoing an assessment. The Government are engaging with a wide range of experts to draw up this guidance. Current practices and the needs of people experiencing a mental health crisis will be carefully considered.
I hope I have been able to persuade the noble Baroness that mandating access to an appropriate adult is inappropriate in the context of a short Section 135 or Section 136 detention, and that, having had this opportunity to debate the issue, she will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Policing and Crime Bill
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen ExcerptsWednesday 2nd November 2016
(8 years ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 55-III(a) Amendments for Committee, supplementary to the third marshalled list (PDF, 64KB) - (1 Nov 2016)
“( ) a designated NCA officer who is authorised by the Director General of the National Crime Agency (whether generally or specifically) to exercise the powers of a law enforcement officer under this Chapter, or”
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)
My Lords, government Amendments 196, 199, 200 and 201 are essentially consequential on the provisions in Clause 138 which enable the director-general of the National Crime Agency to designate NCA officers with the powers of general customs officials. The amendments clarify that NCA officers so designated are able to exercise the new maritime enforcement powers in the same way as NCA officers designated with the powers of a constable. As a result, these important new powers will be available to NCA officers investigating customs matters such as the smuggling of drugs and firearms. I beg to move.
Lord Paddick
Section 66 of the Metropolitan Police Act was repealed on the basis of the powers to stop and search under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. The earlier powers were superseded, so it was decided that Section 66 was no longer necessary.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
Well, my Lords, it just shows how marvellous this House is. We have experts who can always answer the questions for us, which is an enormous help.
As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, explained, Amendments 196A and 200A relate to the power, by regulations, to add to the list of law enforcement officers who may exercise the new maritime enforcement powers in Chapters 5 and 6 of Part 4 of the Bill. Clause 82(3) defines “law enforcement officers” in England and Wales for the purpose of exercising the maritime powers. This includes provision for the Secretary of State to specify in regulations other categories of person who may be allowed to exercise these powers. Clause 94(3) makes equivalent provision for Scotland. The proposed amendments would require the Secretary of State to consult prior to making such regulations.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, mentioned foreign ports. Ports in foreign countries are included. Maritime powers can be exercised in international and foreign waters all over the globe. It is a practical and operational necessity that those exercising such powers should be able lawfully to divert a ship to a port and detain it there where the operation in question takes place hundreds or thousands of miles away from England and Wales. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Rosser—
Lord Rosser
My concern was that “or elsewhere” might be used in cases involving foreign ships which are discovered within our territorial waters to contain, or are suspected to contain, refugees and others in need of international protection who might be in breach of immigration law but who nevertheless have certain rights which, on the face of it, could be overridden if there was a power to divert ships to a port elsewhere—indeed, anywhere in the world. It could mean them being sent back to a place where they would be in danger. It would also mean that they would not have had the right to have their claim for protection fairly determined before they could be returned. The question I was asking is, was my interpretation of the apparent power in the Bill for a law enforcement officer or the Secretary of State to be able to do that correct? If it was not correct—and I said I hoped it was not correct—will the Government explain to me why my analysis was not right?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, inspiration has appeared from over my left shoulder. The maritime provisions of the Bill are strictly intended to enable enforcement officers to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute offences under the law of England and Wales. Any decision to divert a foreign ship that is not in UK territorial waters to a foreign port will require the authority of the Secretary of State. These powers are not intended to be used in a way which is contrary to the Human Rights Act, the 1951 refugee convention or the 1967 protocol.
I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that the Home Secretary will consult appropriately before making any such regulations. Such consultation will certainly include any person or body to be specified in the regulations and, in relation to any regulations to be made under Clause 94, the Scottish Government. Indeed, there is an implied duty to consult the Scottish Government and more in Clause 94(6), which requires Scottish Ministers to consent to any regulations under Clause 94(3)(e), which makes devolved provision. Having stated our intention to consult on any such regulations, I hope the noble Lord will agree that it is not necessary to set this out in the Bill.
Amendments 196C, 196D, 197 and 198 relate to Clause 92, which imposes an obligation on the Secretary of State to provide a code of practice for law enforcement officers who use the power of arrest conferred by Clause 88. This code must provide guidance on the information—for example, procedural rights to be given to a person at the time of their arrest. Amendments 196C and 196D seek to amend Clause 92 to extend the scope of the code of practice so that it also addresses the matters which a law enforcement officer must have regard to when considering making an arrest under the maritime powers. We believe that the proper focus of the code is on the information that should be provided to a suspect at the point of arrest, including in relation to their procedural rights. Importantly, the provisions in the Bill in respect of the code of practice closely mirror those in the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and it would be confusing to law enforcement officers to adopt a different approach here.
The power of arrest, like other powers under the maritime provisions, is clearly set out in the Bill. For example, Clause 88 is clear that the power of arrest may be exercised where an enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence under the law of England and Wales has been, or is being, committed. It will be down to the knowledge, experience and professionalism of the officers concerned as to whether the use of the power is both necessary and appropriate for the purpose of preventing, detecting, investigating and prosecuting offences. The priority for enforcement officers who have apprehended a person on a vessel at sea will be to bring them back to the UK, where they will be processed under PACE in the usual way.
Amendments 197 and 198 relate to the parliamentary procedure for bringing codes of practice into force. The Bill makes provision to bring a new code of practice into law through the affirmative procedure. However, Clause 92(9) provides a choice of procedure for any subsequent revisions to the code. This enables the right level of scrutiny to be provided, proportionate to the revisions being made to the code. For minor or consequential changes the affirmative procedure would, we believe, be disproportionate. Insisting on the affirmative procedure in all cases could cause unnecessary delays in revising the code, with the result that the code would remain out of date in operational terms for longer than necessary. Amendments 197 and 198 would remove this choice, requiring both the first draft of a new code of practice and any revisions to go through the affirmative procedure.
The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee recommended in its report on the Bill of 13 July that when using Clause 92(9), the Minister should be,
“bound by the views of the House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee”.
This is similar to the procedure used for revisions to codes of practice for the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. My noble friend’s letter of 7 September to the noble Baroness, Lady Fookes, chair of the Delegated Powers Committee, accepted that recommendation, so the choice of procedure provided by Clause 92(9) will be exercised with reference to the views of the Home Affairs Select Committee. We believe that this will provide the best approach to ensuring that the appropriate level of scrutiny is provided for any changes to the code.
I hope I have been able to satisfy noble Lords that these amendments are not necessary and that accordingly the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Rosser
I certainly will withdraw the amendment. Unless I was not paying as much attention as I should have been—and I accept that that is a genuine possibility, and I mean that—I am not sure that I got an answer to the question: what kind of current unspecified category of persons do the Government believe may need to be designated as a law enforcement officer that cannot be so designated clearly and specifically now in the Bill? That related to both Clause 82(3)(g) and Clause 94(3)(e).
The only other point I would ask for clarification on, which comes back to the question I raised about how the powers could, on the face of it, be used to override the rights of those in need of international protection, is whether in giving the Government’s response the Minister said that it was not intended that the powers be used to override the rights of those in need of international protection, or that they would not be used in that way. The latter is rather firmer than a statement of intent.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
On the noble Lord’s first point, these powers are necessary to enable the categories of law enforcement officer who may exercise these maritime enforcement powers to be extended in the light of changing operational requirements. For example, both the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990 and the Modern Slavery Act 2015 confer powers on Armed Forces personnel and there may be an operational case for extending the powers in this Bill to such personnel in future.
Lord Rosser
Is there any clarification—or perhaps the Minister could write to me subsequently—of what was said in relation to the apparent ability to override the rights of those in need of international protection through the facility to divert a ship to a port elsewhere, or indeed anywhere in the world? Was the response that it was not intended that that power should be used to override those rights, or was it a clear statement that it would not be used to override those rights?
Lord Rosser
I thank the Minister very much indeed. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, Amendment 196B is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. As we have just been discussing, Chapter 5 of the Bill gives extensive powers to law enforcement officers in relation to maritime enforcement—not just in British territorial waters and not just British vessels but far more extensively—including the power in Clause 86(1) to stop, board, divert and detain the ship,
“if a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that … an offence under the law of England and Wales is being, or has been, committed”.
The amendment seeks to probe whether the powers are intended to apply if a law enforcement officer suspects that any offence whatever has been committed. For example, if two crew members are involved in a fight, could these powers then be used,
“to stop, board, divert and detain”,
the ship? That would appear rather disproportionate. While two crew members having a fight might not be considered a good example, stranger things have happened at sea, apparently. The amendment works on the basis that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery. It takes its wording from proposed new Section 137B by restricting enforcement powers to “indictable” offences only, and only those offences specified in regulations by the Secretary of State. I beg to move.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has explained, Amendment 196B seeks to limit the exercise of the new maritime enforcement powers by the police to suspected offences which are “indictable” and specified in the regulations made by the Secretary of State. He indicated that the intention is to limit the use of these powers to serious crimes, so as to ensure a proportionate response to crime that takes place in the maritime context. I do not believe it necessary to limit these powers in this way.
In other contexts the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has argued that we should put our trust in the operational judgment of chief officers. This is one such area where we should adopt that principle. We should trust in the operational judgment of the police to determine when it is appropriate to commit resources to investigate an offence on a vessel at sea. It is perhaps highly unlikely that resources would be committed to interdicting a vessel for the purposes of investigating a minor summary-only offence, but we should not rule out the possibility that the police would want to exercise these powers in relation to an either-way offence. We do not impose restrictions on the categories of offences that the police can investigate where they take place on other modes of transportation, so I am unclear why we should treat maritime vessels any differently. For these reasons, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
I am grateful to the Minister. The reason why this should apply in the case of these maritime powers is that the potential impact of diverting a cargo vessel in the English Channel, for example, is quite significant. While I may have suggested in other contexts that the number of ranks in each police force should be left to the judgment of chief officers, I do not think that the chief constable of whichever force it is will be making the decision as to whether to divert a ship; it will be an officer of relatively junior rank. The Minister also says that the Government should not be restricting the powers to particular offences, in which case I would ask her to explain why proposed new Section 137B does exactly that. But at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Policing and Crime Bill
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen ExcerptsWednesday 26th October 2016
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 55-II(b) Amendments for Committee, supplementary to the second marshalled list (PDF, 62KB) - (26 Oct 2016)
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)
My Lords, as the way in which policing is delivered evolves, it is important that the powers and remit of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary also evolve to ensure that it remains able to inspect and report on the totality of policing.
As forces rightly place an increasing emphasis on collaboration between emergency services, certain policing functions, such as answering 999 calls, may be delivered by employees of other emergency services without any formal contractual arrangements in place. HMIC must be able to require access to information and premises from these other services when they are related to the delivery of policing functions. That is what these amendments will achieve.
Amendments 165 and 166 extend the definition of a police force for the purposes of an inspection to include non-policing bodies delivering policing functions, even where there is no formal contract in place. In keeping with the scheme provided for in the Bill, such other persons delivering policing services would not be able to appeal against an information notice served on them by HMIC. Amendments 123 and 164 give HMIC and the new inspectors of fire and rescue authorities access to premises in which other services are delivered alongside those that they are inspecting; for example, HMIC would be able to access premises shared by a police force and a fire and rescue service.
I trust the Committee will agree that these are sensible refinements of the inspection provisions in the Bill. I beg to move.
Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)
I am slightly concerned about the phrase “provisional findings”, because it does not define when that is in an investigation. I should declare an interest that I was head of the complaints investigation branch of the Metropolitan Police Service, the subtitle for whom was the “Prince of Darkness”. One knew the provisional findings, but one had that word “provisional” in front. It slightly worries me that we are pushing a process forward where the complainant is given information that new information then changes. It feels an odd thing to be doing. I would like to know why it has been withdrawn in this Bill, as it may have been withdrawn on quite sensible grounds.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, the current process for keeping complainants and other interested persons updated on the handling of their complaint is overly complicated, with Sections 20 and 21 of the Police Reform Act 2002 heavily prescriptive on what exactly a force, or as the case may be the local policing body or IPCC, must do and when. This often results in a box-ticking process and perverse outcomes rather than any genuine consideration of what is best for the complainant.
The Bill simplifies this process. Clause 14 amends Sections 20 and 21 of the 2002 Act to create a broad statutory duty on forces to ensure that they keep relevant parties updated on the progress of the handling of the complaint, the outcome of the complaint, and any right of review. This allows for many of the various notification duties on appropriate authorities currently scattered throughout Schedule 3 to the 2002 Act to be consolidated into one place, and for Sections 20 and 21 of that Act to be extended beyond just complaints where there was an investigation.
This broad requirement is in line with the wider changes to the complaints system where the various routes for resolving a complaint—for example, disapplication, discontinuance and local resolution—have been replaced with a general duty to consider the reasonable and proportionate response to a complaint. Greater discretion for forces in deciding how to keep the relevant parties updated on progress reflects the wider intention to trigger a culture change in forces in the handling of complaints. We want a system that encourages proper consideration to be given to the needs of the complainant, rather than officers simply following a very set procedure regardless of the nuances of the case.
I want to reassure the noble Lord that the Government fully expect that where there has been an investigation into a complaint, updating complainants on the progress of the handling of the complaint will include forces informing them of any provisional findings of that investigation. In keeping with the overall intention to simplify the complaints system and to empower forces in how they deal with complaints, this is not something we consider is necessary to prescribe in primary legislation. Instead, it is for the IPCC to consider whether what is meant by updating on the progress of the complaint is better explored in IPCC statutory guidance. Guidance may be able to better reflect best practice and the principle that all cases need to be treated slightly differently.
The noble Lord, Lord Harris, asked about keeping victims of crime informed on progress. He makes a valid point about victims of crime, but this is not a matter for these clauses. We have a later amendment about the rights of victims of crime.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)
My Lords, this section of the Bill gives the power to designated bodies to make super-complaints to Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary. The complaints can be made where, in the opinion of those bodies, a feature of policing is harming the public and needs to be looked at.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, listed three organisations to make these super-complaints to be put on the face of the Bill. I have some sympathy with the amendments that have been put forward, but I understand that they are probing amendments. I hope that when the noble Baroness replies she can give us some indication of the organisations likely to be designated to make these complaints under the regulations. It is important that, when creating these new powers, we have some idea of what the organisations are likely to be. Are those listed in the amendment likely candidates to be designated when this comes into force, or are there others?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Kennedy, for the opportunity to debate the provisions in the Bill that will create a new system of policing super-complaints.
There are currently three extant super-complaints systems, having been originally created in the Enterprise Act 2002. These systems exist in the commercial sector, the financial system and in payments regulation. All relate to systemic issues affecting consumers relating to private sector organisations. The police super-complaints system, although based on the success of these antecedents, will be the first such system to address issues in the public sector.
A super-complaint is defined in Clause 24 as a complaint that,
“a feature, or combination of features, of policing … by one or more than one … force is, or appears to be, significantly harming the interests of the public”.
Only bodies designated for the purpose of these provisions will be able to make a super-complaint, but any body can be designated if it meets the relevant criteria. Those criteria for designation will, following consultation, be laid out in regulations. The system will be “owned” by the HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, so as to be sufficiently independent of government. Ultimately, this system will allow charities and advocacy groups to raise systemic issues they identify in policing in a more effective way, leading to the improvement of policing in England and Wales.
I turn now to the noble Lord’s amendments which focus on the regulations relating to designated bodies and the designation process contained in Clause 25. The designated bodies able to make a super-complaint will be set out in regulations. Amendment 128 would require the Government to consult on such regulations. We have provided in Clause 25 for consultation on the regulations setting out the criteria for designation, but we do not believe that it is appropriate to consult each and every time a new body is given designation status. Any body that is so designated will have been assessed as meeting the criteria for designation. The Government believe that the criteria are the key to getting the right bodies involved in the system. This is why it is the criteria rather than the bodies themselves that will be subject to consultation. Following consultation on the criteria, further consultation on the resulting list of designated bodies would be unnecessary and, if conducted every time a body is designated, would be burdensome.
On Amendment 129, the Government agree that the nature of the bodies involved in the super-complaints system is key to its success. That is why we shall be consulting widely on the criteria for designation. Furthermore, the Government intend to include a requirement in the criteria for designated bodies to act as umbrella bodies for smaller organisations. This will ensure that any bodies that notice a systemic issue with policing, but are not designated, are still able to raise an issue through another organisation.
We have engaged with a number of key bodies, including Citizens Advice, in the development of this policy. We will continue to work with these bodies throughout its implementation to ensure that the system works in the public interest. It will of course be open to Citizens Advice, the Law Society and the National Council for Voluntary Organisations to apply for designated body status, but that decision is a matter for them. The Government would welcome the input of your Lordships on any particular bodies or organisations that may work towards the improvement of policing through becoming designated bodies.
Amendment 130 would require the first regulations made in relation to designation to be subject to the affirmative procedure. The Government set out the rationale for applying the negative procedure to these regulations in their delegated powers memorandum. That memorandum has been considered by the Delegated Powers Committee which did not take issue with the application of the negative procedure whether on the first or subsequent exercise of these powers. The negative procedure is consistent with the legislative framework applicable to existing super-complaints systems and I see no good case for departing from it here.
Having given these provisions in the Bill the airing they deserve, I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
The noble Baroness has talked about consultation on the regulations. Is there a timescale for when that will take place because obviously the Government will complete their consultation and make a decision before the regulations come into force? Can she give us some idea of when it will be?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
If there is a timescale that we know of, I will write to the noble Lord, but I do not have it here in my notes.
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, it is clear that the Government have given a great deal of thought to the concept of super-complaints. Have they made any assessment of how many such super-complaints might be presented and what proportion of the time of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary is likely to be devoted to looking into such matters?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
We do not know how many super-complaints will be made because it is difficult to judge that. The point about the super-complaints is that they will make an enormous difference to the way things are done. It was interesting to note that in March this year the then shadow Home Secretary, Andy Burnham, held a seminar with the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, which brought together groups that are still campaigning for justice, such as the Shrewsbury 24 campaign, the Orgreave Truth and Justice Campaign, and Justice 4 Daniel. A common thread runs through all of these groups but the way the system works at the moment forces them all to plough their own furrow; it does not allow them to join forces. The super-complaint proposal will rebalance the system in their favour and mean that they can join together.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, perhaps I may pursue the point about the regulations one more time. The noble Baroness has said that there is no timescale but that she will write to me if she can find out if there is. I should say to her that this issue is very important to the campaigns she has just listed. If this legislation gets on to the statute book without us knowing where we are with the regulations, of course it cannot come into force. I hope that she will take back to the department and her ministerial colleagues that the consultation should be done with the utmost urgency. There is no point in passing the legislation if people cannot actually make their complaints.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I do not have a timescale. I do not want to give the noble Lord false information, so it is only fair that I write to him.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I am very grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to the debate, and for the response given by the Minister. I have a confession to make: I did not write the amendments. I am glad to see that everyone fell into the same trap I did. The intention of Amendment 128, whether or not it would be the effect, is for there to be consultation on the regulations, not each time an organisation is designated. It could be that it is a mistake in the drafting—I can say that because I did not draft them.
The organisations listed in Amendment 129 are suggestions as to who authorised persons should be under the Act, not who the designated bodies should be. The authorised persons are those who can make representations to the Secretary of State to have a particular body designated or removed from the list of designated bodies. That is what I believe I explained when I introduced the amendment. The list that includes the Law Society and so forth is not a list of bodies that we think should be designated, but a list of people who should be authorised persons who can then ask the Secretary of State to add or remove people from the list of designated bodies.
I will read again the view of the Delegated Powers Committee so far as Amendment 130 is concerned, but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 128.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
My Lords, this section of the Bill deals with whistleblowing and investigations by the IPCC. It provides a new power for the IPCC to investigate matters raised by a police whistleblower without the matter having to be raised with the police force concerned, and provides further powers to protect the identity of the individual or individuals concerned. All the amendments in this group are in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, with the exception of Amendments 133 and 134 in the name of my noble friend Lord Rosser.
Amendment 132 seeks to provide as much clarity as possible and allows for the eventuality that the person making a complaint could still be under the direction and control of a chief officer of police. This amendment raises an interesting point, which was highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, when he presented his scenario to the House a few moments ago. I hope that when the Government respond they will be as clear possible in their reasoning if they do not think the amendment is necessary.
The amendments in the name of my noble friend seek to add clarity to this section of the Bill by making clear that these provisions cannot be used if the matter is subject to an ongoing investigation. Amendment 134 would allow for whistleblowing protections to be applied to police witnesses. These are good amendments that would strengthen what is proposed by the Government.
When reading and thinking about Amendment 135, I was not completely convinced that it was either necessary or should in fact be there. Having said that, I listened to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and I think that he persuaded me on those.
I am not sure what Amendment 136 adds to the Bill as it would not put in the Bill an exclusive or exhaustive list. Amendment 137 is completely correct: organisations representing police officers and staff must be consulted before regulations are made concerning this section of the Bill. It is not good enough to rely on the subsection that talks about other organisations that are deemed appropriate. Those organisations deserve to be in the Bill when it leaves this House.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Kennedy, for the opportunity to debate the provisions in the Bill that will strengthen protections for police whistleblowers. The Government are committed to ensuring that those working for the police have the confidence to come forward to report concerns of malpractice and misconduct within the service.
Forces should, and do, provide channels for staff to raise such issues in confidence. However, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary has found that the quality of reporting arrangements and support offered to whistleblowers varied considerably by force, and a key concern was a lack of trust in confidential reporting. That is why, through Clause 27 and Schedule 6, we are creating a specific power for the Independent Police Complaints Commission to investigate whistleblowing allegations. If the IPCC decides to investigate, it does not have to refer the matter to the force unless the concern is about a conduct-related matter for the purposes of Part 2 of the Police Reform Act 2002. Even if it decides not to investigate, it will have to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the whistleblower’s identity is protected. These changes will give officers and staff much greater assurance that their concerns will be considered objectively and discreetly.
I have listened with interest to the points raised by the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Kennedy, and on two points I have some sympathy—I see that I have surprised the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. The first is dealt with in Amendment 132, which seeks to modify the definition of a whistleblower to include those raising a concern about matters that occurred within a police force prior to them joining the police. The legislation as currently drafted allows for existing and former members of a police force to raise concerns about matters that occurred while they were serving. It is evident that some cases of police misconduct and malpractice can go unreported for some time, and it may be appropriate that there be some scope for this to be brought to light, as prescribed under new Part 2B, by a whistleblower who had joined the force at a later stage.
Amendment 133, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, addresses the concern that there is a risk under the new provisions that a police officer or staff member interviewed as a witness in connection with a Part 2 investigation by the commission could be deemed a whistleblower, and that this could lead to confusion and complexity. Amendment 133 would prevent the IPCC having to start a new investigation where one is already under way in relation to the concern that has been raised. I am sympathetic to that point.
However, it is not the intention of the legislation to capture those providing factual information in an existing investigation. Rather, the aim of the legislation is to encourage whistleblowers to come forward and capture those concerns that are not being investigated but, in the public interest, should be considered independently by the IPCC and subject to its recommendations.
For this reason, I have less sympathy with Amendment 134, which would allow the IPCC discretion to confer whistleblowing status on any individuals providing evidence in existing investigations. We do not wish to create an expectation among police witnesses that the IPCC could offer them protections in return for giving their evidence. I understand that the IPCC has concerns about the protections available for those who provide it with evidence, but this is a much broader issue which needs be considered in the longer term, beyond the narrow confines of the whistleblowing provisions and in consultation with all relevant policing stakeholders.
Amendment 135 would impose an express duty on the IPCC to inform a whistleblower that his or her identity may be disclosed in the course of any criminal proceedings and to give the whistleblower an opportunity to withdraw the concern. The legislation is quite clear on the protection of anonymity and the circumstances in which a whistleblower’s anonymity might cease to be protected. As well as criminal proceedings, such circumstances could, for example, include the interests of national security and allegations of misconduct against the whistleblower him or herself. It is not practicable for the primary legislation to include every possible prescription. We would expect the IPCC to do its best to ensure that police officers were aware of the limitations of anonymity before they raise their concern, as I do not believe that it would be practical or desirable to provide for a concern to be withdrawn or unsaid by a whistleblower.
Guidance will support the new provisions, including an update of the College of Policing’s Reporting Concerns guidance, to promote awareness and understanding of these important reforms for whistleblowers. The protections offered by the new process that the Government are providing for whistleblowers can only go so far, and certainly not at the expense of allowing criminals to escape justice.
Amendment 136 would restrict the power of the Secretary of State to stipulate the matters on which the IPCC can make recommendations to a police force in cases where it has decided not to investigate a whistleblower’s concerns. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that the intention is not to provide the Secretary of State with the power to prescribe an exclusive list but merely to describe the kinds of recommendations that the IPCC may make. The purpose of the provision is to assist the IPCC in those cases where it decides, with the whistleblower’s consent, to refer the matter to the appropriate authority.
Finally, in response to Amendment 137, the Bill already requires the Secretary of State to consult on the whistleblowing regulations with police staff associations as members of the Police Advisory Board for England and Wales. This matter was discussed in the House of Commons and subsection (5) of new Section 29M to the Police Reform Act 2002 was inserted on Report there to provide for this requirement.
On the understanding that I will consider further, in advance of Report, Amendments 132 and 133, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
I was pleased that the Minister was sympathetic to the point I made on Amendment 133; that is certainly progress. My noble friend raised an important point. We do not want it not to be addressed in legislation on the suggestion that it will come back as guidance, and then we have as an unintended consequence when the guidance is not strong enough that someone makes a complaint and what we thought could not happen does. We need to reflect on that, and perhaps the Government could come back on Report, because I think my noble friend has identified an important issue: we would not want a conflict there to cause problems in future.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
We also have Amendment 148 in this group and the Government have Amendment 147. These are not such big issues but are the sort of thing that we try to cover in Committee. Clause 29 addresses the police barred list and the police advisory list. Clause 29(6) states:
“The Secretary of State may by regulations … make provision that … corresponds or is similar to that made by Part 4A of the Police Act 1996”.
We are not at this point querying the Police Act or Part 4A of it, but rather the words “similar to”. I understand the need to make regulations which will correspond with something. That seems to follow naturally, although sometimes the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee may comment on that. However, the power to make similar regulations seems potentially a wide provision and I am not sure what it means. I hope that the Minister will explain that in responding to Amendment 146, which is a probing amendment.
Government Amendment 147 seems one of the least contentious bits of today’s business. As regards Amendment 148, Schedule 8 contains a provision about the effect of including someone in the police barred list. Certain people are required to check the barred status of potential employees or appointees. The persons are listed as being,
“a chief officer of police; a local policing body; the chief inspector of constabulary; the Independent Police Complaints Commission”,
but also,
“a person specified in regulations”.
Again, there is rather wide scope in that latter provision which could have wide implications. Our Amendment 148 would provide for an affirmative resolution to be passed before the regulations were introduced. One is so pleased by little victories. I am delighted that the Minister has added her name to Amendment 148, which we will be very happy to move in due course. I beg to move Amendment 146.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, explained, this group of amendments responds to two issues raised by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in its report on the Bill in respect of provisions in Clause 29 and Schedule 8, which provide for the creation of a new police barred list and a police advisory list to be held by the College of Policing.
The first issue raised by the Delegated Powers Committee related to the regulation-making power in Clause 29(6), which enables provision to be made which corresponds or is similar to that made by new Part 4A of the Police Act 1996 and which relates to a person who is or has been employed or appointed by a quasi-policing body. As the committee pointed out, certain aspects of the operation of the police barred and advisory lists will be determined by regulations made under new Part 4A of the 1996 Act and it will most likely be necessary, when exercising the power in Clause 29(6), also to make provision corresponding or similar to that contained in such regulations.
I am grateful to the Delegated Powers Committee for highlighting this gap in the regulation-making power in Clause 29(6), which Amendment 147 will address. The amendment will enable regulations made under Clause 29(6) to make provision that corresponds or is similar to that made by or under new Part 4A of the 1996 Act.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, in moving Amendment 147A, which is also in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, I will speak to our other amendments in this group, Amendments 147B, 150A and 151A.
Schedule 8, which is to be inserted as part of Part 4A of the Police Act 1996, outlines the procedures with regard to the police barred list and a duty to report dismissals to the College of Policing, which is responsible for maintaining the list. Amendment 147A removes the requirement to report cases where a civilian police employee has been dismissed for reasons of efficiency or effectiveness. The amendment probes whether the barred list should be confined to wrongdoing such as dishonesty or the inappropriate use of violence rather than a person being deemed to be inefficient or ineffective.
Amendment 147B has a similar effect on the provisions in new Section 88A(6), which defines “dismissed”. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chisholm of Owlpen, just said, someone’s employment prospects could be fundamentally affected by being placed on the police barred list. Does she not think it slightly disproportionate to include people who are considered to be inefficient or ineffective on the barred list and thereby affect their employment prospects so fundamentally?
Amendment 150A has a similar effect on the requirement to report resignations and retirements in the face of an allegation of inefficiency or ineffectiveness. Amendment 151A allows someone reported as having resigned or retired in the face of an allegation to be able to appeal against the decision to report his resignation or retirement. I beg to move.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, I have listened carefully to the case put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for these amendments. The Government are clear that the provisions on the police barred and advisory lists should apply to police officers and civilian staff equally where individuals have been dismissed or face allegations that could lead to their dismissal for reasons of serious misconduct, incompetence or unsatisfactory performance.
The provisions for civilian staff use the language of “conduct, efficiency or effectiveness” to mirror the language in Sections 50 and 51 of the Police Act 1996, under which regulations concerning discipline for police officers are made. This is a catch-all term to encompass all circumstances that could lead to a dismissal, through the processes related to performance and conduct. The barred list provisions are designed to protect against those who have been dismissed from policing being recruited to another force or policing body having been found to have fallen so far below the standards expected of those working in policing that they have been dismissed.
Amendments 147A and 150A would remove grounds of effectiveness from the relevant categories of dismissal that could lead to a civilian member of staff being added to the barred list. It is my view that “efficiency and effectiveness” are inextricably linked; therefore, to remove one of these factors would seriously undermine the ability of these mechanisms to capture individuals who have been dismissed or who are under ongoing investigation for matters of competence or performance.
Dismissal in these cases would arise only following a prescribed and lengthy process to establish that the individual’s performance or competency has fallen well below the standards expected on a consistent basis or relate to a matter so severe that dismissal is justified. For example, the Police (Performance) Regulations 2012 define gross incompetence for officers as,
“a serious inability or serious failure”,
to perform the duties to a satisfactory standard or level.
As drafted, these amendments would create a disparity in the way that civilian staff are treated compared to their counterparts holding the office of constable with regard to what would be captured by, and the effect of, these provisions. In the Government’s view it would not be desirable to make such a distinction and create such a different approach to the information and individuals that would be captured by the barred and advisory lists for civilian staff versus police officers.
Amendments 147B and 151A seek to create a new right of appeal, specifically with regard to inclusion on either the police advisory or barred list. This is neither necessary nor desirable. Our approach is clear: if an individual has been dismissed from policing, they should be added to the barred list to prevent them rejoining another force or policing body at a later stage. It is important to note that new Sections 88F and 88L of the Police Act 1996, as inserted by Schedule 8, already provide for removal from the barred list and the advisory list. There is an existing route for appeal against dismissal via the Police Appeal Tribunal or employment tribunal. As a result, in the circumstances that a decision to dismiss an individual is overturned, this will result in the individual being removed from the barred list. This is explicitly provided for by Schedule 8.
As we see greater flexibility in roles, functions and powers exercised by civilian staff, as designated under the powers set out in Clause 37, it is important that the police barred list provisions adequately capture individuals who have been dismissed from the police service. This flexibility and application of policing powers must, in the view of the Government, be accompanied by appropriate safeguards, protections and accountability.
The police advisory list provisions are in place to ensure that adequate information is captured where an individual leaves a force while investigatory or disciplinary proceedings are ongoing. This list does not represent a statutory bar but creates a framework for capturing this information for future policing employers to take into account as part of the vetting process. To add an appeal route to this process would therefore undermine the ability of police forces and policing organisations to adequately subject incoming candidates to vetting procedures and take account of the fact that a candidate may be subject to an ongoing investigation or disciplinary process.
As with the barred list, the advisory list provisions contain safeguards so that an individual will remain on this list only while proceedings are ongoing. Where it is determined that no disciplinary proceedings will be brought or are withdrawn, or where disciplinary proceedings conclude without there being a finding that the individual would have been dismissed, the individual’s name and details must be removed from the advisory list.
Ultimately, the right of appeal against inclusion on the advisory list exists within a misconduct hearing, where it will be determined whether the individual should be dismissed and so be added to the barred list. Where dismissal is not the outcome, they will be removed when the process concludes.
Given that explanation, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
“Appeals to Police Appeals Tribunals
(1) Schedule 6 to the Police Act 1996 (appeals to Police Appeals Tribunals) is amended as follows.(2) In paragraph 1 (appeal by a senior officer), in sub-paragraph (1), in the words before paragraph (a), for “Secretary of State” substitute “relevant person”.(3) In paragraph 2 (appeal by a member of a police force other than a senior officer or by a special constable), in sub-paragraph (1)—(a) in the words before paragraph (a), for “relevant local policing body” substitute “relevant person”;(b) omit paragraph (d);(c) at the end insert—“(e) one shall be a lay person.”(4) After paragraph 2 insert—“2A(1) For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, “the relevant person” means the person determined in accordance with rules made by the Secretary of State._(2) Rules under sub-paragraph (1) may make—(a) different provision for different cases and circumstances;(b) provision for the relevant person to be able to delegate the power to appoint the members of a tribunal._(3) A statutory instrument containing rules under sub-paragraph (1) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”(5) In paragraph 10 (interpretation)—(a) after paragraph (a) insert—“(aa) “lay person” means a person who is not, and has never been—(i) a member of a police force or a special constable,(ii) a member of the civilian staff of a police force, including the metropolitan police force, within the meaning of Part 1 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (see section 102(4) and (6) of that Act),(iii) a person employed by the Common Council of the City of London in its capacity as police authority who is under the direction and control of the Commissioner of Police for the City of London,(iv) a police and crime commissioner,(v) a member of staff of a police and crime commissioner, or of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, within the meaning of Part 1 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (see section 102(3) and (5) of that Act),(vi) a constable within the meaning of Part 1 of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 (2012 asp 8) (see section 99 of that Act),(vii) a member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland or the Police Service of Northern Ireland Reserve,(viii) a member of the British Transport Police Force or a special constable appointed under section 25 of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003,(ix) an employee of the British Transport Police Authority appointed under section 27 of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003,(x) a member of the Ministry of Defence Police,(xi) a person (other than a member of the Ministry of Defence Police) who is under the direction and control of the chief constable for the Ministry of Defence Police,(xii) a member of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, or (xiii) an employee of the Civil Nuclear Police Authority appointed under paragraph 6 of Schedule 10 to the Energy Act 2004,”;(b) omit sub-paragraph (c).(6) In consequence of the other provision made by this section—(a) in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, in Part 1 of Schedule 22, omit paragraph 11(6)(b);(b) in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, in Part 1 of Schedule 16, omit paragraph 47(2)(b).”
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, Clause 30 is designed to implement two of the recommendations made by Major-General Chip Chapman in his review of the police disciplinary system. Major-General Chapman recommended that the system of police appeals tribunals should be made more transparent and independent by introducing a lay member to the panel. He also identified that enabling greater collaboration between forces would improve consistency of outcomes.
Clause 30, as currently drafted, provides flexibility for the Secretary of State to establish who can be selected to serve on police appeals tribunals and for setting out the administrative arrangements for these tribunals in rules. In its report on the Bill, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee argued that it was inappropriate to leave to secondary legislation the details of who would be eligible to serve on the tribunals.
The Government have accepted the Delegated Powers Committee’s recommendation on this point, and the government amendments in this group ensure that the individuals who may serve as panel members of a police appeals tribunal will, as now, be set out in primary legislation. However, it remains our intention to further strengthen the independence of police appeals tribunals by replacing the current retired police officer panel member—for panels hearing appeals by non-senior officers—with a lay person member, and the replacement Clause 30 amends Schedule 6 to the Police Act 1996 to this end.
The replacement clause, together with Amendment 172, defines a lay person for these purposes. In broad terms, it means any person who has not previously worked in policing, including as a police officer, as a member of the civilian staff of a police force or as a police volunteer. Amendment 232 makes a consequential change to the extent clause. Importantly, the introduction of lay members will bring a greater degree of independence to police appeal proceedings.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, Amendments 159, 163 and 233 in this group are technical and consequential amendments arising from the changes to the IPCC’s governance arrangements that we have already debated. I can provide noble Lords with further details if required, but for now I beg to move.
Lord Rosser
I will just add briefly to the comment made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, at the end of his speech. If the Government do not feel inclined to accept the amendment, there is a need—I am sure it will happen when the Government respond—to hear precisely what their reasons are for not going down that road. It has been said that no comparable body to the IPCC exists to deal with complaints about service police forces. A significant number of forces and agencies do fall within the jurisdiction of the IPCC, including, I understand, the Ministry of Defence Police. If the Government do not accept the amendment, like the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I wait to listen with interest to their reasons why not.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
As the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, has explained, this amendment seeks to put the service police within the remit and jurisdiction of the Independent Police Complaints Commission.
We do, of course, support the need for independent oversight and scrutiny of the Royal Navy Police, the Royal Military Police, and the Royal Air Force Police, including the key objective of having an independent mechanism to investigate complaints against them. I am also aware that Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary has recommended that the Government should consider further whether the IPCC could be the appropriate mechanism.
The Government have given early consideration to this, including discussions with the IPCC. To bring the service police under the remit of the IPCC is potentially a major change. Although only a small number of cases may be involved, it could mark a significant shift for the IPCC far beyond its current operations in England and Wales. As the chair of the IPCC has said,
“There are inherent and significant differences between the remit and jurisdiction of the service police and those of the Home Office Police forces”.
In addition, the IPCC is currently part way through a major programme of expansion to build its capacity and capability to investigate all serious and sensitive allegations against civilian police forces. This Bill will further strengthen the IPCC’s remit and powers and, in light of its expanded role, the Bill also provides for the reform of the organisation’s corporate structure and governance to deliver a more capable and resilient organisation.
At this stage, the IPCC’s capacity for further change to its role is constrained. That is why the Government, led by the Ministry of Defence, are seeking alternative options. Recent work with the Ministry of Defence has been focused on the development of a common complaints procedure across the three service police forces. This procedure covers complaints made by serving and non-serving military personnel against a member of the service police carrying out a policing function, irrespective of location. There is now also a protocol between the service police forces to ensure that, where there may be a conflict of interest around the investigation of a complaint, one service police force may investigate another. The next phase of the Ministry of Defence’s work is to consider how best to introduce a mechanism that will provide for the independent oversight of these complaints, wherever in the world they are made.
I hope that the noble Baroness will understand that, in the light of the work being taken forward by the Ministry of Defence, and the risks that could arise if we sought to impose new responsibilities on the IPCC at a time when it is already going through a substantial reform programme, I cannot commend this amendment to the Committee. I accept, however, that the noble Baroness wants to see more progress towards finding a long-term solution to this issue. I can certainly undertake to write to the Armed Forces Minister to draw his attention to this debate, but for now I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment. Of course, I am more than happy to meet the noble Baroness.
Baroness Jolly
I thank the Minister for her comments and my noble friend Lord Paddick, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for their support. I understand that it would be a large change for the IPCC to undertake this extra work. I imagine that a certain amount of the capacity would go from one organisation to the other. One of the things I would like to understand is the timescale of all this, so perhaps when the Minister and I meet, this is the sort of area we could discuss.
Policing and Crime Bill
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen ExcerptsWednesday 26th October 2016
(8 years, 1 month ago)
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Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 168, 171 and 173 are minor and technical amendments to update and clarify the arrangements for designated staff and volunteers to use their powers. I do not wish to detain your Lordships unnecessarily, but, if required, I can talk further about each amendment. For now, I beg to move Amendment 168.
Policing and Crime Bill
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen Excerpts(8 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Rosser
I thank the noble Earl for explaining to me prior to today the purpose of his amendments and the objective they seek to achieve. The noble Earl has made his case in very clear and cogent terms. I, too, would very much like to hear the Government’s response.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)
My Lords, a key element of the recently announced fire reform agenda is the creation of a new independent inspection regime for fire and rescue. Amendments 120 and 122, tabled by my noble friend Lord Lindsay, relate to persons and bodies appointed by the chief fire and rescue inspector and an English inspector respectively to deliver the inspection function.
The Government do not believe that Amendment 120 is necessary. Clause 11 is modelled on provisions for the inspection of policing and is deliberately broad to provide the chief fire and rescue inspector with flexibility in who they may appoint as an assistant inspector, or other officers, for the purpose of assisting English inspectors. The Government could have listed certain professions or qualifications in the Bill for who could be appointed, but that would be interpreted as an exhaustive list, or would influence the chief inspector on their appointments. Therefore, I assure my noble friend that there is nothing stopping the chief inspector appointing persons covered by his amendment—indeed, there may be some merit in their doing so if needed—but the amendment does nothing to further the Bill as such persons are not precluded.
Turning to Amendment 122, this issue was raised during the Bill’s Commons Report stage. My ministerial colleague, the Minister for Policing and the Fire Service, has exchanged letters with Bob Neill MP and Jim Fitzpatrick MP since then. Therefore, my comments will come as no surprise.
Whereas Amendment 120 deals with the appointment of individuals, Amendment 122 to Schedule 3 covers the appointment of bodies as the recipient of delegated functions. Paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 allows for an English inspector to arrange for the inspection function to be exercised by another public authority on their behalf. This provides a degree of operational flexibility, depending on the inspection model chosen, but it is simply not appropriate for government inspection functions —regardless of what or who they are inspecting—to be delivered by a non-public body. Importantly, for an inspectorate to undertake robust inspections they must have access to information, premises and persons—powers granted in statute. I do not doubt the high standards private bodies operate to, but such invasive powers should be delivered only by those holding public office to avoid any conflict of interest and ensure proper accountability for the exercise of such powers.
I recognise the valuable role UKAS provides in giving confidence to both the public and private sectors as to a person’s competence, consistency and impartiality. However, we deliberately did not add a prescriptive list to the Bill to avoid any constraint on the chief inspector appointing whoever they consider necessary and appropriate. As I said, there is nothing to stop external experts being sourced, including from the bodies covered by these amendments, but this constraint is important. In view of that, I invite my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
The Earl of Lindsay
My Lords, I am grateful for my noble friend’s response and look forward to reflecting on the detail of what she said in due course. It might be useful if there were some discussion between UKAS and the Home Office to make sure that anything that UKAS’s activities can do to support the new inspectorate is developed. I am also mindful that the Home Office will consult on the proposals for the new inspectorate later in the year. That is another opportunity for useful discussions. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Policing and Crime Bill
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Lord Adebowale (CB)
I support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. I have some experience of the police and their responses to mental health as chair of the commission on the Met’s response to mental health policing in London which—I hesitate to claim credit—led to the concordat mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. It is important that mental health is included in reference to collaboration because those people are at the sharp end of the inverse care law when it is not. I am concerned and would like to know more about the Government’s intentions in this regard. I support the amendment.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for explaining the rationale for this amendment. I feel sure he would agree with me that we are already seeing how much of a difference the concordat is making in developing and improving the response to people who experience a mental health crisis. This includes improving the accessibility of local preventive mental health services and reducing the number of times a police cell is used as a place of safety for a person detained under the Mental Health Act. As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, stated, we shall have an opportunity to debate that issue further when we reach Chapter 4 of Part 4 of the Bill.
These are important developments that should be supported and encouraged, and I recognise the noble Lord’s intentions in proposing such a requirement. However, we must also recognise that the strength of the concordat is the flexibility that comes from it being—here is the nub—a local voluntary agreement. This means that all local partners who can make a difference can be involved, which will vary from area to area, and enables every local concordat partnership to agree actions that make sense in its area.
I will give some examples of how it is working. In Greater Manchester, local concordat partners have worked with the charity Self Help to create three places of calm where people with mental health concerns can go at unsociable hours and receive the support that will hopefully avert a crisis. In Sussex, which sees the emergency services respond to a particularly high volume of crisis incidents, the partners are working directly together in street triage schemes in most of the main towns. The triage approach has saved lives, notably at Beachy Head, where, as we know, a lot of suicides have been recorded. In the West Midlands, the police, ambulance and mental health trust share details of people who frequently call them in distress and jointly review the care being offered to them. In many cases these people are now following a constructive care plan instead of phoning in at least four times a day.
As the concordat is a voluntary agreement and does not, as such, impose specific duties on its signatories, we believe that this amendment is misconceived in suggesting otherwise. I would also question the appropriateness of singling out mental health crisis care in the Bill to the exclusion of other areas where collaboration agreements could lead to improved efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of front-line services.
Our local emergency services are acutely aware of the need to appropriately and compassionately respond to those in mental health crisis. I have already pointed to a number of excellent examples of collaboration between emergency services. The provisions in the Bill will encourage and support further such collaboration, and although the noble Lord is right to flag this as an important area where local agencies need to work better together, I am not persuaded that adding this amendment to the Bill helps to secure such an outcome.
Lord Harris of Haringey
The noble Baroness keeps talking about the strength of the concordat, and I do not think any of us disagrees about its importance and potential value. However, she will be aware of figures that have been released by the National Police Chiefs Council, which show that in the last year the police use of Section 136 has increased by almost 20%. Earlier in her remarks, she cited the improvements in Greater Manchester, where the use of Section 136 increased by 2.3 times in the last year. Where exactly is this improvement that she describes happening? Given that there are perhaps some problems with the delivery of the concordat—probably more in the availability of mental health services than necessarily in the response of the emergency services—is that why the Government are so reluctant to see the concordat mentioned in the Bill?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
No, that is not the reason. As I was saying, the strength of the concordat, which is making real changes in many places to services at the local level, is the flexibility that comes from it being a local voluntary agreement. That is its main strength: it means that all local partners who can make a difference can be involved, rather than having an inflexible list of partners set out in law. Similarly, this enables every local concordat partnership to agree actions that make sense in its area.
Lord Harris of Haringey
The noble Baroness seems to miss the point. If the concordat is working so well, why has the police use of Section 136 increased by 20% in the last 12 months? Why has it increased by 2.3 times in Greater Manchester?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I cannot answer that. We have to give these agreements time to work; a lot of them are quite newly put together, and it may well be that it has not been worked out where they need specific people to deal with the problems that are happening. On the whole, where they are working, they are working well. They have led to collaboration between the police and all the emergency services, such as the health service, to come together to find where they need extra help in the areas where they have problems.
Lord Adebowale
I understand the point that the Minister is making but I wonder whether she might comment on this question: in areas where such concordats do not exist, are the Government willing to accept that those with mental health challenges will receive a poorer service? Do they accept that if you happen to live in an area where the voluntary agreements have not come together, you get a poor service? If the concordat is doing as well as she states, why should it not be in the Bill so that everyone can benefit?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I am not suggesting that where there is no concordat, people are not receiving good help. The whole point is that you do not have to have a concordat; it is voluntary. That is the strength of it. It is not always necessary to intervene in everything. People should be allowed the flexibility to organise their arrangements as they feel fit for their area.
Lord Harris of Haringey
In her earlier remarks, the Minister specifically referred to Greater Manchester. There, the number of Section 136 cases has increased by nearly two and half times in the last year. If the example that she cited of the concordat working well has delivered an increase of 2.3 times in the number of Section 136 referrals, what does that imply constitutes doing badly or failing to work at all?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I am sure the noble Lord is correct that the use of Section 136 has gone up in the 2015-16 data, but perhaps that is not necessarily a negative. It could be that it reflects better understanding between the police and their partners of what is happening. From statistics that I have, the use of police cells as a place of safety is down by 50%, so that must show that something is working well somewhere. I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Rosser
I thank the Minister for her response, and I thank noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. I say before I go any further that I will of course withdraw my amendment. I accept that in later clauses we will undoubtedly have a much fuller debate on the police, the provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983 and the changes proposed in the Bill.
I have to say I am slightly disappointed with the response. It did not seem to me that the amendment I moved sought in any way to alter the terms of the concordat or indeed to fix what those terms should be. I accept that the concordat is a voluntary local agreement but, as I understand it, so will be most of the collaboration agreements that we have been talking about, and in that sense they will be on a statutory footing. All my amendment asked was that, in considering effectiveness and efficiency, the impact on the effectiveness and efficiency with which the emergency service is able to meet its duties under the mental health crisis concordat should also be taken into account. I do not intend to push the matter further at this stage; there will be an opportunity for a further and, I am sure, much longer discussion of these issues later.
My final point is that I said that I understood that on 22 March, the Minister referred to an inter- ministerial group having been formed during the previous Government, with the inference that it was dealing with the kind of issues on which the amendment touches. I should be grateful, if the noble Baroness cannot answer the question about what the group is doing, has achieved and hopes to achieve—I fully understand if she cannot—if she would agree to write to me with a response.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
Yes, I apologise to the noble Lord for not getting back to him on that; I will have to write to him, as I am not quite sure to what he is referring.
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)
My Lords, I suggest that the Government might like to look favourably on Amendment 8, in particular. One should focus on the word “varied”. If an agreement is varied by something else, the original agreement survives—it is simply changed a little and varied in form. Clause 4(8) refers to a collaboration agreement being varied by a “subsequent collaboration agreement”. The word “varied” should really be “replaced”, because you then have something different. So there is force in the noble Baroness’s amendment, which is small but neat way of expressing what everyone agrees should be done. The agreement should be capable of being varied; my point is that the original agreement survives, but with a small or large change made to make it more effective. For those reasons, I support that amendment.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I thank noble Lords for taking part in this debate. I understand from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that these are probing amendments designed to tease out how collaboration may be varied. It is of course vital that collaboration agreements can be amended where appropriate to reflect local developments and to ensure the best outcomes for the public they serve. There may be a number of reasons to vary a collaboration agreement, perhaps to include a new partner to the agreement or to change participant roles and responsibilities. Clause 4(8) is simply intended to make it clear that such variations may be made. In locally agreeing to vary the terms in an existing collaboration agreement, the parties will in effect create a new or subsequent collaboration agreement. Such an agreement would be subject to all the provisions that pertain to collaboration agreements. I hope that clarification reassures the noble Baroness and that, accordingly, she will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Lord Hope of Craighead
With great respect to the Minister, she did not address my point. One has a choice: either one varies an agreement or one replaces it with something else. The example given is a very good one of a variation, leaving the existing agreement in place. We are at a very early stage of this Bill and all I am suggesting is that the amendment might be taken away and looked at again. It is a question of the proper use of the English language, which is why I have taken the liberty of standing up and making my point.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
Certainly. I feel I must bow before the noble and learned Lord’s incredible intelligence in these affairs. I cannot possibly completely disagree with what he says because he is way above my intellect. Of course we can go away and look at this.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, that is very helpful. The noble and learned Lord makes the argument far better than I did. I will attempt to rope him in on future amendments. As I said, it became not a probing amendment in the course of that exchange. I want to make it clear that we are not at all arguing against the variation of collaboration agreements—that would be intellectually incoherent. That is not the purpose of this. For the moment, at any rate, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has indicated that these are probing amendments, designed, in the cases of Amendments 14, 32 and 100, to provide some reassurance to those persons to whom a liability is owed that they will not be disadvantaged by a scheme transferring the liability. I appreciate that assurances on liabilities are important when considering arrangements for their transfer from an existing fire and rescue authority to a new PCC-style FRA or to a chief constable.
Statutory transfer schemes of this kind are well precedented. Indeed, I might add that the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 directly transferred all property, rights and liabilities of the old police authorities to the new police and crime commissioners or other local policing body. We have adopted the usual approach here of not requiring the consent of affected persons to the transfer of property, rights and liabilities. Once a Section 4A order is made, the existing fire and rescue authority will cease to exist and it is therefore right that all property, rights and liabilities held by the existing FRA should be transferred. If a person to whom a liability was owed was given an effective veto as to the transfer, that would arguably necessitate the preservation of the existing FRA alongside the new PCC-style FRA. This is a recipe for confusion and muddle.
However, I reassure the noble Baroness that the new PCC-style FRA, or the chief constable, to whom liabilities are transferred will take on the contractual obligations in respect of those liabilities, including, for example, the repayment of any debt. The person to whom the liability is owed will not be disadvantaged.
On Amendment 15, I hope I can reassure the noble Baroness that the approach taken in the Bill to the modification of a transfer scheme is the right one. The power to make modifications is designed principally to ensure that, should it be necessary, corrections may be made to a transfer scheme, particularly to address any errors made regarding the persons to whom rights or liabilities have transferred. As I am sure the noble Baroness appreciates, such transfer schemes can be complex and it is important to safeguard the ability to make revisions. These would need to be effective from the date at which the transfer came into being, rather than the date when the modification was made. To provide otherwise would risk disadvantaging a person, for example, to whom a liability was owed. I assure her that such modifications will be made only where there is agreement to do so between the affected parties.
On the basis of these reassurances, I trust that the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, that is very helpful, and I do indeed beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, I recognise that there are quite a lot of amendments in this group. It is more like reading War and Peace than a group of amendments but not quite as gripping or enjoyable. However, as my noble friend Lady Williams explained in her letter of 7 September to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, these amendments are essentially minor and technical in nature, and ensure that the provisions in Part 1 of the Bill can operate as intended.
In particular, the amendments ensure that the provisions in respect of the new PCC-style fire and rescue authorities, whether operating under the governance model or single-employer model, are properly aligned, with appropriate modifications, with existing statutory provisions relating to policing and fire and rescue authorities. For example, the amendments apply the existing provisions in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 in respect of the handling of complaints against PCCs to the new PCC-style FRAs. This ensures that complaints against a PCC, whether in respect of his or her policing or fire and rescue functions, are handled in a consistent fashion.
I should also single out Amendments 38 and 105, which are subject to amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The Bill already provides in new Section 4L of the 2004 Act a power to apply, with any necessary modifications, relevant legislation relating to police and crime commissioners to a PCC-style FRA. Similar powers are needed to apply, with any necessary modifications, relevant provisions of fire and rescue-related legislation to the chief officer and his or her staff where the single employer model is in operation.
These new order-making powers would be used in particular to ensure that references to employees of an FRA can continue to operate as intended under the single-employer model, where they will become employees of the chief constable—for example, to ensure that they have the relevant powers and functions necessary to perform their fire-fighting functions. A similar power is taken in respect of the single-employer model under combined authority mayors.
At this point, I suggest that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, speaks to his amendments, and I will then respond. I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, we indeed have amendments at the various points at which there is reference to the application of an enactment with or without modifications. I apologise to the Committee that two of the amendments were published only this morning. They were tabled at the same time as the others and I do not know at what point they got lost—there is no particular significance in that.
I missed whether the noble Baroness in her reference to existing legislation was using the term “necessary modifications” as a quote from legislation or whether it was an assurance. If it is in other legislation, that makes my case; if not, I am not clear where the assurance will be in the Bill that the modifications will be “necessary” only for the purposes that she explained. On the face of it, to be able to apply an enactment with, by definition, unnecessary modifications, gives the Secretary of State a very wide power. I am sorry if I am being dim. It is entirely possible that I have lost the plot, but assurances not just from the Dispatch Box but in the Bill as to how the power will be used would be the most desirable way to go.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for explaining her amendments. She explained that they are designed to seek further clarification of the scope of the order-making powers conferred on the Home Secretary to enable provisions of local policing and fire and rescue enactments to be applied to a PCC in relation to their fire and rescue functions, and to a combined authority mayor, where they are exercising the single-employer model.
The ability to apply provisions for such enactments with or without modifications is important to ensure that PCCs and combined authority mayors have the necessary powers and duties to exercise their functions effectively. This may include the ability to make consequential modifications as well as those that are necessary in the strictest sense to enact the arrangements contained within the PCC’s fire governance proposal.
I reassure the noble Baroness that the Home Secretary would need to exercise these powers reasonably and rationally and would do so only on the basis of applying provisions that are consequential on the implementation of either the governance or single-employer models. The Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments will also play an important role in scrutinising the use of the delegated powers and would make a report if in its view the Home Secretary had acted outside her powers or used them in an unusual or unexpected way. I should add that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee did not raise any concerns in respect of the existing order-making powers in the Bill relating to local policing enactments.
On the basis of these assurances, I hope that noble Lords will support the government amendments.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness. She seemed for most of her response to be making my case for me. I noted that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee had not commented on this—but, undeterred, I ploughed on. I will want to read precisely what she said, but I think that the important point is about the reasonableness of any modification made by the Secretary of State and how it relates to what she and I are both describing as “necessary”. I will not pursue the point this evening, but it is no reflection on her if I say that an assurance that the Secretary of State will do the right thing does not cut it for me with legislation.
Psychoactive Substances Bill [HL]
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen Excerpts(9 years, 4 months ago)
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Baroness Meacher (CB)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 56, which refers to Clause 56(2)(a). It is a probing amendment along similar lines to Amendment 21. As there are three different ways in which possession can become a criminal offence, the aim of the amendment is to clarify with Ministers the circumstances in which possession is not a criminal offence and those in which it is. I thank Mr Fortson QC for his briefing on this issue.
The Government have emphasised that the Bill does not make simple possession of a psychoactive substance a criminal offence, and I and many others certainly welcome that important step forward in the Bill. We know from the lengthy experience in Portugal, for example, that decriminalising possession there and investing more resources in treatment and less in prisons has resulted in fewer young people being addicted to drugs. That is surely one of our primary objectives. I find it enormously positive that the Government understand that issue and are taking it forward in the Bill.
As I said, there are three situations in which possession can become a criminal offence. If a person produces a psychoactive substance at home, for example by cooking something up in the kitchen, and they intend to consume it purely by themselves, they will have committed an offence. I want to make clear to your Lordships that I am not suggesting that anyone should cook up a psychoactive substance in their kitchen, albeit I have a number of friends who do just that—they create interesting and highly intoxicating alcoholic beverages in their kitchens. It is very easy to be rather hypocritical about these issues. Nevertheless, I wanted to make the point. It is not that I am promoting the idea of young people getting into the kitchen and creating these things. However, one has to think about the inconsistency.
If a young person is thinking about getting hold of a psychoactive substance and goes out to a dealer, buys a substance and goes home, they will not be committing a criminal offence if they are found with the substance in their hand. If they are found to have created, or are creating, the substance at home, they will be committing a criminal offence. It is possible to say that it could be very much safer for a young person to take a substance when they know its ingredients, rather than go to a crack dealer. I gather that that is what has happened in Ireland. As the head shops have closed, young people have gone to the crack dealers, who are doing a nice business with these psychoactive substances. One has to think of the incentive effect of these kinds of inconsistencies.
It is not only a criminal offence to create a substance in your kitchen. It is also a criminal offence, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, to import a substance for your own consumption. It is also a criminal offence if you export a substance for your own consumption—which might seem a slightly peculiar idea, but it is in the Bill. To illustrate the point, if someone has a psychoactive substance in their pocket, they are not committing an offence if they are at home. However, if they go on holiday with the substance tucked away in their pocket because they have forgotten it is there, and if it is still in their pocket when they come back, they will have committed two offences: importing and exporting a psychoactive substance. I know that that sounds a ludicrous example but one has to be conscious of the kinds of things that arise out of inconsistencies in legislation.
I understand from Mr Fortson QC—I would not have been aware of it otherwise—that this issue is of some importance. The offences to which I have referred are apparently described as lifestyle offences. Therefore, they trigger the most draconian provisions of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Either the prosecutor or the court could initiate confiscation proceedings under POCA for one of these offences of possession of a psychoactive substance. That would seem, certainly to Mr Fortson QC, to be an entirely disproportionate response to what appears to be a rather insignificant offence. It was he who suggested that I should at least raise this matter in the House and seek the agreement of the Minister to ask her officials to look into these inconsistencies and to explore whether there is a way of finding a resolution that would feel somewhat more comfortable.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has indicated, Amendment 21 seeks to exclude from the importation offence in Clause 8, the importation of a psychoactive substance by a person for their own personal consumption. Amendment 56, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, aims to do something similar in that it seeks to exclude production for personal consumption from the scope of the offence in Clause 4.
The Government do not accept that there is an inherent contradiction between, on the one hand, making it an offence to import or produce a psychoactive substance for personal use and, on the other, not criminalising personal possession. The Bill is about tackling the trade in psychoactive substances, whatever form it may take, both domestically and internationally. The importation of psychoactive substances, particularly by post, is indisputably a key form of supply. To exclude importation for personal consumption, even assuming you could neatly carve such conduct out of the importation offence, has the potential to drive a coach and horses through the ban on importation. It would be an open invitation for individuals to import numerous small quantities, which they could then combine together for onward supply.
It is also important to mention that the proposal would impose a near impossible task on Border Force customs officials and National Crime Agency officers in policing the importation ban. It is obvious that it would be very difficult and time consuming for them to determine whether a particular consignment of psychoactive substances was for onward supply or for personal use. For example, a person could import a significant quantity of psychoactive substances at one time, claiming that it was a year’s worth of supplies for their personal use.
With a blanket ban, the Border Force will have a clear mandate to seize any substance likely to be consumed by any individual for its psychoactive effects, and where the importation is not for an exempted activity. This will enable it to stop these potentially dangerous substances entering the country. In fact, between 2014 and 2015, more than 3.5 tonnes of new psychoactive substances were seized by Border Force officers. This was a 75% increase on the previous year.
Once the Border Force has identified a consignment, it can then simply invoke its seizure powers and the substances will be subject to a forfeiture process. In appropriate circumstances, the National Crime Agency will wish to investigate further and seek prosecution of an individual for a Clause 8 offence.
I can assure noble Lords that, as for any offence, a prosecution for an offence under Clause 8 would be pursued only if the public interest test is met. This is clearly set out in the Crown Prosecution Service’s Code for Crown Prosecutors. The sort of questions that the prosecutor must ask him or herself when considering the public interest test include: “Is prosecution a proportionate response?”, “What is the impact on the community?”, and, “Was the suspect under the age of 18 at the time of the offence?”. I hope this reassures noble Lords that decisions to prosecute for any offence in the Bill will not be taken lightly and a number of factors will be considered.
Interestingly, the national policing lead has advised that the long-term focus of enforcement action will be on those sources of supply which caused the most harm to communities in terms of crime and disorder, or where they are connected with organised crime. Some of these considerations apply equally to Amendment 56, to the extent that it could open up a significant loophole which could be exploited. More to the point, I put it to the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher: do we really want to encourage people to manufacture psychoactive substances in their garden shed, or, indeed, their bath? I suggest not. Production is clearly a critical link in the supply chain and we should not tolerate it on any level, whether it is on an industrial or cottage-industry scale.
The purpose of the Bill is to clamp down on the supply of NPS, not to criminalise young people. A range of civil sanctions is available to law enforcement agencies which offer an alternative route to criminal proceedings as a means of tackling the production and supply of psychoactive substances. The use of these sanctions will enable law enforcement officers to take action swiftly to nip a problem in the bud or to adopt a more proportionate approach to low-level offending. It will be a matter for the relevant law enforcement officer to determine the most appropriate course of action.
I hope that has reassured noble Lords—
Lord Howarth of Newport
I just wonder whether the noble Baroness is not sending a rather confusing signal to people. She is saying, on the one hand, that it must be illegal to import a substance; on the other, she is saying—and I am glad she is, in a way—that the public interest consideration will come into play when decisions about the prosecution are to be made. She is saying that it will be illegal to do it, but she is dropping the very broadest of hints that you are not going to get prosecuted for it. Is that not rather confusing for people?
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
I did not mean to be confusing. People certainly will be prosecuted for it, but as I said, the use of these sanctions will enable law enforcement officers to take action swiftly to nip a problem in the bud or to adopt a more proportionate approach to low-level offending. So it will be a matter for the relevant law enforcement officer to determine the most appropriate course of action.
While Border Force will seek to intercept, seize and forfeit any consignment of psychoactive substances coming into the UK, the focus of any criminal justice response will be on cases in which there is evidence of greatest harm. Similar considerations would apply to the enforcement of the production offence. Given this, I trust that the noble Lord feels able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick
I am very grateful to the Minister for her response. Like the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, I am slightly confused. Clearly, the Bill is aimed at tackling the trade, but whether you buy your psychoactive substance from a website abroad or from a drug dealer on the street, it would seem that the Bill is aimed at tackling one part of the trade but not the other—unless I am confused about that, as I see the Minister and the expressions on people’s faces.
Of course Border Force needs to intercept these packages, which is why we are saying that this should be a defence rather than an exemption or not be an offence in itself. Clearly, if somebody is importing a large quantity and saying that it is a year’s supply, they would have great difficulty in convincing the courts that that defence was available to them.
There are two reasons for raising this issue. First, the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs raised it. In point 5 of its letter, it states:
“The Bill has the potential to both criminalise and apply disproportionate penalties to many otherwise law abiding young people and adults”,
and it specifically mentions importation. Secondly, we wanted to get on the record, which we have achieved, the fact that the public interest test will be applied and that, hopefully, not many young people will end up with a criminal record as a consequence of these measures. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Norton of Louth (Con)
My Lords, I would not dissent from the points that have been made about what should go into an annual report. I rise very briefly to comment on Amendment 55 and to commend my noble friend Lord Bates for tabling it; it is extremely helpful. He has already touched on it and the reasons for it, and I just reinforce that. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, did not I think disagree with having the review, but suggested that there should be a second one later on. The point I would make is that there will be: most Acts are now subject to review four to five years after enactment, so this measure would come up for review at that point in the normal course of events. What we have here is an early review, which is eminently sensible in the context of this measure, and it is being done on a statutory basis. I have long advocated post-legislative review. I think it is an excellent thing and now, as I say, it has been brought in as a matter of course. But, where necessary, it is very valuable for it to be made on a statutory basis, for it to be included in a measure so that it is a firm provision. It will be reviewed within 30 months, which, in the context of the measure, is an appropriate period. I commend the Government for bringing this amendment forward.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen
My Lords, I undertook to reflect on the various amendments that were tabled in Committee. Having reflected, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, stated, we have brought forward Amendment 55 in this group.
As I indicated in Committee, post-legislative scrutiny of all primary legislation takes place three to five years after Royal Assent. We accept that there is a case here for special treatment. The Government are bringing forward their post-legislative scrutiny of this particular piece of legislation and will place a review of the operation of the Act on a statutory footing.
We remain firmly of the view that that the duty to undertake a review should be a one-off requirement, rather than a continuing annual requirement with all the costs that that would entail. We are not persuaded of the benefit of undertaking a bespoke review of this legislation year after year. I appreciate that the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, is not confined to a review of this legislation, but my point about the resource constraints carries ever more weight when one looks down the list of matters to be addressed in the noble Lord’s annual review of the Government’s drugs strategy.
Given these considerations, the Government’s amendment simply requires a review of the operation of the Act and places a duty on the Home Secretary to prepare a report on the review and lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament within 30 months of the Bill coming into force. As noble Lords know, a period of 30 months has been specified in order to allow for the collection of up to two years’ worth of data post implementation.
The need for a review of the Bill was one of the issues raised by the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs in its letter of 2 July to the Home Secretary. In the Home Secretary’s response, published yesterday, she said:
“The Home Office is keen to work with the ACMD and would welcome the opportunity to have an early discussion on both the scale and scope of the review having regard to resource constraints, and how to make best use of existing data and evidence”.
Until we have had those discussions with the advisory council, it would be wrong to commit now to the review taking a particular form. I can say that I would expect the review to cover much of the ground identified in the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.
Turning to Amendment 54 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, I agree that many of the issues he raises need to be looked at from time to time. That is why we already produce an annual review of our 2010 drugs strategy. The most recent annual review was published in February and highlighted the progress made across the three strands of the strategy—namely, reducing demand, restricting supply and building recovery. The report also set out our future commitments, including new initiatives and actions to respond to emerging evidence and the changing nature of the drugs market.
I recognise that substance misuse is not an issue that government can tackle alone. We value contributions made by our key partners to support the delivery of the 2010 strategy, including: our independent experts, the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs; law enforcement agencies, including the National Crime Agency; international partners; and those working within the prevention, treatment and recovery sector. We are also committed to ensuring that, where possible, we assess the effectiveness and value for money of the 2010 strategy. Furthermore, our action to restrict the supply of illicit drugs is complemented by activity through the serious and organised crime strategy, which was launched in 2013 and which has been the subject of its own annual report. Together, the strategies are making significant steps forward in tackling the supply of drugs by organised criminals in the UK and overseas.
We recognise that drugs are a complex and evolving issue, so we will continue to develop the strategy and consider other approaches to help us respond to emerging threats and challenges. We will also continue to report in a proportionate way on progress in tackling these threats and meeting these challenges. I hope that noble Lords will agree that on reflection the approach taken in Amendment 55, coupled with the existing reporting on the 2010 drugs strategy, is the right way forward and, on that basis, that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Rosser
I thank noble Lords who have spoken in the debate and the Minister for her response and for addressing government Amendment 55. I am obviously a little disappointed that there is apparently to be a one-off review, with no further review, although I note the observation made by the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth. It rather begs the question: if the Government are determined that it will be a one-off review and no more, what happens if the report that comes out is rather negative in respect of the operation of the Act? Surely if that were so, there would be a strong case for a further review within a fairly short time to see whether the situation had improved, and perhaps to set out what had happened in relation to any recommendations there might be in the review of the operation of the Act. There is presumably not much point in having such a review if problems are found and no recommendations are made as to how they might be addressed.
That issue will probably have to be left for another day, but I am not sure that it is necessarily wise for the Government to shut the door on any further review of the operation of the Act when that very review might make a case for one within a short time, particularly if it finds that the situation is not as satisfactory as one might have hoped. However, I appreciate that the Government have made some movement with their Amendment 55. I also note the noble Baroness’s comments that much of the information set out in our Amendment 52 is likely to be covered in the review of the operation of the Act under government Amendment 55. In the light of that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Psychoactive Substances Bill [HL]
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen Excerpts(9 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Rosser
I shall be brief, but we have an amendment in this group, which states:
“Regulations under this section providing for medical research activity to be excluded from the application of the offences under this Act shall be laid before each House of Parliament within one week of sections 4 to 10 coming into effect”.
Something that has been referred to already is the letter that was received from the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs. One point made in that letter was that the Bill could,
“seriously inhibit medical and scientific research on psychoactive substances”.
We have had the response from the Government in a letter to me, in which they referred to the views of the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs. I take it that that includes the views of the advisory council on the Bill’s potentially seriously inhibiting medical and scientific research on these substances. The Government’s letter said:
“So that we can properly consider the ACMD’s advice, we now propose to defer tabling Government amendments on these issues until the Commons stages”.
On the basis that that is still the position—and I hope that the Minister will be able to confirm that the Government are still looking at the matter of the impact on research with a view to tabling amendments in the Commons—that would certainly suffice with regard to our Amendment 23, if the Minister can give that assurance.
Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)
I thank noble Lords for all their points. As discussed in Committee, there is common ground between these amendments and the Government’s position. As I said in Committee, it is the Government’s absolute and determined objective that bona fide medical and scientific research should be untouched by the provisions of the Bill. We will deal with the issue of research on cannabis when we reach Amendment 25.
It is already the case that broad swathes of research involving psychoactive substances fall outside the blanket ban. If a substance is not intended for human consumption for its psychoactive effects, it will not be caught by the Bill. Paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 exempts investigational medicinal products used in clinical trials. However, I understand, and the Government fully accept, that this exemption does not go far enough. This is an issue of some concern for the academic and scientific community. The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, referred in Committee and again today to the letter in support of her Amendment 12 sent to my right honourable friend the Home Secretary by the Academy of Medical Sciences and five other leading scientific institutions. My noble friend Lord Bates responded to that letter yesterday. I shall read out the critical paragraph in that response:
“We have now had some further discussions with the Department of Health and the Medical Research Council. In going forward, we need to ensure that any amendment to the Bill satisfies the scientific community as represented by the Academy of Medical Sciences and your co-signatories, as well as our own policy and legislative requirements. For this reason, we intend to develop this work in the coming weeks with a view to introducing an amendment when the Bill is considered by the House of Commons. To help achieve this I would value engagement between your representatives and officials from both the Home Office and the Department of Health to reach a common understanding and satisfactory outcome in the next few weeks”.
I hope that that will reassure noble Lords that we are firmly committed to bringing forward an appropriate amendment on this issue, but it will take more time to get it right in consultation with the Academy of Medical Sciences, the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs and others. We need to ensure that bona fide medical and scientific research is excluded from the ambit of the Bill, while not creating a loophole for others, whose only purpose is the recreational use of psychoactive substances, to exploit.
Amendment 11 is on a different point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, in seeking to expand the definition of medicinal products, and therefore the exemption for such products, in paragraph 2 of Schedule 1. The noble Baroness is pushing at an open door here. As I also indicated in Committee, this is another area we are considering further with the Department of Health and the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency.
We are conscious that the Bill as drafted does not include unlicensed medicines for human use known as “specials”. These are lawfully manufactured, imported, distributed or supplied for the treatment of individual patients after being ordered by a range of healthcare professionals, not just doctors. As such, they need to be taken out of scope of the definition of a psychoactive substance.
In its letter to the Home Secretary, the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs specifically raised concerns about the scope of exemption for herbal medicines. The European Herbal & Traditional Medicine Practitioners Association has also flagged a need to ensure that the exemption for medicines includes herbal medicines used by practitioners on a named-patient basis. This is another area where we are actively reviewing whether we need to adjust the current definitions in the Bill.
Medicines legislation is a complex area, as I know noble Lords are aware, and defining bona fide research is not as straightforward as one might imagine. We have certainly not so far been able to identify an off-the-shelf definition in existing legislation which we can readily apply. It is regrettable that we have not been able to table amendments in time for the House today, and I fear we will not be in a position to do so for Third Reading next Monday. I ask noble Lords to bear with us. We will use the time over the Summer Recess—no holidays for us—to bring forward appropriate amendments in the Commons. I will ensure that noble Lords taking part in this debate have sight of those amendments. Your Lordships’ House will then have an opportunity to consider the issue further when the Bill returns from the Commons in the autumn.
I hope that, in the light of that commitment, the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Meacher
My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I thank the Minister for her reassuring comments, her assurance about the Government’s commitment to ensuring that all bona fide medicines and research will fall outside the scope of the Bill, and her assurance that the Government will consult key experts to ensure that the Bill is right in this respect. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.