Monday 13th March 2023
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeFinancial Services and Markets Act 2023 View all Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 80-VIII Eighth marshalled list for Grand Committee - (9 Mar 2023)
Viscount Trenchard (Con)
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lady Noakes in her amendment. As she has explained well, Clause 38 requires the FCA, the FOS and the FSCS to co-operate and to consult with each other in exercising their statutory functions. However, it is important that FOS decisions with wider implications do not diverge from FCA rules, or there may be unintended consequences, and predictability and consistency may be negatively affected.
As my noble friend just said, this does not mean that the FCA or the FOS should act without thinking very carefully about what they are doing. Her amendment takes account of that and would be likely to encourage real thought about the consequences of making a particular decision in any case. Besides, Parliament never intended the FOS to be a quasi-regulator. UK Finance has recommended that the FCA should be given a power to overrule a decision by the FOS where it believes that the decision could have wider and perhaps unforeseen implications. My noble friend’s amendment would deal effectively with this potential problem.
Of course, the granting of additional powers to the FCA strengthens further the case that the FCA must be properly accountable to Parliament, and I regret that I have not yet heard my noble friend the Minister acknowledge that, as drafted, the Bill does not provide adequate arrangements for this. I firmly believe that a properly resourced joint committee is how to achieve that.
The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Penn) (Con)
My Lords, the Government agree that, where there are wider implications, it is critical that the bodies within the financial services regulatory framework, including the FCA and the FOS, co-operate effectively.
As my noble friend Lady Noakes noted, that is why Clause 38 of this Bill introduces a statutory duty for the FCA, the FOS and the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to co-operate on issues which have significant implications for each other or for the wider financial services market. Clause 38 also ensures that the FCA, FOS and FSCS put appropriate arrangements in place for stakeholders to provide representations on their compliance with this new duty to co-operate on matters with wider implications.
As my noble friend also noted, these organisations already co-operate on a voluntary basis through the existing wider implications framework. The voluntary framework was launched in January 2022 to promote effective co-operation on wider implication issues. Clause 38 will enhance that co-operation and ensure that these arrangements endure over time while retaining the operational independence of the bodies involved.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Trenchard for his support; I was not expecting the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, to support my amendment, because she and I have discussed the FOS in the past.
There is a potential problem in the relationship between the FCA and the FOS with the introduction of the new consumer duty. I think that is particularly concerning people: we are going a little into the unknown. We know that if regulatory pressures get too difficult for firms, their natural response is, ultimately, to leave or severely curtail the elements of the market that they are prepared to operate in. We need look only at the availability of advised investment to see what can be the consequence of heavy-handed regulatory action. If the new consumer duty becomes a nightmare, with individual cases being settled on particular circumstances but then having to be read across because of the FCA handbook, which requires cases to then be followed by firms, we could end up with a very confused understanding of what the consumer duty involves. That was the main burden of my tabling the amendment, but we may just need to see what happens when the consumer duty operates in practice to see whether those harms genuinely emerge.
As for the second leg of my amendment, which should have been a separate amendment, I was very interested to hear what my noble friend said about the case having been made. What I am not quite clear about, which she may be able to clarify, is on what timescale she believes the Government will be looking at this, because not many financial services Bills come along to get things done in.
Baroness Penn (Con)
I will have to write to the Committee to clarify the timescale for the noble Baroness.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I look forward to that letter with great anticipation. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)
My Lords, this group of amendments has a general direction which may be supported. It would be much better if the Government were to come forward with proposals in that general direction and improve the situation.
I, too, however, feel that there is some moral hazard. The extent to which victims are compensated draws attention from the fact that this is serious crime which, as I understand it, is growing exponentially. I hope that in looking after victims, which I am broadly in favour of, we massively increase our efforts to prevent fraud in the first place. I do not have a simple solution to that, but it is my understanding that the relationship between a preventive resource in the police and the banks is, compared to the general application to prevent crime, disproportionately low. More resource has to be put into combating this frightening industry. There is a sense of almost moral decay that allows this virulent industry to continue to grow. I hope that, while responding to the concerns of victims, there is also feedback to the Government as a whole that we must find a way to get on top of this very unpleasant crime.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, I recognise the keen interest across this Committee in the provisions in the Bill to tackle financial crime and fraud more generally, and, in this group of amendments, on tackling APP scams specifically and the related work of the Payment Systems Regulator to introduce mandatory reimbursement. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said that she hoped that the sense of the amendments could be taken forward, or that the Government could provide reassurance to noble Lords that it will. I hope to be able to do so.
Measures in the Bill not only enable the Payment Systems Regulator to act on APP reimbursement regardless of the method of payment used, but also have a specific requirement mandating, within a specific timeframe, that they are taken forward under Faster Payments. We have sought within the Bill both to provide further powers for the regulator and to specify that it needs to act within a certain timeframe on the form of payments, which currently represents the largest form of fraud, not only by volume—97% of payments by volume—but by value. The figures I have are that Faster Payments account for approximately 85% of the value. The noble Lord and noble Baroness also mentioned CHAPS. That is the next highest in value, but it is about 4%, so it is right that we prioritise action on Faster Payments first. That does not rule out further action on other forms of payment further down the line.
I appreciate that we often have a debate on what needs to be in a Bill versus powers that, in this case, we are giving to the regulators to make rules. We have also heard during this debate about fraud how dynamic that situation can be, so enabling the regulator to update its response to approaching these questions through its rules is the right approach in this situation.
None the less, a lot of detail of the Payments Systems Regulator’s approach is in the public domain, and I hope it would reassure the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, on a number of his amendments that the approach being taken is consistent with many of the recommendations made by his committee. Indeed, having its proposals out for consultation on how mandatory reimbursement should work has provided an opportunity for all interested parties to comment.
Turning to the specifics in the amendments and hopefully updating the Committee on work that the PSR is taking in relation to each, I begin with Amendments 202 and 207, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, on the scope of the requirement on the PSR to mandate reimbursement. As I have noted, under this legislation the PSR could act in relation to any designated payment system, but with a specify duty on Faster Payments which, as I said, accounts for 97% of scams by volume today. We expect the PSR to keep under review the case for action across other designated payment systems, in collaboration with the Bank of England and the FCA.
In relation to Amendment 204, on issues that the PSR should consider as part of its approach, I assure the Committee that the PSR has set out how it has considered these issues in its consultation. For example, as discussed, the PSR is proposing that the cost of liability is split equally between the sending and receiving banks, recognising that both parties have a responsibility in preventing fraud.
On Amendment 205 on the publication of data, the PSR is currently consulting on a measure to require payment service providers to report and publish fraud and reimbursement data. I was surprised to hear Green support for league tables. I did not know that they were supportive of them on schools, but in this case that data is important and the transparency we are talking about helps noble Lords keep track of how effective these provisions are once they are implemented.
Amendment 206 is on a duty to review. The PSR regularly reports on the discharge of its functions through its annual report and has committed in its consultation to a post-implementation review of its action on APP scams, to assess the overall impact of its measures for improving consumer outcomes. The Government will also monitor the impacts of the PSR’s action and consider the case for further action where necessary. While the Government recognise the intention behind the noble Lord’s amendments, we do not think it necessary or appropriate to further circumscribe the actions of the regulator in primary legislation at this stage, given the extensive consultation the PSR has undertaken on this matter and its responsibilities and expertise in this area as the independent regulator.
On Amendment 203, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, the Government’s intention, as already expressed in the legislation, is to ensure that more victims of APP scams across the Faster Payments system specifically, and wider payments systems in general, are reimbursed, and to enable the PSR to act in this area. The Government recognise that no one sets out to be defrauded and that APP scams are, by their very nature, convincing and sophisticated.
None the less, we also recognise that many banks take action to engage with their customers ahead of making a payment, and that questions of liability can be complex. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, set out, a blanket approach to mandatory reimbursement raises questions of moral hazard and the potential for APP reimbursement fraud itself to become an area of difficulty. This is a difficult balance to strike. While this amendment is well meaning, it will not help achieve effective resolution in these cases. We are confident that the PSR has the appropriate objectives, expertise and powers to develop proposals for APP scam reimbursement that both ensure strong protections for victims and incentivise banks to engage effectively with their customers to prevent fraud. In its consultation on its reimbursement approach, the PSR stated its intention to require firms sending payments over the Faster Payments system to fully reimburse all consumers who are victims of APP scams, with very limited exceptions. The PSR considers that this will ensure that victims are reimbursed in the vast majority of cases. In that regard, the PSR has already signalled its intention to set a high bar for customer liability—higher than currently applies within the existing code of voluntary reimbursement.
We do not believe that this amendment will improve outcomes for customers beyond the provisions already set out in the Bill, and it could impede the work of the regulator, which has already consulted on the proposals. I hope that noble Lords genuinely feel reassured by the level of detail in which the PSR and the Government have thought through these proposals, and acknowledge the ability to have a dynamic response in this area. I therefore hope the noble Lord can withdraw his amendment.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
Can the Minister comment on the Treasury Select Committee’s recommendation on the PSR, effectively subcontracting its responsibilities to Pay.UK?
Baroness Penn (Con)
I apologise to the noble Lord; I did have an answer for him on that. The Bill is clear that the Payment Systems Regulator has the duty to act on mandatory reimbursement. The PSR has the relevant powers and expertise, as well as the appropriate discretion, to determine the most effective approach in that area.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, the Government have a lot of sympathy with noble Lords who feel that they or their families have been subject to unreasonable treatment due to their status as politically exposed persons, or PEPs. As noble Lords have mentioned, I have engaged with noble Lords to understand this issue and I am aware that the difficulties faced can range from seemingly disproportionate requests for information to accounts being blocked, leaving Peers and their family members at risk of being unable to effectively manage their financial affairs.
The Treasury and the FCA will continue to work to address this issue and to ensure that those subject to these rules are treated fairly and proportionately. Before discussing that work further, I will set out the importance of the PEPs regime to UK security and the fight against economic crime.
Enhanced due diligence by banks is a key component of the UK’s anti-money laundering and anti-corruption measures, and ensures that any suspicious activity is identified and reported to law enforcement. Given the potential for the positions of influence held by those subject to the PEPs regime to make them targets for serious and organised criminals and hostile state actors, law enforcement agencies have strongly favoured maintaining these requirements on domestic PEPs. The enhanced due diligence measures are a crucial part of the UK’s anti-money laundering regime and contribute to a coherent, systemwide approach to tackling economic crime, providing law enforcement with valuable and actionable intelligence to help protect the UK’s political system from hostile state actors, for instance.
However, the Government of course recognise that domestic PEPs often represent a lower risk than overseas PEPs. This is already explicit in FCA guidance, which states that domestic PEPs should be treated as lower risk by financial institutions unless other risk factors are present. The FCA remains committed to monitoring banks’ compliance with its guidance on PEPs, and will take action where it identifies systemic issues. The FCA did so last year, resulting in one financial institution apologising to all PEP customers after its failure to adhere to FCA guidance.
In last year’s review of the money laundering regulations, the Government committed to an assessment of the risk profile of domestic PEPs and made it clear that we would consider removing the requirement for mandatory enhanced due diligence if they were found to be sufficiently low risk. The Government’s assessment of the risk profile of domestic PEPs has concluded. As part of that work, they engaged with law enforcement and other operational partners to develop their under-standing of the risk posed by domestic PEPs. In light of that review, the Government consider that the existing requirements remain appropriate.
However, given the concerns raised, the Government will continue to work with the FCA to ensure that banks and other financial institutions appropriately and proportionately implement the guidance set out by the FCA regarding the treatment of domestic PEPs, that it is taken forward in a way that is proportionate to their individual risk and that adjustments are made to enhanced due diligence measures as necessary. I would like to reassure noble Lords that the Treasury continues to engage with the FCA on this issue and stress the importance of taking a proportionate, risk-based approach to the application of enhanced measures on domestic PEPs.
I turn to the specifics of the amendments. Amendment 215 from my noble friend Lord Moylan would remove those politically exposed persons who are tax residents from the regime entirely. As I have set out, including domestic PEPs in the regime is important because of the risks presented by their positions of influence. Such a proposal would weaken the UK’s protection from money laundering and corruption and leave us non-compliant with international standards. International standards for domestic PEPs, as my noble friend set out, are set by the Financial Action Task Force. They require countries to implement a legal framework that compels regulated firms to identify whether their customers are domestic PEPs and make an assessment of which due diligence measures to apply based on the risk presented.
Amendment 215 would remove the requirement for financial institutions to identify and treat those resident in the UK for tax purposes as PEPs, making the UK non-compliant with those international standards. The UK is a leading member of the Financial Action Task Force and was recognised in its mutual evaluation report in 2018 as having the most effective anti-money laundering regime of well over 100 countries assessed to date. The UK remains committed to ensuring that its anti-money laundering regime is compliant with these international standards. While I appreciate that, in drafting their amendments, noble Lords may have sought to remain compliant with those standards, I am afraid it is not possible to remove domestic PEPs from identification altogether and remain compliant.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
Why is it therefore possible to exclude councillors, as the guidance does, but not Peers?
Baroness Penn (Con)
That is a question of who is classed as a domestic PEP, not of the need to have a regime in place to identify domestic PEPs and then look at what enhanced due diligence measures should be applied to them.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
Does the Minister accept that we could therefore exclude all Members of Parliament?
Baroness Penn (Con)
I do not think that would be consistent with the Financial Action Task Force guidance that is interpreted at a UK level.
Earl Attlee (Con)
Further to the questions of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, can the Minister point to any illegal activity on the part of a parliamentary PEP that has been detected as result of the money laundering regulations?
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, to deal with the question of the risk assessment undertaken as part of this work, as I have already said, the Government have engaged closely with law enforcement and the intelligence community to inform our understanding of the risk in this area. It is a difficult area, and it is not particularly appropriate to go into detail on the contents of the risk assessment, given the sensitive nature of the information. As I also set out, the context is that there is potential for those in positions of influence to make domestic PEPs targets for influencing behaviour by serious and organised criminals and hostile state actors. The potential links between domestic PEPs and criminal activity vary, including abuse of political position for personal gain or links to overseas corruption.
I very much understand the desire by those directed by the regulation to hear more about that risk assessment. It was a question that I anticipated and to which I sought to get as full an answer as possible for the Committee. I am under constraints, but I shall none the less take away the requests from noble Lords to see whether there is any more I can do to provide more information on that point.
Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)
I follow up the inquiry of my noble friend Lord Attlee about statistics—whether parliamentarians have actually fallen foul—and take it one stage further. With regard to the particularly appalling way in which family members are implicated here, do we have statistics on how many family members of parliamentarians have fallen foul? Surely, they are implicated simply because they are related to someone who is classified as a PEP. We have mentioned human rights, but this provision cannot be fair or proper and should surely be removed.
Baroness Penn (Con)
As I said, I shall take away the point about what further I can say about the work on the risk assessment. The focus has been on looking at risk, and my understanding is that, in considering that, the question of close associates or family members—I believe that is the terminology in the regulations—has also been considered.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
I am sorry about this, but the Minister will not be surprised, because we have had 10 years of this issue. There was a review last year, which she reported on in the House, which said that no change was needed, which is extraordinary. She referred to the case where we all got an apology, but that was only because we kept on standing up and asking for it, otherwise it would never have happened.
The important thing that I wanted to raise is that this somehow is going further than anti-money laundering—it is about general corruption. Some of us have been debating the National Security Bill, where it is being dealt with in another way. I do not think that the Minister has been following that Bill, but I can understand that she has not because she has been involved with this one. We now have the FIRS scheme, which will be set up when the Bill becomes an Act and which is about the other things—the approach to politicians by malign forces trying to corrupt us, or whatever. So can we take out corruption and that sort of thing, because the National Security Bill will deal with that? This is simply to be simply about anti-money laundering—in other words, dirty money.
A lot of what the Minister has said goes beyond that, and the fact that she cannot tell us means that the spooks—who tell us that they do not want it, by the way—want it for some other cause. That is not the purpose of the provisions on anti-money laundering; it is about dirty money. Perhaps the Minister could talk to the Home Office and Tom Tugendhat about how much is covered now on the approach to any of us as politicians by malign forces, because this is separate.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, although I have not been following the detail of that Bill, I am aware of the provisions in it. As part of looking at this question, one question asked is, in our broader ecosystem of the checks and balances that we have on our politicians and people defined as PEPs—the other requirements of disclosure that they are held to and the other tools that we have at our disposal—how they influence the risk assessment has been done. I reassure noble Lords that that question has been asked. I should also reassure noble Lords that I am seeing the Security Minister tomorrow to discuss economic crime, but also that issue. We are seeking wherever possible to ensure that there is join-up across government in our assessment of the risks and the tools available to deal with them, ensuring that where we have measures in place they remain proportionate. That is something that I continue to engage with, with the Security Minister and others across government.
I shall just try to answer the point on the Financial Action Task Force, the difference between domestic and foreign PEPs, and the requirements within that, as I understand it. I commit to following up in writing if it remains unclear or if anything I say is not correct. The requirement for automatic enhanced due diligence applies to foreign PEPs. However, within the FATF guidance on recommendations 12 and 22—I think that this is particularly around 12—there is still the need to take steps to identify whether someone is a domestic politically exposed person and then review the relevant risk factors. So they need to determine whether a customer or beneficial owner is a domestic PEP, then determine the risk of the business relationship in that context—and then, in low-risk cases, there are no further steps to determine whether a customer is a PEP. In other words, there is still a requirement to identify whether someone is a domestic PEP or not and to look at the risk around that.
Where there is a difference, in my understanding, from the Financial Action Task Force requirements, is that for foreign PEPs you need to apply automatic enhanced due diligence. Under the EU regulations, that also applied to domestic PEPs—and we therefore ensured that automatic enhanced due diligence applied to domestic as well as foreign PEPs was a system in our regulations. The review we did last year into all of our anti-money laundering regulations did not conclude that on this matter no further action was to be taken but that we needed to look at the risk profile and risks associated with domestic PEPs before determining whether those requirements of automatic enhanced due diligence remained appropriate, now that we had the ability to vary our money laundering regulations, having left the EU. So that was a further piece of work that needed to be done after the review was published last summer of our money laundering regulations overall. That further piece of work has been undertaken, and I have undertaken to write to noble Lords with further details if I can provide them on that risk assessment, but that concluded that it was appropriate to maintain automatic enhanced due diligence for domestic PEPs.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
Did this review involve the FCA? When the FCA reissued its guidance in 2017 it was very clear about domestic PEPs being low risk, but it was constrained by the regulations, which said that you had to do enhanced due diligence. It was within that context. There seems to have been a shift between the FCA’s apparent position on the risk profile of UK PEPs and what my noble friend the Minister is now saying that she is being told by the security services, which will always try to find things that can go wrong. It is quite easy to construct a case that we are potentially capable of being corrupted by whoever and involved in money laundering, but they are not involved in the money laundering processes; the FCA is. I am getting a bit confused about how robust this risk assessment is in the context of money laundering.
Baroness Penn (Con)
I believe that it aimed to get relevant information from all those involved and take a holistic view. I appreciate and agree that we need to ensure that, when these measures are put in place, they are proportionate to the risk faced, so it is entirely right to interrogate that risk assessment. I also appreciate that it is a slightly frustrating process when the sensitive nature of some of these issues means that we cannot always go into all the details noble Lords want at this time. I have tried to explain the context as to why domestic PEPs are viewed as having sufficiently high risk so that enhanced due diligence should still apply. I have the FCA guidance in my pack but I will not go through it, but it is also true to say—this is another point that I checked—that although the risk is sufficient to have enhanced due diligence measures, it is lower for domestic PEPs than for foreign PEPs. That assessment still applies.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
The Minister is doing a very good job on a very sticky wicket. I am not surprised. Notwithstanding what she said about risk assessments and how that has to be, of necessity, a discretionary issue, the problem we are identifying, which the Government should address if they come forward with an amendment at Report, is the opaque nature of identifying these individuals and the offence against natural justice, because when people have accounts closed they are often not told why, who made the decision, on what basis and using what methodology. That is a serious issue and, after 10 years, one that the Government should address, if necessary by a government amendment.
Baroness Penn (Con)
I absolutely take that point. It comes back to the appropriate and proportionate enforcement of these regulations. I know that that is something noble Lords have raised previously, but we need to continue to work to ensure that it takes place.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
This goes back to when the Minister mentioned the FATF provisions. I thought she mentioned the risks in business relationships. All the stuff we get as PEPs is our personal stuff; it is nothing to do with business relationships. I have not been interrogated about anything to do with the London Stock Exchange, of which I am a non-executive director; I am interrogated about my father’s will and that kind of stuff.
Again, I am happy—in fact I would almost prefer—for the Minister to write the replies because it is hard to put together quoted bits and pieces, even when we get them back in Hansard. It seems that the whole risk assessment business is being set aside at the behest of the security agencies, which just like the idea that they have another captive load of people and that they may be able to track something with money—which I doubt, because these forms go to an outsourced place, they are filed, and nobody ever looks at them. There is no “know your client” going on. They may look at one or two, but I do not see how it adds up at all, even taking that security aspect into account, because if anybody was really a security threat, there are other ways of vetting.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
I am confused. I always encourage people to find out what is happening in this House by telling them to look at the speeches and follow Hansard, but now I am dreading anyone watching this because we have a government Minister implying that the security services at looking at us, particularly our private financial affairs, because we are high risk. Why? I do not think that is true. I want to denounce the notion that because you are in the House of Lords you are more likely to be doing something such as that.
I do not think the Minister can answer my second point, but I think we would all feel that it is a generalised accusation rather than specifically going after individuals who might be doing things that are wrong based on evidence, which nobody here objects to. Never mind the families; I have got to the point now where it is not just the families. I am sitting here feeling embarrassed, thinking, “Oh god, somebody is basically saying that the security forces think that we are all up to no good”. If the public find that out, it is said by a Minister and it is the general atmosphere, that is not good, is it? I usually put my speeches up on social media; I am not putting this one on. I do not want anyone to know about this conversation, because it will discredit the reputation of this House far more than anything else.
Baroness Penn (Con)
My Lords, I have already set out for the Committee, and I repeat now, the reasons why UK domestic PEPs may be at greater risk of money laundering. For example, in the general sense, the positions of influence that we have can put us at greater risk. I have also tried to set out—and will set out in writing for noble Lords—the approach that we are taking to look at risk in this area. I will share any further details that I am able to.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
Following on from what has just been said, I would quite like the Minister to rephrase what she said: that we are at greater risk of money laundering. I cannot let that stand on the record.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
I can let stand that we might, in some instances, be at greater risk of being targeted for various things, and I hope that we also have a greater capacity for repelling such actions, given the experience of people in the House and having done the sorts of things that we have done throughout our lives. I am not prepared to accept that kind of statement with any acquiescence whatever on my behalf or, by the sound of it, on behalf of colleagues here.
Baroness Penn (Con)
I am very happy to clarify for the Committee and anyone who may be reading our proceedings, that we, due to our positions of influence, are at greater risk of being targeted by those who may seek to engage in money laundering.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, I say to the Committee that if someone tried to target me in any inappropriate way, I would report it to the appropriate authorities immediately.
Baroness Penn (Con)
I am sure that many of us in this Committee would do so—
Baroness Penn (Con)
I am sure we all would. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked me to set out in writing the position of the Financial Action Task Force in terms of the requirements for foreign and domestic PEPs. I will also set out in writing the position on the risk assessment that has been undertaken, so that everyone has it and it is not just in the toing and froing of the exchanges in this Committee. I will clearly set out for the Committee the Government’s position on this.
Baroness Penn (Con)
Others are involved in looking at the risks of money laundering in counterterrorist and proliferation financing, which I believe are subject to these regulations.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
As far as financial institutions are concerned, all of those are dealt with by the FCA, not the security services or any other shadowy agencies that seem to be involved in this latest risk assessment, so I am struggling to see what wider issues could possibly have been taken into account.
Baroness Penn (Con)
The Government believe that the decision about the scope of the money laundering regulations is best taken by, and should remain with, the Government, rather than being delegated to the FCA.
I turn to Amendment 224 from the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town. This would require the FCA to consult with consumers with regard to its functions relating to PEPs. In the discussion—
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
The noble Baroness does not need to respond on this; it was a placeholder.
Baroness Penn (Con)
Okay—I was going to talk about the engagement that we have conducted so far and will continue.
My noble friend Lord Trenchard touched on my noble friend Lord Forsyth’s Amendment 234, but I am not sure whether anyone spoke to it specifically. In my response, I addressed the Committee’s desire to focus its attention on the statutory changes, and I am not sure we had a detailed discussion on the other proposals put forward here.
Noble Lords have made their position on the issue very clear. I hope that, to some extent, they have also heard the rationale for the Government’s approach and would agree with the desire to be in line with international standards in any action that we take in this area. As the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, said at the start of his remarks, we should bear in mind the context of the Government’s efforts, very much supported by this House—we are often pushed to go further by this House—in tackling issues of economic crime, which include money laundering. We have to recognise that London and the UK being such a centre for financial services, and the great benefits that that brings, also brings greater risks. It is right that we make sure that we have a regime that manages those risks as effectively as possible.
I shall write to noble Lords on the matters that I have mentioned, and any other matters in looking at this debate again, on which I can provide further clarity. I am sure that I will engage with noble Lords further on this issue ahead of Report.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)
Would the Minister also engage with the banks and financial institutions to see whether they can improve their performance in being reasonable?
Baroness Penn (Con)
The noble Lord is absolutely right to say that. This Government are committed to do that with the regulator. I understand this Committee’s desire to look at legislative change, but I have also heard from the Committee that the guidance is clear on the lower risks of PEPs, and the challenge really lies in the effective implementation of that guidance. We should not take our eye off that work. It is something that the Government are absolutely committed to doing.
I know that noble Lords have raised the challenges of engaging with the FOS on this issue, but I remind them of that route. I have also said to noble Lords, as the FCA has said, that in the list of contacts that we have provided to parliamentarians with issues with their status as politically exposed persons, the FCA will monitor any of those points of contact in terms of complaints to look more systematically at whether there are issues in individual institutions so that further action can be taken on that basis. The Treasury will continue to engage with the FCA on how we can ensure that that takes place.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
I think that we have already mentioned why the FOS is so inappropriate. To expect a judge to take a complaint to the FOS is frankly out of order. It is no way for this issue to be raised. It is a very small number—but it is not appropriate to ask very senior judiciary to go via FOS, if their children are being affected. That is really not the right way forward.
Baroness Penn (Con)
I appreciate that it will not be the right route of recourse in many circumstances, but I do not agree that it is never the right form of recourse for people. It is important for people to know that that route is there. For particular cases, it may be appropriate. The noble Baroness has set out why, in many other cases, that is not the form of recourse that people want, which is why we have also set out other points of contact and ways in which to try to resolve these issues, which also act as a data point for the FCA as the regulator to look at issues in particular banks or institutions that are not applying the guidance appropriately.
Lord Moylan (Con)
My Lords, we have had a very valuable debate. I am grateful to all noble Lords who spoke in it and, if I do not thank them individually, I hope that they will forgive me, given the length of the debate so far. It is unusual, at the end of such a long debate, to be able to summarise the arguments made in one or two sentences—but I can, because everybody, in effect, said the same thing. That is that we want to see change, and the majority of us want to see legislative change.
Having said that I am not going to refer to individuals, there are two speeches to which I will briefly refer, because they were important. The first was the winding-up speech from the Labour Party Front Bench by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe. He spoke very briefly, but his words were very pregnant and important as we approach Report.
The second, which I will deal with at greater length, was the speech made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, who acutely put her finger on a key issue that must be addressed if we are to achieve the legislative change that we want to see. That is about the definition that we choose. When I spoke earlier, I said that there must be a way in which to distinguish satisfactorily between domestic and foreign. In doing this, I will not use the term “non-discriminatory”, because that has legal implications, but we want to do it in a way that is fair and is seen to be fair by everybody who might be affected. At least a couple of suggestions have been made, and they both have merits. This is something to which we need to return as we approach Report, to make sure that we are comfortable with it—but I thought that the noble Baroness put her finger on that very acutely.
Normally, at this stage in a speech of reply, I would turn to a lengthy and careful analysis of the remarks made by the Minister, but she has been subject to a lengthy and careful analysis by practically everybody else in the course of her winding-up speech. So perhaps I will spare her that, and congratulate and thank her for taking, with such good grace, the questions and points that were put to her.
However, I shall refer to two points, the first being the security services. Frankly, I have never come across a case where the police or security services have given up a right to scrutiny that they already have. There is always some excuse for why it is necessary. I find that unconvincing—and the reasons are not, per se, on the grounds that it is the security services, but because of the arguments made here. It is astonishing that there is a special list of people in scope of suspicion of money laundering and terrorism, who happen to be the list in Regulation 35(14), when all of us could supply—even a five year-old could supply—a list of people much more likely to be in scope, who are not being subject to the same scrutiny.
On my second point, I do not think that I am in the wrong here, and suspect that my noble friend has not quite got it right, but am happy to be corrected. What are our international obligations to the FATF, insofar as we have legal obligations to it in a legal sense, given that it is not a legal body?
From this little iPad, I read out and referred very carefully to the current version of recommendation 12. It quite clearly says “foreign”; it places no obligation on the parties to the agreement to do anything about domestic PEPs. Clearly—this is where there may be a degree of confusion—in deciding who is a foreign PEP, you have to make a decision, if you like, that they are not a domestic PEP. Naturally, a sift is therefore required to get to the point of identifying that this is a foreign PEP, but I suspect that too much has been built on that, and there is some suggestion that that sift—are they foreign or are they domestic?—involves some obligation to scrutinise them. However, it simply is not there, so I referred in the course of my noble friend’s speech to the interpretative notes, and there is an interpretative note to recommendation 12, but it deals entirely with life assurance policies.
I think I also heard my noble friend say that recommendation 22 was relevant. That may have been a mishearing on my part but, looking at recommendation 22, it deals almost entirely with casinos, real estate managers and trusts. I do not know why they are all in the same recommendation, but there we are.