Use of Drones in Defence

Wednesday 3rd September 2025 Westminster Hall

15:20

[Peter Fortune (Bromley and Biggin Hill) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the use of drones in defence.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell. I thank colleagues for enabling me to secure this debate.

Contrary to what some people may think, drones are not a new tool. The UK first began testing unmanned aerial vehicles for training during the first world war and later developed them in the 1930s for anti-aircraft gunnery target practice. Much like the noble tank owes its name to Britain, the drone does too: the Hatfield-built Queen Bee radio-controlled aircraft is thought to have inspired the term “drone”. As technology has improved and drones have become more sophisticated, their military use has expanded over the decades to include reconnaissance, surveillance and targeted strikes.

From the Queen Bee to bomb disposal vehicles to today’s Reapers, the UK armed forces have long used drones, but while we were an early pioneer, we now risk falling behind. The slow evolution of drones is now fast revolutionising warfare. Their mass use has transformed combat in Ukraine, on the land, in the air and at sea, with cheap kamikaze drones causing immense damage. Staggeringly, up to 80% of Russian and Ukrainian casualties are due to drones. They have transformed combat on the frontline. Drones threaten infantrymen, fortified positions and vehicles up to 9 miles from contact lines. Moving positions and supplies has become a deadly task.

[Mr Gregory Campbell (East Londonderry) (DUP)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing the debate. He is outlining accurately the issue in Ukraine, where the Russians are deploying drones to devastating effect. Does he agree that, unfortunately, the west has not armed Ukraine sufficiently to counter that threat and ensure there is a pushback against the Russian aggressor, and we need to reassess that threat not just in Ukraine but across the globe?

[Peter Fortune]

It is right that we continue to support Ukraine. Our support of Ukraine is keeping us safe in the west, and we need to redouble our efforts to make sure the brave soldiers and people of Ukraine are well defended.

Drones are now an important part of supply chains and logistics, with Ukraine using ground drones to move ammunition and other supplies to the frontline. Operation Spiderweb saw Ukraine smuggle 117 cheap first-person-view drones to successfully strike a Russian airfield, disabling a third of Russia’s strategic bombers. That is drones worth a couple of hundred dollars inflicting an estimated $7 billion of damage.

Sea drones have changed the balance of power in the Black sea. A third of Russia’s fleet was damaged or destroyed by relatively low-cost sea drones packed with explosives ramming ships. While Russia’s navy has adapted to make these attacks harder, sea drones carrying missiles or other drones are still causing immense damage—a $300,000 sea drone can destroy fighter jets worth $50 billion.

Drones are transforming warfare and levelling the playing field in asymmetric fights, but the change can be seen beyond Ukraine. Israel weakened Iran’s attacks on its territory by covertly transporting drones in suitcases and trucks to destroy Iranian air defences and missiles. Houthi rebels used drones to target HMS Diamond, requiring the ship to use its expensive missiles to stop a relatively cheap attack. Even drug cartels in Mexico are using cheap drones to launch targeted strikes against security services. Terrorist groups are also adapting commercially available drones for reconnaissance and filming propaganda, and they will undoubtedly be used in future attacks.

The pace of change is unbelievably fast, but the direction is clear: drone warfare is the future, and Britian must be the leader in the development, testing and mass deployment of drones. That means three things. First, we must develop an ecosystem of private enterprises that can innovate, test and build drone models—big and small, sophisticated and simple—at a larger scale. Ukraine is armed with many UK-made drones. We have supplied some 70,000 already and have a target of 100,000 by the end of the year, but that pales in comparison with the numbers required for drone warfare. Ukraine aims to produce 4.5 million this year.

It would take relatively little money to kick-start a collection of competing companies, capable of innovating to keep up with battlefield changes, to build inexpensive or sophisticated drones. We must also help commercial drone enterprises to thrive. Although they were not initially intended to, those machines can have military purposes and can provide the industrial-scale drone warfare that we require. It is disappointing and frankly unacceptable that, since the general election, the Government have purchased only three drones for the UK armed forces.

Secondly, if the UK procures many new drones, we will be able to start training our forces and learning the lessons from Ukraine. Although our brave service personnel use drones for many tasks, they are not as widely utilised as modern warfare demands.

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making a powerful speech, with which I agree. Like him, I have been part of the armed forces parliamentary scheme with the Royal Marines. Over the past year, he and I have seen drones deployed—I will not say where. More importantly, there is innovation in the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines, but it is compartmentalised and bitty, and it is not at the scale that he is talking about. Is it not time for the Government to use the innovation in the armed forces to expand out into the private sector?

[Peter Fortune]

This is a good point at which to mention the armed forces parliamentary scheme, of which colleagues from across the House are part. That great enterprise enables us to better understand the pressures and the reality that our armed forces personnel face. My hon. Friend is right that we have visited sites where we have seen how drones can be used and how effective they can be for deployment on the battlefield. That drives my request to the Minister to look at how we can procure more drones.

We are steadfast in our support for Ukraine, where we have made the military links we need to learn how drones can make our British forces even more lethal. They can carry out unmanned assaults and provide the support that our personnel need.

Finally, and in equal measure, we need to look at how the armed forces can counter drones—what we can do to fight them off. HMS Diamond is a particular case in point, as it successfully destroyed nine Houthi drones, but at huge expense. We have seen the damage that drones have inflicted on prestigious targets—Russian jets, ships and bombers—so we clearly need to defend ourselves from them. As a nation, we cannot afford to let cheaply purchased drones with a grenade attached wreck a multimillion-pound piece of equipment. We are already developing solutions such as radio frequency directed energy weapons, capable of neutralising swarms of drones, but as we look to ramp up defence spending in a more dangerous world, the threat posed by cheap drones must be answered.

Drones will not make infantry, artillery, ships or aircraft obsolete; they are a new tool that will help to transform warfare. They must be an integral part of our efforts to strengthen the UK’s armed forces and face down the threats our country now faces.

[Edward Morello (West Dorset) (LD)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing this important debate. Yesterday afternoon, we were in this Chamber discussing the battle of Britain, and we spoke at length about the reforms made prior to the second world war to the British military—especially to the Royal Air Force, including the use of radar. In fact, I am currently reading a book on the pre-world war one Haldane reforms to the British armed forces. In the light of the defence review and the changing nature of warfare, does the hon. Gentleman believe that the current structure and make-up of the British military reflect the urgent, pressing reality that we will be facing war close to our borders in the next five years? Does he have any recommendations to the British military for the changes that are needed?

[Peter Fortune]

I was hoping to attend the debate yesterday—of course, Biggin Hill in my constituency played a huge part in the RAF’s incredible efforts during the second world war and the battle of Britain—but sadly I was in the main Chamber in a different debate. Through those big conflicts at the beginning of the last century, we saw huge innovation and people learning, as the cliché goes, not to fight the previous conflict. We will always have to adapt and change. I know, especially through the armed forces personnel scheme, which my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon (Gregory Stafford) mentioned, that senior people—and, I am sure, Ministers, with their huge experience—are considering all the time how we best get ready for the conflicts that we do not yet know we are about to face.

In conclusion, the Government must embrace a review of how we are developing drones, fast—

[Apsana Begum (Poplar and Limehouse) (Ind)]

The hon. Member may be aware that some months ago a surgeon broke down while giving evidence to the International Development Committee describing what appeared to be some form of artificial intelligence or unmanned vehicles descending to shoot children in Gaza after bombing had occurred. Does he agree that drones should never be used to kill children? We must know whether drones developed or made in the UK that were exported to Israel before licences were suspended are being used to shoot children in Gaza.

[Peter Fortune]

It is not my place to talk about what the Israeli Government are doing, but I know that there are international laws of conflict, and everybody should adhere to them.

In conclusion—I have started so I shall finish—the Government need to embrace this issue, and fast. We cannot afford to wait and see. Britain must foster companies, train our forces and develop countermeasures to ensure that we master this new form of warfare.

09:41

[Jamie Stone (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell.

The potential of drones first struck me shortly after I was first elected to this place. In August 2017, the new aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth went on a tour of the north of Scotland and tied up at Invergordon. While she was there, an enterprising photographer flew a drone from the Black Isle across the Cromarty Firth with a view to taking pictures of the new aircraft carrier. The wind got up, and the drone automatically landed on the deck. That posed the question in all our minds: “How on earth did this happen? How did that drone get so close to an incredibly expensive warship—the pride of the Royal Navy?”

The photographer was quite open about what he had done, and he wittily quipped to the BBC that he could have put a couple of pounds of Semtex on the drone. Nothing was done about it, and the following week he did it again—he took photographs, but he did not land the drone that time. I made the point in the press that if that person had been of wicked intent, he could have flown the drone straight into the radar assembly and made a complete mess of our fine warship.

We have all seen the extraordinary effectiveness of drones, as has been referred to by the hon. Member for Bromley and Biggin Hill (Peter Fortune). I congratulate him on a thoughtful and timely speech—I will come to that in a second. We have seen what happens when a Ukrainian drone drops an explosive device through an open hatch on a Russian tank. Some military experts have argued that the massive explosion that happens is partly due to the way the munitions are stored in a circular fashion within the turret of the tank—it is called the “jack-in-the-box” effect. One thing is for sure: the crew have no chance of survival when that happens. The T-14 Armata tank was reckoned to be the last word in armoured vehicles, but Russia perhaps has not talked about it quite so much recently. We are pretty sure that drones may not get through its armour, but they have taken out the engine, and when a tank is immobilised it loses most of its effectiveness.

I suppose the point I want to make is an historic one. In 1906, Admiral Lord Fisher set about building HMS Dreadnought—it was very much his brainchild—and he completed it in nine months flat. Dreadnought completely transformed the way navies build their ships. It rendered every other warship in the entire world obsolete in one fell swoop, and all the other countries had no choice but to think that they had to build ships equivalent to Dreadnought—turbine powered, high speed, all big guns—and hundreds of battleships were just sent for scrap. The reason why I think this debate is historic is that it occurs to me that we may have such a moment on our hands right now.

I was my party’s defence spokesperson for a number of years. We all knew about Challenger 2 being upgraded to Challenger 3, but just how drone-proof will Challenger 3 be? We have all read about constructing cages over tanks, in the hope that drones will bounce off, but the fact is that all tanks have weak spots—we have heard about the engine of the T-14 Armata. Tanks are designed with their armour forward or to the sides to deflect at very high speed a missile or a shell; the rear of a tank is the most vulnerable bit.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

My background is in armoured infantry and warfare, and I completely concur that the weak spots of a tank are probably underneath it or to the rear. As the hon. Gentleman pointed out with the Armata tank, we should consider the use of drones to immobilise, and not just the engine block. The weak spot of any tank is its tracks, which are very easily disabled—that is the point of an anti-tank mine. During the second world war the Russians trained dogs to find food under tanks, so that they could then strap explosives to them, send them under German tanks and detonate them. Should we be looking at the protection that we provide to the side of a tank, to further protect its tracked infrastructure and prevent it from being mobility-killed?

[Jamie Stone]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. He knows his subject—we can see that.

In conclusion, as we plough on from Challenger 2 to Challenger 3, and as we develop armoured personnel carriers and other armoured vehicles, have we in fact come to the Dreadnought moment, when we have to completely rethink how we design and indeed deploy armour? That could be the case, and if an APC is equally vulnerable to a drone, which it will be, we must think about how we move infantry around. I seek reassurance that the Government are taking a completely new look at that. As I say, I believe this is a Dreadnought moment, and we owe it to our armed services to have the courage to say, “Wait a minute, hang on. Do we need to start all over again with a blank sheet of paper?” Drones are here to stay, and the point made about us being at the forefront of constructing drones is true and I concur with it.

09:47

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell.

The nature of warfare has changed. During the last three years of conflict driven by the war in Ukraine and, perhaps controversially, two years of Israel Defence Forces operations in Gaza, we have seen a paradigm shift in the nature of warfare—a tangential move away from the manoeuvre warfare that has shaped military thinking since the blitzkrieg illustrated the potential of speed and firepower. The previous Conservative Government recognised the direction of travel and introduced the UK defence drone strategy prior to the election, in February last year. Backed by an investment of £4.5 billion, the intention was to enable the rapid experimentation, testing and evaluation of uncrewed platforms.

The past year has seen the publication of the strategic defence review, which reflects the continued change of focus. It makes much of the need to adopt a high-low mix, combining exquisite capability with attritable capability such as drones—for high-low, read “expensive-cheap”. At the recent Royal United Service Institute land warfare conference, the opening address of General Sir Roly Walker, Chief of the General Staff, directly referred to the change to a high-low mix in the British Army. He said:

“I want 20% of our lethality to come from the survivable layer, 40% from the attritable, and 40% from consumable. That does not mean I want 1/5th the number of crewed platforms in the Programme of Record, it’s that I want each one to be five times more lethal, survivable and sustainable…And I want to spend 50% of our money on the 20% of crewed and expensive, and 50% on the remaining 80% of attritable.”

We have all seen footage of first-person view drones and how they have been used in the Ukraine-Russia conflict. As a former infanteer, the sight of individual soldiers being stalked slowly by drones hovering just behind them, and menaced and killed at will, strikes fear into my heart for the future of being an infantryman. This is, hopefully, a temporary situation, and in much the same way that the improvised explosive device was in conflict with electronic countermeasures—ECMs—so too will drones find themselves, in time, at the mercy of counter-unmanned aircraft system solutions. Last week, there was an article in The Washington Post about the measures the Ukrainians are taking to combat Russian drone threats, which include going as far as using a biplane with a crew member firing them out of the air with a shotgun. That is the sort of inventive stuff that is currently going on in the east—we would not believe it if we saw it in a movie.

We have already seen the RAF and the Army begin to employ agile combat employment such as the penetrative threat of drones, as illustrated by the bold attack by Ukraine on airfields deep inside Russian territory mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Biggin Hill (Peter Fortune). There is, however, very little in place to prevent a copycat attack against our forces in the UK. If RAF Brize Norton can be breached by civilians on scooters, it can be easily breached by a swarm of drones. What price our air-to-air refuelling or heavy lift capability? That is not easily replaced and fairly easily defeated on the ground. What efforts are the Government making to ensure that we have permanent counter-unmanned aircraft systems capability at all operational flying bases? Agile combat employment will get us only so far and, as we have seen, it takes only a couple of litres of red paint to destroy a jet engine.

In Ukraine, we have seen that survivability is key: how we fight a vehicle is as important as how we physically protect it or conceal it. Before any talk about thermal camouflage or, increasingly, multispectral camouflage, we should consider how the age and capability of the kit we have makes it vulnerable to a drone threat it was never designed to encounter.

The strategic defence review outlines the British Army’s intention to move to a dynamic high-low capability mix, as I alluded to earlier, of 20-40-40: that is 20% crewed platforms to control 40% attritable—preferably survivable—platforms, and 40% consumables such as shells and missiles, also including attritable one-way effector drones. For such a fundamental doctrinal shift in manoeuvre warfare around which the entire Army would need to be restructured, a single sub-paragraph on page 110 of the SDR does not really cut it. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s view on how he plans to extrapolate such a paucity of strategic intent.

At the lowest consumable level, handheld off-the-shelf drones are a plentiful, cheap and effective tool. They are low cost and high volume. Our funding of capability in Ukraine should really be seen as an investment; it is not cynical to suggest that the current conflict is a helpful proving ground for our own future capability. First-person view drones have quickly become a stalwart of the modern battlefield and sit within what the Ministry of Defence considers to be tier 1 and tier 2—those that are consumable or attritable. It is those drones that will see the quickest development, the biggest leaps in capability, and the most effort going into combating them from an anti-personnel perspective. We have already seen the development of a counter-UAS ECM that has led to the impractical horizontal development of fibre-optic drones. The pace of development should force us to ask what the capability will be like by the time British troops are required to use them in anger.

[Edward Morello]

The hon. Member is right to point out the rapid change in drone technology in the field in Ukraine. We have also seen the deployment of artificial intelligence such that where drones are being jammed, the AI can take over and continue to lock on and have something in the region of a 70% success rate even after jamming. Obviously, there is an understandable shift in UK military thinking towards drones, but that needs to be supported by UK innovation in the AI space. We need to get greater ownership of that, especially in our technology sector and our universities, to support development. Does the hon. Member have any views on that?

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

I think AI will increasingly become a mainstay of the battlefield, and how we employ it will become incredibly important. My concern is about the control of AI and knowing that the target we are trying to prosecute is indeed still viable right up to the last safe moment. Once we lose control of a drone and it becomes AI-capable, in theory it could switch to a more preferential target, which may be a good opportunity, or it may be a catastrophe that ends up as front-page news. We need to think carefully about how we employ drones.

On the overall development of drones, another important factor to consider is how we employ the warhead. It is only a matter of time before we look at options such as the replacement of Javelin—I was a Javelin platoon commander when I was in the Army—which has a two-stage warhead, with the first stage penetrating the armour and the second stage going inside the vehicle, exploding and detonating to kill the crew. The application of something like a two-stage warhead to an FPV drone is going to become an increasingly potent threat. It will be interesting to see at what point that emerges on the battlefield.

At tier 3—a level up—we have those platforms that are firmly considered to be survivable. The entry into service of Protector RG mark 1, replacing Reaper, illustrates how the Royal Air Force is moving further into the world of uncrewed air systems. With a ceiling of 40,000 feet and a mission endurance in excess of 30 hours, it marks the next evolution in our drone capability. With an ongoing project to enable it with the low-collateral Brimstone 3, it will be a potent weapons delivery platform, although that project is currently rated at amber.

Indeed, the introduction of remotely piloted aircraft systems—RPAS—as its own stream within RAF pilot training illustrates the complexity of how drones will be used going forwards. We have already seen the SDR outline the desire to introduce a hybrid carrier air wing, with crewed and uncrewed platforms operating alongside one another from our carrier strike group.

That leads us into the category of exquisite capability. The elephant in the room is GCAP—the global combat air programme—a trilateral endeavour with Italy and Japan that aims to deliver a sixth-generation fighter by 2035. I do not wish to derail the debate by talking about the merits and pitfalls of sixth-generation fighters, and whether by the time they arrive we will still need or want an exquisite capability, given how precious we are already about our fifth-generation F-35s, but there is a key issue with the platform as an exquisite capability.

The intention of GCAP is not to have massed squadrons of fighters flying into dogfights over Russia. Those days are long gone; in future, we should expect most, if not all, engagements to take place beyond visual range. Any near-peer conflict will involve formidable air defence that will render the low-level bombing runs of yesteryear the stuff of Hollywood. No, the intention is to operate GCAP as a system of systems: a crewed platform where the pilot is less of a pilot and more an integrated part of the system—effectively, a weapons platform operator co-ordinating the battle space—and where the uncrewed autonomous collaborative platforms, or loyal wingmen, operate as a squadron and conduct the task as an attritable but very expensive asset that can complete the mission without risk to aircrew, impervious to being disabled by ECM, and operating networked to GCAP itself.

The RAF’s autonomous collaborative platform strategy aims to have ACP as an integral part of the RAF force structure by 2030, and we have started to see that being rolled out in recent weeks. This is a concept that I do not believe we can fully afford. The National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority already has the future combat air system rated at red—that is not just GCAP but the ACP strategy that accompanies it. It would be one thing to achieve an ACP capability, and another to develop and deliver a sixth-generation fighter, whether on time or decades late, but to deliver both seems fanciful based on the Ministry of Defence’s procurement track record.

In a world where the infantry are still using armoured vehicles that came into service the same year the Beatles released their debut single—closer to the end of the first world war than to today—with no current plans to replace them, I cannot envisage a situation where we have a sovereign fighter jet that ranks as the best in the world and a squadron of drone fighters operating alongside it. We urgently need to start managing our expectation.

The Government talk a good game on RPAS but, for all the talk of increasing the defence budget, our drone strategy looks an incoherent mess. I am sure the Minister will set me straight on whether that is accurate. We are pouring money into exquisite capability while watching the war in Ukraine spiral-develop capability that we have no idea how to use in the last 100 yards. The pace of technological change that is driving the evolution of the threat environment is such that unless we leverage the spiral development capability that already exists here, coupled with the expertise that now exists in Ukraine, British forces will be left behind.

09:57

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

It is a real pleasure to serve under your chairship again, Ms Lewell. I commend the hon. Member for Bromley and Biggin Hill (Peter Fortune) for setting the scene so well. I had hoped to see more people at this debate; I expected a full house. This is about modern technology—this is the future—and something we really have to look at. There are fantastic benefits to using drones in our defence sector. It is a real pleasure to see the Minister in his place again; he is becoming a regular in Westminster Hall. He is trying to catch me up, and I am sure he is almost there.

Drones can provide real-time intelligence and access hard-to-see areas, providing essential information for local armies and for the Government—I will mention some roles outside of defence in which they can be effective. We must make sure they are used correctly and to the best of our ability. It is great to be here to discuss that. I was sitting here thinking about drones, and I can remember, because of my age, the first episode of “Star Trek” with the laser guns and “Beam me up, Scotty.” We are not yet at that stage, but I do wonder whether one day we will be. It would be great for an MP living in Northern Ireland: I could be in my office at 9 o’clock and at 25 past be beamed over to Westminster. I know that is fictional and highly improbable, but drones were once highly improbable, and now they are not. They were once fictional, but now they are reality.

We can cast our minds back to The Terminator films, in which drones chase the Terminator and other people about. That shows what can happen, and that is what is happening today in Ukraine. Fictional things of the past that we thought were not going to happen clearly can happen—and perhaps they will. I am not sure whether anybody else saw in the paper yesterday that China seems to have a laser attack capability. There was a tank in the square, on parade yesterday, that has laser capabilities and could be the weapon of the future. Again, it is early days, but who can say it will not happen sometime in the future?

In February 2024, the UK Ministry of Defence launched a defence drone strategy backed by a £4.5 billion investment over the next decade. There is a need for new advanced technology, especially after the conflict we have witnessed in Ukraine. When I watch the things happening in Ukraine, I find them almost inconceivable; I know others feel the same. We see innocent civilians in their gardens or going to the shops and children coming back from school being targeted by Russian drones—the Russians know fine rightly that those are innocent civilians and yet they attack and kill them. On the buses there are no army personnel; they are civilians. The Russians know exactly what they are doing with the drones. Russia has shown technology at its worst. We should be aware of what is happening.

I was watching TV last week. A civilian journalist and cameraman went down to the battlefront in Donetsk. A drone followed them; they got under the trees and hid there. When they were driving down there, there were net-type things over the roads that deflect the drone activity. These are some of the things that have to be done, but technology is moving so fast. What we thought in the past would never happen is happening today. That tells me that in the future, when I will probably not be here, there will be even more of the impossible becoming the reality.

The UK Government have invested over £40 million in radio frequency-directed weapons research. I thank the Government for that as well as the previous Minister, the hon. Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge). To give him some credit, when he was in government he made regular visits to Thales in Belfast and across Northern Ireland, and he—now the shadow Minister—recognised the importance of the new technology. I know the present Minister and the Government feel the same way, so there is no dispute and they will continue with that policy. I am convinced of that.

There are 135 skilled jobs at Thales in Northern Ireland offering further support in our defence. My right hon. Friend the Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson) and I visited Thales in his constituency last year to ascertain where it was going. I was incredibly impressed by the modern technology and how we are leading the way. I am also pleased that when it comes to technology in modern warfare, there is a real Government policy, of the previous Government and this one, to ensure that all parts of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland can take advantage of it. I thank them for that.

To look at a different angle, the Police Service of Northern Ireland uses drones in operational support and border surveillance. It can keep track of what is happening in border areas. It also supports police officers on the ground. There are other ways of doing things and we have to acknowledge what those ways are. Are they effective? Yes, they are. Can they help and do the job? Yes, they can. They assist in monitoring crime hotspots as well. When someone is involved in drugs, antisocial behaviour, attacks, assaults or whatever it may be, a drone in the air can spot that person, providing an evidential base for the future. Drones are used in search and rescue and managing public disorder. Let us not forget that the eye in the sky is keeping an eye on us when we are on the streets, as happens in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.

As everyone knows, I represent Strangford. Boats in Strangford lough have unfortunately got lost or have overturned over the years, and one of the ways of doing search and rescue is to use a drone. When young people go missing, drones are used to ascertain where they were. Unfortunately, on the occasions that I can recall us hoping to find someone alive, that did not always work out, but drones did help with the search and rescue. That is what the PSNI and other organisations are doing, and we have to recognise the good that that brings.

Drones are crucial for situational awareness and enable personnel to make quicker and more effective decisions. The soldier of today is much better equipped, more able and more experienced in modern technology than soldiers would have been in the past. Drones allow for constant surveillance and the detection of enemy movements or illegal activity. More importantly, they enable early intervention, which can reduce casualties and military deaths, making sure that those who do their best for our safety are as protected and safe as possible.

Numerous manufacturers across this nation are more than capable of making and supplying drones for our defence industry. I am told by my right hon. Friend the Member for Belfast East that 60% of the workforce at Thales, in my neighbouring constituency, comes from Strangford. We are very pleased to make a direct contribution to the Thales workforce. The efforts that they make are critical for defence.

There is a real opportunity to progress technological warfare and to share data with our allies, especially the US. One day, we will have our drones, others will then find a way of deflecting the drone, another side will get another way of modifying the technology, and then we will have to come back again with something else—it is always going to evolve. We have to support the Government’s commitment to spending money on cyber-security and drone technology, and we thank the Government for it. Drones are a key element of UK defence. They aim to enhance our national security and, importantly, protect lives. We must invest wisely in their use.

We must also remember the opportunities for local people. Thales employed 200 new people, some of whom were apprentices. The apprentices receive a level of remuneration that makes them want to stay there. I know some of the young apprentices; the company was paying their student fees so that they would stay, because Thales wants to have a level of technological advantage by bringing in people at an early stage. That is a point about employment and job creation.

I look to the Minister to ensure that we can continue to be a leading nation in surveillance and drone defence, and to commit to proving that over the next decade. I know that he will, but we must all be focused on that.

10:09

[Helen Maguire (Epsom and Ewell) (LD)]

It is an absolute pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell. I thank the hon. Member for Bromley and Biggin Hill (Peter Fortune) for securing this important debate; I was sorry not to be able to hear from him yesterday in the battle of Britain debate.

The integration of drones, or unmanned aerial vehicles, into defence has transformed the way that nations think about security and the battlefield. Over the past decade, we have seen a steady growth in their use, and the war in Ukraine has made clear to the world just how central they have become. What was once considered cutting-edge technology is now an everyday feature of modern warfare. It is alarming that more soldiers today are being killed by drones in Ukraine than by any other form of warfare.

However, the benefits of drones are undeniable. Drones allow us to project force and gather intelligence without putting soldiers directly in harm’s way. They give commanders a real-time picture of the battlefield, overcoming traditional line-of-sight limitations and extending awareness deep into enemy territory. They have become central to surveillance, targeting, logistics and even battlefield medical support. For example, drones equipped with advanced thermal imaging can locate casualties hidden in rubble, smoke or woodland. They can deliver medical supplies, bandages, medication and even defibrillators into remote or inaccessible areas, providing rapid aid while reducing the need to send medics into danger.

In defensive operations, tethered drones are able to remain airborne for hours, providing uninterrupted surveillance and protecting bases from surprise attack. AI-enabled drones can patrol throughout the night, automatically detecting and flagging suspicious activity, which reduces the pressure on human surveillance teams and cuts the risk of fatigue.

Cost is another factor. Compared with tanks, aircraft or armoured vehicles, drones are relatively cheap to produce, quick to deploy and often expendable. Ukraine’s experience shows how even commercial drones adapted for reconnaissance or artillery targeting can deliver immense tactical advantage. Their real-time video and geolocation data have significantly improved artillery accuracy, reducing waste of ammunition and increasing strike precision. Drones have also enabled Ukraine to conduct long-range strikes deep into Russian territory, disrupting logistics and undermining morale.

However, alongside those advantages, we must acknowledge the challenges. Drones are not a silver bullet. They come with ethical concerns about remote warfare, accountability and lethal decision making, and the potential for escalation when operators can strike from thousands of miles away.

Technically, they are also highly vulnerable. Drones depend on data links—radio or satellite based—and GPS signals to navigate and communicate. Adversaries with electronic warfare capabilities can jam, spoof or hijack those links. That is not theory: as has already been mentioned, in 2009 Iraqi insurgents intercepted live US drone video feeds using cheap, commercially available software. In Ukraine, Russian jamming and interference has disrupted as many as 60% to 80% of drones before they reach their targets. That has forced Ukrainian forces to innovate using frequency-hopping communications, deploying fibre-optic cables up to 50 km long, and even experimenting with AI-based navigation when comms fail.

The lesson is clear: we must be realistic about what drones can do. Overreliance on them would be reckless. Ground forces remain indispensable for holding territory, engaging with civilian populations, providing humanitarian relief and responding to dynamic battle conditions. Drones can enhance these missions, but they cannot replace them. A balanced force of combined arms structure is essential.

I welcome the Government’s announcement of a £2 billion drone investment package and the establishment of a drone innovation centre. Those are important steps, but technology alone is not enough. A fleet of advanced drones is only as effective as the people who operate and maintain it, and all three services will need drone pilots. That should form part of basic training.

Drone warfare requires highly skilled professionals—pilots trained to control aircraft in contested environments, engineers able to maintain complex systems, data analysts capable of interpreting live feeds and AI specialists who can design resilient autonomy. Without those skills, our investment risks being underutilised or, worse, ineffective. Recruitment, training and retention must therefore be a central part of any strategy. We need a robust pipeline of talent if we are to scale drone operations responsibly and securely.

We must also recognise the speed of innovation because our adversaries are not standing still. They are rapidly working to advance their drones as well; if we are to maintain our edge, sustained research and development is a necessity. That means investment not only in next-generation drones, but in secure communications, anti-jamming technology, counter-drone systems and resilient AI. It also means collaboration, working closely with universities, private sector innovators and start-ups that can bring new technologies quickly to the table.

It is essential that the UK can quickly adapt to the rapidly evolving nature of warfare. Drones are not just another tool; they are reshaping the character of conflict. They save lives by keeping soldiers out of harm’s way, they improve precision and they provide persistent surveillance and awareness, yet they also carry risks—ethical, strategic and technological. Our task is to embrace their potential while also guarding against the vulnerabilities. We need investment in technology but also in people. The Government must work to balance technological innovation with conventional strength and ensure that the UK remains at the forefront of research and development, so that we are not only consumers of new technologies but leaders in shaping how it is used responsibly in defence.

10:13

[James Cartlidge (South Suffolk) (Con)]

It is a real pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell. I know you take a great interest in these matters because you served on the Defence Committee when I was a Minister, and I am sure you regard this debate with great interest.

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Biggin Hill (Peter Fortune) on introducing this debate, because the issue of drones is so timely, interesting and, I dare say, urgent for defence procurement, defence training and all aspects of defence. He made a brilliant speech. It was not only delivered well but made some important and substantive points on, for example, countering drones, which should be considered as important in this debate as the acquisition of our own strike-reconnaissance capabilities and so on. I am pleased that we have the Veterans Minister here, and I know he is also very passionate about this subject.

I quickly say, especially as the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) is here, that people are still the most important capability, despite everything we will say in this debate. I hope he will be as robust as possible in standing up for our veterans in the weeks ahead, because this stuff will come to a head. All of us who care about the British armed forces have to stand by those who served all those years ago, so that we do not undermine the morale of those who serve today.

On the key subject of drones, my main argument is that they are an amazing opportunity for the United Kingdom to fundamentally modernise its armed forces in a way we have not done for a long time. In many ways, we are quite lucky, because drones bring mass and lethality to our existing forces relatively cheaply and relatively quickly. Above all, and this is underestimated, we are in an amazing position to capitalise on that in many ways, for reasons that have not been fully shared with the public. I will now try to do that.

The day I became Defence Procurement Minister in April 2023, there was a vote in the House of Commons. People came up to congratulate me as I walked through the Lobby, and every other colleague said, “By the way, you’ve got Ajax,” which is what defence procurement was known for at the time. Two months later, I made a statement to the House about Ajax resuming field training with the Army and the Household Cavalry, and how it is a highly capable vehicle.

However, I had a sense, as Defence Procurement Minister, that there was a parallel universe. There was business as usual, with long procurement times and many delays under successive Governments—the old way. On the other hand, there was what we were doing in the MOD for Ukraine. It was like a parallel universe. We acted at pace for Ukraine with incredible scale and innovation. We got thousands and thousands of shells from around the world and delivered them to Ukraine. It was an incredible exercise, of which I am very proud. I am also very proud that the current Government have continued it.

Nowhere was this difference more striking than in drones. I would not quite call it an epiphany—I do not know the right word—but my most memorable moment as Defence Procurement Minister came in the autumn of 2023, when I visited an SME in the south of England. It had developed a drone—at the time it was highly sensitive, dare I say classified—that went on to be used in Ukraine. It was a highly effective long-range, one-way attack drone, now a matter of public record. This SME, not a big prime, had developed a drone relatively cheaply and very quickly, and it made an impact on the frontline against a peer military of Europe.

That was extraordinary. Revolutionary. I was so struck by it, but what really got me—the thing that is most important about the uncrewed area—is that the SME was getting feedback from the frontline within days, if not hours. It was using that feedback to immediately upgrade the capability by changing various important but relatively subtle parameters. I was immersed, as all Defence Procurement Ministers are, in the endless emails about delays to the latest big platform, or whatever it was, so I was struck that there is a different way.

What did I do about it? As my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty) and the hon. Member for Strangford said, I launched the drone strategy in February 2024. It was relatively simple. The Secretary of State always says it was only 12 pages, but the truth is that it was a lot shorter when it was first presented to me. I was pretty furious about that, because to me drones are a fundamental part of defence. The key point is that I wanted it to reverse the sense of living in a parallel universe. I wanted us to embrace what we were doing for Ukraine so that our armed forces could benefit in the same way. It is simple to summarise the strategy: to continue delivering drones at scale for Ukraine—thousands of them, as we did and as the current Government have done—but, in parallel, to develop our own SME drone ecosystem for the British armed forces. That is what I wanted to do.

In February 2024, I also announced the integrated procurement model, which I am very grateful that you mentioned in the recent Defence Committee debate, Ms Lewell. The key thing is that it was also relatively straightforward. Instead of these very long development times for new equipment, it is about setting minimum deployable capability—to get things into use as quickly as possible, where they can be used if the balloon goes up, to put it bluntly—and then to develop them spirally in service. That is how the modern world works, and it is how software companies have always sought to work: get it going, and then constantly upgrade. That is the only way to keep pace with technology. That procurement model went live in April 2024, and the general election was called in May, so it is fair to say that there was not a huge amount of time to introduce some of it, but we made some progress.

I now want to talk about some key points about how to ensure that the UK seizes this opportunity so that our armed forces are world leaders in the use of drones. The first point is the most important. This has not been a political debate, and I am not trying to play party politics, but I have also been a Treasury Minister. When I was the Minister for Defence Procurement, I was in all the discussions about how to get to 2.5%, so I know what it is like to deal with the Treasury. What happened is that when the new Government came in—they are not the first to do this—the Treasury put a clamp on procurement as a way of controlling in-year budgets. It is very common. The Treasury frequently tried to do it with us, but Ben Wallace and Grant Shapps, the Secretaries of State, always pushed back. I tried to work with the Treasury to find compromises and to prioritise the procurements that were most important to the Department.

The consequence is that, for months, there has been an effective procurement freeze. Defence companies tell us that they are waiting and waiting. They were waiting for the SDR, and now they are waiting for the defence investment plan, which will put in place the decisions of the SDR. They have been waiting for the defence industrial strategy. They have been waiting for the appointment of a national armaments director, who will come in as a great white knight and solve all these problems. By the way, when the problems are really tough, the companies will turn around to the Defence Procurement Minister, who earns about a thirtieth of what they do, and ask them to solve it because it is political, which it always ends up being.

In the meantime, we need to get on with it, so let me suggest an idea. My hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Biggin Hill said that when we tabled a written question asking how many drones have been ordered since the general election, we were told three, which is extraordinary. When I raised the matter with the Secretary of State, he said that it was a specific answer to a specific question. It certainly is, but it is still fairly shocking. What we have found, particularly when we talk to those in the Army, is that there are drones coming into their units, but they are, for example, through sports—they do drone sports. There is not yet a central push to transform the forces to fight with uncrewed systems.

So where could we get the money? My personal view is that the Chagos deal is basically bonkers. Next year, we as a country will spend £250 million leasing back a base that we currently own freehold—the islands too, of course. Half that budget could transform the UK drone ecosystem, because tens of millions of pounds would make a difference.

There is one risk: how do we buy drones when, in theory, they go out of date so quickly? There is no risk to what I would call a training order. We should buy enough drones from British companies so that the Army can start training with them at scale. But the crucial thing is not the manufacture or the initial buy; it is establishing the relationship between our forces and those SMEs so that they are constantly developing them in service. That is how new technology works. That is a relatively inexpensive step to take; it just needs leadership, and I know the Minister wants to make it happen.

Another key point is testing. In June 2023—two months after I became Defence Procurement Minister— I held a roundtable in Larkhill with what were then the main UK defence drone SMEs. It was a really fascinating meeting. I went round the table and said to all of them, “Name the one thing the Government could do to help you,” and they all came up with the acronyms CAA and MAA—in other words, the Civil Aviation Authority and the Military Aviation Authority. They all wanted it to be easier to test drones, particularly kinetic drones, in the UK.

I was encouraged recently when I attended the Royal International Air Tattoo and was told by a relatively senior military officer that there will be testing on the Outer Hebrides range—in Benbecula, I think, which I visited when I was a Minister—for firing what are still dummy drones, but testing them as far as we can in the UK. I fully accept that there is a limit to how we can test, particularly if the drones have explosives, but we have to be able to test more than we currently do.

It is not just testing for the SMEs. My team met some reservists recently who talked about the red tape and what they have to fill in even to be able to use a reconnaissance drone for Army training. As is so often the case in the MOD, others will assure us, “It’s all fine, Minister.” On the MAA and the CAA—we set up a working group with the Department for Transport—I remember being told, “Minister, it’s all sorted. It’s all fine,” but then the SMEs told me something different. We have to grip this competition because we want to win it and it is vital to our prosperity.

Colleagues talked about training. The hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Helen Maguire) made a very good point about making drone use part of regular training. This is not so much my area of expertise. The Minister obviously has great expertise in this area, and I hope he will touch on how we are bringing forward training in the use of drones at a unit level.

My hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon, having served in the infantry, obviously speaks with massive experience. He made the point that we need an Army that can fight with these things. It is all well and good talking about procurement, which is the side I have seen, but how do we get them into the Army to rapidly boost its lethality and survivability? That is what we all want to see, and it is what the new head of the Army, the Chief of the General Staff, will deliver.

My hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon raised an important point about GCAP. When I worked on GCAP as a Minister, it was primarily on the diplomatic side. [Interruption.] The roof is creaking slightly. Hopefully that is merely the power of my oratory and rhetoric, and nothing to be concerned about.

On GCAP, I will refer to a couple of points I made last September when we were invited to make submissions to the SDR. At the time, I was merely the interim shadow Defence Secretary while my party awaited a new leader. I do not know if anyone read our submissions—I think AI read a lot of the submissions—but my two points are still worth considering.

First, instead of focusing on 10-year equipment plans, which would become the defence investment plan, we need much more focus on a three-year war readiness plan in each of the forces. That is something that the Chief of the General Staff has, in effect, been talking about. If that were done with the RAF, it would be much harder for it to meld all the elements of GCAP into one. The other point I made is that we really need a two-pillar GCAP—a bit like AUKUS.

The first pillar is the platform, which is where the focus inevitably always is in defence—that is the old, platform-focused procurement model. Instead, we should have a second pillar with all the ancillary stuff. That would include, as my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon said, the “system of systems,” particularly electronic warfare capability and drones. That needs to come into service much faster.

The key thing to all of this is the threat. If the threat really is only two or three years away, we have to be stronger in two or three years. The aspects of RAF development that are to do with loyal wingman are about helping our current aircraft. Forget about the stuff that will arrive in 2040, important though that is; it is about the capabilities that can help the current Typhoon fleet and the F-35s to be even more lethal and capable. We know that drones can fly with them. We need to accelerate all of that.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Biggin Hill made an important point about the Red sea, which has also been a key testing ground for drones. The key point is that the drones were not only threatening Ukraine; they were threatening our own Royal Navy. HMS Diamond was attacked. As a Minister at the time, I had a real sense that this was a clear and present danger because the drone attacks had to be thwarted with much more expensive missiles, which is the key issue.

However, we know that Iran was supplying more and more sophisticated ballistic missiles to the Houthis. That is on public record. How could we defend against all those things? I therefore felt we needed to accelerate all ranges of technology that could help to intercept drones relatively cheaply, so that we could keep our missile stocks for the really exquisite threats. We need a balance between expensive and cheap capabilities, which is why DragonFire is a good example of something we should take forward.

All Members have focused on the counter-drone point. I cannot think of a better symbol of the parallel universe—the way we have delivered for Ukraine but not for our own armed forces—than the fact that, if we visit the Army today, its electronic countermeasures will be the box that was used in Afghanistan. That was very good at the time, but it is not up to date. Nevertheless, a British company has been delivering, in real time, countermeasure kits to Ukraine that have been incredibly successful and are saving lives on a real frontline. We should be buying those for our Army at the same time. That is why I say it feels like a parallel universe, which is what we need to break. I know the Minister understands that and is as passionate about it as I am.

The hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (Jamie Stone) spoke about how to defend against the drone threat, and he particularly spoke about armour. My hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon spoke about tanks and the need to protect their tracks. I do not have that level of battlefield experience, but it is true to say that we must move quickly on lasers, directed energy weapons and, particularly, sound weapons that use radio frequencies—they are currently a bit indiscriminate, but they have a lot of potential if they are refined. We have to go at these things as fast as possible. Britain has an amazing science base.

That brings me to my final point, which is about autonomy. This is really about technology and the need to outthink one’s opponent, as much as anything. If we are honest, we will never have every aspect of every drone made in the UK. The areas where we really need to lead are the brain—the science. Britain has an amazing science base. I always found the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory’s advice fascinating. The DSTL has huge experience and works well with the military. We could go further on the way in which DSTL and the defence science base link in with SMEs. There has been a lot of progress on that, but we can go further. Going back to the drone I was talking about, the company was successful because its link to the data really gave it the edge. That is what we have to do: we have to enable SMEs to come into Main Building or other secure environments and to be constantly fed the battlefield data—what is really happening in warfare—so that they can respond quickly.

This is really about autonomy. The hon. Member for Poplar and Limehouse (Apsana Begum) spoke about the situation in Gaza. I know that there are people who are worried about the ethics of the autonomous use of weapons, and I understand that. I appeared before the AI in Weapons Systems Committee in the House of Lords, where the Bishop of Coventry asked me some interesting questions about the ethics of all this. I would simply say—okay, this is a defence point of view—that we should be very wary of in any way tying our hands on the use of autonomy, because you can bet your bottom dollar that the Chinese and the Russians will not be doing that. We have to maintain our ability to compete with them.

Phalanx is the gun on the side of some of our ships. When it is on, it is effectively autonomous. If something flies into its sight that fits certain parameters, it will fire. No one presses a button. The point, though, is that there is a chain of command and a way back that will have been built by someone from a country with a democracy and so on. So it is the whole life cycle that we have to take into account. We should really invest in autonomy. We should back our science base, working closely with our SMEs.

I finish by saying to the Minister that we are all patriots here. We want to succeed. We want to have the world’s best armed forces. We want to lead in this. We know we can. We have done amazing things. When we supply Storm Shadows and leading drones to Ukraine, we are going to know a bit about how to use them. We have never been directly involved, but we have done so much that we are well placed to learn from it. I hope the Minister can drive this forward. He knows he has our backing in doing so, but we need to see greater pace and urgency and, ultimately, not just big defence documents, but kit in the hands of those who serve our country.

10:32

[The Minister for Veterans and People (Al Carns)]

I am truly grateful to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell. I thank the hon. Member for Bromley and Biggin Hill (Peter Fortune) for securing the debate—I genuinely believe that we are at a pivotal time, so having it today is poignant. The opportunity to discuss the critical importance of uncrewed systems to our armed forces and our national security is a continual requirement in this place.

It will not be lost on hon. Members that I am not the Minister for Defence Procurement, but I have a vested interest in this subject. I have been helping a cross-ministerial team to design our strategy as we move forward. Why am I passionate about this issue? Mentioned in dispatches, combat; Military Cross, combat; Distinguished Service Order, combat; OBE, combat—I spent a lot of time in combat. What we are seeing now in Ukraine gives the soldier, the airman or the sailor the ability to disengage from combat and to send technology forward. We are seeing a revolution in technological affairs in Ukraine, and it is of the utmost importance.

The devastation and horror of war provide an imperative for rapid innovation. Each side pitted, racing to gain decisive advantage by innovating faster than the other. These developments define an era of conflict and innovation. Think the Parthian shot, the longbow, the crossbow, the musket, the tank, the aeroplane and, as the hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (Jamie Stone) mentioned, the Dreadnought. They have all marked a pivotal moment in technological change. Today, I would argue that it is uncrewed systems. The lesson for the UK is that we must be a leader in the revolution in uncrewed systems—which has not changed the nature of conflict, as Clausewitz would say, but changed its character forever—or be left behind.

In no small part, this understanding motivated me to enter politics, and it was one of the key reasons I left the military: to galvanise change and to do what I could to safeguard this great nation, because I saw war changing the entire character of conflict itself. Today’s discussion addresses an existential challenge, which this Government, the Defence team, and I are absolutely determined to grip.

Uncrewed systems have fundamentally changed the character of conflict—fact. In Ukraine, thousands of drones fill the skies every day and night. On average, thousands of drones a day—up to 2,000 or 3,000, and, at the very height, 6,000—are being flown on the frontline. A division has hundreds of drones that observe every section of the battlefield 24/7 and cue strike platforms at a moment’s notice. Drones are 22 times more lethal and accurate than an artillery round. For the first time since the first world war, more casualties have been caused by a system other than artillery or offensive support—that is, drones. Not training our people in drones would be like not training our people in artillery prior to the first world war.

A year ago, I was quoted as saying that uncrewed systems represent

“a machine gun moment for the Army, a submarine moment for the Navy and a jet engine moment for the Air Force.”

I also said that the inclusion of data, AI and quantum would only deepen the effects of this revolution. I would say now, one year later, that we are at an inflection point similar to the moment when armies fighting in world war one realised the utility of airpower. We know what happened then: the “Top Gun” generation was born, and airpower changed every nation’s way of fighting.

We are approaching the 85th anniversary of the battle of Britain, which is a poignant reminder of the significant impact of cutting-edge technology, such as the Spitfire, radar, importantly, or our very first computers, on the defence of our nation. Unlike those previous advances, the impact of uncrewed systems across air, land and sea is simultaneous, undermining many existing, exquisite and expensive capabilities.

As I reflect over 24 years of military service, I recognise just how much of what I did could now be done by uncrewed systems. I mean that, because about 75% of everything I have done could be done by uncrewed systems. That would have made my life a lot safer, although it would probably have reduced the medal count.

We have seen this revolution shape Putin’s war of aggression. On land, surveillance and attack drones stalk the battlefield around the clock. Thousands of drones, whether FPV—first-person-view—drones, surveillance drones or long-range strike drones, dominate the battlefield. There is a dead zone on the frontline, about 30 km deep, where no one moves: small teams or individuals are the only ones who survive, and they do not survive for long. Interestingly—the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty) mentioned tanks earlier—tanks’ sustainability on the battlefield is limited. Not K-kills but M-kills—mobility kills, taking off the tank’s tracks, immobilising its engine, or immobilising the crew, the sights and the sensors—happen relatively quickly. Perhaps we can allude to what that will look like in the future later in the debate.

In the Black sea, we have seen a navy without a navy sink a navy—that is, Ukraine’s unmanned vessels have sunk or scattered Russia’s once all-powerful Black sea fleet.

[James Cartlidge]

The Minister is making a fascinating speech, and he knows that I am as interested in this subject as anyone. On the naval point, it was an incredible moment in May when a Ukrainian naval drone downed a Russian Su-30, I think. Does that not point to some of our looming procurements—for example, future air dominance, the Type 83, and all those things in the Navy’s assumptions about how we defend this island in the future? We are an island, so the potential for us to be protected by uncrewed barges and sensors carrying effectors way out in our ocean is an exciting development.

[Al Carns]

I completely agree. I can see a future—we will talk about this later—involving a high-low mix, in which we have very sophisticated fifth generation capability matched by relatively low-end hardware with very sophisticated software. When we combine the two, we can increase our mass, our lethality and our overwatch of large swathes of land, sea and air. It is also worth noting—I will cover this later—that there are false lessons from Ukraine. The Black sea is not the Pacific or the north Atlantic. However, the technology, when designed with the right hull form, can absolutely survive in those environments.

Moving on to air, we see co-ordinated waves of drones penetrate the most sophisticated air defence systems in the world and strike far beyond the frontline. I mentioned yesterday, in relation to the remembrance of the battle of Britain, that we are hearing air sirens every day in Ukraine. We are not talking hundreds of drones; we now talking, in some cases, of thousands of drones attacking major cities and critical national infrastructure throughout Ukraine.

These capabilities are being enhanced, made increasingly sophisticated—with the capability to map and target-identify—and combined with the use of data and artificial intelligence to train training models, with profound implications for the way we fight warfare. Our adversaries understand that. Russia, other countries such as China, and large states are developing at a different scale. They are already producing drones on an industrial scale, and investing in innovation to make them more capable and deadly, and to remove the human even further from the battlefield. War is driving an innovation cycle that cannot be replicated in peacetime.

The hon. Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge) talked earlier about the innovation cycle here with SMEs. SMEs that often have joint ventures or relationships with companies at the front in Ukraine are innovating faster than anyone else. We are talking 20 or 30 to 100 innovations in a year, in comparison with some of our contracts in the past, which have had one, two, three or four innovations linked into the contractual management.

I would argue that we need to do more. Ukraine reminds us daily that to safeguard the nation we have an obligation to lead in the development of uncrewed systems. We may not have the opportunity to fight differently. Historically, almost every major conflict has been characterised by short periods of manoeuvre, and long periods of attrition to build up capability and capacity and to innovate, which are then broken by periods of manoeuvre, with a focus on supporting the warfighter with the best technology. I would posit that, if it came to it, our adversaries would seek to draw us into an attritional conflict, which puts the burden on the defence industry, our economy and our society’s ability to sustain the fight. At a tactical level, there is an argument that this will no longer be about supporting the warfighter, but about supporting the technology in the fight. That is a fundamental shift and change in opinion, and a critical and fundamental distinction in the way that future wars may be fought.

This Government have taken decisive action, as laid out in our strategic defence review, first to integrate uncrewed systems across the British Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, and to adapt our military culture to recognise that uncrewed systems are a core capability.

Several hon. Members mentioned the innovation cycle. In Ukraine early on in the war, a stalemate took place across the frontline, broken by periods of manoeuvre and usually initiated by dominance in GPS-guided munitions. The Russians quickly learned to counter a proportion of that, and as such the innovation of drones and uncrewed systems came into place on land, at sea and in the air. We have now accelerated along that line. We have gone from hundreds of different Ukrainian companies with different intellectual property swamping the battlefield with small start-ups, to the Ukrainians synthesising that capability procurement down to a set number of drones, and mass producing. They are using the innovation cycle on the frontline, with companies embedded in combat companies to drive that innovation cycle faster than ever before. They went broad to start with, and they have now gone narrow and are scaling. It is starting to work.

We must learn some of those lessons as automated platforms are bought by the Army, Navy and Air Force. Do they all talk to each other? Do they have the same software, or different hardware? Can they work together? Can they work on an integrated kill net? If they do not, we may repeat some of the same mistakes as Ukraine. A great quote is, “Slow is smooth, smooth is fast.” There is a bit that we must watch, and we must ensure that we get this right, because if we get it wrong, it may be difficult to unravel.

I mentioned adapting our military culture, and the hon. Member for South Suffolk mentioned commander training within our organisations, whether that be Dartmouth, Cranwell or Sandhurst. I have been on that, as an individual responsible for people, to ensure that these things are inculcated at the earliest stage of training, whether that be defence from drones or the adoption of drones as a critical component, much the same as a machine gun is for a rifle section. We are moving forward in that space.

Secondly, as hon. Members have said, there is a requirement to work seamlessly with industry, transforming our procurement and industrial base to meet the demands of modern warfare and drive growth for the nation. To do that, we must encourage the best of Ukrainian industry to share its expertise with us. We must continue to foster a truly innovative and adaptive defence industry that draws on the best of Britain. What I am leading to here is that British start-ups and British companies, both primes and SMEs, must engage with Ukrainian companies on joint ventures and cross-IP sharing to enhance the best of both. If they do that, I genuinely think they will be world beating, above and beyond what British industry already is.

The Government’s vision is to become a defence industrial superpower by 2035, and we are making that a reality. As a frontier industry, drone development is key to that economic transformation, which will attract major investment and create high-quality jobs. It is also vital to put the best systems into the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. Drone systems now will be out of date within six weeks on the frontline, but the training and the integration of the culture and the software may not be, so we must think carefully as we bring systems into the military and avoid 10-year contracts that buy the wrong drone in six years’ time that is way out of date in six weeks.

The Government are doing everything possible to capitalise on this opportunity. We have committed to more than doubling our spend on autonomous systems over this Parliament. I pushed really hard to get £4 billion of investment in mass-produced both unsophisticated and sophisticated weapons. The hon. Member for Huntingdon mentioned GCAP and loyal wingman; I would see loyal wingman as a sophisticated, high-end, fourth, fifth or sixth-generation capability. I see mass uncrewed systems for the Army—and in some cases the Navy—slightly differently.

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

If we are talking about those low-end, attritable systems being introduced at Army or Marine level as section-level capability, like a light machine gun, at what point will we look at redesigning our entire military capability in terms of logistical supply of batteries and parts for those? We all know that soldiers already carry too much kit, and carrying more batteries for drones will be key in that. How can we effectively redesign the section attack to incorporate drones? As I said in my speech, this is a fundamental shift in how the Army fights battles. I appreciate that the Minister is doing everything he can to introduce drones into the ecosystem, but it seems to me that we are making huge changes here. This is almost the same as introducing the machine gun and then wondering why we do not know how to fight it properly when we get to the battlefield. I would be interested to hear what we are doing to further that.

[Al Carns]

It is a combination of the two. Yes, it is a machine gun moment for the Army, but it is also an Air Force moment for the whole military, so we need careful consideration of how we will integrate this. The Ukrainians, for example, have combat companies who will fly 150 FPV drone strikes a day. They will do that with separate teams flying in support of infantry, much as we would have had close air support in the past. A drone team may fly 50 drone missions a day with 80% lethality and accuracy.

I will leave it to the generals, the admirals and the air vice-marshals to work out how they integrate the system. However, it must be integrated at the section and infantry level all the way to the division level in the Army; from the single ship all the way to the fleet level in the Navy; and from the single aircraft, if not major drone, all the way to fighting formations in the Air Force. That is the level of integration that will be required—it is pretty seismic.

We talked earlier about the high-low end mix. We will help to deliver Europe’s first hybrid carrier air wing. The hon. Member for Huntingdon mentioned, and I agree, that GCAP and the loyal wingman programme are sophisticated capabilities, but there is nothing to say that it is not—no pun intended—a Russian doll method where something releases something smaller that becomes more attritable and more mass-produced. That is probably where we are going with many of these systems.

We are also enhancing our uncrewed naval platforms. The patrol of the north Atlantic, protecting our continuous at-sea deterrent can adopt some of that technology. We will also, as the hon. Member mentioned, move towards a 20:40:40 capability mix for the British Army, which I think is essential, as is being proven in Ukraine at the moment. As he mentioned, that is 20% crewed, 40% reusable and 40% disposable uncrewed systems. I would like to see a lot of those drones used as ammunition so that, much as we would have down the range with a magazine and 30 rounds of ammunition, we should be able to go down the range with 10 drones, fly them down, use them, get proficient in that and ensure that we are as accurate and lethal with a drone as we are with a rifle, if not more so.

It is a move to help deliver our goal of increasing the Army’s lethality tenfold. I argue that we need to move on that as fast as is feasible. The critical component is our partnership with industry, and not just the big primes but SMEs are key to delivering those ambitions. That is why we have established UK Defence Innovation to connect with investors and get those SMEs, innovators and start-ups able to break into the defence market, which we know has been a problem in the past. That will ensure that we can rapidly identify and back innovative products that will give us a military, and indeed an economic, edge.

To integrate these new technologies across three military services—I think this is the critical component—we are creating an uncrewed centre of excellence, alongside a range and testing facility. It will be surrounded by SMEs and industry, with the people who know what they are talking about, because there is a lot of snake oil out there. We must put them in one place and then, as I mentioned, slow is smooth, smooth is fast. We must allow them to help the Army, Navy and Air Force to contract different hardware that has simultaneous and integrated software. That is how we will create capabilities that will be able to talk to each other in the future.

[James Cartlidge]

I called my reform the integrated procurement model, because I think the Minister is right: integration is so important, and it has been a deficiency of our bottom-down approach. However, does that not mean that we will need some kind of C2 system for our military? When I was in post, there was a lot of talk about ACCS, which was the system developed for NATO, but frankly was not fit for purpose. That would be a very significant investment. Is it something that the MOD is currently looking at?

[Al Carns]

In the SDR, there was a £1 billion investment in an integrated targeting web, and that is what ties all these systems together. The only way it will tie together is if the software is interchangeable. Indeed, if we were then to lay on AI in quantum, we would be taking it to the next step of starting to remove people further back down the chain. I believe we will always have to be in the chain, but we will move back. Our adversaries may not. That will be a pivotal change in the way of warfare again.

The uncrewed centre of excellence is one to watch within the SDR. It will be in place by February. It will provide centralised expertise, funding and standards. The Military Aviation Authority and the Civilian Aviation Authority were mentioned. The centre will help them to develop and get through some of the bureaucracies while remaining in line with the rules and regulations. It will help to develop skills across defence. For example, drone qualifications across the Navy, Army and Air Force at the moment are all starting to move in different directions. We have to synthesise them, and make sure that they are correct and that everyone is doing the same, so that we can swap and interchange people. That will help to deliver a regulatory framework in which our companies can succeed.

In June, we announced a landmark partnership with Ukraine to share technology, harness the innovation expertise from the frontline and increase our industrial co-operation, which is critical because innovation is moving at such a pace on the frontline. Our plans are a shot in the arm. We need to continue to push as hard as is feasible for what is already one of the leading uncrewed systems sectors in the world.

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

Recently, we saw the ACUA Ocean Pioneer granted a licence by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency. Do we think that by pushing out more civilian licences to enable more companies to develop those autonomous platforms, including for things that have maritime applications, drones will be enhanced more quickly? I appreciate that a drone can be set up and flown relatively easily, but getting something that floats in the water, particularly something sizeable that has a civilian application, is quite difficult. Do we think that advancing the number of licences given to companies working on autonomous maritime capability would be an advantage?

[Al Carns]

The reality is that the governance and compliance of some of these systems has not kept pace with the innovation in the technological-industrial world. The drone centre of excellence will cut through that. Some countries are using dual-use technology, from drone delivery of shopping through to resupplying in disaster zones, and mapping and tracking forestry for carbon capture. We are on the very cusp of a change. It is interesting to look at the key capabilities of what each drone requires to sustain itself to innovate, and where those capabilities come from. That may give us a lead on where we should be focusing from an economic perspective as well.

The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) made a really interesting point. He mentioned “Star Wars”. It feels a bit like that. When I watched the first destruction and sinking of a Russian frigate, I said it was a cross between “Star Wars” and “The Dam Busters”, because that is the leap it was making in war. Three ships were sunk in three weeks by relatively simple uncrewed systems, taking out the most significant naval platforms in the world. A lot of people would say that, as these ships get removed off the line of march, one of the biggest mistakes would be to replace them with the same capability.

Drone warfare is today’s reality. Capabilities are evolving faster than any of us can possibly imagine in Ukraine. That is why the Government’s response has been both immediate and decisive, but we have to go faster, and we have to go harder. Through clear leadership, unprecedented investment, closer work with industry and, importantly, our Ukrainian partners who are at the cutting edge, we will ensure that Britain remains at the forefront of this revolution. I genuinely believe that we will get there, and that it will make us stronger abroad and secure at home.

10:54

[Peter Fortune]

I thank the Minister for responding to the debate. I have huge personal respect and regard for him, and I feel confident that he not only heard what we said today but was already on top of it and recognised it. I trust him to have the grip, the focus and the pace to move forward with this, and he will have our support when he does so.

The shadow Secretary of State, my hon. Friend the Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge), gave an excellent speech that literally nearly brought the roof down, with a range of well-informed views that showed his huge experience. His story about going to an SME and hearing about how these small businesses can prepare drones quickly and get them out on the frontline was very striking.

I turn to the contribution from the hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (Jamie Stone). As someone who trained as a loader for the Challenger 2, I think it is always good to spend half an hour talking about how we blow them up. That was rather disturbing, but he was right to talk about the Dreadnought moment and the fact that we are at a point of change. That was developed by my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty), who continued to talk about how he would blow me up. Using the knowledge from his previous career, with passion and compassion he talked about how we must rethink modern conflict.

The hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Helen Maguire) talked about the reality of warfare and how drones can be used to keep our soldiers safe, especially with developing AI technologies. She also touched on the ethical and moral issues, which we did not discuss for too long today and are possibly something for further debate. The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) talked about the pace of change he has seen, with the marvels of science fiction becoming a reality of modern warfare today. To build on the “Star Wars” theme that he developed, I think we all recognise that, with his wisdom, kindness and sagacity, he remains the Obi-Wan Kenobi of Westminster, and we thank him for his contribution.

Mostly, what has struck me has been the positive tone of the debate. It goes to show that we in this place are all patriots. As patriots, we recognise that the battlefield is changing, and we have a duty to our brave service personnel to ensure that they are prepared and equipped to fight on our behalf.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered the use of drones in defence.

10:57

Sitting suspended.