Highways (Financing) Bill (Second sitting)

Alison Griffiths Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 29th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Tristan Osborne (Chatham and Aylesford) (Lab)]

Q Under the French model which you have cited as a template, 91% of roads are owned by privatised companies, and that is very different to the UK. They are extremely controversial and many accuse companies in France of price gouging. We have concerns about asset management and the valuations. You have said that the RAB model is potentially ideal, but is there any element of it that you can say is better than the French concessionary model? What teeth would you give the regulator to make it so, if we were to go down that route? What is missing from the RAB model that would make it more effective?

Ben Hopkinson: It is a good question. First, in the French example, I am well aware that it is quite expensive to drive on a French motorway. On the other hand, they have many more miles of motorway, and if it is too expensive you can take the equivalent of an A road for certain journeys. Judging by the number of people who drive on French motorways, I think people are generally willing to accept the costs, especially given that they have built many more miles of motorway just this century than we have in total.

I could be proved wrong if it works really well, but the main challenge with the RAB model is the sheer uncertainty of whether the ORR is up to the task and has the right staff in place. It has never done this before. I know there have already been some concerns about capacity issues and general commercial experience within the ORR. I would be concerned if the private sector had large commercial control and contract teams and the public sector did not have them and was out-negotiated. That is certainly possible if civil servants are not able to properly push back on price increases.

I think the fundamental incentives in a RAB model are not right for delivering one-of-a-kind, unique pieces of infrastructure. It works a lot better for infrastructure that has very clear unit costs—for example, the cost of laying 100 metres of pipe. That is good because a regulator is clearly able to understand how much 100 metres of pipe costs to lay and can apply that across its base, whereas the cost of one lower Thames crossing is up in the air. Some additions from the private contractor might seem sensible; they might get away with that. Having a more environmentally friendly construction process certainly seems sensible on the face of it, but that also adds cost. I would want to be reassured that the ORR is up to the task and has both the capacity and the know-how to properly understand the arrangements it is entering into.

Sam Dumitriu: You mentioned price gouging. It is important to work out what the main risks are. Roads are, in most cases, natural monopolies, and the best thing about being a monopoly is a quiet life. It is not necessarily that you have all these opportunities to gouge your customers; it is that the lack of competition means you are not forced to adopt cost-saving measures, or become more customer-friendly and so on. You might have a situation where various people are claiming quite high margins or they are being aggressive in that sense, but the UK has the other problem, where people are not on it around costs. They are not working out what the best structure is to ensure that costs keep falling.

On Ben’s point, one possible way of resolving the issue is quite a radical reform that is probably beyond the scope of the Bill. I have always wondered whether it makes sense for the UK to have Ofgem doing RAB regulation for energy networks, Ofwat doing it for water, the ORR for road and rail and Ofcom for telecoms, or whether it makes sense to have a specialist economic regulator that deals with the costs of natural monopoly networks. That would have a bunch of advantages. It would potentially resolve some of the revolving door problems that you might see. It would also ensure that there is a similar expertise and a standard approach. You do not want varying approaches between all the regulators, because that suggests that they are doing something wrong when you have essentially the same economic problem to solve. As I say, however, that would be far beyond the scope of the Bill.

[Alison Griffiths (Bognor Regis and Littlehampton) (Con)]

Q I will build on some of what the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Buckinghamshire, said about tipping points. My question is to both of you, so please feel free to answer in whichever order you prefer. The shadow Minister was referring to things such as fuel duty, I am acutely conscious that the cost base of the lower Thames crossing project is going up and is as yet unknown, and we do not know what the toll will be.

In a situation such as we have at the moment, where diesel is at £2 a litre and the sustainable version another 50p on top of that, costs are going right up not only for the build, but for the corporate budgets of the haulage companies and for everyday individuals, who have to manage their household budgets. If the cost goes up to a level beyond the right balance of pricing that is commercially viable for the operator, or absorbable for the family or the business, what happens?

At the moment, I am worried about a white elephant across the Thames. In such circumstances, in the end all the costs would get absorbed by the taxpayer and this model goes up in smoke. I am keen to hear from you how concerned I should be about that and what alternative models there are elsewhere.

Ben Hopkinson: The ultimate backstop is the Exchequer. Already the Exchequer has had to bear the cost of bringing the lower Thames crossing through planning. I think it is expected to spend about £3.1 billion on the lower Thames crossing even before private investment is brought in. If we have a circumstance where the toll is not paying back what is necessary and the private body that has financed the road falls into difficulty, the Bill states that the Exchequer is able to top up or provide payments, guarantees or low-cost loans. The backstop is therefore ultimately the taxpayer, combined with higher charges for motorists on the road.

[Alison Griffiths]

Q Should we put in greater stipulations on how costs are incurred? This goes back to some of what the shadow Minister was talking about, that the Bill should stipulate that the road is not overspecified—although safety should remain absolutely paramount—while things such as the use of sustainable diesel are not a necessary part of the Bill. Should that be in the Bill?

Ben Hopkinson: I am not sure if that would be an appropriate thing for the Bill itself, but trying to make the project as low-cost as possible will definitely be appropriate as we go on to construction and working with National Highways and whatever private company wins the contract. That will be about ensuring that the Office of Rail and Road is set up properly to oversee the costs that are being put through.

Sam Dumitriu: It is worth remembering, however, that the families who may pay higher tolls to cross either the Dartford crossing or the lower Thames crossing, in the absence of a lower Thames crossing bear very high costs, too, as does freight traffic between two of our major ports. The crossing is crucial to the whole wider freight economy—there are really big problems there. I think it is worth remembering that the projects should be made a priority and that, ultimately, they need to get built.

[Alison Griffiths]

Q Ben just said he did not think that we should be stipulating cost-effectiveness in the Bill—I am paraphrasing, to be fair. My challenge back to that is: why not? If I sit and look at the effectiveness of regulation in other sectors, I come from the private sector—

[The Chair]

Order. That brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witnesses for their evidence.

Examination of Witness

Thomas McLennan gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jim Dickson]

Q Is this largely the result of having had considerable allocation of Treasury funding already, in order to be able to make a start and, essentially, mobilise and begin the project in the way described?

Matt Palmer: The logic is that the economic benefit of the scheme is great. Not only does it solve the problem in the local area; it is a national-level project, so we move at pace, we start the construction and we take a lot of the difficult, time-consuming activities like land assembly—putting plots of land together—and that is what we are doing at the moment. All of that enables a much more stable platform for investors to come in.

[Alison Griffiths]

Q I want to come back to the question of hydrotreated vegetable oil. Mr Palmer, you suggested that there was parity/comparability in costs between white diesel and HVO. I have spent a little time in the last few minutes looking at Google, Claude and ChatGPT, and not one of those sources suggests that is the case unless you count HVO being 10% to 30% more expensive as comparable. So I want to push back and ask you to be more precise on the additional cost base of using HVO in construction across the course of this project, both to date and in your estimates going forward.

Matt Palmer: In construction in the UK, about two thirds of our constructors use HVO as standard. For a project, you will find that a number of constructors bid with HVO—it is just in the costs. That is the case with lower Thames crossing. Two thirds of our contractors bid with HVO.

[Alison Griffiths]

Q That is comparing yourself to another contractor. That is not what I am asking. I am asking about what your costs are of white diesel versus HVO—a completely different comparison.

Matt Palmer: But we have never—what I am saying is that we went to market and asked them to build us a project. They did that with HVO as the base bid. We did not see the cost with diesel.

[Alison Griffiths]

Q Okay. So when you said that the costs were comparable, you did not know whether that was the case, because you had not actually gone to market with that.

Matt Palmer: We did not go out with a diesel-based product because the market typically comes forward with an HVO product.

[Alison Griffiths]

Q I just want to correct the record, though; when you say that the costs are comparable, actually they are not.

Matt Palmer: I think I have explained myself. They are comparable. £1.70 is what we are paying. I have been clear that that is what we are paying for HVO at the moment.

[Alison Griffiths]

As I say, when I asked each of these sources specifically about construction projects—I have not asked them about retail; I asked them about construction—they have been clear that there are substantial additional costs to using HVO. I just wanted to make sure that that was clear.

[The Chair]

If there are no further questions from Members, I thank the witnesses for their evidence.

Examination of Witnesses

Roger Forsdyke and Andrew Truscott gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tristan Osborne]

Q This question links to the independent review. I questioned the ORR on this. Obviously, you are sitting on the other side of the table, and you are looking to extract as much as you can from an investor perspective. You represent one side of the spectrum, and the regulators are on the other side. There has to be a working partnership between you both. Obviously, the efficiency of a project finance model such as the one for this crossing relies on certainty and predictability for investors, and regulators being there to ensure the stability of the regime. Obviously, we do not have a regulator that manages this at the moment. Where does investor confidence stand regarding the ORR? Do you think investor confidence is there for this model to work going forward?

Andrew Truscott: I would slightly reject your first statement, if I am honest. As an infrastructure investor, we provide, candidly, the lowest cost private capital that is available across the world. If you are attracting John Laing and people like us, I can guarantee that you are getting the lowest cost of equity capital that you can possibly attract and therefore the risk transfer needs to be accordingly appropriate.

I will slightly repeat my opening comments: when we first started interacting with DFT about this project, I was quite nervous about the RAB model. I am not a RAB nerd; there are lots of RAB nerds, and I am not one. RAB can be incredibly complicated, and it can take a huge amount of time to drill down. There is not a regulator. There is an awful lot of work that needs to be done. Am I nervous that that is going to take longer than it should do or could do? Yes, I am, but again, credit to DFT and the Treasury, they seem to be well on track. Maybe the better answer to your question is that we as investors will need absolute certainty—and I mean absolute certainty—about what that regulatory model is, who the regulator is and how that regulation is going to work before we will put in a dollar, a pound, or a euro—whatever currency you like.

[Alison Griffiths]

Q I want to go back to comments that both of you have made. Andrew, you said that you can count on one hand the number of projects that finish on time and on budget, and that is despite the extensive experience that you both have. Roger, you said that cost overruns come from uncertainty. I had a 30-year private sector career. One experience I had negotiating contracts was that when the customer was creating unrealistic expectations or poor procurement was taking place, where you had a competitive environment and people were trying to win the contract was where you ended up with cost and time overruns. Are there any lessons the Government should be learning about how we procure these types of contract so that we get the best possible outcome at the best possible price, but without cost and time overruns?

Roger Forsdyke: It is really interesting that you say that from your experience it is the commercial pressure. The most important thing in the tendering process is to have measurables beyond just the cost. If it is first past the post, you are destined to push the price down to the lowest-quality bid, which often creates the problems you are describing and that we described earlier. You have to look at how you will measure the quality of the tenders in real terms, beyond the cost of the lowest bid. I do not think that is regularly done effectively, so you end up with cheap materials, optimistic programming, optimistic budgeting and all those things just to get to a price that is probably optimistic in the first place. That echoes what Andrew said.

[Alison Griffiths]

Q Can anything in how the relationships are built with the procurement teams be changed to shift that?

Roger Forsdyke: I think so. If you have gateways where you build the price through detailed submissions, you can then control it. You do not want uncontrollable cost and excellent quality, but you need to create some gateways through the process so that you can control the quality as you go through. That is my experience. Those sorts of two-stage processes create the best outcomes.

You then have to make sure there is no undefined scope. As you cross the line to secured and the responsibility moves to the contractor, you do not want any change. That is sometimes very hard to achieve, but it is a really important step. It is often, “Oh, we just need to get started,” and the pressure of starting often means that the project will start prematurely, before the scope is defined. That is where the optimism bias goes in—the provisional sum might be light or whatever—and then you end up with escalation, notwithstanding the delays to resolving the issues themselves.

Andrew Truscott: I do not have a huge amount to add, because Roger has put it beautifully. I will just say one thing, and he can kick me under the table: contracting is a hard business. They do billions of pounds-worth of revenue for 2%, 3% or 4% margins—it is hard—and there is therefore little scope in their business models for mistakes. They will always enter into these sorts of projects with an expectation that mistakes do not land at their desk, because otherwise they go bust, and they have done globally.

Again, credit to the way LTC is being procured. I think separating church and state a little bit—separating equity and financing from contracting, rather than having one single proposal—is arguably a way of getting more certainty around deliverability than amalgamating all those elements into one. Where we have seen material cost overruns, it tends to be in the big projects where one single solution is given to a customer. We have been looking at a lot of US projects recently in the road space where single projects— equity, traffic and revenue, as well as construction—are lumped into one big unit and presented to a customer, who then tries to aggregate and always aggregates to lowest cost, and that is not always the right solution.

I am giving my previous panellists an awful lot of credit today, which is wonderful. I think disaggregating elements could be a way of managing that risk and that cost and delay overrun quite well.

[Jim Dickson]

Q I agree with your earlier point that it is really important that the tolls are kept affordable in every way, not only for the haulage industry but for motorists and other vehicles. Presumably one aspect of that will be this being an attractive project for which lots of interest is generated in the market, and therefore we get lots of potential bidders—

Andrew Truscott: Hopefully not.