English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Lord Jamieson Excerpts

Tuesday 27th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

The noble Lord, Lord Cameron, said that it would be unhelpful if regional and local government continued doing their own thing. I think that this is an important debate and I look forward to the Minister’s reply, but the Government might look at the powers that existed with regional development agencies until 2012, in terms of spatial development strategies and the land use framework, when a lot was done. They might revisit that to make sure that everyone going off to do their own thing—the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron—is avoided.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Lansley for his amendments. I think that there has been consensus among noble Lords contributing on this group that this is something that should be explored and looked at further. Amendment 45 rightly links local growth plans to spatial development strategies, ensuring that they are not formed in isolation and do not contradict each other. When a local growth plan is drafted, it should take account of the implications for spatial development. We welcome this amendment and support a more integrated and coherent approach.

However, we also believe that these plans must be informed by neighbourhood plans as well as neighbourhood priority statements, which have yet to be commenced under the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act. Amendment 46 seeks to ensure that spatial development strategies take into account national environmental improvement plans and the land use framework. This will help local government at least to have regard to the national Government’s environmental targets and to be aware of the environmental solutions proposed. As for the land use framework, we are still waiting for it to be published. Can the Minister confirm the timeline? As others have asked, will it be imminent?

Amendments 138, 139, 144 and 145 address the need for spatial development strategies to be aligned with infrastructure projects to identify any that are needed for growth. Again, these should be important considerations to ensure that new developments are supported with the necessary infrastructure rather than treating the two in isolation. As we said in the Planning and Infrastructure Bill debates, the consequences for development of the failure to deliver infrastructure should also be clear.

We agree with the principle behind all these amendments. It is important that combined authorities’ and councils’ various strategies are joined up, co-ordinated and coherent to ensure not only good governance and efficiency across local government but, more importantly, high-quality development. I thank my noble friend for his efforts and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, that was an interesting discussion. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, for his amendments and I welcome the opportunity to discuss the role of spatial development strategies in the new devolution framework.

Amendment 45 would require strategic planning authorities to identify the policies in their spatial development strategies that are of strategic importance to address the local growth priorities identified in local growth plans. I very much agree with the need for spatial development strategies properly to address the priorities identified in local growth plans where they are of strategic importance to the area, such as the issues that the noble Lord mentioned around skills and infrastructure. There is an expectation in the revised NPPF that that is exactly what will happen.

The Planning and Infrastructure Act, to which the noble Lord also referred—we recently sat through many hours of debate on it—requires strategic planning authorities to have regard to any plan or strategy they have published. This would include a local growth plan. In the draft revised NPPF, which was published just before Christmas, we set out that spatial development strategies should give spatial expression to strategic elements of local growth plans, and that would include all of the issues mentioned by the noble Lord. We also set out in the draft revised NPPF that spatial development strategies should be tested against national policy when they are examined; that will include the industrial strategy, for example, and will shine a light on whether they are meeting the expectations we have of the SDS.

A number of Peers spoke to Amendment 46. I say to my noble friend Lady Young that I found her extrapolation of this through to losing lots of elections in May and then having a whole reshuffle a bit depressing. I hope that will not happen, and I also hope that my noble friend will have a wander through one of her new forests and cheer herself up a bit. Amendment 46 would require a strategic planning authority to have regard to the Government’s environmental improvement plan and the land use framework for England while preparing a spatial development strategy.

I absolutely agree with noble Lords on the importance of these national documents relating to land use and the environment. The provisions detailing the required content of spatial development strategies and the factors to be taken into account in their preparation were introduced less than two months ago in the Planning and Infrastructure Act, following very thorough parliamentary scrutiny. I do not consider it necessary to revisit or amend these requirements before they have even had a chance to be tested in practice. The documents in question are expected to inform the drafting of national planning policies, and strategic planning authorities will be required to have regard to the need to ensure that their strategy is consistent with the current policy.

For example, if we found that the land use framework or the environmental improvement plan were being ignored in strategic development strategies, we would keep that under review. Should any gaps or misalignments emerge between strategic development strategies and these documents, we can consider future changes to the National Planning Policy Framework or planning practice guidance, or even secondary legislation to ensure that they are taken into account in preparing an SDS.

A number of noble Lords asked questions on the publication of the land use framework, which I know is eagerly awaited. The Government consulted on land use in England from January to April last year. The responses, as well as the feedback from supporting workshops that have been held since, are being analysed. The responses will inform the preparation of the land use framework. I cannot give noble Lords an exact publication date today, I am afraid, but I know that my colleagues in Defra want to publish it as quickly as possible.

On the question from the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, about regional plans, I used to be on the regional assembly, so I sat thought the entire process of the east of England regional plan; the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, did so as well, I believe. There were a lot of lessons to be learned from those regional plans, particularly around the co-ordination of data and so on, and I know that officials in the department have taken into consideration how that was done. We need to reflect carefully on those experiences and how they fit in with what we are about to do with strategic development strategies.

The noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, asked about London. The London plan sits outside this Bill, I think, but there is an expectation on London boroughs that this will be done. Indeed, my own borough is quite a way outside London—well, 28 miles; we are in Hertfordshire, so not that far—and we were consulted on the London plan as part of the Ring Around London consultation.

On my noble friend Lady Young’s question about the local nature recovery strategies, it is a requirement that SDSs take account of those; indeed, the London plan has to take account of local nature recovery strategies as well.

Amendments 138, 139, 144 and 145 would require mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities to set out in their local growth plan what is needed in spatial and infrastructure terms to realise the economic growth opportunities presented in the plan. As with Amendment 45, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, I agree with the need to ensure that places are identifying these needs. Local growth plans will be required to set out an economic overview of their area, shared priorities agreed with the Government, and a pipeline of investment opportunities. Where infra- structure or development presents a relevant investment opportunity, we would expect it to be included in that pipeline. We are clear that local growth plans should provide an overarching framework for growth, identifying actions and investment that can drive economic growth and productivity.

But, when it comes to addressing the spatial implications of local growth plans and identifying the development and infrastructure needs for realising growth, the right vehicle is the spatial development strategy. That is why we set out that spatial development strategies should give spatial expression to strategic elements of local growth plans when we published our proposed reforms to the National Planning Policy Framework. For all those reasons, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, will withdraw his amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Jamieson]

47: Clause 8, page 8, leave out lines 27 to 28
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment removes the new subsection inserting a new section into the LURA to provide the Secretary of State with the power to designate a mayoral strategic authority as an established mayoral strategic authority.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak to the two amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook. Amendment 49 would allow the Secretary of State to make subordinate legislation to cause a mayoral combined authority to cease to be a mayoral strategic authority if, and only if, the combined authority consents for this to be the case. That would allow the structures of local government to be formed locally, according to local needs, priorities and democratic wishes, rather than setting in stone structures that may not be suitable for local communities later down the line.

On the creation of established mayoral strategic authorities, Amendment 47 would remove the proposed power of the Secretary of State to designate a mayoral strategic authority as an established mayoral strategic authority because we believe that the process should be locally led and not imposed from above. Amendments 48 and 50 in the name of my noble friend Lord Lansley also address the creation of established mayoral strategic authorities.

The Government White Paper set out the eligibility criteria for accessing the established mayoral tier. These amendments seek to give a basis for deciding whether proposals for a mayoral combined county authority, a mayoral combined authority, or for being designated an established mayoral strategic authority, have substantive merit.

We also know that the scope of integrated settlements for mayoral strategic authorities will be confirmed at each spending review, on the basis of functional responsibilities and their value, by a formulaic process. Can the Minister please elaborate on what those responsibilities are and on the formulaic process? Authorities need to be able to feed back on the amounts and types of funding they receive, so what process will be in place to ensure that funding is based on funding received from authorities?

In addition, how will government ensure that the timeline for this Bill aligns with the timelines for new strategic authorities and the spending review? Will the new mayors have the same powers and financial resources made available to them as the existing mayors? Local government reorganisation should not be undertaken simply for the sake of it; the Government’s plans and timelines need to be coherent and co-ordinated and underpinned by genuine principles for devolution to be meaningful and effective. I look forward to hearing the contributions of noble Lords and the Minister’s response on these matters. With that, I beg to move.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I have two amendments in this group, Amendments 48 and 50. It is another of those occasions when there are two amendments to achieve one purpose. Amendment 48 relates to county combined authorities and Amendment 50 to combined authorities, and each is on the question of under what circumstances they should be able to be designated by the Secretary of State as an established mayoral strategic authority.

On the purpose of designation, two key things happen when you are an established strategic authority. First, you can have access to an integrated financial settlement. This is quite an important issue, although it is not in the Bill because it is financial; it would be determined by Treasury financial legislation. However, this being established means that it is a gateway to the ability to manage finances with what we would call in departments the power environment between different headings. These would normally not be available to local authorities where they receive delegated funding for one purpose and want to be able to use it for other purposes.

As we progress, if there is to be a significant tourism revenue to strategic authorities, the financial arrangements of strategic authorities will be an important element. We may come back to that in later groups. I do not want to dwell on that. The point is that this is the gateway to an integrated financial settlement from the Treasury. Very few strategic authorities have it now. I suppose that London and Manchester will get it first, in this spending review, then other strategic authorities will get it in the next spending review.

Secondly—we will no doubt come back to this on Clause 51—there is the ability of established mayoral strategic authorities to seek additional powers and functions within the designated areas of competence. That is quite an important additional power. These are two important powers, and Amendments 48 and 50 ask by what means the Secretary of State decides whether they should be established. What is in the Bill sets out a process but no criteria.

Paragraph 2.2.4 of the English devolution White Paper told us that there would be criteria for accessing the established mayoral tier: that the strategic authority has

“been in existence … for at least 18 months … has a published Local Assurance Framework in place … has not been the subject of a Best Value Notice, a MHCLG commissioned independent review, or a statutory inspection or intervention … is not subject to any ongoing (or implementing) recommendations from an externally mandated independent review; and there are no material accounting concerns covering the current or previous financial year”.

These are essentially matters of financial governance and accountability. I do not understand why the Bill makes no reference to the criteria the Secretary of State would apply, given that the devolution White Paper has set them out specifically. If my amendments were accepted, an indication would at the very least be given of the criteria: effective governance, accountability, and specified performance metrics.

It is a good idea that, as this develops, a specific power be provided in the legislation enabling the Secretary of State to publish the criteria that will be applied to the question of designation. It would not be right simply to say that there is a process but no criteria. We should have the criteria established.

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[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

The tourism tax is an interesting step forward because, as far as I know, this is the first time a fiscal power has been devolved. The Government are keen to test out that devolution of fiscal power; I do not have the details at my fingertips so I will write to the noble Lord on the detail of how it is moving forward.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Lansley for his thoughtful amendments and comments. I also thank the Minister for her feedback, which has certainly provided some more illumination on a sometimes slightly murky area of devolution.

On integrated financial settlements, I know that, when I chaired the LGA, I pushed very hard to move in this direction. I was very pleased that we managed to get a couple of them over the line with the previous Government. They are important and offer huge benefits to the areas that have them. Therefore, this idea of criteria, and being very clear on them, is important; I thank the Minister for being clear that the White Paper is where the criteria are set out.

However, I am quibbling over and slightly uncomfortable with the fact that the criteria are just guidance for the Minister and could, therefore, be changed relatively easily. When you are talking about devolution, with local councils and local government making significant changes in anticipation of something that will potentially make a significant difference to their areas, those criteria must be very clear and not changeable. Councils must know what goal they are aiming for because, as the Minister said, this is not something that happens overnight; it takes several years, potentially, and a lot of effort. I do not want the goalposts to move too much—most local authorities would not want that, I think—so I would like some assurances, though not necessarily today, on how set in stone the criteria are as people go through the process.

I am also quite curious about the “no stepping back” bit. As the Minister said, we set some very high bars. However, the day after, someone might fail those high bars—but they are still there. A little elaboration on that at some later point would be very much appreciated.

With that, I thank noble Lords for the debate and beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 47 withdrawn.

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[Lord Freyberg (CB)]

My Lords, I will briefly support the amendments in this group that seek to remove the cap on the number of commissioners and the appointment of special advisers. In doing so, I restate my support for Amendments 6, 10 and 51 in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, and the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, to add the arts and culture as an area of competence, which would allow a modest increase in the number of commissioners from seven to eight.

I fully recognise that the Government wish to maintain a coherent and settled devolution framework, to limit additional costs that such appointments would incur and to exercise caution around unelected roles. Here I entirely take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s answers to those numerous and very important questions.

I also accept the argument that further powers may be pursued within the existing areas of competence. That said, the question here is one of governance rather than architecture. A small degree of flexibility in the commissional model, as the noble Lords, Lord Bassam and Lord Bach, have argued for, would allow mayors to organise their leadership teams and their advisers in ways that reflect local priorities and circumstances without altering the framework itself.

Different regions face very different challenges: a dense metropolitan authority and a largely rural combined county authority may reasonably require different internal arrangements. For those reasons, I generally support these amendments and the flexibility they seek to introduce.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, we have had an interesting debate. I thank all noble Lords who have participated. It does appear to be the first one today where we are not quite in agreement on things. I assure my noble friend Lord Trenchard that we share his concerns about appointing unelected commissioners to roles that have real political power. However, before I go on to that, this raises an important and enduring question about how leadership is accountable and the flexibility to operate within a system that is devolved.

At its heart, this debate returns to the principles of devolution. It is about not just transferring powers from the centre to the local level but about who exercises those powers. It is about how they are held to account and how clearly responsibility is understood by the public whom those institutions are designed to serve.

On the amendments, while the noble Lord, Lord Bach, made a good case, we have concerns about commissioners holding responsibility for multiple areas of confidence because there is a risk that it could reduce accountability, concentrating authority into too few hands and blurring the lines of responsibility, making it harder for the public to discern who is ultimately answerable for decisions—there may be cases that need further thought in this area. I also accept the noble Lord’s points about police authorities. With the recent announcement in the other place, can the Minister say whether that is being taken into account in the devolution Bill or, even better, whether that announcement is going to take account of the devolution Bill? That is rather important.

On the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, devolution works best when responsibilities are clear, visible and capable of effective scrutiny. I have a real concern here, which has been shared by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley. First, I will talk about commissioners. What is the definition of a commissioner? Working in local government, when you say that the commissioners are coming in, while I personally am not used to a failing council, normally you send them in after a best value inspection when one is failing. We have had this issue several times in the devolution Bill, and definitions and consistency of definitions would be helpful.

However, the real concern about commissioners is that we seem to have an expanding strategy. The Bill talks about seven but now we have amendments that talk about political advisers, special advisers and more deputy mayors. My focus in local government is value for money. Local government and mayors should be about delivering services to residents. They should not be about creating an unelected bureaucracy that is appointed and risks political cronyism. The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, also raised a number of practical issues such as whether when the mayor resigns all the commissioners go and you lose all that knowledge and so forth. I will not go on to those again, because that would be unnecessary repetition, but we have a real concern.

A number of noble Lords raised an issue around whether we can have commissioners for specific areas. I have sympathy with that, but they do not have to be commissioners. We are talking about political leads for certain areas. There is no reason why an elected councillor cannot be a political lead, whether it is for rural affairs, the environment, culture and so forth. I do not think that we have to focus on commissioners there—that can be a political lead.

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There was a question about why existing elected members cannot do it, as they already lead on portfolios. We expect that commissioners will have detailed knowledge—

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

With voting, the figure required can be either two-thirds or 50:50. Can the Minister clarify what figure is required to remove a commissioner?

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

For the overview and scrutiny committee, I believe it is a simple majority vote, but I will clarify that in writing for the noble Lord.

We expect that commissioners will have detailed knowledge and expertise in their assigned area of competence and will be appointed on this basis. Constituent members will not necessarily be experienced in their portfolio subject area. There are also circumstances where it would not be appropriate for a portfolio lead to represent both the borough and the region; there may be perceived conflicts of interest. As I said earlier, the local authority leaders who sit on the combined authority will also be running their councils on a day-to-day basis.

Commissioners will be able to represent the mayor’s authority and policy positions in a given area, including by speaking to the media. They could help make day-to-day decisions that are delegated by a mayor and provide strategic insight and advice for their area of expertise. We also expect commissioners to play a leading role in stakeholder engagement and partnership working, across geographies and organisations, as appropriate. This would include working closely with local councillors, business leaders and public sector institutions, using their advocacy and influence to deliver the mayor’s agenda.

I hope that that has helped clarify some of the points raised by noble Lords and that, with the assurances I have given, they will not press their amendments.

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[Lord Fuller (Con)]

My Lords, I support the principle of Amendment 191 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, and the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill. I observe that, for the first time, we are bringing local, parish and community councils substantially into scope, for I believe that the definitions provided in Amendment 191 will do so. What has not been fully understood is that one of the second-order effects of the Bill is that it will create a significant number of larger community councils as a result.

As a result of local government reorganisation, large numbers of cities, such as Oxford, Exeter and Norwich, and former county boroughs, such as Ipswich, Great Yarmouth and King’s Lynn, which have been billing authorities hitherto, will now fall into the lower tier of local authorities. Those authorities have no constraint or cap on the amount of council tax that they can raise. In Salisbury, they have jacked up council tax by 44% in the past four years—they have let rip, and it is not good enough. There has been no scrutiny, there has been cost shunting, and the council tax payers have paid more.

I have laid amendments, which we will discuss later, that will make provision for those larger smaller authorities to fall under the constraints that all the other authorities will have. I do not seek to fetter the smallest parish council, but if you have a population that hitherto has been part of a billing authority, it is right that they should be constrained going forward, as they have in the past.

I am not sure that I entirely welcome all the provisions in Amendment 191 on local public accounts committees, but the amendment shines a light for the first time on where we will go with these smaller community parish councils. There is merit in the thrust of what has been proposed here. I wait to hear how the Minister reacts to what constraints will be placed on this new class of large parish or town council as a result of the changes proposed in the Bill.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, I will take a step back to reflect on what this debate is really about. It is not simply about committees, processes or institutional design—it is about trust that power, once devolved, will be exercised well; trust that decisions will be open to challenge; and trust that the public will be able to see how and why those decisions are taken.

Amendment 53, introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, speaks directly to that question. The requirement for mayors to establish scrutiny committees for commissioners recognises a simple but important truth: as we add layers of responsibility and delegation within combined county authorities, scrutiny cannot remain an afterthought. If commissioners are to exercise real influence, there must be clear, visible and credible mechanisms through which their actions can be examined, questioned and, where necessary, challenged. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain how the Government envisage scrutiny operating in practice where commissioners are appointed and whether they are confident that existing arrangements will suffice.

Amendment 191 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bichard proposes local public accounts committees. The noble Lord has raised a very important point: there has been a tremendous amount of devolution, just not to local government but to unelected quangos and devolved bodies. Anyone who has led a council will tell you how much difficulty they have trying to get those bodies to do things that are best for the local area because they have to report to Whitehall. This is an interesting proposal to try to oblige those bodies to work together with local government. I do not seek to speak specifically to that design—more to question of principle, because it goes back to the heart of scrutiny as we have more devolution and deal with these other devolved bodies. How will the Government ensure that appropriate scrutiny happens across an area where not only the combined authority but those other bodies are essential to deliver some of those services? As I said, local public accounts committees are one possible solution, and I am very interested in seeing what the Government’s suggestion on that is.

I also press the Minister on a number of broader points. First, has the department assessed whether existing local scrutiny arrangements are adequate for the scale and complexity of devolved expenditure now envisaged? Secondly, what assessment of the fiscal governance risks that arise when large multiyear funding settlements are devolved without strengthened independent financial oversight at the local level? As was raised earlier, how do the Government intend to identify problems earlier rather than having the audit function of explaining what went wrong afterwards?

Thirdly, I would be grateful if the Minister could address the question of cost—not simply its narrow budgetary terms but the strategic ones. If the Government do not believe that local public accounts committees are the right answer, what is the solution? If we are serious about devolving power, responsible scrutiny must sit alongside it, not trail behind it.

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Debate on whether Clause 12 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, the Clause 12 stand part notice, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook, is intended to probe. We recognise that mayors and mayoral combined authorities will, in practice, need the ability to borrow to deliver infrastructure, regeneration and long-term investment. Borrowing can be a sensible and necessary tool. Our purpose today is not to deny that reality but to seek clarity from the Government about how this power will operate in practice and what safeguards will accompany it.

We would welcome further detail from the Minister on a number of points. First, what caps or controls do the Government envisage on mayoral borrowing? Will these mirror existing prudential borrowing frameworks for local authorities, or will a different regime apply? Secondly, what is the Government’s expectation of the purposes for which this borrowing will be undertaken? Are there limits envisaged on the types of projects or expenditure that may be funded through borrowing? Thirdly, who ultimately underwrites this borrowing? In the event of financial difficulty, where does the liability sit? Does it sit with the combined authority itself, with constituent councils or perhaps with central government?

Finally, what checks will be in place to ensure that borrowing decisions are subject to appropriate scrutiny and transparency, locally and nationally? Devolution must go hand-in-hand with accountability. Granting borrowing powers without clear safeguards risks storing up problems for the future—for local taxpayers and potentially for the Exchequer. I look forward to the Minister’s response and reassurance on these important points. I beg to move.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, for raising some very crucial issues on the levels of borrowing powers. I add to that my concern—made even more so by the fact that constituent councils will not be able to scrutinise the work of the mayor or commissioners.

In that situation, I hope the Government will not be anticipating that local councils will then be responsible for any overspending by mayors and the combined authorities because, otherwise, there will be a demand on the council tax payer. So can the Minister confirm that overspends caused by poor-quality work by mayoral authorities will not end up with the council tax payer having to bail them out?

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, for her Clause 12 stand part notice, ably spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson.

All existing mayoral combined and combined county authorities have the power to borrow for all their functions. Unlike local authorities, the current process requires making a bespoke statutory instrument after an institution has been established. This process is highly inefficient. The Bill streamlines the process by giving the power to borrow to mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities for purposes relevant to their functions. The power to borrow is still subject to safeguards. Clause 12 requires authorities to obtain the Secretary of State’s consent before they exercise the power for the first time in respect of functions other than transport, policing, and fire and rescue.

I will cover some of the points that the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, asked me about. First, in relation to agreeing a debt cap, in general the exercise of power will remain subject to consent from the Secretary of State for the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, before it can be used for the first time, as I said. That would follow any internal processes, such as a debt cap agreement. The only exception will be where the new mayoral combined authorities and combined county authorities inherit fire, police or transport functions. In this instance, the power to borrow can be exercised immediately for these functions to ensure that ongoing financial arrangements are not disrupted.

In terms of how borrowing is agreed, any borrowing by a mayoral strategic authority is agreed through the annual budget-setting process and is subject to approval by the combined and combined county authority, operating within existing legislative, financial and prudential controls. While the mayor proposes the budget, borrowing cannot be undertaken unilaterally. Under the Bill, most budgets will be approved by a simple majority, which must include the mayor.

In response to the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, the budget, like all other matters, will be subject to the overview and scrutiny process, so there can be scrutiny of the budget in the same way that you would expect in a local authority.

The noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, asked about underwriting. Like the rest of local government, strategic authorities must also operate within the prudential framework. This framework comprises statutory duties and codes intended to ensure that all borrowing and investment is prudent, affordable and sustainable. It provides robust mechanisms for oversight and accountability. For those reasons, I ask that the noble Lord does not press his clause stand part notice.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her response. If I may, I will delve a little deeper into some of her comments. She said that the first time an authority borrows, it will have to get consent from the Secretary of State, with an implication that, at that time, guidelines or parameters would be set up. I think that is what I heard. I want to make sure it is not the case that, the first time you borrow, the Secretary of State says it is fine, and then thereafter there are no guidelines, or whatever. I appreciate the Minister may not be able to clarify that today, but if she could write to us, that would be much appreciated.

The authority can already borrow for fire and police. The Minister mentioned one other: transport. For those, there would not be any such guidelines, as I understand it from the Minister’s comments. Again, it would be helpful if the Minister could come back to confirm whether that is the case or whether they would be subject to whatever guidelines may be given by the Secretary of State. That would be much appreciated.

We talked about budget controls. I am curious about that because it raises the point that the budget in effect has to be agreed by the mayor. I am intrigued as to what happens when the mayor and the combined authority are slightly at odds. What then happens in that process?

The Minister did not mention, as far as I am aware, the key question that I asked and that the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, was also concerned about: who in effect is the guarantor in the event that the combined authority cannot pay back its borrowing? I would be grateful if the Minister could come back with a response to that. Anticipating those answers, I will not press my opposition to Clause 12 standing part of the Bill.

Clause 12 agreed.