English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Baroness Scott of Bybrook Excerpts

Tuesday 27th January 2026 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook]

41: Clause 6, page 3, line 32, leave out from “CCA” to end of line 33
Member’s explanatory statement
This probing amendment seeks to explore the justification for providing the mayor with a veto over decisions of a Combined County Authority.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 41 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Jamieson is a probing amendment concerning why the Government wish to give mayors a veto over the decisions of a combined county authority.

If this Bill is truly about empowering local communities, decision-making power should be allocated equally between all elected councillors, not concentrated in the hands of one political party individual. This is not to say that the mayor should not have a vote, or perhaps even a casting vote, but we currently see no justification for giving mayors a veto over all decisions made by a majority of a community’s democratically elected representatives. This would not empower local government but would instead turn it into a kind of presidential system. That is not how we do things in this country, nor do we want to.

Amendments 42 and 44 in the name of my noble friend Lord Lansley seek to bring the Bill in line with past legislation. Amendment 42 is in relation to the voting powers of members of combined county authorities whereby the Secretary of State can make provision for different weights to be given to votes of different types of members, as set out in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023. Amendment 44, on transport, seeks to bring the Bill in line with the arrangements set out in the Local Transport Act 2008 and the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009. These amendments seem entirely sensible—unless the Government have other reasons, and we would be grateful if they elaborated on those if they do.

Amendment 43, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Jamieson, again probes the Government as to why the decisions of a combined county authority must require the agreement of the mayor, rather than being determined by a simple majority of local councillors. We believe this would undermine local democracy, rather than empowering it. If decisions require the agreement of the mayor, a majority of councillors may be disregarded and the wishes of the people ignored. That is not democracy, nor have we heard any arguments as to why it is needed.

Finally, my noble friend Lord Jamieson and I oppose the Question that Clause 6 stand part of the Bill, since we do not see why the Government have deemed it necessary to amend the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 to replace the constitutional arrangement it sets out. I hope the Minister will explain why the Government hope to empower mayors over other local councillors, since this does not empower local democracy; rather, it empowers a select few individuals tasked with representing large geographical areas with different communities, who inevitably will have different needs.

As the Bill stands, this will not further localism; rather it will centralise power and take away the decision-making powers of local councillors. Not only does this fly in the face of the Bill’s title, but we have not been given any justification or reasoning for it. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response. I beg to move.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend and speak to these amendments to Clause 6. The clause relates to decision-making in combined county authorities and combined authorities and its purpose is to provide for a default structure of voting in both kinds of strategic authorities. In particular, that default structure would provide that in mayoral authorities the majority in favour of a decision must include the mayor, thus in effect giving the mayor a veto over decisions, since the majority excluding the mayor would not be decisive.

Before I turn to my amendments, and apropos of the question of whether the clause stands part, I will ask a question. I refer noble Lords and the Minister to Section 13(2)(a) of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act. The section enables regulations to be made about members, and Section 13(2)(a) states that those regulations can include provision about

“cases in which a decision of a CCA requires a majority, or a particular kind of majority, of the votes of members of a particular kind”.

It seems to me that that paragraph of the levelling-up Act enables exactly what the Minister is setting out to do by statutory instrument rather than by primary legislation. Could she tell us why primary legislation is required to achieve this purpose? That might inform our deliberations on the stand part debate.

Amendments 42 and 44 are in my name. I do not share my noble friend’s desire, set out in her Amendments 41 and 43, to take out the mayoral veto from the clause. I have been a resident in the Cambridgeshire and Peterborough combined authority for however many years. When we had a mayor, the mayor found it very difficult to secure, for example, a non-statutory spatial strategy, not least because the mayor was often frustrated in getting a policy through due to the votes of one of the strategic authority’s constituent councils. In my view, if you elect a mayor and you want a mayor to exercise leadership in a strategic authority, it does not follow that the mayor will necessarily be able to get everything that the mayor wants, and the mayor will have to secure a majority to do so. It is very difficult for the mayor to carry on and provide that leadership if there is a majority that can carry proposals against his or her own policy.

This therefore forces the mayor to act in a certain way. I have seen that in Cambridgeshire, where the current mayor, Paul Bristow, is doing a very good job; he will be known to some of my noble friends. Partly because of this legislation, he is securing a majority in the combined authority, not least because there is an expectation that the strategic authority, when it gets these powers, will be able to make progress with the majority that includes him, and so he will not be able to be blocked by one constituent council.

I turn my focus to my Amendments 42 and 44. The former relates to combined county authorities. In this Committee, I am afraid that we are getting used to the fact that we have to do everything twice, because we have to legislate both for combined county authorities and for combined authorities; it will get a lot simpler when we have just one kind of strategic authority and when legislation for all strategic authorities is pretty much the same. Nevertheless, combined county authorities are governed by Section 10 of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023, which enables the Secretary of State to set out their constitutional arrangements. Section 10(2)(b) includes

“the voting powers of members of the CCA (including provision for different weight to be given to the vote of different descriptions of member)”.

That is the existing legislation: it provides for different weights to be allocated to different members. The current situation is that the constitution of a combined county authority is not a “one member, one vote” arrangement—it can vary.

Clause 6 will insert new Section 13A into the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023. It says that

“each voting member has one vote”.

So, what I am really asking by way of these two amendments—in this instance, for combined county authorities—is: does the primary legislation we are discussing now override, in effect, the existing potential for regulations to determine a different weight for different members for different decisions; or, because of this primary legislation, does it have to be “one member, one vote”?

There is a problem there. That problem was illustrated to me when we had a meeting just a few weeks back—my noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook will recall it—about Suffolk. It was about unitaries, as it happened, but it also encompassed a discussion about the prospective Norfolk and Suffolk strategic authority, which is in the devolution priority programme. The leader of Suffolk County Council was asked, “Suffolk is a single unitary and Norfolk is three, maybe even four, unitaries. What happens if they come together into one strategic authority?”

The problem is easily illustrated: one constituent council and one vote equals perhaps three votes for Norfolk and one vote for Suffolk. The leader of Suffolk County Council said, “That’s not a problem because we’ll weight the votes”. This is exactly what one would do using existing legislation, but I am worried that the structure of the Bill’s drafting will take that discretion away. That is the purpose of my Amendment 42.

My Amendment 44 relates to combined authorities, not combined county authorities, but it runs to the exact same issue. Of course, combined authorities are governed not by the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act but by the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009, Section 104 of which provides that the constitutional arrangements for combined authorities may, by order, be made according to the provisions of the Local Transport Act 2008. Section 84 of that latter Act relates to constitutional arrangements; subsection (2)(b) refers to

“the voting powers of members of the ITA”—

the integrated transport authority—

“(including provision for different weight to be given to the vote of different descriptions of member)”.

The Committee will recognise those exact same words, so we are dealing with exactly the same issue: is it different weights for different members, or is it to be overridden by “one member, one vote”?

I want, as the outcome of this debate, for us to be sure that this legislation continues to permit a constitution for a strategic authority that both allocates different weights to different members and enables voting power to reflect the wide range of circumstances of constituent councils and other voting members of strategic authorities.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (Baroness Taylor of Stevenage) (Lab)]

I thank noble Lords for their scrutiny of the first clauses of the Bill last week. I have replied in writing to some of the questions noble Lords asked me last week, and I hope they have received those replies. I look forward to further scrutiny today.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, and the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, for their amendments to Clause 6, on decision-making arrangements. The amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, probes whether Clause 6 is required. Clause 6 is central to the Bill’s core ambition of moving from devolution by deals to devolution by default. It creates a clear and consistent decision-making framework for combined authorities and combined county authorities. Current decision-making arrangements in combined authorities and combined county authorities are complex and vary widely, as noble Lords who have spoken have referred to. This confuses the public and makes accountability harder. For example, mayors are often seen by the public as the accountable person for their authority, but the Mayor of the West of England and the Mayor of the West Midlands are not allowed to vote on their combined authority’s budget.

Clause 6 introduces a simple majority voting system which makes decisions more transparent, creates a level playing field and provides more clarity for the public. For mayoral strategic authorities, the mayor must be in the majority for a vote to pass. This reflects their direct democratic mandate across the entire area. When he was referring to Cambridgeshire, the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, spoke about the consequences if that is not in place. I think it is an important move. Collaboration remains important, and we are clear that we want to see mayors build a consensus, but one member should not be able to block decisions for an entire region. Removing Clause 6 would keep the current patchwork of governance rules, which slows decision-making down and can undermine accountability to the public, so we believe the clause is essential for strong, transparent governance and should remain in the Bill.

Amendments 41 and 43, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, seek to understand the justification for providing the mayor with a veto over decisions and why decisions must require the agreement of the mayor. The Government recognise the importance of strong collaboration with strategic authorities. That is exactly why the Bill requires both the mayor and the constituent members to work together. The standard voting arrangement in the Bill requires that a majority of members support a decision. We believe the provisions in the Bill strike the right balance between collective decision-making and clear leadership. Directly elected mayors have a unique democratic mandate. They are elected by the public to provide leadership and direction for their whole area. Requiring mayoral agreement on key decisions helps ensure clarity over who is accountable for outcomes. Without that clarity, responsibility risks becoming blurred. Removing the requirement for mayoral agreement would weaken the leadership model that underpins effective devolution. It would lead to slower decision-making, less coherent strategies and reduced accountability to the public.

Amendments 42 and 44 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, seek to provide that secondary legislation can be used to set voting arrangements for combined authorities and combined county authorities that differ from the standard arrangements set out in Clause 6. The Government agree that simple majority voting would not be appropriate for all situations. That is why Clause 6 already provides that voting arrangements set out in other enactments continue to apply. Therefore, these amendments are not necessary. For example, in non-mayoral areas the local transport plan must instead have the consent of all constituent councils in order to be adopted. In mayoral areas, the local transport plan remains a mayoral function, but it must be approved by a simple majority vote of the strategic authority. The existing powers for the Government to provide place-specific voting arrangements in secondary legislation, to which the amendments refer, will also apply.

Turning to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, about the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act, the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act—that is a snappy title—and Clause 6, the Bill does not disapply or override those Acts. Their relevant provisions continue to apply where appropriate, so restating them here does not add any new legal protection. Including additional statutory references risks creating confusion about which provisions apply in different circumstances and undermines the clarity of the governance framework the Bill is trying to apply.

We recognise that some parts of the country have unique technical circumstances that require small changes to this consistent approach, such as to reflect arrangements relating to the management of trams or local bus companies. We have undertaken extensive engagement with existing combined authorities and combined county authorities over the past 12 months on this issue to agree a limited set of bespoke voting arrangements that met this high bar. Should any future strategic authority seek bespoke arrangements, the Government would need to consider them on a case-by-case basis. However, we are clear that any changes to the standard voting arrangements would be by exception and subject to a very high bar.

The Government will maintain some of the place-specific voting arrangements. For example, Lancashire combined authority has bespoke voting arrangements in relation to its budget, which reflects its governance structure. In response to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, about weighted voting, the existing powers for the Government to provide place-specific voting arrangements will continue to apply, so that will be for Suffolk and Norfolk to determine as we go forward. For the reasons that I have set out, I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I am grateful to the Minister and to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. As I said, the issues raised today go to the heart of how we structure local democracy and ensure that the voices of all our communities are fairly and effectively represented. That is why we brought forward these probing amendments.

A consistent concern has emerged that the balance of power proposed in the Bill risks concentrating authority in the hands of the one single officeholder rather than empowering the broad and diverse range of locally elected councillors who best understand the communities that they serve. I have not heard a lot today that puts my mind at rest, but I will read Hansard tomorrow and look further at it. I was pleased that the Minister said that places such as Norfolk and Suffolk, quite close to my heart now, will have that flexibility to deal with local problems—but I have to say that they might argue about it. Who knows? Let us hope that there are two single authorities and we do not have any problems.

We all agree that effective local leadership is vital, but leadership does not mean overriding democratic deliberations; it means working with those local representatives, ensuring accountability and respecting the mandate of those who have been elected by their communities. When decision-making structures are distorted in favour of one individual, however capable, they operate not as a system of local democracy but, as I said, as a presidential model, which sits uneasily with the traditions of government in this country.

My noble friend Lord Lansley’s amendment rightly seeks to bring the Bill back into alignment with those frameworks established in previous legislation. I will read this back, but it sounds as if that is happening, although I am not quite sure how. If there are any further questions, I am sure that we will talk to the Minister about them. I am happy with that.

In relation to Clause 6, we have urged the Government to reconsider whether rewriting the constitutional arrangements of the Act was necessary or justified. It looks to me as if we are perhaps not rewriting as much as we feared was being rewritten—but, as I said, we will look at that in detail when Hansard comes out.

We still believe that, if the Government truly wish to empower our local authorities, they must demonstrate it by upholding democratic balance, trusting councillors and ensuring that all voices, not just one, carry the appropriate weight in the decisions that shape our counties and regions. But at this time, I am happy to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 41 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their amendments on mayoral commissioners and for the wide-ranging debate that we have had on the subject.

Before I respond to any individual amendments, I want to reiterate why the Government are introducing commissioners. I completely understand the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, on title and definition. I must say, I asked myself the same question on the potential confusion around commissioners who are sent to do a job when an authority is failing and these types of commissioners; we have to think carefully about that.

As I have set out, the Bill will empower our mayors with wide-ranging new powers over transport planning and local growth, so they can drive growth across their region, and powers over health and public safety, so that they can deliver the public service reform that the public expect to see. These are critical functions, and it is not reasonable to expect a mayor to do all of them. That is why we have introduced commissioners—an optional appointment to whom mayors can delegate functions to support them in their work. Mayors will be able to appoint up to seven commissioners, aligned to the areas of competence and reflecting areas of responsibility. As the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, said, mayors can also appoint members of the combined county authority or combined authority as portfolio holders, of course; they will also have officials to support their work, such as finance officials, legal officials and so on.

Let me be clear: this is not about inviting a proliferation of appointments. Rather, it is about mayors having capacity to deliver against the full range of their functions and giving them flexibility in how they deliver for their area. Local authority leaders who are on the combined authority will be able to support the mayor as portfolio holders; do not forget, though, that it is important to remember that they will have their own authorities to lead as well, so they will be working in their own authority at the same time.

On Amendments 51A and 52A, I reiterate that commissioners are an optional appointment: they are designed to increase capacity and give mayors more flexibility in how they choose to deliver for their areas. These amendments, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Willis, would remove that optionality, effectively introducing seven new statutory roles in the combined authority or combined county authority. We have set out the competency, for example on the environment and climate change, in the Bill itself, but mayors are best placed to determine whether they need additional support on this based on the needs of their local area.

While we have set out in the competencies what we think mayors should be doing, it cannot be right that we make the choice for them about how they do that. Therefore, it is for mayors to decide. I know this can be difficult for us in the political process when a mayor may put an emphasis on an area that would be less important to us than something else, but I am afraid that is part of the democratic process that we live with all the time; it is not that different.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I just do not understand this. If I am a leader of a local authority and I have a specific need for a competence, I employ an official or an officer. I interview a large range of them; I do not go to one of my mates and ask if they would like to be a commissioner. I do not understand why that should be any different in a mayoral office. If they are doing work that demands somebody extremely well-qualified in a specific arts project, they can employ an officer or official. It does not need to be a commissioner who has a connotation of being politically motivated, as well as being possibly qualified in that area.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I will come on to that in a moment, if that is okay. If I do not answer the noble Baroness’s question, I will come back to it.

Amendments 50A, 51B and 53A, tabled by my noble friend Lord Bassam, seek to remove the statutory cap on the number of commissioners that may be appointed by the mayor. It is important that mayors have the support they need from specialists to deliver for their constituents. However, we believe the Bill strikes the right balance, ensuring that mayors have the capacity to deliver without inviting a proliferation of appointments.

For this reason, I am afraid I cannot support the Amendment 196A, tabled by my noble friend Lord Bassam. This amendment would enable mayors to appoint mayoral special advisers and would include provisions regarding their appointment, function and code of conduct. It would also exempt these advisers from holding a politically restricted post under a local authority for the purposes of Part 1 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989. I agree that mayors can benefit from advice that they trust aligns with their politics. Political advisers bring important expertise that helps mayors formulate their strategy, policy decisions and communications approach. That is why mayors can already appoint a political adviser, and our current position is to provide new mayoralties with that option too.

However, these advisers will be subject to political restrictions in the same way existing advisers are. Accountability in public office is of paramount importance, which is why we have existing guardrails in place. The cap ensures that spending remains proportionate to the institution and prevents a proliferation of political appointments. On my noble friend Lord Bassam’s point on the code of conduct, mayors’ special advisers, where appointed, are employees of the strategic authority, and therefore they would be covered by the strategic authority’s code of conduct.

Amendments 54, 55, 58, 59, 57 and 61, tabled by my noble friend Lord Bach, seek to enable commissioners’ work or the delegation of function to relate to more than one area of competence. The amendments also seek to allow two or more commissioners to relate to the same area of competence. I thank my noble friend for these amendments, and I reassure him that the mayor will already have the flexibility to consider local circumstances when considering a commissioner’s exact brief and any delegated functions relating to the area of competence.

The Bill states that a commissioner’s work or functions can relate to other areas of competence and matters outside of them where it is incidental to the work in their special area of competence. For example, a commissioner focused on economic development and regeneration could lead on a growth strategy that included elements related to housing, skills and transport.

Amendment 171, also in the name of my noble friend Lord Bach, seeks to ensure that, where a mayor is responsible for more than one police force, they would have the flexibility to appoint a single deputy mayor or separate deputy mayors for each police force. As I have set out, the Bill already ensures that the mayor has support in exercising police governance functions in each of the police forces for which they have responsibility, and it recognises that these forces remain distinct and separate entities. The provisions in the Bill will prevent the same person from being appointed to more than one deputy mayor for police and crime positions, ensuring that there is a dedicated lead for the day-to-day oversight of policing in each force area.

My noble friend will know that I worked in policing for many years, and I am very aware of the different policing challenges that can occur even in neighbouring forces: the balance of different types of crime—rural and urban—and some of the more internal issues around different IT systems, and so on. That seems appropriate at the moment. Our right honourable friend the Home Secretary spoke very powerfully about her view that there needs to be further reorganisation of policing, and we should of course work across government as we move forward with the Bill to work with her to identify her ideas and how that might be implemented in this. But I appreciate that she was talking about some of this being implemented some way off, as the noble Lord, Lord Bach, said.

For the moment, this amendment would impact the direct line of accountability the mayor is able to provide to voters regarding the police forces which they are required to hold to account. I will reflect on his call for flexibility around this, and I think we need to have further discussions with the Home Office about how this will work moving forward.

Amendment 221, tabled by my noble friend Lady Griffin of Princethorpe, would enable a mayor of a combined authority to appoint any councillor of a constituent council in a combined authority area as deputy mayor. I want to clarify with her that I have understood her amendment properly, because I think she said something slightly different from what is in the amendment itself. The mayor can appoint members of the constituent authorities who sit on the combined authority in portfolio holder roles, but they cannot appoint any member of the constituent authority. I just clarify that.

The position of deputy mayor is a significant responsibility, which could involve stepping in to chair the authority and undertaking mayoral functions. That is why, currently, only those constituent councillors who have been appointed as a member of the combined authority may be appointed as a deputy mayor. These members have been appointed by the council to the authority in the knowledge that this may involve taking on the deputy mayor role, so they have the legitimacy to perform it if called upon. It is important that we keep measures in place to ensure that a deputy mayor is a legitimate appointment, best prepared for the demands they will face should they have to step in as mayor. Because this amendment applies only to combined authorities, technically it would create a divergence between the requirements imposed on them, versus combined county authorities.

The remaining amendments in this group, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, seek to remove Clause 9 and Schedule 3. This would eliminate the role of commissioners from the Bill, preventing their appointment by mayors. As I have stated, commissioners are intended to increase mayors capacity and give them more flexibility in how they deliver for their area. These authorities will have critical new functions to undertake, requiring representation on national bodies, joint working with partners and access to the expertise they need. It is simply not realistic to expect a mayor to do all this on their own. These appointments will be a local decision, and no additional funding will be provided.

I will now cover some of the questions that have been asked by noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, the noble Lords, Lord Jamieson and Lord Shipley, the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, and others. Starting with the question about commissioners being simply devolution to unelected officials, commissioners are optional and can be appointed only by the mayor, who determines their terms and conditions. They will work in lockstep with the mayor to drive forward the policy agenda for a specific function, such as transport or public health. This will be particularly effective where a commissioner has specialist knowledge and expertise that can help deliver the mayor’s vision for local people. There is a real difference here between employed officials of a local council, for example, and what these commissioners will do. The best example I can give is the way that these positions work in London, where the mayor has a number of deputy mayors, as they are called, who act for the mayor in certain policy areas.

The mayor, the combined county authority and the overview and scrutiny committee will each play a role in the commissioner’s appointment and/or the termination of their appointment. We will set out guidance, following Royal Assent, on recruitment and job descriptions. Responding to the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, I say that these commissioners will be subject to the Nolan principles, as employees of strategic authorities. Commissioners will also fall under the strengthened accountability system for devolution, which will confirm further details in due course; we are likely to have further discussions about that later this evening.

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Moved by

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook]

62: Clause 10, page 12, line 34, at end insert—
“(3A) Any report produced under subsection (3) must be produced annually and published on the website of the Combined County Authority.”

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 263 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Jamieson. If there is one theme that runs consistently through today’s debates, it is the need for transparency, certainty and a clear understanding of the Government’s plans for governance structures, from Whitehall’s right down to local government. Clause 10 establishes the core reporting obligations for combined county authorities. These obligations are the foundations of accountability. As we reorganise who holds which competences, what powers are exercised at what level and who has the ability to pull levers to make things happen, it is essential that those exercising powers are clearly and robustly accounted for. These reporting requirements enable Parliament, constituency councils and, indeed, the public to understand how devolved powers are being exercised, how public money is being spent and whether these new authorities are delivering what was promised when the powers were devolved. Yet as the Bill currently stands, the substance of those obligations is left to guidance, and that has not yet been published. We are, in effect, being asked to approve a statutory framework without knowing how one of its central accountability mechanisms will operate in practice. Our amendment simply provides that Clause 10 should not come into force until that guidance is available and has been laid before Parliament. This is a modest but important safeguard. It ensures that combined county authorities are not placed under statutory duties that they cannot yet fully understand and that the accountability framework underpinning devolution is complete, transparent and subject to parliamentary scrutiny from the outset.

I will therefore probe the Government on a few points. First, why has the guidance not been published alongside the Bill, given that these reporting duties are so central to its operation? Secondly, what assurance can Ministers give the Committee that the guidance will not materially shape or, indeed, constrain the scope of parliamentary oversight once the Bill is enacted? Thirdly, what would be lost in practical terms by accepting a provision that simply requires Parliament to see and consider this guidance before the relevant section is commenced?

This amendment does not seek to delay devolution for its own sake; nor does it introduce unnecessary bureaucracy. It simply asks that transparency comes before implementation and that accountability is designed in rather than bolted on later. To us, that seems a pretty sensible position; I will, of course, listen carefully to what the Minister has to say in response.

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[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, for her amendments relating to providing allowances for combined county authority members with special responsibilities.

Amendments 62 and 236 would make it mandatory for the Secretary of State to issue guidance before Clause 10 comes into effect, and would require a combined county authority to publish an annual report on its webpage outlining the allowances that have been paid to members with special responsibilities. I welcome the commitment from the noble Baroness to ensuring transparency in local government—a matter of paramount importance to this Government.

As a former council leader, the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, will know, as I do, that allowances probably attract more debate and discussion, from both Members and the public, than much of the other policy that we debate. That is why we will issue statutory guidance on complying with the duty under Clause 10 to produce and publish reports. The guidance will allow the Secretary of State to set clear expectations—for example, regarding the frequency of such reports and where they are published—to support combined authorities and combined county authorities in this area. In the event that further clarification is needed, the power to issue guidance provides flexibility for the Government to update their position.

I would also add that, because this amendment applies to combined county authorities only, it would create a divergence in law between the requirements imposed on them versus combined authorities. That would be inconsistent; it would not be right to treat the two types of authority differently on that basis. My understanding is that this statutory guidance will be published on Royal Assent. I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I thank the Minister but we are back where we started, really, in that we would like to see the guidance before Report so that we can see whether the guidance is correct or whether it could include something else. I currently do not know this, and we will not know. So I thank the Minister for her answers, but we should try to get the guidance before Report; if we do not, we are going to be asking more and more questions on this in Committee.

I accept what the Minister says about combined authorities and county combined authorities. I will look at that again and, if we do not get this guidance, I will retable it on Report. At this point, I say to the Minister that this is an important issue, and it would be better if we could scrutinise it properly, at least on Report, but at this point I withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 62 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook]

63: Clause 11, page 14, line 33, leave out subsection (1)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to probe why the Government propose to change the precept arrangements as set out in the LURA 2023.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 63 and 64 in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, both relate to Clause 11 and the proposed changes to the mayoral precept arrangements. They are intended to elicit from the Government a clearer explanation of both the necessity and the principle behind the changes proposed in this clause. We want to see the prevention of uncontrolled mayoral precepts, the avoidance of tax rises through the backdoor and fiscal parity with existing local authorities. That is more important now, having heard some of the debates today.

Amendment 63 seeks to probe why the Government believe it necessary to revisit the precept arrangements that were set out only recently in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023. They were presented as part of a carefully planned settlement between central government, local authorities and the public, particularly in relation to accountability and transparency around local taxation. Those arrangements were debated at length in this House by noble Lords on all Benches, as the Minister and I know only too well, given the many hours we spent debating it.

Against that background, it is not immediately clear why the Government now feel the need to depart from that framework so soon after it was enacted. What has changed and what problems have arisen that they are now seeking to address? I would therefore be grateful if the Minister could first explain what evidence the Government have had that existing arrangements are no longer fit for purpose; secondly, whether local councils or mayoral combined authorities have themselves asked for these changes; and thirdly, what outcomes for precepts they are expecting or seeking to facilitate through these changes. It is right to be cautious about reopening settlements that have barely had time to bed in, and I hope the Minister can reassure us that this is not just change for change’s sake.

Amendment 64 addresses a related but distinct, significant concern: why mayors should be treated differently from other local authorities when it comes to limits on precept increases. As things stand, other types of local authority are subject to clear principles set out annually by the Secretary of State, which limit the extent to which they may increase their council tax without triggering additional scrutiny or consent. The amendment simply proposes that mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities should operate within the same principles. Therefore, my question for the Government is very simple: what is the justification for the differential treatments?

Mayors exercise significant powers and command substantial budgets with high public profile. It is only right that those powers come with the same fiscal discipline and protections for taxpayers that apply to other tiers of local government. Without parity, there is a risk that mayoral precepts become a means of raising revenue, perhaps even for vanity projects or unfunded responsibilities, without the safeguards that residents elsewhere quite rightly expect.

This leads me to a broader concern that underpins both of the amendments in this group. Too often, we see responsibilities devolved without sufficient or sustainable funding attached. While devolution can and should empower local decision-making, it should not become a mechanism by which central government passes financial pressures down the line and leaves local leaders, and therefore local taxpayers, to pick up the bill.

If mayors are given additional duties without adequate funding, the inevitable consequence is pressure to raise their precept. From a Government who have sought to raise punitive taxes at every opportunity, this sounds very much like another tax rise through the back door. I do not believe that is what the public would understand as devolution or community empowerment. It is not consistent with the principles of transparency and accountability that we all should stand for.

The last two questions I have for the Minister are: for what reason do precept arrangements in the LURA need to be reopened, and why should mayors not be subject to the same precept arrangements as other local authorities? I hope the Minister will be able to reassure me on both points, and I beg to move.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, for her amendments on precepts.

Amendment 63 probes why the Government are changing precept arrangements, and I completely understand why she would do that. The changes to existing powers will allow mayors to precept for all an authority’s functions, giving mayors more flexibility about how they fund mayoral priorities.

I remind noble Lords that the ability to issue a mayoral precept has existed in law since 2017, but it remains at the discretion of mayors how to use it. However, as it stands, mayors who choose to use the precept can spend it only on mayoral functions rather than on all the authority’s functions. This limitation is arbitrary and unnecessary. It could mean, for example, permitting spending on transport but not on health.

We want to give mayors the tools to tackle the obstacles to growth and improve the lives of people in their area, and to do this effectively, mayors must be able to spend across all an authority’s functions.

Amendment 64 would impose council tax principles automatically on strategic authorities. The Secretary of State can already set referendum principles on strategic authorities should they choose to do so. However, where used, mayoral precept rates are proportionately a small amount. Imposing a limit on how much they can rise in line with councils would mean that, in almost all areas, the value would remain insignificant and be ineffective for investing in local priorities.

The Government have made it clear that any increases to the mayoral precept should be fair and proportionate, but aligning maximum mayoral precept rate rises with other council tax rises reduces local agency, which runs contrary to the spirit of the Bill and of devolution. We want to see mayors who are empowered to invest in their communities, creating better public services and driving economic growth.

I took a quick look at some of the rates of mayoral precepts that are levied. It was interesting for me to see that in Liverpool in 2025-26, residents of band D properties were charged £24 extra for the mayoral precept per year. In Cambridgeshire and Peterborough, the figure was £36. It is a bit unfair to compare some of the other authorities because they deliver police services and they precept for those as well. But then I looked at some of the town and parish council figures, and the average parish band D precept is £92.22, which was a percentage change of 9.4% in the last year. So, the mayoral precept feels proportionate to me.

The Government consult on the local government finance settlement each year. That is the established and appropriate way of considering what is best for authorities and taxpayers each year, and we will continue to do so. I therefore ask the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I am grateful to the Minister for her responses and for trying to assure me about those amendments. However, she will understand that concerns raised in the short debate between us are not about opposing devolution nor about questioning the role of mayors but about ensuring that changes to local taxation powers are justified and consistent.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, Clause 13 will allow combined authorities and combined county authorities to make a transport levy on their constituent councils to cover any transport costs not met by grants or other revenue streams. Previously, the powers to charge a transport levy have been provided through varied and disparate regulations and orders. The Bill standardises and makes consistent the ability for combined authorities and combined county authorities to charge a transport levy. These minor and technical amendments correct new sections and amend cross references to protect the regulation-making powers for levies. I beg to move.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, as the Minister said, these are technical and consequential amendments to the levies section of the Bill. It has been a long enough day, and I have already made my position on mayoral precepts and council tax very clear in the previous two groups, so I will not repeat myself.

Amendment 65 agreed.