Thursday 29th October 2026
(1 day, 22 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesHighways (Financing) Bill 2026-27 View all Highways (Financing) Bill 2026-27 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 29 October 2026 - (29 Oct 2026)
The Chair
We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we start to hear from our witnesses, do any Members wish to make a declaration of interest in connection with the Bill?
We will now hear oral evidence from the Centre for Policy Studies and Britain Remade. We have until 2.35 pm for this panel. Would the witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record?
Ben Hopkinson: I am Ben Hopkinson, head of housing and infrastructure at the Centre for Policy Studies.
Sam Dumitriu: I am Sam Dumitriu, head of policy at the campaign group Britain Remade.
Greg Smith (Mid Buckinghamshire) (Con)
Q
Clearly, this is a Bill of two halves: there is the specific stuff on the lower Thames crossing, and then it is a pretty open-ended book for other projects going forward. Can I have your initial assessment of whether this is the right model to solve both the question of getting the lower Thames crossing built and issues relating to future trunk road projects that may be required or identified in the country? Will it actually deliver value for the motorist and haulage businesses using the scheme? Do we even know that it will deliver to certain metrics? No one can give us an answer yet on what the toll would be on the lower Thames crossing, for example.
Ben Hopkinson: We have quite serious concerns about the regulated asset base model. This will certainly be the first time it is been used for roads. The main issue is that there are quite limited incentives for cost control within a regulated asset base. If you are the private contractor, you have significant incentives to increase the capital expenditure on the regulated asset base to make it as large as possible, because that means you get as large a return on your investment as possible.
The organisation standing in the way of that is the Office of Rail and Road in this case, and it has never overseen a RAB before. It would not even be able to look at other organisations or regulators that have overseen a RAB for roads, because there are none internationally.
We have a better model through concessions. France has built more miles of motorway this century than the UK has in total. It has done that with the private sector working through concessions. Under a concession, there are strong incentives for private contractors to keep their costs as low as possible, because it directly impacts their bottom line, which is completely the opposite for a RAB model.
Greg Smith
Q
Ben Hopkinson: The Bill is focused on delivering a RAB model. It is a completely different set-up to use a concession model. There is a second challenge with RAB in so far as the Department for Transport does not really bear any of the costs either. That is why you get it doing things like banning diesel construction vehicles for the lower Thames crossing. That is a policy goal it has otherwise that does not actually lead to a better overall road. It is an example of “everythingism”, where it has plenty of different goals, none of which is necessarily delivering the best road project for motorists at a very reasonable cost.
Greg Smith
Q
Ben Hopkinson: I do not have a specific number for it, but it is a regulation that might lead to a different form of construction than they would have chosen were they going purely for value for money. Across the piece, the lower Thames crossing has been racked by planning delays, which I am sure we are all aware of. It was designated a national priority project in 2011 and it took 14 years, 360,000 pages and £300 million to get planning approval. That all adds cost. When the project started going through, it was projected to cost about £4 billion. Then international events got in the way and it is now projected to be over £10 billion. Moving quickly saves costs. Our slow planning system has been a real driver of added cost here.
Sam Dumitriu: Cost control is one of the most important issues here. If you look at road building generally, the big problem in the UK is that we have a very large construction cost premium. Britain Remade has looked at 345 infrastructure projects across the world, of which 121 were road projects. On average, the UK pays about 65% more to build a given mile of road or railway. It is a bit less for road on average, but when you look at more complicated projects like the lower Thames crossing, it tends to creep back up.
Many people often dismiss our problems around infrastructure as a problem of too little money going in, but over the past five years or so—a period that includes covid, but also years either side of it—we spent about £308 per head on Government public infrastructure investment. In France it is more like £271 and in Germany about £251. When you account for that cost premium, we end up getting about £180 of what the French or the Germans would get. For me, that is the No.1 problem.
About £300 million has been spent on the planning process for the lower Thames crossing. If you add together the world’s longest road tunnel, which was built in Norway, and a tunnel built 282 metres under the sea, you just about reach that. They are building much more complicated projects for much less. You can talk about how it is more difficult to build due to UK geographical or geological issues, but fundamentally, just those front-loaded costs make it very difficult to build anything cost-effectively. Because of that, there is a risk that this model is adopted as a way of taking some of those costs off the books without the right level of scrutiny.
Greg Smith
Q
Sam Dumitriu: One thing is that a lot of major road projects have been cancelled recently. The first road investment strategy was much more ambitious than the ones that followed. That was partly due to covid, but now we are out the other end, we see reduced ambition on road building. Road maintenance has gone up a bit, which is positive, but at the same time, we are not building the projects.
It is important to look at which projects are appropriate for tolling; bridges and tunnels make perfect sense. In America, lots of additional lanes that have their own toll are built. Based on our geography and the amount of road infrastructure we have, you probably could not do that—when you are adding a super-fast lane on a seven-lane motorway, that works; it does not really work here—but clearly there are lots of bottlenecks and opportunities to finance things via tolls.
The question we have to ask is, as fuel duty revenue declines, because people are switching to electric vehicles, will there be the same impetus to put money into the roads? Currently, motorists do not get a very fair deal: they pay a lot in tax, but they do not see the same return in road building, as the money tends to go into the general pot. You might want to, say, hypothecate that revenue—that is one thing—but road user charging gets around the question of politicians attempting to use infrastructure money generally to put it towards your primary, day-to-day spending, whether that is on the NHS or £100 to deal with the cost of living, et cetera.
There needs to be some way of insulating long-term infrastructure funding from those, and that is the advantage of tolling. The problem is that motorists will only bear or accept it if they are confident that they are not being hit by all these other taxes and are getting something genuinely new in return. I do not see many motorists complaining about the Silvertown and Blackwall tunnels being tolled, because they have new infrastructure and congestion has fallen. It would be different if an existing road were tolled without a noticeable improvement.
Ben Hopkinson: There is nothing inherently wrong with road user charging. It is quite sensible that the people who use and get the benefits of an infrastructure asset pay towards its construction and maintenance. The challenge is that we already have quite high fuel duty, and it is more than solely the combination of carbon output and what we spend on roads and maintenance. If fuel duty were solely for mitigating the externalities of carbon emissions, combined with the upkeep, maintenance and addition of roads, it would be around 35p, rather than the about 52p it is now, so fuel duty is already higher than the economic impacts of roads and emissions.
If you kept fuel duty where it is, or cancelled out the 5p cut—the scrapping of which is perennially promised—and added road user charging on top, that would be quite a significant burden for motorists to bear. But ideally, new infrastructure would be funded through some form of road user charging. The people who drive get the benefits, so that is only fair.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Justin Madders)
Q
Ben Hopkinson: I am well aware that there are safeguards and that the regulator is tasked with ensuring that there are not runaway costs. However, the ORR has never done this before. No regulator has ever done a RAB for a road before. There is a real risk that if it sets the return too high, motorists will pay significantly more, but if it sets the return too low, then no one will want to invest.
While in theory the model makes a lot of sense, I am a little worried about the practicalities of the ORR accidentally setting a rate too high or too low. In other sectors where rates are set by regulators, there are often risks, especially when there are macroeconomic shifts—higher interest rates, for example. Regulators are sometimes slow to update to that. There are concerns there. With a concession model, as used in France and around the world, there are much better incentives for contractors to keep costs down because they are the ones bearing them, not the potential motorists.
Justin Madders
Q
Ben Hopkinson: Well, there is a bit of control. There is also the market pushback; if tolls are set too high, people simply will not use the new asset. In that circumstance, the private constructor bears the revenue risk of it being set too high. There is also the overall agreement that the concessionaire strikes with the state initially.
One other concern that I have about the RAB is that there is not necessarily a sunset clause. In France, it is very common for roads to return to public ownership after about 60 or 70 years. There is a chance here, under the RAB, that there is no sunset and so they are permanently away from state ownership. I know that the Bill does provide for some sunset clauses if they impose them, but that is not the default here. That is another concern that I have about the RAB model.
Justin Madders
Q
Sam, you spoke about the planning delays and have set out the significant costs and delays because of that. In terms of the lower Thames crossing, is it your understanding that those risks are now past?
Sam Dumitriu: In general, it appears so. However, we have seen some cases for example, in energy infrastructure, where you can have a development consent order passed and construction under way, but then encounter further planning-related delays.
For example, the Hinkley Point C nuclear power station is potentially the most expensive nuclear power station that the world will ever see. One of the issues is that, after spending around £700 million on fish mitigations, it is still in the process of trying to get the permit that unlocks the final phase of construction. If it does not get that permit, it then has to apply for a DCO variation, so there can still be planning risk even if you address the up-front challenges. Hopefully some of the changes in the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 around environmental delivery plans—if they start being rolled out much further than the initial pilot—and potentially also changes to judicial review, which can delay some of these things as well, will address those.
In terms of the point about safeguards, there is one reason to be slightly less pessimistic than Ben. One advantage with the ORR that you do not have with Ofgem or Ofwat is that in National Highways you have a state-owned body with access to cost information. What you tend to see with these other sectors is more opaque, because it is fundamentally people in industry paying very expensive economic consultancies to produce lengthy PowerPoints to tell you how much something should cost. If you have National Highways building toll projects funded via RAB, you have that information, which should allow you to see through some of the perhaps excessive claims on cost that you can see in other sectors. That is a positive, but you still have the fundamental problem of the RAB, which is slightly less incentive to keep costs down unless you have very good information and a regulator that is very on it.
Olly Glover (Didcot and Wantage) (LD)
Q
Ben Hopkinson: I completely agree that the UK has a long historical challenge with delivering infrastructure cheaply and quickly. HS2 is the most expensive railway ever built, and the Bakerloo line extension will be one of the most expensive underground lines ever built. Tramlines are double the cost here compared to other European countries. We have the most expensive nuclear power plant ever built. There is a real long-term failure to build infrastructure quickly and cheaply.
On the Bill, it is good that we are getting private financing in, and that will help ease some of the burden on the state, when we are already pushed up against our fiscal limits. As I have mentioned, I have a little concern about the incentive structure, especially insofar as the private constructor has incentives to escalate costs as much as they can get away with under the ORR. A concession model might work a little better.
Sam Dumitriu: One of the important things when it comes to infrastructure delivery is ensuring you have a pipeline of projects, you know what you will build next and you can plan appropriately. We have many reasons why, in the UK, those pipelines get knocked about. Sometimes you have a road that you want to build, and everyone wants it built, but someone has brought a lawsuit against the road and it is delayed by a year. That makes planning for that really challenging.
One of the other problems is that sometimes those delays mean that you get pushed into different funding windows—the Treasury can reopen conversations about value for money, especially when in every Budget someone is trying to squeeze things into the fiscal rules and moving things from one period into another period, and cost-saving measures that are really delays. Those things tend to happen, and have happened for ever.
One thing that was really impressive under the last Government was the road investment strategy approach, which essentially said “We will set out a strategic case for all the big roads we want to build, we will give a pot of money and then we will give a delivery body the freedom to execute that.” The freedom to execute was slightly constrained by the planning system and all those delays, but fundamentally that is a very good approach. The challenge comes when the money is not quite there from the public purse, in part because the fiscal situation is tighter, but also because different choices are being made. In that case, private finance can fill the gap and ensure that you have a much more stable pipeline. I am in favour of that aspect and I think that will speed up delivery.
Tristan Osborne (Chatham and Aylesford) (Lab)
Q
Ben Hopkinson: It is a good question. First, in the French example, I am well aware that it is quite expensive to drive on a French motorway. On the other hand, they have many more miles of motorway, and if it is too expensive you can take the equivalent of an A road for certain journeys. Judging by the number of people who drive on French motorways, I think people are generally willing to accept the costs, especially given that they have built many more miles of motorway just this century than we have in total.
I could be proved wrong if it works really well, but the main challenge with the RAB model is the sheer uncertainty of whether the ORR is up to the task and has the right staff in place. It has never done this before. I know there have already been some concerns about capacity issues and general commercial experience within the ORR. I would be concerned if the private sector had large commercial control and contract teams and the public sector did not have them and was out-negotiated. That is certainly possible if civil servants are not able to properly push back on price increases.
I think the fundamental incentives in a RAB model are not right for delivering one-of-a-kind, unique pieces of infrastructure. It works a lot better for infrastructure that has very clear unit costs—for example, the cost of laying 100 metres of pipe. That is good because a regulator is clearly able to understand how much 100 metres of pipe costs to lay and can apply that across its base, whereas the cost of one lower Thames crossing is up in the air. Some additions from the private contractor might seem sensible; they might get away with that. Having a more environmentally friendly construction process certainly seems sensible on the face of it, but that also adds cost. I would want to be reassured that the ORR is up to the task and has both the capacity and the know-how to properly understand the arrangements it is entering into.
Sam Dumitriu: You mentioned price gouging. It is important to work out what the main risks are. Roads are, in most cases, natural monopolies, and the best thing about being a monopoly is a quiet life. It is not necessarily that you have all these opportunities to gouge your customers; it is that the lack of competition means you are not forced to adopt cost-saving measures, or become more customer-friendly and so on. You might have a situation where various people are claiming quite high margins or they are being aggressive in that sense, but the UK has the other problem, where people are not on it around costs. They are not working out what the best structure is to ensure that costs keep falling.
On Ben’s point, one possible way of resolving the issue is quite a radical reform that is probably beyond the scope of the Bill. I have always wondered whether it makes sense for the UK to have Ofgem doing RAB regulation for energy networks, Ofwat doing it for water, the ORR for road and rail and Ofcom for telecoms, or whether it makes sense to have a specialist economic regulator that deals with the costs of natural monopoly networks. That would have a bunch of advantages. It would potentially resolve some of the revolving door problems that you might see. It would also ensure that there is a similar expertise and a standard approach. You do not want varying approaches between all the regulators, because that suggests that they are doing something wrong when you have essentially the same economic problem to solve. As I say, however, that would be far beyond the scope of the Bill.
Alison Griffiths (Bognor Regis and Littlehampton) (Con)
Q
In a situation such as we have at the moment, where diesel is at £2 a litre and the sustainable version another 50p on top of that, costs are going right up not only for the build, but for the corporate budgets of the haulage companies and for everyday individuals, who have to manage their household budgets. If the cost goes up to a level beyond the right balance of pricing that is commercially viable for the operator, or absorbable for the family or the business, what happens?
At the moment, I am worried about a white elephant across the Thames. In such circumstances, in the end all the costs would get absorbed by the taxpayer and this model goes up in smoke. I am keen to hear from you how concerned I should be about that and what alternative models there are elsewhere.
Ben Hopkinson: The ultimate backstop is the Exchequer. Already the Exchequer has had to bear the cost of bringing the lower Thames crossing through planning. I think it is expected to spend about £3.1 billion on the lower Thames crossing even before private investment is brought in. If we have a circumstance where the toll is not paying back what is necessary and the private body that has financed the road falls into difficulty, the Bill states that the Exchequer is able to top up or provide payments, guarantees or low-cost loans. The backstop is therefore ultimately the taxpayer, combined with higher charges for motorists on the road.
Alison Griffiths
Q
Ben Hopkinson: I am not sure if that would be an appropriate thing for the Bill itself, but trying to make the project as low-cost as possible will definitely be appropriate as we go on to construction and working with National Highways and whatever private company wins the contract. That will be about ensuring that the Office of Rail and Road is set up properly to oversee the costs that are being put through.
Sam Dumitriu: It is worth remembering, however, that the families who may pay higher tolls to cross either the Dartford crossing or the lower Thames crossing, in the absence of a lower Thames crossing bear very high costs, too, as does freight traffic between two of our major ports. The crossing is crucial to the whole wider freight economy—there are really big problems there. I think it is worth remembering that the projects should be made a priority and that, ultimately, they need to get built.
Alison Griffiths
Q
The Chair
Order. That brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witnesses for their evidence.
Examination of Witness
Thomas McLennan gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear evidence from the British Vehicle Rental and Leasing Association. We have until 2.55 pm for this panel. Could the witness please introduce themselves for the record?
Thomas McLennan: Hi, I am Thomas McLennan. I am the director of policy and public affairs for the British Vehicle Rental and Leasing Association.
Greg Smith
Q
Thomas McLennan: Thank you for the question. For wider context, we have more than 1,000 members, and between them there about 4.6 million vehicles, representing about one in 10 cars, one in six vans and one in six trucks on UK roads. Our members own those vehicles, but other people use them. Right at the core of the problem with almost any measure or change of this scale is the technical detail. Perhaps that is not as interesting as the macro questions around how things are funded and so on, but it is what really impacts us and everyday users.
We have seen in a number of major changes in how road funding and wider funding happens, such as the eVED scheme, that the technical detail has not been considered up front. That has led to huge stress for the sector and potentially administration bills in the hundreds of millions of pounds. We want to see, in any change of this scale, especially if it will encompass an expansion of barrierless charging to more current barriered toll operations, that technical detail is guardrailed in right from the start.
At the end of the day, what we want to see is good user experience, as well as good business experience for both our members and their customers. It is in no one’s interest to have a system that is bureaucratic, challenging and leads to abrasion, when you are reducing the barriers to reduce abrasion and exactly that kind of thing. If you are just moving it elsewhere, it does not really meet its purpose. We are keen to see that this is as technically guardrailed as possible to make sure that end customers have a good experience.
Greg Smith
Q
For example, here in London, we have the congestion charge. It is dressed up as an environmental scheme, but we all know it is just road charging. Equally, other schemes are popping up. Arriving at my party’s conference in Birmingham, I remember saying to a passenger in the car, “Quick, panic—look up whether I have to pay a charge for this new clean air zone”—or whatever it might be. Is one of the things you are looking for in that answer something that simplifies the experience of the British motorist across schemes built under this model, as well as everything else?
Thomas McLennan: Short answer: yes. The long answer is that consistency is key. A lot of the burden in this model, and in any of these charging models, falls on the registered keeper. On your point, Greg, of needing a passenger to pay, not everyone has a passenger. There are lots of instances where people do not pay and there are inconsistent lengths of time that you have in which to make that payment—it might be 24 hours or six days. There might be an inconsistency in the ramping up of charges if you do not pay, or in how that charging is structured and the portals that you can use—it is all varied.
If you can create a national framework for individual specificity—I am not saying that everyone has to be exactly the same in what they are delivering, but you need to have the same guardrails and structure that enable someone to have consistency of experience. That would enable fleets to advise their customers, who might be someone running grocery stores across the country or a tourist who is arriving at an airport in the north or the south, and to train their staff to be able to give consistent advice and experience. Having every scheme with its own approach could be deeply challenging.
Greg Smith
Q
Thomas McLennan: That is a very good question. I am afraid we have not done that modelling, but we can look into it. The more pernicious point for us is that the more points of friction you have in your usership, the less likely you are to be able to make the usership work for you. We have unfortunately seen that even in great measures, and in London the level of friction has meant that some car club companies had to fold. It is challenging to operate where you have a split, with every borough having its own rules—all of those interactions have been deeply challenging. With more consistency, we can have a strategic vision on how to deliver within that framework. That is a much stronger approach to enable the investment from ourselves and the customers to be able to keep mobility moving in this country.
Justin Madders
Q
Thomas McLennan: We have had very mixed experiences with barrierless charging, so I do not think we can give a pure vision on that right now. We have had some use cases where currently there is not even the ability to transfer liability to someone who has hired a vehicle—the operator does not allow it. Then there are other instances where you can do bulk uploads, the system works really well and it is effectively smooth sailing.
What we always see is that the removal of barriers means a lot more penalty charge notices. That obviously makes sense, because previously you had to pay to get across, and then the barrier is removed and lots of people do not pay, so there is a sharp increase in penalty charge notices. All of our members have reported that to us.
The question is what happens after that. The inconsistencies mean that you can then have a duplicative effect of enormous administrative burdens on everyone involved, which have to be paid to make that work. We would say that if we are going towards barrierless charging from the get-go, which we understand has congestion benefits and so on, it needs to be done so that you do not shift the burden of someone paying at the barrier downstream to someone then having to figure out how to transfer liability or chase up on that, removing people’s ability to challenge the fines because they have just been paid, and so on. We need to look at all those things in the Bill from the start and structure them there.
Justin Madders
Q
Thomas McLennan: I have a concern that there is too much emphasis on downstream consultation in the Bill. We want to see a requirement to enable things such as the transfer of liability in the Bill because that has not been consistent in the market to date. We need to see that embedded from the start.
The Chair
If there are no further questions from Members, I will thank the witness for his evidence and we will move on to the next panel.
Examination of Witnesses
Will Godfrey and Matt Palmer gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from the Office of Rail and Road and National Highways. We have until 3.35 pm for this panel. Will the witnesses please introduce themselves briefly for the record?
Will Godfrey: Good afternoon. My name is Will Godfrey, and I am director of economics, finance and markets at the Office of Rail and Road. I am leading our preparations for the licensing arrangements and the regulatory framework that you have under consideration today.
Matt Palmer: Good afternoon. I am Matt Palmer, and I am the National Highways chief exec for the lower Thames crossing.
Greg Smith
Q
Given the significant new responsibility that the Bill will give to the Office of Road and Rail in particular, is the organisation suitably equipped to take on a new licensing regime? Does it have a skills base that has looked at other parts of the world or other sectors that have adopted a RAB model? Does it have the necessary interactivity with road users to ensure that early projects do not end up with more teething problems than anybody would have wanted? I am not saying that anybody would want teething difficulties, but we know that that happens when big change comes about.
Will Godfrey: We do not underestimate the significance of this work. It is important work, and it builds very significantly on the experience that we have from both rail and road. Our interactions on the rail side cover publicly and commercially funded infrastructure, and managers and operators. I could refer to a number of examples, including the work that we do on price controls on the high-speed link down to the Channel tunnel, and interactions with international passenger operators looking to expand operations there.
On the road side, we obviously have experience as the monitor and the organisation responsible for holding National Highways to account. We are certainly looking to build on the engineering, economics and finance operations. We also have consumer policy experience across both road and rail.
I started out in economic regulation just over 25 years ago. I have worked in the water sector, and I worked in telecommunications for a number of years, including overseeing the arrangements that led to the roll-out of superfast broadband, among other things. A number of colleagues have worked in other sectors, spanning aviation, water and others.
Your question about the risk of teething problems is well placed. I am confident that we have the lead time to build in the necessary arrangements and resourcing to get ourselves ready for the new arrangements. One of the important things to bear in mind is that the regulator’s role takes place once a licence has been awarded. A licence for the lower Thames crossing—the first scheme that will be enabled by the Bill—is some way off yet. The process for awarding that licence currently sits with the Government, but we are in discussion with the Department about our future resourcing to deliver this work.
Greg Smith
Q
Will Godfrey: There are two parts to that question. One is where we are at with, for example, the lower Thames crossing. There is a lot of debate about the risk of cost overruns and so forth, but this is not a new project; it is already significantly advanced. There has been significant work, and perhaps Matt will talk to it in a moment, on preparation—literally the groundwork—to get this project ready, so it is not a completely new project. That comes with the advantage of some teething issues already happening.
In terms of the ORR’s capability, we are working closely with the Department to look at the arrangements that might apply to, for example, licensing. This is an important point I want to stress: the Bill gives us the duties and powers that we want to see, but the really important thing for making a lot of these schemes work is that the licensing arrangements are the right ones, and that you have the licence conditions in place to hold the company to account properly and scrutinise its delivery not just on construction but on operation, its approach to tolling and so forth.
In terms of having the resource in place to do that, I am currently working with a small team. We are looking at the suite of skills and capability that we anticipate needing across, for example, corporate finance, supporting the stakeholder group—that is an important part of the Bill—and the engineering and operations capability. I am confident that we have the lead time to get in place the team that we need. We are in discussion with the Department about the resourcing necessary to secure that.
Greg Smith
Q
Matt Palmer: I am an historic mega-project constructor. I have done many big projects across the world and in the UK. Let’s talk about diesel and its cost. It is part of lower Thames crossing’s requirements, which were set in 2022, for us to construct to carbon neutral, and actually, it ends up with us being in line with the sixth carbon budget. That has been a requirement in our project. We have executed it. It is in part of our development consent order. It is required now by law and by statute through the development consent order. The vast majority of our diesel is being replaced by HVO, for which we are currently paying £1.70 per litre.
Greg Smith
Q
Matt Palmer: We pay £1.70; our contractors do not pay VAT on it. It is marginally over a current diesel cost, but we ran a competitive process and it was competitively bid.
Greg Smith
Q
Matt Palmer: It is comparable to diesel. Actually, the total operating cost of some of our equipment that we are starting to bring out is cheaper. The electric kit is actually cheaper per total operating cost, which is what you would experience in your EV and so on.
Greg Smith
Q
Matt Palmer: No, it does not. That is why we are using HVO and electric.
Greg Smith
Q
Will Godfrey: Matt has covered the construction side of things. Was there a part of your question about licensing arrangements?
Greg Smith
Yes.
Will Godfrey: In terms of the construction of this particular project, as I say, the way you hold the company to account relates to what is in the licence, and it is important to draw a distinction between what is in the development consent order and what is in the licence. The regulator’s role is not to hold the company to account on the DCO—that remains subject to the separate process for the scrutiny and delivery of that.
What the ORR would be doing under these arrangements is holding the company to account on the licence itself. The first price control settlement, if you like, would be set by the Department as part of a competition toward the first licence. Those would set the commercial terms—the expectation around allowed revenue and so forth—and then the ORR would come in as the regulator at the start of the price control and hold the company to account against that, by monitoring and scrutinising the delivery against the relevant milestones on the construction.
Justin Madders
Q
Matt Palmer: The lower Thames crossing has been developed in detail over the last six years. Our development consent order fixes that scope very tightly; we cannot build any more or any less, so the scope is very well known. We are now running at 90% designed, so we literally are fully designed, and it has been competitively bid for. It is operating—we are currently on site with 3,300 people—and operating well against that very defined scope.
It is, I am afraid, just a simple road. My colleagues back at base will kick me for that, but as a project it is a simple thing to build. We are not building a complex signalling system or a control system for a nuclear power station; we are just building a simple dumb asset. As for our ability to control that, control on road construction is historically very good. If you take a similar project, which would be something like Thames Tideway, a similar RAB-based model, it is another simple dumb asset—that is no disrespect to my colleagues who built that. These are simple projects to build. They are large, but they are simple, and we know how to build them in the UK. The cost control on it is predominantly driven by the fact that we know what we are building and what it costs.
Justin Madders
Do have anything to add, Mr Godfrey?
Will Godfrey: I would reiterate the point that the development consent order tightly defines the scope of what is being delivered. As Matt said, the project is already well advanced.
There are a few other points to bring up. Getting the cost forecast right, which underpins the allowed revenue for the first control period, is really important. That is the baseline against which you are holding the company to account. The instruments thereafter are what you specify in the licence, and that is really important to get right. That is not stuff you put in the Bill, but it is really important that you get it right in the licence and that you have the right incentives for the privately financed entity to deliver against that schedule. You need to make sure that the balance in the allocation of risk is right and that end users are ultimately protected from the risks of cost overruns.
As I say, this project is fairly well advanced already; it is not like we are talking about starting one from scratch.
Olly Glover
Q
Will Godfrey: I think the ORR’s role, as envisaged in the Bill, would not be to advise on those questions. That would be more of a question to address to Government. It is perhaps relevant here that it is important to take account of the risk-adjusted cost of financing. You have already made the point about whether things are on the balance sheet or not. Another point to bring in is the certainty around the funding and delivery arrangements. RAB-based price controls are a commitment to a certain cycle of, typically, five-year reviews in which you set the funding requirements, the price control limits and what is delivered in that period. You reset each time but the point is that it is not potentially subject to Government reopening the arrangements for the funding, which is sometimes encountered in other publicly funded arrangements. I think that is as much as I am able to say. That is more of a question for Government.
Olly Glover
Q
Matt Palmer: If you talk specifically about the lower Thames crossing, its strategic case is incredibly strong and it was introduced by Government to be built because of the broader economic benefit for the country. There is a mixture of models that the Government could choose to fund it. There was a discussion about concessions and RAB-based models earlier. They will all carry the same carrot and stick for driving cost performance. In the end, it is the Government’s decision to bring a project forward. If it is of a strategic nature then this Bill will allow you to fund it.
Olly Glover
Q
Will Godfrey: One distinction I would draw with the Railways Bill is that that Bill was so significantly concerned with the creation of Great British Railways, which will be responsible for something like 75% of all traffic on the network—not quite the whole market but a very significant proportion of the market. People are therefore understandably keen to see what arrangements are in the licence for that entity. This Bill is enabling and economy-wide. Clearly, the main project that we are talking about currently is the lower Thames crossing, but in principle several other licensed entities could be out there. That is one distinction that I would draw.
As to whether a particular licence is essential to inform the scrutiny of a Bill, my feeling is that the Bill gives you, as a regulator, the kind of duties, functions and powers that you would expect. On the licence, clearly there is work to be done there, but one advantage is that the licences will be put out to competitive tender. That provides a different level of scrutiny from the arrangements under the Railways Bill, in which the licence is awarded to GBR as the given entity that will receive it.
Tristan Osborne
Q
“There are, however, likely to be gaps such as those relating to construction phase price controls, project specific
I know you said that you had confidence in that area, but that report was published just last month. Can I get some clarity? Are you saying that the report is not entirely right and that you are confident that the three aspects it raised will be covered going forward?
Will Godfrey: We very much welcome that independent review of the ORR. It is always helpful to have that sort of outside-in look and scrutiny.
On what it describes as gaps, the other point that Dr Richard Judge brought out was that we are not building from scratch, so this is about providing incremental capacity. I think he was right to draw out those areas as ones where you would want to make sure that the gaps have been filled by the time you are past Royal Assent, the first licence has been awarded and you are into the start of the first price control, which is a long way from today. The point I am making is that, from the discussions I have been having with the Department, I am reasonably confident about being able to resource what I would describe as incremental gaps, rather than starting from a blank sheet.
Shivani Raja (Leicester East) (Con)
Q
Will Godfrey: At the heart of the regulator’s responsibilities would be furthering the interests of current and future users. Those are exactly the kind of considerations that would be at the heart of how you approach the regulation, how you set up the instruments—I am referring specifically to the licence—and how you then hold the company to account against that licence.
For the first control period, in the case of the lower Thames crossing, the licence would be awarded by the Department, so the particular tolling structure and the level of tolls would be set through that competition for the first licence. Thereafter, the way that the ORR operates is that the code that the ORR would be responsible for creating on the approach to tolling arrangements will clearly be important once you are past that first point.
My feeling is that the arrangements necessary to provide protections to end users around, for example, tolling and toll shocks and so on feel about right to me in the enabling legislation. What is really important is what goes into the licence and what we put into the code, and then how the company responds. I hope there will be a virtuous circle, in which there is a clear signal of what is expected, we hold the company to account, it delivers and implements it, and we then take the feedback from the market. I do not know if you were anticipating a different concern, but I will pause there in case I have not answered your question.
Shivani Raja
No, that is fine. Do you have anything to add, Mr Palmer?
Matt Palmer: I think it is beyond my scope—National Highways is here as an operator and a constructor. I think Will has probably answered the question properly.
Mike Reader (Northampton South) (Lab)
Q
Matt Palmer: I think all of us recognise that annualised costs on major projects, especially mega-projects, are very difficult to deal with. They drive perverse cost behaviours, where you are trying to fit into a 12-month window, and the Government are currently moving, with the mega-projects piece, towards more of an envelope-type conversation. This is just another extension of that. You end up with a cost envelope that you are working within, with a driven timeframe that you have to deliver to, which then allows the flexibility to execute at the right time—depending on the weather and so on. It is that flex that you need in order to execute efficiently. If you are constraining yourself on cost to a budget every year, which is common, it does drive cost. This model gives you the flex that allows you to drive an efficient construction project.
Mike Reader
Q
Matt Palmer: The base cost of the scheme—the cost without inflation—has been fixed since 2020. The great thing about a development consent order is that the scope is fixed. We are still building 52 bridges, 22 km of road and 4.3 km of tunnel. The cost difference between now and previously is essentially driven by inflation. You have got great cost control sat there inside the direct consent order. Our contracts with our contractors then drive to that same scope and control, and there is a pain/gain share: they get into pain if they exceed and they get incentivised to deliver below, which is normal with any project of this scale.
Mike Reader
Q
Will Godfrey: I hope my earlier answers go to some of that. If your question is specifically about the scope of what you were just asking Matt, it is important for us that the arrangements around what will be LTC Co. and its relationship with its contractors, and in turn what it is allowed to charge to end customers, is not a simple pass-through-type arrangement. That is really important.
You need to make sure that there are the right liability caps in relation to the pain/gain sharing. Are those at the right level? Has LTC Co. or any company licensed under these arrangements—let us concentrate on the LTC example—got the right incentives to be able to control the relationship with the contractors? Through the licence and the price control arrangements we need to create arrangements in which there remains that discipline to control those costs, so it is not a set of arrangements in which, beyond a certain threshold, end users are ultimately on the hook for cost pass-through.
The importance that the Bill places on efficiency in the economy and that being at the heart of our duties is something that we would take really seriously and very much welcome. It gives us the authority to be able to act on getting to those kind of price control licence arrangements. Of course, as I said earlier, the first price control arrangement would be set by the Department through that first competition for the first licence. In terms of how we operate on it thereafter, we would look to make sure there is not just a simple mechanistic pass-through in the event that costs overrun, whether for inflation or other cost shocks.
Douglas Lumsden (Aberdeen South) (Con)
Q
Will Godfrey: I think “without any level of scrutiny” is something I would take issue with, certainly as I would see the arrangements working. We have had good discussions with old colleagues of mine at Ofwat about the arrangements they had, for example, for the Thames tideway tunnel. There, both the rhythm—by which I mean the frequency of reporting, monitoring and scrutiny of costs during construction—and the importance of having a dependable, expert, independent technical assurer on the costs are really important for making sure you have that right level of visibility and scrutiny. I would question the nature of unchecked costs. I am not denying that cost pressures would arise, but that is the whole point of having arrangements like an independent technical assessor.
Douglas Lumsden
Q
Will Godfrey: I will go to both costs and schedule. There are instruments that you can bring in through a licence—such as cost-sharing rates. The point I was trying to make earlier is that you do not necessarily design a price control—at the moment, if there is a cost shock, it just goes through to end-user prices, so cost-sharing arrangements are one example. You can also bring in thresholds to make sure that the company is incentivised to remain on schedule as well.
Douglas Lumsden
Q
Will Godfrey: Before we get to that point, it is worth bearing in mind whether there are other potential investors willing to buy out the company that is struggling. There may be particular reasons why—maybe it was not well managed or well financed. There is the potential in principle for someone to come in through normal mergers or acquisitions and take responsibility. In the event that the company is really struggling against a particular settlement, that is a challenge for a regulator to manage. There are certain provisions on the limit, where things ultimately are pushed to the point of non-recoverability, which are envisaged within the Bill.
One of the jobs of the regulator is, first, getting that first price control settlement right. As I say, at the moment that is being set by the Department, but getting that projection on the allowed cost is key—get it right at the start. Then, that rhythm of regular monitoring is really important to make sure that you anticipate that point. What you do not want to be doing, particularly with a construction project like this, is to get to that point with some element of surprise. What you need to do is keep that regular rhythm of monitoring and scrutiny, so that you can act before you get to that point that the company has nowhere to go.
Douglas Lumsden
Q
Will Godfrey: At certain points it is possible that a regulator could introduce things like cost limits, beyond which there was then a redetermination of a price allowance, but not necessarily one that was a simple “costs have overrun by CX, therefore tolls increase by the same amount.” It would not be an automatic pass-through; it would be subject to that efficiency and economy test.
Jim Dickson (Dartford) (Lab)
Q
Matt Palmer: We are moving at pace. The Chancellor at the last autumn Budget—not this one—announced funding to get us to private finance, and we are well into that. We are moving at pace. There is a misunderstanding that we have not started. We have very definitely started: 2,000 people are on site, we have 14 sq km of land and there is a lot of mud at the moment, I am afraid. We are moving well and at pace. Our target is to get a tunnel boring machine, which will be the largest in the world at the time, in the ground in 2028, which will line up roughly with when we go to private finance. All of that is contingent on the fact that we need the legislation through to allow us to get the equity to move on thereafter.
Jim Dickson
Q
Matt Palmer: The logic is that the economic benefit of the scheme is great. Not only does it solve the problem in the local area; it is a national-level project, so we move at pace, we start the construction and we take a lot of the difficult, time-consuming activities like land assembly—putting plots of land together—and that is what we are doing at the moment. All of that enables a much more stable platform for investors to come in.
Alison Griffiths
Q
Matt Palmer: In construction in the UK, about two thirds of our constructors use HVO as standard. For a project, you will find that a number of constructors bid with HVO—it is just in the costs. That is the case with lower Thames crossing. Two thirds of our contractors bid with HVO.
Alison Griffiths
Q
Matt Palmer: But we have never—what I am saying is that we went to market and asked them to build us a project. They did that with HVO as the base bid. We did not see the cost with diesel.
Alison Griffiths
Q
Matt Palmer: We did not go out with a diesel-based product because the market typically comes forward with an HVO product.
Alison Griffiths
Q
Matt Palmer: I think I have explained myself. They are comparable. £1.70 is what we are paying. I have been clear that that is what we are paying for HVO at the moment.
Alison Griffiths
As I say, when I asked each of these sources specifically about construction projects—I have not asked them about retail; I asked them about construction—they have been clear that there are substantial additional costs to using HVO. I just wanted to make sure that that was clear.
The Chair
If there are no further questions from Members, I thank the witnesses for their evidence.
Examination of Witnesses
Roger Forsdyke and Andrew Truscott gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear evidence from Wates Construction and John Laing. We have until 4.10 pm for this panel. Could the witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record?
Andrew Truscott: I am Andrew Truscott. I am the chief executive officer of John Laing, which is a global investor in infrastructure projects. We are a 178-year-old UK business. Our specialism is investing in greenfield projects, by which I mean projects that go through the construction cycle. We have delivered about 180 greenfield construction projects across the world over the last 25 years.
Roger Forsdyke: My name is Roger Forsdyke. I am UK operations director for Wates Construction. Wates is a business privately owned and incorporated in 1897, and has been working in infrastructure and house building since then.
Greg Smith
Q
Andrew Truscott: We applaud the use of RAB in this regard. Why? This is a complicated project. Listening to the previous panel, the feature of RAB that feels very relevant to LTC is the ability to have intra-cycle changes, subject to the way that, in particular, traffic operates in the future.
I am speaking purely from an investor perspective, so please excuse me; I look at Tideway as a really well delivered project, from an investor perspective, and a similar model was used there. The model used at Heathrow has also been relatively successful. Being totally transparent, when we first started talking to Government about this project, I felt that a more traditional concession model might be more appropriate, but the way in which the project is now being procured, and in particular the addition of the bridge, means that the RAB model looks really very interesting and, I would probably argue, more attractive from an investing perspective.
Greg Smith
Q
Andrew Truscott: Yes: uncapped construction cost risk being transferred on to an investor. I am being overly simplistic, so please excuse me, but that is something that we would not do, and I would argue that we are a relatively good proxy for investors of our type. Some work and some thought need to go into how to manage that cost overrun risk.
Echoing the comments from the previous panel, this is a well thought through project. We applaud the way it has been developed. Hopefully it can be delivered on time and on budget, but of the 180 projects that we have delivered, I can probably count on the fingers of one hand how many actually have been. As a contractor, an investor or a Government, all stakeholders have to be prepared for the expectation of cost overrun. Asking an investor to take uncapped cost overrun into its accounts does not necessarily mean that it is a terrible outcome; it just means that I cannot price equity.
Greg Smith
Q
Andrew Truscott: Plan for the worst, and really plan for the worst around cost inflation. It was interesting listening to the Chancellor yesterday. Every element of the supply chain and the cost is increasing globally for all these sorts of projects. Plan for the worst and plan for an expectation that, unfortunately, even though it is not the intention, you will end up with a project that costs more than you expected it to on day one.
Greg Smith
Q
Andrew Truscott: Again, I will focus on cost for a minute, and then I would love Roger’s view because he is at the coalface; I am just a simple investor in my ivory tower.
What is important is that there are mechanics in the construction process or the construction phase that incentivise contractors to stick to budget as much as they can. Again, credit to the way in which the Bill is written and the way LTC is being procured—this idea of cost sharing and certain elements of cost being shared between contractor and Government and rolled into RAB. Having those sorts of features that really—no disrespect to Roger—hold the contractor’s feet to the fire in terms of cost control are very sensible. These projects can be delivered on time and on budget. We have just finished the North East Link project in Melbourne where we tunnelled under the Yarra, which is quite a complicated river. We did it on time and on budget.
Greg Smith
Q
Roger Forsdyke: It is about responsibility for outcomes, and Andrew is right: put it where the responsibility lies. As a contractor, we are in control of only some of the process. I often think the contractor is being presented with all the risk, when the design, the planning and the procurement are in some other court.
For me, the most important thing is to get the planning done, so that you do not start before you are ready. A lot of projects start under pressure, without the outcome and the scope having been fully detailed and the risk apportioned correctly. You have to look at the stages that we need to go through so that, when we put a shovel in the ground, the scale and scope have been determined. In the majority of cases, cost overruns come from uncertainty, which is often there before we start work; things have not been properly nailed down with the appropriate parties. Yes, hold the contractor’s feet to the fire, but there are other parties and elements: the designers, the ecology—all the other things that go into a proper, well-delivered project. There needs to be some measure of accountability there also. Often, at the other end of the contract, we find that being transferred—not necessarily fully realised—into the contractor’s risk. That is where you get problems.
Greg Smith
Q
Roger Forsdyke: Potentially. It is a question of appropriateness. If it is blanket HVO—well, there is some plant, some stuff, you need to use diesel for, so it is a question of appropriateness for me. There is an uplift in use of that type of fuel—HVO. If that is a key stakeholder requirement and the public purse can afford it, it is something that should be done, but those are decisions outside a contractor’s position.
Greg Smith
I appreciate that that is outside the contractor’s position. That is why I came with the question.
Roger Forsdyke: That is not a variable cost to me; it is just an additional cost. The risk comes from variable costs that I cannot control.
Greg Smith
Q
Roger Forsdyke: I think you have answered your own question.
Greg Smith
Fair enough.
Andrew Truscott: There is only one thing I would add, and this is a bit naughty, so apologies. You are building a road; people have diesel cars that drive on the road. One of the things that we at John Laing do is this. We own toll roads; we own availability roads all around the world, and we couch our stage 1 and stage 2 emissions on each of our roads with a path to net zero in 2050. The one thing we cannot control is the vehicles that run on the roads that we build. We can control the operations and we can have input into the way they are built, but ultimately these are polluting events, because people drive diesel and petrol cars on them.
Olly Glover
Q
Andrew Truscott: My biggest concern about this project is the ultimate cost to the end user. That is a piece of maths that we all, collectively, need to get right, because we cannot end up with a wonderful project that unfortunately saddles the user with an uneconomic toll for the next 50 or 60 years. How can we manage that? We can manage it by, obviously, trying to keep the cost of construction as low as we possibly can. Other things in our toll roads and our businesses globally include dynamic tolling, where we encourage road use by differentiated pricing depending on the time of day—I would love to explore that with the Government at the right time—and differentiation for different types of vehicles. I think there is a way of getting the end users’ experience to be a little fairer than if there was just a flat toll.
In terms of the overall costs and delivery, obviously, the cost of financing at the moment is as high as it has been in my career. That is a factor that we all have to be aware of. I am sure you guys all know this, but infrastructure is a diversifier in pension fund portfolios. We are a spread to the risk-free investor. That is how we calculate our returns, so unfortunately, as risk-free rates go up, the expectation of the returns on our capital also goes up.
Innovation around how we can collectively deliver a financing package against that backdrop that is as cheap and deliverable as possible is also quite important. How do we do that? Certainty of outcome, high-quality regulation and ensuring that everybody who commits capital understands the limits of their capital and is therefore able to calculate their returns accordingly.
Olly Glover
Any thoughts from you, Mr Forsdyke?
Roger Forsdyke: Not on the subject of financing; it is outside my experience.
Tristan Osborne
Q
Andrew Truscott: I would slightly reject your first statement, if I am honest. As an infrastructure investor, we provide, candidly, the lowest cost private capital that is available across the world. If you are attracting John Laing and people like us, I can guarantee that you are getting the lowest cost of equity capital that you can possibly attract and therefore the risk transfer needs to be accordingly appropriate.
I will slightly repeat my opening comments: when we first started interacting with DFT about this project, I was quite nervous about the RAB model. I am not a RAB nerd; there are lots of RAB nerds, and I am not one. RAB can be incredibly complicated, and it can take a huge amount of time to drill down. There is not a regulator. There is an awful lot of work that needs to be done. Am I nervous that that is going to take longer than it should do or could do? Yes, I am, but again, credit to DFT and the Treasury, they seem to be well on track. Maybe the better answer to your question is that we as investors will need absolute certainty—and I mean absolute certainty—about what that regulatory model is, who the regulator is and how that regulation is going to work before we will put in a dollar, a pound, or a euro—whatever currency you like.
Alison Griffiths
Q
Roger Forsdyke: It is really interesting that you say that from your experience it is the commercial pressure. The most important thing in the tendering process is to have measurables beyond just the cost. If it is first past the post, you are destined to push the price down to the lowest-quality bid, which often creates the problems you are describing and that we described earlier. You have to look at how you will measure the quality of the tenders in real terms, beyond the cost of the lowest bid. I do not think that is regularly done effectively, so you end up with cheap materials, optimistic programming, optimistic budgeting and all those things just to get to a price that is probably optimistic in the first place. That echoes what Andrew said.
Alison Griffiths
Q
Roger Forsdyke: I think so. If you have gateways where you build the price through detailed submissions, you can then control it. You do not want uncontrollable cost and excellent quality, but you need to create some gateways through the process so that you can control the quality as you go through. That is my experience. Those sorts of two-stage processes create the best outcomes.
You then have to make sure there is no undefined scope. As you cross the line to secured and the responsibility moves to the contractor, you do not want any change. That is sometimes very hard to achieve, but it is a really important step. It is often, “Oh, we just need to get started,” and the pressure of starting often means that the project will start prematurely, before the scope is defined. That is where the optimism bias goes in—the provisional sum might be light or whatever—and then you end up with escalation, notwithstanding the delays to resolving the issues themselves.
Andrew Truscott: I do not have a huge amount to add, because Roger has put it beautifully. I will just say one thing, and he can kick me under the table: contracting is a hard business. They do billions of pounds-worth of revenue for 2%, 3% or 4% margins—it is hard—and there is therefore little scope in their business models for mistakes. They will always enter into these sorts of projects with an expectation that mistakes do not land at their desk, because otherwise they go bust, and they have done globally.
Again, credit to the way LTC is being procured. I think separating church and state a little bit—separating equity and financing from contracting, rather than having one single proposal—is arguably a way of getting more certainty around deliverability than amalgamating all those elements into one. Where we have seen material cost overruns, it tends to be in the big projects where one single solution is given to a customer. We have been looking at a lot of US projects recently in the road space where single projects— equity, traffic and revenue, as well as construction—are lumped into one big unit and presented to a customer, who then tries to aggregate and always aggregates to lowest cost, and that is not always the right solution.
I am giving my previous panellists an awful lot of credit today, which is wonderful. I think disaggregating elements could be a way of managing that risk and that cost and delay overrun quite well.
Jim Dickson
Q
Andrew Truscott: Hopefully not.
Jim Dickson
In terms of investor attractiveness, how would you rank the scheme globally against other schemes of similar size, or other comparable schemes? Do you think we are set to have a competitive and very interested set of players looking to bid?
Andrew Truscott: It is a really good question. I will try to keep my answer brief, because I could bore you for about a month on this.
The short answer is that the big attention for the main global contractors—of which there are, let us be honest, a handful—is currently on the US. The US is undergoing a big programme of what they are calling managed lanes projects, which are about upgrading existing roadways to be either tolled or semi-tolled or managed. I am sure you have not seen Ferrovial or Cintra—all the big Spanish contractors are very focused on the US. Australia is sporadic but yes, there are some large projects—not necessarily transportation projects—that are attracting interest from investors and contractors in Australia. In Europe, you can count it on the fingers of one hand. Actually, that is where LTC may get more attention, as a consequence of the lack of other available opportunities.
However, this is a big project. This is a big equity cheque and there will be an awful lot of investors who say—well, I am certainly yet to meet the investor who will be able to write a single cheque for the entire amount. My guess is that this will come down to pools of consortium of capital, very much like those that ended up being on Thames Tideway, who come together because the amount of capital required is just so huge.
Do I expect it to be competitive? Unfortunately, yes. Do I expect you to have 10 to 15 single-asset bidders all vying to buy 100% of the equity? Not in the slightest.
Douglas Lumsden
Q
Andrew Truscott: Not for the contractor; for the investor. Sorry—if I said “contractor”, I meant “investor”. Apologies. I do not care about the contractors. [Laughter.]
It is not because we do not understand and price risk; that is what we do for a living. It is just that I cannot go to my investment committee and, when asked, “Okay, Andrew, what is the maximum amount of equity you are going to put into this project and therefore what is the return you are expecting to get on it?”, give the answer, “I don’t know.” That is not a conversation—well, it could be a conversation, but it would be the last conversation I have with my investment committee.
Douglas Lumsden
Q
Andrew Truscott: Again, I am getting well over my skis, so apologies, but it is about being smart. I am not just suggesting that this all lands on the country balance sheet, whether it is the National Wealth Fund taking excess risk above a certain threshold and therefore becoming an equity investor as a consequence, but it would be sensible to be smart and think innovatively about how to cap the number, so that I can then go to my investment committee and say, “This is the amount of capital we’ll commit, with any excess being provided by somebody else in exchange for an economic interest.” Rather than trying to give answers, I would say that being thoughtful and innovative about how that cap can be constructed is definitely worth putting on the agenda.
Douglas Lumsden
Q
Andrew Truscott: I think it will.
Douglas Lumsden
Q
Andrew Truscott: I cannot speak for the entire investment community, but I can repeat what I said earlier. I think we are fairly typical—I mean, we are brilliant, but we are fairly typical—and an uncapped equity commitment is almost impossible for us to write.
The Chair
If there are no further questions from Members, I thank the witnesses for their evidence. We will move on to the next panel.
Examination of Witness
Justin Madders MP gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from the Minister. We have until 4.30 pm for this panel. Will the Minister please briefly introduce himself for the record?
Justin Madders: Good afternoon. I am Justin Madders, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the Department for Transport.
Greg Smith
Q
Justin Madders: We are pretty clear that it is not a backdoor to road pricing. The hon. Member may have an amendment that he thinks will deal with that, but I can assure him that we have gone through extensive discussions with the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel on this. I refer him to Logistics UK’s evidence this morning. They said that they thought the Bill was relatively strongly drafted in terms of closing the loopholes.
It is probably worth saying that, as the hon. Gentleman will know, the Bill’s intent is also important. My statements on the record on Second Reading, probably a number of times in Committee, I imagine, and today will all be relevant should, at some point in the future, a future Secretary of State want to do something that is clearly outside the scope and intention of the Bill. I will say, again, for the record, that this Bill does not provide a backdoor for widespread tolling.
The Bill is creating an additional financing option for major strategic road infrastructure, specifically for trunk roads in England. It is deliberately a framework because, rather than legislate for one individual project, it is possible that there may be more suitable projects in the future, but that does not mean—I want to be clear—that this will become the default model for road investment. Any future use would need to meet the requirements of the Bill and be considered on its own merits. As Steve Gooding from the RAC said this morning, I am happy to confirm that, at the moment, there are not any other schemes that are being considered for use under this Bill.
It is important to say that the Bill narrowly defines when a licence can be granted: for a new road, a capacity-enhancing improvement or the continued operation of a road that has been previously licensed under this regime. This is about major strategic infrastructure; it is not about, as in the example the hon. Member gave, putting in tolls when a new camera or something is introduced. That clearly is not the case. Some of the evidence earlier also suggested that our geographical constraints would make that very difficult anyway, even if that was what we wanted to do, which, I will state again for the record, is not the case.
Greg Smith
Q
Justin Madders: I am afraid I am going to disappoint you. We are not going to give figures for tolls for a nine-year window in advance, because that will be part of the ongoing analysis and development of the project and part of the discussions with potential investors. We are clear that the Bill will set out the framework for how that will work. It is about the economic and efficient costs of provision. It is very clear that we believe tolls must remain affordable and they must represent good value for road users. Future projects would be undertaken on the same basis, so although I cannot give any figures in pounds and pence, I can give assurances that there will be sufficient restraints in place to ensure that this is not an unlimited blank cheque for increased tolls for evermore.
Greg Smith
Q
Justin Madders: I thought the evidence from National Highways was very clear on that. It is saying that there is not an increased cost as a result of that. It also said very clearly that this was a requirement set in the development consent order in 2022, when your party was in government. I am not entirely sure where you are going with this.
Greg Smith
Q
Justin Madders: I would gently push back and say that, rather than evidence from people who are not working on the project, or from ChatGPT or whatever the source—
Greg Smith
The market, Minister.
Justin Madders: We had very clear evidence from National Highways that this is not having an overall impact on costs. I am happy to provide further information. I will ask it to put something in writing about the detail of that. You will be aware that this Bill is scheme agnostic, so it is not appropriate for such restrictions to be placed in the Bill, but I am happy to facilitate a further conversation, because I understand you are concerned about that.
Jim Dickson
Q
Justin Madders: I understand why you ask that question. The Bill sets the framework for the RAB model, and that will establish the independent regulator. Its remit is clear, and it is there in the first few clauses of the Bill: to take account of the interests of road users. There will be fair pricing, transparency and long-term sustainability as a result of that. You will also be aware that there will be a stakeholder group in which users will have the opportunity to feed in. We have a pretty robust set of reassurances that I hope will satisfy you and your constituents.
Olly Glover
Q
Justin Madders: First, as it made clear, the Treasury will not fund the totality of the project, so we have to look at other models. There are different views about how that would work. If we want to compare it to the private finance initiative, which has been the major funding source for a number of crossings in recent years, costs under the RAB model tend to be lower.
Clearly, we have an independent regulator that will, as I have explained and you have heard in evidence, be able to limit cost recovery, to make sure it is economic and efficient. There will be regular requirements set out to review that under the licence. Ultimately, the Government will not be left, as they would be under PFI, with repaying a debt over many years. That might be off the balance sheet, but it still ends up coming to the taxpayer.
Olly Glover
Q
Justin Madders: As this is a road, the Office of Rail and Road seems to be the appropriate regulator.
Olly Glover
Q
Justin Madders: There is a different approach because this is a different situation. This is the regulated asset base model, which is about a long-term investment, balancing the interests of users and investors and having a strong regulator that understands the sector. As we have heard, the ORR is already working on it. That is absolutely the right balance to make sure this delivers for everyone.
Olly Glover
That is an interesting answer, because railways also have both users and investors, but perhaps that is a debate for another day. I will happily let other people come in now.
Tristan Osborne
Q
Again, speaking to the investor spokesperson today, they said that regulatory certainty was absolutely critical for them. I want to understand the operational capabilities, the engagement between the DFT and the ORR, and whether or not we will have that structure and that robust regulatory regime in place, and how confident you are about that.
Justin Madders: I am confident about that, because that is what the Bill intends to do. It sets it out very clearly. We have heard from the investors that that certainty will be a very attractive opportunity for the long-term investment we are seeking to deliver. There will be a need for some additional capability and capacity in the ORR, but I was very impressed with the evidence we heard today. It is very much on top of this, but there is much more to be done, and the Bill will enable it to do that.
Douglas Lumsden
Q
Justin Madders: I am not too familiar with the factors he takes into account when investing, but my advice from officials is that the soft market testing that has been taking place has shown a lot of interest in this. He also said in his response that there would be quite a lot of people who would be looking to invest in this. That conversation is ongoing.
Having the legislation on the statute book will actually help give more certainty to investors. Clearly one of the reasons why the project has already started is to de-risk it to some extent. All the indicators I am getting are that we are putting this in a strong position to attract investment.
Douglas Lumsden
Q
Justin Madders: I do not think that this is covered by the Bill anyway, but I will certainly take it away to see if there is anything to reflect on. I assure you that this would not be proceeding if there were no interest in investment.
Mike Reader
Q
Justin Madders: I think it will. Obviously the Treasury decision on how this is going to be funded is driving us in a direction where we have to secure private investment. I think the model gives us the opportunity to give the investor certainty over a long period. Clearly, guardrails in there will protect users as well, but as I say, the indications I have had so far are that the long-term nature of the project and the way in which it has been de-risked make it an attractive proposition.
Mike Reader
Q
Justin Madders: As I probably made clear, the Bill is scheme agnostic, so an amendment to require a certain type of fuel would not really help us at all. Look, we have had quite a lot of evidence and, as a Committee, we should take confidence in the measures that are in place to ensure that the costs are kept under control.
Mike Reader
Q
Justin Madders: I suppose, to pick up from one of the witnesses, I will reference the fact that the road investment strategy—which was started by the previous Government —has set us up with a very sustainable model to develop these large projects over a longer term, giving confidence to the supply chain to keep control of costs and to deliver on time and within scope. I think that National Highways is now very well skilled at doing that, which should give us all confidence.
Mike Reader
Q
Justin Madders: The tolls will ultimately be part of part of the licence, which is covered by the Bill—
Mike Reader
Q
Justin Madders: That will be part of the licence conditions, and probably a little too specific for the Bill. Obviously, there are safeguards in the Bill about the things that will need to be considered by the operator.
Mike Reader
Q
Justin Madders: Yes, we are happy to do that.
The Chair
As there are no further questions from Members, I thank the Minister for his evidence. That brings us to the end of the sitting. The Committee will meet again at 9.25 am on Tuesday 3 November to begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration of the Bill be now adjourned.—(Michael Wheeler.)