(1 day, 9 hours ago)
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Baroness Scott of Bybrook
Member’s explanatory statement
This probing amendment seeks to explore the justification for providing the mayor with a veto over decisions of a Combined County Authority.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 41 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Jamieson is a probing amendment concerning why the Government wish to give mayors a veto over the decisions of a combined county authority.
If this Bill is truly about empowering local communities, decision-making power should be allocated equally between all elected councillors, not concentrated in the hands of one political party individual. This is not to say that the mayor should not have a vote, or perhaps even a casting vote, but we currently see no justification for giving mayors a veto over all decisions made by a majority of a community’s democratically elected representatives. This would not empower local government but would instead turn it into a kind of presidential system. That is not how we do things in this country, nor do we want to.
Amendments 42 and 44 in the name of my noble friend Lord Lansley seek to bring the Bill in line with past legislation. Amendment 42 is in relation to the voting powers of members of combined county authorities whereby the Secretary of State can make provision for different weights to be given to votes of different types of members, as set out in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023. Amendment 44, on transport, seeks to bring the Bill in line with the arrangements set out in the Local Transport Act 2008 and the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009. These amendments seem entirely sensible—unless the Government have other reasons, and we would be grateful if they elaborated on those if they do.
Amendment 43, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Jamieson, again probes the Government as to why the decisions of a combined county authority must require the agreement of the mayor, rather than being determined by a simple majority of local councillors. We believe this would undermine local democracy, rather than empowering it. If decisions require the agreement of the mayor, a majority of councillors may be disregarded and the wishes of the people ignored. That is not democracy, nor have we heard any arguments as to why it is needed.
Finally, my noble friend Lord Jamieson and I oppose the Question that Clause 6 stand part of the Bill, since we do not see why the Government have deemed it necessary to amend the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 to replace the constitutional arrangement it sets out. I hope the Minister will explain why the Government hope to empower mayors over other local councillors, since this does not empower local democracy; rather, it empowers a select few individuals tasked with representing large geographical areas with different communities, who inevitably will have different needs.
As the Bill stands, this will not further localism; rather it will centralise power and take away the decision-making powers of local councillors. Not only does this fly in the face of the Bill’s title, but we have not been given any justification or reasoning for it. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response. I beg to move.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend and speak to these amendments to Clause 6. The clause relates to decision-making in combined county authorities and combined authorities and its purpose is to provide for a default structure of voting in both kinds of strategic authorities. In particular, that default structure would provide that in mayoral authorities the majority in favour of a decision must include the mayor, thus in effect giving the mayor a veto over decisions, since the majority excluding the mayor would not be decisive.
Before I turn to my amendments, and apropos of the question of whether the clause stands part, I will ask a question. I refer noble Lords and the Minister to Section 13(2)(a) of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act. The section enables regulations to be made about members, and Section 13(2)(a) states that those regulations can include provision about
“cases in which a decision of a CCA requires a majority, or a particular kind of majority, of the votes of members of a particular kind”.
It seems to me that that paragraph of the levelling-up Act enables exactly what the Minister is setting out to do by statutory instrument rather than by primary legislation. Could she tell us why primary legislation is required to achieve this purpose? That might inform our deliberations on the stand part debate.
Amendments 42 and 44 are in my name. I do not share my noble friend’s desire, set out in her Amendments 41 and 43, to take out the mayoral veto from the clause. I have been a resident in the Cambridgeshire and Peterborough combined authority for however many years. When we had a mayor, the mayor found it very difficult to secure, for example, a non-statutory spatial strategy, not least because the mayor was often frustrated in getting a policy through due to the votes of one of the strategic authority’s constituent councils. In my view, if you elect a mayor and you want a mayor to exercise leadership in a strategic authority, it does not follow that the mayor will necessarily be able to get everything that the mayor wants, and the mayor will have to secure a majority to do so. It is very difficult for the mayor to carry on and provide that leadership if there is a majority that can carry proposals against his or her own policy.
This therefore forces the mayor to act in a certain way. I have seen that in Cambridgeshire, where the current mayor, Paul Bristow, is doing a very good job; he will be known to some of my noble friends. Partly because of this legislation, he is securing a majority in the combined authority, not least because there is an expectation that the strategic authority, when it gets these powers, will be able to make progress with the majority that includes him, and so he will not be able to be blocked by one constituent council.
I turn my focus to my Amendments 42 and 44. The former relates to combined county authorities. In this Committee, I am afraid that we are getting used to the fact that we have to do everything twice, because we have to legislate both for combined county authorities and for combined authorities; it will get a lot simpler when we have just one kind of strategic authority and when legislation for all strategic authorities is pretty much the same. Nevertheless, combined county authorities are governed by Section 10 of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023, which enables the Secretary of State to set out their constitutional arrangements. Section 10(2)(b) includes
“the voting powers of members of the CCA (including provision for different weight to be given to the vote of different descriptions of member)”.
That is the existing legislation: it provides for different weights to be allocated to different members. The current situation is that the constitution of a combined county authority is not a “one member, one vote” arrangement—it can vary.
Clause 6 will insert new Section 13A into the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023. It says that
“each voting member has one vote”.
So, what I am really asking by way of these two amendments—in this instance, for combined county authorities—is: does the primary legislation we are discussing now override, in effect, the existing potential for regulations to determine a different weight for different members for different decisions; or, because of this primary legislation, does it have to be “one member, one vote”?
There is a problem there. That problem was illustrated to me when we had a meeting just a few weeks back—my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook will recall it—about Suffolk. It was about unitaries, as it happened, but it also encompassed a discussion about the prospective Norfolk and Suffolk strategic authority, which is in the devolution priority programme. The leader of Suffolk County Council was asked, “Suffolk is a single unitary and Norfolk is three, maybe even four, unitaries. What happens if they come together into one strategic authority?”
The problem is easily illustrated: one constituent council and one vote equals perhaps three votes for Norfolk and one vote for Suffolk. The leader of Suffolk County Council said, “That’s not a problem because we’ll weight the votes”. This is exactly what one would do using existing legislation, but I am worried that the structure of the Bill’s drafting will take that discretion away. That is the purpose of my Amendment 42.
My Amendment 44 relates to combined authorities, not combined county authorities, but it runs to the exact same issue. Of course, combined authorities are governed not by the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act but by the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009, Section 104 of which provides that the constitutional arrangements for combined authorities may, by order, be made according to the provisions of the Local Transport Act 2008. Section 84 of that latter Act relates to constitutional arrangements; subsection (2)(b) refers to
“the voting powers of members of the ITA”—
the integrated transport authority—
“(including provision for different weight to be given to the vote of different descriptions of member)”.
The Committee will recognise those exact same words, so we are dealing with exactly the same issue: is it different weights for different members, or is it to be overridden by “one member, one vote”?
I want, as the outcome of this debate, for us to be sure that this legislation continues to permit a constitution for a strategic authority that both allocates different weights to different members and enables voting power to reflect the wide range of circumstances of constituent councils and other voting members of strategic authorities.
Lord Shipley (LD)
My Lords, I shall be very brief because it would be better if the Minister responded to the important points that have been made.
I will not take up too much of the Committee’s time, but I want to say two things that will, I think, help in this situation. First, we must get clarity about which powers are only for the mayor and which are to be shared with the combined authority; it is important that that be made clear. Secondly, on voting in the combined authority, there is at times a requirement for a two-thirds majority and, at other times, a requirement for a simple majority. We need to be absolutely clear why those differences apply.
With that, I would like to hear what the Minister has to say.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (Baroness Taylor of Stevenage) (Lab)
I thank noble Lords for their scrutiny of the first clauses of the Bill last week. I have replied in writing to some of the questions noble Lords asked me last week, and I hope they have received those replies. I look forward to further scrutiny today.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, and the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, for their amendments to Clause 6, on decision-making arrangements. The amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, probes whether Clause 6 is required. Clause 6 is central to the Bill’s core ambition of moving from devolution by deals to devolution by default. It creates a clear and consistent decision-making framework for combined authorities and combined county authorities. Current decision-making arrangements in combined authorities and combined county authorities are complex and vary widely, as noble Lords who have spoken have referred to. This confuses the public and makes accountability harder. For example, mayors are often seen by the public as the accountable person for their authority, but the Mayor of the West of England and the Mayor of the West Midlands are not allowed to vote on their combined authority’s budget.
Clause 6 introduces a simple majority voting system which makes decisions more transparent, creates a level playing field and provides more clarity for the public. For mayoral strategic authorities, the mayor must be in the majority for a vote to pass. This reflects their direct democratic mandate across the entire area. When he was referring to Cambridgeshire, the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, spoke about the consequences if that is not in place. I think it is an important move. Collaboration remains important, and we are clear that we want to see mayors build a consensus, but one member should not be able to block decisions for an entire region. Removing Clause 6 would keep the current patchwork of governance rules, which slows decision-making down and can undermine accountability to the public, so we believe the clause is essential for strong, transparent governance and should remain in the Bill.
Amendments 41 and 43, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, seek to understand the justification for providing the mayor with a veto over decisions and why decisions must require the agreement of the mayor. The Government recognise the importance of strong collaboration with strategic authorities. That is exactly why the Bill requires both the mayor and the constituent members to work together. The standard voting arrangement in the Bill requires that a majority of members support a decision. We believe the provisions in the Bill strike the right balance between collective decision-making and clear leadership. Directly elected mayors have a unique democratic mandate. They are elected by the public to provide leadership and direction for their whole area. Requiring mayoral agreement on key decisions helps ensure clarity over who is accountable for outcomes. Without that clarity, responsibility risks becoming blurred. Removing the requirement for mayoral agreement would weaken the leadership model that underpins effective devolution. It would lead to slower decision-making, less coherent strategies and reduced accountability to the public.
Amendments 42 and 44 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, seek to provide that secondary legislation can be used to set voting arrangements for combined authorities and combined county authorities that differ from the standard arrangements set out in Clause 6. The Government agree that simple majority voting would not be appropriate for all situations. That is why Clause 6 already provides that voting arrangements set out in other enactments continue to apply. Therefore, these amendments are not necessary. For example, in non-mayoral areas the local transport plan must instead have the consent of all constituent councils in order to be adopted. In mayoral areas, the local transport plan remains a mayoral function, but it must be approved by a simple majority vote of the strategic authority. The existing powers for the Government to provide place-specific voting arrangements in secondary legislation, to which the amendments refer, will also apply.
Turning to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, about the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act, the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act—that is a snappy title—and Clause 6, the Bill does not disapply or override those Acts. Their relevant provisions continue to apply where appropriate, so restating them here does not add any new legal protection. Including additional statutory references risks creating confusion about which provisions apply in different circumstances and undermines the clarity of the governance framework the Bill is trying to apply.
We recognise that some parts of the country have unique technical circumstances that require small changes to this consistent approach, such as to reflect arrangements relating to the management of trams or local bus companies. We have undertaken extensive engagement with existing combined authorities and combined county authorities over the past 12 months on this issue to agree a limited set of bespoke voting arrangements that met this high bar. Should any future strategic authority seek bespoke arrangements, the Government would need to consider them on a case-by-case basis. However, we are clear that any changes to the standard voting arrangements would be by exception and subject to a very high bar.
The Government will maintain some of the place-specific voting arrangements. For example, Lancashire combined authority has bespoke voting arrangements in relation to its budget, which reflects its governance structure. In response to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, about weighted voting, the existing powers for the Government to provide place-specific voting arrangements will continue to apply, so that will be for Suffolk and Norfolk to determine as we go forward. For the reasons that I have set out, I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
I am grateful to the Minister and to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. As I said, the issues raised today go to the heart of how we structure local democracy and ensure that the voices of all our communities are fairly and effectively represented. That is why we brought forward these probing amendments.
A consistent concern has emerged that the balance of power proposed in the Bill risks concentrating authority in the hands of the one single officeholder rather than empowering the broad and diverse range of locally elected councillors who best understand the communities that they serve. I have not heard a lot today that puts my mind at rest, but I will read Hansard tomorrow and look further at it. I was pleased that the Minister said that places such as Norfolk and Suffolk, quite close to my heart now, will have that flexibility to deal with local problems—but I have to say that they might argue about it. Who knows? Let us hope that there are two single authorities and we do not have any problems.
We all agree that effective local leadership is vital, but leadership does not mean overriding democratic deliberations; it means working with those local representatives, ensuring accountability and respecting the mandate of those who have been elected by their communities. When decision-making structures are distorted in favour of one individual, however capable, they operate not as a system of local democracy but, as I said, as a presidential model, which sits uneasily with the traditions of government in this country.
My noble friend Lord Lansley’s amendment rightly seeks to bring the Bill back into alignment with those frameworks established in previous legislation. I will read this back, but it sounds as if that is happening, although I am not quite sure how. If there are any further questions, I am sure that we will talk to the Minister about them. I am happy with that.
In relation to Clause 6, we have urged the Government to reconsider whether rewriting the constitutional arrangements of the Act was necessary or justified. It looks to me as if we are perhaps not rewriting as much as we feared was being rewritten—but, as I said, we will look at that in detail when Hansard comes out.
We still believe that, if the Government truly wish to empower our local authorities, they must demonstrate it by upholding democratic balance, trusting councillors and ensuring that all voices, not just one, carry the appropriate weight in the decisions that shape our counties and regions. But at this time, I am happy to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Lansley
“2A In section 12D of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 (contents of spatial development strategy), after subsection (3) insert—“(3A) A spatial development strategy must identify the policies which are of strategic importance in order to meet the local growth priorities identified in the relevant local growth plan for that strategic area.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment links the local growth plan to the preparation of the spatial development strategy.
Lord Lansley (Con)
Clause 6 provides, right at the end, that Schedule 2 makes further provision, including in relation to the spatial development strategy that strategic authorities are required to produce under the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, as inserted by Section 58 of the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025. Those who are former inmates of the Stockholm syndrome that was the Planning and Infrastructure Bill will recall this very well. I apologise to all those noble Lords for revisiting this, but I hope with a useful purpose.
Alongside a spatial development strategy, the Bill requires, in Clause 39 and Schedule 20, the strategic authority also to prepare a local growth plan. Noble Lords will see that, by virtue of the transport and infrastructure powers of strategic authorities and their power to charge a community infrastructure levy linked to that infrastructure provision—Clause 34 and Schedule 15 provide for that—the strategic authority will need to have, in addition to a local growth plan, an infrastructure strategy and an infrastructure delivery framework. I hope that is what they intend to do. The purpose of my amendments in this group is to link these things together. I entirely take the point that the Minister may rightly make: “Surely that’s what strategic authorities have to do”. But we have statutory provision in relation to the spatial development strategy, in particular, that does not refer across to local growth plans and I think it is important that it does.
There are two things that should be linked. Amendments 138 and 144 say that the local growth plan should identify, for the spatial development strategy then to take into account, the employment, industrial, commercial and logistic growth opportunities identified in the local growth plan. Noble Lords will recall from the Planning and Infrastructure Act that there are a number of specifics that the spatial development strategy has to take on board, but they are essentially housing related. I did not succeed in persuading the Government that they should also specifically take account of employment and related issues. But that is exactly what will happen in practice, and ought to happen: the local growth plan and the employment opportunities associated with it should be an essential part of the strategic process of establishing the spatial development in that area. I cannot see that they can be separated and done without reference to each other.
Amendments 139 and 145 are intended for the local growth plan to identify the infrastructure needed to meet the growth priorities set out in the local growth plan. As a consequence, it must identify the employment-related implications for the spatial development strategy. I do not think that I am inventing these kinds of processes. I have been involved locally for a number of years—I refer to my registered interest as chair, over the years, of the Cambridgeshire Development Forum. The way a local plan is established—and in due course the spatial development strategy for Cambridgeshire and Peterborough—starts from an understanding of the future employment implications of the growth that will occur in our area. It is substantial and those growth priorities will be laid out in the local growth plan, a draft of which has already been produced by the Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Combined Authority. That is a starting point for understanding the spatial development strategy that I hope it will now rapidly go on to produce.
There are two sets of amendments, one for county combined authorities and the other for combined authorities. I hope that Amendments 138, 139, 144 and 145 would secure an internal coherence between the local growth plan and the infrastructure priorities derived from that local growth plan, which is then linked into the planning of where that growth in employment and housing should be located through the spatial development strategy. I hope that consistency would enable the strategic authorities to work effectively.
Baroness Willis of Summertown (CB)
My Lords, I support Amendment 46, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. We must ensure that any spatial development strategy underlines and works with the principles of the Environmental Improvement Plan and the upcoming land use framework, as the noble Lord rightly pointed out. Particularly regarding the latter, it makes no sense to have two systems dealing with how we use our land pulling in different directions—which is the risk here. We have these central government legally binding environmental targets, so we need to use the Bill to ensure that this new devolved governance structure means that each tool is deployed in an effective but consistent manner. Consistency is key here.
Bluntly, I do not see how we can halt biodiversity loss, let alone restore it, without giving authorities the duty to work towards meeting these targets. A recently published global biodiversity assessment highlighted the threats to the UK’s national security and prosperity from biodiversity loss and really stressed the importance of delivering the 30by30. This is a very tall target at the best of times, but if we have the devolved Governments pulling in different directions on this, there is no chance that we will reach anywhere near it. We are a long way off right now—at 7%—so have an awfully long way to go in the next seven years.
This amendment would mean that authorities think about nature recovery, soil, water and land use from the outset, rather than as something to be dealt with at a later stage. We had a long-standing debate on this in the planning Bill. This is often where the delays are, caused by nature and environmental considerations. If we consider the environment strategically before we get into this whole planning process, I hope many of those delays and debates will go away, so we do not have them. This will reduce conflicts and create more consistency in how we achieve our environmental targets. It is a very good amendment and it has my strong support. I see it as essential but also proportionate.
Baroness Young of Old Scone (Lab)
My Lords, I speak in support of Amendment 46, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. Spatial development strategies are a really big opportunity and much to be welcomed. We have long needed a spatial view at that sort of level, so we have to get this right because there is a lot that they can deliver.
However, to be frank, if spatial development strategies do not play a key role in delivering things such as the Environmental Improvement Plan statutory targets, I am not entirely sure how government will get those statutory targets delivered, because the land is fundamental to delivering those targets. The question really is: if there is not some strong guidance that the spatial development strategies must play a role in delivering the Environmental Improvement Plan statutory targets, how will government ensure that these targets are met? Is it envisaged that there will be guidance rather than something in the Bill?
We should not underestimate the importance of the environment for growth. I remember years ago, when some of the big drug companies were thinking about where they were going to put production facilities, they came to the conclusion that England’s green and pleasant land was a pretty good place to come. Not only was there a reasonably stable economy in those days, but there were also excellent places for the people they would have to attract—potentially from other countries but also from other parts of the UK—to come and work for them. They were also potentially attractive places for those businesses to come and pursue sustainability and growth as part of their global strategies. Therefore, a pleasant, productive environment not only provides security against climate shocks, flooding, heat and all those things if done on a big enough scale; it is also an attractive place for businesses to come because they can get good staff who want to come and live in pleasant places. That is a crucial element that the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, has rightly pointed out.
I have stood up and talked about the land use framework many times; I do go on about its importance. For me, it has two major importances. First, it brings a degree of rationality to considerations and discussions about competing land uses, which is absolutely what regional—spatial—development strategies ought to be doing as well, so they are very complementary. As the noble Baroness, Lady Willis, pointed out, the land use framework is also a means of reducing conflict.
We all too often see development being delayed because there is local or county-level antipathy by the public to what is being proposed. A land use framework approach is a way of getting that dialogue going across multiple land uses—including land for climate, biodiversity and other environmental management, and land for development—that can introduce a note of calmness, conciliation, balance and rationality to the debate. The land use framework is important and the big problem right now of course is its timing. We have been a very long time waiting for it. My understanding, and the Minister can perhaps confirm this, is that it is in a good enough shape for write-round, but we hear that it may well be delayed.
The reality is that we are up against a hard deadline. The hard deadline for me—and this is a purely personal view, not the view of my party, I am sure—is that we are going to have a rough time in the elections in May and there could well be all sorts of reshuffles emanating from that. The last thing that any of us wants is for a brand-new set of Ministers to be appointed as a result of a reshuffle, or even a few Ministers to be appointed as a result of a reshuffle, who quite rightly, in the case of something as important as the land use framework, will want to delay and have a look at it themselves to make sure that they understand it and that they are behind it. That could cause even more delay, so if we do not get it agreed and published by late April, we could be stuffed—I think that is the technical term. Perhaps we could persuade the Minister to tell us what it would take to get this announced by April.
There is one further requirement that the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, does not cover, which is the whole issue of local nature recovery strategies. Those noble Lords who have played a role in local nature recovery strategy development and approval will realise just how much sweat and blood has been magnificently used at a county level to produce these agreed strategies. They are very much another brick in the wall of the rational approach to land use. There has been a huge amount of engagement of local authorities, communities and NGOs at the county level to get these strategies going. They are incredibly valuable, because they have been a meeting ground for all these competing land use bodies. One has to ask: what is the point of a local nature recovery strategy if it does not play a role and does not figure in the spatial development strategy? Can the Minister assure us that local nature recovery strategies will be material in local development strategies? If so, why not put it the Bill? Depending on her answer, I may have to egg on the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, to add that into consideration on Report.
Baroness O'Neill of Bexley (Con)
My Lords, I am happy to support my noble friend Lord Lansley’s amendments, but can I probe the Minister, for when she responds, about what happens in London? In London, all 33 boroughs—or 32 plus the City, if you want to be pedantic—would all have their own local plans, and out of those local plans would come all our different plans. Then, of course, you have the London Plan, which potentially trumps—I am going to take on board some of the language just used, but I think “trumps” probably is the best phrase to use—what is done locally. Not only can it contradict what is done locally, which has quite often cost an awful lot of money, time, sweat, tears and everything else, but in addition to that it creates uncertainty. When the Minister responds, perhaps she could think about the London scenario, please.
Lord Cameron of Dillington (CB)
My Lords, I, too, support Amendment 46, particularly the reference to the land use framework. The point about the land use framework is that it is not a dictatorial thing; it is not saying, “Thou must do this or that” or “Thou must grow that”, or whatever it might be. It is definitely a framework, but on the other hand there is no point in having a framework unless it is part of the thinking from the top to the bottom of government—central government to regional government to local authority and everything in between.
I should also say that a land use framework is not necessarily a fixed event. It is not going to be cast in stone for ever and it should be open to review from time to time. I would have thought that three years would be the right sort of time. However, it needs to change according to events, including world events. Do we need more homegrown food production as a result of current world politics? Does the latest research tell us that our biodiversity is still receding, running away from us? Does the international situation indicate that we need more homegrown green power or more homegrown timber? That is important. The noble Baroness, Lady Young, and I have just come from a meeting where it was indicated that the Government’s long-term housebuilding programme could very much depend on our ability to produce the relevant timber products needed. What would be the point of a land use framework if regional and local government just continue to do their own thing regardless? Therefore, the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, is crucial to the efficient management of that very scarce UK commodity—namely, our land.
Lord Shipley (LD)
The noble Lord, Lord Cameron, said that it would be unhelpful if regional and local government continued doing their own thing. I think that this is an important debate and I look forward to the Minister’s reply, but the Government might look at the powers that existed with regional development agencies until 2012, in terms of spatial development strategies and the land use framework, when a lot was done. They might revisit that to make sure that everyone going off to do their own thing—the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron—is avoided.
Lord Jamieson (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Lansley for his amendments. I think that there has been consensus among noble Lords contributing on this group that this is something that should be explored and looked at further. Amendment 45 rightly links local growth plans to spatial development strategies, ensuring that they are not formed in isolation and do not contradict each other. When a local growth plan is drafted, it should take account of the implications for spatial development. We welcome this amendment and support a more integrated and coherent approach.
However, we also believe that these plans must be informed by neighbourhood plans as well as neighbourhood priority statements, which have yet to be commenced under the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act. Amendment 46 seeks to ensure that spatial development strategies take into account national environmental improvement plans and the land use framework. This will help local government at least to have regard to the national Government’s environmental targets and to be aware of the environmental solutions proposed. As for the land use framework, we are still waiting for it to be published. Can the Minister confirm the timeline? As others have asked, will it be imminent?
Amendments 138, 139, 144 and 145 address the need for spatial development strategies to be aligned with infrastructure projects to identify any that are needed for growth. Again, these should be important considerations to ensure that new developments are supported with the necessary infrastructure rather than treating the two in isolation. As we said in the Planning and Infrastructure Bill debates, the consequences for development of the failure to deliver infrastructure should also be clear.
We agree with the principle behind all these amendments. It is important that combined authorities’ and councils’ various strategies are joined up, co-ordinated and coherent to ensure not only good governance and efficiency across local government but, more importantly, high-quality development. I thank my noble friend for his efforts and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
My Lords, that was an interesting discussion. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, for his amendments and I welcome the opportunity to discuss the role of spatial development strategies in the new devolution framework.
Amendment 45 would require strategic planning authorities to identify the policies in their spatial development strategies that are of strategic importance to address the local growth priorities identified in local growth plans. I very much agree with the need for spatial development strategies properly to address the priorities identified in local growth plans where they are of strategic importance to the area, such as the issues that the noble Lord mentioned around skills and infrastructure. There is an expectation in the revised NPPF that that is exactly what will happen.
The Planning and Infrastructure Act, to which the noble Lord also referred—we recently sat through many hours of debate on it—requires strategic planning authorities to have regard to any plan or strategy they have published. This would include a local growth plan. In the draft revised NPPF, which was published just before Christmas, we set out that spatial development strategies should give spatial expression to strategic elements of local growth plans, and that would include all of the issues mentioned by the noble Lord. We also set out in the draft revised NPPF that spatial development strategies should be tested against national policy when they are examined; that will include the industrial strategy, for example, and will shine a light on whether they are meeting the expectations we have of the SDS.
A number of Peers spoke to Amendment 46. I say to my noble friend Lady Young that I found her extrapolation of this through to losing lots of elections in May and then having a whole reshuffle a bit depressing. I hope that will not happen, and I also hope that my noble friend will have a wander through one of her new forests and cheer herself up a bit. Amendment 46 would require a strategic planning authority to have regard to the Government’s environmental improvement plan and the land use framework for England while preparing a spatial development strategy.
I absolutely agree with noble Lords on the importance of these national documents relating to land use and the environment. The provisions detailing the required content of spatial development strategies and the factors to be taken into account in their preparation were introduced less than two months ago in the Planning and Infrastructure Act, following very thorough parliamentary scrutiny. I do not consider it necessary to revisit or amend these requirements before they have even had a chance to be tested in practice. The documents in question are expected to inform the drafting of national planning policies, and strategic planning authorities will be required to have regard to the need to ensure that their strategy is consistent with the current policy.
For example, if we found that the land use framework or the environmental improvement plan were being ignored in strategic development strategies, we would keep that under review. Should any gaps or misalignments emerge between strategic development strategies and these documents, we can consider future changes to the National Planning Policy Framework or planning practice guidance, or even secondary legislation to ensure that they are taken into account in preparing an SDS.
A number of noble Lords asked questions on the publication of the land use framework, which I know is eagerly awaited. The Government consulted on land use in England from January to April last year. The responses, as well as the feedback from supporting workshops that have been held since, are being analysed. The responses will inform the preparation of the land use framework. I cannot give noble Lords an exact publication date today, I am afraid, but I know that my colleagues in Defra want to publish it as quickly as possible.
On the question from the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, about regional plans, I used to be on the regional assembly, so I sat thought the entire process of the east of England regional plan; the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, did so as well, I believe. There were a lot of lessons to be learned from those regional plans, particularly around the co-ordination of data and so on, and I know that officials in the department have taken into consideration how that was done. We need to reflect carefully on those experiences and how they fit in with what we are about to do with strategic development strategies.
The noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, asked about London. The London plan sits outside this Bill, I think, but there is an expectation on London boroughs that this will be done. Indeed, my own borough is quite a way outside London—well, 28 miles; we are in Hertfordshire, so not that far—and we were consulted on the London plan as part of the Ring Around London consultation.
On my noble friend Lady Young’s question about the local nature recovery strategies, it is a requirement that SDSs take account of those; indeed, the London plan has to take account of local nature recovery strategies as well.
Amendments 138, 139, 144 and 145 would require mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities to set out in their local growth plan what is needed in spatial and infrastructure terms to realise the economic growth opportunities presented in the plan. As with Amendment 45, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, I agree with the need to ensure that places are identifying these needs. Local growth plans will be required to set out an economic overview of their area, shared priorities agreed with the Government, and a pipeline of investment opportunities. Where infra- structure or development presents a relevant investment opportunity, we would expect it to be included in that pipeline. We are clear that local growth plans should provide an overarching framework for growth, identifying actions and investment that can drive economic growth and productivity.
But, when it comes to addressing the spatial implications of local growth plans and identifying the development and infrastructure needs for realising growth, the right vehicle is the spatial development strategy. That is why we set out that spatial development strategies should give spatial expression to strategic elements of local growth plans when we published our proposed reforms to the National Planning Policy Framework. For all those reasons, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, will withdraw his amendment.
The Earl of Clancarty (CB)
My Lords, we will come to local growth plans and culture. Can the Minister confirm that the spatial development strategies will include cultural growth as something to look at?
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
Each local area will consider its local growth plan, and I hope they will all look at culture. We have carefully considered and are reflecting on the comments made on the competencies we included. This is important, and I gave some stats on the first day of Committee on the benefit to the economy of some of the culture in my own county. It is important that all areas consider this as a key part of what should be in any development strategy and local growth plan.
Lord Lansley (Con)
I am most grateful to the Minister for that response and to all noble Lords who spoke on this group. In particular, I give warm thanks to those who supported Amendment 46. As the noble Baroness, Lady Young of Old Scone, rightly said, we may need to think about this again on Report, just to check, for example, that the National Planning Policy Framework does what the Minister says it does. At the moment, I cannot honestly say that I am sure that it does.
Noble Lords who are often in these planning discussions will always find it rather odd to try to work out that the Government sometimes say that we need to put something in the Bill. For example, local nature recovery strategies are prescribed to be taken into account for a spatial development strategy. Why not prescribe the land use framework? That, apparently, will be covered in the National Planning Policy Framework, which, as we know, is a document that derives statutory weight. So, if it is in there, the weight is there, and that is fine. But the point is that we are writing this legislation now, and this gives us an opportunity for Parliament to say what it thinks, because we cannot and do not debate the content of the National Planning Policy Framework in the way that we debate this legislation. So, there is a reason why we do this now, in the here and now.
There are many links to, for example, environmental well-being, local nature recovery strategies and promoting the adaptation to and mitigation of climate change in the way spatial development strategies are to be constructed. I just think we need to be absolutely certain that Ministers will make that clear in the NPPF. Indeed, they have a power under Section 12D(7) to prescribe the matters that spatial development strategies must include. We just need a bit more certainty that these things will be prescribed.
Where the relationship with the growth plan is concerned, I completely take the Minister’s point. It is just that, although growth appears to be the priority, actually the spatial development strategy says that the strategic authority should focus on the consequences of growth rather than on delivering the growth. The relationship between the local growth plan and the spatial development strategy is much more of an ex ante than post hoc set of decisions. You want to go upfront and say that we are designing the local growth plan alongside the spatial development strategy and not trying to retrofit the housing to meet the local growth requirements. I hope that that is what is going to happen; otherwise, I fear that these will be two teams in strategic authorities, with the economic development people on the one hand and the planning people on the other, when they should be one team producing one strategy. I hope that we can encourage that as much as possible through the nature of the debates we are having.
Lord Jamieson
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment removes the new subsection inserting a new section into the LURA to provide the Secretary of State with the power to designate a mayoral strategic authority as an established mayoral strategic authority.
Lord Jamieson (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak to the two amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook. Amendment 49 would allow the Secretary of State to make subordinate legislation to cause a mayoral combined authority to cease to be a mayoral strategic authority if, and only if, the combined authority consents for this to be the case. That would allow the structures of local government to be formed locally, according to local needs, priorities and democratic wishes, rather than setting in stone structures that may not be suitable for local communities later down the line.
On the creation of established mayoral strategic authorities, Amendment 47 would remove the proposed power of the Secretary of State to designate a mayoral strategic authority as an established mayoral strategic authority because we believe that the process should be locally led and not imposed from above. Amendments 48 and 50 in the name of my noble friend Lord Lansley also address the creation of established mayoral strategic authorities.
The Government White Paper set out the eligibility criteria for accessing the established mayoral tier. These amendments seek to give a basis for deciding whether proposals for a mayoral combined county authority, a mayoral combined authority, or for being designated an established mayoral strategic authority, have substantive merit.
We also know that the scope of integrated settlements for mayoral strategic authorities will be confirmed at each spending review, on the basis of functional responsibilities and their value, by a formulaic process. Can the Minister please elaborate on what those responsibilities are and on the formulaic process? Authorities need to be able to feed back on the amounts and types of funding they receive, so what process will be in place to ensure that funding is based on funding received from authorities?
In addition, how will government ensure that the timeline for this Bill aligns with the timelines for new strategic authorities and the spending review? Will the new mayors have the same powers and financial resources made available to them as the existing mayors? Local government reorganisation should not be undertaken simply for the sake of it; the Government’s plans and timelines need to be coherent and co-ordinated and underpinned by genuine principles for devolution to be meaningful and effective. I look forward to hearing the contributions of noble Lords and the Minister’s response on these matters. With that, I beg to move.
Lord Lansley (Con)
My Lords, I have two amendments in this group, Amendments 48 and 50. It is another of those occasions when there are two amendments to achieve one purpose. Amendment 48 relates to county combined authorities and Amendment 50 to combined authorities, and each is on the question of under what circumstances they should be able to be designated by the Secretary of State as an established mayoral strategic authority.
On the purpose of designation, two key things happen when you are an established strategic authority. First, you can have access to an integrated financial settlement. This is quite an important issue, although it is not in the Bill because it is financial; it would be determined by Treasury financial legislation. However, this being established means that it is a gateway to the ability to manage finances with what we would call in departments the power environment between different headings. These would normally not be available to local authorities where they receive delegated funding for one purpose and want to be able to use it for other purposes.
As we progress, if there is to be a significant tourism revenue to strategic authorities, the financial arrangements of strategic authorities will be an important element. We may come back to that in later groups. I do not want to dwell on that. The point is that this is the gateway to an integrated financial settlement from the Treasury. Very few strategic authorities have it now. I suppose that London and Manchester will get it first, in this spending review, then other strategic authorities will get it in the next spending review.
Secondly—we will no doubt come back to this on Clause 51—there is the ability of established mayoral strategic authorities to seek additional powers and functions within the designated areas of competence. That is quite an important additional power. These are two important powers, and Amendments 48 and 50 ask by what means the Secretary of State decides whether they should be established. What is in the Bill sets out a process but no criteria.
Paragraph 2.2.4 of the English devolution White Paper told us that there would be criteria for accessing the established mayoral tier: that the strategic authority has
“been in existence … for at least 18 months … has a published Local Assurance Framework in place … has not been the subject of a Best Value Notice, a MHCLG commissioned independent review, or a statutory inspection or intervention … is not subject to any ongoing (or implementing) recommendations from an externally mandated independent review; and there are no material accounting concerns covering the current or previous financial year”.
These are essentially matters of financial governance and accountability. I do not understand why the Bill makes no reference to the criteria the Secretary of State would apply, given that the devolution White Paper has set them out specifically. If my amendments were accepted, an indication would at the very least be given of the criteria: effective governance, accountability, and specified performance metrics.
It is a good idea that, as this develops, a specific power be provided in the legislation enabling the Secretary of State to publish the criteria that will be applied to the question of designation. It would not be right simply to say that there is a process but no criteria. We should have the criteria established.
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, and the noble Lords, Lord Jamieson and Lord Lansley, for their amendments on established mayoral strategic authorities.
Amendment 47, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, seeks to remove the Secretary of State’s ability to designate by regulations a mayoral strategic authority as an established mayoral strategic authority. We have been clear that newer strategic authorities will need a chance to establish themselves and set up core functions properly before they exercise all the powers in the devolution framework. However, it is important that our most established strategic authorities are not held back from accessing the full suite of powers in the devolution framework.
The ability for the Secretary of State to designate established mayoral strategic authorities is crucial to ensuring that the most mature institutions have full access to all devolved powers. Amendment 47 is therefore inconsistent with the Government’s objective of devolving further powers out of Whitehall. As the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, said, established mayoral strategic authorities have access to an integrated settlement, which is a very important measure for them.
I will set out further where we have got to with this so far, as it might help noble Lords with the concept. The English Devolution White Paper confirmed that the following combined authorities have met the criteria and will be eligible to apply for the established mayoral level of devolution: Greater Manchester, Liverpool City Region, South Yorkshire, West Midlands, West Yorkshire and the North East.
Once the Bill becomes law, several other combined authorities will become eligible to apply for MSA status: Cambridgeshire and Peterborough, East Midlands, and York and North Yorkshire at that point. These prospective established mayoral authorities will need to submit formal proposals outlining how they meet the relevant criteria. Those proposals will then be considered by the Government, taking into account the combined authority’s or combined county authority’s track record of managing major programmes. The Government will engage with all remaining mayoral combined authorities when they meet the eligibility criteria to apply for established mayoral strategic authority status. I hope that that helps to clarify where we are at the moment.
In practice, the effect of this amendment would be to remove the regulation-making power when the Secretary of State designates an established mayoral strategic authority. In the absence of that regulation-making power, designation would instead rest solely on the Secretary of State. This amendment would therefore deny Parliament a say on the designation of established mayoral strategic authorities.
Amendment 49, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, seeks to require the Secretary of State to obtain the consent of a combined county authority before making subordinate legislation in relation to the designation of established mayoral strategic authorities. The amendment, as drafted, would require the Secretary of State to obtain the consent of a combined county authority before removing its status as an established mayoral strategic authority using secondary legislation. However, the actual effect of the amendment would be inconsequential, as Clause 8 already prohibits the Secretary of State from using secondary legislation to remove an authority’s established status. Therefore, this amendment is not necessary.
Also, if in tabling this amendment the noble Baroness was seeking reassurance that a combined county authority could not be designated as an established mayoral strategic authority using secondary legislation without the consent of the authority, then this amendment is also not necessary. Clause 8 already stipulates that the Secretary of State may designate an authority as established only if that authority itself submits a written proposal asking to be designated as an established mayoral strategic authority. Therefore, the authority’s consent is an inherent part of the process, as no authority can be designated unless it actively applies.
Amendments 48 and 50, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, seek to introduce a new statutory requirement for the Secretary of State to consider the
“governance, accountability and specified performance metrics”
of an existing mayoral combined authority or mayoral combined county authority, before it can be designated as an established mayoral strategic authority. I accept that the noble Lord has made this amendment in good faith and wishes to ensure that only those authorities with a strong track record of delivery, and which can demonstrate exemplary stewardship of public finances, are able to access the deepest powers and functions. On this, the noble Lord, the Government and I, as the Minister, are aligned. However, the amendment is unnecessary. The Government have already published clear non-statutory criteria for accessing the established mayoral tier, as set out in the English Devolution White Paper. The reason for having this in non-statutory documents is that it may require amending from time to time, depending on our experience of taking this forward.
To answer the question about criteria from the noble Lords, Lord Jamieson and Lord Lansley, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, already set them out, but just to be clear, they include that a mayoral combined authority or mayoral combined county authority must have been in existence, with a directly elected mayor, for at least 18 months at the point of submitting the request. It must have published a local assurance framework and it must not have been subject to a best value notice, independent review, statutory inspection or intervention in the previous 18 months. Finally, it must not have been subject to any ongoing recommendations from an externally mandated independent review and there should be no material accounting concerns covering the current or previous financial year that relate to the strategic authority’s ability to manage public money.
Lord Lansley (Con)
Before my noble friend responds to the debate, I want just to be sure that I am clear. On the criteria that are applied by the Secretary of State to the question of whether a strategic authority that applies to be established should be permitted to do so, so far they presently include what the devolution White Paper said. None of that has been withdrawn and nothing has been added; it is still the same. But if that were to change at some point in the future, the Government do not need a power in order to change it, because the Secretary of State will simply issue some document that says, “From now on, this is how the Secretary of State is going to look at these decisions”. It is important to get these criteria right. Unless I am misunderstanding the Minister, the intention is that this is a gateway through which you can pass in only one direction. You become an established mayoral strategic authority and you cannot come back if it is wrong, so the criteria have to be right, and the mayoral strategic authority has to be able to live permanently with that status. Am I correct about that?
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
Yes, the noble Lord is right, but this is quite a high level of criteria. There are some financial aspects, but the fact that the authority must not have been subject to a best value notice, an independent review, a statutory inspection or intervention in the previous 18 months covers a wide variety of activity in a strategic authority. There is a rigorous process and a very high bar for those authorities to get over. When we look at the established authorities that I mentioned in relation to the progress on where we are with these now, they have been in place for a long time. Some of them are requesting additional powers to do things that were not traditionally in the framework for mayoral authorities. It is important that that is a high bar for them to get over.
As the noble Lord rightly pointed out, having an integrated settlement is an important step forward for those authorities. We hope that this will be a transformational process and that all the combined and combined county authorities will strive to get to that process once they have a mayor in place. We do not want it to be something that slips back. Let us hope that we can set these criteria, setting the bar high, which indicates the direction of travel we have for devolution, and move forward so that our authorities have the powers to do what they need to do locally.
Lord Lansley (Con)
I apologise for interrupting; I promise that this will be the last time. On the question of tourism revenue, if there is a tourism tax or whatever, what do we know about the arrangements for that? Is it the case that only established mayoral strategic authorities will be able to levy any kind of tourism tax because they have the financial governance and accountability arrangements established for this purpose—forgive the use of “established”, but the noble Baroness can see what I mean—or is there an intention that this would be a wider financial offering to strategic authorities?
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
The tourism tax is an interesting step forward because, as far as I know, this is the first time a fiscal power has been devolved. The Government are keen to test out that devolution of fiscal power; I do not have the details at my fingertips so I will write to the noble Lord on the detail of how it is moving forward.
Lord Jamieson (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Lansley for his thoughtful amendments and comments. I also thank the Minister for her feedback, which has certainly provided some more illumination on a sometimes slightly murky area of devolution.
On integrated financial settlements, I know that, when I chaired the LGA, I pushed very hard to move in this direction. I was very pleased that we managed to get a couple of them over the line with the previous Government. They are important and offer huge benefits to the areas that have them. Therefore, this idea of criteria, and being very clear on them, is important; I thank the Minister for being clear that the White Paper is where the criteria are set out.
However, I am quibbling over and slightly uncomfortable with the fact that the criteria are just guidance for the Minister and could, therefore, be changed relatively easily. When you are talking about devolution, with local councils and local government making significant changes in anticipation of something that will potentially make a significant difference to their areas, those criteria must be very clear and not changeable. Councils must know what goal they are aiming for because, as the Minister said, this is not something that happens overnight; it takes several years, potentially, and a lot of effort. I do not want the goalposts to move too much—most local authorities would not want that, I think—so I would like some assurances, though not necessarily today, on how set in stone the criteria are as people go through the process.
I am also quite curious about the “no stepping back” bit. As the Minister said, we set some very high bars. However, the day after, someone might fail those high bars—but they are still there. A little elaboration on that at some later point would be very much appreciated.
With that, I thank noble Lords for the debate and beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Bassam of Brighton
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would remove the statutory cap on the number of commissioners that may be appointed by a mayoral authority.
Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
My Lords, this group has a number of amendments in my name: Amendments 50A and 51B; Amendment 53A to Schedule 3; and Amendment 196A. There are two separate issues involved in these amendments; I will speak first to those that relate to the restrictions on the number and roles of commissioners.
Last week, we had a really useful debate on the areas of competence. In a sense, this debate shadows that because the commissioners are supposed to shadow the areas of competence. Those of us who were thinking about other areas of competence—in particular, the arts, culture and so on—were looking for some flexibility. These amendments seek similar flexibility in the related roles of commissioners.
New Section 29A, to be inserted by Clause 9, says that mayors may appoint up to seven people and that their functions align with the competence areas. This is potentially an unnecessary example of central control. I would argue that mayors should be free to appoint people to roles determined by them. Why do I think this? Because every area is very different and every area will have different priorities.
Broadly speaking, the areas of competence are wide-ranging. We were arguing that the arts and culture should be an additional area, but they could be within one of the areas of competence; this may mean that a mayor will wish to appoint an additional commissioner. I use this as an example because it is what we were debating last week. This issue is important because you need to bring in the right people for the right jobs, covering those areas of competence and where mayors will make a particular and special emphasis.
It also makes the devolution framework very rigid for the future, which is bad for two reasons. First, it would require primary legislation to enable a change in responsibilities and job titles, or to add more commissioners. Over time, I suspect there will be new priorities in different areas. Secondly, the restrictions would also prevent mayors appointing people to roles which they might want to fill, inhibiting the innovation we want to see from the devolution model—which, in general terms, I think we all applaud. For example, some already appoint active travel commissioners, who would either be out of scope in terms of the legislation or be prevented from continuing in their roles. The amendment, therefore, deals with this by getting rid of the restrictions.
Fewer restrictions would allow mayors to make commissioner appointments to different roles, depending on the needs of their own area, region, county or counties. For example, instead of a single transport and local infrastructure commissioner, we could see some areas appointing a bus commissioner or an active travel commissioner under these provisions; such appointments would still be subject to other scrutiny provisions on commissions contained in Schedule 3 to the Bill.
Overall, this change would create the right kind of flexibility in the mayoral model, while keeping mayors responsible for keeping a lid on costs through transparency and scrutiny. I anticipate that the Minister will argue that we have to have restraints on costs, and I do not disagree with that.
My second area of interest in this group is the restrictions on mayoral political advisers; Amendment 196A deals with that issue and argues for mayoral special advisers. Currently, the central government model of transparency and flexibility on special adviser appointments has, I think we could fairly argue, been a success in balancing value for money for the taxpayer with the ability of Ministers to bring in the right level of expertise.
I recently read a really interesting book called Every Journey Matters, which looks at the history of the first 25 years of Transport for London. The thing that emerges very strongly from that account of TfL’s first 25 years is the quality of advice that TfL was able to tap about commissioners, support staff and, effectively, special advisers—though I do not think they were called that back in the day. All the mayors have drawn on that and, I think, benefitted from it. One could fairly argue that TfL is one of the most successful metropolitan transportation networks and systems in the world, and the quality of advice has made that difference.
Therefore, the model from the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 should be applied to mayors, given their increasingly broad role and responsibility. There are three issues relating to the current system of appointments of political advisers by mayors. First, mayors are able to appoint political advisers only if it is covered in the relevant secondary legislation; in other words, they are governed by secondary legislation. Most mayors are allowed only one political adviser under relevant statutory instruments, which also cap the pay at the level of local government political assistance, which is something like £45,000. This opens the potential for differences which are unfair and need to be standardised. Secondly, there are no requirements for transparency on mayoral political adviser appointments or pay, unlike for government special advisers under the 2010 Act. Thirdly, there is no code of conduct for mayoral advisers, unlike for government special advisers, though the code of conduct is not required under primary legislation.
The amendment applies the central government model of special advisers to mayors; it would deal with these issues by allowing mayors to appoint mayoral special advisers, subject to an annual transparency requirement, and by their being paid in line with the relevant commissioner allowances, which the Bill already specifies should be determined by remuneration committees. It also moves away from the political adviser designation, so that mayors may be able to appoint special advisers to fulfil a variety of roles, just as Ministers are able to. Mayors can then bring in the people they need as they wish, subject to local oversight on pay and public scrutiny of the total cost, as we do with national government.
Baroness Willis of Summertown (CB)
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 51A and 52A in my name. I respect and agree with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, about having some flexibility in the appointment of these different commissioners.
My amendment looks specifically at the commissioners for climate and nature. In particular, it seeks that these two topics do not just become a political football at the mercy of the political leanings of the mayor that is put in place. It is not enough to say that a mayor merely can appoint a person to oversee the delivery of one of the authority’s competencies; the mayor needs to appoint someone to oversee the delivery of the competencies outlined in Clause 2. That is especially important when we consider nature and climate, since both the 2008 Climate Change Act and the 2021 Environment Act have clear, unambiguous delivery targets, many of which are spatially constrained and require strategic oversight and consideration of competing land uses. We need someone in place who is able to oversee the delivery of these competencies strategically. The problem is that, currently, the duties in these Acts apply only to the Secretary of State, so there is an incredibly high risk that one of our most important delivery arms is under-deployed or at least deployed very unevenly, depending on the political swing or leanings of that mayoral authority.
Why is this so important? I calculated—on the back of an envelope, I admit—the amount of land the six new mayoral districts and the combined areas will be responsible for. It is 75% of the English landscape. This is not a small amount: we are talking about the biggest part of our landscape. Therefore, this should really make us stop and think whether we have the right safeguards in place to ensure the delivery of climate and nature targets if the political leanings of the mayor are not that way inclined.
Of course, it should be for the mayors to appoint whom they wish as commissioners, but it is also important to note that we need them to appoint commissioners in certain areas where they have relevant experience or expertise. Although I accept that it would be the responsibility of the mayor of an area to decide how to develop an action policy, we need to put in place some safeguards to ensure that central government’s policy priorities and legal responsibilities are delivered.
I am going to give a few examples of the importance of a commissioner for nature and climate. The first, as we heard about before in the previous discussion, is local nature recovery strategies. These are full of potential, but now, as they reach implementation stage, there is a risk they will sit on the shelf, for two reasons: first, because of the challenge of integrating decision-making in local government; and secondly, because of the need to organise co-ordinated action at scale.
Environmental skills is another issue. They are commonly and widely recognised as a bottleneck; we do not have the people who are able to help our planning officers to make the decisions needed in the planning system. Lack of skills in planning control and enforcement is a really big risk to delivering on things such as biodiversity net gain right now; only 5% of local authorities say that they have adequate resources properly to manage biodiversity net gain. To deliver and fill those gaps, we need skills and education programmes that are co-ordinated and have oversight at the strategic levels. It is highly unlikely that any of these areas of competence for strategic authorities would see the skills gap as part of their portfolio. I cannot see any of those competences thinking that they should focus on employing people or on education programmes; I would see this sitting under a commissioner for climate and nature.
Finally comes the issue of green infrastructure planning, which many of us discussed in the passage of the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, and the delivery of nature-based solutions and protecting and restoring the UK’s natural capital assets. This requires some large-scale spatial co-ordination actions—for example, the Environment Act targets to reduce nitrogen and phosphorous pollution, and ambitions for nature-based solutions for flood defence. All of that will require strategic interventions and top-down leadership, and to be under a dedicated, named person. Who is going to do it if, within a mayoral system, there is no one with that title who can oversee and manage nature and climate?
At the same time, these large-scale conventional infrastructure projects—I know that one of our noble friends works in the Oxford–Cambridge Arc—require large-scale nature plans to ensure that they do not destroy large swathes of nature and critical natural capital assets. That is something we often forget about when we think about nature recovery.
I would like to zoom out a bit on this one. It is worth remembering that in a report last year about the role of natural capital in the UK’s green economy, the Environmental Audit Committee found that while natural capital assets are an essential foundation of the UK and global economy, there is little evidence of that being considered in decision-making. So, while the amendment does not specifically deal with natural capital, it would ensure that somebody at the top was considering and responsible for oversight of this in the new authority.
I make one more point about natural capital. It is not just a “nice to have”. In November, the ONS released its reports, valuing natural capital assets in the UK at £1.6 trillion. This is not just about the pretty flowers somewhere—this is serious infrastructure. Natural infrastructure underpins so many things we rely on. The annual value of £41 billion in natural capital assets was largely driven by health benefits gained from recreation. So, it comes back to us needing a commissioner at the top who looks at these figures and at what we need to do to deliver on the ground. Devolved government is a fantastic idea, and I am a huge supporter of it, but we need the right people in the right place to deliver what I believe they can deliver.
I would be grateful if the Minister could say what the Government’s intention is here. Do they think there should be a commissioner for each of the competences? Given that there are seven competences and seven commissioners, I would think that the answer is yes, although I am not sure any more—maybe it should be more. If they do not think they should state that in statute, why? What situation are they allowing for if we get in a political situation whereby the mayor does not support nature and climate as part of our infrastructure? That is a very big risk that we should look at in this Bill now.
Lord Bach (Lab)
My Lords, I shall speak to six amendments, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59 and 171. As this is my first and may even be my last contribution, I want to express straightaway that I welcome the Bill very warmly. It gives mayors new powers to appoint commissioners, to increase capacity and to maximise the benefits of devolution. Obviously, mayors will have to consider carefully how best to use these directly appointed roles, drawing on the right expertise and ensuring value for money.
I also welcome the Government’s approach to entrusting directly elected mayors to make decisions on commissioner appointments tailored to local needs. However, these amendments seek to make some pragmatic changes that would improve the Bill by giving—vitally—greater flexibility on shaping commissioner roles. All my amendments go to that greater flexibility on shaping commissioner roles and appointments so that they are suitable for the specific circumstances of their region.
I will briefly outline three such issues, to which I will ask the Government to consider making changes. First, in relation to my Amendment 171, the Bill could enable greater flexibility for the appointment of deputy mayors for policing and crime under mayors that will be responsible for more than one police force area. As the Committee may know, I speak as a former Leicestershire police and crime commissioner. Although I may have mixed feelings about the Government’s decision to abolish police and crime commissioners, I am enough of a realist to realise that it is a done deal—it will happen—so we have to talk about the future, and I am happy to do so. Speaking as a former PCC, I recognise the importance of effective democratic oversight and accountability for our police forces in this new world that we are undoubtedly moving into.
The integration of police and fire services under mayors will improve democratic accountability and enable better integration of these services with wider mayoral functions. The Bill will enable the transfer of police and crime commissioner functions to mayors whose boundaries are coterminous with one or more PCC areas, and for most PCC functions to be delegated to a deputy mayor for policing and crime. In the east Midlands, this means that Derbyshire PCC and Nottinghamshire PCC functions transferring to the Mayor of the East Midlands, because the boundaries of the two PCC areas are coterminous with the East Midlands Combined County Authority.
Importantly, the Government also intend to transfer fire and rescue authority functions to mayors too. For the east Midlands, the Government have committed to explore merging the Derbyshire FRA and Nottinghamshire FRA, so that the East Midlands Combined County Authority becomes the fire and rescue authority for the area. I will return to that point in a moment.
As drafted, however, the Bill risks limiting the full potential of this integration, where a mayor takes on PCC functions for more than one police force. This means that a deputy mayor for policing and crime must be appointed for each police force area, so there will be two deputy mayors where there are two police forces. There are good reasons why a mayor may want to appoint a deputy mayor for each police force, including to ensure effective oversight and scrutiny of complex organisations. However, in some cases, a single deputy mayor for policing and crime—or a single deputy mayor for public safety, including fire—may enable better integration and join-up across services.
That is particularly the case—this is the main argument for this in this area—where a mayor may be responsible for two police forces and one fire and rescue authority. For example, it would be impracticable to have a deputy mayor responsible for fire across the whole region but for only one of the two police forces. Therefore, my Amendment 171 to Schedule 22 seeks to ensure that, where a mayor may be responsible for more than one police force area, they would have the flexibility to appoint a single deputy mayor or separate deputy mayors for each police force. I invite the Minister to think carefully about whether this is a sensible proposal to make this part of the Bill marginally more flexible.
Lord Shipley (LD)
My Lords, we have had a very interesting set of amendments so far, but what strikes me about them is that they all seem to run counter to the principle of election—be that either direct or indirect election—and we need to be very careful about that.
I have given notice to oppose that Clause 9 stands part of the Bill for two reasons. First, elections are important for public posts that require the expenditure of large sums of public money. I believe that most of those positions should be elected. Secondly, there is a huge absence of detail in the proposal within new paragraph 9 in Schedule 3 for the appointment and scrutiny of commissioners.
The Explanatory Notes at paragraph 74 states that commissioners will be,
“independent appointees, made by and accountable to the mayor”.
I have difficulty understanding quite how they will be independent if they are made by and accountable to the mayor and function, as the Explanatory Notes explain in the same paragraph, as “extensions of the mayor”. Can the Minister say in what way they are independent and why “independent” does not appear in this paragraph? The Explanatory Notes then state:
“Commissioners would not replace elected members”—
and there has already been a debate about that as part of this group, but they then say that areas—whatever an area is defined as—will,
“have the freedom to use a combination of commissioners and elected members to lead on different areas depending on what works best for them”.
Will the Minister say who makes the decision about whether elected members have the capacity to lead an area of competence, whether that decision made by the mayor alone and will the appointment of commissioners be public appointments, subject to the Nolan principles of selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership? Perhaps the Minister can tell us whether the posts will be advertised and subject to equal opportunities legislation. Will there be an agreed job description and a person specification? Will there be competitive interviews or is it all a matter, in practice, for mayoral patronage? Will councillors of constituent councils be able to scrutinise the full-time commissioners—for they are full-time appointments—that the mayor may decide to appoint?
Schedule 3 states that:
“The mayor must determine the terms and conditions of a person’s appointment as a commissioner”.
Can the Minister tell us what scrutiny is planned about what those terms and conditions actually are?
We should just note that the appointment of a commissioner will end when the mayor’s term of office comes to an end. That means that a mayor who decides to resign will cause all the commissioners they have appointed to lose their jobs, which are, as it says in the Explanatory Notes, full-time jobs. It seems that the clear implication of the wording of the Bill is that if a mayor was to quit the post, all those appointed by the mayor would have to leave. I seek the Minister’s clarification of that point, for that is my reading of Clause 9 and Schedule 3.
I have noted that commissioners cannot approve local growth plans, local transport plans or spatial development strategy, but they are writing them, planning them and will be advising the mayor on them. I understand the formality of a decision to approve a plan, but what the plan is and how it has got there will clearly be heavily dependent upon the commissioner.
I understand that:
“The mayor must obtain the consent of the CCA to any arrangement for a commissioner to exercise a function”,
but does that extend to the appointments process itself? I wonder why there is no discussion by the Government of using the professional expertise of local government officers. So, not only are the Government dispensing with the ballot box in terms of any form of direct election to strategic authorities, but they are simply leaving an election of a mayor, following which we simply have a world of appointments. I am very concerned about what that means. I ask myself, “Whatever happened to the primacy of the ballot box?” because commissioners will not be elected, so voters will have no say in their appointment because the electorate will elect a only mayor and will have no role after that. Indeed, unlike with a Member of Parliament, the electorate will have no power of recall of a mayor.
We then have Amendment 196A in this group on special advisers. I listened carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, said about them, but I have not understood the difference between a full-time commissioner and a special adviser. The noble Lord talked about a special adviser having professional expertise. I understand that professional advice is needed—of course it is—but I have not understood what is wrong with professional local government officers, with their expertise in the areas that might, at the moment, be proposed for a commissioner.
There are a lot of very important questions for the Minister to answer. The level of expenditure has been mentioned twice so far this afternoon, and the consequent level of the precept, which might then be high. We must be really careful about this and not duplicate. I remember, because I was around when metropolitan counties were abolished and we moved to joint boards, that the expertise in each of the areas of concern we have proposed was held by an individual local authority that had a lot of officers dealing with that specific policy area on behalf of everybody else. The joint boards had councillors; I was privileged to serve as a councillor on a number of those joint boards at different times.
I just do not think that the Government have gone far enough in examining how to deliver some of their proposals on, say, local transport, which used to function in Tyne and Wear with a joint board. What exactly is the problem with that? As I said last week, I fear that we have upwards mission drift in this Bill, taking powers away from established local government. I believe that to be true, but I also think that we are in danger of reinventing processes that have previously worked pretty well. I do not think that Clause 9 and Schedule 3 can stand here without us challenging what the Government intend to do because there is already a demand in this group for us to have yet more commissioners.
I am, by the way, in favour of culture’s status being raised—it is absolutely correct to do that—but I am uncomfortable with the suggestion that every area of concern should have a commissioner. Indeed, that is not the Minister’s proposal. The Government are not proposing that that should happen because there will be a mixture of commissioners, with the elected leaders of the councils of the combined authority and the strategic authority.
I shall stop there, but I hope that the Minister can allay some of my concerns around the failure of the Bill to have anything worth reading in it and with nearly everything that is going to happen next coming in the form of guidance. As I said last week, I would be happier if I knew a little more about what the Government are thinking in terms of guidance.
With that, I shall respond at some point when we come to the right moment, but I very much hope that the Minister will take on board some of my comments.
Viscount Trenchard (Con)
My Lords, I agree very much with most of what the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, just said. I have been unhappy with much of Clause 9 since I first read it, and I look forward to hearing what my noble friends have to say about it, because they have also added their names to the intention from the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, to oppose the Question that the clause stands part.
Baroness Griffin of Princethorpe (Lab)
My Lords, as I have said before, I wholeheartedly welcome the Bill. Before I speak to my Amendment 221, I will discuss this group more broadly. As my noble friend the Minister has demonstrated, local government is better placed than Whitehall to understand the possibilities of local regeneration and strategic planning; place-based regeneration that is owned and directed by local people; effective skills training for local high-GDP jobs in emerging local industries; industry relevance coupled with creative thinking; and creativity, which is the linking of ideas to technique. As my noble friend said, what is important is politics being done with communities, not to them. Every child should have access to quality green space, clean air and a creative education. Who can plan better the walking pram distance to a school than a local parent or carer?
Listening to the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, on spatial planning, my years as chair of economic development in Liverpool City Council came flooding back. I know that Liverpool City Region is looking forward to the opportunities of tourism tax, and indeed we should consider whether this will work and how it can go further. As the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, advocated so convincingly last week, devolution done well should and can build social cohesion and inclusion. I was very pleased to hear my noble friend the Minister say that culture may be considered as a competence.
Having represented combined local authorities in the European Parliament, I have had the pleasure of witnessing how devolved strategic government can mobilise regeneration, growth and job creation, and provide better access to public services, including affordable and—I hope—accessible green transport. The only way forward with hydrogen is green. I firmly believe that no city, town or rural community should be left behind, as has sadly been the case so far. We must afford these opportunities of well-audited devolution further and create an exchange of practice between regions and sub-regions to share learning, both on what is good and on where to avoid mistakes.
Amendment 221 is technical but also practical, widening the pool from which an elected mayor can appoint a deputy mayor. Current rules tightly limit who a regional mayor can appoint as deputy: only members of their cabinet, except for exceptional circumstances—that is, the leaders of the constituent local authorities. This new clause would amend Section 107C of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act, so that a mayor is no longer restricted to appointing a deputy mayor from among the leaders of the constituent local authority’s members of the combined or strategic authority, thus widening the pool both of choice, and, as others have said, expertise. Among the wide opportunities afforded by the Bill, I hope my noble friend the Minister will consider this.
The Earl of Clancarty (CB)
My Lords, I will be quite brief and will make a point of principle to start with. If something is important enough to be an additional area of competence, it should have a dedicated commissioner to go with it, which is in line with what the Government have done so far. I say that at the outset.
The noble Lord, Lord Bassam, has given us an intriguing, rather creative amendment in terms of flexibility, but I have a couple of concerns. I know that the noble Lord is an enlightened individual arts-wise, who I am sure would like to see—like me—the arts, culture and heritage thrive in the new strategic areas. But, as the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, and I pointed out last week in the debate on my Amendment 6, not all councils are quite so enlightened. Even if every mayor was conscientious enough today to ensure that their strategic authority did everything it could for the arts, culture and heritage—I say this simply as an example of an area of concern rather than competence—there is no guarantee that those who follow would have the same commitment unless there was a statutory commitment. This is very much in line with what the noble Baroness, Lady Willis of Summertown, was saying earlier. I very much support Amendment 51A in her name, and the other amendments that she proposed as well.
Lord Freyberg (CB)
My Lords, I will briefly support the amendments in this group that seek to remove the cap on the number of commissioners and the appointment of special advisers. In doing so, I restate my support for Amendments 6, 10 and 51 in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, and the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, to add the arts and culture as an area of competence, which would allow a modest increase in the number of commissioners from seven to eight.
I fully recognise that the Government wish to maintain a coherent and settled devolution framework, to limit additional costs that such appointments would incur and to exercise caution around unelected roles. Here I entirely take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s answers to those numerous and very important questions.
I also accept the argument that further powers may be pursued within the existing areas of competence. That said, the question here is one of governance rather than architecture. A small degree of flexibility in the commissional model, as the noble Lords, Lord Bassam and Lord Bach, have argued for, would allow mayors to organise their leadership teams and their advisers in ways that reflect local priorities and circumstances without altering the framework itself.
Different regions face very different challenges: a dense metropolitan authority and a largely rural combined county authority may reasonably require different internal arrangements. For those reasons, I generally support these amendments and the flexibility they seek to introduce.
Lord Jamieson (Con)
My Lords, we have had an interesting debate. I thank all noble Lords who have participated. It does appear to be the first one today where we are not quite in agreement on things. I assure my noble friend Lord Trenchard that we share his concerns about appointing unelected commissioners to roles that have real political power. However, before I go on to that, this raises an important and enduring question about how leadership is accountable and the flexibility to operate within a system that is devolved.
At its heart, this debate returns to the principles of devolution. It is about not just transferring powers from the centre to the local level but about who exercises those powers. It is about how they are held to account and how clearly responsibility is understood by the public whom those institutions are designed to serve.
On the amendments, while the noble Lord, Lord Bach, made a good case, we have concerns about commissioners holding responsibility for multiple areas of confidence because there is a risk that it could reduce accountability, concentrating authority into too few hands and blurring the lines of responsibility, making it harder for the public to discern who is ultimately answerable for decisions—there may be cases that need further thought in this area. I also accept the noble Lord’s points about police authorities. With the recent announcement in the other place, can the Minister say whether that is being taken into account in the devolution Bill or, even better, whether that announcement is going to take account of the devolution Bill? That is rather important.
On the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, devolution works best when responsibilities are clear, visible and capable of effective scrutiny. I have a real concern here, which has been shared by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley. First, I will talk about commissioners. What is the definition of a commissioner? Working in local government, when you say that the commissioners are coming in, while I personally am not used to a failing council, normally you send them in after a best value inspection when one is failing. We have had this issue several times in the devolution Bill, and definitions and consistency of definitions would be helpful.
However, the real concern about commissioners is that we seem to have an expanding strategy. The Bill talks about seven but now we have amendments that talk about political advisers, special advisers and more deputy mayors. My focus in local government is value for money. Local government and mayors should be about delivering services to residents. They should not be about creating an unelected bureaucracy that is appointed and risks political cronyism. The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, also raised a number of practical issues such as whether when the mayor resigns all the commissioners go and you lose all that knowledge and so forth. I will not go on to those again, because that would be unnecessary repetition, but we have a real concern.
A number of noble Lords raised an issue around whether we can have commissioners for specific areas. I have sympathy with that, but they do not have to be commissioners. We are talking about political leads for certain areas. There is no reason why an elected councillor cannot be a political lead, whether it is for rural affairs, the environment, culture and so forth. I do not think that we have to focus on commissioners there—that can be a political lead.
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their amendments on mayoral commissioners and for the wide-ranging debate that we have had on the subject.
Before I respond to any individual amendments, I want to reiterate why the Government are introducing commissioners. I completely understand the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, on title and definition. I must say, I asked myself the same question on the potential confusion around commissioners who are sent to do a job when an authority is failing and these types of commissioners; we have to think carefully about that.
As I have set out, the Bill will empower our mayors with wide-ranging new powers over transport planning and local growth, so they can drive growth across their region, and powers over health and public safety, so that they can deliver the public service reform that the public expect to see. These are critical functions, and it is not reasonable to expect a mayor to do all of them. That is why we have introduced commissioners—an optional appointment to whom mayors can delegate functions to support them in their work. Mayors will be able to appoint up to seven commissioners, aligned to the areas of competence and reflecting areas of responsibility. As the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, said, mayors can also appoint members of the combined county authority or combined authority as portfolio holders, of course; they will also have officials to support their work, such as finance officials, legal officials and so on.
Let me be clear: this is not about inviting a proliferation of appointments. Rather, it is about mayors having capacity to deliver against the full range of their functions and giving them flexibility in how they deliver for their area. Local authority leaders who are on the combined authority will be able to support the mayor as portfolio holders; do not forget, though, that it is important to remember that they will have their own authorities to lead as well, so they will be working in their own authority at the same time.
On Amendments 51A and 52A, I reiterate that commissioners are an optional appointment: they are designed to increase capacity and give mayors more flexibility in how they choose to deliver for their areas. These amendments, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Willis, would remove that optionality, effectively introducing seven new statutory roles in the combined authority or combined county authority. We have set out the competency, for example on the environment and climate change, in the Bill itself, but mayors are best placed to determine whether they need additional support on this based on the needs of their local area.
While we have set out in the competencies what we think mayors should be doing, it cannot be right that we make the choice for them about how they do that. Therefore, it is for mayors to decide. I know this can be difficult for us in the political process when a mayor may put an emphasis on an area that would be less important to us than something else, but I am afraid that is part of the democratic process that we live with all the time; it is not that different.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
I just do not understand this. If I am a leader of a local authority and I have a specific need for a competence, I employ an official or an officer. I interview a large range of them; I do not go to one of my mates and ask if they would like to be a commissioner. I do not understand why that should be any different in a mayoral office. If they are doing work that demands somebody extremely well-qualified in a specific arts project, they can employ an officer or official. It does not need to be a commissioner who has a connotation of being politically motivated, as well as being possibly qualified in that area.
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
I will come on to that in a moment, if that is okay. If I do not answer the noble Baroness’s question, I will come back to it.
Amendments 50A, 51B and 53A, tabled by my noble friend Lord Bassam, seek to remove the statutory cap on the number of commissioners that may be appointed by the mayor. It is important that mayors have the support they need from specialists to deliver for their constituents. However, we believe the Bill strikes the right balance, ensuring that mayors have the capacity to deliver without inviting a proliferation of appointments.
For this reason, I am afraid I cannot support the Amendment 196A, tabled by my noble friend Lord Bassam. This amendment would enable mayors to appoint mayoral special advisers and would include provisions regarding their appointment, function and code of conduct. It would also exempt these advisers from holding a politically restricted post under a local authority for the purposes of Part 1 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989. I agree that mayors can benefit from advice that they trust aligns with their politics. Political advisers bring important expertise that helps mayors formulate their strategy, policy decisions and communications approach. That is why mayors can already appoint a political adviser, and our current position is to provide new mayoralties with that option too.
However, these advisers will be subject to political restrictions in the same way existing advisers are. Accountability in public office is of paramount importance, which is why we have existing guardrails in place. The cap ensures that spending remains proportionate to the institution and prevents a proliferation of political appointments. On my noble friend Lord Bassam’s point on the code of conduct, mayors’ special advisers, where appointed, are employees of the strategic authority, and therefore they would be covered by the strategic authority’s code of conduct.
Amendments 54, 55, 58, 59, 57 and 61, tabled by my noble friend Lord Bach, seek to enable commissioners’ work or the delegation of function to relate to more than one area of competence. The amendments also seek to allow two or more commissioners to relate to the same area of competence. I thank my noble friend for these amendments, and I reassure him that the mayor will already have the flexibility to consider local circumstances when considering a commissioner’s exact brief and any delegated functions relating to the area of competence.
The Bill states that a commissioner’s work or functions can relate to other areas of competence and matters outside of them where it is incidental to the work in their special area of competence. For example, a commissioner focused on economic development and regeneration could lead on a growth strategy that included elements related to housing, skills and transport.
Amendment 171, also in the name of my noble friend Lord Bach, seeks to ensure that, where a mayor is responsible for more than one police force, they would have the flexibility to appoint a single deputy mayor or separate deputy mayors for each police force. As I have set out, the Bill already ensures that the mayor has support in exercising police governance functions in each of the police forces for which they have responsibility, and it recognises that these forces remain distinct and separate entities. The provisions in the Bill will prevent the same person from being appointed to more than one deputy mayor for police and crime positions, ensuring that there is a dedicated lead for the day-to-day oversight of policing in each force area.
My noble friend will know that I worked in policing for many years, and I am very aware of the different policing challenges that can occur even in neighbouring forces: the balance of different types of crime—rural and urban—and some of the more internal issues around different IT systems, and so on. That seems appropriate at the moment. Our right honourable friend the Home Secretary spoke very powerfully about her view that there needs to be further reorganisation of policing, and we should of course work across government as we move forward with the Bill to work with her to identify her ideas and how that might be implemented in this. But I appreciate that she was talking about some of this being implemented some way off, as the noble Lord, Lord Bach, said.
For the moment, this amendment would impact the direct line of accountability the mayor is able to provide to voters regarding the police forces which they are required to hold to account. I will reflect on his call for flexibility around this, and I think we need to have further discussions with the Home Office about how this will work moving forward.
Amendment 221, tabled by my noble friend Lady Griffin of Princethorpe, would enable a mayor of a combined authority to appoint any councillor of a constituent council in a combined authority area as deputy mayor. I want to clarify with her that I have understood her amendment properly, because I think she said something slightly different from what is in the amendment itself. The mayor can appoint members of the constituent authorities who sit on the combined authority in portfolio holder roles, but they cannot appoint any member of the constituent authority. I just clarify that.
The position of deputy mayor is a significant responsibility, which could involve stepping in to chair the authority and undertaking mayoral functions. That is why, currently, only those constituent councillors who have been appointed as a member of the combined authority may be appointed as a deputy mayor. These members have been appointed by the council to the authority in the knowledge that this may involve taking on the deputy mayor role, so they have the legitimacy to perform it if called upon. It is important that we keep measures in place to ensure that a deputy mayor is a legitimate appointment, best prepared for the demands they will face should they have to step in as mayor. Because this amendment applies only to combined authorities, technically it would create a divergence between the requirements imposed on them, versus combined county authorities.
The remaining amendments in this group, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, seek to remove Clause 9 and Schedule 3. This would eliminate the role of commissioners from the Bill, preventing their appointment by mayors. As I have stated, commissioners are intended to increase mayors capacity and give them more flexibility in how they deliver for their area. These authorities will have critical new functions to undertake, requiring representation on national bodies, joint working with partners and access to the expertise they need. It is simply not realistic to expect a mayor to do all this on their own. These appointments will be a local decision, and no additional funding will be provided.
I will now cover some of the questions that have been asked by noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, the noble Lords, Lord Jamieson and Lord Shipley, the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, and others. Starting with the question about commissioners being simply devolution to unelected officials, commissioners are optional and can be appointed only by the mayor, who determines their terms and conditions. They will work in lockstep with the mayor to drive forward the policy agenda for a specific function, such as transport or public health. This will be particularly effective where a commissioner has specialist knowledge and expertise that can help deliver the mayor’s vision for local people. There is a real difference here between employed officials of a local council, for example, and what these commissioners will do. The best example I can give is the way that these positions work in London, where the mayor has a number of deputy mayors, as they are called, who act for the mayor in certain policy areas.
The mayor, the combined county authority and the overview and scrutiny committee will each play a role in the commissioner’s appointment and/or the termination of their appointment. We will set out guidance, following Royal Assent, on recruitment and job descriptions. Responding to the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, I say that these commissioners will be subject to the Nolan principles, as employees of strategic authorities. Commissioners will also fall under the strengthened accountability system for devolution, which will confirm further details in due course; we are likely to have further discussions about that later this evening.
Lord Jamieson (Con)
With voting, the figure required can be either two-thirds or 50:50. Can the Minister clarify what figure is required to remove a commissioner?
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
For the overview and scrutiny committee, I believe it is a simple majority vote, but I will clarify that in writing for the noble Lord.
We expect that commissioners will have detailed knowledge and expertise in their assigned area of competence and will be appointed on this basis. Constituent members will not necessarily be experienced in their portfolio subject area. There are also circumstances where it would not be appropriate for a portfolio lead to represent both the borough and the region; there may be perceived conflicts of interest. As I said earlier, the local authority leaders who sit on the combined authority will also be running their councils on a day-to-day basis.
Commissioners will be able to represent the mayor’s authority and policy positions in a given area, including by speaking to the media. They could help make day-to-day decisions that are delegated by a mayor and provide strategic insight and advice for their area of expertise. We also expect commissioners to play a leading role in stakeholder engagement and partnership working, across geographies and organisations, as appropriate. This would include working closely with local councillors, business leaders and public sector institutions, using their advocacy and influence to deliver the mayor’s agenda.
I hope that that has helped clarify some of the points raised by noble Lords and that, with the assurances I have given, they will not press their amendments.
Lord Shipley (LD)
If there are any matters raised by me or other noble Lords that the Minister did not cover, could she send a letter to cover them? I do not think I heard confirmation about the Nolan principles, for example. If there is anything else, I hope that officials might draft something for her to send.
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
I did confirm that the commissioners will be subject to the Nolan principles. I will go back over Hansard—I always do after these debates—and if I have missed anything, I will certainly write to the noble Lord.
Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
My Lords, this has been an absolutely fascinating debate. It has made me think a lot about the history of local government and how it has changed over 150 or 160 years. There was a time when we had aldermen, but they were abolished. We have had two-tier government, county boroughs and so on, but things have changed there too. The introduction of commissioners is a very progressive move, so I cannot agree with the noble Lords, Lord Shipley and Lord Jamieson, on that point. I can see that the accountability framework for commissioners is very important; they will have a powerful job.
If we think about it, some of those combined mayoral authorities will cover large geographical areas. My own likely combined mayoral authority involves East and West Sussex, which is about 100 miles from one end to the other and about 50 miles wide—and East Anglia covers a similarly large geographical area. It is right that we have these commissioners appointed and can hold them to account, because they will have a very important job to do. That is one reason why I thought that introducing some flexibility in terms of the patch or territory they cover, or the policies, was so important. However, I have heard what the Minister has said about that, and I hope we can reflect on some of those issues before Report.
On the points I made about political advisers and special advisers, I simply say this: again, it relates to the size of the task in front of mayors and commissioners. The salary is some £45,000 a year, which is generous but not pitched at a level one would necessarily expect to attract the very best. We need to have good quality political advisers involved in these strategic mayoral authorities. In my time as a local government leader, I did not see fit to have a political adviser—I got more than enough political advice from the Labour group, daily, and sometimes beyond that. But political advisers and special advisers are of immense value. When I first became a Minister back in 1999, what the civil servants used to say to me that was of value was that they had access to a special adviser who understood the thinking of the Secretary of State and their Ministers. That is really important, and that is why I thought it worth having a discussion about introducing special advisers into these very large strategic mayoral authorities. However, I have heard what the Minister said about that, and I shall reflect on it some more. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Shipley
“Scrutiny of mayoral commissioners(1) The mayor of a combined county authority must establish, for each commissioner appointed by the mayor, a scrutiny committee composed of elected members of the constituent local authorities.(2) The purpose of each scrutiny committee is to review, assess and report on the exercise of the policy responsibilities of the commissioner to whom it relates.(3) Each scrutiny committee must have the following powers—(a) to require the mayor, the relevant commissioner, or any member of their staff to attend before the committee to give evidence;(b) to require the production of any documents relevant to the exercise of the commissioner’s functions;(c) to publish reports on the committee’s findings and recommendations.(4) The mayor and the relevant commissioner must have regard to any report or recommendation made by the corresponding scrutiny committee under this section.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment requires a Mayor of a Combined County Authority to establish a scrutiny committee of elected members with powers of summons to examine and report on the Mayor’s exercise of functions.
Lord Shipley (LD)
My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 53 on behalf of my noble friend Lady Pinnock. This amendment is about how you scrutinise mayoral commissioners. I noted what the Minister said in responding to the previous group about the mayor or combined authority members being responsible for scrutinising commissioners, yet that removes any responsibility on the constituent authorities to undertake scrutiny. It is doubly important that elected members of the constituent local authorities have some powers in scrutinising the work of a commissioner. They will need powers to do that—to require the mayor and relevant commissioner or indeed any member of their staff to attend and give evidence—so it can be a requirement to attend rather than a request to attend, and there should be an ability to require the production of any documents relevant to the exercise of a commissioner’s function.
There should then be a right to publish reports on the committee’s findings and recommendations, with an absolute power to do so; it would not be for the combined authority or the mayor to say that this matter cannot be published. It is really a fundamental matter about who is in a position to scrutinise what mayors do.
Can I make just two points about scrutiny, which will come up later in our deliberations? The best form of scrutiny is one that happens before the decision is made, not one that comments on a decision after it has been made. The best way in which to deliver that objective is through a committee system, because a committee system actually authorises decisions to be made and has the major advantage that the scrutiny is happening at the same time as a decision is made.
I have found it very disappointing in the Bill that quite so much is being said about the committee system and its perceived failures, most of which I do not recognise. It may be that when we get to further discussions in Committee and then on Report, further consideration can be given to those matters. I hope the Minister will be able to say that the Government do not downplay the importance of scrutiny, particularly when so many issues and so much public money is involved in the proposals to devolve power to mayors and commissioners. I beg to move.
Lord Bichard (CB)
My Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendment 191, and, in doing so, declare an interest as an honorary vice-president of the Local Government Association.
The amendment would provide for the establishment in every local area of a local public accounts committee to ensure the effective scrutiny and accountability across the whole range of public service spending and activity in that area, not just the actions of the strategic authority or the mayor. So why is an amendment like this necessary?
During the past 40 years we have seen in this country a radical fragmentation of our public services with the establishment of a myriad disconnected, sometimes single-purpose agencies. Sadly, these have too often worked in isolation, seeking to achieve their own specific targets energetically, but on occasions their efforts have conflicted or overlapped with their partners. They have too often worked in silos and, sadly, regulators have been very slow to recognise and challenge that. As a result, the public often struggle to access or even make sense of the disjointed services which this system has produced. In addition, resources are wasted because of the overlap and duplication, bureaucracy thrives, and there is inevitably a culture of competition rather than collaboration. This needs to change, but I do not believe that, as drafted, the Bill alone will achieve that level of change. If we are adequately to integrate public services in a locality, all public service providers and partners have to build co-operation into everything they do.
A later amendment in my name seeks to impose a duty on all local public partners to do just that. But alongside that kind of duty we also need to put in place local accountability—and not always accountability to the centre, which has been the model we have followed for so long. We need more local accountability to ensure that genuine co-operation does take place, so that services are delivered which are actually recognisable to ordinary local people and which meet their needs effectively.
Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)
My Lords, I rather suspect that the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, and I are fishing in a similar pool here. My Amendment 196B is all about local accounting officers and is designed to help to improve the level of scrutiny and accountability for each mayoral strategic authority.
The system of departmental accounting officers and their requirement to appear before the Public Accounts Committee is often used to justify value for money—an issue that could prevent proper devolution—but this is because accounting officers are technically meant to be able to justify all spending even if, in reality, the decision to devolve to a different authority has been made. With the development of the new combined mayoral authority model, we need to learn from those models being used by the devolved Administrations where accounting officers’ responsibilities have been given to the relevant bodies.
This amendment would look to devolve AO responsibilities to new local accounting officers, who would be local and accountable to the relevant authority’s scrutiny bodies for any spending by an established mayoral strategic authority. This is loosely based on the relevant legislation for Welsh accounting officers. The relevant body here might include a local public accounts committee; the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, made the case for that.
This amendment is designed to be helpful. The Minister may say that it is unnecessary but, in my view, it would be a genuine move towards devolved accountability—in terms of models of funding and allowing places to innovate while retaining an appropriate level of scrutiny. With the development of devolved mayoral combined authorities, we need an extra layer of accountability that looks at the way in which public money is spent. For too long, local government has been burdened with more responsibility, less funding and fewer opportunities to innovate and develop; at the same time, to my way of looking at things, local authority accounting practices have not really moved on from where they were in the 1990s. This amendment is an attempt to be helpful, very much in the spirit in which the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, spoke to his amendment.
Baroness Thornhill (LD)
My Lords, I will make a brief comment on Amendment 196B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, which is worth discussing further, especially given how it fits with Amendment 191 from the Lord, Lord Bichard, which I strongly support.
The question I asked myself, perhaps trying to anticipate the Minister’s response, was: would it duplicate existing audit and scrutiny arrangements? I came to the conclusion that I do not believe that it would. Audit answers the questions of whether the accounts were properly kept and whether the acceptable processes and procedures were legally carried out. But this amendment addresses a different and much more important question: is public money being spent effectively across the whole system? Audit is retrospective, siloed and looks at individual organisations after the event. Local public accounts committees, as proposed in this amendment, would look across organisations in real time. They would look at how councils, mayors and public service partners are actually working together—they are not the same things.
The Bill deliberately—and correctly, in my view—will push power and spending into shared collaborative arrangements, but our scrutiny remains fragmented, organisation by organisation. This mismatch is the gap that Amendment 191 would fill. Without it, no one body would be clearly responsible for asking very basic questions such as: is it the case that joint working is working? Is it delivering value? Are overlapping budgets aligned with agreed priorities? Are partnerships working as intended? Audit does not do that—and scrutiny committees, as currently structured, will struggle to do that.
In contrast, this amendment would enable that. It is not more bureaucracy; it is better oversight. It is not another unnecessary new layer. The amendment is enabling, not prescriptive, and it allows Ministers to integrate these committees within existing audit and scrutiny frameworks. It provides coherence and not clutter, and in fact good system-level scrutiny actually reduces duplication by exposing it.
My main reason for supporting the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, is that devolution without strong, visible accountability risks undermining public confidence. If power and money are exercised at a mayoral strategic level, scrutiny must exist at that same level. Otherwise, we are asking people to trust structures they cannot see being properly examined.
In conclusion, Amendment 191 strengthens the Bill by aligning power, spending and accountability. It complements audit and scrutiny; it does not replace them. In fact, the financial cost of not having effective system-wide scrutiny could lead to duplicated programmes, misaligned budgets and failed collaboration, which will almost certainly cost a lot more than the modest investment required to make this work well. For these reasons, I hope that the Minister will give both ideas serious consideration.
Lord Fuller (Con)
My Lords, I support the principle of Amendment 191 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, and the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill. I observe that, for the first time, we are bringing local, parish and community councils substantially into scope, for I believe that the definitions provided in Amendment 191 will do so. What has not been fully understood is that one of the second-order effects of the Bill is that it will create a significant number of larger community councils as a result.
As a result of local government reorganisation, large numbers of cities, such as Oxford, Exeter and Norwich, and former county boroughs, such as Ipswich, Great Yarmouth and King’s Lynn, which have been billing authorities hitherto, will now fall into the lower tier of local authorities. Those authorities have no constraint or cap on the amount of council tax that they can raise. In Salisbury, they have jacked up council tax by 44% in the past four years—they have let rip, and it is not good enough. There has been no scrutiny, there has been cost shunting, and the council tax payers have paid more.
I have laid amendments, which we will discuss later, that will make provision for those larger smaller authorities to fall under the constraints that all the other authorities will have. I do not seek to fetter the smallest parish council, but if you have a population that hitherto has been part of a billing authority, it is right that they should be constrained going forward, as they have in the past.
I am not sure that I entirely welcome all the provisions in Amendment 191 on local public accounts committees, but the amendment shines a light for the first time on where we will go with these smaller community parish councils. There is merit in the thrust of what has been proposed here. I wait to hear how the Minister reacts to what constraints will be placed on this new class of large parish or town council as a result of the changes proposed in the Bill.
Lord Jamieson (Con)
My Lords, I will take a step back to reflect on what this debate is really about. It is not simply about committees, processes or institutional design—it is about trust that power, once devolved, will be exercised well; trust that decisions will be open to challenge; and trust that the public will be able to see how and why those decisions are taken.
Amendment 53, introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, speaks directly to that question. The requirement for mayors to establish scrutiny committees for commissioners recognises a simple but important truth: as we add layers of responsibility and delegation within combined county authorities, scrutiny cannot remain an afterthought. If commissioners are to exercise real influence, there must be clear, visible and credible mechanisms through which their actions can be examined, questioned and, where necessary, challenged. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain how the Government envisage scrutiny operating in practice where commissioners are appointed and whether they are confident that existing arrangements will suffice.
Amendment 191 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bichard proposes local public accounts committees. The noble Lord has raised a very important point: there has been a tremendous amount of devolution, just not to local government but to unelected quangos and devolved bodies. Anyone who has led a council will tell you how much difficulty they have trying to get those bodies to do things that are best for the local area because they have to report to Whitehall. This is an interesting proposal to try to oblige those bodies to work together with local government. I do not seek to speak specifically to that design—more to question of principle, because it goes back to the heart of scrutiny as we have more devolution and deal with these other devolved bodies. How will the Government ensure that appropriate scrutiny happens across an area where not only the combined authority but those other bodies are essential to deliver some of those services? As I said, local public accounts committees are one possible solution, and I am very interested in seeing what the Government’s suggestion on that is.
I also press the Minister on a number of broader points. First, has the department assessed whether existing local scrutiny arrangements are adequate for the scale and complexity of devolved expenditure now envisaged? Secondly, what assessment of the fiscal governance risks that arise when large multiyear funding settlements are devolved without strengthened independent financial oversight at the local level? As was raised earlier, how do the Government intend to identify problems earlier rather than having the audit function of explaining what went wrong afterwards?
Thirdly, I would be grateful if the Minister could address the question of cost—not simply its narrow budgetary terms but the strategic ones. If the Government do not believe that local public accounts committees are the right answer, what is the solution? If we are serious about devolving power, responsible scrutiny must sit alongside it, not trail behind it.
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Bassam and the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, for their amendments relating to accountability and scrutiny, and I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, is recovering.
Starting with Amendment 191, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, there is already an existing system of scrutiny that provides accountability to the public and local checks and balances and accountability to government, including a requirement for combined authorities and combined county authorities to establish an overview and scrutiny committee and an audit committee. In addition, the English devolution accountability framework and the scrutiny protocol set out the processes and principles that mayoral strategic authorities are expected to follow. Both documents are being reviewed to reflect the changes introduced through the integrated settlement and through this Bill. Where the most established mayoral strategic authorities benefit from integrated settlement, assurance is provided via an outcomes framework which interacts with the wider government system of accountability.
However, we recognise that there is scope to strengthen further the system of accountability and scrutiny for mayoral strategic authorities. That is why the Government committed in the English devolution White Paper to exploring a local public accounts committee model. Listening to the noble Lord made me reflect on some work that I did in 2015 with Sir Richard Leese, who was then the leader of Manchester City Council, and Jules Pipe, who was then mayor of Hackney. That work was focused on devolution and turning the dial from acute responses to prevention.
We recommended that if there was more widespread devolution, there was a need to think about local public accounts committees. Although that feels like six months ago, it was 10 years ago. Maybe every idea has its time. Therefore, I accept the principle behind this amendment and assure the noble Lord that we intend to hold mayoral strategic authorities to a very high standard.
The noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, was reflecting on the scrutiny of integrated settlements, for example, and allowing those who have the local knowledge of how things are working is crucial. When we were thinking about the possibility of a local public accounts committee, we saw it as being as powerful as the Public Accounts Committee here, being able to call witnesses from various bodies that are impacted on by the services and projects that are being delivered so that it can gain a much fuller picture of what is going on. This is a very different type of scrutiny—fundamentally different, as the noble Baroness said, to audit, which is a financial function. It is really important that we consider this fully. However, I ask that the Government are given time to complete the engagement that we need to do with the sector to design such a new approach, because it is important that we talk to the sector about this.
I hear the point that the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, made about the scrutiny of all levels of local government. He is of course right that both budgets and precept levels in town and parish councils are not insignificant in many areas, so we have to think about that. It is essential that any new accountability and scrutiny regime complements the existing system and the reformed audit framework in the future. Above all, it must be proportionate and supported by clear guidance and support for the sector, to make sure that we get these reforms right. With that assurance, I hope the noble Lord will feel able not to move his amendment.
Amendment 196B relates to local accounting officers. I thank my noble friend Lord Bassam for this proposed new clause that would require established mayoral strategic authorities to create local accounting officers. His amendment would designate the head of paid service as the accountable officer responsible for local spending, value for money and scrutiny. Although I agree with the importance of strong accountability and value for money, all mayoral strategic authorities already operate within an existing system of accountability, and that accountability is split between the “golden triangle” of statutory officers: the chief executive, chief finance officer and monitoring officer. These officers are accountable to their board and required to comply with the best value duty.
Strengthened systems are already in place for areas that have integrated settlements. This includes the mayoral strategic authority chief executive being responsible for core accountability processes within their authority, including responsibility for local outcome delivery and value for money. However, we are continuing to explore the local accounting officer model. We recognise that accountability to Parliament for the use of taxpayer money, which the accounting officer system provides, is a fundamental principle and not something to be altered lightly.
As part of our work on testing a strengthened accounting officer model, the Government are engaging with mayoral strategic authorities and other government departments. It would not be appropriate to pre-empt the outcome of that work with a primary legislative change to introduce local accounting officers at this point. For these reasons, I hope my noble friend will feel able not to move his amendment.
On Amendment 53, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, this proposed new clause would place a duty on the mayor of a combined county authority to establish a separate scrutiny committee for each commissioner they have appointed. As I have set out, mayoral strategic authorities are expected to follow the existing principles and processes described in the English devolution framework. This includes requirements that all combined authorities, and combined county authorities, must establish an overview and scrutiny committee, which provides local checks and balances. The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, raised a very important issue about being able to undertake pre-scrutiny. Overview and scrutiny committees are very capable of putting in place pre-decision scrutiny if they wish to do so. Some local authorities have that already, so it is not prohibited.
Further, the Bill ensures that the overview and scrutiny committee will have the power to recommend termination of a commissioner’s appointment. I can respond properly now to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, about the voting majority. To correct what I said earlier, a two-thirds majority of non-mayoral members of the combined authority or the combined county authority is required to accept the recommendation. Commissioners are also accountable to the mayor, who can terminate their appointment.
As Clause 9 allows for the appointment of up to seven commissioners, this amendment would risk institutions having to establish as many as seven scrutiny committees in addition to the existing overview and scrutiny committee that is already accountable. This would create significant additional labour and cost pressures for combined county authorities. There is a technical difficulty in that it would also apply a lopsided accountability system, as the amendment makes no reference to these seven committees applying to combined, as opposed to combined county, authorities. While we recognise that there is scope further to strengthen the system of accountability and scrutiny for mayoral strategic authorities, we believe that this amendment would create unnecessary pressures on the existing system, and I therefore ask that it is not moved.
Lord Shipley (LD)
I am grateful to the Minister for a comprehensive reply to a comprehensive set of issues. It gives us pause for thought. I am glad that the Minister recognises the importance of pre-scrutiny. That is a fundamental issue, so if it can be better built into the Bill before it becomes an Act, that will be very helpful. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook
“(3A) Any report produced under subsection (3) must be produced annually and published on the website of the Combined County Authority.”
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 263 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Jamieson. If there is one theme that runs consistently through today’s debates, it is the need for transparency, certainty and a clear understanding of the Government’s plans for governance structures, from Whitehall’s right down to local government. Clause 10 establishes the core reporting obligations for combined county authorities. These obligations are the foundations of accountability. As we reorganise who holds which competences, what powers are exercised at what level and who has the ability to pull levers to make things happen, it is essential that those exercising powers are clearly and robustly accounted for. These reporting requirements enable Parliament, constituency councils and, indeed, the public to understand how devolved powers are being exercised, how public money is being spent and whether these new authorities are delivering what was promised when the powers were devolved. Yet as the Bill currently stands, the substance of those obligations is left to guidance, and that has not yet been published. We are, in effect, being asked to approve a statutory framework without knowing how one of its central accountability mechanisms will operate in practice. Our amendment simply provides that Clause 10 should not come into force until that guidance is available and has been laid before Parliament. This is a modest but important safeguard. It ensures that combined county authorities are not placed under statutory duties that they cannot yet fully understand and that the accountability framework underpinning devolution is complete, transparent and subject to parliamentary scrutiny from the outset.
I will therefore probe the Government on a few points. First, why has the guidance not been published alongside the Bill, given that these reporting duties are so central to its operation? Secondly, what assurance can Ministers give the Committee that the guidance will not materially shape or, indeed, constrain the scope of parliamentary oversight once the Bill is enacted? Thirdly, what would be lost in practical terms by accepting a provision that simply requires Parliament to see and consider this guidance before the relevant section is commenced?
This amendment does not seek to delay devolution for its own sake; nor does it introduce unnecessary bureaucracy. It simply asks that transparency comes before implementation and that accountability is designed in rather than bolted on later. To us, that seems a pretty sensible position; I will, of course, listen carefully to what the Minister has to say in response.
Lord Shipley (LD)
My Lords, I have just one thing to add to what the noble Baroness, Lady Scott of Bybrook, said. Last week, I mentioned the importance of guidance being published in advance of Report; it is absolutely fundamental to our understanding of the Bill, given that so much is missing from it. I therefore repeat my support for the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, that it would help us to have a better understanding of some of the detail that the Government are going to put into guidance before we get to the point of debating and voting on it on Report.
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, for her amendments relating to providing allowances for combined county authority members with special responsibilities.
Amendments 62 and 236 would make it mandatory for the Secretary of State to issue guidance before Clause 10 comes into effect, and would require a combined county authority to publish an annual report on its webpage outlining the allowances that have been paid to members with special responsibilities. I welcome the commitment from the noble Baroness to ensuring transparency in local government—a matter of paramount importance to this Government.
As a former council leader, the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, will know, as I do, that allowances probably attract more debate and discussion, from both Members and the public, than much of the other policy that we debate. That is why we will issue statutory guidance on complying with the duty under Clause 10 to produce and publish reports. The guidance will allow the Secretary of State to set clear expectations—for example, regarding the frequency of such reports and where they are published—to support combined authorities and combined county authorities in this area. In the event that further clarification is needed, the power to issue guidance provides flexibility for the Government to update their position.
I would also add that, because this amendment applies to combined county authorities only, it would create a divergence in law between the requirements imposed on them versus combined authorities. That would be inconsistent; it would not be right to treat the two types of authority differently on that basis. My understanding is that this statutory guidance will be published on Royal Assent. I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
I thank the Minister but we are back where we started, really, in that we would like to see the guidance before Report so that we can see whether the guidance is correct or whether it could include something else. I currently do not know this, and we will not know. So I thank the Minister for her answers, but we should try to get the guidance before Report; if we do not, we are going to be asking more and more questions on this in Committee.
I accept what the Minister says about combined authorities and county combined authorities. I will look at that again and, if we do not get this guidance, I will retable it on Report. At this point, I say to the Minister that this is an important issue, and it would be better if we could scrutinise it properly, at least on Report, but at this point I withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to probe why the Government propose to change the precept arrangements as set out in the LURA 2023.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 63 and 64 in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, both relate to Clause 11 and the proposed changes to the mayoral precept arrangements. They are intended to elicit from the Government a clearer explanation of both the necessity and the principle behind the changes proposed in this clause. We want to see the prevention of uncontrolled mayoral precepts, the avoidance of tax rises through the backdoor and fiscal parity with existing local authorities. That is more important now, having heard some of the debates today.
Amendment 63 seeks to probe why the Government believe it necessary to revisit the precept arrangements that were set out only recently in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023. They were presented as part of a carefully planned settlement between central government, local authorities and the public, particularly in relation to accountability and transparency around local taxation. Those arrangements were debated at length in this House by noble Lords on all Benches, as the Minister and I know only too well, given the many hours we spent debating it.
Against that background, it is not immediately clear why the Government now feel the need to depart from that framework so soon after it was enacted. What has changed and what problems have arisen that they are now seeking to address? I would therefore be grateful if the Minister could first explain what evidence the Government have had that existing arrangements are no longer fit for purpose; secondly, whether local councils or mayoral combined authorities have themselves asked for these changes; and thirdly, what outcomes for precepts they are expecting or seeking to facilitate through these changes. It is right to be cautious about reopening settlements that have barely had time to bed in, and I hope the Minister can reassure us that this is not just change for change’s sake.
Amendment 64 addresses a related but distinct, significant concern: why mayors should be treated differently from other local authorities when it comes to limits on precept increases. As things stand, other types of local authority are subject to clear principles set out annually by the Secretary of State, which limit the extent to which they may increase their council tax without triggering additional scrutiny or consent. The amendment simply proposes that mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities should operate within the same principles. Therefore, my question for the Government is very simple: what is the justification for the differential treatments?
Mayors exercise significant powers and command substantial budgets with high public profile. It is only right that those powers come with the same fiscal discipline and protections for taxpayers that apply to other tiers of local government. Without parity, there is a risk that mayoral precepts become a means of raising revenue, perhaps even for vanity projects or unfunded responsibilities, without the safeguards that residents elsewhere quite rightly expect.
This leads me to a broader concern that underpins both of the amendments in this group. Too often, we see responsibilities devolved without sufficient or sustainable funding attached. While devolution can and should empower local decision-making, it should not become a mechanism by which central government passes financial pressures down the line and leaves local leaders, and therefore local taxpayers, to pick up the bill.
If mayors are given additional duties without adequate funding, the inevitable consequence is pressure to raise their precept. From a Government who have sought to raise punitive taxes at every opportunity, this sounds very much like another tax rise through the back door. I do not believe that is what the public would understand as devolution or community empowerment. It is not consistent with the principles of transparency and accountability that we all should stand for.
The last two questions I have for the Minister are: for what reason do precept arrangements in the LURA need to be reopened, and why should mayors not be subject to the same precept arrangements as other local authorities? I hope the Minister will be able to reassure me on both points, and I beg to move.
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, for her amendments on precepts.
Amendment 63 probes why the Government are changing precept arrangements, and I completely understand why she would do that. The changes to existing powers will allow mayors to precept for all an authority’s functions, giving mayors more flexibility about how they fund mayoral priorities.
I remind noble Lords that the ability to issue a mayoral precept has existed in law since 2017, but it remains at the discretion of mayors how to use it. However, as it stands, mayors who choose to use the precept can spend it only on mayoral functions rather than on all the authority’s functions. This limitation is arbitrary and unnecessary. It could mean, for example, permitting spending on transport but not on health.
We want to give mayors the tools to tackle the obstacles to growth and improve the lives of people in their area, and to do this effectively, mayors must be able to spend across all an authority’s functions.
Amendment 64 would impose council tax principles automatically on strategic authorities. The Secretary of State can already set referendum principles on strategic authorities should they choose to do so. However, where used, mayoral precept rates are proportionately a small amount. Imposing a limit on how much they can rise in line with councils would mean that, in almost all areas, the value would remain insignificant and be ineffective for investing in local priorities.
The Government have made it clear that any increases to the mayoral precept should be fair and proportionate, but aligning maximum mayoral precept rate rises with other council tax rises reduces local agency, which runs contrary to the spirit of the Bill and of devolution. We want to see mayors who are empowered to invest in their communities, creating better public services and driving economic growth.
I took a quick look at some of the rates of mayoral precepts that are levied. It was interesting for me to see that in Liverpool in 2025-26, residents of band D properties were charged £24 extra for the mayoral precept per year. In Cambridgeshire and Peterborough, the figure was £36. It is a bit unfair to compare some of the other authorities because they deliver police services and they precept for those as well. But then I looked at some of the town and parish council figures, and the average parish band D precept is £92.22, which was a percentage change of 9.4% in the last year. So, the mayoral precept feels proportionate to me.
The Government consult on the local government finance settlement each year. That is the established and appropriate way of considering what is best for authorities and taxpayers each year, and we will continue to do so. I therefore ask the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
I am grateful to the Minister for her responses and for trying to assure me about those amendments. However, she will understand that concerns raised in the short debate between us are not about opposing devolution nor about questioning the role of mayors but about ensuring that changes to local taxation powers are justified and consistent.
Lord Jamieson (Con)
My Lords, the Clause 12 stand part notice, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook, is intended to probe. We recognise that mayors and mayoral combined authorities will, in practice, need the ability to borrow to deliver infrastructure, regeneration and long-term investment. Borrowing can be a sensible and necessary tool. Our purpose today is not to deny that reality but to seek clarity from the Government about how this power will operate in practice and what safeguards will accompany it.
We would welcome further detail from the Minister on a number of points. First, what caps or controls do the Government envisage on mayoral borrowing? Will these mirror existing prudential borrowing frameworks for local authorities, or will a different regime apply? Secondly, what is the Government’s expectation of the purposes for which this borrowing will be undertaken? Are there limits envisaged on the types of projects or expenditure that may be funded through borrowing? Thirdly, who ultimately underwrites this borrowing? In the event of financial difficulty, where does the liability sit? Does it sit with the combined authority itself, with constituent councils or perhaps with central government?
Finally, what checks will be in place to ensure that borrowing decisions are subject to appropriate scrutiny and transparency, locally and nationally? Devolution must go hand-in-hand with accountability. Granting borrowing powers without clear safeguards risks storing up problems for the future—for local taxpayers and potentially for the Exchequer. I look forward to the Minister’s response and reassurance on these important points. I beg to move.
Lord Shipley (LD)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, for raising some very crucial issues on the levels of borrowing powers. I add to that my concern—made even more so by the fact that constituent councils will not be able to scrutinise the work of the mayor or commissioners.
In that situation, I hope the Government will not be anticipating that local councils will then be responsible for any overspending by mayors and the combined authorities because, otherwise, there will be a demand on the council tax payer. So can the Minister confirm that overspends caused by poor-quality work by mayoral authorities will not end up with the council tax payer having to bail them out?
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, for her Clause 12 stand part notice, ably spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson.
All existing mayoral combined and combined county authorities have the power to borrow for all their functions. Unlike local authorities, the current process requires making a bespoke statutory instrument after an institution has been established. This process is highly inefficient. The Bill streamlines the process by giving the power to borrow to mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities for purposes relevant to their functions. The power to borrow is still subject to safeguards. Clause 12 requires authorities to obtain the Secretary of State’s consent before they exercise the power for the first time in respect of functions other than transport, policing, and fire and rescue.
I will cover some of the points that the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, asked me about. First, in relation to agreeing a debt cap, in general the exercise of power will remain subject to consent from the Secretary of State for the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, before it can be used for the first time, as I said. That would follow any internal processes, such as a debt cap agreement. The only exception will be where the new mayoral combined authorities and combined county authorities inherit fire, police or transport functions. In this instance, the power to borrow can be exercised immediately for these functions to ensure that ongoing financial arrangements are not disrupted.
In terms of how borrowing is agreed, any borrowing by a mayoral strategic authority is agreed through the annual budget-setting process and is subject to approval by the combined and combined county authority, operating within existing legislative, financial and prudential controls. While the mayor proposes the budget, borrowing cannot be undertaken unilaterally. Under the Bill, most budgets will be approved by a simple majority, which must include the mayor.
In response to the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, the budget, like all other matters, will be subject to the overview and scrutiny process, so there can be scrutiny of the budget in the same way that you would expect in a local authority.
The noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, asked about underwriting. Like the rest of local government, strategic authorities must also operate within the prudential framework. This framework comprises statutory duties and codes intended to ensure that all borrowing and investment is prudent, affordable and sustainable. It provides robust mechanisms for oversight and accountability. For those reasons, I ask that the noble Lord does not press his clause stand part notice.
Lord Jamieson (Con)
I thank the Minister for her response. If I may, I will delve a little deeper into some of her comments. She said that the first time an authority borrows, it will have to get consent from the Secretary of State, with an implication that, at that time, guidelines or parameters would be set up. I think that is what I heard. I want to make sure it is not the case that, the first time you borrow, the Secretary of State says it is fine, and then thereafter there are no guidelines, or whatever. I appreciate the Minister may not be able to clarify that today, but if she could write to us, that would be much appreciated.
The authority can already borrow for fire and police. The Minister mentioned one other: transport. For those, there would not be any such guidelines, as I understand it from the Minister’s comments. Again, it would be helpful if the Minister could come back to confirm whether that is the case or whether they would be subject to whatever guidelines may be given by the Secretary of State. That would be much appreciated.
We talked about budget controls. I am curious about that because it raises the point that the budget in effect has to be agreed by the mayor. I am intrigued as to what happens when the mayor and the combined authority are slightly at odds. What then happens in that process?
The Minister did not mention, as far as I am aware, the key question that I asked and that the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, was also concerned about: who in effect is the guarantor in the event that the combined authority cannot pay back its borrowing? I would be grateful if the Minister could come back with a response to that. Anticipating those answers, I will not press my opposition to Clause 12 standing part of the Bill.
Member's explanatory statement
This would be consequential on the amendment of clause 13 which provides for the amendment of section 143 of LGFA 1988 and section 106A of LDEDCA 2009.
Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)
My Lords, Clause 13 will allow combined authorities and combined county authorities to make a transport levy on their constituent councils to cover any transport costs not met by grants or other revenue streams. Previously, the powers to charge a transport levy have been provided through varied and disparate regulations and orders. The Bill standardises and makes consistent the ability for combined authorities and combined county authorities to charge a transport levy. These minor and technical amendments correct new sections and amend cross references to protect the regulation-making powers for levies. I beg to move.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
My Lords, as the Minister said, these are technical and consequential amendments to the levies section of the Bill. It has been a long enough day, and I have already made my position on mayoral precepts and council tax very clear in the previous two groups, so I will not repeat myself.