Earl of Lindsay
Main Page: Earl of Lindsay (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Earl of Lindsay's debates with the Home Office
(8 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in moving Amendment 120 and speaking to Amendment 122, I should, at the outset, acknowledge the importance of strengthening the provisions in the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 by introducing a robust and independent regime for fire and rescue authorities in England. Equally, I recognise the desire to increase transparency and to ensure that the new inspectors have the powers to exercise their function to monitor and report on the effectiveness and efficiency of our fire and rescue service, and to take action where necessary.
I do however hesitate over the rationale behind the decision to limit the conduct of all inspection activity to public authorities and officers recruited into the Home Office, as the Government are potentially missing an opportunity to utilise the inspection expertise available outside the public sector. I should declare an interest in this matter as the chair of the UK Accreditation Service, which is the sole national body recognised by the Government for accreditation, against nationally or internationally recognised standards of organisations providing inspection services, as well as certification, testing and calibration. UKAS’s role and remit as the national accreditation body are enshrined in the Accreditation Regulations 2009 and, in addition, UKAS operates under a memorandum of understanding with the Secretary of State for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, on behalf of the Government as a whole. That memorandum of understanding requires UKAS to act in the public interest at all times.
UKAS itself is peer-assessed against strict international standards and we are able to demonstrate and in turn assess impartiality and independence as well as technical competence and consistency as being vital elements of all whom we are assessing. This is why UKAS accreditation is used with confidence across a wide spectrum of policy and regulatory areas.
Extending the clause as currently drafted to enable the chief fire and rescue inspector to utilise inspections by competent, impartial and independent inspectors from conformity assessment bodies, outside public authorities, provided they hold the appropriate accreditation from UKAS, would in no way compromise the effectiveness, transparency or credibility of the new inspectorate. On the contrary, it would help to enhance the inspectorate’s reach and impact. It would also help to cement and enhance its position by giving assurance that all inspection and audit activities are conducted by independent, impartial and fully competent personnel as demonstrated by their conformity with UKAS’s robust and rigorous requirements as the Government’s sole national accreditation body. Such an approach would also support the Government’s policy of risk-based regulation, enabling the new inspectorate to use its inevitably finite resources to target its inspection and audit activities to where they are most needed, which would benefit the inspectorate itself, compliant fire and rescue services and of course the public.
For more than a decade, the national accreditation body had a strong record in working with the Government to underpin better regulation, government efficiency and public sector reform. It has helped to reduce the regulatory burden on society and reduce the inspection costs incurred by regulators while at the same time ensuring that robust outcomes in terms of compliance and behaviour are in line with required policy or regulatory objectives. There are a number of examples where UKAS accreditation has been successfully used by regulators to support and complement existing regulatory regimes: specifically, accreditation has enabled regulators to use a more risk-based approach, which has resulted in a better targeting of resources by regulators. Where organisations have a UKAS-accredited inspection or certification in place against a recognised national or international standard, this has been recognised as a reliable indication of compliance and so has given regulators the opportunity to focus their efforts on those organisations where the risk of non-compliance is highest.
For example, the Forensic Science Regulator has recognised the importance of UKAS accreditation as a mechanism to ensure that the standards required by the Home Office are met and maintained. The Forensic Science Regulator Codes of Practice and Conduct for Forensic Science Providers and Practitioners in the Criminal Justice System require forensic science providers to hold UKAS accreditation in accordance with the statement of requirements contained in the code. The requirement to hold accreditation applies irrespective of whether the forensic science provider is public, police or commercial. I could cite other examples. For instance, the Care Quality Commission uses UKAS’s accreditation to increase its regulatory oversight and effectiveness. I should also add in passing that UKAS currently works closely with the Chief Fire Officers Association, the Fire Risk Assessment Competency Council and British Approvals for Fire Equipment on a number of accredited certification schemes.
Using accredited inspection in this way does not remove the requirement for statutory inspections. There is always a need for the possibility of statutory intervention when appropriate. However, supplementing statutory inspection with an accredited alternative can free up valuable additional resources in line with the established better regulation principles without compromising outcomes.
The introduction of the new inspectorate is an important step forward and is to be welcomed. However, I firmly believe that granting the new inspectors the flexibility, if they so wish, to commission inspection activities from, or delegate inspection activities to, organisations in which all parties can have confidence because they have been fully accredited for that specific purpose by the national accreditation body will maximise the benefits, for the new inspectorate, for all who have an interest in the new inspectorate being able to deliver its role, and for public safety. I beg to move.
I thank the noble Earl for explaining to me prior to today the purpose of his amendments and the objective they seek to achieve. The noble Earl has made his case in very clear and cogent terms. I, too, would very much like to hear the Government’s response.
My Lords, a key element of the recently announced fire reform agenda is the creation of a new independent inspection regime for fire and rescue. Amendments 120 and 122, tabled by my noble friend Lord Lindsay, relate to persons and bodies appointed by the chief fire and rescue inspector and an English inspector respectively to deliver the inspection function.
The Government do not believe that Amendment 120 is necessary. Clause 11 is modelled on provisions for the inspection of policing and is deliberately broad to provide the chief fire and rescue inspector with flexibility in who they may appoint as an assistant inspector, or other officers, for the purpose of assisting English inspectors. The Government could have listed certain professions or qualifications in the Bill for who could be appointed, but that would be interpreted as an exhaustive list, or would influence the chief inspector on their appointments. Therefore, I assure my noble friend that there is nothing stopping the chief inspector appointing persons covered by his amendment—indeed, there may be some merit in their doing so if needed—but the amendment does nothing to further the Bill as such persons are not precluded.
Turning to Amendment 122, this issue was raised during the Bill’s Commons Report stage. My ministerial colleague, the Minister for Policing and the Fire Service, has exchanged letters with Bob Neill MP and Jim Fitzpatrick MP since then. Therefore, my comments will come as no surprise.
Whereas Amendment 120 deals with the appointment of individuals, Amendment 122 to Schedule 3 covers the appointment of bodies as the recipient of delegated functions. Paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 allows for an English inspector to arrange for the inspection function to be exercised by another public authority on their behalf. This provides a degree of operational flexibility, depending on the inspection model chosen, but it is simply not appropriate for government inspection functions —regardless of what or who they are inspecting—to be delivered by a non-public body. Importantly, for an inspectorate to undertake robust inspections they must have access to information, premises and persons—powers granted in statute. I do not doubt the high standards private bodies operate to, but such invasive powers should be delivered only by those holding public office to avoid any conflict of interest and ensure proper accountability for the exercise of such powers.
I recognise the valuable role UKAS provides in giving confidence to both the public and private sectors as to a person’s competence, consistency and impartiality. However, we deliberately did not add a prescriptive list to the Bill to avoid any constraint on the chief inspector appointing whoever they consider necessary and appropriate. As I said, there is nothing to stop external experts being sourced, including from the bodies covered by these amendments, but this constraint is important. In view of that, I invite my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful for my noble friend’s response and look forward to reflecting on the detail of what she said in due course. It might be useful if there were some discussion between UKAS and the Home Office to make sure that anything that UKAS’s activities can do to support the new inspectorate is developed. I am also mindful that the Home Office will consult on the proposals for the new inspectorate later in the year. That is another opportunity for useful discussions. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.