English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Lord Shipley Excerpts

Tuesday 27th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend and speak to these amendments to Clause 6. The clause relates to decision-making in combined county authorities and combined authorities and its purpose is to provide for a default structure of voting in both kinds of strategic authorities. In particular, that default structure would provide that in mayoral authorities the majority in favour of a decision must include the mayor, thus in effect giving the mayor a veto over decisions, since the majority excluding the mayor would not be decisive.

Before I turn to my amendments, and apropos of the question of whether the clause stands part, I will ask a question. I refer noble Lords and the Minister to Section 13(2)(a) of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act. The section enables regulations to be made about members, and Section 13(2)(a) states that those regulations can include provision about

“cases in which a decision of a CCA requires a majority, or a particular kind of majority, of the votes of members of a particular kind”.

It seems to me that that paragraph of the levelling-up Act enables exactly what the Minister is setting out to do by statutory instrument rather than by primary legislation. Could she tell us why primary legislation is required to achieve this purpose? That might inform our deliberations on the stand part debate.

Amendments 42 and 44 are in my name. I do not share my noble friend’s desire, set out in her Amendments 41 and 43, to take out the mayoral veto from the clause. I have been a resident in the Cambridgeshire and Peterborough combined authority for however many years. When we had a mayor, the mayor found it very difficult to secure, for example, a non-statutory spatial strategy, not least because the mayor was often frustrated in getting a policy through due to the votes of one of the strategic authority’s constituent councils. In my view, if you elect a mayor and you want a mayor to exercise leadership in a strategic authority, it does not follow that the mayor will necessarily be able to get everything that the mayor wants, and the mayor will have to secure a majority to do so. It is very difficult for the mayor to carry on and provide that leadership if there is a majority that can carry proposals against his or her own policy.

This therefore forces the mayor to act in a certain way. I have seen that in Cambridgeshire, where the current mayor, Paul Bristow, is doing a very good job; he will be known to some of my noble friends. Partly because of this legislation, he is securing a majority in the combined authority, not least because there is an expectation that the strategic authority, when it gets these powers, will be able to make progress with the majority that includes him, and so he will not be able to be blocked by one constituent council.

I turn my focus to my Amendments 42 and 44. The former relates to combined county authorities. In this Committee, I am afraid that we are getting used to the fact that we have to do everything twice, because we have to legislate both for combined county authorities and for combined authorities; it will get a lot simpler when we have just one kind of strategic authority and when legislation for all strategic authorities is pretty much the same. Nevertheless, combined county authorities are governed by Section 10 of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023, which enables the Secretary of State to set out their constitutional arrangements. Section 10(2)(b) includes

“the voting powers of members of the CCA (including provision for different weight to be given to the vote of different descriptions of member)”.

That is the existing legislation: it provides for different weights to be allocated to different members. The current situation is that the constitution of a combined county authority is not a “one member, one vote” arrangement—it can vary.

Clause 6 will insert new Section 13A into the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023. It says that

“each voting member has one vote”.

So, what I am really asking by way of these two amendments—in this instance, for combined county authorities—is: does the primary legislation we are discussing now override, in effect, the existing potential for regulations to determine a different weight for different members for different decisions; or, because of this primary legislation, does it have to be “one member, one vote”?

There is a problem there. That problem was illustrated to me when we had a meeting just a few weeks back—my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook will recall it—about Suffolk. It was about unitaries, as it happened, but it also encompassed a discussion about the prospective Norfolk and Suffolk strategic authority, which is in the devolution priority programme. The leader of Suffolk County Council was asked, “Suffolk is a single unitary and Norfolk is three, maybe even four, unitaries. What happens if they come together into one strategic authority?”

The problem is easily illustrated: one constituent council and one vote equals perhaps three votes for Norfolk and one vote for Suffolk. The leader of Suffolk County Council said, “That’s not a problem because we’ll weight the votes”. This is exactly what one would do using existing legislation, but I am worried that the structure of the Bill’s drafting will take that discretion away. That is the purpose of my Amendment 42.

My Amendment 44 relates to combined authorities, not combined county authorities, but it runs to the exact same issue. Of course, combined authorities are governed not by the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act but by the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009, Section 104 of which provides that the constitutional arrangements for combined authorities may, by order, be made according to the provisions of the Local Transport Act 2008. Section 84 of that latter Act relates to constitutional arrangements; subsection (2)(b) refers to

“the voting powers of members of the ITA”—

the integrated transport authority—

“(including provision for different weight to be given to the vote of different descriptions of member)”.

The Committee will recognise those exact same words, so we are dealing with exactly the same issue: is it different weights for different members, or is it to be overridden by “one member, one vote”?

I want, as the outcome of this debate, for us to be sure that this legislation continues to permit a constitution for a strategic authority that both allocates different weights to different members and enables voting power to reflect the wide range of circumstances of constituent councils and other voting members of strategic authorities.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, I shall be very brief because it would be better if the Minister responded to the important points that have been made.

I will not take up too much of the Committee’s time, but I want to say two things that will, I think, help in this situation. First, we must get clarity about which powers are only for the mayor and which are to be shared with the combined authority; it is important that that be made clear. Secondly, on voting in the combined authority, there is at times a requirement for a two-thirds majority and, at other times, a requirement for a simple majority. We need to be absolutely clear why those differences apply.

With that, I would like to hear what the Minister has to say.

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[Lord Cameron of Dillington (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, support Amendment 46, particularly the reference to the land use framework. The point about the land use framework is that it is not a dictatorial thing; it is not saying, “Thou must do this or that” or “Thou must grow that”, or whatever it might be. It is definitely a framework, but on the other hand there is no point in having a framework unless it is part of the thinking from the top to the bottom of government—central government to regional government to local authority and everything in between.

I should also say that a land use framework is not necessarily a fixed event. It is not going to be cast in stone for ever and it should be open to review from time to time. I would have thought that three years would be the right sort of time. However, it needs to change according to events, including world events. Do we need more homegrown food production as a result of current world politics? Does the latest research tell us that our biodiversity is still receding, running away from us? Does the international situation indicate that we need more homegrown green power or more homegrown timber? That is important. The noble Baroness, Lady Young, and I have just come from a meeting where it was indicated that the Government’s long-term housebuilding programme could very much depend on our ability to produce the relevant timber products needed. What would be the point of a land use framework if regional and local government just continue to do their own thing regardless? Therefore, the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, is crucial to the efficient management of that very scarce UK commodity—namely, our land.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

The noble Lord, Lord Cameron, said that it would be unhelpful if regional and local government continued doing their own thing. I think that this is an important debate and I look forward to the Minister’s reply, but the Government might look at the powers that existed with regional development agencies until 2012, in terms of spatial development strategies and the land use framework, when a lot was done. They might revisit that to make sure that everyone going off to do their own thing—the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron—is avoided.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Lansley for his amendments. I think that there has been consensus among noble Lords contributing on this group that this is something that should be explored and looked at further. Amendment 45 rightly links local growth plans to spatial development strategies, ensuring that they are not formed in isolation and do not contradict each other. When a local growth plan is drafted, it should take account of the implications for spatial development. We welcome this amendment and support a more integrated and coherent approach.

However, we also believe that these plans must be informed by neighbourhood plans as well as neighbourhood priority statements, which have yet to be commenced under the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act. Amendment 46 seeks to ensure that spatial development strategies take into account national environmental improvement plans and the land use framework. This will help local government at least to have regard to the national Government’s environmental targets and to be aware of the environmental solutions proposed. As for the land use framework, we are still waiting for it to be published. Can the Minister confirm the timeline? As others have asked, will it be imminent?

Amendments 138, 139, 144 and 145 address the need for spatial development strategies to be aligned with infrastructure projects to identify any that are needed for growth. Again, these should be important considerations to ensure that new developments are supported with the necessary infrastructure rather than treating the two in isolation. As we said in the Planning and Infrastructure Bill debates, the consequences for development of the failure to deliver infrastructure should also be clear.

We agree with the principle behind all these amendments. It is important that combined authorities’ and councils’ various strategies are joined up, co-ordinated and coherent to ensure not only good governance and efficiency across local government but, more importantly, high-quality development. I thank my noble friend for his efforts and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

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Secondly, during this period of major reforms, mayors need the flexibility and trust given to them from the Government to put the right arrangements in place for their own region. If direction of travel is towards mergers to fewer forces, the Government should surely be willing to give mayors flexibility and to appoint a single deputy mayor for more than one of their current police force areas.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, we have had a very interesting set of amendments so far, but what strikes me about them is that they all seem to run counter to the principle of election—be that either direct or indirect election—and we need to be very careful about that.

I have given notice to oppose that Clause 9 stands part of the Bill for two reasons. First, elections are important for public posts that require the expenditure of large sums of public money. I believe that most of those positions should be elected. Secondly, there is a huge absence of detail in the proposal within new paragraph 9 in Schedule 3 for the appointment and scrutiny of commissioners.

The Explanatory Notes at paragraph 74 states that commissioners will be,

“independent appointees, made by and accountable to the mayor”.

I have difficulty understanding quite how they will be independent if they are made by and accountable to the mayor and function, as the Explanatory Notes explain in the same paragraph, as “extensions of the mayor”. Can the Minister say in what way they are independent and why “independent” does not appear in this paragraph? The Explanatory Notes then state:

“Commissioners would not replace elected members”—


and there has already been a debate about that as part of this group, but they then say that areas—whatever an area is defined as—will,

“have the freedom to use a combination of commissioners and elected members to lead on different areas depending on what works best for them”.

Will the Minister say who makes the decision about whether elected members have the capacity to lead an area of competence, whether that decision made by the mayor alone and will the appointment of commissioners be public appointments, subject to the Nolan principles of selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership? Perhaps the Minister can tell us whether the posts will be advertised and subject to equal opportunities legislation. Will there be an agreed job description and a person specification? Will there be competitive interviews or is it all a matter, in practice, for mayoral patronage? Will councillors of constituent councils be able to scrutinise the full-time commissioners—for they are full-time appointments—that the mayor may decide to appoint?

Schedule 3 states that:

“The mayor must determine the terms and conditions of a person’s appointment as a commissioner”.


Can the Minister tell us what scrutiny is planned about what those terms and conditions actually are?

We should just note that the appointment of a commissioner will end when the mayor’s term of office comes to an end. That means that a mayor who decides to resign will cause all the commissioners they have appointed to lose their jobs, which are, as it says in the Explanatory Notes, full-time jobs. It seems that the clear implication of the wording of the Bill is that if a mayor was to quit the post, all those appointed by the mayor would have to leave. I seek the Minister’s clarification of that point, for that is my reading of Clause 9 and Schedule 3.

I have noted that commissioners cannot approve local growth plans, local transport plans or spatial development strategy, but they are writing them, planning them and will be advising the mayor on them. I understand the formality of a decision to approve a plan, but what the plan is and how it has got there will clearly be heavily dependent upon the commissioner.

I understand that:

“The mayor must obtain the consent of the CCA to any arrangement for a commissioner to exercise a function”,


but does that extend to the appointments process itself? I wonder why there is no discussion by the Government of using the professional expertise of local government officers. So, not only are the Government dispensing with the ballot box in terms of any form of direct election to strategic authorities, but they are simply leaving an election of a mayor, following which we simply have a world of appointments. I am very concerned about what that means. I ask myself, “Whatever happened to the primacy of the ballot box?” because commissioners will not be elected, so voters will have no say in their appointment because the electorate will elect a only mayor and will have no role after that. Indeed, unlike with a Member of Parliament, the electorate will have no power of recall of a mayor.

We then have Amendment 196A in this group on special advisers. I listened carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, said about them, but I have not understood the difference between a full-time commissioner and a special adviser. The noble Lord talked about a special adviser having professional expertise. I understand that professional advice is needed—of course it is—but I have not understood what is wrong with professional local government officers, with their expertise in the areas that might, at the moment, be proposed for a commissioner.

There are a lot of very important questions for the Minister to answer. The level of expenditure has been mentioned twice so far this afternoon, and the consequent level of the precept, which might then be high. We must be really careful about this and not duplicate. I remember, because I was around when metropolitan counties were abolished and we moved to joint boards, that the expertise in each of the areas of concern we have proposed was held by an individual local authority that had a lot of officers dealing with that specific policy area on behalf of everybody else. The joint boards had councillors; I was privileged to serve as a councillor on a number of those joint boards at different times.

I just do not think that the Government have gone far enough in examining how to deliver some of their proposals on, say, local transport, which used to function in Tyne and Wear with a joint board. What exactly is the problem with that? As I said last week, I fear that we have upwards mission drift in this Bill, taking powers away from established local government. I believe that to be true, but I also think that we are in danger of reinventing processes that have previously worked pretty well. I do not think that Clause 9 and Schedule 3 can stand here without us challenging what the Government intend to do because there is already a demand in this group for us to have yet more commissioners.

I am, by the way, in favour of culture’s status being raised—it is absolutely correct to do that—but I am uncomfortable with the suggestion that every area of concern should have a commissioner. Indeed, that is not the Minister’s proposal. The Government are not proposing that that should happen because there will be a mixture of commissioners, with the elected leaders of the councils of the combined authority and the strategic authority.

I shall stop there, but I hope that the Minister can allay some of my concerns around the failure of the Bill to have anything worth reading in it and with nearly everything that is going to happen next coming in the form of guidance. As I said last week, I would be happier if I knew a little more about what the Government are thinking in terms of guidance.

With that, I shall respond at some point when we come to the right moment, but I very much hope that the Minister will take on board some of my comments.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I agree very much with most of what the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, just said. I have been unhappy with much of Clause 9 since I first read it, and I look forward to hearing what my noble friends have to say about it, because they have also added their names to the intention from the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, to oppose the Question that the clause stands part.

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[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

For the overview and scrutiny committee, I believe it is a simple majority vote, but I will clarify that in writing for the noble Lord.

We expect that commissioners will have detailed knowledge and expertise in their assigned area of competence and will be appointed on this basis. Constituent members will not necessarily be experienced in their portfolio subject area. There are also circumstances where it would not be appropriate for a portfolio lead to represent both the borough and the region; there may be perceived conflicts of interest. As I said earlier, the local authority leaders who sit on the combined authority will also be running their councils on a day-to-day basis.

Commissioners will be able to represent the mayor’s authority and policy positions in a given area, including by speaking to the media. They could help make day-to-day decisions that are delegated by a mayor and provide strategic insight and advice for their area of expertise. We also expect commissioners to play a leading role in stakeholder engagement and partnership working, across geographies and organisations, as appropriate. This would include working closely with local councillors, business leaders and public sector institutions, using their advocacy and influence to deliver the mayor’s agenda.

I hope that that has helped clarify some of the points raised by noble Lords and that, with the assurances I have given, they will not press their amendments.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

If there are any matters raised by me or other noble Lords that the Minister did not cover, could she send a letter to cover them? I do not think I heard confirmation about the Nolan principles, for example. If there is anything else, I hope that officials might draft something for her to send.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I did confirm that the commissioners will be subject to the Nolan principles. I will go back over Hansard—I always do after these debates—and if I have missed anything, I will certainly write to the noble Lord.

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Moved by

[Lord Shipley]

53: After Clause 9, insert the following new Clause—
“Scrutiny of mayoral commissioners(1) The mayor of a combined county authority must establish, for each commissioner appointed by the mayor, a scrutiny committee composed of elected members of the constituent local authorities.(2) The purpose of each scrutiny committee is to review, assess and report on the exercise of the policy responsibilities of the commissioner to whom it relates.(3) Each scrutiny committee must have the following powers—(a) to require the mayor, the relevant commissioner, or any member of their staff to attend before the committee to give evidence;(b) to require the production of any documents relevant to the exercise of the commissioner’s functions;(c) to publish reports on the committee’s findings and recommendations.(4) The mayor and the relevant commissioner must have regard to any report or recommendation made by the corresponding scrutiny committee under this section.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment requires a Mayor of a Combined County Authority to establish a scrutiny committee of elected members with powers of summons to examine and report on the Mayor’s exercise of functions.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 53 on behalf of my noble friend Lady Pinnock. This amendment is about how you scrutinise mayoral commissioners. I noted what the Minister said in responding to the previous group about the mayor or combined authority members being responsible for scrutinising commissioners, yet that removes any responsibility on the constituent authorities to undertake scrutiny. It is doubly important that elected members of the constituent local authorities have some powers in scrutinising the work of a commissioner. They will need powers to do that—to require the mayor and relevant commissioner or indeed any member of their staff to attend and give evidence—so it can be a requirement to attend rather than a request to attend, and there should be an ability to require the production of any documents relevant to the exercise of a commissioner’s function.

There should then be a right to publish reports on the committee’s findings and recommendations, with an absolute power to do so; it would not be for the combined authority or the mayor to say that this matter cannot be published. It is really a fundamental matter about who is in a position to scrutinise what mayors do.

Can I make just two points about scrutiny, which will come up later in our deliberations? The best form of scrutiny is one that happens before the decision is made, not one that comments on a decision after it has been made. The best way in which to deliver that objective is through a committee system, because a committee system actually authorises decisions to be made and has the major advantage that the scrutiny is happening at the same time as a decision is made.

I have found it very disappointing in the Bill that quite so much is being said about the committee system and its perceived failures, most of which I do not recognise. It may be that when we get to further discussions in Committee and then on Report, further consideration can be given to those matters. I hope the Minister will be able to say that the Government do not downplay the importance of scrutiny, particularly when so many issues and so much public money is involved in the proposals to devolve power to mayors and commissioners. I beg to move.

[Lord Bichard (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendment 191, and, in doing so, declare an interest as an honorary vice-president of the Local Government Association.

The amendment would provide for the establishment in every local area of a local public accounts committee to ensure the effective scrutiny and accountability across the whole range of public service spending and activity in that area, not just the actions of the strategic authority or the mayor. So why is an amendment like this necessary?

During the past 40 years we have seen in this country a radical fragmentation of our public services with the establishment of a myriad disconnected, sometimes single-purpose agencies. Sadly, these have too often worked in isolation, seeking to achieve their own specific targets energetically, but on occasions their efforts have conflicted or overlapped with their partners. They have too often worked in silos and, sadly, regulators have been very slow to recognise and challenge that. As a result, the public often struggle to access or even make sense of the disjointed services which this system has produced. In addition, resources are wasted because of the overlap and duplication, bureaucracy thrives, and there is inevitably a culture of competition rather than collaboration. This needs to change, but I do not believe that, as drafted, the Bill alone will achieve that level of change. If we are adequately to integrate public services in a locality, all public service providers and partners have to build co-operation into everything they do.

A later amendment in my name seeks to impose a duty on all local public partners to do just that. But alongside that kind of duty we also need to put in place local accountability—and not always accountability to the centre, which has been the model we have followed for so long. We need more local accountability to ensure that genuine co-operation does take place, so that services are delivered which are actually recognisable to ordinary local people and which meet their needs effectively.

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[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Bassam and the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, for their amendments relating to accountability and scrutiny, and I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, is recovering.

Starting with Amendment 191, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, there is already an existing system of scrutiny that provides accountability to the public and local checks and balances and accountability to government, including a requirement for combined authorities and combined county authorities to establish an overview and scrutiny committee and an audit committee. In addition, the English devolution accountability framework and the scrutiny protocol set out the processes and principles that mayoral strategic authorities are expected to follow. Both documents are being reviewed to reflect the changes introduced through the integrated settlement and through this Bill. Where the most established mayoral strategic authorities benefit from integrated settlement, assurance is provided via an outcomes framework which interacts with the wider government system of accountability.

However, we recognise that there is scope to strengthen further the system of accountability and scrutiny for mayoral strategic authorities. That is why the Government committed in the English devolution White Paper to exploring a local public accounts committee model. Listening to the noble Lord made me reflect on some work that I did in 2015 with Sir Richard Leese, who was then the leader of Manchester City Council, and Jules Pipe, who was then mayor of Hackney. That work was focused on devolution and turning the dial from acute responses to prevention.

We recommended that if there was more widespread devolution, there was a need to think about local public accounts committees. Although that feels like six months ago, it was 10 years ago. Maybe every idea has its time. Therefore, I accept the principle behind this amendment and assure the noble Lord that we intend to hold mayoral strategic authorities to a very high standard.

The noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, was reflecting on the scrutiny of integrated settlements, for example, and allowing those who have the local knowledge of how things are working is crucial. When we were thinking about the possibility of a local public accounts committee, we saw it as being as powerful as the Public Accounts Committee here, being able to call witnesses from various bodies that are impacted on by the services and projects that are being delivered so that it can gain a much fuller picture of what is going on. This is a very different type of scrutiny—fundamentally different, as the noble Baroness said, to audit, which is a financial function. It is really important that we consider this fully. However, I ask that the Government are given time to complete the engagement that we need to do with the sector to design such a new approach, because it is important that we talk to the sector about this.

I hear the point that the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, made about the scrutiny of all levels of local government. He is of course right that both budgets and precept levels in town and parish councils are not insignificant in many areas, so we have to think about that. It is essential that any new accountability and scrutiny regime complements the existing system and the reformed audit framework in the future. Above all, it must be proportionate and supported by clear guidance and support for the sector, to make sure that we get these reforms right. With that assurance, I hope the noble Lord will feel able not to move his amendment.

Amendment 196B relates to local accounting officers. I thank my noble friend Lord Bassam for this proposed new clause that would require established mayoral strategic authorities to create local accounting officers. His amendment would designate the head of paid service as the accountable officer responsible for local spending, value for money and scrutiny. Although I agree with the importance of strong accountability and value for money, all mayoral strategic authorities already operate within an existing system of accountability, and that accountability is split between the “golden triangle” of statutory officers: the chief executive, chief finance officer and monitoring officer. These officers are accountable to their board and required to comply with the best value duty.

Strengthened systems are already in place for areas that have integrated settlements. This includes the mayoral strategic authority chief executive being responsible for core accountability processes within their authority, including responsibility for local outcome delivery and value for money. However, we are continuing to explore the local accounting officer model. We recognise that accountability to Parliament for the use of taxpayer money, which the accounting officer system provides, is a fundamental principle and not something to be altered lightly.

As part of our work on testing a strengthened accounting officer model, the Government are engaging with mayoral strategic authorities and other government departments. It would not be appropriate to pre-empt the outcome of that work with a primary legislative change to introduce local accounting officers at this point. For these reasons, I hope my noble friend will feel able not to move his amendment.

On Amendment 53, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, this proposed new clause would place a duty on the mayor of a combined county authority to establish a separate scrutiny committee for each commissioner they have appointed. As I have set out, mayoral strategic authorities are expected to follow the existing principles and processes described in the English devolution framework. This includes requirements that all combined authorities, and combined county authorities, must establish an overview and scrutiny committee, which provides local checks and balances. The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, raised a very important issue about being able to undertake pre-scrutiny. Overview and scrutiny committees are very capable of putting in place pre-decision scrutiny if they wish to do so. Some local authorities have that already, so it is not prohibited.

Further, the Bill ensures that the overview and scrutiny committee will have the power to recommend termination of a commissioner’s appointment. I can respond properly now to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, about the voting majority. To correct what I said earlier, a two-thirds majority of non-mayoral members of the combined authority or the combined county authority is required to accept the recommendation. Commissioners are also accountable to the mayor, who can terminate their appointment.

As Clause 9 allows for the appointment of up to seven commissioners, this amendment would risk institutions having to establish as many as seven scrutiny committees in addition to the existing overview and scrutiny committee that is already accountable. This would create significant additional labour and cost pressures for combined county authorities. There is a technical difficulty in that it would also apply a lopsided accountability system, as the amendment makes no reference to these seven committees applying to combined, as opposed to combined county, authorities. While we recognise that there is scope further to strengthen the system of accountability and scrutiny for mayoral strategic authorities, we believe that this amendment would create unnecessary pressures on the existing system, and I therefore ask that it is not moved.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister for a comprehensive reply to a comprehensive set of issues. It gives us pause for thought. I am glad that the Minister recognises the importance of pre-scrutiny. That is a fundamental issue, so if it can be better built into the Bill before it becomes an Act, that will be very helpful. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 53 withdrawn.

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Amendment 62 would require the publication of the commissioners’ allowances online. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why the Government consider it unnecessary to include a clear requirement in the Bill for these allowances to be published. Is that not the bare minimum for transparency? Surely the Government are not going to suggest that there are material costs associated with this since senior council officers’ salary bands are already published, as are councillors’ allowances. Proactive publication in this area strikes me as a sensible and proportionate safeguard —one that would strengthen, rather than undermine, the credibility of the commissioner’s role. I beg to move.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, I have just one thing to add to what the noble Baroness, Lady Scott of Bybrook, said. Last week, I mentioned the importance of guidance being published in advance of Report; it is absolutely fundamental to our understanding of the Bill, given that so much is missing from it. I therefore repeat my support for the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, that it would help us to have a better understanding of some of the detail that the Government are going to put into guidance before we get to the point of debating and voting on it on Report.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, for her amendments relating to providing allowances for combined county authority members with special responsibilities.

Amendments 62 and 236 would make it mandatory for the Secretary of State to issue guidance before Clause 10 comes into effect, and would require a combined county authority to publish an annual report on its webpage outlining the allowances that have been paid to members with special responsibilities. I welcome the commitment from the noble Baroness to ensuring transparency in local government—a matter of paramount importance to this Government.

As a former council leader, the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, will know, as I do, that allowances probably attract more debate and discussion, from both Members and the public, than much of the other policy that we debate. That is why we will issue statutory guidance on complying with the duty under Clause 10 to produce and publish reports. The guidance will allow the Secretary of State to set clear expectations—for example, regarding the frequency of such reports and where they are published—to support combined authorities and combined county authorities in this area. In the event that further clarification is needed, the power to issue guidance provides flexibility for the Government to update their position.

I would also add that, because this amendment applies to combined county authorities only, it would create a divergence in law between the requirements imposed on them versus combined authorities. That would be inconsistent; it would not be right to treat the two types of authority differently on that basis. My understanding is that this statutory guidance will be published on Royal Assent. I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

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[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, the Clause 12 stand part notice, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook, is intended to probe. We recognise that mayors and mayoral combined authorities will, in practice, need the ability to borrow to deliver infrastructure, regeneration and long-term investment. Borrowing can be a sensible and necessary tool. Our purpose today is not to deny that reality but to seek clarity from the Government about how this power will operate in practice and what safeguards will accompany it.

We would welcome further detail from the Minister on a number of points. First, what caps or controls do the Government envisage on mayoral borrowing? Will these mirror existing prudential borrowing frameworks for local authorities, or will a different regime apply? Secondly, what is the Government’s expectation of the purposes for which this borrowing will be undertaken? Are there limits envisaged on the types of projects or expenditure that may be funded through borrowing? Thirdly, who ultimately underwrites this borrowing? In the event of financial difficulty, where does the liability sit? Does it sit with the combined authority itself, with constituent councils or perhaps with central government?

Finally, what checks will be in place to ensure that borrowing decisions are subject to appropriate scrutiny and transparency, locally and nationally? Devolution must go hand-in-hand with accountability. Granting borrowing powers without clear safeguards risks storing up problems for the future—for local taxpayers and potentially for the Exchequer. I look forward to the Minister’s response and reassurance on these important points. I beg to move.

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, for raising some very crucial issues on the levels of borrowing powers. I add to that my concern—made even more so by the fact that constituent councils will not be able to scrutinise the work of the mayor or commissioners.

In that situation, I hope the Government will not be anticipating that local councils will then be responsible for any overspending by mayors and the combined authorities because, otherwise, there will be a demand on the council tax payer. So can the Minister confirm that overspends caused by poor-quality work by mayoral authorities will not end up with the council tax payer having to bail them out?

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, for her Clause 12 stand part notice, ably spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson.

All existing mayoral combined and combined county authorities have the power to borrow for all their functions. Unlike local authorities, the current process requires making a bespoke statutory instrument after an institution has been established. This process is highly inefficient. The Bill streamlines the process by giving the power to borrow to mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities for purposes relevant to their functions. The power to borrow is still subject to safeguards. Clause 12 requires authorities to obtain the Secretary of State’s consent before they exercise the power for the first time in respect of functions other than transport, policing, and fire and rescue.

I will cover some of the points that the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, asked me about. First, in relation to agreeing a debt cap, in general the exercise of power will remain subject to consent from the Secretary of State for the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, before it can be used for the first time, as I said. That would follow any internal processes, such as a debt cap agreement. The only exception will be where the new mayoral combined authorities and combined county authorities inherit fire, police or transport functions. In this instance, the power to borrow can be exercised immediately for these functions to ensure that ongoing financial arrangements are not disrupted.

In terms of how borrowing is agreed, any borrowing by a mayoral strategic authority is agreed through the annual budget-setting process and is subject to approval by the combined and combined county authority, operating within existing legislative, financial and prudential controls. While the mayor proposes the budget, borrowing cannot be undertaken unilaterally. Under the Bill, most budgets will be approved by a simple majority, which must include the mayor.

In response to the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, the budget, like all other matters, will be subject to the overview and scrutiny process, so there can be scrutiny of the budget in the same way that you would expect in a local authority.

The noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, asked about underwriting. Like the rest of local government, strategic authorities must also operate within the prudential framework. This framework comprises statutory duties and codes intended to ensure that all borrowing and investment is prudent, affordable and sustainable. It provides robust mechanisms for oversight and accountability. For those reasons, I ask that the noble Lord does not press his clause stand part notice.