(2 months, 3 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberThank you very much, Madam Chair. May I first take the opportunity to congratulate you on your election? I promise to try not to try your patience over the coming weeks, years and so on, but we will see how things go.
I wish primarily to speak today to amendment 9 and, of course, consequential amendment 10, which effectively seek to ensure that the fiscal lock proposed in the Bill should also include any changes to the fiscal rules and would require the Office for Budget Responsibility to produce a report on their effect on public finances. The Office for Budget Responsibility was of course constructed by a Conservative Chancellor following the poor forecasting record of the previous Labour Government. Between 2000 and 2010, the then Labour Government’s forecasts for economic growth were out by an average of £13 billion, and their forecasts for the budget deficit three years ahead were out by an average of £40 billion. Their forecasts therefore lacked credibility, and to re-establish confidence and credibility the OBR was created by the Conservative Government.
Labour lacked economic credibility in the past, and I am afraid it still lacks it now. The facts simply do not stand up the false claim that the Government have inherited the worst economic circumstances since the second world war; they transparently have not. Contrary to the rewriting of history that the current Labour Government are attempting, when we took over from Labour back in 2010, inflation was 3.4%. When they took over from us, it was 2.2%. The annual deficit is half what we inherited in 2010, unemployment is about half what it was in 2010, and we handed Labour the fastest economic growth in the G7. The dominant political and economic narrative since the second world war is in fact, as has been widely commented on, that every single Labour Government end up with unemployment higher at the end of their time in power than when they took over from the Conservatives preceding them.
The British public should not be taken for fools. Just because Labour keeps claiming something, that does not mean that it suddenly becomes true, which is why clarity over plans and rules is so important. The fiscal rules are of course restrictions on fiscal policy set by the Government to constrain their own decisions on spending and taxes. The fiscal rules set by the previous Government said that the debt to GDP ratio should be falling within a five-year horizon, and that the ratio of the annual budget deficit to GDP should be below 3% by the end of the same period. Labour’s manifesto for the election proposed the following fiscal rules: balancing the current budget, so that day-to-day costs are met by revenues, and that debt must be falling as a share of the economy by the fifth year of the forecast. On the surface, therefore, the debt rules appear to be broadly the same under the new Government. The Government have even said that they have an “ironclad” commitment to reduce Government debt. It is therefore critical what definition of debt is used for the fiscal rules. Clearly, any changes to the fiscal rules are financially significant decisions because they affect how much the Government can borrow and spend.
On Second Reading, the Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury said:
“Our fiscal rules are non-negotiable.”—[Official Report, 30 July 2024; Vol. 752, c. 1263.]
Great, but why then has the Chancellor repeatedly failed to rule out that she will change the definition of debt in her fiscal rules to allow, presumably, for massive borrowing? The Government cannot run from the scrutiny that they should be subjected to if they are considering making such a change. We believe that our amendment requiring an OBR report on changes to the fiscal rules is entirely consistent with the Government’s stated policy intent, and should therefore be fairly uncontentious. After all, on Second Reading, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury said that
“the announcement of a fiscally significant measure should always be accompanied by an independent assessment of its economic and fiscal implications, in order to support transparency and accountability.”—[Official Report, 30 July 2024; Vol. 752, c. 1211.]
We agree, and not accepting our amendment would be contrary to those goals, because clearly changing the fiscal rules would be a fiscally significant measure in anybody’s book. Furthermore, the Chief Secretary said that
“fiscal discipline and sound money is the bedrock of our plans.”—[Official Report, 30 July 2024; Vol. 752, c. 1213.]
Well, changing the fiscal rules would be changing the foundations and that bedrock.
Transparency and clarity are important in relation to the public finances, because Ministers should never forget that it is not their money that they are spending; it is the public’s money. The public have a right to know how their money is being spent, and government is about making difficult choices with limited resources. With Government spending being above £1.2 trillion per year, the British public recognise that the Government clearly have choices. It is not an endless supply of money, but it is a very, very large amount. In the last few weeks, the new Labour Government chose to spend the public’s money on pay settlements for their union friends rather than on supporting pensioners. Those settlements are estimated to cost about £10 billion. They also chose to spend £8.3 billion on a public energy company and £7.3 billion on a national wealth fund, so far from inheriting a £22-billion black hole, they have actually just spent £25 billion creating one within their first few weeks of coming to power.
My hon. Friend is making a fantastic speech on the importance of being responsible with our public finances. Much of the Bill is concerned with responsibility and transparency. Does he know whether the Government published an impact assessment when they took away the winter fuel allowance?
I thank my hon. Friend for that point. My understanding is that the Government have not published an impact assessment, as would normally be the case for something with such a significant impact. I think that speaks to the whole narrative that we are hearing from the Government: claiming one thing when the facts speak differently. As I said, far from inheriting a £22 billion black hole, they have actually spent, or committed to spending, an additional £25 billion. That is a choice that they made, so the claim that the Labour Government are having to take the winter fuel allowance away from millions of pensioners as a response to unexpected financial constraints simply does not stack up against the facts, or indeed the words of the Chancellor herself, who on 25 March 2014—yes, a decade ago—said:
“We are the party who have said that we will cut the winter fuel allowance for the richest pensioners and means-test that benefit to save money”.—[Official Report, 25 March 2014; Vol. 578, c. 174.]
That is a direct quote in Hansard from the current Chancellor, so no, the Government’s restriction of winter fuel payments is not a response to financial circumstance; it is a long-established, clearly stated Labour policy intent—a deliberate policy choice, but a policy that they conveniently forgot to tell the public about in the run-up to the last election.
I hope, however, that the Government can be straight with the public on this point about the fiscal rules, accept the amendment that we are proposing, and provide assurance to all Members and the outside world that there is no sleight of hand here. We want the Bill to work as they say it is intended to, and to include financially significant decisions, such as on the levels of Government borrowing and the fiscal rules. I would therefore appreciate it if the Chief Secretary to the Treasury confirmed in his wind-up that the Government do not intend to change the definition of debt in their fiscal rules or practise some accounting trick to hide the level of Government borrowing, and that they do indeed wish to be clear and transparent about the public finances. If Labour Members vote against our amendment, it will merely prove that they are planning to change their fiscal rules in the Budget to borrow more money, increase debt, and run away from independent OBR scrutiny—the very opposite of the stated intent of the Bill.
A very strong maiden speech, without a script in hand—your parents will be proud.
It is a delight as ever to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Ghani. I congratulate the hon. Member for Loughborough (Dr Sandher) on his maiden speech and his kind comments about his predecessor Jane Hunt, a great colleague of this House. It was one of my great pleasures in my previous role as Minister for science and research to visit the fine university he now represents; I wish him and them well, and I wish him all the best of luck with those on his Front Bench in procuring the financial support he seeks.
This is a disreputable Bill, if we are brutally honest. It is a piece of political theatre, which all of us on both sides of this House should think very strongly about giving our support to. This history of this place is of legislation made in haste, which this House subsequently repents at leisure. I say this in all seriousness and in the spirit of this place: at a time when there is low trust in politics, did our constituents—did the hon. Gentleman’s constituents, when they trooped to the ballot box and returned him to this place only weeks ago—seriously expect that our role would be to give away even more of our responsibilities? Can any of us, hand on heart, say that our constituents know what and who the OBR is? Did the electors of Bristol North West, Hampstead and Highgate, Richmond Park or, indeed, Arundel and South Downs send us to this place only to give away our duties and responsibility to the unnamed, unknown and unelected officials—well-meaning, no doubt—of the Office for Budget Responsibility? Hands on the face of a stopped clock are sometimes more accurate than the OBR forecasts, as they are at least correct twice a day for sure.
In truth, this legislation, put together at breakneck speed, has more holes than a Swiss cheese. If we look at clause 1(3), who decides the “costing”? Proposed new section 4A exempts any measure that is intended, at the time of its introduction, to be temporary. Members of this House will be familiar with the fact that income tax itself, one of the largest ever fiscal measures, was intended to be temporary; perhaps the Minister will address that fact when he winds up. Income tax was introduced by Pitt the Younger in 1799 as a temporary measure. Well, here we are, 225 years later, and that temporary measure is still going extremely strong.
Who defines what is and is not a fiscal measure—a measure with a potential impact on the GDP of this country? Many things decided in this House will have a direct or indirect impact on the GDP of this country; the decision by Tony Blair to take us to war without a vote in this House undoubtedly had an impact on our GDP. Decisions to introduce a four-day working week—if this House so chooses to make them, as is its right—would have a material impact on the GDP of this country. The Centre for Business and Economic Research estimates that every bank holiday costs this country a sum approaching £3.6 billion. Three, four, five or six bank holidays add up to a 1% impact on GDP, which I speculate may be the threshold for the OBR to intervene.
On trade deals, if those on the Government Benches fulfilled their ambition to realign with Europe—to federate and once again abrogate our trade to Europe—that would potentially have a material fiscal impact on GDP. There are very few domains of this House—very few of the decisions that our constituents have sent us here to legislate and decide on their behalf—that would not potentially fall foul of this rule.
I will delight the hon. Gentleman, because, as I am sure he saw on the amendment paper, I have tabled an amendment that would look at trade deals. One of the reasons why I felt compelled to do that, and explore this question that he raises about the economic impact, is that while he was in government and, indeed, a Treasury Minister, the Government did not publish any information for the very trade deals he is talking about. I will always welcome a sinner who repenteth but, for the avoidance of doubt, is he saying that he now believes there should be independent scrutiny of things such as the trade and co-operation agreement?
It is good to have a proper debate. I certainly think that if we want and seek good government—which, like the human condition, is not a perfect state, but a state that we should seek constantly to perfect—the highest levels of transparency and the very important exercise in Government publishing of impact assessments when they make material decisions, as required by Cabinet Office guidance, are things that the whole House should join hands and agree on. It is one of the reasons why I asked my colleague, my hon. Friend the Member for Droitwich and Evesham (Nigel Huddleston), whether the Government had published an impact assessment on their callous decision to withdraw the winter fuel allowance from so many pensioners. The hon. Member for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy) will well know that the process of trade deals undergoes extensive scrutiny in this House, and I took one of those trade deals through that process of scrutiny in a former life.
I will conclude, because I simply want to alert hon. Members to what they are potentially doing as they seek to support this Bill. It is not for partisan or political advantage, but about the important role of Parliament, which has been litigated many times in this Chamber and in debate.
Unsurprisingly, I have listened to the hon. Gentleman’s speeches on a number of occasions, and I agree with quite a lot of what he is saying about transparency. Does he agree that the burden of his argument is that we cannot make a Government behave better or govern more effectively by quango? This quango was set up by George Osborne to trap an incoming Labour Government and restrict and slow them down, and it is an odd thing that we see this quango being gilded.
As ever, the hon. Member makes an important and weighty contribution. He is exactly right about the direction of travel. On both sides of the House, we will all find our own particular point on the envelope when it comes to the balance around organisations that can hold us to account and, in particular, hold a mirror to Government and ensure that this House acts with the best, most accurate and well-meaning data.
My core point is that we are sent here by our constituents. I again congratulate the hon. Member for Loughborough, who has been sent here on behalf of his constituents and has given a fine speech today, but I do not believe—he may intervene and correct me—that the citizens of Loughborough, whether they voted for Jane Hunt or for him, intended that one of the very first actions he and we would take as legislators would be to award more of our powers and place more fetters on ourselves. This is the right Chamber for accountability. We should hold ourselves to account; we have a number of ways in which to do that to ourselves. The hon. Member for Blackley and Middleton South (Graham Stringer) makes a very real point about quangos, arm’s length bodies and how we hold ourselves to account.
That is my point. I understand that many colleagues wish to get in. I support the amendment put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Droitwich and Evesham, because it is quite right that we have rules. I was an accountant by training, and the first thing we learn—whether someone is an accountant or in performance sport—is that we play by the rules as they are; we do not seek to rig the rules in our favour.
It is a pleasure to speak in the same debate as the maiden speech given by my hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough (Dr Sandher). I am sure other speeches are coming that will show just how impressive the new generation of MPs is across the House.
It is also a joy to follow the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs (Andrew Griffith), because I have always enjoyed the experience of listening to him. When he was a Treasury Minister in the previous Government, I watched him, debated with him and tried to encourage him to take on the buy now, pay later lenders—that is related to what I will say about legal loan sharking. But I have to be honest: being lectured by former Conservative Ministers about fiscal probity is a bit like being lectured by Toad of Toad Hall about safe driving, given the experiences of many of our constituents, which have led to the need for this legislation.
I put on record my support for this legislation, because frankly anybody who has had to renegotiate a mortgage since the Liz Truss Budget knows exactly why it is needed and why we must protect the British public from the consequences of bad decision making at a national level. As we saw in many examples under the previous Administration, the public have paid the price for that and will continue to do so.
Of course, the legislation does not fetter previous Governments, but it would fetter the discretion of the hon. Lady’s own Front Benchers. In that context, does she not have the same confidence in her Front Bench that many others seem to enjoy?
I am a bit disappointed that the hon. Member did not seek to call me Ratty. I am also quite struck by the fact that he, a former Conservative Treasury Minister, rises not to hold himself accountable for the consequences of decisions made by the previous Government, or indeed to defend them, but simply to say, “You will be held to a higher fiscal standard.” We on the Labour Benches welcome a higher fiscal standard; that is the purpose of the legislation. Political decisions will still be made, but we will make them with the benefit of independent information. He will know that there were many debates in the previous Parliament, and indeed in those before it, in which independent information about and verification of the economic impact of policies mattered but were missing. Indeed, he mentions trade deals, which are an example of where we did not have independent information. I will comment on that only briefly, because my amendment has not been selected—he will be as disappointed as I am about that.
The Minister can answer this briefly as well. Could he confirm that he has no plans to change the fiscal rules?
The hon. Gentleman is enjoying himself, but he knows the answer: wait for the Budget.
The amendments from the official Opposition are therefore not necessary. To answer the question from the shadow Financial Secretary, the hon. Member for Droitwich and Evesham (Nigel Huddleston), as I have been invited to do so, the Chancellor has already confirmed that the Government will set out the precise details of our fiscal rules at the Budget on 30 October, alongside an updated OBR forecast.
amendments 6 and 7, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy), focus on the definition of “fiscally significant” measures to which the fiscal lock will apply. They would extend the definition to include measures that have a cumulative effect on public sector net debt or contingent liabilities. I welcome my hon. Friend highlighting this issue, on which I know she has worked for many years. The draft charter text states that measures will trigger the lock when the combined costing is at least 1% of GDP in any year, and specifically:
“The costing of a measure is the direct impact of a policy decision on the public finances”.
It is difficult to set and interpret a threshold consistently for contingent liabilities as they can often be large in maximum exposure, but low in expected or reasonable worst-case losses. Effective management of contingent liabilities is important, and transparency is key to good fiscal management. The Government plan to announce new significant contingent liabilities at fiscal events to make sure there is transparency with Parliament. We will of course continue to notify Parliament of new contingent liabilities, as set out in “Managing Public Money”.
The amendments would also place a condition on policies with a cumulative impact on public sector net debt, and my hon. Friend noted public-private partnerships as an example. She was referring to PFI and PF2 models, which the previous Government had no longer proceeded with, and there has been no change to this policy. As the Chancellor said in her Mais lecture earlier this year, we will also report on wider measures of public sector assets and liabilities at fiscal events to ensure transparency across the whole balance sheet, which includes non-debt liabilities. Reporting transparently on the Government’s stock of contingent liabilities is key to ensuring we do not take excessive risk. I can therefore confirm today that the Government will publish a report on our contingent liabilities. I expect the contingent liability central capability to do this in early 2025. Having said all that, I recognise the issues my hon. Friend raises, and I will arrange to meet her to discuss them further.
Moving on to the Liberal Democrat amendments, amendment 2 was tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney). As she said, it would enable the OBR to notify the independent adviser on Ministers’ interests if the fiscal lock was triggered. I remind hon. Members that the purpose of this Bill is to ensure that never again do we find ourselves in a situation, like at the 2022 Liz Truss mini-Budget, in which fiscally significant measures are announced without accompanying OBR analysis. If a future Government were to act in this way, the Bill provides a clear remedy. The OBR is empowered to independently notify the Treasury Committee and to produce its own report. This would be available for full scrutiny by stakeholders and Parliament, which would be able to hold Ministers to account in the normal way. We therefore do not consider the amendment necessary.
Amendment 1, also tabled by the Liberal Democrats, would broaden the definition of fiscally significant measures to cover anything that is likely to have an impact on the cost of Government borrowing, interest rates or economic growth. The Bill is focused on preventing irresponsible large-scale fiscal announcements that could undermine macroeconomic stability, such as at the mini-Budget. To support that, we need clear and robust legal frameworks that ensure the provisions are triggered only when appropriate. This requires precise definitions that everyone, including the OBR in particular, can understand clearly and work with practically. It would therefore not be helpful, in the Government’s view, to have a broader, vaguer definition that might repeatedly trigger the fiscal lock under many different circumstances.
Amendments 3 and 4 would require the Treasury to consult the OBR and the Treasury Committee before the charter can be updated for the purposes of the fiscal lock, and to publish a report on the outcome of any such consultations. It is of course important that the views of the OBR and of Parliament are taken into account when making changes to the charter. However, I hope the hon. Member will accept that it will not be necessary to set out this specific process in primary legislation, because the Bill already includes an important safeguard on the fiscal lock, which is the requirement that any changes to the charter for budget responsibility are published in draft at least 28 days before they are laid in the Commons. That will ensure that the OBR, the Treasury Committee, this Parliament and all stakeholders will have a clear opportunity to make representations to the Treasury and to publish their views, as they see fit.
Amendment 5, tabled by the hon. Member for North Herefordshire (Ellie Chowns), would require the OBR to take net zero targets into account when preparing a report on fiscally significant announcements. Strong legal frameworks are already in place in the Climate Change Act 2008 to support the transition to net zero in 2050. The Act legislates for interim five-year carbon budgets, and requires the Government to report on those periodically. Parliament and its Select Committees already scrutinise that in great detail. The Green Book, the Treasury’s guidance on how to appraise policies, projects and programmes, requires Departments to assess the climate and environmental impacts of policy proposals, with major bids and proposals at fiscal events being assessed accordingly in that way. We therefore do not consider the amendment to be necessary.