Financial Services and Markets Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 6th February 2023 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

67: After Clause 24, insert the following new Clause—
“Prevention of fraud objective
In section 1B of FSMA 2000 (FCA’s general duties), in subsection (3) at the end insert—“(d) the prevention and detection of fraud perpetrated in or through financial services.””

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, in this group, we return to the issues of fraud and encouraging the financial regulators to be more active. Fraud now accounts for nearly half of all crime and there are still issues around ensuring that there are preventive steps.

I have three amendments in this group, which I offer in order to probe the best way to engage the regulators more actively in matters of fraud. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for his support on two of my amendments; I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, for his support on one of them. I note the overlapping of some of my amendments with those in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt.

My first amendment in this group, Amendment 67, would add an additional operational objective for the FCA in

“the prevention and detection of fraud perpetrated in or through financial services.”

As I have indicated on previous days of our debates, there are questions about where best to place requirements so as to ensure that they are effective. In this case, I put it high in the layering of the objectives, although the requirement of the FCA is in fact only to do things that advance one or more of its operational objectives. As has been said previously, this allows the regulators to pick and choose, and underlies what the public and many parliamentarians see as manifest failure.

With that in mind, I concluded that it perhaps needed to be a strategic objective because that cannot be dodged. After all, fraud is already a significant factor undermining payment systems—in particular, the faster payment system—and calling into question the general sustainability of instant payments.

With that strategic thought, I proposed Amendment 73, which would add to the definition of “relevant markets” in the FCA’s strategic objective. My addition—proposed new paragraph (d)—would include

“the financial markets and the markets for financial services, whether regulated or not, in matters of fraud.”

Given the role of banks, the PRA should also have a similar objective, although my thinking is that it would need to be wider than its applicability to rule-making. I hope that, collectively, we will be able to return to the issue of best placing when it comes to Report. The fact is that our financial services regulators are, or should be, well placed to discover fraud beyond the confines of specifically regulated financial services. There may be freedom in those services being unrestrained, but that does not mean cheating and fraud, as with the Libor rigging case, for example, and other matters that have been discussed earlier.

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[Baroness Penn (Con)]

I absolutely note the noble Baroness’s point. That same principle has informed our approach to proceeds under the Proceeds of Crime Act, so this has happened elsewhere in Government.

I was going to note that, previously, the FSA was able to keep all the income it took from penalties and use it to subsidise the levy it charged on the firms it regulated. That was changed because, when the regulators took a large amount of money from those they had fined, they reduced the charges they made on those firms. In thinking about these issues, we would want to avoid similar unintended consequences in the future.

I close by saying that I have heard noble Lords’ strength of feeling on this debate. As I said on the previous group, I am always open to meeting noble Lords to discuss issues further. We have different ways in which we think those issues can be tackled, but it is always right to see what more we can do. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, suggested perhaps having a co-ordinating meeting on fraud, particularly to cover the specific issues raised in the different Bills before your Lordships. I will endeavour to take that forward ahead of Report.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

Your Lordships will be pleased to know that I cannot possibly go through everything, yet again, that has been spoken about. I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. The Minister must have heard the concern from all sides of the Committee.

The only bit of good news that I can hang on to from what was said is that more work is being done on data sharing between banks. That is important. The list of roles of the FCA just proves that it does not have a great deal of power to do things within financial services in general. It can do things with regulated bodies, but that is very limited, as we discussed previously, so I will not go into it again. It can do things with bodies that are pretending to be regulated but are not, but we are for ever bashing up against this regulatory perimeter, one way or another. That just does not deal with fraud, because fraudsters are well aware of it and are going to use it.

We have tried to cover various different types of fraud. Fraud by and in financial services surely should be caught, even if it is by a regulated entity but in an unregulated area. The financial services regulator should still be able to prosecute the entity, not just through cases that deal with criminal matters which it can take; there should also be some regulatory approach. Then there is fraud in which financial services are the final vehicle. Financial services are in a special place because, ultimately, how can you monetise your fraud? You have to put it through a bank or somewhere else, no matter whether it was started or perhaps enabled by a telecoms company, online platform and so on. Ultimately, financial services firms have a special duty for extra vigilance, because that is where this all funnels down.

I agree that probably more has been done to capture these things in financial services than in some of the online platforms and telecoms companies. I will not go through the whole of the very thick fraud report, but there are issues in it that go across the piece. That is part of the problem. We have this complete alphabet soup of organisations that are supposed to be helping us address crime, and fraud in particular, in different ways. However, it is not well co-ordinated, and fraud falls between the gaps, and so it is with the financial services side of it.

One thing that was in the report from the Fraud Act committee was about engaging regulators more in the fight—that is, regulators in general—through having regulatory offences. Here, the imagination has to be used. We should not just pin down regulators to doing very small things within a tiny regulated bit, while everywhere else people can either get away with it or it has to go over to less specialised people to deal with. There are big holes, and we will have to come back to this.

At the bottom of it, there are issues around the funding. You will have to fund regulators more if they are to address fraud more. I do not see any harm in the recycling of fines. They should not be recycled so as to say “Right, now the levy is less”, but they could be recycled specifically for prosecutions. Given that you can turn a profit from them and that you are helping individuals who have had their money stolen, it is very bad if the Treasury does not look at that more favourably. Everybody is crying out for this, but we acknowledge that you have to have money to do it.

For now, I will obviously withdraw my amendment. However, we will have to come back on Report with one or two amendments aimed at furthering things, unless the Minister is able to persuade the rest of the Treasury that it needs to act in this area, as there would be ways in which it could ring-fence the financing and turn a net profit.

Amendment 67 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Penn (Con)]

The points that I gave in reply to the noble Baroness’s specific question on PPI and interest rate hedging products were in the context of the consumer duty as written, with the reasonable expectations provision in there. However, of course I take seriously the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and I will write to the Committee to further expand on that.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My recollection from the passage of the 2021 Act was that the final wording was government wording, put in as a concession to amendments from my noble friend Lord Sharkey. The government amendment said that a duty of care, or variations thereof, could be consulted on. Was it the Treasury’s, or the Minister’s, expectation at the time that it would be severely diluted? Was that the point of those extra bits?

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

I think I said directly what was required of the FCA, and the FCA has fulfilled its obligations under that Act. Furthermore, the FCA is not of the view that it has diluted the approach; it has taken a different approach from the duty of care. I have attempted to set out some of the reasoning and thinking behind the approach it has chosen to take versus the alternatives that were put to it. I am happy to write further.

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[Baroness Penn (Con)]

I do not have a breakdown of the different responses to the consultations. However, as I said, in its feedback statement on a previous consultation on the duty of care, the FCA noted that industry stakeholders did not support a statutory duty of care. It also noted that a number of consumer groups did not support a statutory duty of care. I can point back to when that was considered in 2019 as not being a single view from a single source of consultees.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

One is a number, as I was always taught when I was training as a patent attorney. It might mean that one consumer organisation did not agree, but the vast majority did.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

The noble Baroness has made her point.

I was turning to the private right of action, which was also consulted on by the FCA. It has concluded that it will not be beneficial at this time to introduce a private right of action, as it sees benefit in giving firms time to implement the significant changes that the duty entails without the threat of private action.

However, the FCA has committed to keeping this matter under review. The FCA has the power to introduce a private right of action through its rules, without the need for legislative change, if it considers it appropriate to do so in future. In addition, as noble Lords know, consumers will remain able to seek redress via the Financial Ombudsman Service where they believe a financial services firm has breached the consumer duty.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 1st February 2023 Grand Committee

To that end, I ask my noble friend to respond to all the points in those amendments and, ideally, accept them in Committee to save me having to resubmit them on Report.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, there are many good suggestions in this group of amendments. Indeed, they are all good and they are all very supportable. It is particular pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, because with the amendment on the determination of authorisations he has put his finger on a specific problem that interferes with the day-to-day running of businesses, or those hoping to run new businesses, and is at the heart of competitiveness. So without addressing those kinds of issues, we will not get anywhere. This lies behind similar amendments in my name, in a later group, relating to efficiency.

I hope that, given the number of amendments, and no doubt contributions, from noble Lords from all sides, the Government and the regulators will acknowledge the need and the parliamentary appetite for further accountability through formal reporting and, as I point out in my Amendment 121, for independent performance metrics. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, for signing that amendment. Of course, it is a probing amendment directed at the FCA. To be thorough, there would need to be another one replicating it for the PRA, but I had tabled enough amendments already. I am conscious also that the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, has proposed a more fully developed model, with an amendment in a later group creating an office for financial regulatory accountability. I have signed that amendment.

My amendment suggests that the FCA report its performance against a set of statistics developed and periodically updated by the National Audit Office, in consultation with consumer representatives, through which the FCA’s achievements and progress may be objectively evaluated. The idea for the amendment developed out of discussions that we had in your Lordships’ Industry and Regulators Committee when we were looking at competitiveness in financial services, particularly in the insurance sector, as well as the wider discussion about competitiveness.

The issue with reports by the regulators is that, even within a given topic, they are setting their own exam questions and then grading themselves on how well they have passed. There is a constant need to get different specifics and granularities as new issues arise, and that is not necessarily being done—for example, reporting on authorisations, as I have mentioned. The committee had some discussions with the NAO, finding it very helpful and astute, and there are always lots of interesting things in its report that at times already challenge what the regulators have said about themselves and how they have spent their resources. It sheds light on things that—shall we say?—have certainly been exaggerated by the regulators in the past.

It is clear from the number of amendments in this group and elsewhere that to address problems comprehensively within the structure of FSMA is quite difficult and convoluted, needing many amendments that make it ever more difficult and convoluted. That is one reason to have an external body that can look over everything and cut through some of the obfuscation and difficulty one has in trying to put something comprehensive into FSMA and needing about eight amendments to do it. My fundamental question is: does the Minister recognise that need for an independent body of substance that can update what is reviewed and measured around regulatory performance and is free from the regulators’ own glossing, and if not, why not?

I need touch only briefly on my other two amendments in this group, Amendments 157 and 158. They simply suggest that when respondents to consultations do not wish to be named—that is perfectly reasonable—there should nevertheless be an indication of the nature of the respondents so that we can see how many have come from industry and how many from elsewhere. That is done sometimes; it is done routinely in some departments but in others it is never done. It is just good governance because, without revealing the identity of individuals or companies, you can nevertheless see what the universe of respondents truly looks like.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I have Amendments 83 and 84 in this group and I have added my name to Amendments 66, 115 and 116 in the name of my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond. I did not add my name to some of the other amendments in this group but I think a pattern of considerable agreement is emerging from all parts of this Committee as to the things that we need to address. Perhaps we have not quite honed in on how to find the one solution to that, but the purpose of Committee is to explore these things.

My noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond’s Amendment 66 aims at much the same target as Amendments 45 and 63 in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull. I support what both said in introducing their amendments. I understand what the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, is seeking to achieve but it is not enough just to tell the FCA or the PRA to monitor and measure what they are doing in certain areas. We need to go further, and into regular and focused reporting, which is why I particularly wanted to support my noble friend Lord Holmes’s Amendment 66. Of course, the two issues are not mutually exclusive, and I can see the start of a way forward to an amendment on Report that encapsulates many of the issues arising in respect of the competitiveness and growth objectives.

I am particularly concerned that the regulators will pay lip service to the new objective: we will get pages of elegant words in their annual reports but whether they will amount to anything useful in terms of information is something of a moot point. I also believe that relatively few people actually read the annual reports of the regulators, much as not many people read the annual reports of listed companies. If noble Lords are in any doubt about the capacity of the PRA to write a lot of words without saying much of substance, they need only look at the PRA’s discussion document on how it will respond to this new competitiveness and growth objective. It runs to 70 pages but there is virtually no meat in there at all. We need hard data in a regular report which will get attention in Parliament and elsewhere, which is the other main theme that will emerge from our Committee: how we can start to build a proper system of accountability. However, reporting by the regulators is an important building block in there.

My Amendments 83 and 84 also concern the competitiveness and growth objective, but this time in the context of consultation on new rules. These amendments amend new Sections 138I and 138J of FSMA, as inserted by Clause 29, so that the PRA and the FCA have to include an explanation of the impact of how the competitiveness and growth objective has affected whatever new rules are brought forward. Whenever new rules are proposed, there is an important opportunity to consider their potential impacts on competitiveness and growth. As we know, regulators do not need many excuses to create new rules, but every time they respond to real or perceived risks with another addition to the rule book, they will end up imposing costs, and costs are ultimately borne by consumers. They can also have the effect of slowing down or hampering innovation, so it is important that, at the point before new rules are introduced, we have the opportunity to review the impact of those rules on competitiveness and growth in the UK. I like ex poste reporting, but I also like ex ante analysis and, if necessary, action to change rules before they have an adverse impact.

I have also added my name to my noble friend Lord Holmes’s Amendments 115 and 116 because they would give hard data on how speedy the regulators are in handling new approvals, which is an important area. Amendment 116, which would require information on various kinds of regulatory decisions made by the FCA, could usefully be extended to the PRA because it, too, seems to drag its feet on those areas.

Anybody who has worked in a bank will have a story about how long it took to get directors and key executives approved. Last week the Financial Times reported that a digital asset technology company was forced to register in Switzerland because the FCA was too slow to deal with its UK authorisation application. We really must have regulators in the financial services sector that work efficiently and effectively if the UK is to remain a successful financial centre. We need the kind of reports covered in these amendments to form part of a suite of information on which Parliament can start to hold these regulators to account more effectively.

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[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Penn) (Con)]

My Lords, there is a large number of amendments to cover in this debate, so I aim to be succinct. While these amendments cover a range of issues, they all relate to reporting requirements on the regulators to enable effective scrutiny and oversight of their work.

First, on Amendments 45 and 63, in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and Amendment 66, in the name of my noble friend Lord Holmes, the Government agree that it is vital to have appropriate public metrics to ensure that the operationally independent regulators can be held to account for all aspects of their performance, including against their new growth and competitiveness objectives. FSMA establishes multiple channels for this, including annual reports. The regulators also voluntarily publish a range of data—for example, on operating service metrics. Specifically, Clause 26 will require the FCA and the PRA to report on their performance against the new growth and competitiveness objective, as part of their annual reports. That sets out for my noble friend Lord Bridges the existing reporting done by the regulators—but the Government recognised the need to go further in requiring the regulators to publish information, which is why we added Clause 37. It provides an additional mechanism for the Treasury to require the regulators to publish information, including performance data, on a more regular basis, where the Treasury considers it necessary to support scrutiny of performance.

The broad approach is that FSMA requires the regulators to report on how they have discharged their functions and that the decisions on publishing operational metrics are appropriate for the operationally independent regulators to determine, working with government, where appropriate. It is impossible to predict how the power in Clause 37 requiring regulators to publish information on a more regular basis may be used, but I reassure noble Lords that the Treasury will work with stakeholders, industry, consumers and Parliament to understand the evidence base for whether it is in the public interest to exercise this power and the kinds of situations in which it would be desirable to do so. That power also includes a number of safeguards to ensure that it is exercised appropriately.

However, locking specific, detailed metrics into primary legislation would result in a static framework unable to adapt and respond to wider changes, and impose fixed requirements which may not be possible or appropriate for the regulators to report on. Clause 37 provides a more flexible—and therefore future-proofed—mechanism for ensuring appropriate scrutiny. Similarly, Amendment 121, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, seeks to impose a requirement to report against metrics determined by the National Audit Office, along with consumer representative bodies. Again, embedding this in primary legislation would not be the most effective approach. The NAO is already able to examine and report on the value for money of spending by public bodies, including the FCA and the PRA, and it reports its findings to Parliament. The Government consider that the setting of specific reporting requirements for these bodies goes beyond the scope of the NAO’s remit.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

May I interrupt the Minister? The whole point of my amendment—whether it be the NAO or otherwise—was specifically to address the fact that the criteria might need to be changed, so it would not be a fixed list but would develop depending on circumstances. Perhaps the Minister does not think that the NAO is the body, but the question I posed was about this in general. There is a difference between it being an independent body and it being the Government. Given all the other powers that the Government have to direct the regulators, it could look like a conflict of interest if it is not done with a greater degree of independence. The fact that the Minister said that Clause 37 needs to be used with discretion seemed to recognise that that potential tension and conflict might be wrong. Would it not be better to have an independent body involved?

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for teeing me up to answer the question that she posed at the end of her remarks. I understand her point about trying to have a more flexible framework of criteria and the NAO being one idea for an independent organisation that can do that. She will know that the Government considered this as part of the future regulatory framework review and found that there are substantial practical costs and resourcing obstacles to overcome in making such a body operationally effective. Such a body would also duplicate existing accountability structures and potentially undermine the regulators’ operational independence.

In considering that question, the Government concluded that the existing avenues for stakeholders to provide input, feedback and challenge through public consultation are appropriate, supported by strengthening the statutory panels, independent challenge and cost-benefit analysis.

In addition, the Treasury and Parliament will continue to assess the work of the regulators in their oversight role, strengthened by a number of the measures in the Bill. That position was supported by the TSC report The Future Framework for Regulation of Financial Services, which said:

“The creation of a new … body … would not remove the responsibility of this Committee to hold”


the FCA and the PRA

“to account, and it would also add a further body to”

the regime that Parliament would need to scrutinise. The Government therefore concluded that the Treasury, as the department responsible for financial services policy, is best placed to assess whether, as a backstop, further reporting is required by the regulators and to direct them to publish this if necessary and appropriate.

I fully appreciate that the Committee will want to continue to explore this question in discussing these amendments and further amendments as we reach them, but I think it is helpful to set out that the Government considered this question as part of their consultation and work in the development of the Bill. Careful thought has been given to it. We have been open to making improvements: indeed, I believe Clause 37 was an improvement made when the Bill was in the House of Commons, so we are open to further thoughts, having already given this quite a lot of consideration.

Turning to Amendments 83 and 84, I hope I can reassure my noble friend Lady Noakes that Sections 138I and 138J of FSMA already require the FCA and the PRA to provide an explanation of how their draft rules advance their objectives as part of their public consultations. The Government’s policy intention is that this requirement extends to the new secondary objectives. However, I thank my noble friend for raising this issue. We will consider whether the legislation could be made clearer on this point before Report.

I move to Amendments 113 and 114, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. The Government recognise that the Bill represents significant reform, and it will be important to provide an assessment of its effects on the system. However, we think it would be inappropriate to task the regulator with this assessment. In line with Cabinet Office guidance, within three to five years of Royal Assent, the Government will submit a memorandum to the Treasury Select Committee with a preliminary assessment of the impact of the Act in practice, to allow the committee to decide whether it wishes to conduct further post-legislative scrutiny.

Turning to Amendments 115, 116 and 196, tabled by my noble friend Lord Holmes, I am aware that the speed and effectiveness with which the regulators process applications for authorisation and other regulatory approvals remains an area of concern for both Parliament and industry, and the Committee has reflected that to me again today. I welcome the report published by TheCityUK last week about this important issue and, just as importantly, the constructive way in which the regulators have engaged with that feedback from the sector.

The Government share these concerns. In December, the Economic Secretary wrote to the CEOs of the PRA and the FCA setting out the importance of ensuring that the UK has world-leading levels of regulatory operational effectiveness. In their replies, both CEOs committed to publishing more detailed performance data on authorisation processes on a quarterly basis going forward. The FCA, in particular, has an extensive programme of activity under way to improve the timeliness of its approvals. It recruited almost 100 new authorisation staff in the last financial year, streamlined its decision-making processes and is digitising its application forms to make the process smoother for firms. The power in Clause 37, which I mentioned earlier, for the Treasury to require additional reporting from the regulators could be used to hold the regulators to account on the important issue of authorisations raised by these amendments, but, as I say, there is a commitment by the regulators to publish more detailed quarterly information on this matter. However, the Government will continue to engage in discussions with the regulators on continuing to improve operational efficiency.

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[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I will make three brief observations. First, in this context, we are looking at the mandate that we are giving the regulator. One obviously could look at rules by some ex ante supervision, but that is not how this will work. Leaving it all to accountability after the horse has bolted is not the right way to proceed. It is very important that we give attention to the scope of the mandate.

Secondly, there is an obvious illustration as to the scope of the mandate in the proposal from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes: proportionality. I would be astounded if anyone disagreed with that proposition, because only a fool would argue that you should make disproportionate legislation.

It seems to me that, in looking at this, we ought to know how the people given the mandate by Parliament intend to operate. Do they intend to produce consistent and predictable rules? I would imagine that they do intend to. They may agree with many of these objectives, but it is very important for the Committee to know the Government’s view of the form of regulation—the mandate—before we decide on what should happen. We also need to know how they are going to do it, because you always ask your agent how they will do something. If we were informed, there might be much less dispute.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 70 in this group, which was also referenced by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, who supported and signed it. It would insert a regulatory principle of efficiency that the PRA and FCA must ensure that their supervisory and approval interactions are efficient from the perspective of the regulated entities and in comparison with regulators in comparable countries. Clearly, it overlaps with some of the issues that we have already discussed, but it gets to the heart of the matter as to how and for whom the regulators are thinking, and whether they recognise what their impact is.

My Amendment 122 establishes that a corresponding report is required, which must include how they have undertaken this efficiency comparison, including the periodicity of the comparison and its outcome.

Amendment 144 is another go at inserting the same principle into the bank’s supervisory roles. It will not have escaped the notice of those who have read all the amendments that a similar amendment also appears in other places and formats, in part as a response to the layering of objectives to make sure that they actually happen. The point is really to find the best place for this, not to keep repeating it, but I had several bites at the cherry.

As I said, the substance of my amendment has already been discussed in the previous group, but I wanted to bring out the perspective point. The regulator itself might be very efficient at the expense of the industry it regulates—for example, by using the same template letter at the start of institutional approval processes, without any regard for proportionality or without saying anything useful about what might already have been presented at an extensive, exploratory, preliminary meeting. I recognise the traps that the regulators are trying not to fall into, but this has to be looked at from the other side.

As I said before, when the Industry and Regulators Committee was looking at competitiveness, there was a constantly repeated complaint from industry about delays over routine approval matters, including staff appointments, which caused delay and costs in day-to-day matters. These issues keep coming up, both in real life and in the amendments from noble Lords from around the House, including from the Government’s side. I therefore hope that the Minister and Government will help us to address them as we proceed on the Bill. It is obviously a matter to which we will return on Report, probably in more than one way. Therefore, some preliminary discussions with the Minister would be very useful.

I must also comment on the proposals from the noble Lord, Lord Lilley. If you look at all his amendments, you will see that he is also a victim of the need to insert the same thing all over the place in FSMA in order to make it happen—and I appreciate that there are bigger and more developed amendments to come. My concern is whether the amendments achieve the objectives they set out to. I see the attractiveness of predictability, but I think that some of the concepts underlying these kinds of amendment are about reintroducing thinking in the regulator and in industry. By having layer on layer of complex rules, starting at the top, drilling down, then making the next one slightly different and providing lots of tick boxes, you can get certainty. But everybody says they want principles. I thought the idea was to have principles and then to discover that, if you did not take some reasonable precautions, there may be some regulatory actions against you. I have had these kinds of conversations with some of the authors of these proposals.

This almost goes back to where it used to be, when there was unlimited liability, but you took a little more care, because you might be for the high jump. You had to think about what you would do and consider the harm, instead of looking at a set of rules, against which you could put a little compliance tick that took away the thought and judgment that should be going into what you are doing in such an important industry. This cannot be tick-box. I fear that this is driving in the same direction. If I heard correctly, even the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, talked about these broad principles needing more detail underneath.

These amendments do not solve what some of those who have spoken in this group have told me that they want them to solve. I fear that this will be static rather than agile, yet after Brexit we keep saying that we want our regulators to be agile to new things and able to adjust. One cannot be both agile and wholly predictable, because you have to respond to new circumstances.

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On Monday, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, strongly supported the inclusion of a climate and nature objective, but she opposes the inclusion of the competitiveness and growth objective. If the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, had their way, it would certainly deliver a double whammy to the financial services industry. The exclusion of the competitiveness objective and the inclusion of the noble Baroness’s preferred objective would have a negative effect on growth, leading to reduced investment in new and cleaner energy and infrastructure projects and, perversely, making the Government’s net-zero targets even harder to attain.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I have several amendments in this group. Amendment 48, which has already been referred to, seeks to add “sustainability” in as a sort of foil to the international aspect. Amendments 49 and 59 seek to remove the bits in brackets relating specifically to financial services, which is more of a comprehension issue. Amendments 51 and 60 propose another placing of the efficiency amendment in case it might sit better within the competitiveness and growth objective.

There is another very dangerous thing going on here, on which I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes—we agree more often than people would think. To some extent I support her Amendment 47, as I will explain later.

As has already been said, my Amendment 48 seeks to add in “sustainability” so that the competitiveness and growth objective would be “subject to sustainability and aligning with relevant international standards”. We have been talking about the need for balance and I felt that that, potentially, was a balance that we wanted. That also seemed a suitable place in which to write sustainability into the Bill. Perhaps we could choose other words, because I meant it to cover sustainability in financial terms and in a humanitarian and environmental context, too. I am not clear that some of the things which are said to be covered actually are covered.

When we were talking about position limits, I believe that the Minister said that taking humanitarian matters into account was something that the FCA could do. I cannot see anywhere among its objectives or anywhere else where that comes about. I can see that there can be market integrity things on position limits, but not whether you want to think about whether you are causing people to starve. There are things that we expect to be taken into consideration—it is not a subliminal matter, but just by implication—but they are not there if you look for the words. From experience of looking at things when they have gone pear-shaped and the regulators want an excuse, it seems to me that they will be asking where it says those things.

Returning to the competitiveness and growth objective, the more I look at it, the less I like it, not from the point of view of the competitiveness and growth bit but for all the other drafting around it. This is where I agree: what on earth is this “subject to international standards” doing there?” It gets sprinkled around quite liberally in legislation. When I was an MEP, I learned very soon after I got to Brussels that the Treasury wanted “alignment with international standards” put liberally into EU legislation as a way to try to cut down EU degrees of freedom. Now, here we are, post-Brexit, trying the same trick on ourselves and handing it to unelected bodies. Much as I did not object to the EU system, we are where we are. I do not think it is right. If we think recently in terms of LDI and so on, we hear the Bank of England saying, “Until we have the international rules on non-bank financial institutions, we have not done anything”, when something that is a complete viper’s nest is going on that is completely within everything to do with the United Kingdom. That shows us—we will come to this later on with some of my financial stability amendments—that it is looking for support and to hugger-mugger together with the rest of the regulatory organisations rather than putting the UK first and thinking clearly about what we want.

Are we now trying to control the regulators as we tried to tie the EU? We do not need it to control the regulators because they largely control what goes into the international standards, and those international standards have far less parliamentary scrutiny than anything done by UK regulators for the UK. I accept that the Treasury has a seat at the table and therefore knows what is going on, but it is very difficult to scrutinise what goes on at Basel and the other international organisations. You can get our regulators to explain what they agree with and claim victories where they put things in, but to get any explanation in time to be able to react to it and to influence it is extremely difficult. I tried this while I was chair of ECON in the European Parliament when we were doing the capital requirement rules. We forced one or two meetings with them, but they did not really want to know, and we are going to be in even more difficulty trying to follow those kinds of things within the UK’s parliamentary system.

Here we are signing up blind to something rather than signing up after scrutiny. That is what happens in other countries, notably the EU and the US, which have a whole system, including parliamentary procedure, to determine whether they are going to sign up to the international rules.

There is nothing wrong with political statements being made which say that the broad expectation is for us to be in alignment with the international standards, but I do not see what that does without any kind of caveat around it within primary legislation. It makes a mockery of us trying to scrutinise anything when we know that what we will be getting is just what the regulators have decided with other regulators, at a different level over the UK’s head.

As I mentioned on the last group, I also put my amendments on efficiency here, so I will not go into those again. We can discuss among ourselves where they fit best.

My final point relates to the words in brackets, which I address in my Amendments 49 and 59. Simply, when I read this part of the Bill, it did not read as if the financial services references were in there because that was the bit that the regulators were empowered to do; I thought that it was possible to make it read as if some kind of preference could be given to financial services over and above other things. I know that that is not the intention, so my only objection to these words is to ask whether the Government are absolutely sure that they read properly. I am not suspicious of the motives but, if one of my assistants had written this back in my patent attorney days, I would have been thinking that it was not quite right and asking if we could rephrase it. So there is nothing more suspicious to it than that.

I do not think that those words are actually needed because, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said, they can only influence financial services. Financial services must serve the economy and must serve other businesses. So you could, theoretically, enhance the economy within financial services by putting up all your charges to the rest of industry. One hopes that competitiveness and competition laws would stop that from happening, but you could have that interpretation. Somebody might be able to hang something on those words if they are still there.

That explains my amendments. I do not think there is anything too untoward; I would be interested to hear from the Minister about international standards. I accept that we have them in other pieces of legislation, but if we have got it wrong somewhere else, we do not need to keep repeating it.

[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)]

My Lords, I speak briefly to give full-throated support to the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes. This tying to international standards seems odd, at best, for at least two reasons: first, this is attached to the competitiveness objective and not run through all objectives, not least the primary objectives; and, secondly, this objective, even before it has been launched, is fettered and shackled through this connection to international standards and the ISSBs that they are under. That seems curious, in that it seems to run counter to the espoused purpose and intention of the Bill. I would be very keen to hear my noble friend the Minister’s comments when she comes to sum up on those points.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, which has turned out to be a rather more interesting one than I thought we might have on this subject. It has raised a lot of very interesting points. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, challenged us on why we do not keep referring back to the financial crisis. There is a very simple reason: we are in a different world now. As we know, financial regulation was overhauled both in the UK and internationally. The banks have far more capital but, more importantly, significant changes have been made to ensure that they can fail safely. We are not talking about carrying the inherent risks which came to fulfilment in the early part of this century. Constantly harking back without recognising the huge changes that have happened since then is just not helpful.

I thank my noble friend the Minister for explaining which standards are intended to be covered by this. That is a helpful statement to have on the record. However, I confess that, while I completely accept the notion that we will want generally to comply with international standards—we lead them quite a lot of the time—as far as I can tell, the regulators spend at least half their lives on airplanes to exotic parts of the world to have meetings about international standards. I am not sure that that is a very good use of their time.

It could be that we do not wish to follow particular standards, even though being in a leadership position would imply that we would generally do so. It continues to trouble me that the wording says

“subject to aligning with relevant international standards”,

as if we align with them automatically, not merely as our default position. I am not entirely convinced that my noble friend has explained to my satisfaction that this wording gives sufficient flexibility to allow international standards to be ignored when relevant to the UK. I completely accept that whether or not international standards are followed will be primarily determined by our regulators, in the light of what is necessary. I may well want to revisit this on Report but, for this evening—which has gone on for rather a long time—I beg leave to withdraw.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

Before the noble Baroness sits down, I mentioned that I wrestled with this in the EU. There it says “having regard to”, which I would have thought was the appropriate wording: we have regard to it and usually do it, but do not have it in binding language.

Amendment 47 withdrawn.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 30th January 2023 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

38: After Clause 23, insert the following new Clause—
“FCA powers beyond designated activities
(1) This section applies to any person (P) conducting or purporting to conduct any financial services and markets activity, including advisory services, whether or not that activity is designated or regulated, provided that P—(a) occupies a position in which they are expected to safeguard, or not to act against, the financial interests of another person (CP), or in which there is significant asymmetry of information,(b) dishonestly abuses that position, and (c) intends, by means of the abuse of that position—(i) to make a gain for P or another, or(ii) to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss.(2) A person may be regarded as having abused their position even though their conduct consisted of an omission rather than an act.(3) If the conditions set out in subsections (1) and (2) are met, the FCA has the following powers in relation to P—(a) a power to require the supply of information;(b) a power to make investigations (including the making of reports);(c) a power of entry into premises controlled by P;(d) powers of inspection, search and seizure with respect to premises controlled by P;(e) a power to make a private or public statement of censure;(f) a power to impose monetary penalties.(4) The Treasury may by regulations make provision about enforcement in connection with the powers included in subsection (3), and may make such modifications to the provision in subsection (3) as the Treasury considers appropriate.(5) If the conditions set out in subsections (1) and (2) are met, P is liable—(a) to account to CP for any gain P has made directly or indirectly by the transaction, and(b) to indemnify CP for any loss or damage resulting from the transaction.(6) If the FCA is satisfied that the conditions set out in subsections (1) and (2) are met, it may order P to pay to the appropriate person or distribute among the appropriate persons such amount as appears to the FCA to be just, having regard to the profits appearing to the FCA to have accrued to P.(7) The FCA has the power to institute criminal proceedings, including under section 4 of the Fraud Act 2006, provided that the conditions set out in subsections (1) and (2) are satisfied.”

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group address matters of fraud or misrepresentation that occur around and because of the regulatory perimeter and have been factors in various recent scandals. Amendment 38 establishes a regulatory offence for fraud by abuse of power and reaffirms FCA power to undertake criminal prosecutions for fraud. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, for his support on that amendment. Amendments 39 and 198 deal with instances where there are forms of deception or inadequate or lack of information that can mislead about regulated status but which are not caught by existing offences.

A central feature in various scandals has been the abuse of a position of power and/or a belief that an entity was regulated and therefore all its activities had some seal of approval. It has later been discovered that there is no regulatory, supervisory or any other cover and no redress via regulators. The list of examples is extensive, and includes Lloyds Bank’s business support unit, HBOS Reading, Blackmore Bond, London Capital & Finance and RBS’s Global Restructuring Group, but there are many more.

Smaller but nevertheless still substantial businesses have been particular targets: bankers taking advantage of business lending being outside the regulatory perimeter, seemingly not covered by the integrity objective or anything else, which I and other noble Lords have laid out in detail and has been covered by the APPG on Fair Business Banking and others.

The FCA explained in excruciating detail how the asset stripping in the GRG case fell outside its objectives and its own created interpretations, and Andrew Bailey, then CEO of the FCA, said that even if the SMCR had been active at the time, it would not have been covered by it. Later, he hedged and said that maybe it would have applied, but it would all depend.

In its final report, the FCA concluded that there was no case to rule senior RBS managers not fit and proper, because the bar was too high. The fact is that the relationship that businesses and individuals have with their bank is a special one: finance, loans, mortgages, outgoings and income, available capital and other assets, trading accounts, major clients, cash flows—all such things are known by the bank, indeed required to be known, to access finance. But little is known about the bank’s assessment criteria. The relationship is inherently asymmetric in both power and information, and can and has been abused repeatedly.

The relationship with your bank is the lifeblood of businesses, especially small businesses, the homes of which are often subject to a charge. It is known what you are good for and can be taken for. Consumers have had additional protections that businesses do not.

Amendment 38 is specific to abuse of power within financial services and it uses the same wording that appears in Section 4 of the Fraud Act 2006 for fraud by abuse of power. The Fraud Act conditions are that if a person is in a position in which they are expected to safeguard, or at least not act against, the interests of another person, or where there is asymmetry of information, and there is dishonest abuse of that position to make a gain or cause loss to another, it is a criminal offence. My amendment replicates those Fraud Act provisions and introduces a corresponding regulatory offence.

Subsection (7) of my amendment reaffirms the power of the FCA to institute criminal proceedings under Section 4 of the Fraud Act. I say “reaffirm” because the FCA has power to prosecute beyond offences explicitly listed in FSMA, as confirmed in Regina v Rollins [2010] UK Supreme Court 39, in which the court found that the FSA’s powers to prosecute criminal offences were not limited to the offences referred to in Financial Services and Markets Act. The FSA always had been able to bring any prosecution, subject to statutory restrictions and conditions, provided that it was permitted to do so by its memorandum and articles of association, which were so permissive. The FCA, in essence, has the same articles and legal position as the FSA did then, but seems to need both more tools and more encouragement.

Various particularly relevant offences continue to be singled out and put into FSMA. Adding an offence of fraud by abuse of power is therefore long overdue, given the power and asymmetry of information that I have already explained. We know that the bar is high for criminal prosecution—to the extent that some rely on that, a chain of command and shared responsibility to eliminate mens rea and the ability to obtain a conviction, hence my suggestion that there is also a regulatory offence.

Turning to the other amendments in the group, Amendment 39 is also about when a regulated person carries out unregulated activity, the boundary is not clearly understood, and a customer may not know when they have strayed into riskier waters. A common thing may be to see headed paper or a website displaying, as required, that a person is regulated for a given activity, but the limiting language is not always going to be meaningful to the ordinary person. As we discovered in the Gloster report, even the FCA got it wrong.

--- Later in debate ---

With that, I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, to withdraw Amendment 38 and not to move Amendments 39 and 198 when they are reached.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I thank the Minister and other noble Lords who have spoken and intervened in this debate. We have strayed a little from my amendments into the general issues of fraud, which will come up in later groups because I think the body of opinion is that not enough is yet being done to prevent fraud.

The Minister suffers to some extent from exactly the same tunnel vision as the FCA, in that it wants to deal only with those things that are convenient, and it is not looking for the enemy and the evil within—and within regulated entities. One would have thought that those banks that defrauded business customers were reputable institutions, and that deception is not addressed at all by anything that the FCA is doing or that the Minister has said. It is doubtful whether it can be addressed even by the senior managers regime, because again, that has been diluted and spread around in such a way that you have the same problem as trying to find mens rea with a board.

The FCA may have done all the things that the Gloster report required but most of those were to do with things that were operationally bad within the FCA; they were not necessarily going to do anything to address the kind of “enemy within” fraud in banks, on their customers, that I outlined in my first amendment.

There is an urgent need to do something about this. It is ridiculous to say that there is a role or any integrity in our financial markets when this kind of thing can go on and be unpunished. The FCA may indeed be able to take a criminal offence if it ever finds the guts to do so, but I was giving it a regulatory offence here, which would be much easier for it to do, and at least there would be punishment and maybe more awareness through reputational damage within the banks so that that they would do something about it. I am not convinced that it cannot happen again. This is special—the inherent asymmetry of power and information—and this appears to be totally disregarded both by the FCA and by the Minister.

The other two amendments also plug important gaps that, no matter much you tweak Section 24, are not covered by it; therefore they can be used and abused. So I am far from satisfied that the Minister or the FCA is in any way serious about trying to tackle the type of fraud that I am discussing here. We will come on later to other kinds of things—there are other ways to do it. However, to say it is caveat emptor everywhere does not leave us in a good state when the next scandal comes along and everybody says, “There’s the rotten UK banking system again. Don’t do business in the UK—your own bank might fleece you.”

Due to lack of enthusiasm, obviously I will withdraw this amendment for now. However, I will not leave this issue alone, because it is quite clear that the Government have not understood the seriousness of this for businesses—small businesses and profitable businesses—which are being scammed by their own banks. However, with the leave of the Committee, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 38 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Penn (Con)]

The noble Baroness touches on one possible difference in documentation needing to be provided where something is regulated versus where it is voluntary. That comes back to the question of SME lending having increased costs for banks and alternative finance providers. This can be passed on to businesses in the form of higher fees and interest rates, and it can affect the availability of credit for small businesses. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, mentioned start-up banks and challenger banks. When we have discussions elsewhere on other issues related to financial services regulation, we also discuss how we create a more competitive environment in the banking sector, as smaller banks can struggle to deal with regulations. This is a general point about balance.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I am sorry to intervene again, but I am also intrigued about what the extra cost is of this coming into regulation. We are not suggesting that there should be great big oversight mechanisms which mean that the FCA would have to do a lot more—until problems occur, when there must be a route to justice. Is the Minister saying that banks will make less profit when they cannot cheat their customers, and that is where the cost comes from? I do not understand it. The suggestion was that it might be documentation, but the cost of that is the same wherever the documents go. What is this extra cost other than banks having to behave responsibly?

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

In relation to Amendment 40, there are benefits—which we have heard about—and costs to any activity being brought within the regulatory perimeter. I think that point is fairly well accepted. The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked me for further details on that, and I will write to the Committee.

On my noble friend’s Amendment 219, there are costs related to bringing disputes through the courts system as opposed to other dispute resolution mechanisms. There can also be benefits to that mechanism, but it is not enormously contentious to say that there are both costs and benefits to these solutions, which need to be weighed up when we consider them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

I understand my noble friend’s point, and of course the Government also consider that when we look at what to bring into the regulatory perimeter or the right of redress, both as a route of redress and as a point of deterrence. The Government take all those factors into account when considering this question.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

If I may ask one more question, one area that might be interesting for comparison, especially if we are looking at the Consumer Credit Act, is what the difference is between the loans of £25,000 to small businesses and bounce-back loans, where the conditions of the Consumer Credit Act were dispensed with. Can we have a comparison to see whether they have fared better or worse? That will perhaps show us where the true costs of regulation and lack of regulation lie.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

The noble Baroness makes an interesting point. However, bounce-back loans were designed for a specific set of circumstances, and the aim of disapplying the Consumer Credit Act provisions was to do with the speed of being able to get bounce-back loans out to customers. The noble Baroness has indicated that there can then be some regulatory cost to having those protections in place. That is an interesting point, which I am sure people will want to think about in the consultation that is under way on the Consumer Credit Act and the direction of travel there.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I must point out that I was fearing that the true cost was with the small businesses.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

The true cost of the protections afforded under the Consumer Credit Act—

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

It is about the lack of protection.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

To be honest, I am not sure that I totally follow the noble Baroness’s point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Young of Old Scone (Lab)]

My Lords, I very much enjoyed what was just said by my fellow countryman. I will talk to Amendment 69 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, which I have also put my name to. The amendment adds nature to the new regulatory principle on net-zero emissions. I also recognise everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, said about needing an objective rather than a regulatory principle. However, if we are to be stuck with a regulatory principle, it needs to address the twin existential crises we are facing globally and as a nation: climate and nature decline.

I must confess that I was kind of taken aback by the two previous speakers. The fact that climate and nature are such major things and go hand in hand, with one not being able to be resolved without the other, is now so commonly recognised globally by the business and financial communities and by Governments that I felt there was a whiff of quill pen coming from the other side, which is most distressing. The reality is that our financial institutions have a key role in enabling the financing of decarbonisation of the economy but also in promoting nature-based solutions. It is partly about making sure that the natural environment is lending its full hand to solving the climate change crisis, because we need every lever in the kit—every tool in the toolbox—to step up to that challenge. The financial institutions have a key role in that.

However, we also already have government commitments on the natural environment in this country: the Environment Act targets. That was the first time we have had statutory nature conservation targets in this country, which the Environment Act introduced and which become binding on government at midnight tomorrow night. We have to recognise that, if we have big bucks that are directed by the financial institutions and by investment, they absolutely have to tackle both climate change and nature conservation.

We should not look at this as a sort of dead-weight cost on the regulatory process or the financial markets because these investments in nature and climate are vital for our future economic growth. They are the heartland of our future economic growth; the jobs of the future are green jobs. We are behind the curve at the moment; the director-general of the CBI and others are all commenting that we are falling behind and losing our international competitiveness because we are not being vigorous enough in getting investment streams into climate change and nature. So we need the regulators to drive green growth and green investment really hard, for both net zero and nature recovery, to give businesses the confidence to invest.

These are very big bucks: the director-general of the CBI was absolutely clear that, in the past two years, the UK has lost its market share in green tech, which is equivalent to a potential value of £4.3 billion by 2030. Globally, an estimated $32 trillion of investment is needed by 2030 just to tackle climate change. So we are talking about big bucks, big investment, big jobs, big economy and big growth, and we were on it until a very small number of years ago. We have to get back on it to be able to hold our heads up in the international economic community.

So I hope that some of the things I have heard tonight are not government policy and that the Government are still absolutely clear about their commitment to action on the twin crises to turn them into opportunities. So, if the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, on regulatory objectives is not adopted, I ask the Minister at least to ensure that the regulatory principles reflect that commitment.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I had not intended to speak on this subject, but I very much agree with everything that has been said, especially by the noble Baroness, Lady Young, just now, about the lost opportunity if we do not take climate change and embedding it in financial services seriously. ESG investing is the big growth area at the moment, and what message are we giving if we say, “Well, we’re not really that interested in the ‘E’”? I am not sure about the “S” and the “G” either. We will potentially lose out.

It is not as if this will be an environmental tax on every business, or as if it has to be woven into every last little bit of financial services, like some chain round their neck. I spend some time looking at the general duties of the regulators, and, if I were to say anything about the positioning of this, I would say that it is not necessarily high enough up in the hierarchy because it is entirely forgettable within the layering that we have. I object to the notion that we are still in an era where we can do damage and compensate; you cannot compensate for a ruined planet. That is very much old thinking. It is almost centuries old in my book.

The FCA’s general duties state:

“In discharging its general functions, the FCA must, so far as is reasonably possible, act in a way which … is compatible with its strategic objective and … advances one or more of its operational objectives.”


What we are talking about here is a secondary operational objective, but the whole thing could be forgotten. If you ask me, it should be in the strategic objective, which is the only thing that cannot be rubbed out, because that is where we are at. We can go through this lovely list. Integrity gets rubbed out when it comes to SMEs—we have been through that debate—so climate things will be rubbed out if you want to be one of the rough-and-tumble financial firms that wants to deal with gas and oil exploration. Money is needed for that to work it all through and make sure that there are no stranded assets.

What is the big problem with what I would call a measly secondary objective? I understand the competitiveness and growth objective, which seems to be liberally sprinkled throughout to try to give it some kind of priority, but you have to balance that with sustainability in its broadest sense. All these things are about balance. We cannot have a Climate Change Act that says we will do things and then just ignore it in our biggest industry. It is the biggest case out there and we need something on it here. I will look at this again on Report and the Minister jolly well knows where I will put it.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, this has been such an enjoyable debate, although I fear that the Government may not be listening as much as they should. When I first looked at this Bill, I was absolutely shocked that the word “sustainable” was not in front of “economic growth”. That seemed quite extraordinary in the era in which we live. It is a very old-fashioned, limited kind of approach that does not recognise the significant intertwining between finance, economic growth, the future of the planet and meeting our targets on climate change and protecting nature. It is extraordinary that it was removed.

I want to pick up the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, in particular. I disagree with her purpose but in one thing she is exactly right: as this Bill is currently written, that international competitiveness objective will largely drive us to try to compete with Asian financial centres that, frankly, could not give a single hoot about climate change and nature. That is why, frankly, the way in which the Bill is currently structured is so weak. As my noble friend Lady Bowles, who knows about this even more than I do, said, we have seen how the FCA deals with secondary operating objectives—I forget the exact phrase—in the past. Occasionally, it might pay attention to them if it suits it but they are certainly not embedded in its culture and do not light the core of its thinking or drive most of the decisions it makes.

I very much support the amendments led by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, and joined by others, as well as Amendment 69 in the name of my noble friend Lady Sheehan. However, I will talk in particular to two of the other amendments: first, that from the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, which asks, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said, that we get this green taxonomy in our sustainable disclosure requirements fast because we desperately need that structure and strategic update.

This is in the context that the European Union already has its sustainable financial disclosure regulations; noble Lords may notice that the initials are exactly the same, bar one letter, which is part of my general concern in all this. Financial investors based in the UK are now using that as their template. As far as they are concerned, having to run one regime if they fall under EU regulations and a different one if they fall under UK regulations would be a nightmare. They are now wondering whether they are being pushed to choose between the two.

In its consultation on sustainable disclosure requirements, the FCA very helpfully provides a chart of how you can cope if you are trying to be under what is contemplated for the UK regime while also dealing with the EU regime. I honestly think that that is in there because the FCA thought that it would be helpful, but I recommend that somebody go and look at it, because it is a nightmare. You can see that it will be incredibly difficult and very costly for companies that work in both arenas to deal with these different alignments.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 25th January 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Naseby (Con)]

My Lords, I was one of the 34 who took part in the debate on secondary legislation, and I previously had the privilege of being on the Public Accounts Committee for some 12 years.

The debate on those two reports was an absolute watershed. Here is a golden opportunity to ensure that this Bill, which is so fundamental to the growth of our country, particularly the City of London, at a particular time can be pioneering. I am sorry to load that on to my noble friend; at any other time it might not be loaded on to her.

The key elements are there: secondary legislation basically means that those of us here in Parliament, in both Houses, have an opportunity to debate any changes made to a Bill. If I had to take issue with the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, it is that he has in his amendment, at proposed new paragraph (b), the word “significant”. One company’s “significant” might be insignificant to another, and vice versa, so I do not think that is quite the right word to use.

We will go through this Bill in detail. Others have made their points, but for me—I did previous work with two quoted companies and a friendly society in the role of chairman—this is an opportunity. We must recognise that growth for our country is fundamental. That fundamentality is, to a fair degree, influenced by the Bill before us.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, for the purposes of Committee I declare my interests in the register, in particular as a non-executive director of the London Stock Exchange.

I will comment only briefly in this debate because, as others have said, it touches on some issues that run throughout the Bill. This is a matter of great importance: how we transpose the legislation and get the benefits of that transposition into UK law. If we have the flexibility, we ought to be able to use it, but financial services are our largest-earning industry, and I believe it is right that Parliament has to be able to keep track of what is going on and why when there are changes, and, as has already been pointed out, to have its attention drawn to significant changes.

If this amendment comes round again on Report, I would also like to see in it a report on the resulting change to the regulatory perimeter. Quite a lot of change is already going on and it is not necessarily something that we have had our eye on. Some of this change will be entirely at the behest of the regulators rather than in the hands of government. We will come across this later. It was always clear with EU legislation—maybe irritatingly so, in some instances—that the regulator “shall” do something, which did not give it any room for manoeuvre if it thought something did not need to be done. It looks like we will give our regulators the bits of wriggle room and the flexibility that we want, but it is wholly right that there should a report back to draw to the attention of our House and those who scrutinise this the intended difference in the regulatory perimeter, among other things, so that we can watch it and see how it goes.

I will return to the regulatory perimeter in many ways, because one of the problems is that once something is inside that perimeter, a whole truckload of things that were not really necessary might come along. AIFMD might be a good example of that. It is a whole load of extra reporting: where has it gone, what has happened to it, and has it done anything?

At the same time, if bad things are going on, you want there to be some kind of powers of intervention. It should not be a whole caboodle, with lots of rules and regulations and reporting on one hand but nothing on the other. We need to be able to do the things that are in the middle and bridge that gap. Given the way the edges of what is or is not a financial service are getting more and more blurred, what with the big tech industries and so on as well as the more nimble fintechs, we need that ability to ensure that where there is harm there is a route for action, without it having to mean that the whole kitchen sink of reporting is thrown at it across the board.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, for pointing out that the process here differs from that in the retained EU law Bill. Could the Minister in her response set out more clearly the differences between the process here and the process in the other Bill, and the reasons for the differences?

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington. I do not support them, because I think that what the Government are trying to do in this Bill is moving in the right direction.

We have to remember that derivatives are basically a success story. It is a huge financial activity. The total value of derivative trading is sometimes estimated to be a multiple of global GDP. Of course, commodity trading is only a relatively small part of that, but it is important because the advantages of trading allow effective risk management, price discovery and market efficiency. Those are the sorts of things that actually help consumers, at the end of the day, so we must be very wary of trying to interfere in what is fundamentally a successful part of our financial infrastructure.

Of course, speculation is involved in derivatives, there is risk for some counterparties—and sometimes systemic risk—in derivatives, and sometimes they are extremely complicated as individual instruments, even to understand. But they are part of and underpin something that works well for markets overall. We should intervene in that only if absolutely necessary.

My own view is that the changes in the Bill probably do not go far enough to take the dead hand of EU prescriptive regulation away, but they are a solid move in the right direction. As the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, pointed out, they replace a mandatory regime with a permissive one that allows the rules to be designed for the particular markets. In particular, the changes in Schedule 2 will allow the FCA to transfer responsibility for setting position limits to trading venues, if indeed position limits are needed. For some time now, the FCA has not been enforcing excesses on position limits in respect of the majority of contracts, and the world has not come to an end.

I think Amendments 21 and 22 are a step backwards in trying to preserve a mandatory EU regime. So too is trying to drag over-the-counter derivatives into that regime, because—as the noble Baroness pointed out—it has been found that they are extremely difficult to identify. Their removal from the regime was almost universally supported in the consultation that the Government carried out on changes to the derivatives regime.

Amendment 41 from the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, is about putting additional information in annual reports and accounts. There are already obligations on companies to report things that are material to an understanding of the financial position of those companies. They are required to describe their trading model and the operating segments that are relevant to them, but they are not required to identify income streams from particular instruments that they operate. There is a good reason for that. Annual reports are already very long, complicated and difficult to understand, and the noble Baroness is asking for information that in very many cases will be wholly irrelevant to an understanding of the financial position or operations of the companies that involve some trading. For many, it is embedded in their marketing activities for the products they engage in. I do not support any of the amendments put forward by the noble Baroness.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, on venturing into commodities. I remember many happy hours—I call them that—when I was chair of ECON, discussing commodities with the chair of the CFTC, Gary Gensler, in particular, and the chairs of the agriculture committees in the Senate, which deal with a lot of the derivatives. It is an impossible task to get a grip on everything, but that does not mean you should not try to get a grasp of things that might go wrong.

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[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

If I may drag the Minister back to where she was just finishing off, in her response to me and the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, she said that the UK would continue to observe its G20 commitments, which I do not doubt, and that various agricultural products and so on would definitely still be within scope. However, it says here in legislation that the FCA “may”. It does not say, “Apart from the fact that we are observing G20, and agriculture is still in”—it just says “may”. Where does it say in primary legislation that there will be guidance—or whatever the appropriate word is—as to how these things will be dealt with by the exchanges in the circumstances that give rise to concern? Otherwise, looking at our legislation—at least, our primary legislation —I see that we would not have that certainty, and it is proper that we have it.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

It might be wise for me to write to the noble Baroness to address that specific point. Under the overall framework for the regulators, they need to make their rules in a way that is consistent with international standards, to which the noble Baroness referred. That would be the additional way in which one would have that reassurance, but it is worth writing to set out the point for her with more clarity.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Worthington, talked about whether the FCA, in acting to advance its objectives, would have sufficient grounds to intervene in these markets. The Treasury is confident that it would, and an example of humanitarian grounds for intervention was given. We are confident that the FCA could intervene on humanitarian grounds, acting in line with its objectives, but perhaps I will also write to the Committee to expand on that further.

The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, somewhat pre-empted me: I was just about to turn to Amendment 41. I am afraid that the Government will disagree with the noble Lord and the noble Baroness. Arguments were advanced by my noble friend on this point. Amendment 41 would require all listed companies to disclose how much revenue they make from trading commodity derivatives. However, listed companies are already required to publish comprehensive information about their operations and finances as part of their annual reports. The Government view that as sufficient.

It may be worth turning to the questions asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on government Amendment 28, if the Committee is happy for them to be addressed here. Does the power in Clause 3 allow the Treasury to amend primary legislation to give us or the regulator new powers? The power in Clauses 3 and 4 to modify legislation, including to create new powers for the Treasury or regulators, is limited to retained EU law, as set out in Schedule 1. Clause 3 powers cannot amend primary legislation.

The powers in Clause 4 can be used to move provisions from retained EU law into primary legislation. The power in Amendment 28 applies where the Treasury is making transitional amendments to retained EU law or restating it. It is designed to allow, for example, the Treasury to give itself a power to update a definition or threshold in legislation. This mirrors delegated powers for the European Commission in retained EU law. While it would be possible to deliver the same outcome by reuse of the powers in Clauses 3 and 4, the Government consider it more appropriate to create a specific power to allow for such updates to be made, where they consider it appropriate. When creating such powers, His Majesty’s Treasury will have the ability to specify the procedure for any statutory instruments made using the new power. The Treasury will follow the same approach to determining the appropriate procedure as it has in the Bill. Where the Treasury exercises the power to create further powers, the instrument doing that will be subject to the procedure specified in Clause 3(9), which, in the vast majority of cases, will be the affirmative power.

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[Lord Naseby (Con)]

My Lords, I am not going to repeat what my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Trenchard have said, but I certainly think that His Majesty’s Government—I am a very loyal member of the governing party—need to recognise that this is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity in this Bill. Therefore, for me, the driving force should be to ensure that in doing what we are doing—I accept that it is important to mention designated activities—we should be driven by the need for growth for our economy, good competition and innovation. Those things are so key to the future of this country, the City and the whole of the financial services area that we need to be a little bit careful. I think that my noble friend Lady Noakes’ proposal is a perfectly valid one. The Government can have another look at it, but I do not think that it is necessary.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I have some questions which arise from what the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said. If we want to go back to before the EU had the single market in financial services, we need to know how it worked with short selling. Unfortunately, I do not know how it all worked in the UK back then. When we started to do, or were forced into doing, the short selling regulation, I was told repeatedly from all sides in the UK that we did not need it but that naked short selling was banned. A lot of the concern was about short selling when you had not actually located where you would be able to get the share from for delivery. After the regulation was done, you had to know where you were going to get it, and it was a little firmer. However, I was assured that the wording was more or less the same as was applied, so how did we apply it? We did not have a designated activity regime.

There may be lots of little snippets around in financial services where you just need a simple rule like that—that you cannot do naked short selling but covered short selling is fine—without having lots of regulation, reporting and things around it. How are we going to do this? Would we do a designation just for a one-line piece of information? This is a genuine question, because absurdities begin when you have to invoke something that then requires complex rules. As soon as you go beyond the simple principle of no naked short selling, it will become a much bigger thing, as the European regulation did. There are other drivers for that, and it may be that more than just not doing naked short selling is necessary. My question is, within this designated activities regime, how do you do just one simple, little thing?

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 10th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I declare my financial services interests in the register and my membership of the international Systemic Risk Council.

This Bill falls short on accountability. During the passage of the 2021 FSA, I suggested regular independent reviews akin to the Australian system—a more advanced vision than the sporadic reviews in this Bill, which are reliant on government initiation. Why not have rolling and thematic reviews and regulators reporting to Parliament under independent assessment criteria, such as from the NAO?

The framework consultation touted parliamentary scrutiny as a safeguard, but that is deceptive when the Government have blocked adequate parliamentary influence. Committees have modest power through public interrogation, and Ministers now regularly avoid attending Lords committees. Should parliamentary reports not get specific attention in review processes, not least to reflect public interest, which is left faint among the numerous industry hotlines to Downing Street? The Government cannot hide behind regulatory independence when they fix the regulatory perimeter and key policies, appoint regulators and control reviews. Failure is on the tab of government—maybe a different one further down the track, but the collective reputation of the UK in financial services is on the line.

We have just had an example of that with the market turmoil from DB pension schemes. At its root is the setting aside since 2005 of EU rules requiring pension scheme investment to be vanilla because pension schemes have only light-touch supervision and trustees are mainly ordinary folk and not financial experts. Trustees were thus left at the mercy of unregulated, liability-shirking advisers and the hapless Pensions Regulator.

I have been involved in investigations through the Industry and Regulators Committee, giving evidence to the Work and Pensions Committee and participating in conferences, where polling on the biggest loser in the debacle put the reputation of the UK top. Gilt turmoil is a named issue in papers for international organisations looking at systemic risk.

The timid excuse is that we are waiting for international agreement relating to non-bank systemic risk—that is outrageous, given that this is a UK-created and UK-specific issue of financial stability, with a regulators’ muddle, gaps and an issue that the Financial Policy Committee should have been all over. In evidence to the Economic Affairs Committee, Sir Paul Tucker questioned the point of the Financial Policy Committee if all it does is report. Now, there is some pulling up of socks, again after the event. Systemic risk exists in many funds, but the corralling and correlation of risky investment strategies in pension schemes with emphasis and concentration in gilts is uniquely ours, uniquely crafted and well-known where it should have mattered. It is not black swans and larger buffers; Bank of England yield tables show turmoil well under way at under 40 basis points’ change, and the transposition dirty secret has long been protected by the Treasury and its alumni.

The Bill also touches on issues of cryptocurrency and critical third parties, a reminder that financial services are not really penned in to entity and activity-based perimeters. As the IMF said, we are already into the era of reimagining regulation, otherwise it is not possible to cope with fintech or big tech which blur and exploit the boundaries of regulation. Online brokerage mimics the addictive features of social media, targeting the vulnerable. We regulate gambling but we do not even have robust age verification for online investing. Fraud is at epidemic levels and respects no regulatory boundaries. Far from having agile principles and simple regulation, we have a rigid perimeter and rule dinosaur, which is fostering fraud and revelling in the abuse of position and asymmetry of information. Regulators are operationally inefficient, underfunded, late and thwarted on enforcement.

Financial services are the food of the economy. Where there is harm, there should be justice—and not just where it is regulated. I will be offering amendments.

Financial Services (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2022

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Tuesday 15th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for the introduction. It does not matter how many times I read these kinds of explanations about what is going on, I still find them totally incomprehensible and I doubt I am alone.

I have two very short questions. First, does this mean that for a period there was a lacuna when neither EU nor UK regulators held sway and Gibraltar was doing its own thing while having access to the UK as it always had done? If that was the case, did the Gibraltarian financial services authorities know? I cannot tell whether there was such a lacuna or not.

Secondly, on the temporary permissions relating to STS—I declare an interest as an erstwhile director of Prime Collateralised Securities ASBL, which looked over such things as STS to check them out—is this how it will be for ever? Will we extend this by another two years every two years? Does this happen until the UK regulators think they need a change and do something different? It seems to me that we did an awful lot of temporary permissions. I do not like to think that we will have to do them all over again every two years, because that will take an awful lot of parliamentary time. I would like to get a handle on whether this is the way of the future or whether there will be an end to these temporary permissions.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing this SI. It seems that she and I agree that it is really two SIs, covering Gibraltar and securitisation.

To take Gibraltar first, as far as I can tell, the SI simply clarifies the application of UK regulation to Gibraltar. The Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (High-Risk Countries) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2022 set out a new list of high-risk third countries in relation to which enhanced due diligence requirements apply under the principal money laundering regulations. Gibraltar has been added and Malta removed; the changes apply from 12 July 2022. Will this SI assist Gibraltar in getting off the high-risk list? If so, how will the UK regulatory authorities be involved? I am trying to understand this; how different will the regulation of financial services firms in Gibraltar be from, for example, the regulation of a financial services firm in Birmingham?

The second part of this SI seems solely about extending the present transitional arrangements for a further two years. The clearest statement of this is in the de minimis assessment—I like the assessments, when I get round to reading them, because they tend to be written in easier language:

“This SI is required to address this misalignment of dates in order to prevent looser due diligence requirements for EU STS securitisations than UK ones. This SI will also prevent additional administrative burdens on firms which could arise from the absence of an exemption for EU STS securitisations from the clearing obligation. This instrument will help”—


I would quibble with that word—

“bridge this gap until a permanent framework for designating equivalent jurisdictions with regard to securitisation regimes is in effect and an assessment of the EU can be undertaken under it.”

Am I right in my precis? When and how will

“a permanent framework for designating equivalent jurisdictions”

be determined?

Financial Markets: Stability

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Thursday 3rd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, the mini-Budget caused sharp falls in the value of sterling, gilts and confidence in the UK’s rating. Despite policy reversals, there is substantial residual damage in people’s pockets and pension funds.

But this was not just an economic event. It triggered a systemic financial stability event, leaving question marks over regulators. The devil was liability-driven investment funds—LDI—and, as if we learned nothing from the great financial crisis, financial engineering that hides behind three-letter acronyms eventually leads to four-letter expletives when it blows up. So what was lurking, and why? The Pensions Regulator—TPR—has overly favoured investment in gilts, which steered funds away from higher-yielding productive investments. The accounting practice also developed of requiring net present value of liabilities, based on gilt interest rates, to be used in both pension scheme valuations and sponsor company accounts. That transferred artificial volatility to both scheme and company balance sheets.

Ways to smooth that volatility were therefore sought. LDI emerged and, with it, borrowing and leverage using repo and derivatives. Gilts were subject to repo—that is, sold but with retention of interest, a buy-back agreement and margining—and the cash used to buy further investments. Along with interest rate swaps, this quashes the accounting volatility and the pension fund gets to hold equities that regulatory edicts had inhibited. This sounds a bit like regulation-dodging, but the practice was actively encouraged by TPR. Alas, it also exposed pension schemes to cash margin calls. They were borrowing short against long liabilities—maturity transformation, just like Northern Rock, with shades of the great financial crisis again.

Then excess set in and, instead of buying equities with the borrowed money, more gilts were bought and underwent repo and so on. They were often leveraged four times, or seven times, as admitted in a TPR survey, or, anecdotally, 13 times. In 2018, the Bank of England Financial Stability Report noted that leverage and exposure to derivatives in pension funds was far greater than in hedge funds. It advised liquidity buffers and stress-tested market moves to 100 basis points based on historical review. My thoughts were that it did not think widely enough, not even to taper tantrums. The Bank pointed to international concern about systemic risk in non-banks but, despite the known UK-specific circumstances of DB schemes and a systemic feedback loop on gilts should there be a falling market, direct action was not—maybe could not—be taken. So the systemic trigger event happened. There was a spiral of margin calls and, although the Bank intervened to purchase gilts, the fire sale of assets within pension schemes cost many of them around 25% of asset value.

Now we come to the funny money accounting illusion where the TPR, FCA and BoE all say that, due to the recent rise in gilt yields, the net present value of liabilities has dropped, deficits have narrowed and pension schemes are in a better position for buyout. Rejoice they may, but assets—out of which pensions will actually be paid, both now and in the future—have dropped by 25%. That hole will be felt.

Was LDI, at least in its simplest embodiment, a smart move? Possibly, but there is the issue that pension scheme borrowing is not legal. TPR hides behind the sophistry that repo is a sale and repurchase, though the BoE and FCA more honestly call it borrowing. Thus, in pursuit of buyout or accounting niceties, employers, trustees and regulators have embraced the contrivance of dubious legality to evade primary principles in legislation, with the Pensions Regulator, the FCA and the BoE seemingly oblivious to those primary principles. It is an accident waiting to happen again.

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[Baroness Penn (Con)]

No, it is correct. The noble Lord seems to know how it is composed, so we are transparent in how that number is reached. I would like to make a little progress.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I am sorry, I know that the Minister keeps being interrupted, but maybe it should all come at once. She mentioned that the Bank of England had powers to intervene. I would be very interested to know what preventive powers she thinks the Bank of England could have used to intervene on LDI and leverage. It put it in its Financial Stability Report, but genuinely, I do not know what powers it has to intervene over something that is not covered by FiSMA. It is DWP and there is another regulator, yet it is causing a systemic glitch that could happen again.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

The noble Baroness is right that there is more than one regulator at play in this space. That point was also made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton. If the noble Baroness will forgive me, I will come on to some actions taken after the 2018 stress test shortly.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked what the forthcoming Bill will do to promote financial stability. Allowing us to tailor our financial services regulation to the UK’s situation and needs will mean that we can create the best regulation for our circumstances. In a world where financial services are evolving all the time, with new developments and technologies requiring regular changes, the measures in the Bill will mean that UK regulations can remain up to date and effective.

It is also the role of the Government to ensure that their own decisions lead to trust and confidence in our national finances. Our responsible approach to managing the economy meant that we went into Covid and the current economic crisis with strong public finances, allowing us to intervene to support people’s lives and livelihoods. In that context it is important to acknowledge that, while well intended, the recent growth plan had unintended consequences for economic volatility.

Mistakes were made, and we have taken steps to fix them. Most of the tax measures in the growth plan have been reversed and the associated volatility dissipated. However, we are still faced with a profound economic crisis, with global inflationary pressures driven by increased demand post Covid, elevated energy prices after Putin’s invasion, widespread labour shortages and, in response, central banks across many major economies raising interest rates.

My right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer has been clear that we will take the measures needed to restore confidence and trust in the UK’s public finances and to deal effectively with the economic shocks that are being felt across the globe. In doing so there will be difficult decisions to take, but I hope that I can reassure the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and others, that in taking them, this Government will protect the needs of the most vulnerable.

Specifically on recent events, the FPC noted in its July Financial Stability Report that the worsening global economic outlook had caused markets to be volatile in recent months. Since July, global inflationary pressures have intensified further. Specifically on the intervention by the Bank of England, all noble Lords will be aware that in late September there was elevated uncertainty in the UK bond market that resulted in gilt yields rising rapidly and significantly. LDI funds, many of which held leveraged positions in the gilt market, faced significant margin calls as a result. In some cases, these calls exceeded the cash buffers that they held, forcing them to raise cash by selling gilts into a falling market. Large sales of gilts into an already illiquid market led to yields increasing even further, in turn triggering further margin calls and forcing further gilt sales to try to maintain solvency.

This would have led to a spiral of falling prices but increasing pressure to sell gilts, so, within its remit, on Wednesday 28 September, the Bank of England started temporary purchases of long-dated UK government bonds, with the aim of restoring orderly market conditions. In line with the Bank’s statutory financial stability objective, the purpose of these operations was to act as a backstop to restore orderly market conditions and reduce any risks from contagion to credit conditions for UK households and businesses while the appropriate adjustment takes place. This operation was fully indemnified by the Treasury.

It is worth remembering that the Bank’s intervention served to keep the gilt market stable so that funds had time to adjust their positions in line with the changed market conditions. The speed and scale of repricing far exceeded historical moves, and therefore fell outside the expectations of risk management plans or regulatory stress tests. Throughout the intervention, the Bank worked with LDI funds and pension schemes as they built their financial resilience ahead of it coming to an end. Market conditions have since improved. The Bank’s usage of the scheme, at under £20 billion, was significantly below the maximum size permitted under its maximum daily auction size and below the increase in the indemnity provided by the Treasury. This stress in the LDI sector highlights the necessity of ensuring that the appropriate risk oversight and mitigation systems are in place for market-based finance.

I shall try to address the question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, about what has happened since the 2018 exercise that looked at this. Since then, the Bank of England has worked with other domestic regulators, including the Pensions Regulator and the FCA, on enhancing monitoring of the risks. That included working with the Pensions Regulator on a survey of DB pension schemes in 2019 and prompting work to improve pension liquidity risk management. As the FCA noted in its letter to the noble Lord, Lord Hollick, and my noble friend Lord Bridges in March this year, the FCA contacted the largest LDI fund managers to ask them what plans they had in place to deal with increased volatility. It also probed large managers on the speed with which they could call money from underlying pension funds in the event of stress.

In response to many noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Sharkey, Lord Sikka and Lord Davies of Brixton, and the right reverend Prelate, the Government recognise that there will be lessons that need to be learned from the market volatility seen in recent weeks. The regulators are working with the industry to improve their resilience to market shocks, and it remains a focus of the Government and regulators to ensure that we have a robust regulatory system.

In addition to the ongoing monitoring of systemic risks by the FPC, His Majesty’s Treasury and UK financial regulators have been working internationally as part of the Financial Stability Board, as I previously noted, to develop global approaches to identify and address vulnerabilities in market-based finance. The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, asked why we take a different approach to the regulation of banks versus non-banks in the financial system. Part of that is the international nature of the non-banking part of our financial system.

The Bank of England has also committed to working with the Pensions Regulator and the Financial Conduct Authority to ensure that appropriate levels of resilience are in place to mitigate risks to UK financial stability. As the Pensions Regulator chief executive emphasised earlier this month, DB pension schemes were not and are not at risk of collapse due to rapid movements in the price of gilts, and savers should not make any hasty decisions about their pension pots.

I turn to pensions. As I have just stressed, defined-benefit pensions remain strong, and members of those schemes that were invested in LDI funds are not at risk of losing out as a result of either the aforementioned volatility or interventions made by the Bank. Indeed, the independent Pensions Regulator issued a statement on 12 October for trustees of defined-benefit and defined-contribution schemes and their advisers, which communicated its expectations on matters for trustees to consider in relation to managing schemes and supporting savers.

The noble Lords, Lord Sharkey, Lord Best and Lord Campbell-Savours, and my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham, rightly mentioned the housing market, and I want to respond directly. The fact is that interest and mortgage rates have been rising since last autumn in response to global trends. This is not a UK phenomenon, with the US Federal Reserve having raised its base rate since March 2022 and the ECB taking similar steps. In the UK, around 75% of residential mortgages are on a fixed rate and therefore, in the short term, shielded from rate rises. However, I know that, for those on variable rights and those who are seeing their own fixed-rate deals coming to an end in forthcoming months, there will be significant concern. Where mortgage holders fall into financial difficulty, FCA guidance requires firms to offer tailored forbearance options. While it is important to note that the pricing of mortgages is a commercial decision for lenders in which the Government do not intervene, the Government do offer support through Support for Mortgage Interest loans for those in receipt of income-related benefits and protection in court through the pre-action protocol.

Similarly, the setting of rates is a commercial decision for private landlords in which the Government do not intervene. However, we understand that many people will be worried about the impact of rising prices. My noble friend Lord Young of Cookham spoke more broadly about the reform needed in the private rented sector in order to provide more security to tenants in that sector. I agreed with much of what he had to say. Indeed, the Government’s programme of work to reform the private rented sector continues through, for example, our commitment to ban Section 21 no-fault evictions. We heard ideas from my noble friend Lord Young and the noble Lords, Lord Best and Lord Campbell-Savours, for other changes that we could potentially make in housing. I will take those back to the department and ensure that they are looked at carefully.

The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, asked whether the local housing allowance would be uprated. He will know that, as part of our response to Covid, the rates of local housing allowance were increased significantly to the 30th percentile of the market, with 1.5 million households gaining just over £600 a year. We have maintained those rates at an elevated level last year and this year in order to ensure that claimants can continue to benefit from this. This is reviewed annually, and I will not comment further on the uprating of benefits.

More specifically, many noble Lords spoke about the difficulties that vulnerable people are facing this year with the rising cost of living. The Government absolutely recognise that and are focusing our support most heavily on those households. People are facing a difficult time. We have put in place an energy price guarantee and further support for those on income-related benefits, pensioners and those with disabilities. There is also discretionary support for local authorities to provide help in their local areas.

I am conscious of the time so I will begin to wrap up. Many noble Lords used this debate as an opportunity to look ahead to the Chancellor’s Autumn Statement. I welcomed the constructive efforts by the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, to make suggestions not just about areas of spending that should be prioritised but about ideas for tax reform to help to fund them, which always needs to come alongside. I will only say to him, on his suggestion for equalised pension tax reform, that we have heard in this Chamber in recent weeks about the challenges of keeping GPs and others in their roles because of the tax treatment of their public sector pensions, and the idea might perhaps be a bit more complicated than it may look at first sight.

Defined Benefit Pension Funds

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Tuesday 1st November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

My Lords, LDI strategies can be used as a risk-management strategy for pension funds, and I would expect them to continue to do so. There were specific circumstances which the Bank stepped in to address. But my noble friend is right that it is important that we reflect on what happened to those particular funds in that period and make sure that the Bank of England and the Financial Policy Committee have the right oversight to ensure ongoing stability in these markets.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, a key focus of the IORP directive, which was transposed into the Pensions Act 2004, was to prohibit borrowing so that assets are retained for the payment of pensions and not put at risk of being drained away to third parties. With that prohibition on borrowing, how has that been circumvented, permitting repos and investing in funds that break both the principle and detail of that provision? Is it not dishonest to describe LDI as de-risking when it introduced leverage and derivative exposures of some £1.4 trillion, which is nearly the same as the total pension fund assets?

Queen’s Speech

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Wednesday 25th May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, the gracious Speech included commitments to tackle corruption, money laundering and tax evasion—pernicious issues that undermine trust in business and finance. Greater transparency, as well as sanctions, is needed in these areas and beyond. As the noble Lord, Lord McFall, pointed out, transparency can usefully extend to regulators and, I would say, to HMRC.

Next year brings mandatory public disclosure of tax strategy for large businesses, but more could be done, especially around country-by-country reporting, such as publishing reasons for tax paid being less than headline rates and disclosure of tax risk. EY’s 2013 report on tax transparency noted that 53 FTSE 100 companies had an effective tax rate lower than the UK headline rate and also suggested potential benefit to organisations and board governance from understanding and reporting effective tax rates country by country.

More transparency is also still needed in the fee structure that has undermined pension funds. There is no incentive to save when those managing the money get more out of it than you do. Added to that are concerns about lukewarm stewardship by UK fund managers, and the FRC is now reviewing the stewardship code commitments. I would add to its list looking at pooled nominee accounts, both to enfranchise ordinary shareholders and to avoid risk from broker insolvency.

There is no room for fainthearted governance. It breeds the absence of culture identified in the Kay review, which showed how companies and wider society have drifted apart. There is too much “duty of directors to maximise shareholder value” and, to that end, complex executive remuneration incentives occupy acres of annual report while average employee pay is never the metric. The duty of directors to promote successful companies has been watered down and concern for markets and the public good reduced to mere price competition. An interim report from the Big Innovation Centre suggests that this narrow-minded approach has led to British companies losing growth of more than £130 billion a year, and accounts for lower productivity, lack of training and high worker turnover. Better corporate governance is the intangible infrastructure that business needs to grow.

I turn to the referendum. There have been suggestions that the third-country equivalence provisions in EU financial markets legislation could mitigate the loss of passporting rights. My back bears the scars of negotiating more open third-country provisions and, without the UK around the table, this is one of many examples where regulation will shift away from where we have taken it and where we wish it to be.

Equivalence findings are not swift, simple or comprehensive. The Commission is under no obligation to undertake them, member states collectively have to approve them and how prescriptive the requirements and conditions are depends entirely on the EU. It is political. There are significant administrative hurdles, too: firms registering with ESMA and notifying national regulators, supervisory co-operation agreements with ESMA, including disclosure of information about individual firms, agreement to litigation being in an EU member state—so not in the UK any more—and retail services will remain as 27 separate regimes with branch requirements.

A report, The UK Referendum—Challenges for Europe’s Capital Markets, commissioned by the Association for Financial Markets in Europe from Clifford Chance cautions that,

“there are risks that political constraints may obstruct the use of third country mechanisms to mitigate the exit of the UK from the EU”,

and that,

“changes to law or regulation over time in the UK and the”,

continuing EU,

“could adversely affect the harmonised legal framework existing at the outset and put at risk the continued availability of equivalence determinations”.

So at best, under Brexit we would be second-class citizens, taking instead of making financial services law and at significant risk of being cut off, given that our loss is their gain.

Brexit being bad for the City has also been compared to concerns about the UK being left out if we did not join the euro, which in fact did not materialise. Brexit is different, notably because we were saved before by the single market, which protected the City from the European Central Bank’s policy for euro securities to be cleared in the eurozone. The strength of the single market was underestimated. We are protected now by that strength—strip it away, and significant business will have no choice but to move.