Policing and Crime Bill

Lord Rosser Excerpts

Wednesday 14th September 2016 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, these government amendments respond to one tabled on Report in the Commons by Amanda Milling. It is important that the public know that, where a police and crime commissioner is also the fire and rescue authority for an area, they are electing someone to both roles and are able to hold them to account for the delivery of both services. We therefore propose changing the legal title of a PCC to “police, fire and crime commissioner” where they additionally have fire and rescue responsibilities to ensure absolute clarity on this point.

Further, to ensure consistency, we similarly propose to amend the legal title of a police and crime panel for the area in which the PCC is also the fire and rescue authority to “police, fire and crime panel”. Again, this will provide greater transparency to the public as the new title reflects the additional scrutiny responsibilities of the panels in these areas. The Government consulted both police and fire partners on these amendments and it is clear that there is broad support for the new titles. They will preserve the identity of the fire and rescue service, which we have been clear will remain a distinct and equal partner to the police. I beg to move.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I will make just a few brief comments on these government amendments. I suppose we have achieved a great deal if we have managed to get away without endless discussion of what the new title of a police and crime commissioner who takes over responsibility for the fire and rescue service should be. That is the kind of issue on which there are usually interminable discussions.

Looking at the proposal that the individual who takes over responsibility for a fire and rescue service should be renamed the police, fire and crime commissioner, that title does not include reference to the rescue function. It is a fire and rescue service but the title simply refers to a police, fire and crime commissioner. I note that the Minister said that there had been consultation and discussion on this and that the proposed name change seems to have found general favour. I simply ask: why was it decided to exclude the reference to the rescue activity of the fire and rescue service from the renamed PCC where that PCC takes over responsibility for a fire and rescue service?

The other point I would raise refers to Amendment 72, which deals with the change of title to the police and crime panel. I do not intend to repeat the point I made about the new title of the police and crime commissioner in relation to these panels. However, have the Government carried out or do they intend to carry out any assessment of the effectiveness of these panels, bearing in mind that greater responsibility will be placed on them where the police and crime commissioner takes over responsibility for a fire and rescue service?

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank noble Lords for the points they have made. On using the word “rescue” in the title, apart from the fact that it is a bit of a mouthful, chief fire officers in the Chief Fire Officers Association do not have the word “rescue” in their title. I think that is the reason. I take the noble Lord’s point, but too many words can be a bit cumbersome. We consulted police and fire stakeholders between the amendment being made in the Commons and our suggestion to change the name.

On whether the panels are effective, I was on the police authority for a year. At that time there was a lot of criticism of police authorities being remote from people and questions about whether they were fulfilling their function of bringing police authority to account. The police and crime panels under the Bill have clear powers to scrutinise the actions and decisions of each PCC and to make sure the information is available to the public. The meetings are held in public, so not only is the information available to the electorate but they can watch these meetings, which are often recorded. For example, the meeting of Sussex PCP is broadcast, and members of the public can submit questions to the panel for the commissioner ahead of the regular scrutiny meetings. I will not disavow what the noble Lord said—I have not read the book—but their powers are clear, and the decision-making and the scrutiny process is transparent. The scrutiny meetings are often available for broadcast, and members of the public can ask questions ahead of them.

[Lord Rosser]

Does the Minister not agree that if the Government are satisfied that the police and crime commissioners have been in existence for long enough to form a view that they would be competent and suitable to take over responsibility for a fire and rescue service, the police and crime panels have also been in existence for sufficient time for the Government to properly evaluate their effectiveness and the extent to which they have or have not achieved the objectives that were laid down? The Minister acknowledged that the points I was making were not my personal views—they came from the study that had been undertaken—and I would have thought that there was an argument, now that their powers and responsibilities are to be extended, to at least have a look at the extent to which they are delivering on the objectives to which the Minister has just referred.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I undertake to ask, between now and Report, whether any reviews have been undertaken on the effectiveness of police and crime panels and to get back to the noble Lord. I will write to noble Lords on that point and, if that is not the case, say whether the Government intend to review the process in light of the previous criticism of police authorities.

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In our view, there are some fundamental issues of governance and democracy here. Country fire and rescue authorities are elected as local authorities. A police and crime commissioner is elected perhaps at a different time, and perhaps in a different political climate, on the basis of different political and other considerations. I am distinctly queasy at the notion of giving the PCC a vote as the Bill provides. I beg to move.

[Lord Rosser]

We have Amendment 81 in this group. Clause 7, to which our amendment refers, inserts a provision into the Local Government Act 1972 to the effect that:

“A relevant police and crime commissioner may attend, speak at and vote at a meeting of a principal council in England which is a fire and rescue authority”.

A sub-paragraph then sets out the circumstances in which that applies, and one of those is,

“only if and to the extent that the business of the meeting relates to the functions of the principal council as a fire and rescue authority”.

Our amendment seeks to address what happens if there is a dispute as to whether or not council business is fire-related, and whether the relevant police and crime commissioner is able to exercise their power to attend, speak at and vote at the meeting. The amendment says that if there is a dispute on this point, the decision of the monitoring officer in that authority should be final—in other words, the monitoring officer will adjudicate if there is a difference of view regarding the extent to which the business of the meetings relates to the functions of the council as a fire and rescue authority. Naturally, one would hope that such a situation would not be a common occurrence, to say the least; indeed, one might hope that it would never be an occurrence, but clearly there has to be some effective means of resolving the matter if there is a dispute.

I suggest only one particular circumstance in which problems of this kind might arise: if a police and crime commissioner wanted to take over a fire and rescue service against the wishes of the local authority concerned. The local authority concerned might then seek to look very closely at the extent to which the business at the meeting related to its functions as a fire and rescue authority and therefore perhaps seek to preclude the police and crime commissioner from attending, speaking or voting at it.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, Clause 7 provides for PCCs to request to be represented on fire and rescue authorities within their police areas where they do not take responsibility for the governance of the fire and rescue service. This is what we have described as the representation model. When an FRA accepts such a request, we have set out that PCCs will be treated as if they were a member for the purposes of bringing agenda items, receiving papers and so on, and have full voting rights to ensure that they can take part in the business of the fire and rescue authority in a meaningful and effective way.

The amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would remove those voting rights, which would be a great shame, as the PCC would not have real influence behind their contribution. Again going back to my experience, it would set an incredibly negative tone to the whole environment. In fact, it would make me wonder how they managed to get that far in the first place. We want PCCs and FRAs to consider the representation model as a viable option for promoting greater collaboration between the two services. To limit the PCC’s involvement would weaken representation as a serious model for collaboration; it would be quite anti-collaboration. The amendments also remove the necessity for a fire and rescue authority to publish its decision and reasoning in considering PCC membership. I would be concerned that to do so would remove transparency and accountability from the process, because these provisions enable PCCs to seek representation where they wish to while respecting local fire governance arrangements.

The final decision on representation rests with the fire and rescue authority, although we would fully expect that in most instances the FRA would accept the PCC’s request and if it does not, their reasons should be made clear to both the PCC and the public. This ensures that the process is fully transparent and open to effective scrutiny.

Amendment 81, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, would make the monitoring officer the final arbitrator of disputes about whether business is fire-related. We do not consider this to be an appropriate role for the monitoring officer. Where a county or unitary FRA does not have a dedicated committee for fire, the Bill provides that the PCC’s ability to attend, speak and vote will be restricted to matters relating to the functions of the fire and rescue authority. It will be for local appointing committees to consider how these arrangements work in practice.

As the noble Lord knows, monitoring officers have existing duties under Section 5 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 to report to the local authority if, at any time, it appears to them that any actions of the authority are or would be in contravention of legal provisions. It would therefore be a conflict of interest for them also to take a role in arbitrating on decisions.

As a further safeguard, PCCs will be subject to the local authority’s code of conduct for the purposes of their representation on the FRA. Were they to act outside of the code, the monitoring officer must refer the matter to the relevant police and crime panel, which will make a report or recommendations to the PCC.

I believe that the Bill as drafted allows for the representation model to be considered as a serious alternative to other governance models, and I hope that I have been able to persuade the Committee of the merits of the approach taken in the Bill and that consequently the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Rosser]

Perhaps I can clarify what the Minister said. I understood the point that she sought to make about the unsuitability of the monitoring officer, in the Government’s view. I am still unclear, and she may need to explain to me again, what will be the process to resolve an issue if there is an argument about whether a police and crime commissioner is entitled to attend, speak at or vote at a particular meeting, because that relates to whether business is being discussed which is relevant to the role of a fire and rescue authority. Will a process or procedure exist, will guidelines be issued on it, or do the Government argue that they do not envisage that such a problem will ever arise?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

As I have explained, in most instances, the FRA would accept a request, and it would be in the interests of good working, good faith and collaboration for it to do so. As to the process if it refused such a request, as I understand it—I will write to noble Lords if it is any different—if it refuses it, it refuses it, and there is no recourse thereon in.

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[The Earl of Lindsay (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 120 and speaking to Amendment 122, I should, at the outset, acknowledge the importance of strengthening the provisions in the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 by introducing a robust and independent regime for fire and rescue authorities in England. Equally, I recognise the desire to increase transparency and to ensure that the new inspectors have the powers to exercise their function to monitor and report on the effectiveness and efficiency of our fire and rescue service, and to take action where necessary.

I do however hesitate over the rationale behind the decision to limit the conduct of all inspection activity to public authorities and officers recruited into the Home Office, as the Government are potentially missing an opportunity to utilise the inspection expertise available outside the public sector. I should declare an interest in this matter as the chair of the UK Accreditation Service, which is the sole national body recognised by the Government for accreditation, against nationally or internationally recognised standards of organisations providing inspection services, as well as certification, testing and calibration. UKAS’s role and remit as the national accreditation body are enshrined in the Accreditation Regulations 2009 and, in addition, UKAS operates under a memorandum of understanding with the Secretary of State for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, on behalf of the Government as a whole. That memorandum of understanding requires UKAS to act in the public interest at all times.

UKAS itself is peer-assessed against strict international standards and we are able to demonstrate and in turn assess impartiality and independence as well as technical competence and consistency as being vital elements of all whom we are assessing. This is why UKAS accreditation is used with confidence across a wide spectrum of policy and regulatory areas.

Extending the clause as currently drafted to enable the chief fire and rescue inspector to utilise inspections by competent, impartial and independent inspectors from conformity assessment bodies, outside public authorities, provided they hold the appropriate accreditation from UKAS, would in no way compromise the effectiveness, transparency or credibility of the new inspectorate. On the contrary, it would help to enhance the inspectorate’s reach and impact. It would also help to cement and enhance its position by giving assurance that all inspection and audit activities are conducted by independent, impartial and fully competent personnel as demonstrated by their conformity with UKAS’s robust and rigorous requirements as the Government’s sole national accreditation body. Such an approach would also support the Government’s policy of risk-based regulation, enabling the new inspectorate to use its inevitably finite resources to target its inspection and audit activities to where they are most needed, which would benefit the inspectorate itself, compliant fire and rescue services and of course the public.

For more than a decade, the national accreditation body had a strong record in working with the Government to underpin better regulation, government efficiency and public sector reform. It has helped to reduce the regulatory burden on society and reduce the inspection costs incurred by regulators while at the same time ensuring that robust outcomes in terms of compliance and behaviour are in line with required policy or regulatory objectives. There are a number of examples where UKAS accreditation has been successfully used by regulators to support and complement existing regulatory regimes: specifically, accreditation has enabled regulators to use a more risk-based approach, which has resulted in a better targeting of resources by regulators. Where organisations have a UKAS-accredited inspection or certification in place against a recognised national or international standard, this has been recognised as a reliable indication of compliance and so has given regulators the opportunity to focus their efforts on those organisations where the risk of non-compliance is highest.

For example, the Forensic Science Regulator has recognised the importance of UKAS accreditation as a mechanism to ensure that the standards required by the Home Office are met and maintained. The Forensic Science Regulator Codes of Practice and Conduct for Forensic Science Providers and Practitioners in the Criminal Justice System require forensic science providers to hold UKAS accreditation in accordance with the statement of requirements contained in the code. The requirement to hold accreditation applies irrespective of whether the forensic science provider is public, police or commercial. I could cite other examples. For instance, the Care Quality Commission uses UKAS’s accreditation to increase its regulatory oversight and effectiveness. I should also add in passing that UKAS currently works closely with the Chief Fire Officers Association, the Fire Risk Assessment Competency Council and British Approvals for Fire Equipment on a number of accredited certification schemes.

Using accredited inspection in this way does not remove the requirement for statutory inspections. There is always a need for the possibility of statutory intervention when appropriate. However, supplementing statutory inspection with an accredited alternative can free up valuable additional resources in line with the established better regulation principles without compromising outcomes.

The introduction of the new inspectorate is an important step forward and is to be welcomed. However, I firmly believe that granting the new inspectors the flexibility, if they so wish, to commission inspection activities from, or delegate inspection activities to, organisations in which all parties can have confidence because they have been fully accredited for that specific purpose by the national accreditation body will maximise the benefits, for the new inspectorate, for all who have an interest in the new inspectorate being able to deliver its role, and for public safety. I beg to move.

[Lord Rosser]

I thank the noble Earl for explaining to me prior to today the purpose of his amendments and the objective they seek to achieve. The noble Earl has made his case in very clear and cogent terms. I, too, would very much like to hear the Government’s response.

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)]

My Lords, a key element of the recently announced fire reform agenda is the creation of a new independent inspection regime for fire and rescue. Amendments 120 and 122, tabled by my noble friend Lord Lindsay, relate to persons and bodies appointed by the chief fire and rescue inspector and an English inspector respectively to deliver the inspection function.

The Government do not believe that Amendment 120 is necessary. Clause 11 is modelled on provisions for the inspection of policing and is deliberately broad to provide the chief fire and rescue inspector with flexibility in who they may appoint as an assistant inspector, or other officers, for the purpose of assisting English inspectors. The Government could have listed certain professions or qualifications in the Bill for who could be appointed, but that would be interpreted as an exhaustive list, or would influence the chief inspector on their appointments. Therefore, I assure my noble friend that there is nothing stopping the chief inspector appointing persons covered by his amendment—indeed, there may be some merit in their doing so if needed—but the amendment does nothing to further the Bill as such persons are not precluded.

Turning to Amendment 122, this issue was raised during the Bill’s Commons Report stage. My ministerial colleague, the Minister for Policing and the Fire Service, has exchanged letters with Bob Neill MP and Jim Fitzpatrick MP since then. Therefore, my comments will come as no surprise.

Whereas Amendment 120 deals with the appointment of individuals, Amendment 122 to Schedule 3 covers the appointment of bodies as the recipient of delegated functions. Paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 allows for an English inspector to arrange for the inspection function to be exercised by another public authority on their behalf. This provides a degree of operational flexibility, depending on the inspection model chosen, but it is simply not appropriate for government inspection functions —regardless of what or who they are inspecting—to be delivered by a non-public body. Importantly, for an inspectorate to undertake robust inspections they must have access to information, premises and persons—powers granted in statute. I do not doubt the high standards private bodies operate to, but such invasive powers should be delivered only by those holding public office to avoid any conflict of interest and ensure proper accountability for the exercise of such powers.

I recognise the valuable role UKAS provides in giving confidence to both the public and private sectors as to a person’s competence, consistency and impartiality. However, we deliberately did not add a prescriptive list to the Bill to avoid any constraint on the chief inspector appointing whoever they consider necessary and appropriate. As I said, there is nothing to stop external experts being sourced, including from the bodies covered by these amendments, but this constraint is important. In view of that, I invite my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.