Financial Services and Markets Bill (Third sitting)
Tuesday 25th October 2022
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 View all Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 25 October 2022 - (25 Oct 2022)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
I have a few preliminary comments to make. Will Members who speak send their notes by email to Hansard in the usual way—it really helps? Will you ensure that you have turned off all your electronic devices, so that you do not disturb anyone? As ever, tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings—just a reminder. Everyone in Committee is experienced, but there have been a lot of changes over the past couple of years, so I will remind you about proceedings and how we run Bill Committees.
Today, we begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection and groupings list for the sitting is on the table—it is worth getting a copy—and it shows how the clauses are selected and the amendments grouped together for debate. Amendments grouped together are generally on the same or similar issues. I know you are aware of this, but decisions on amendments do not take place in the order in which they are debated; they are taken in the order in which they appear on the amendment paper. The selection and groupings list shows the order of debates. Decisions on each amendment and on whether each clause should stand part of the Bill are taken when we come to the relevant clause.
The Member who has put their name to the lead amendment in a group is called to speak first—so, I will call Peter first, because his amendment is the first listed today—and other Members are then free to catch my eye in the usual way. I urge you to make that obvious, as sometimes it is a little difficult to tell. A Member may speak more than once in a single debate. At the end of a debate on a group of amendments, I shall call the Member who moved the lead amendment again. Before they sit down, will they please indicate whether they wish to withdraw the amendment or take it to a vote? Will any Member who wishes to press any other amendment in a group to a vote please let me know in advance, because it helps the organisation of our proceedings?
Clause 1
Revocation of retained EU law relating to financial services and markets
Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)
I beg to move amendment 44, in clause 1, page 1, leave out line 6 and insert—
“(1) The Treasury may, by regulations, revoke the legislation referred to in Schedule 1.
(1A) The Treasury may not make the regulations referred to in subsection (1) if the Chancellor of the Exchequer considers that the revocation of legislation provided for in the regulations would have the effect of prejudicing the interests of consumers, unless alternative and adequate legislative provision has been enacted which mitigates these prejudicial effects.”
This amendment would mean that the Treasury cannot revoke retained EU law relating to financial services if such revocation would be prejudicial to the interests of consumers, unless other provision has been made to mitigate these prejudicial effects.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
That schedule 1 be the First schedule to the Bill.
Peter Grant
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair this morning, Dame Maria.
As Members know, the SNP group came close to voting against the Bill on Second Reading. In fact, we tabled a reasoned amendment, primarily because of our concern about how the clause intends to take matters forward, but it was not selected by Mr Speaker. A sad fact for many of us is that the United Kingdom is no longer part of the European Union and that, therefore, all European Union legislation needs to be reconsidered. My problem is that it has already been decided in the Bill that, on financial services, all European Union legislation needs to be thrown out.
We hope that someone in the Treasury will at the same time, or very quickly afterwards, replace that legislation with something at least as good, if not better. I mean no disrespect to anyone here, to any Member of Parliament, the Minister or anyone working in the Treasury, however, when I say that I can have no confidence that that process, on that scale and at that speed, will work—we need only look at the number of amendments that the Government have had to table to the Bill because of mistakes in it, as published. In Delegated Legislation Committees on which I have sat, there have been instances where we have had to correct the correction to the correction of an initial piece of secondary legislation arising from Brexit.
It is simply not realistic to believe that all the revocations and repeals proposed under the clause can be replaced with equally good regulation without mistakes being made. When mistakes are made in the regulation of financial services, people get scammed, companies that should survive go under and the United Kingdom’s reputation as a dodgy place to do financial services becomes even worse. For all that I am not a big fan of the United Kingdom, I do not want to see that happen. I am not a big fan of the United Kingdom Parliament either, but I do not want to see its right to scrutinise in detail any suggested changes to legislation undermined, simply because it suits the Government of the day.
While it may be that the right thing to do with all 200-plus pieces of legislation listed in schedule 1 is to revoke and repeal every single word, Parliament should be given a choice, at reasonable speed, to decide whether that is correct. Ideally, at the same time as Parliament is asked to revoke the legislation, we should be given the chance to consider what will be put in its place.
My view on clause 1 altered slightly when we heard from the witnesses last week, especially those from the financial institutions. Some of them said that they genuinely felt that some of the existing EU legislation needs to go or to be changed significantly. I did not hear anybody asking for a wholesale revision of all 200-plus pieces of legislation. The motivation appears to be to take the European Union sticker off the number plate and put a Union Jack on it instead. If that is the only difference that is being made, what the Government suggest here is far too risky and undermines the right of Members of Parliament, including those who are not on the Committee, and their responsibility to scrutinise legislation that is crucial not only to the wellbeing of the economy on a big scale, but to the wellbeing of the economies of hundreds of thousands of our constituents. For many of them, this legislation has come too late, because they have been ruined by financial services scams that could perhaps have been prevented if this legislation had been introduced sooner.
It is my intention to press the amendment to a Division, Madam Deputy Speaker—I mean, Dame Maria. I do not know whether I should apologise for promoting you. Accepting the amendment would not significantly delay any legislative changes that the Government intend to introduce, but it would ensure that they are scrutinised properly to increase the chance that when mistakes are made in the replacement legislation, as they will be, they are picked up and dealt with before it is too late.
Dame Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)
Good morning, Dame Maria. It is a great honour to be on a Bill that you are chairing—I think it is our first time together in this iteration.
The Opposition do not have a problem with the principle of repealing some of the EU legislation, but I rise to invite the Minister to give us more detail on precisely how he envisages the wide-ranging power in clause 1 will be exercised in practice. I speak as a former member of the European Statutory Instruments Committee, which did a great deal of work in sifting all of the EU legislation to onshore it ahead of Brexit, including all the legislation covered by the Bill. We sat regularly and looked at thousands upon thousands of pieces of EU legislation, which we brought onshore ahead of Brexit. A great deal of work was done to achieve that, but a great many mistakes were made during the process in the drafting, the interpretation and the way in which powers were onshored in areas where we have not legislated directly for 47 years. This is a great accumulation of technical, but also extremely important, legislation that impacts on our constituents’ experience of everyday life as consumers and on how they use financial services and insurance, banking and savings products. If we get it wrong, there can be a great deal of detriment to our constituents.
Will the Minister give the Committee an idea of how the wide-ranging power to amend a large amount of legislation that has been on the statute book for many years will be done in a way that reassures all our constituents that we have the right balance between consumer protection and consumer rights on the one hand and our financial services industry and the way that it operates on the other? How will Parliament get to look at this? It is possible to argue that clause 1 would allow Parliament to be run over roughshod, without providing proper scrutiny, so will the Minister indicate how it will work in practice? How does he propose the powers will be exercised? What can Parliament do if we perceive that an issue that has been overlooked in all the technocracy impacts on our constituents? We need to ensure we have proper accountability.
I would be less worried if, as the hon. Member for Glenrothes said, we are just taking off an EU flag and sticking on a Union Jack, but I assume the Minister is taking these powers because he wants to use them. Will he set out in his comments on clause 1 precisely how he expects that to happen?
Shaun Bailey (West Bromwich West) (Con)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dame Maria. We often cross paths in these Committees and it is great to see you once again in the Chair.
I will speak briefly about amendment 44, following the comments of the hon. Members for Wallasey and for Glenrothes. The Government need to be nimble in how they lay regulations, particularly in this transitional period. Clause 1 provides the ability to be agile, particularly as we redevelop our financial services framework following our departure from the European Union. The Government clearly need the ability to do that. We are dealing with a vast array of regulation, primary legislation and laws that will require a significant amount of time to be developed, but at speed. Clause 1 enables the Minister to do that, and I trust my hon. Friend the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs to develop the legislative framework in the right way.
Peter Grant
If there is such an urgent need for speed, why has it taken so long for the Bill to be brought before the House?
Shaun Bailey
Perhaps I should have finished my comments, which would have led to the point that the hon. Gentleman has made. There is a need for speed and also a need to make things right. I think that is the point that he and the hon. Member for Wallasey were making, particularly as it is so vital that we get it right. I agree with the hon. Lady that there is a place for scrutiny. Drafting errors are a concern, and we have to make sure that as we build the framework, it is done in the right way. I pay tribute to the work that she did on the EU sifting Committee, because it is a thankless task to go through.
Dame Angela Eagle
It was not the most fascinating thing I have ever done in the House, but it was one of those things that one has to do, or the statute book ends up in a right mess.
Shaun Bailey
I thank the hon. Lady again for the work that she has done.
I will round up my comments by saying that I think it is right that in clause 1 the Minister has the ability to do what he needs to do, but I do ask him to consider what Members have said about the safeguards to ensure that there is the right framework, particularly around drafting amendments and suchlike, so that we get this right. The Bill is needed and the Government are absolutely right to do what they are doing. As with any piece of legislation, it is about ensuring that we iron out the creases. I hope the Minister will give us those assurances today.
Tulip Siddiq (Hampstead and Kilburn) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Dame Maria, especially after our time together on the Women and Equalities Committee.
The Opposition recognise that enabling the City to the thrive will be fundamental to support the country and to help people through the cost of living crisis. We need a regulatory framework that allows our country to take advantage of opportunities outside the EU, whether by unlocking capital in the insurance sector for investment in green infrastructure or supporting the vibrant UK fintech sector to thrive.
The Minister knows that the Opposition are broadly supportive of the Bill. We welcome clause 1, which will empower the UK to tailor regulation to meet our needs outside the EU, but my questions are similar to those posed by my hon. Friend the Member for Wallasey. What reassurance can the Minister provide that clause 1 will not result in the Government diverging for divergence’s sake and, in the process, unnecessarily revoking rules that might boost the competitiveness of the City or protect consumers from harm? As my hon. Friend said, we want a bit more detail on clause 1.
I also have a few technical questions. Will the Minister confirm whether his Government still plan to revoke all retained EU law by the end of 2023? What assessment has he made of the impact of that date on UK financial services? The date seems a bit arbitrary and we want to know how much thought went into coming up with it. Does the Minister think there is a risk of creating uncertainty and extra costs for the sector by forcing financial services businesses to unnecessarily adapt their business models by the end of next year? A bit of information would help us gain clarity on the clause.
The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Andrew Griffith)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Maria. The Bill is central to delivering the Government’s vision for the future of the financial services sector. The hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn talked about some of the great opportunities that it unlocks. It seizes the opportunities of EU exit, although it is not exclusively about that. It tailors financial services regulation to UK markets to bolster the competitiveness of the UK as a global financial centre and to deliver better outcomes for consumers.
Clause 1 revokes retained EU law on financial services. That clears the way to regulate financial services in a way that works for the UK, building on the model established by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. In response to hon. Members who asked how it will operate in practice, the settled position for some time has been that the FSMA model delegates the setting of regulatory standards to operationally independent financial services regulators, within the framework that Parliament sets. That is an internationally respected approach that historically has had support from all sides of the House, and I hope that continues.
As a result of our membership of the EU, the UK has been left with a patchwork—the hon. Member for Wallasey talked about her assessing role as that corpus of law was brought into the UK.
Dame Angela Eagle
I wonder about the sequencing. There is a list in schedule 1 of all the legislation that applies to financial services, lock, stock and barrel. The sifting Committee had oversight of that when we onshored it. Once the schedule is law, it does not all disappear at once, does it? Surely, we keep it there and have a look at things that might cause difficulty and at where we may wish to diverge.
Andrew Griffith
I am coming to the point where I will address the hon. Lady’s comments, but that is the substance of the position. The Bill enables the powers to do that, but we do not seek divergence for divergence’s sake. The whole purpose of the Bill and of giving the Treasury and regulators the necessary powers is to allow a thoughtful process that provides continued certainty to the sector—so no arbitrary retirement—and that allows time for those regulatory rules to be put on the UK rulebook in a way that is appropriate for the UK. That is the substance of what we are trying to do in the clause.
As to the question asked by the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn, there is no arbitrary backstop date. The technical repeal is in the Bill, but the rules will sit on the rulebook, providing valuable certainty and continuity to the sector until such time as the operationally independent regulators decide that it is appropriate to revisit the rules and tailor them to UK circumstances. That is what the clause is intended to do.
Liz Twist (Blaydon) (Lab)
As a member of the European Statutory Instruments Committee, I wonder whether the Minister can offer any assurance that there will be parliamentary scrutiny of the clause in the future. Can he offer any suggestions as to how we might be able to ensure that that takes place?
Andrew Griffith
The hon. Lady is right to talk about the important role of Parliament. We are giving regulators a great deal more power because we are importing a large body of European laws into the UK rulebook, which is one of the reasons why the Government have contemplated the public interest intervention power in the past. The large number of rules—the hon. Member for Wallasey talked about how large that body is, and painted a graphic picture of all that sifting work—does not lend itself to Parliament being the rule setter in each case. Again, that is at odds with the approach to rule setting in the UK historically, but Parliament will continue to have a voice where it feels the need to.
Dame Angela Eagle
I apologise for intervening, but Standing Committee is the time when we can ask detailed questions, so I hope the Minister does not mind my coming back in. [Interruption.] I think there was a Siri outburst there.
Dame Angela Eagle
As a member of the Treasury Committee, I can say that we are trying to get a handle on the scrutiny that will be applied as regulators come to look at these things. One assumes that they will announce that they are reviewing a particular area, and they may come up with some divergences. Regulators have their way of doing things, Government Ministers want particular things, and sometimes Parliament has a different view, particularly if something affects our constituents in unanticipated ways. Given the structure that the Bill sets out, I am trying to get a handle on how Parliament’s view on an issue would be put forward.
Andrew Griffith
I will try one more time, Dame Maria, but I want to emphasise that the approach that the Government envisage being taken is exactly the approach embedded in FSMA 2000. We should not be debating these points ab initio simply by virtue of the work that the Bill does in importing the EU rulebook into UK law. The Treasury Committee, of which the hon. Lady is a member, does valuable oversight work and spends a disproportionate amount of time interviewing the regulators. All the regulatory rules are required by statute to have a period of consultation.
We are straying off the clause, but the role of the Treasury Committee and its Sub-Committee is codified in the Bill to enhance the level of scrutiny. There is a Government proposal—it would be interesting to hear the views of the official Opposition on this—for a public interest intervention power, which would cover precisely the sorts of issues that the hon. Lady’s constituents may be concerned about relating to regulations. I say again that there is no substantive change to the way Parliament scrutinises the independence of financial services regulation, and I hope that is something on which we can all agree on both sides of the House.
In the interest of time, I turn to amendment 44, which would, as the hon. Member for Glenrothes said, mean that retained EU law relating to financial services could not be repealed, other than where it is prejudicial to the interests of consumers, unless replacement legislation is already in place. It is not the Government’s desire to sweep away retained EU law in financial services without ensuring that it is adequately replaced in UK law. I can assure the Committee that there is no arbitrary sunset—
Tulip Siddiq
I watched every minute of the Minister’s appearance before the Treasury Committee. He specifically said that the Government would revoke the retained law by the end of next year, in line with the previous Prime Minister’s policy. Is there now a change in that policy?
Andrew Griffith
That is not the position in the Bill, which does not contain that date. Whether or not the Government’s intention at the time was different, nothing in the Bill says that that will happen. The Government will not diverge for divergence’s sake, because we understand the need for continuity to give financial services companies the confidence that they seek.
Martin Docherty-Hughes (West Dunbartonshire) (SNP)
It is good to see you in the Chair, Dame Maria. Does that also apply to financial organisations based in Northern Ireland, Minister?
Emma Hardy (Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle) (Lab)
Will the Minister give way?
Andrew Griffith
One more time. I am being generous in giving way because we are at the early stages of the Bill, Chair.
Emma Hardy
The Minister is being generous, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Wallasey pointed out, we use Committee stage to scrutinise, question and ask for lots of detail that we would not ask for on the Floor of the House.
The Library briefing states that there is to be
“a ‘transitional period’ of undefined length…for each provision that is to be revoked.”
How will the decision be made on which provisions are to be revoked and when? What is the justification for revoking some at a different time from others?
Andrew Griffith
The Committee will indulge me if this sounds repetitive, but the thrust of the questions is the same: there is no change in the fundamental approach to UK financial services regulation, which is that the pen is held by the operationally independent regulators—primarily under the scrutiny of the Treasury Committee, to which they regularly give evidence—and they use the established statutory consultation procedure. That is the position, and will be the position going forward.
If the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle would like to table an amendment that would dispense with operationally independent regulators in the UK, so that Parliament holds the pen on rule making, the Government will consider it. That is not the Government’s view of what should happen, however, and I do not believe that it is the view of the official Opposition. I understand the important role of parliamentary scrutiny, but an embedded feature, and one that I hear hon. Members pushing back on or challenging, is that regulators—in consultation with industry, following the statutory consultation process—are that ones that make the rules.
I will make some progress. To address a point made by a number of hon. Members, the Treasury will, as it does now, work closely with the Financial Conduct Authority and other regulators to ensure that the transition from retained EU law to UK regulations is orderly and meets the need of UK consumers, and that there is no gap in protections or relevant rules. As I have said, that work will be subject to the statutory consultation process in the normal way.
Amendment 44, tabled by the hon. Member for Glenrothes, is about consumer protection. I can assure the Committee that clause 3(2)(f)—we are getting ahead of ourselves—specifically enables the Treasury to modify retained EU law to protect consumers and insurance policyholders. Clause 4 enables the Government to restate retained EU law in domestic legislation for the same purpose. Consumers of financial services are already assured of appropriate protections under the UK framework for financial services regulation. Parliament has given the FCA a consumer protection objective—one of its core objectives—to ensure an appropriate degree of protection for consumers, which the FCA is required to advance when discharging its general functions. As evidence of that, the FCA has, among other things, recently introduced a new consumer duty. I hope that assures the Committee that there are already adequate consumer protections, both in the Bill and in the wider body of regulation. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Glenrothes to withdraw his amendment.
I will now explain the approach that clause 1 and schedule 1 take to repealing retained EU law. Retained EU law is revoked by clause 1. Schedule 1 lists the retained EU law revoked by clause 1. Part 1 of the schedule captures retained direct principal EU legislation, which means EU regulations such as the prospectus regulation. Part 2 captures secondary legislation that was made to implement EU directives or other obligations. That includes statutory instruments made under the European Communities Act 1972, which implemented significant pieces of EU law, such as Solvency II and the markets in financial instruments directive, known as MiFID.
Part 3 captures EU tertiary legislation, including delegated regulations, implementing Acts and EU decisions. Part 4 repeals part of primary legislation that relates to retained EU law, in particular part 9D of FSMA 2000, which relates to rules defined in relation to the EU capital requirements regulation, and chapter 2A of part 9A of FSMA, which governs technical standards. Those parts of FSMA will not be necessary following the repeal of the retained EU law to which they relate. Part 5 acts as a sweeper provision: it revokes all EU derived legislation relating to financial services that is not directly listed in the schedule. That does not capture any domestic primary legislation; it simply captures the kinds of EU law covered by parts 1 to 3 but not specifically listed. I therefore recommend that clause 1 and schedule 1 stand part of the Bill.
Peter Grant
I thank all the hon. Members who contributed to the debate. I notice that the Minister did not explain why amendment 44 is a bad idea. He has not given any reason why it would make things worse. He has argued that it would not make things better, would make them only slightly better or would make them better in a way that is not needed.
I take the Minister’s point that later parts of the Bill give the Treasury the power to act in the interest of consumer protection. I want to go further than allowing the Treasury to protect my constituents; I want Parliament to force the Treasury to protect my constituents. We do that by not allowing the Treasury to revoke consumer protection legislation until we, the House of Commons, are on behalf of our constituents satisfied that there is a suitable replacement for it.
I draw the Committee’s attention to part 5 of schedule 1, on page 96 of the Bill. It essentially states, “We have listed 200 bits of legislation that we are going to revoke. There are probably lots of other ones that we have not found yet, so we are going to put in a catch-all clause, so that they will all be revoked as well.” That does not strike me as a good way for the House of Commons to revoke legislation. The Minister has repeatedly said that the Government do not expect all the legislation to be revoked overnight. In fact, the explanatory notes to the Bill point out that the Government think that changing all that EU law will take several years. What happened to, “We got Brexit done”? We have hardly even started on the financial services part of Brexit.
As I said in my opening remarks, although I was against the suggestion that that law needs to be changed, I accept that the United Kingdom has to start to change parts of EU law. The wholesale nature of the change intended in clause 1 is not necessary and is extremely dangerous to the interests of our constituents. Amendment 44 would not necessarily remove all of that danger, and I am still concerned about what we would be left with. I have nothing but respect for the Minister as an individual, but let us face it: if recent history is anything to go by, he will not be there when decisions on revoking legislation are actually taken. Who knows? Maybe he has his phone on just now, and is waiting for that call.
Let us be honest: over the summer, this has not been a Government who have honoured their promises. They have not honoured the assurances made to their own party members so that one Member could become Prime Minister—the Prime Minister who recently resigned. Promises made at the Dispatch Box have been unmade almost before the Minister making them sat down. This Government have severely damaged the tradition that assurances given by a Minister, either here in Committee or in the Chamber, will always be honoured. That does not happen any more. I am afraid the House is entitled to ask for a bit more than might have been accepted a few years ago, when the traditions of this House were actually respected by each and every member of the Government.
Dame Angela Eagle
Clearly, Pepper v. Hart applies when a reassurance is given by a Minister. That is partly why we ask questions in these proceedings. We wish to have on record reassurances about the meaning of the statute in front of us, how the Government interpret it, and what the Government’s intent was. If there is any subsequent doubt about that, the record can be looked at under the provisions of Pepper v. Hart.
Peter Grant
I am grateful for that intervention. I do not disagree with a word of it. My point is simply that whatever the conventions, traditions and proceedings of this House might tell us, in practice the doctrine of ministerial responsibility does not apply in the way that I just about remember learning about 50 years ago as a schoolchild, in what was then called modern studies. There are numerous examples of Ministers behaving in a way that would require them to go, if they believed in the conventions of the House. I am not suggesting for a second—
The Chair
Order. I remind the hon. Member that we really need to stick to the text of the Bill, rather than giving a lesson on constitutional law. That would be really helpful.
Peter Grant
Thank you, Dame Maria. I hear the Minister’s assurances, but this issue is too important for us to rely on the conventions of the House, which have been broken far too often. The protection of our consumers and the financial services industry is important enough that any changes to regulations that had to be at least initially consented to by this Parliament should be made only with the consent of this Parliament, to which power was supposed to be returned by Brexit.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 4 stand part.
Government amendment 2.
Clause 5 stand part.
Andrew Griffith
Clauses 3, 4 and 5 create the necessary powers to replace retained EU law, which we have just been talking about, when it is repealed through clause 1. While the Government will act quickly to repeal and reform those areas that offer the greatest potential benefits, some of the retained EU law listed in schedule 1 —this may give comfort to hon. Members—will remain in force for a period following Royal Assent.
Clause 3 creates a power for the Treasury to modify the retained EU law in schedule 1 during the transitional period—that is, the period from the Bill’s receipt of Royal Assent to the point at which the revocation of the instrument is commenced, whenever that is. That allows the Government to make proportionate and targeted—Members might like to note those words—modifications to retained EU law before it is repealed. That ensures that financial services regulation continues to function appropriately for UK markets, and that UK firms are not required to comply with outdated regulations while we put in place the new UK-designed rules.
Clause 4 allows the Treasury to modify and restate the retained EU law listed in schedule 1 of the Bill. The clause gives the Government the necessary tools to move, over time, to a comprehensive FSMA model of regulation. Under that model, the UK’s expert and operationally independent regulators will generally make the detailed rules for firms to follow, within a wider framework set by Parliament and Government. Under the FSMA model, the Treasury sets the regulatory perimeter through secondary legislation by specifying which activities should be regulated. Some elements of retained EU law perform a similar function and should therefore be maintained in domestic legislation. That includes provisions that set the perimeter of financial services regulation in which the regulators will operate, enforcement powers for the regulators, and the ability of the Treasury to make and give effect to equivalence decisions in respect of overseas jurisdictions.
The clause also allows the Treasury to modify the retained EU law that it restates. That is essential for the UK to seize the opportunities of Brexit, tailoring financial services regulation to UK markets to bolster the competitiveness of the UK as a global financial centre and to deliver better outcomes for consumers and businesses. The exercise of that power will almost always be subject to the affirmative procedure. The only exception is where the power is used to make transitional modifications to either EU tertiary legislation or legislation that was originally made under the negative procedure. In this case, it is appropriate to follow previous precedent and apply the same negative procedure.
Clause 5 empowers the Treasury to replace references to EU directives in domestic legislation through a statutory instrument. EU directives are EU legislative acts that do not directly have effect in the UK; however, there are various references to EU directives in domestic legislation, and those should be removed as we move to a comprehensive FSMA model of regulation. That is why the clause gives the Treasury the power to modify UK domestic legislation to replace references to EU directives. Sometimes, however, no replacement will be necessary, and amendment 2 simply clarifies that the power can be used to remove such references without replacement.
The Government will be able to exercise the powers given to them in clauses 3, 4 5 and in amendment 2 only in line with the purposes listed in clause 3(2). Those purposes have been drafted to be similar to the objectives of the FCA, the Prudential Regulation Authority, the financial stability objective of the Bank of England, and the special resolution objectives. That will ensure that, while retained EU law remains in place and constrains the action that regulators can take to further their objectives, the Government can act as appropriate.
I acknowledge that these are relatively broad powers, but they are appropriately constrained by reference to existing objectives, with appropriate parliamentary scrutiny and in relation to retained EU law. It is proportionate to the task ahead of us, which is to seize the opportunity of the EU exit to build a comprehensive model of financial services regulation tailored specifically to UK markets. I commend clauses 3, 4 and 5 to the Committee.
Emma Hardy
If I am correct, there was significant questioning of clause 3 and the powers during transition in the oral evidence sessions, particularly with Martin Taylor, who was the last person to give evidence. As the Minister may recall, he spoke about how this extra power that the Treasury will have could undermine the trust of the markets in the independence of the regulators. I was just looking to see if there was a copy of the Hansard of those oral evidence sessions, but I cannot seem to see one—[Interruption.] I have one now.
Martin Taylor’s significant concerns were, as we have recently, that when the markets believe there is not independence of the regulators, they react accordingly. Has the Minister reflected on that evidence, and what reassurance can he give the markets and others that the Treasury will not exert undue influence over the regulators?
One of the points that stuck in my mind, though I cannot remember who made it, was about the Treasury having the power to intervene when something is in the public interest. One of the witnesses said that that implies that sometimes the regulators will act not in the public interest, given that the Treasury have to intervene in the public interest and exert power and control over them. I wonder if the Minister has reflected further on some of those concerns that were raised during the oral evidence session.
Peter Grant
It is interesting that we have three clauses here, each of which give the Treasury the power to amend legislation in very, very closely defined and restricted ways, and every one of them needs regulations to be approved by Parliament. Most of them require approval by the affirmative procedure. However, two minutes ago we were told we could wipe out 200 different items of legislation in their entirety without Parliament needing to have any oversight of the process. It does seem a strange contradiction.
The way the clauses are worded and the restrictions that are placed on them mean that this is one of the very few occasions where I would be comfortable in allowing regulations to be used to amend primary legislation. However, I have to say that for some of the restrictions, one wonders why they are there. Subsection (6) to clause 3 requires the Treasury to consult the regulator, and subsection (7) basically says, “But the Treasury only needs to consult the regulators if the Treasury thinks it is a good idea”. Why on earth does that need to be put into an Act of Parliament?
If clause 1 had been worded in a similar way to these clauses, there would have been no need for my amendment. There would have been no question at all from my point of view about that clause being accepted. I hope the Minister can explain why it is that these very limited and restricted powers to amend legislation are subject in most cases to the affirmative procedure, whereby Parliament has to approve them, when all the legislation that was put up for repeal and revocation in clause 1 needs no further detailed scrutiny from Parliament.
As far as the concerns raised by the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle, I think those comments perhaps related to an amendment that the Government have flagged that they intend to introduce that may well give the Government far too much power to direct the supposedly independent regulators. If and when that amendment comes forward, we will certainly have concerns about it. I do not think those comments were related to the clauses in the Bill as it stands. On that basis, I will not oppose the clauses today.
Dame Angela Eagle
I want to register some concern and get the Minister’s reassurances on the record about what are very broad-ranging powers for the Treasury, which are then subject to constraints. Was it necessary to have such broad-ranging powers? It is not a good way of approaching things unless there are no other options. Is the Minister worried that, over time, those constraints might loosen and the broad powers will remain? The dynamic of this kind of structure is what worries me, rather than the balance that he has explained the Government have currently set.
Shaun Bailey
I shall be brief. Broadly speaking, I support the three clauses and particularly clause three on the qualifications it puts on how the Treasury will utilise those powers. I do not know the inner machinations of the Treasury. I know there are people in this room, particularly the hon. Member for Wallasey, who probably know it better than me, but the practical reality needs to be an important part of this as we debate the clauses too.
I hope my hon. Friend the Minister will say to me that the Treasury will not fly solo without consultation with the regulator. Clearly, the Treasury has built a partnership with the regulators, which forms a key part of any sort of work within the scope of these three clauses, particularly amendments of regulation and the qualifications under clause three. I am just keen to stress the point to my hon. Friend that as the Bill progresses and is practically applied, that discourse with regulators is a key part of its implementation.
The hon. Member for Wallasey made a fair point about the loosening of restraints. The assurances we seek from my hon. Friend are just to ensure that the frameworks that in place are robustly monitored and maintained. That will be the key to ensuring that the constraints under which my hon. Friend’s Department is placed as he executes the provisions of these clauses are properly maintained.
Andrew Griffith
I welcome the contributions from the hon. Members for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle and for Wallasey, and my hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich West. Both sides of the House are wrestling with exactly the same issue, which is taking what is acknowledged to be an unprecedented corpus of European law, which the Westminster Parliament had no opportunity to have oversight of or change—
Andrew Griffith
I will not give way at the moment. The issue is therefore about docking that corpus into an established framework of operationally independent regulators, with Parliament establishing the perimeter and ultimately having the right degree of scrutiny. That may be through the public interest intervention power that the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle talked about, but which is not tabled in the Bill at the moment and is subject to continuing debate. That was the main thrust of the witness in the final session of last week’s sitting.
As currently written, clause three does not interfere with regulatory independence. Repealing retained EU law means the regulators will generally, as the default position, take over setting the detailed requirements, replacing the function of the European Commission and the European Parliament. However, that will take time and so we will not repeal those rules immediately. The regulators, under direction and intervention, as currently, from the Treasury Committee, will decide on the areas of most focus.
Emma Hardy
When will the details on those intervention powers be published so we can have a good look at them?
Andrew Griffith
I have previously given the assurance to the Treasury Committee that they will be tabled during the course of the Committee stage of the Bill. That remains the intention.
I have broadly addressed the points. I do not think Hon. Members oppose the Bill’s wording. I understand probing and I welcome the scrutiny of Parliament; we are here to provide precisely that function. However, I hope that I have been able to set out to the Committee’s satisfaction why these powers are necessary, but also the wider context in which they will be operated.
Dame Angela Eagle
I wonder whether the Minister could be a bit more forthcoming about when the amendment will be available, because that will give us a fuller picture of the Government’s decisions on the delicate balance that must be struck. Bearing in mind that the Committee sits for two weeks and at the end of today we will have had 25% of the Public Bill Committee proceedings on this Bill, I hope that the Minister will not publish the amendment at the end of next week.
Andrew Griffith
I am afraid that the hon. Lady will have to accept my previous commitment to the Committee. I also observe that mixed messages have come from the Opposition side of the House, because a lot of the thrust today is that Parliament should have greater ability to scrutinise or to intervene; previously, we have heard the opposite. But I have nothing further to add in terms of the timing.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Power to replace references to EU directives
Amendment made: 2, in clause 5, page 4, line 37, after “provision” insert “(if any)”.—(Andrew Griffith.)
This amendment clarifies that the power conferred by clause 5(1) to remove references to EU directives can be exercised so as to remove such references without replacement.
Clause 5, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Restatement in rules: exemption from consultation requirements etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Griffith
Clause 6 supports the efficient transfer of financial services regulation from retained EU law to the regulators’ rulebooks. As retained EU law is revoked, the regulators will take on significant new responsibilities for making rules in areas where EU law currently exists, within the framework set by the Treasury and Parliament through FSMA and enhanced by this Bill. Part of that wider framework sets out the processes that the FCA, the PRA, the Bank of England and the Payment Systems Regulator must follow when they make rules. Those processes rightly include requirements to conduct cost-benefit analysis, to carry out a public consultation and, in some cases, to consult other regulators. Such provisions are crucial to the functioning of our regulatory system and ensure that the impact of new rules on individuals and businesses is appropriately assessed and considered.
However, there are likely to be occasions when existing rules under retained EU law do not need to be materially altered and so, when the regulators bring forward new rules, they may remain broadly similar to the retained EU law that they replace. In those cases, the rules would not require any real changes for firms, compared with the existing retained EU law. The clause therefore enables the Treasury to exempt the regulators from cost-benefit analysis and consultation in those circumstances where they make rules that are “materially similar” to those currently in retained EU law. That will ensure proportionality and will therefore enable the regulators to focus their resources on those areas where reform will unlock the benefits that arise from tailoring regulation to UK markets.
I should reassure the Committee that the clause is framed as a power rather than a blanket exemption. Even when a regulator is proposing to make rules that are “materially similar” to existing requirements, a full consultation and a cost-benefit analysis may be appropriate.
Clause 7 is a technical provision that defines several terms used in clauses 1 to 6 and schedule 1. It governs how those other provisions should be interpreted. I will briefly set out the major elements of interpretation. First, the clause defines the word “regulator” as referring to the Prudential Regulation Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority, the Bank of England and the Payment Systems Regulator. Secondly, it excludes regulator rules from the definition of EU-derived legislation, meaning that where regulator rules implemented EU directives, they will not be revoked by the Bill. That is a necessary exclusion because many parts of the regulatory rulebook would otherwise meet the definition of retained EU law, but it would not be appropriate to repeal them as they are for the regulators to determine. The regulators already have the necessary powers to delete or modify them as appropriate. I therefore commend the clauses to the Committee.
Dame Angela Eagle
Could the Minister spend a bit of time explaining what “materially similar” means?
Martin Docherty-Hughes
I asked the Minister earlier about Northern Ireland, and SNP and Labour Members would be interested to hear what he means by “proportionality” when it comes to services, EU-derived legislation and what differences there will be between the UK and Northern Ireland. He never mentions Northern Ireland—he keeps talking about the United Kingdom.
Andrew Griffith
To the question asked by the hon. Lady, my understanding is that the terms will have the common law usage. It would be inappropriate for me to try to insert my own definition.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
Members will have noted that we now come to clause 2, which the Government requested we debate in this order.
Clause 2
Transitional amendments
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss that schedule 2 be the Second schedule to the Bill.
Andrew Griffith
We have already discussed the provisions the Bill delivers to allow us to replace the entirety of financial services retained EU law with domestic legislation that is in line with the established FSMA model. The Government will use the powers in the Bill and work closely with the regulators to give effect to that. However, it is important that we act now, where we can, to tailor our regulations to seize the benefits of EU exit and support our world-leading financial services sector. Clause 2 and schedule 2 do just that, making two sets of important and immediate transitional amendments to retained EU law. These are technical and important changes, so forgive me for taking some time to set them out.
First, schedule 2 makes a series of priority reforms to the UK’s regulatory regime for wholesale capital markets as identified through the Government’s wholesale markets review. The regime is predominantly set out in EU-derived legislation collectively known as the markets in financial instruments directive—MiFID—framework. The resilience, effectiveness and competitiveness of the UK’s capital markets rest on strong and effective regulation.
However, the MiFID framework was designed for the EU and intended to ensure detailed, harmonised rules across 28 jurisdictions. Many of the rules are therefore not calibrated optimally for the UK and, in a number of areas, have not delivered the intended benefits. This has led, for example, to duplication and excessive administrative burdens for firms or has stifled innovation. Such rules clearly do not work for a global financial centre such as the UK.
Parts 1, 2 and 4 of schedule 2 deliver the most urgent reforms identified through that process. The reforms will result in a simpler and less prescriptive regime that meets the needs of UK markets while still maintaining the highest regulatory standards. Part 1 of schedule 2 removes unnecessary restrictions on firms’ ability to execute transactions, deleting the share trading obligation and double volume cap. The EU argued that these restrictions would increase transparency in share trading, but evidence suggests that they have prevented firms from accessing the most liquid markets and therefore achieving the best price for investors.
Dame Angela Eagle
Obviously, this is an extremely complex area of technical regulation. It requires the regulators, alongside the Basel Committee and the international authorities regulating the flow of this kind of stuff, to operate effectively. If securitisation goes wrong or if markets begin to be opaque, with transparency going down, there can serious consequences for the countries in which such firms are based. That might also engage systemic threats to the banking structures of those countries. We have been through that before, and we know what happened when securitisation went wrong in the global financial crisis and what damage that caused to the global infrastructure.
Clearly, those tasked with ensuring that that does not happen again—those in the Bank of England, the prudential regulators and the FCA who have a handle on this, as well as the international regulators trying to set standards—have to be very aware of how such regulation might change and effect firms in the markets. However, there will always be a push in these markets to move the boundaries towards something less opaque and more profitable for those doing business, hoping that the risks can be left somewhere else. When risks crystallise, however, they are left on the balance sheets of nations that have to cope with cleaning up the mess. So, while I approve of modernising such regimes, little alarm bells go off in my mind when I think about attracting more such business. That kind of business is attractive if it is safe; it is not attractive if it is unsafe.
The Minister ploughed through his speech about all the technicalities of the shift away from EU-regulated systems and about how onshoring back to the UK will be done. Given how large our banking, financial services and insurance sector is, we are clearly at systemic risk if we get this wrong. We have to get the balance right between ensuring that any new regimes are transparent and safe enough to be hosted in our country. The Minister took us through some of the technical changes, but will he reassure us about the transparency and safety issues in the new regime that I have hinted at?
Peter Grant
If the sun moves much further, I will have to sit on the other side of the room to keep it out of my eyes, so my apologies for having to move seat during the debate, Dame Maria.
I thank the Minister for doing what I hoped he would have done in the debate on the revocations in clause 1: outlining in terms understandable to a lay person why some specific items of EU legislation are no longer appropriate for the United Kingdom—in fact, it is questionable whether they are appropriate elsewhere. I would have wanted to see that before the changes proposed in other parts of the Bill. On the basis of the Minister’s comments, and the fact that none of the regulators we heard from raised concerns, I am willing to accept that the changes suggested in the clause and the details in schedule 2 are appropriate.
I want to draw attention to a comment the Minister made earlier and to give him the chance to correct it. He suggested that this is EU legislation that Parliament never had the chance to scrutinise, but that is not the case. I spent several years, as other hon. Members did, on the European Scrutiny Committee. Every single piece of legislation the European Union intended to implement came before that Committee, which had the authority to call in Ministers and to put a stop on them approving things at EU Council meetings if the Committee was unsatisfied as to the impact. The House of Commons—the whole of Parliament—had the right to take action to prevent any of those directives from coming into force. The fact that Parliament seldom did that is a failing of this and previous Parliaments. The fact that Ministers had so much free rein to do what they liked, and could ignore Parliament if they wanted to, is not the fault of the European Union; it is because of the relationship between Parliament and Government. This Parliament is unfit for purpose, and Ministers from other members of the European Union would not have been allowed to agree to those directives without a vote in their respective Parliaments. I hope the Minister will be willing to correct the record. We can agree or disagree about legislation that the European Union put in place, but to suggest that this Parliament was somehow unable to have any impact on that legislation is simply not accurate.
Tulip Siddiq
Has the Minister picked up any feedback from the sector about the Government’s proposed reform to the position limits—a regulation under MiFID II—and the fact that they have not been adequately assessed for commodity market speculation risks? How does he plan to keep that issue under review? If he has heard of concerns, is he planning to address them?
Andrew Griffith
I am happy to stand corrected by the hon. Member for Glenrothes, but I am not happy to relitigate matters that the British people settled, given the chance in a referendum. I hope the hon. Member will reciprocate by looking forwards, not backwards, so that we can go forward with the best financial services regulation for the UK.
The matters raised by the hon. Members for Wallasey and for Hampstead and Kilburn are precisely within the scope of the regulators, and they have been consulted on. The hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn raised important points about the commodity market. The regulators are aware of those, and they will remain under constant review. Parliament itself has the ability, as always, to set the perimeter within which the regulators operate. Having addressed those points, I have no further comments.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2 agreed to.
Clause 8
Designated activities
Peter Grant
I beg to move amendment 34, in clause 8, page 7, line 4, after “activity” insert—
“(c) the extent to which the activity has the effect of raising finance for any business purpose by means of soliciting financial contributions other than by—
(i) an authorised issue of shares, or
(ii) borrowing from an authorised financial institution.”
This amendment would allow the Treasury to designate and regulate businesses which seek to raise finance by soliciting contributions from the general public other than by an authorised share issue.
First, I welcome the intention behind the clause, because it seeks to close a number of loopholes that have become evident in the way financial regulators are allowed to regulate and in the way that activities come within or fall beyond their scope. Far too often we see dodgy operators deliberately choosing to operate in empty spaces between the remits of different regulators. Too often the regulators seem more concerned about arguing that something is someone else’s responsibility than about taking responsibility themselves.
It is not clear whether the amendment falls within the scope of this Bill or that of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill, which is about to start its Committee proceedings, so I am pleased that it has been ruled competent. Essentially, the problem that the amendment is designed to address is what Blackmore Bond and Safe Hands Funeral Plans became. Quite possibly, it was always the intention of the directors that they would move away from being businesses carrying out particular business activities, and towards being businesses of which the main purpose in life was to get the general public to fund those activities. Although Safe Hands was a funeral plan business on the face of it—that was how it was set up—it became a way for the director, who took over a few years before the company collapsed completely, to take money from people who thought their money would be kept safe to pay for their funeral when the time came. The director then used that money to speculate on wildly high-risk and potentially high-profit investments.
Stephen Hammond (Wimbledon) (Con)
I understand exactly what the hon. Gentleman is trying to do with the amendment, and I have a lot of sympathy, but I am not clear about its scope and extent. Is he trying to ensure that the Treasury starts to regulate crowdfunders? That is potentially what the amendment would allow. It is a very widely drawn amendment, and I seek clarification on this point.
Peter Grant
If it became clear to the Treasury or the relevant regulator that crowdfunders were using funds for illicit purposes, rather than for genuinely good causes, I would expect the Treasury and the relevant regulator to step in. My amendment is designed to put primary legislation in place to allow the regulators to step in, and to allow the Treasury to take action, if it becomes clear that there is a problem, regardless of whether that is through crowdfunding or any other method of raising finance. The important part of the amendment is about finances being raised as a way of raising capital. The amendment does not in any way imply that it would cover, for example, crowdfunding for a good cause or to raise funds for someone who has had a serious accident. That would not be covered by the wording of the amendment.
I can understand the concerns, and I am quite happy if someone can come up with better wording—possibly in an amendment to a different piece of legislation—that achieves the aim of the amendment, but I am utterly convinced that there is a serious weakness in our current regulation. As currently worded, neither this Bill nor the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill will close down that loophole sufficiently.
At Blackmore Bond, the abuse that was taking place was stopped after it was too late. At Safe Hands Funeral Plans, the abuse that was taking place was stopped after it was too late and people had lost their money. The selling of mini-bonds to the general public, which is what Blackmore Bond was up to, is now outlawed, so action has been taken on that specific kind of abuse. Funeral plans are now regulated, so action has been taken on that specific kind of abuse. I do not want the regulator or the Treasury having always to see where the next specific company disguise is going to be, however; I want them to have the power to regulate based on how businesses take money from the general public.
With those comments, I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response. If he is not minded to accept the amendment, I hope that we can get an assurance that the intention behind it will be addressed at a later stage.
Emma Hardy
I have a general question on the clause and the designated activities regime. In the consultation response document produced by the Treasury—“Financial Services Future Regulatory Framework Review: Proposals for Reform. Response to Consultation” to be precise—some consultation respondents were concerned about what activities would physically be regulated, what constraints were to be placed on the powers of the Treasury and what the consequences for failing to comply with the regulator’s rules would be. I have not yet seen their concerns answered by the Minister. Will he address that?
Stephen Hammond
It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Maria. Will the Minister clarify quickly proposed new section 71S? The power in subsections (3) to (7) is an exceptional power, rather than a regular power.
Andrew Griffith
The amendment seeks to make it clear that offers of non-equity securities to retail investors—for example, as cited, retail bonds—can be brought into regulation through the designated activities regime. That is the important subject we are talking about. That regime—the DAR—has been designed to allow for the proportionate regulation of activities involving interactions with financial markets in the UK and conducted by many that are not traditional financial services firms. In essence, it is the core scope of regulation. The DAR includes a range of activities, such as an activity connected to the financial markets or exchanges of the UK, or an activity connected to financial instruments, financial products or financial investments issued or sold in the UK. Any of those can be designated under the DAR. Our contention is that it is therefore already sufficiently broad in scope. We will discuss that further when we consider clause stand part later.
Offers of non-equity securities to retail investors as proposed by the amendment would fall within the definition of the DAR should the Government wish to designate that activity in future. Indeed, proposed new schedule 6B of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which is to be inserted by the Bill and which provides illustrative examples of the types of activities that His Majesty’s Treasury may designate, includes
“Offering securities to the public.”
I can therefore give my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon the comfort that he seeks, in that the provision does extend to crowdfunding, which was his specific point.
Peter Grant
I am grateful for that assurance, but does the Minister take my point that in the examples of abuses that I mentioned, people did not say that they were offering any kind of securities? They said that they were selling funeral plans. Next time, they will be selling school or university fees plans or Christmas hamper plans; it will not be presented as the selling of equities as he and I would understand it.
Andrew Griffith
We will refer to that in more detail when we return to the DAR this afternoon. The DAR is the important establishment of the perimeter. I hear the hon. Gentleman on how we set the scope and those definitions, but the position of the Government is that the Bill already enables the Government to take action to ensure that offers of retail bonds are appropriately captured by regulation.
In April 2021, the Government consulted on the future regulation of non-transferable debt securities such as mini-bonds. In response to the consultation, the Government decided to bring certain non-transferable securities, including but importantly not limited to mini-bonds, within the scope of the reformed prospectus regime. The Government confirmed that we would bring forward our reforms to the UK prospectus regime using the powers in the Bill to replace retained EU law—following commencement. I am therefore confident that the Bill as drafted can achieve what is needed to regulate such activities. I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.
Peter Grant
I am still not sure that the Minister gets this. I will not push the amendment to a vote, but I sincerely hope that he will see the need for such a measure in financial services legislation or, more appropriately, in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill on its way through the House. If the clause as worded had been in place 20 years ago, Blackmore Bond would still have happened, Safe Hands would still have happened, and my constituents and all others would still have been scammed out of hundreds of millions of pounds.
A couple of years ago, when I spoke about Blackmore Bond, I said that I had a horrible feeling—an almost certain feeling—that it was already happening again somewhere else; six months later, Safe Hands collapsed and tens of thousands of people lost all their funeral plan money. I do not know the nature of the business that is being used as a cover for the latest scam, but deep in my guts I know that it is happening now, and that it will happen again next year and the year after. Nothing in this legislation as framed adequately clamps down on that.
I will not push the amendment to a vote, not because I do not think it is important but because I would rather not put it to a vote to see it voted down, which would be a serious mistake by the Committee. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Joy Morrissey.)
Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (First sitting)
Tuesday 25th October 2022
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 View all Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 25 October 2022 - (25 Oct 2022)
The Chair
Good morning, everyone. We are sitting in public and our proceedings are being broadcast. I have a couple of preliminary announcements. Hansard colleagues will be grateful if Members could email their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk and I remind everyone—including myself—to turn mobile phones to silent. Date Time Witness Tuesday 25 October Until no later than 10.10 am UK Finance; British Private Equity & Venture Capital Association Tuesday 25 October Until no later than 10.30 am Lloyds Bank Tuesday 25 October Until no later than 11.05 am The National Police Chiefs Council; Arianna Trozze Tuesday 25 October Until no later than 11.25 am Jonathan Hall KC, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation Tuesday 25 October Until no later than 2.30 pm Companies House; National Economic Crime Centre (National Crime Agency) Tuesday 25 October Until no later than 3.00 pm City of London Police; Serious Fraud Office; The National Police Chiefs Council Tuesday 25 October Until no later than 3.45 pm Spotlight on Corruption; Global Coalition to Fight Financial Crime; UK Anti-Corruption Coalition Tuesday 25 October Until no later than 4.15 pm Oliver Bullough; Bill Browder Tuesday 25 October Until no later than 4.45 pm Professor John Heathershaw, University of Exeter; Chatham House Thursday 27 October Until no later than 12.00 noon Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at RUSI; Transparency International Thursday 27 October Until no later than 12.30 pm OpenCorporates; Elspeth Berry, Nottingham Law School Thursday 27 October Until no later than 1.00 pm Graham Barrow Thursday 27 October Until no later than 2.20 pm Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales Thursday 27 October Until no later than 2.50 pm The Chartered Governance Institute UK & Ireland; City of London Law Society Thursday 27 October Until no later than 3.10 pm Catherine Belton Thursday 27 October Until no later than 3.30 pm Professor Jason Sharman, University of Cambridge
We will first consider the programme motion on the amendment paper, and then a motion to enable the reporting of written evidence for publication and the motion to allow us to deliberate in private—which will take only a minute or so—before the oral evidence session. I hope to take those motions formally.
Ordered,
That—
1. the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 25 October) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 25 October;
(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 27 October;
(c) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 1 November;
(d) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 3 November;
(e) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 8 November;
(f) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 15 November;
(g) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 17 November;
(h) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 22 November;
(i) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 24 November;
2. the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following Table:
TABLE
3. proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 48; Schedule 1; Clauses 49 and 50; Schedule 2; Clauses 51 to 90; Schedule 3; Clauses 91 to 100; Schedule 4; Clauses 101 to 134; Schedule 5; Clauses 135 to 141; Schedule 6; Clause 142; Schedule 7; Clauses 143 to 153; Schedule 8; Clauses 154 to 162; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
4. the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Tuesday 29 November.—(Jackie Doyle-Price.)
The Chair
The Committee will proceed to line-by-line consideration of the Bill on Tuesday 1 November at 9.25 am.
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Jackie Doyle-Price.)
The Chair
Copies of written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room and will be circulated to Members by email.
Resolved,
That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Committee shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.—(Jackie Doyle-Price.)
The Chair
We are now sitting in public. Good morning to our first witnesses. I am going to crack on straightaway, because the timetabling is tight this morning, but you are very welcome. Thank you for coming. I remind everyone we are now being broadcast. Do any Members need to make a declaration of interest? No. Witnesses, will you briefly introduce yourselves, please?
Nick Van Benschoten: My name is Nick Van Benschoten. I work at UK Finance, which is the voice of the UK’s banking and finance industry. I work in our economic crime policy unit.
Gurpreet Manku: I am Gurpreet Manku. I am the BVCA deputy director-general and director of policy. The BVCA is the representative body for private equity and venture capital in the UK. We look after the smallest venture capital firms investing in start-ups all the way through to growth capital and private equity firms offering across the UK and worldwide.
The Chair
Thank you. You are welcome. Given the time constraints, I will ask Members for short, snappy questions, so short, snappy answers will be very much appreciated. I start with the Opposition spokesman.
Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)
Q
First, thank you for giving evidence. Nick, I am conscious of your perspective for the whole of the financial services sector and I want to ask a question specifically about data and information sharing: is enough happening in the Bill to deal with what has been described to me as the chilling factor of sharing information? What might come back in the consequences of promoting sharing?
Ms Manku, you gave evidence in which you described the “unintended consequences” of requiring limited partnerships to have a registered office. I am not sure that we would necessarily agree with that, so I am interested in your argument.
Nick Van Benschoten: We welcome the provisions in the Bill for private sector information sharing. We are very glad to see that they apply across the AML regulated sector—not just banking, but payments, crypto, e-money and so on—which allows us to follow the money and the data as criminals move across sectors to obscure their tracks. That is very welcome.
We also welcome the protection from breach of confidence. That can be in common law and, typically, in terms and conditions. It is important to be able to encourage people to do the right thing without the fear that they might be subject to litigation. However, we note that the Bill falls short in the way in which we can share information with the National Crime Agency, which is a disapplication of all civil litigation. We would like to explore whether we could go further in the Bill, but those provisions are very welcome.
I will not say too much. An expert colleagues from one of our member banks is speaking to you later, but I stress the fact that we want to encourage the use of information sharing as much as possible. It is not just where customers are exited, but where a restriction is placed on them, such as additional monitoring or thresholds—there are a lot of ways in which the banks put each other on notice. We want to encourage that use as much as possible in true cases of economic crime.
Gurpreet Manku: We welcome the provisions in the Bill to ensure that limited partnerships are not abused by criminals—I want to make that clear. On the point about having a registered office, we agree that there needs to be a service address in the UK for the delivery of documents and for the registrar to contact the organisation, but our concern is actually in reference to the legal meaning of “registered office” in the Companies Act 2006 when it comes to standard companies. We know that the term means something else in that context, so it is actually quite a knotty legal point rather than an objection to the principle of having a link to the UK.
It is just about ensuring that any existing arrangements that have been set up for legal and regulatory purposes for international funds structures remain intact. We will need to work through the process of what this means in practice. We were speaking to BEIS officials as soon as yesterday to talk through what it means in practice. This is more of an implementation point, and we have suggested edits that will come through to officials.
Seema Malhotra
Quite a lot of people want to ask questions, so I will make further remarks later.
Dame Margaret Hodge (Barking) (Lab)
Q
“We do not think these proposed changes support the Bill’s central aim of reducing the use of limited partnerships for money-laundering, since criminal users of limited partnerships will simply ignore them.”
That suggests to me that we are not going far enough. We are aiming to catch the people who are guilty of economic crime. Attached to that, somehow I cannot see any investor wanting anything other than to know that they are putting their money into a kosher investment. Even if you are just a pension fund putting your money into a scheme, it does not seem a bad idea to check that the person behind it is legitimate and not a drug or people smuggler.
Gurpreet Manku: Absolutely. We agree with you that it is not in our interests to have our limited partnership fund structure abused by criminals for all those reasons. We believe that the introduction of annual confirmation statements, the requirement to have authorised corporate service providers register limited partnerships and the power for HMRC to obtain accounts will deter criminals and prevent them from using the vehicle—we hope that they have stopped using it now given that these reforms are finally going through Parliament.
On how those points link to the evidence you quoted specifically, which was actually about some niche requirements on passive investors in a limited partner- ship fund, a worry there is that those investors might be deterred from using the UK limited partnership structure because they feel that their liabilities are being increased, that they are being asked to do the job of management and that criminal sanctions are attached to that. That part of our evidence applied not to the Bill as a whole but to those specific areas.
Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)
Q
Nick Van Benschoten: We think that the Bill’s provisions for Companies House reform definitely point in the right direction. The question for us is, “Are they going far enough and will they be implemented fast enough?” Companies House abuse is, as I am sure you are all aware, a significant problem that we in the regulated sector have been trying to compensate for, but we cannot. We need Companies House to act as a proactive gatekeeper.
On the verification measures, one of the key points is that they fall short of minimum industry standards. Verification of identity is necessary but not sufficient. A key thing we have noted is that the Bill does not provide for order-making powers to allow Companies House to verify the status of directors or beneficial owners, and for that sort of requirement on company information agents and so on. That seems an odd gap. We understand that it may be a matter of phasing or resourcing, which can be dealt with in the implementation, but not if we do not have the order-making powers in the bill.
I have spent 12 years arguing for Companies House reform in my various roles. I do not have another 12 years in me, to be frank. We need to make sure that the Bill gives the powers so that the debate can be had during implementation and, if necessary, a phased or risk-based approach. What I mean is that there is a real risk of nominee directors and abuse thereof. Companies House needs to be able to verify that and therefore bring other things within its realm of power, querying and amending the register.
The how is maybe another question for more detail, but a risk-based, reasonable approach is also minimum industry standards. We have not yet seen it, but I note that the international body FATF—the Financial Action Task Force—agreed last Friday that it was going to consult on best practice guidance on implementing new standards for company registers. These are the same reforms that the Government pushed for as part of their G7 presidency. It has been part of the change: the US is setting up a register; Switzerland is moving. The UK cannot fall behind these new standards, so it is important that the Committee takes cognisance of that.
Trust or company service providers is one of those cases where we know that there is an issue; the banking sector and other industry partners in the joint money laundering intelligence taskforce and another four along with the National Crime Agency did a study of the risks of abuse in the UK trust or company service provider sector. We found shortfalls. There was a remediation exercise agreed. I understand that the remediation exercise is still ongoing. It is one of those sectors where there are concerns. We are doing other work that I am not at liberty to discuss, but it is about that sector.
That means that Companies House needs to be careful and cautious. There need to be strict legal undertakings with proper penalties, not just that they have met the standard of verification but that they have done everything they should be doing as a regulated sector. There needs to be access to the evidence of these checks, and that evidence needs to be something that, on a risk basis if necessary, can be queried—not just the information in the register but the actual checks undergoing. There needs to be the ability for Companies House to take sample checks and do also risk-based reviews. That may be something we can come to later on in terms of the querying power. I am sorry for a long answer, but it is an important point.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Nick Van Benschoten: I do not have a view on that. I know that the Treasury will be consulting on reforming the AML supervisory regime. That is something we have been pushing for for quite a while. I know that Jersey, for example, has a very different model where it has most of the regulator sector under one bailiwick, and that includes company formation. That may be something that the Committee looks at in future, but it is not the UK model at the moment.
Our priority would be, rather than look at the cost-benefit narrative and machinery of government change, the co-ordination point. There need to be powers not just to request information but to get information from other supervisors. There needs to be the ability to pass information around the ecosystem, including the National Crime Agency and regulated sector people sharing intelligence. There are some provisions in the Bill at the moment where we think they could go further on that matter, but the key thing is that Companies House needs to be a data hub. On whether it has the responsibility or others, we have not taken a view on that yet, I am afraid.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Nick Van Benschoten: I do not think they are unprecedentedly low. From a very quick survey, we found that Benin and Turkmenistan also have a low figure. I am not sure that is the company the UK wants to keep. There is a question about international competitiveness. It is important to note that in other EU countries with major financial centres it is in the £50 to £100 range. That does not seem an unreasonable amount for us.
Perhaps more importantly, we think Companies House needs to get resourced properly. You have to will the means, not just the ends. It is very important that Companies House fees are set at a reasonable level that would not deter an entrepreneur but would disrupt some of the bulk abuse we have seen, in which criminals set up hundreds and hundreds of shell companies. That is definitely a typology that we have seen.
Once there is enough money coming through main registration, there is then the question of whether Companies House will be granted any investment money out of the economic crime levy that is coming in next year. It is important that the levy is spent on things that actually improve the system, and that we do not just cross-subsidise, and that some of the opportunities also have a benefit for the economy—maybe for streamlining the onboarding of small companies, or for facilitating other access to regulated services.
Obviously, there is the question of what the Government will spend the levy on. We welcome the money that they have spent so far. There is an interesting proposal—by, I think, one of the Committee members’ all-party parliamentary groups—that the Government should match-fund the economic crime levy. Obviously, we in the regulator sector would love that. It is something for the Government to consider.
The Minister of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Jackie Doyle-Price)
Q
Gurpreet Manku: To clarify, I think this is a really important Bill. We have been saying for a very long time that the provisions need to be implemented quickly. The issues that we have raised are really on points of detail. Raising an international private equity or venture capital fund is quite a complex process. We hope that the swift introduction of the provisions will deter criminals from using the vehicles that we are talking about. When the requirement was introduced for Scottish limited partnerships to go on the people with significant control register, it led to a dramatic drop-off in the use of such partnerships for nefarious purposes. We were not aware that English limited partnerships were being used in that way instead, and we were surprised that they were, because English limited partnerships do not have a legal personality, and so cannot hold assets and should not be able to set up a bank account; certainly, they cannot in this country. We were therefore surprised by the scale of abuse there.
The Government are sending a really strong signal by introducing these provisions, particularly the requirement to have an authorised corporate service provider submit documention and the measures around annual confirmation statements. That should deter criminals. Our version of the limited partnership fund structure has been emulated across the world, so there is a lot of competition, in the sense that international fund groups could set up a vehicle in the UK, the EU or the US. Our wish is for them to be here, because that drives other economic activity.
We have a huge domestic venture capital and growth capital funds industry that invests in small businesses around the country. Two thirds of our investment is outside London; 90% of investment goes to small and medium-sized enterprises. Our managers are small firms; they need a domestic vehicle that works and is trusted by international investors, including those from the US who invest heavily in our members. These vehicles are used by private equity and venture capital funds. They are also used by infrastructure, pension schemes and fund-to-fund investors. Notably, they are also used by the British Business Bank through its equity programmes. It is the largest venture capital and growth equity investor in the UK. It has a really important role in catalysing innovation and crowding in additional institutional investors. I am passionate about the need for a robust UK vehicle, and it has been really disappointing to see the abuse first in Scotland and then in England in recent years.
English limited partnerships and Scottish limited partnerships are popular because they are here. The UK law courts attract institutional investors, as does the fact that we have a large professional services community here. Because we have funds here, we also have the administration here, which means that we have good-quality jobs around the country; some of our members have hubs in Belfast and Southampton. I am passionate about ensuring that this vehicle works, and the rules that are being introduced will deter criminals; they will improve the robustness of the vehicle.
Our points are really points of detail, just to ensure that the limited liability status of investors is protected and that we can implement these reforms in a swift and easy manner.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Gurpreet Manku: I think it will make a very good statement, and it will attract international investment. There is a huge level of interest in the UK because we have had some brilliant growth stories in our businesses, particularly in deep tech in life sciences and biotech, especially coming out of the pandemic. There is a lot of interest in investments, and the Bill will send a signal that these investors should be using UK fund vehicles and not those based outside the country.
Liam Byrne (Birmingham, Hodge Hill) (Lab)
Q
Nick Van Benschoten: That is the case, and perhaps more, in a way, than you might expect. We are not saying that Companies House should be regulated for anti-money laundering, but it does not have the provisions to verify the status of directors or beneficial owners. That is the gap to the standards. I should stress that the industry standards allow reasonable measures in how you verify status, because it is a challenge, but those reasonable measures are a matter of how, not whether.
Liam Byrne
Q
The second thing I think you said is that the verification regime proposed in the Bill runs a risk of failing to establish those in actual economic control of a company. Is that true?
Nick Van Benschoten: There is always the risk, yes, but some of the shortfalls in the Bill can be addressed, and we think they should be, so that we can address the issues that you mention. In specific terms, some of the abuses are going to be abuses that the UK has suffered in the past; others will be abuses that we have seen happening overseas. The key thing is that the Government need to take a risk-based approach to measuring those. At the moment, the Bill does not allow Companies House to pick up some of those measures, including if we identify them in the future and want to remedy the regime.
Liam Byrne
Q
Nick Van Benschoten: I think they could be improved, yes.
Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)
Q
Nick Van Benschoten: Are you addressing the question to me?
Stephen Kinnock
To both of you, if you do not mind. It would be good to hear from both of you on both questions.
Nick Van Benschoten: My view is that, in terms of resourcing, there is a lot of new technology. Companies House is quite lucky that it can leapfrog using best practice. We have had a number of meetings with it. I think you may be hearing evidence from Graham Barrow later; we had a roundtable with Graham Barrow, Companies House and some other providers to try to explore this issue. Companies House is quite lucky in that it does not need to be a manual exercise: the goal is to get very much a minority manual review by humans, with the majority being technology and machine learning and so on.
That said, we also did a webinar with a number of data providers, including well-known companies that are looking at the size of the challenge and the opportunities. There is a big difference between quick wins and longer-term investment. Companies House already has a risk engine; it has data analytics already. It is just that its enforcement people, working as hard as they can, have their hands tied behind their back. I think there will be a lot of policy development, and work to implement not just the technology but the way that it interacts with the regime that it wants to set up. It is a challenge, because the short term is a burning platform.
Known patterns of abuse are identified every day. Also, a number of companies may be about to walk off with a lot of stolen public money through bounce back loan scheme fraud, and that is an area where Companies House may or may not have powers. Whatever powers the Bill gives need to be operated at speed. Sorry, that was a roundabout way to get to your question. There are short-term things it can do now, and there is a long-term thing; but it must make sure that it is dealing with the urgent as well as the transformative. We understand that the transformative exercise will take a long time, but there is also need for it to apply more tactical focus around the risks, especially in the short term. What was your second question? Sorry, I forgot it in my enthusiasm.
Stephen Kinnock
On data sharing.
Nick Van Benschoten: Each country has its own threats and problems. Singapore’s COSMIC database addresses particular exposures and problems that it has with trade-based money laundering. The UK is in a different place in that market, but we have our own problems. In terms of data-sharing, one of the key things we would like is for Companies House to enable permissioned access to the regulated sector. We have a lot of problems that are not so much in high-end corporate, but in the retail customer base. We have money mules for fraud, we have a lot of spoof companies enabling purchase and investment scams. Trying to work out where exactly the needle is in the haystack is difficult when we do not all have access to the same data.
Companies House seems to be facing a binary choice: either it is public, or it is only for the public sector. There does not seem to be a middle ground that works on a need-to-know basis, where you have an obligation to apply money laundering checks and to have careful, need-to-know handling procedures and anti-tipping off and so on, and where that information is available for the purposes of safeguarding your customer and maintaining the integrity of the market. From a UK perspective, that is definitely something that we would support. We also think it might allow us to develop something equivalent for our own risks, as the Singaporeans and other countries have done.
Gurpreet Manku: We have focused on the limited partnerships provisions in the Bill, but in principle we would support Companies House being appropriately resourced to implement all these changes effectively. I have no objections to data-sharing with relevant authorities. Our investment community operates across the globe, so we are used to this type of activity in other jurisdictions.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Gurpreet Manku: We have not looked into that. I do know that Ireland has set up a new funds limited partnership, so that could be part of the reason for their growth—but that was very recent, so I do not know why that has happened. Again, it is quite worrying if people are just moving around, exploiting different structures.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
The Chair
May I ask for a brief answer?
Gurpreet Manku: We are commenting on different parts of the Bill. On the limited partnerships part, we think that a number of the new provisions being introduced will deal with the issues you have outlined. To reiterate, we are really unhappy and shocked to see the amount of abuse of this fund structure, because it has been in place for decades and is used for legitimate purposes on our side.
When you read the paper cold, you are right—it does look quite negative; we probably should have reinforced our support for the provisions that will work. Sometimes we have a tendency to go into the detail and start thinking about how things will be implemented in practice. We want to ensure that we use the tools and implement the most effective measures in the Bill. If there are other points that, on balance, would not necessarily help with the overall aim of the Bill, perhaps we should look at whether they need to be implemented.
The Chair
Q
Nick Van Benschoten: I would just say that we support the application of the Companies House powers to all the entities registered at Companies House. Companies House needs risk-based querying powers and to be able to follow the data and the money. My earlier comments also apply to the point about limited partnerships and verification by trust company service providers; we need a much more cautious approach to the reliability of that service.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Nick Van Benschoten: From a financial sector point of view, it is important to look at this as an ecosystem; that is definitely how the criminals look at it. They look for weak points. Sometimes the problems are upstream of the financial sector, but it crystallises in our sector because that is when people realise that the money has gone out of their accounts.
We are very supportive of the fraud provisions in the Online Safety Bill—we think they are critical. We also think it critical that everyone be incentivised to play their part. That includes potential issues around the scope of the economic crime levy, which applied only to the AML regulated sector. The Bill levels up powers for the cryptoasset seizures and freezing orders. That is welcome; it simplifies things. We work with crypto sector associations. They are now trying to realise that they are part of a regulated sector, and they want to be part of the gatekeeper community.
On what the Bill does, it is important, as I mentioned, that there be information sharing across sectors. That is key, because then we can see whether we all have a different piece of the puzzle to put together. A systems approach is definitely needed; that is maybe the context for our point that Companies House should really be an enabling hub. That includes giving access to information that may not be on the public register.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Nick Van Benschoten: That is a very good point, yes. There are also the information processing provisions on the identification, prevention and detection of economic crime in the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill, as well as the Online Safety Bill. Obviously, consultation is ongoing about a statutory APP or authorised push payments code. There may also be other vehicles in one of those bits of legislation, or this one, for other measures that we are currently discussing with the Government. I think the Minister made reference to our difficulty with having to process payments within a set period—there is a hard regulatory obligation, even when we have identified economic crime risks. We are still exploring whether that needs guidance or legislation. All these things need to come together if we are to design the right ecosystem. That then raises the question of who is leading the system. We are working on that with the Government.
The Chair
We have less than one minute. Ms Manku, do you want to make a few final comments?
Gurpreet Manku: We are glad that these provisions are being implemented. We have been working on them since 2018, and stand ready to work with officials to ensure that they are implemented effectively to meet the Bill’s overall goals.
The Chair
That was good timing. I thank the witnesses for coming to see us and for their answers.
Examination of Witness
Nigel Kirby gave evidence.
The Chair
Thank you for joining us, Mr Kirby. We have until 10.35 am. Would you briefly introduce yourself, please?
Nigel Kirby: Good morning to the Chair and the Committee. I am currently the head of the group financial intelligence unit at Lloyds Banking Group. Across the industry, I am a representative on UK Finance’s information and intelligence committee and, for full transparency, as part of that I was deputy director of the economic crime command of the National Crime Agency.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Nigel Kirby: Perhaps I can give a couple of the examples that we used when we were speaking with the Home Office for the formation of the Bill. In one case that involved money laundering, Lloyds identified seven customers that were receiving cash payments into their accounts. We linked those seven customers because they used the same fraudulent documentation—a gas bill—to set up their accounts. They had all been linked using fraudulent IDs. They were sending money to one individual in another bank.
At the moment, we act on such cases by meeting our statutory obligations—we exited those customers—but from the criminal’s perspective, the second bank is not aware of the fact that they are receiving those funds, because we do not have the capability to share that information with them. Secondly, it is highly likely that those seven customers moved on to other banks and continued that activity because, again, at the moment we have no capability to share the information about our economic crime concerns in that space.
That is a fairly simple example, but to build on it, the same kinds of techniques were used to launder criminal funds in another case involving three companies that were banking with us. We recognised that they were receiving cash money from the same post office source. They were also receiving money from other companies in banks. That money all got consolidated and was sent out to, if you like, a fifth bank. I do not know what happened to it after that—we cannot see.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Nigel Kirby: It was, at that particular point, a UK domestic bank, yes. We have this sort of complexity of companies that are linked using different identities and are moving money around, layering it in the system, and sending it to other parts of the system. We are currently limited in what we are able to do.
On those three companies that we at Lloyds could see were receiving money from five other banks, at the time we could not inform those banks of our concerns or explore with them whether that money was legitimate—it is not all illegitimate; it could, of course be legitimate funding. Furthermore, when that money was consolidated and sent to another bank, we were unable to inform that bank.
Whatever the predicate crime—there are all sorts of predicate crimes—the layering is not that complex but it uses the banking system, across the banking system, to obfuscate and layer the funds, and then the criminals move on. The big challenge at the moment is that we can report those entities and companies, but they will just go and open up in another high street bank, and when they have exhausted the five major high street banks, they will go to the challenger banks, and when they have exhausted those, they will go to the fintechs. We are not aware of that in the way that other industries such as the motor industry might well be.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Nigel Kirby: To take the first question first—about whether the Bill goes far enough—I commend and compliment the Home Office. It worked with us on the Bill. This piece of legislation was, fortunately, done by the Home Office but using our case examples. The Home Office explored whether the Bill would work with the scenarios we gave them. That helped the information provisions to be pretty much in the right place. There is one key omission from our perspective; I can come back to that, if helpful. There is also one key dependency in another Bill—
Seema Malhotra
Q
Nigel Kirby: The omission was referred to by Nick Van Benschoten: the civil liability protection. In the UK, we have real trust and confidence built up in voluntary information sharing with the National Crime Agency under section 7 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013. That has been the basis of our voluntary sharing, and we have built confidence in it over seven years.
The legislation has two limbs to civil liability protection—I will have to read my notes to make sure I do not make a mistake. The first limb is
“an obligation of confidence owed by the person making the disclosure”—
that limb is also included in this Bill. The second limb that we rely on is
“any other restriction on the disclosure of information (however imposed)”—
that limb is not included in the Bill.
Our position is that the Bill should align with the existing legislation that we are comfortable with. We would have more comfort in sharing and be more incentivised to share if we had the same protections as we have when we share with the National Crime Agency. The further observation is that there is not just one precedent; another piece of legislation, the Criminal Finances Act 2017—under section 11, I think—had sharing provisions with the purpose, in effect, of bringing better disclosures to the NCA. It had exactly the same two civil liability limbs, written in the same way. We believe that the second limb would be hugely helpful in doing things.
You might want to come back, but the other dependency that is key for us is that the Bill is drafted as an interlink with the GDPR, as you well know. That is wise, and one of the protections—that it has that link with the GDPR—but because the Bill has that interlink, the provisions in the GDPR are really important. I am aware that there is a draft Bill that has not yet been laid before Parliament and, again, we—my colleagues in UK Finance—have worked on that Bill. Absolutely key for us in the draft Bill is a legitimate interest for sharing, because that Bill sets out legitimate interests.
At the moment, the GDPR cites only fraud as a legitimate interest, and no other crimes. To be able to make the measure in this Bill work, we need the revised GDPR to have the “prevention, investigation” and “detection” of crime—what the GDPR says at the moment—to be for all crime as a key part, so we can make the interlink. Otherwise, we are restricted only to fraud, but do not include wider economic crime.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Nigel Kirby: Your question is specifically about fraud and what we can do in that space. I suggest that tackling fraud is a shared responsibility. When you look at a typical fraud, you have the payment platform, as you mention; you have a sending bank and a receiving bank, and you have the victim. To tackle it, we need to look at the whole ecosystem, as Nick said, and have an approach that works. I am not convinced that there are things that one can put into the Bill for that—it is the wider point of the whole ecosystem coming together for any fraud strategy moving forward, how we tackle that and how we incentivise the right behaviours for tackling fraud in future.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Nigel Kirby: When looking at enacting new legislation, I would go back to the purpose. Putting my NCA hat on, rather than from a Lloyds perspective, I was involved in two pieces of quite significant legislative change: the introduction of asset forfeiture orders in the Global Finance Act, and the change in the sanctions penalty from two years to seven years. That was done very much on an operational need basis. As an organisation, we were able to put out the operational perspective of the gap—the fact that we could not use certain powers because, in the sanctions case, of the length of the sentence. There was a big gap in the ability to seize assets from a civil regime.
In whatever we look at, it is important that we understand that gap from an operational perspective. It is clear and compelling that by having new legislation, that gap gets filled. The other point is that there is the resource and the ability to use the legislation when it comes forward.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Nigel Kirby: I would leave those to UK Finance; it is not my area of expertise. Our nominated office in Lloyds feeds into UK Finance so we get the whole industry.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Nigel Kirby: I can link this to your question on safeguards. Coming from a law enforcement background, I believe that safeguards for members of the public are really important in this space, and I am used to following those. GDPR does not stop us from doing some things. It provides a set of safeguards for what we do.
When you look at what the Bill does on safeguards—I am trying to answer both questions—it makes it very clear that we share this information when certain conditions apply, such as exit or restriction, or we need the relevant actions, which would be the prevention and detection investigations for economic crime. Those safeguards are built into the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill.
In GDPR you already have safeguards in place. The first safeguard is: do we have a legitimate interest to share? That is precisely my point, Minister, about our needing to have legitimate interests to share—prevent all crime, not just fraud. Then you have a necessity limb to this. Is what we want to share targeted? Is it proportionate? Is there a less intrusive way? From a law enforcement perspective, we look at whether our actions are proportionate and collateral intrusion. There is a balancing act sitting there as a third limb, on ensuring that the legitimate interest of the public is not unduly overridden. I actually support the fact that there are safeguards in GDPR; I think that is the right thing to have. I support the fact that we need to meet those to be able to share information, but in doing so in that particular space, we need to be able to have sufficient breadth to be able to share across all economic crime and not just fraud.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Nigel Kirby: I think it would be very helpful to have, on the obligations, clear guidance from somewhere like the Information Commissioner’s Office—it has got good guidance, to be fair—as we move through this. Should the Bill be enacted and become legislation, guidance across the industry and from the relevant Government sectors or law enforcement sectors on how we do this and come together in the same way as we came together through the Bill, would be important and give clarity, because, as I am sure you are aware, Minister, there are different interpretations of things, different views and different risk appetites. That is normal in business. The views, legal interpretations and risk appetites will always be different, but where there is guidance to help us through this, with a positive intent from Parliament, that is always really helpful.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
I want to take you back—I could not quite hear what you said to Alison—to the SARs regime, if I may. It may not be your area of expertise, but it is a very important instrument for informing the enforcement agencies of where there may be a problem. The system is clearly broken—hundreds of thousands of SARs are landing on the desks of enforcement agencies. And we had the idea that they could be put into categories—risk categorised. I wonder whether you are able to comment on that at all, because if currently there is just a tick box—you send off your SARs and you have done it—too often the banks then carry on doing business with a suspicious person. Is there room in the Bill for doing something more on that regime, to ensure that the enforcement agencies are more effective in rooting out economic crime?
Nigel Kirby: I think the SARs regime and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 itself actually need—well, not necessarily to be turned upside down, but to be looked at as a whole. I think an individual focus just on some aspect of SARs probably would not change the system in any particular—
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Nigel Kirby: Just to be very clear, I am here from Lloyds Banking Group; I will answer this question from my former role at the NCA—from that perspective. SARs do have huge value in what they do; the idea that they just go to a box and are not used is not entirely correct. One of the things the UK has done with SARs, which is world leading and others are quite jealous of, is that they are accessible to a wide range of investigators. It is not about following each one up. There is a database. A wide range of financial investigators can see them and they are held there for six years, as legislation allows. So there is a huge use there.
Also, Dame Margaret, we need to think about this. There is the SARs regime and there is the SARs reform work that is being led; investment is going to be put forward there. I would suggest that we need to see what differences the SARs reform makes first.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Nigel Kirby: Reflecting back and particularly focusing on this area, as I am sure you do, we need to build and are building on the public-private relationships we have had. One Member mentioned Singapore and Holland, but actually, from the perspective of a private-public partnership, how we operate together and particularly the joint money laundering intelligence taskforce, we are seen as world-leading in that space. There is something there about building on that as we move forward and bringing in other sectors, which I know the NCA does. In this particular space, the enablers, as they are sometimes referred to—the telcos, the ISPs, the social media companies—being brought into that public-private partnership and building on what we have is important.
The Bill brings forward private-private relationships, and I think that is important. Hitherto, the information-sharing provisions have all relied on the NCA gateways. There is a throttle there, in terms of capacity. Widening that out so that private-private can share and be the frontline, in many ways, to help to prevent and detect is an important way forward.
Broadening out, there are a couple of elements in the legislation that we need to look at. For us, one is about friction in the system. We have a very quick payment system in the UK; when you pay, you press the button and off it goes. That is something we have got used to as a public and as a banking industry. It is unhelpful when you are looking to put legitimate targeted friction into a system to temporarily stop what I will call economic crime, because it is not just fraud, although it includes that.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Nigel Kirby: Respectfully, I think that is a different question.
You asked me to put my other hat on, Dame Margaret. Looking at the scale of fraud—you know, you have got it here; you are familiar with it—and the number of victims and the cost to the UK, it is time for the UK and those with the power to do so to either think about fraud as a strategic policing requirement or, going even further, ask whether it is now a national security threat. I do not just mean with that label—that is really important. You can put a label on these things, but if it could be classed as a national security threat and have the available resources brought together from our national agencies and national policing, that might have a greater impact for the public.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
I have two questions. First, I am trying to understand why you have this sense of optimism, because it looks like a pretty dire situation to me. Our enforcement agencies have been starved of the resources and capabilities they need. Secondly, you have had a long career in the NCA and in enforcement; I am sure you are still in touch with some of your former colleagues. If you had to define the resources they need, what extra would they need to be able to turn this situation around? It would be great to hear from you on that.
Nigel Kirby: For clarity, I used “world-leading” specifically in reference to private-public partnerships and what we are doing for voluntary information sharing. Look at the joint money laundering intelligence taskforce and the facts in that space: it has supported 950 investigations that have led directly to 280 arrests, with £86 million secured. There are some hard figures around here that are different. When I was in law enforcement, we had law enforcement from other countries coming to ask how we did it, including Singapore and Holland. I am in the private sector now, and we have private sector colleagues coming to ask us how do we do that part. That is just a part of the ecosystem that is important—
Stephen Kinnock
Point taken.
Nigel Kirby: If I misled you or you took it that way, that was not intended.
On your question about if I were still there, I am sure that Graeme Biggar, the DG of NCA, will have plans for what that could look like. When I was there, we certainly put forward evidence-based propositions such as, “If there were x amount of funding, these are the extra capabilities we could bring and this is the impact we believe it could have.” I am afraid my contacts are not close enough now to know the detail of that.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Nigel Kirby: I fully agree that we need enforcement to be properly resourced with the right capabilities to be able to deliver what it is asked to do.
Liam Byrne
Q
Nigel Kirby: Well, it does not stop that in the UK because our financial system launderers are in there, but what we can do is to prevent them from continuing to abuse the financial system. Take the example I gave with the five other banks—four were sending money—that were involved with Lloyds. The Bill will allow us to have a conversation with the four banks that were sending money into our companies, and to say “In relation to our responsibility for understanding due diligence, money laundering and so on, can we share information on those four companies so we can better understand those flows from those companies?” That is important, because some of them may have been legitimate and some may have been illegitimate, but that will help us to define the good from the bad in that particular space. It will also act as an alert trigger for those other four banks to have a look if they have not done so already.
An intelligence-led approach would say, “Lloyds has a concern about these four companies” and it could look further into the matter and do an investigation into its own relationship with its customer. The other element on all that money that came through to us—it was in the millions—that went out to a fifth bank, which I will call bank F, is that we could alert that bank about our money laundering concerns, provided we had exited those three companies, which we did. If that bank had not already picked it up with its transaction monitoring, it would have an intelligence-led trigger to be able to do its own investigations, and to stop that and report it to the authorities.
The final and important part of this is the indirect part—we call it the utility. The ability to better share this information for others is important because. If all those companies were exited out of the financial system by the five banks involved, it is highly likely that they would go on and open up accounts with other banks. This Bill gives us the opportunity to be alerted to that and to take the appropriate action and due diligence that we need.
Liam Byrne
Q
Nigel Kirby: It is an important point in terms of focusing on risk. We are having a conversation at the moment in industry with law enforcement and a regulator about how we can define where the high priorities are and how we can focus our resources on them, while meeting regulatory requirements and the law enforcement perspective. It would be helpful—we refer to it as dial up, down down—in terms of resource to be able to move to a space where our voluntary discretionary resource could be targeted in exactly the way you suggest, because there is a lot of voluntary discretionary resource in this space.
Liam Byrne
Q
Nigel Kirby: Not in the sense of prioritising what the highest threats are and where we should be. That is to the best of my knowledge. Just for clarity, I am not familiar with every aspect of the Bill.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Nigel Kirby: I think, with respect, that “automatic strike-off procedures” are your words, not mine. I used the fact of us taking an approach and considering whether to exit—that might be a similar thing—a customer. We take this really seriously. We look to understand whether we have economic crime concerns about those consumers. There is a range of things that we can do in that space. The ultimate one is about exit. We would exit that relationship, which is contractual, so we are able to do that. But there are other things that we do, and one is actually to speak to the customer and understand that transaction. We see some unusual transactions, but we have a conversation.
Seema Malhotra
It is more about Companies House automatic strike-off—but they might be your customers.
The Chair
Order. I am terribly sorry; we do have to leave it there. I must cut it off on the dot. Mr Kirby, thank you very much for joining us.
Examination of Witnesses
Andy Gould and Arianna Trozze gave evidence.
The Chair
We will kick off. You are very welcome, witnesses. Thank you for joining us. Would you be so kind as to briefly introduce yourselves and your positions?
Arianna Trozze: Hello everyone. My name is Arianna Trozze, and I am a PhD researcher at University College London. I look at detecting and prosecuting financial crime involving cryptoassets, and for the past year I have also been advising the Home Office on a part-time basis on technical aspects involving cryptoassets in relation to this Bill.
Andy Gould: Morning. My name is Andrew Gould. I am a detective chief superintendent with the City of London police. My job is to run the cyber-crime programme for the National Police Chiefs’ Council, which is focused on building capacity and capability across policing.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Andy Gould: Sure. Fraud is not really my area of responsibility—I am focused very much on computer misuse act offending—but yes. I know there has been significant additional resource put into the ROCUs for fraud in the last couple of years. Is there enough capacity to meet the demand? Probably not. What policing probably needs to do is take a slightly different approach. Rather than trying to investigate those volume crime offences, it should focus more on those organised crime groups or individuals that are doing the most harm. That is the kind of pivot that policing is trying to make, in terms of being more proactive. I know Commander Adams is giving evidence this afternoon, and he will be able to tell you more about that.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Andy Gould: Yes, I do. I think we have got the capability, but what we lack is capacity. The capability we have got today does not necessarily mean we will be able to maintain that capability tomorrow. We have invested, through the national cyber-security strategy and the programme through Government. We have got about an extra £100 million that has been invested over the last four years or so, building capability across policing. Some of that money we have effectively taken into crypto, so that cyber money is being used to cross-subsidise wider policing. We have created what we describe as cryptocurrency tactical advisers across the whole of policing. There are now officers in every force and every regional organised crime unit who are trained and equipped to do that. We have nationally procured the investigative tools to enable them to progress the investigations, and we have a national storage platform to store that once we have seized it.
We are in a position where we have actually seized hundreds of millions of pounds worth of cryptocurrency assets within the last year or so. The challenge we have is that it is getting harder and harder to do. The assets themselves are becoming more diverse and more technically complex, so our officers are in a bit of an arms race trying to keep up.
On the tools that we use, you might have one supplier that is brilliant on Bitcoin but not so good on another asset class, so we need more than one investigative tool to be able to investigate effectively. That is very expensive. One of the providers is currently quoting $60,000 to $80,000 per licence. That is unachievable, or unsustainable, for policing. We need to procure nationally for everybody, so we have an 80% discount on our current investigative tool, taking that approach.
The big worry for me at the moment is not just the technology changes and whether we will be able to maintain that level of resourcing and expand the capacity across policing; we have created a real staff retention problem. Because crypto is an emerging market, some of the best expertise and understanding of crypto in the UK sits within policing. We have been investigating cryptocurrency since 2015 or 2016. One of my sergeants has just been offered 200 grand to go to the private sector. We cannot compete with that. That is probably the biggest risk that we face within this area at the moment.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Arianna Trozze: I would echo Andy’s point about the difficulty of tracing certain cryptoassets and investigating certain chains and things like that, and how this is evolving rapidly in competition with the existing providers and the blockchain services themselves. It gets more and more difficult to investigate as time goes on. You need more and more capacity building and investigative tools. At the same time, the crypto companies and the blockchain companies are seeking to develop their technologies in ways that will evade that detection, so it is a constant race between the two sides to be able to effectively investigate and prosecute these crimes.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Arianna Trozze: One of the key ways that legislation can future-proof itself in the face of this rapidly developing technology is via the definitions. I think that the definition of cryptoasset in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill is sufficient to do that. Probably most importantly, the inclusion of cryptographically secured contractual rights means that the definition will cover smart contracts, which is really the technology that underpins all the major advances in the space of, for example, decentralised finance and non-fungible tokens that have taken place, and that we expect to continue to develop in the coming years. Furthermore, the ability to amend those definitions via secondary legislation is clearly a positive, because in the event that something slips through the cracks and develops in a way that we cannot anticipate, it will make it more efficient to change them.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Arianna Trozze: Because they are very clear that they include cryptoassets, it really makes the rules clear for everyone in the industry. Consumers then know as well what rights they have. My view is that it obviously cannot do everything, but the fact that there are provisions for victim compensation goes a long way to also protecting consumers. Obviously, it does not prevent the crimes from occurring, but it helps them to recover the losses.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Arianna Trozze: I cannot really speak to that. I am very sorry about that.
Andy Gould: I cannot either—sorry. I have not looked at that.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Andy Gould: Probably the most obvious area would be around ransomware, which is if you are an organisation and you get hacked and attacked and then lose access to all your files or systems, and then get a demand from a cyber-criminal saying, “Okay, if you want to get access back, you have to pay”—basically, an extortion demand. That extortion demand will virtually always be in cryptocurrency, because there is a view that that is harder to trace.
Depending on the kind of cryptocurrency, the traceability varies. Effectively, a lot of the technology that sits behind cryptocurrencies is based within what is described as the blockchain. Arianna is much better at explaining this than me, but the blockchain is effectively a public ledger, if we are talking about Bitcoin or something like that. We can see all the transactions. It is like your bank account or NatWest or any other bank doing its transactions in the public space—everybody can look at them. It is effectively decentralised and very public, so there are real benefits in that. The anonymity comes from not knowing who is sending what or who is who, in terms of the bank accounts—the wallet equivalent.
That provides opportunities to follow the money, but, although you might be able to see where the money goes, you will not necessarily know who has sent it or who has received it. There are other investigations you would need to do that. And there are tools—mixing services or exchanges—that will jumble it all up and then send it elsewhere, and you will not be able to see what has come in compared with what is going out. That is why criminals like to use it—because, as they see it, it covers their tracks effectively.
Arianna Trozze: One way to make it a bit clearer is to situate cryptocurrency money laundering in the traditional phases of money laundering. When we talk about money laundering, we tend to talk about three specific phases—placement, layering and integration. In the crypto space, placement may look like someone depositing their Government-issue currency into a cryptocurrency exchange, and exchanging it for cryptoassets, or potentially using what is called a fiat on-ramp to buy cryptoassets using their fiat currency. They may also use something like an over-the-counter broker, which may allow them to buy cryptoassets using cash.
Then, the layering process follows, which is kind of what Andy was talking about, in terms of trying to obfuscate the origin and trail of funds. There are a lot of different tactics that the criminals can use to do that. As Andy mentioned, they may use mixing services, to try to break the chain. They may create thousands of different cryptocurrency wallets and accounts and transfer the funds among them in order to make it more difficult to trace. They may exchange them for various different types of cryptoassets, including privacy coins, which we, again, have a lot of trouble chasing, although there have been advancements in that regard. Finally, they may move to completely different blockchains, using what are called blockchain bridges, and that further makes it more difficult to trace—as Andy mentioned before, different providers have different capabilities and different expertise in terms of which chains they specialise in and which assets they are able to trace. That is something else that they may do to hide that trail of funds.
Finally, we have the integration process, which is criminals using those now-cleaned funds for mainstream economic activity. We know that sometimes they may seek to keep those funds in cryptoassets in an attempt to further their gains, speculatively investing in the market; or they may, again, use one of these exchanges or what is called a fiat off-ramp to transfer their cryptoassets back into pounds or any other currency.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Arianna Trozze: Yes, and as it is such a quickly developing technology, there are constantly new ways coming out for criminals to use the technology for various purposes. Again, it is a rush for law enforcement and investigative companies to try to keep up with this.
Andy Gould: To give you a sense of the scale of the challenge, there are thousands of different forms of cryptoassets or cryptocoins in existence. We have to learn to use all the ones that the criminals are using. We can only do it with the private sector. There is no way we can invest in or have the skills in-house to be able to develop all of those tools for all of those different asset classes, so we work really closely with all the big private sector companies to build that capability. It is why we do big open national procurements—because that is the only way it is affordable.
Liam Byrne
Q
Andy Gould: It is really hard to say, because it is so hard to identify or report at scale. However, I would say yes. If you talked to all of the big cyber-incident companies and the threat intelligence companies about what we are seeing, in terms of reporting, then yes, everybody would say that it is rising. Certainly, the crime survey for England and Wales does.
Liam Byrne
Q
Andy Gould: It is both. There is a real mixture. You can have your sophisticated organised crime groups, with some of those having a bit of a crossover with hostile state actors, which makes that more complex to manage. You therefore have a lot of overseas threat at the higher end, but during the pandemic we also saw a shift of mainstream, traditional—if that is the right way of describing them—UK-based criminals moving into cyber-crime, because a lot of the tools are readily available on the internet and are quite easy to use.
Liam Byrne
Q
Andy Gould: Yes, that is right.
Liam Byrne
Q
Andy Gould: Yes, definitely.
Liam Byrne
Q
Andy Gould: I think that a lot more has been invested. I think—
Liam Byrne
That was not the question. Are we investing enough?
Andy Gould: Well, as a police officer, I will always say that you are never investing enough.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Andy Gould: No, there is definitely an element of truth in that. If you have a public blockchain, you can see where it is moving, and that is very open—Bitcoin is the most obvious open public blockchain and the most popular crypto. However, that does not mean that you necessarily know who it is that starts and finishes. That is the issue, and with a lot of the different criminal services available, it is becoming harder and harder to manage. It is becoming more tricky. So, the answer to your question is probably yes and no.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Andy Gould: The Financial Conduct Authority has taken on regulatory powers in this space. I am not an expert in that area, but that is looking pretty promising. A lot of UK-based entities that were offering those services are no longer able to do so, so there has definitely been a clean-up of the market in that space, which is positive.
The challenge is that international regulation, and a lot of the recent work we have seen in that space, has driven a lot of overseas exchanges and providers, which might have been operating in a bit of a grey space, shall we say, to suddenly look to become more legitimate and comply because they want to come into the mainstream financial system. I would use the analogy that the tide is going out on a lot of the more criminal providers. They are effectively being left as “clearly not engaging, clearly criminal”, and a lot of those that may be operating in the grey space in international jurisdictions are becoming more and more legitimate as they clean up their acts.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Andy Gould: Absolutely, yes.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Andy Gould: The average member of the public using cryptocurrency will probably be using an account through one of the legitimate exchanges. They will go through the whole “know your customer” process that they would go through for a bank. Regulation pretty much covers that; I think we are in a good place with it. It is the criminal exchanges and criminal service providers that regulation would not affect. You would not be able to build an infrastructure that stops them being able to create their own wallets, as you could for those accounts with what are effectively crypto banks.
Arianna Trozze: There has been research that some of the KYC processes, especially in some of the higher-risk exchanges, are quite easy to fool with fake documents and other such things. There are companies serving UK customers that are still not registered with the FCA and do not meet its KYC or AML requirements, despite its best efforts. For example, none of the Bitcoin ATMs operating in the UK is registered with the FCA, even though they are supposed to be, and they tend to have quite lax KYC requirements. They may require you to put in a phone number. Some of them have more requirements, but whether it is a rigorous process remains in question.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Arianna Trozze: In my view, the only thing would be more enforcement efforts against non-compliant companies. I do not know how practical that is, or what kinds of resources there are to address the problem, but to me the only way forward is to make sure that those companies and operators know that it is not acceptable to be working and serving UK customers without a licence.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Andy Gould: I think the FCA has prosecution powers and enforcement and regulatory options, but I could not say what it is doing about that.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Andy Gould: I do not know. They only came in earlier this year, so I would be surprised if the FCA has got to the stage where it is able to exercise them in terms of investigation.
Jane Hunt (Loughborough) (Con)
Q
Andy Gould: Yes, definitely. That is a huge benefit of the Bill; it is one of the provisions that we have been asking for. Imagine a scenario where you execute a search warrant on criminal premises: you go in and you can see stolen property, but at the moment, if they are not there, they are not under arrest and there is no existing investigation. You then have no power to take that crypto under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. So yes, that is a big step forward for us.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Andy Gould: No.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Arianna Trozze: I need to think for a moment.
Andy Gould: We are generally very happy with the provisions of the Bill. One area that we might want to look at is storage of the assets. Imagine you have £100 million- worth of cryptocurrency. That is really expensive to store, and there is always a security risk around where it is stored. If we were able to turn that into cash straight away at the point we get the restraint from the magistrates court, and that that was a standard power, a lot of that cost and security concern would be taken away. That would be one area where we could improve.
There is an existing power under POCA, where you can go to the Crown court and make that application, but that can be contested by the defendant. There is a cost associated with that. If we had a standard power to do that, I think we would be a bit happier, but we are generally very happy with the provisions in the Bill.
Arianna Trozze: I would echo that I generally think the Bill goes far enough—as far as is technologically possible at this time. I do not think there is anything that I personally would amend at this time.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Arianna Trozze: I see both sides of that argument. Obviously, if assets are transferred into cash and then the original assets significantly gain value, and if the person with the assets were then found not to be a person of crime, the Government would be on the hook for the change in value of those assets. There are two sides to the argument but, as Andy mentioned, the storage is quite risky and very expensive. I ultimately agree, but I see both sides of the argument.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Andy Gould: It is quite commercially sensitive, but it could be a large sum—we are talking hundreds of thousands of pounds.
The Chair
Okay, we have come to the end of this session. Thank you very much for joining us.
Examination of Witness
Jonathan Hall KC gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Jonathan Hall: I am the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. I also have a bit of a background in crypto from my practice as a barrister, which is why I was interested in this whole area. I was asked by the Government to feed into some of the clauses as they went through, and I am here to talk about the crypto aspect.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Jonathan Hall: I do not know about the resources of the NCA, but in terms of whether the powers go far enough, I think there are some areas where they perhaps go too far, or at least where I think, from a fundamental rights and individual rights perspective, some attention may need to be drawn. There is the simple question whether you should be able to seize cryptoassets on the basis of the fact that they might be used by terrorists. Of course you should. Then you have the complicated question of how you bring about a seizure regime where assets are not physical. It is one thing if you seize a jewel or some cash, but it is another thing if you are effectively seizing information. What you have here is a very lengthy set of provisions to allow you to do that.
Generally speaking, I think it works, but there are one or two areas I want to draw to your attention. The first, which I think is acceptable but worth thinking about, is that the power is a power to seize not just cryptoassets but crypto-related items. In practice, you are not seizing a thing; you are seizing a code and that can be written down on a bit of paper or on a computer. What these provisions do, unlike all the other seizure powers that say you can seize the jewel, the cash or the contents of a bank account, is that they allow the police to seize any item, which could be a computer, or a piece of paper. So, it is quite a wide seizure power. I think it is kept effectively within bounds, but it is something that is worth drawing attention to, which is different from other aspects of seizure in this field.
The next point is that you have to be able to convert crypto and there are several reasons for that; one is because the prices may go massively up or down. Individuals whose assets are the subject of seizures may never be prosecuted—and this is a civil remedy—and, in fact, no final application for forfeiture may ever be brought. That is particularly true in the context of terrorism, because often what counter-terrorism police will want to do is disrupt the transfer, but they will not necessarily want to go on and apply to forfeit. The figures from last year show that there is a disparity between the number of accounts that are frozen and the amount of money that is finally the subject of forfeiture.
The Government did listen to my views on this issue. It is important that the Bill has provisions such that both the police can apply to convert the cryptocurrency into, say, pounds sterling, and that it is also open to the individual from whom it is seized, who might say, “Look, I bought this crypto. It’s gone massively up in value. You’re never going to apply to forfeit this. I don’t want to lose out on the rise of value.” There is provision in the Bill for the individual to go to court and say, “I’m a person from whom the crypto has been seized. Please can you convert it?” That will be decided by the court, but it is good that that provision is in the Bill; I think it works.
Is this too boring and long? I mean, there is a third bit, which I think is the most difficult bit. It is the power of a magistrates court to require a UK-connected wallet provider to freeze the cryptoassets and, even more significantly, to require that the UK-connected crypto wallet provider should actually pay the money over to the court. It is slightly in the weeds, but what the Government have done—and I understand it—is to try to be quite novel. They are really trying to push the law here, because they realise that many of crypto wallet providers will not be based in the UK, but this comes with a consequence regarding how the Bill is currently worded. I will just give you the bit that I think may need a bit of attention; it is clause 10Z7B—
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Jonathan Hall: Yes, I will. It is clause 10Z7B(7).
The Chair
Q
Jonathan Hall: I am not sure I have got the same document; I have got the Public Bill Committee document for 30 September and it is on page 10.
The Chair
Q
Jonathan Hall: I will just flag it up to you. It defines a UK-connected cryptoasset service provider. It includes a provider
“ which…is acting in the course of business carried on by it in the United Kingdom.”
Well, that is completely fair enough; if they are carrying on business in the United Kingdom, they should be subject to court orders. However, it then has this provision:
“has terms and conditions with the persons to whom it provides services which provide for a legal dispute to be litigated in the courts of a part of the United Kingdom”.
I will just put the flag up and then allow the Committee to move on. That is quite a wide extension of UK jurisdiction over companies that may be based abroad and potentially over victims who may have claims overseas.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Jonathan Hall: Let us imagine that counter-terrorism police have intelligence that there is an Islamic State cell that has been fundraising in Birmingham, and they are going to try to transfer the funds that they have managed to raise to an active cell based in Syria. Their plan is to do that by using Bitcoin. Let us imagine counter-terrorism police had intelligence that that was about to happen. They could raid the premises where the UK-based cell was operating. They could seize a bit of paper on which the crucial key is written down, which would allow the transfer of the funds to take place to Syria. They could then use that key to grab the cryptoassets—let us say it is £1 million-worth of assets that are about to be converted, or have been converted, into cryptocurrency—and transfer the cryptocurrency to a police-controlled wallet or to another provider who they trust.
That money, which would otherwise have gone out to Syria to buy guns and so on, will then be seized by the police. If the police have evidence to do so, they could in six or 12 months’ or up to three years’ time, go to a magistrates court and say, “We can prove that this cryptocurrency was going to be used for the purposes of terrorism” or “It was the resources of a proscribed organisation, Islamic State. Can you now please order that the money be seized and transferred to the Treasury?” Does that help?
Jackie Doyle-Price
Yes, not only is that a brilliant explanation that brings this to life, but it is a great plot for a film.
Jonathan Hall: It is real life. There was a man called Hisham Chaudhary who was convicted last year of doing more or less that.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Jonathan Hall: We can never be confident it is completely future-proof, but it is necessary and definitely a very strong step in the right direction. As I say, I have one reservation about overseas companies where I think it may go a bit too far. It may just be a question of deleting one part of the provision I read out to you. In general, it is a good step.
The Chair
I think the number of the page you are looking for is in the amendment document on page 47 and it is new schedule 1. I think that is what you were referring to, Mr Hall. I am going to move on anyway.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Jonathan Hall: In the counter-terrorism world, there is an open question about quite how much this blockchain technology will be used by terrorists. There is quite a lot of excitement about the possibility of its use, but the jury is slightly out about how much it is, in fact, being used. I cannot speculate why that would be. Counter-terrorism is a well-resourced part of police business, so I would expect that there would be specialists who would be willing to stay because they are quite highly motivated; outside counter-terrorism, I do not know. I was very struck by the point about the £200,000 transfer fee.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Jonathan Hall: Do you mean the Russia-Ukraine aspect?
Dame Margaret Hodge
Ukraine gives one a sort of focus on the worst aspects of dirty money, but are we really being as comprehensive as you were when you did the counter-terrorism stuff there?
Jonathan Hall: The one thing that I think would make all the difference would be to resource Companies House. I follow Graham Barrow on Twitter—I think he is giving evidence—and occasionally I look at the overseas entities register, and, as he has pointed out, there are these anonymous chip shops in Barnsley, which have about 57 British Virgin Islands companies attached to them. It seems that that is the low-hanging fruit: having a well-resourced Companies House that can tackle the entries, verify them and prosecute them.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Jonathan Hall: The funny thing is that there is a principle in law that, if someone is giving advice to someone in order to commit a crime, legal professional privilege does not apply. It is quite hard to find examples of cases in which that doctrine has been applied, so I do not know whether it is about law enforcement having the confidence, when they have a lawyer who is deeply engaged in advising someone to break the law, to say, “We don’t care that you are saying this is privilege because we are going to run the case and say it is for a criminal purpose”. Beyond that, I do not know. I am a lawyer and I completely support maintaining access to justice—of course I do. But you are also completely right that lawyers and trust companies are at the heart of this issue, and I am afraid there are professional enablers.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Jonathan Hall: I have not got an answer beyond the one I gave before, I am afraid. I am sorry; I have not thought of a positive thing. I would just remove that subsection (b) from the definition of UK-connected cryptoasset service provider.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Jonathan Hall: It is quite a bit step to convert it to fiat currency, or pounds, because you are then interfering with the bet that person has placed on the value of the currency going up. I do not know what the figure is in terms of storage. I am interested, too, in the question of potential police liability. I am thinking about the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. As you know, before the Government brought in the suite of changes that allowed urgent sanctions, they were very careful to narrow down the potential liability that the Government might have in relation to sanctions, if they were challenged. I have not given it attention, but maybe it is worth having a look at whether there are equivalent protections for the police. The seizures can be very high in this field—they can measure many millions—so the potential liability of the police could be quite high. We would not want the police to be too disincentivised by the risk that they would be on the hook for damages, if everything goes wrong.
In terms of the balance, it may be that ultimately one or other party—the person from whom the assets are seized, or the police—is going to suffer some sort of loss. The key thing is to make sure that people have access to the courts. The courts will have to generate their own sort of expertise and case law over when you should convert a currency. I can imagine that someone will come to the magistrates court saying, “My assets have been frozen. Now is the time for converting them from Bitcoin into Ethereum”, and the court says, “What? How do I determine that?” There will need to be a body of expertise. This is a minor point, but it is something that I support: one of the intentions is to allow quite a wide range of law enforcement personnel to be responsible for the court proceedings, precisely so that you can develop a cadre of people who have got that sort of expertise.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Jonathan Hall: I do not want to say. The key thing is that I am not a Scottish lawyer, and I am not going to try and opine on whether there is a legitimate use of them. The key thing is basic enforcement. You made the point that there are zombie companies. Well, someone in Companies House needs to follow these things up. I am sure they will, but the resourcing of Companies House is where I would put my money.
Liam Byrne
Q
Jonathan Hall: It is a serious problem. I would say that the reason we have not faced the wave of mass casualty terrorist attacks in the UK, in contrast to America, is the lack of readily available firearms. That is the key thing. It is why the growth of the extreme right wing and all these ideologies that inspire mass killings, the obsession with Columbine and so on, have not resulted in mass shootings. From a national security perspective, the real concern is the alignment—if it happens—between terrorist organisations and those in organised crime, who do have the capacity to source firearms. That is a really important point.
Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Second sitting)
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Chair
Our first witnesses, the fifth panel, are Martin Swain from Companies House and Adrian Searle from the National Economic Crime Centre.
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
May I just declare an interest, very briefly?
The Chair
Absolutely. We will all listen with bated breath to the Minister’s declaration of interest.
Tom Tugendhat
I simply refer to my wider declaration in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.
The Chair
Thank you. Mr Swain, would you introduce yourself briefly for the record?
Martin Swain: Good afternoon. I am Martin Swain. I am one of the executive directors of Companies House, with responsibility for—
The Chair
You will have to speak up, because the acoustics in this room are very poor.
Martin Swain: Apologies. At Companies House, I have responsibility for policy, strategy and communications, and legal services.
The Chair
Thank you. Mr Searle?
Adrian Searle: Good afternoon. I am Adrian Searle. I am director of the National Economic Crime Centre. I am here with two hats on: as the director of the NECC, as it is called, and as a director within the National Crime Agency—so I can make comments about both the NECC and the NCA. If it helpful, I can explain a little bit about what the NECC is.
The Chair
No, I do not think so; we do not have time for that. I call Seema Malhotra to ask the first question.
Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)
Q
My second question is to both of you. Do you believe the Bill should go further and reform the strike-off procedure for companies? There is a recognised issue where companies are building up debts, not filing a return and then being struck off as one of the routes through which money laundering may be taking place, with limited room for manoeuvre after that. Would there be any benefits to reforming that process? Is there any consideration, for example, of companies being placed in a compulsory liquidation procedure? I would be interested in your thoughts on that.
Martin Swain: As you say, we have £63 million through the spending review for transformation. We are two thirds of the way through our transformation programme at the moment. It is fair to say that we have been clear with the Department and Treasury that we are taking on significant new functions and responsibilities. Some of that will require more people and people with different skills from those that we have now. Companies House is a register of information, so a lot of our people do processing work. We will need to move those people off that. We will need to employ skills that we do not currently have, so we are actively talking to the Department and the Treasury about our funding model.
To your point on fees, yes, we could increase fees to pay for additional resources. I know there is some challenge around the fee being too low. Again, we have taken provision in the Bill to charge fees for different things that we currently cannot charge fees for. For example, we cannot currently recover costs for investigation and enforcement activity, as it is centrally funded. We are taking powers to do things differently. I do not think I am at a stage to be able to say we have a definitive figure that we have agreed with the Department or Treasury that would give us our funding model for the future.
The Chair
Mr Searle?
Adrian Searle: I think the question that was probably targeted towards me is not about the resources in Companies House, but the second, follow-up question relating to striking companies—
Seema Malhotra
It was about how to tackle economic crime and whether the reform of the strike-off process is important to that.
Adrian Searle: The strike-off process is not something I have a detailed understanding of. I suspect Martin might be better placed to answer that question.
Martin Swain: Again, it is something we are very aware of. Companies take advantage of the strike-off route to discharge themselves of debts and so on, and for other purposes. My sense is probably that the Bill as drafted gives us what we need. It is about how we take forward the policy in that area regarding where companies are moved to strike off. For example, we get lots of representation with regard to lots of companies being registered at one address—a registered office being used and abused. The route for that would be to default them to our address at Companies House, for not having a registered office address that is valid. The next step on that would be strike-off, but clearly if we do that we may be having an adverse impact on the system and giving companies a route to use it for criminal activity or to fold without paying their debts. We are very aware of the issue.
The Minister for Industry (Jackie Doyle-Price)
Q
Adrian Searle: I think we have. There is, as you say, a real challenge to get the balance right between a prosperity and a security agenda. As we know, the Companies House reform elements of the Bill are a long time coming, so there has been lots of analysis and consideration of how you get the balance right. What I know from a law enforcement investigative perspective is that the changes being introduced under the Bill will certainly make the job of law enforcement far more straightforward in terms of our ability to investigate criminals and corrupt elites who are exploiting the complexity of the corporate structures to hide their assets, launder their wealth, and so on. I am confident that it gives Companies House and, by extension, the investigative agencies the powers we need. The indications that I have from exchanges with Martin and others in the industry are that the changes do not go so far that they inhibit transparent business practices in a way that undermines our economy. It feels to me that the balance is right.
Martin Swain: It is a very good point. It is a challenge for us as an organisation, because we have very clear direction from our Ministers that we should not create a burden for business, or make it difficult for companies to incorporate or for people to invest in the UK. The concept of balance is always there for us. We will bring in things such as ID verification, but we need to make that really efficient, and make it easy for people to understand the process, so that we do not create a burden for the vast majority of companies on our register that are legitimate businesses. That is quite a tension sometimes, because there is a significant spotlight on Companies House to become more than the passive register that we are at the moment, and to become—I hear this term—an “active gatekeeper” of the register. There is a potential that we move too far into that territory and make it harder for the vast majority of companies to deal with us.
I mentioned our transformation programme. There are two elements to our transformation. One is the legislative reform and all that is involved with that. The second part is digitising our services. That is what we have been focusing on in the last few years: making our systems really quick and easy to use, and to drive data, rather than receiving information on paper. You cannot work effectively with law enforcement from paper transactions; you have to have data.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Martin Swain: It is a huge culture change for us, not least in becoming more of a proactive agency. I hear it said that Companies House will be key to the economic crime ecosystem; what I say to people is that we will also be part of the business growth ecosystem. It is important that we have that dual role.
Adrian Searle: I think there is real value for businesses in being able to trust the other businesses they are dealing with. There is a strong argument that the transparency agenda supports the business agenda.
Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)
Q
Martin Swain: At the moment we are in the design phase for verification. I should say first of all that we will not do the ID verification ourselves; we will outsource that.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Martin Swain: At the moment we are looking at two options. We are working closely with Government Digital Service and others on the potential for the Government solution. We have been clear with them about our requirements with them. We are separately looking at market options, whereby we would go to the private sector and outsource via that route, where a number of providers can do identity checks.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Martin Swain: It goes back to some of the things that I said about ease of doing business. There are two key parts of our specification: whether we can make it really efficient, and fast and easy for people to do, and whether it is at an equivalent standard to the industry standard. We are very clear that we are operating along the same lines as others in the system.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Martin Swain: I heard that, and I am surprised that they are saying that. I will have a conversation with them about where that has come from.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Martin Swain: People with significant control will be subject to verification—beneficial owners, but not shareholders who have less than 25%.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Martin Swain: It was a decision by the Department and Ministers, post consultation. They consulted on the whole area of shareholders, and the information that they hold, and verification. The decision was that they would not be subject to verification.
James Daly (Bury North) (Con)
Q
Martin Swain: One of the main measures is ID verification. That is one of the biggest gaps in our register at the moment. We do not verify people who are setting up and running companies. The fact that we will know them and have verified them is key. We are taking considerable powers in the Bill to do things that we cannot do at the moment. We cannot query information that is filed with us. We cannot analyse and proactively share information. At the moment, we are very reactive. I use the word “passive”, and “reactive” is another word that I would use. We react to colleagues such as Adrian coming to us saying that they want information on certain things. In the future, we will be able to do our own intelligence work and will proactively be able to work with law enforcement.
James Daly
Q
Adrian Searle: For sure. It is a really fundamental change. I already have folk from my intelligence and investigative teams in the National Crime Agency working with colleagues in the Companies House teams to help them to set the road map for how they will transform.
Dame Margaret Hodge (Barking) (Lab)
Q
The Chair
We now resume the evidence session. Mr Swain is going to answer the question that was put to him by Dame Margaret Hodge.
Martin Swain: The question was about the balance of burden against tackling economic crime. I think you asked about the need for smarter regulation. I totally agree. Part of the challenge is how we use our powers in future. I would say that the way in which we use our powers will be around the integrity of the register; we will focus our activity on where we can have the most impact to improve the integrity of the register. In doing so, we do not want to create a burden for legitimate businesses.
The benefit of focusing on the integrity of the register is that we create value. As Adrian said, we already contribute a significant amount of money to the UK economy. If we can improve the integrity of the register so that people are making better decisions based on the data, and people are not being defrauded because of the way in which we are improving the integrity of the register, to me that is what smarter registration should be about.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Martin Swain: We will not be replacing the AML supervision, which rests with the AML supervisors. The Bill introduces a number of measures around ACSPs which we currently do not do. For an ACSP to file with us, they will need to register with us.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Martin Swain: With us. This is separate to their AML supervision. In order to file with us, they will need to register. We will verify the identities of the people who run the agency—the agents—and we will require them to confirm who they are supervised for for AML purposes. We will cross-check that with the AML supervisors. There are also some new offences in the Bill, so people will be required to maintain their records of their supervision with us. If they are suspended from their AML supervisor and do not tell us, that will be an offence. They will also have to maintain records of verification, which we will have the power to check. None of that exists at the moment. An agent can file with us without any of those things happening.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Martin Swain: Yes.
Dame Margaret Hodge
But it does nothing.
Martin Swain: I am not going to answer from HMRC’s perspective. If we are talking about smarter regulation, the benefit is that we will have a power and an ability to go back to HMRC and raise flags where we see activity from agents that is not consistent with what we want.
Dame Margaret Hodge
That is very helpful, thank you. I have a quick question for Adrian.
Adrian Searle: Can I come in on that earlier question? The requirement that the company service provider has a UK footprint is a significant shift. Prior to this Bill, overseas-based service providers could provide that third-party service to registered companies. That is a fundamental challenge. When there is a UK footprint, whether it is the supervisory bodies or, potentially, the investigative agencies, we have got a starting point that we can go after, which you cannot do when there is an overseas base.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Adrian, with your wider remit, there has been a huge decrease in the number of cases that have been taken by the SFO and indeed by all the agencies. One reason is the fear of costs landing on those agencies—for example, the NCA—if they lose the case. Can you give us a view? Do you think we should have a cost cap, in the way we have with unexplained wealth orders? Do you think we should have the American system whereby no costs at all are given to the litigant or the person accused of wrongdoing at the end? What is your view of that?
Adrian Searle: We are certainly very keen to continue to look at that. The cost capping in the UWO regime is attractive. I understand that other colleagues and Government, in particular the Ministry of Justice, have had conversations. They are having concerns raised that that undermines the core principle of loser pays. There are different views on this issue.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Adrian Searle: We find cost capping an attractive proposition, but we also understand that it is challenging. In addition, we are speaking to colleagues in the Home Office and the Treasury about the establishment of a regime that will help us to manage the risk associated with potential big financial costs if we were to lose a case. There is a governance system that they are proposing to put in place that will help us to manage those risks. It is still early days, and conversations are ongoing, but at least colleagues in Government recognise the challenge that we face. There is no doubt a chilling effect on the agency from the risk associated with financial costs.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Adrian Searle: I assume that is a reference to the ARIS system—the asset recovery incentivisation scheme. As it currently stands, we get 50%.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Adrian Searle: It is certainly true for the NCA and policing. I would need to check whether that runs across the whole system. I can come back to you on that.
Liam Byrne (Birmingham, Hodge Hill) (Lab)
Q
Martin Swain: Not yet, to my knowledge. We have had the confirmation of part of our £63 million, but we are in conversations with the Department around future budgets.
Liam Byrne
Q
Martin Swain: It would be very difficult for me to describe what a gold standard would be at this point. We have put in a significant proposal to the Department as part of our spending review preparations.
Liam Byrne
Q
Martin Swain: I cannot give you a figure on the budget, but in terms of numbers of people, it was in excess of an extra 100 people.
Liam Byrne
Q
Martin Swain: That was our assessment at the time. It obviously depends how quickly we can digitise services because, as I said earlier in the session, the quicker we can digitise things, the more we can move people off manual processing into other work. I think it also depends on what the final shape of the legislation is when it gets through. We saw that with the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022, where there were things, as the legislation went through, that changed and we had to adapt and do things differently. It would be wrong of me to estimate it at this point, before the legislation has passed.
Liam Byrne
Q
Martin Swain: I would probably say we do not need to. We have this package of reform, and it is fair to say we have worked really closely with the Department and people like the Treasury on what the package of reform needs to look like. We have been heavily involved, and we have been able to influence some of the thinking around what the reform needs to look like. However, I think nobody would disagree with the need to reform Companies House. Certainly, we would not; we welcome these reforms with open arms. As an agency, it is probably fair to say that we are hugely excited by the prospect of being able to do things that we have not been able to do in the past.
Liam Byrne
Q
Martin Swain: I have not said they failed to agree it. We have not got to that point of agreement yet.
Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)
Q
Martin Swain: I do not think we would have the capacity to do ID verification internally, certainly not within the timescale that we are looking at bringing it in. I go back to my point—and I will pick up the point with UK Finance—that we will be operating ID verification to standards that are appropriate across sectors that use ID verification. With any aspect of these reforms, there is potential for gaps in the system. What we are trying to do is design out gaps in the system. However, I think we know from the current companies framework that there are gaps in the system, and even where you plug those gaps, others will appear.
The Chair
Thank you very much indeed to both of you for your evidence. It has been very helpful. We now move on to the next panel.
Examination of Witnesses
Commander Nik Adams, Simon Welch and Michelle Crotty gave evidence.
The Chair
Good afternoon. We now have Commander Nik Adams from the City of London police, Simon Welch representing the National Police Chiefs’ Council, and Michelle Crotty from the Serious Fraud Office. May I ask each of you to introduce yourselves briefly, please?
Commander Adams: Good afternoon. I am Nik Adams, commander in the City of London police and the current lead on economic and cyber-crime.
Simon Welch: Good afternoon. I am Simon Welch, the national co-ordinator for the National Police Chiefs’ Council on the economic crime portfolio.
Michelle Crotty: I am Michelle Crotty, chief capability officer at the Serious Fraud Office.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Commander Adams: Shall I start, as the City of London senior rep? I have the advantage and the disadvantage of having been in this job only since April, so I can give you a view of where I think things have got to. I obviously was not part of the network when that report was written. I think it reflected an approach to economic crime that has been very much built bottom up historically, which led to the assessment that policing was fairly fragmented, with different levels of investment and different prioritisation across forces.
As long as economic crime and fraud, in particular, are not part of the strategic policing requirement, it is difficult to really get police forces to galvanise that response. We have seen, however, some fantastic work by the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners to get fraud and economic crime into police and crime plans. We have seen through the support that the City of London police has provided, as the co-ordinating force, a great deal of consistency starting to layer on in local forces. In this year alone, we have visited 29 out of all 43 forces to look at their delivery of the economic crime response and of shared good practice across the country. That bottom-up has given us those improved levels of consistency.
Through the spending review and the police uplift programme, we are seeing significant investment at both a regional and a national level to help us to build some of those capabilities. By the end of this year, we will have proactive economic crime teams built around a consistent model in every single regional organised crime unit. With the anticipated investment from the economic crime levy, we will see the growth of regional economic crime teams—proactive financial investigation at a regional level—and, with our support, the continued network of those teams across the country, which will give us a growing and more consistent approach as we go forward.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Dame Margaret Hodge
I will read out the two figures. The number of crimes under investigation has halved in the past three years, and convictions for fraud offences, according to national crime statistics, have decreased by 67% since 2011. What you are talking about is theoretical; it is not what is happening. At the same time, fraud is going up and up.
Stephen Kinnock
Will you say a word about why that is? The system seems not to be working, so what do we need to do to fix it?
Commander Adams: I will start and then bring in Simon, who is an expert on money laundering. The first thing to say is that fraud is getting increasingly complex. About 70% of all fraud emanates from overseas and, as Adrian touched on, it is very difficult for us to obtain prosecutions and convictions across jurisdictions. That is a real challenge for us, as are the growth in technology, the way in which fraudsters are now exploiting people and the changes in tactics.
Fraudsters are moving away from unauthorised payment fraud, where people’s details are stolen and used fraudulently—banks are now preventing somewhere in the region of 65p in every pound of that type of activity—and we are now seeing much more sophisticated frauds, where people are socially engineered, or manipulated, into physically approving transactions. That of course is much harder for technological solutions to prevent, when the target is a human being.
Of course, all that complexity requires a much more complex and sophisticated policing response. As I described, the growth that is coming down the line—in particular the proactive growth—will not start landing until the end of this year and then, of course, we are several years before we have fully experienced and really competent and effective investigators working on those crimes. All those things will layer on over a period. We anticipate that the technological advances will continue, both in support of us and in challenging us in how we can investigate and progress these crimes. Simon, do you want to comment specifically on money laundering?
Simon Welch: On money laundering, the amount of offences—detected offences—is going down. Criminals are getting a lot more savvy about our tactics and things like that, so we find that they are not having assets in their own names so much—vehicles, houses, things like that—and our opportunities for confiscation are probably going down a bit. However, what you can see from the seizure figures is that the cash value is up, but the volume is down. We are targeting and getting good results from the cases, but it is a smaller number of cases. In reality, POCA is now quite old, and people are used to us going after the money, so they take far more steps to protect that money from us being able to confiscate it.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Michelle Crotty: At the moment, we have those pre-investigation powers for overseas bribery and corruption. They allow us to investigate earlier, in particular to identify banking evidence earlier, and to see whether there is a case to pursue. By extending that to fraud and domestic-based issues, we are enabled to do that in those cases. At the moment, we have to take on a case formally and to commit resource in order to exercise the powers. To some extent, we can negotiate on occasion with companies to get that material, but if we have the power of compulsion, it would make it quicker and easier to get the material and so identify whether there is a case there.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Michelle Crotty: Yes.
Jackie Doyle-Price
And to address some of the questions we heard earlier—if you can act more quickly and establish whether a crime has been committed, that is clearly more efficient.
Michelle Crotty: It is more efficient and means that, if we follow the money and there is a reasonable explanation, we can screen a case out more quickly, rather than committing more resource and taking longer to reach that decision.
Alison Thewliss
Q
“Company formation and related professional services are therefore a key enabler or gatekeeper of”
trade-based money laundering. Is there enough in the Bill to remove that risk?
Simon Welch: It is difficult to say. We have heard about the verification processes going on. With the authorised corporate service providers, if we strengthen all that and make things more difficult, we target harm. At the moment, you can register a company from abroad, and there is little opportunity for us to follow that up, especially in a jurisdiction that it is difficult to get information from. The idea of having ACSPs in this country, where we can see them and start the inquiry from the UK, would be very desirable. I am not sure whether the Bill goes that far; I have not read that bit too much.
The Chair
Sorry, you are going to have to speak up. We all wish to hear the answer.
Simon Welch: Sorry—I appreciate that. Authorised corporate service providers, if they are based in this country so that we have a starting point for our inquiry, would be something that we would welcome. That would make it easier for us to start an inquiry. At the moment, if it is coming from a jurisdiction that is not particularly co-operative with us, it might be difficult for us to get that information, so, clearly, we would want to see that.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Michelle Crotty: No. Anything that will help us to identify suspects is welcome, as my colleague has said.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Simon Welch: If they can still get the companies and they can still make them work, they are going to make them work. It is if we make it prohibitively difficult for them to do that—if we make it difficult for them to create their verifications, because they will have to work harder to get the verification sorted out to make sure they have got the IDs sorted out. We have talked about the fee of £12.50 for registering a company. There are lots of arguments about that—frictionless trade and things like that—but we have the lowest price for registering a company pretty much anywhere in the world.
Alison Thewliss
Yes—by some margin.
Simon Welch: So is there a view for increasing that and using it for Companies House to invest in verification? That is something that could be looked at.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Simon Welch: I do not know. If you were to ask a businessman what they were prepared to start a company for—how many companies they are looking to start? At the end of the day, if you were just building a couple of companies and you knew you were going to get a really good service, you might be quite happy to pay £100 or whatever. I do not know what is a reasonable price.
Commander Adams: One of the challenges for us in our investigations is how desirable shell companies are to criminals who want to create a legacy pattern that an organisation has been running for many more years than it actually has. Of course, if you are then into a large-scale boiler room-type fraud, whether you are paying £12, £100 or £1,000, it is simply a drop in the ocean compared with the amount of money you are going to make at the end of that. Making it harder for people to inappropriately and unlawfully use shell companies in the way they are at the moment is what will help us ultimately.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Commander Adams: If I am right, the Bill allows for retrospective work to take place. However, as you have alluded to, there are simply millions of entities on there. As you heard from colleagues earlier, the resourcing of those retrospective checks, given all the work that has to be done—there are something like 1,500 companies registered every day in the UK; it is phenomenal—is going to be a real challenge. We would want to see resourcing to do those retrospective checks, to remove those companies from the register as quickly as possible.
James Daly
Q
Commander Adams: Again, you heard from colleagues earlier about this. The big thing for us is making sure that checks are undertaken to ensure that individuals who are setting up companies or have a significant stake in them are verified, to give us, as Adrian said, those investigative lines of inquiry into individuals. For us, that is the biggest game changer in what we are currently seeing, but of course it will require the right level of scrutiny and adequate robustness in those checks, and the capacity to do them at speed.
James Daly
Ms Crotty?
Michelle Crotty: The same—anything that allows us to identify the people behind it and then to use that to follow up with lines of inquiry. Capacity is certainly something that we would be concerned about, but the work that the NCA and the NECC are doing with Companies House should help with that, in terms of training Companies House staff.
Simon Welch: It would also be nice to be able to data wash some of the registrations through law enforcement indices before they were actually registered. That is obviously another quantum leap from where we are now. I think we are looking at sharing that data, but that is another thing for Companies House to work out, in liaison probably with the NECC. I think that would be preferable for us. Then we could prevent these companies from opening up in the first place, and stop them being used as vehicles for criminality.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Michelle Crotty: We are very strongly on the record as saying that that is an offence that we would like to see. We have seen good results with it in relation to bribery and corruption since its introduction in 2010. Nine of our 12 deferred prosecution agreements have involved a failure to prevent bribery offence. We think that it not only punishes but helps to reform corporate behaviour. What we have seen with the Bribery Act 2010 is that companies have very much focused on putting adequate procedures in place because that is the defence that it provides them. The prosecution is one part of it, but actually the preventive work in terms of adequate procedures is as important, if not more important.
The other thing that we would say in terms of the impact on business is that for a failure to prevent economic crime offence many of the adequate procedures would already be in place in terms of anti-money laundering and other areas. Clearly that is something that the Committee, and guidance, would need to work through, but the impact on business may not be as heavy as some might fear.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Commander Adams: Yes. Ultimately, as Michelle said, I do not think that the imposition on business would be that significant. There are lots of areas where we see unintended consequences of thresholds upon which, or below which, things are not reported to law enforcement. That sort of legislation would give us the ability to ensure that there are policies and processes in place in institutions to provide the sorts of checks and balances that identify patterns that might fall outside some of the clearly defined breaches of legislation. That, for me, would be the galvanising benefit of that power, in a not dissimilar way to financial institutions reimbursing victims, which helps to galvanise effort and investment into preventing crime, to avoid spending money out the other end. All those sorts of measures are really helpful. Particularly through Adrian’s role as director of the NECC, I think he would say that the things that help to galvanise the partnership and the whole-system response to fraud is where we will ultimately see our biggest successes.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Michelle Crotty: The SFO would like to see those. We understand the concerns that other parts of the system have in terms of how you ringfence a cost regime just for economic crime. In terms of what the SFO can recover in any one year, we can retain £900,000 of legal costs if we win. Clearly, it is the other way if we lose, and there are ongoing discussions with the Treasury. I gave evidence to another Committee last week that, where we do not have a fund available to us for that that sits within our budget, we have to go and negotiate one with the Treasury if we lose. We would certainly welcome some protections, but we understand the challenges around fitting them into the broader scheme.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Simon Welch: Obviously, we are putting more resource into this area. If we are to go after them proactively, we are building up our intelligence around this. Historically, fraud has not been given the same emphasis as other types of criminality, so I think we lack in some areas. If we start to build that up, to get more intelligence that is actionable for us to work on, and to go after some of these people proactively as opposed to reactively, we will be getting ahead of the game, and then we will be able to arrest these people and prevent other people from becoming victims. It is important to invest in this area. It is a difficult time for us, because recruitment and retention of staff are challenging. We are looking to build, and are getting investment streams coming into us. We are looking to develop that all across the piece. We are looking at the intelligence and at the proactive capability and the investigative capability to take this on.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Simon Welch: Resources are a big part of it, but there is experience as well. If we bring in new people, they are unlikely to be the most experienced investigators. Unfortunately, in recent times, we have lost a lot of our middle-ranking, experienced investigators, so we are having to bring people through quite quickly. There is quite a quick turnover now, especially in things like crypto investigations, because those skills are very desirable in the private sector. It is really difficult for us to hang on to those people, so we are going through a bit of a treadmill trying to recruit and hang on to them. Mr Adams is looking at things like structures and strategies within the force to try to hold on to people and to look at different ways of retaining those skills and experience to make us that much better at investigating these things.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Michelle Crotty: It is fail to prevent for us, and it is capacity, capability and retention. As my colleague said, we can train people up with fantastic training, but the real challenge is that they are then very valuable recruits—not just to the private sector, but within the law enforcement community and in how we operate jointly to ensure that we build a pathway for people within law enforcement, as well as out into the private sector.
Commander Adams: The final thing to add to all of that is technology. The licences for the tools that we are able to use at the moment, particularly some of the tools for tracking crypto assets, are expensive. When you start to build up those layers of individual costs that Simon described on the tools and technology, to be really effective we have to bring those together with highly skilled and highly competent individuals. All that is a challenge for us at the moment, in the recruitment environment that we face.
Liam Byrne
Q
Commander Adams: I am not sure that my impression is the thing to take as gospel here. We see from the crime survey, our annual reporting and the growth in trends around victimisation that fraud is growing year on year. We predict that there could be anywhere from 25% to 65% growth in fraud over the next four to five years. If we were to go around the room and ask for a show of hands on who has received a smishing or phishing message, versus those who have been burgled in the past 12 months, I think we would be staggered at the volume.
Liam Byrne
Q
Commander Adams: It is a really complex landscape. We have a great deal of investment from the private sector in some of our specialist capabilities. We need more investment at the frontline of policing in undertaking economic crime investigations at that most basic level. That does not mean more people; it means investment in training to ensure that all frontline officers can deliver that.
Liam Byrne
Q
Simon Welch: As Mr Adams says, we could always do with more people—if you ask, we will always say we want more staff—but the reality is that it is difficult to bring them in at the moment because we are not offering wages that are competitive with some of the other agencies or the private sector. We are struggling to build that up. If we can build that up and maintain some trajectory so we can hang on to some of the staff to get them to an experienced level, we will start to see more impact on performance there, but we need to work on that really hard.
Commander Adams: I touched at the beginning on the investment and the proactivity around both financial investigation and fraud investigation. We have to see some of that investment land, get people into the posts, do the work that City of London police is doing as the national lead force to co-ordinate that activity across the country, and see what effect that has. That will then inform the business case and the arguments that we make for more or different resource in the future.
Liam Byrne
Q
Commander Adams: That might be one for Simon.
Simon Welch: Yes. You can identify a person of significant control, but sometimes it can be difficult if you are looking at the people who ultimately have control of some of those companies, because you have people stood up saying they are that person, but there are people sitting behind that person. It depends how good your intelligence is whether you can work these things out. Very often, if you investigate these people, you will be able to see that they have control of the company. If you do not investigate them, you will not be able to tell. You need to be on them with the right intelligence to work it, and then you might have an opportunity to show that they were running that company.
Liam Byrne
Q
Simon Welch: As an ex-policeman, I will always say yes to that, but obviously there are implications, because you need the resources down there to do it. Obviously, we will always go for the gold standard wherever possible, because if you are doing that, you are stopping people getting in at the first level, but there are obviously implications of the cost of that. But yes, of course we want the highest standards of verification.
Liam Byrne
Q
Michelle Crotty: It is certainly an issue for us. We would be interested in the proposal. If the evidence is overseas, even if the offence is based here, I think we would want to think through the mechanics of the prosecution. There would be some detail to work through, but in principle, I think we would welcome looking at that kind of offence.
The Chair
If there are no more questions, I thank the witnesses for their attendance and their contributions.
Examination of Witnesses
Dr Susan Hawley, John Cusack and Thom Townsend gave evidence.
The Chair
We now have evidence from Dr Susan Hawley from Spotlight on Corruption, John Cusack—via Zoom—from the Global Coalition to Fight Financial Crime, and Thom Townsend, representing the UK Anti-Corruption Coalition. Can I ask Dr Hawley and Thom Townsend to introduce themselves first?
Dr Hawley: Hello. I am Dr Susan Hawley, executive director of Spotlight on Corruption. We are a UK anti-corruption charity that monitors how the UK enforces its anti-corruption laws and keeps its international anti-corruption commitments.
Thom Townsend: Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Thom Townsend. I am the executive director of Open Ownership and the incoming chair of the UK Anti-Corruption Coalition. Open Ownership supports more than 40 Governments around the world to implement exactly these types of reforms.
John Cusack: Hello everyone. My name is John Cusack. I am the chair of the Global Coalition to Fight Financial Crime, which is an NGO. It is a 20-member organisation, both public and private, with large members such as Interpol and Europol, as well as Open Ownership—Thom’s organisation—and RUSI, which you may well know in the UK too.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Secondly, does the Bill provide enough mechanisms to help with transparency around the new responsibilities of Companies House, and should there be reporting—to Parliament, or certainly publicly available—on new powers? What would you want to see in order to have confidence that measures are having impact?
The Chair
Who wants to go first?
Thom Townsend: I think that there are significant areas of improvement for the piece of legislation that we see before us. Primarily, from our perspective, we focus on reform of company registrars around the world, so my focus is very much on how Companies House can better operate. The key area we would identify is around the verification mechanism, as you would expect, and that splits out into two points.
One is around how we verify someone’s identity versus how we identify and verify the statement of control and ownership that they are giving about their involvement with the company. That second part—their status—is not covered here. We are not putting in place mechanisms to understand whether the disclosure of beneficial ownership is accurate, and that is a significant problem. A colleague talked previously about having a gold standard, but we are far off that. We see company registrars in countries around the world taking meaningful steps to attempt to use their data and powers to begin to understand whether those statements are true. That needs to be significantly beefed up in this legislation.
On the second part—the ID of individuals—there are grave misgivings about that being outsourced to the trust or company supervisor profession. There are other ways of identifying people: in an ideal world, Companies House should be doing that. That is a big change for this piece of legislation, but frankly, that is where most of the world is going.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Thom Townsend: It is worth saying that countries that are doing very well on this typically have a national identity card system that is the foundation of their ID process. There are other ways of doing it. I think about Estonia, France, Germany—the list could go on, but it is based around their national ID card system. Clearly, we do not have that. The Government have done significant work on their own identity verification programme, which has had mixed results. We know we can do this. It does not necessarily need to be outsourced to that profession, which of course is supervised, but we collectively have severe misgivings about it.
On the second point around the accountability mechanism, we would like to see a very strong mechanism for Companies House to be coming to Parliament on a regular basis to talk about how this is looking and how it is performing. It is a much broader conversation about the kinds of indicators we would like to see reported on. That is a much longer conversation, but I will pass over to colleagues at this point.
John Cusack: I share Thom’s views, principally, on this. I spent 30 years working in banking as an MLRO—that is the previous history to my current role—and I spent many, many occasions trying to establish beneficial ownership. It is not easy, but it is the key to understanding risk and understanding who owns and controls a bank account, real estate or a company. That is absolutely key. I would like to see an obligation on the companies register that is essentially equivalent to that which a bank has in relation to knowing its customer, to the extent that that is possible. That is where we need to get to. Thom was explaining that some of the better countries are trying to get to that kind of standard.
Secondly, I believe that the registrar of companies needs to have a much stronger obligation than is currently set out in the proposed legislation—it needs, again, to be slightly similar to my old obligations as an MLRO. There needs to be an obligation to operate an AML programme that is worthy of the name, and to have strong and meaningful controls in order to be able to demonstrate that Companies House and the companies register are doing a similar job to what other people do in the private sector.
Dr Hawley: I would like to strongly back that up. It is essential that the “know your customer” rules that the private sector has to use are used by Companies House as well. There is no point having a registry that SMEs cannot rely on because it is not as accurate as it needs to be. That has been a problem now that the big companies simply do not use the corporate register because it is so inaccurate. There is a long way to go on that.
We also have real concerns, as Thom mentioned, about the authorised corporate service provider provision in the Bill. In essence, it relies on another part of the system—the anti-money laundering supervision system—and the danger is that we are just playing whack-a-mole. We are just pushing the problem down the road. We know that HMRC, in its supervision of TCSPs, has had lots of very serious questions about whether it is up to the job, and it just recently revised its average fine level down from £250,000 to £8,000. There are real questions about whether that is a serious deterrent. In its recent report, it found that nearly 50% of its cases that went up to the governance panel had to be returned to the case officer for serious work to be done again. Either the Bill needs to address the AML supervision regime—I can tell you some of our suggestions, because it would not be that difficult to come up with a transition—or there are real questions over whether that clause should be in it at all.
A final point, which was picked up earlier by colleagues from law enforcement, is about how this will be funded. The registry will be meaningful only if there are proper resources. It can be completely cost-neutral to the Treasury. We are heading into a difficult fiscal time, so it needs to be cost-neutral. As the gentleman from the National Police Chiefs’ Council said earlier, we have almost the lowest registry fee. We are the 6th lowest, in company with Rwanda, Timor-Leste, Ukraine and South Africa. Most other countries charge an average of £150 to £300, compared with £12. That could go an enormous way to getting the right IT infrastructure. We know a lot of this will have to be done with technology and AI. Making sure that the fees for Companies House are set at a realistic level to make this properly verified is essential.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Dr Hawley: Absolutely. The key thing is what John alluded to—clause 88. What is the requirement in the Bill for how far the registrar has to go? If it is the minimum amount, the fees will be minimal. If we are going for the gold standard, the fees will need to be higher to reflect the greater verification work.
Thom Townsend: Just a quick thought: what strikes me, reading the Bill, is that it is not quite clear what Government want Companies House to be, when you delve into the detail. Is it around minimising criminal activity, as in the fourth objective? Is it about preventing, which comes up in clause 88? That needs to be resolved to give a very clear idea in primary legislation of what we want Companies House to be. It should be the first line of defence in the UK economy from the perspective of integrity and preventing crime.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Thom Townsend: Absolutely. My point was just that countries that do have been able to go further and faster as a result of having the underlying infrastructure. But no, absolutely, you can do that. We have brought down the cost of identifying people in this country very rapidly, with KYC for new banking, and taking a video of yourself. We have a lot of technology and lots of ways to achieve that end. It does not have to be done through the trust and corporate service provider industry—it simply does not.
Jackie Doyle-Price
That is helpful.
John Cusack: I will just add to Thom’s point about clause 88. The language concerns me greatly. This will be dependent on the registrar’s diligence and, essentially, on the financing that the registrar has in order to carry out their activities. The language—that the
“registrar must carry out such analysis of information within the registrar’s possession as the registrar considers appropriate”—
is extremely timid. If there is no money for it, the registrar will not be doing anything. That is really problematic. We would not apply that in any other circumstance; we would want to set out the obligation—the expectation—and to fund that appropriately, not the other way around.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Dr Hawley: We focused more on what is not in the Bill. I do not know whether John or Thom want to address that.
Thom Townsend: I would hand over to John on this one.
John Cusack: The Bill is positive. It is one of the contributions that will definitely help, and it is trying to fix a long-standing problem. At the end of the day, however, if we want to deal with financial crime, economic crime, we need convictions—investigations, prosecutions and convictions—and asset recoveries. That comes from resourcing the public sector, as well as demanding high expectations from the private sector. I am worried that in the UK the financing of law enforcement, and of the FIU in particular, is insufficient to assure the objectives that we all want, which are to mitigate, manage and reduce harms from economic crime. This is a long-standing weakness in the UK, as it is in many other countries, and that would definitely help, but let us not kid ourselves that it will make a material difference to the economic crime situation in the UK.
Alison Thewliss
Q
John Cusack: Yes, of course. I would support that. However, I would also say, with respect, that the idea is to do prevention with the changes. When we put a lock on the door of an aeroplane, the fact that no one has stormed the cockpit is not how we judge whether a lock on the door is appropriate. We are tightening things up and preventing financial crime, but yes, absolutely, we need to see more enforcement. You would hope that these measures will mean that people will no longer necessarily look to UK companies and Scottish limited partnerships as the vehicle of choice for abuse, and they will look elsewhere.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Thom Townsend: When this legislation passes, there will be a lot of remedial work to sort out what is there—there is no doubt about that. Everything that you have just described is true, and it is probably a lot worse even than we are aware of. As you just mentioned, we are clearly starting from such a low bar that any legislation will have some kind of deterrent effect, but it is important to think not just about ensuring that we hit the gold standard with a piece of primary legislation. It is also the resourcing, but ultimately nothing that we can do will create a 100% perfect system.
Essentially, we are trying to remove as much noise as possible from the system to give law enforcement the best possible chance of focusing its resource where it can make the most difference. It is important not to think about this in zero-sum terms of: is it possible to commit crime or not? It is really just about making an environment where it is somewhat more manageable to detect, and then enforce. As it stands it, is the wild west on that register. If you wanted to do enforcement, we would be here until the end of time.
Alison Thewliss
Q
John Cusack: Not necessarily, because what I am most interested in is getting the Bill out in its current form with a financed and adequate registrar with obligations, and resolving that underlying issue. One of the reasons people use UK companies is not so that they can open UK bank accounts, because then you go through the gamut of UK obligations in the regulating sector, even though that happens occasionally when buying real estate and other things. Actually, people buy and acquire UK companies and Scottish limited partnerships so that they can open accounts abroad, because the UK is seen as a first-class jurisdiction. That means that when they open those accounts abroad, not many questions are asked, or not as many as would be if they were acquiring a Nigerian company, for example, which would ring all sorts of alarm bells. The interesting thing about the companies registry is that the abuse by foreigners does not necessarily translate into a UK economic crime issue per se, even though it is something that we also all want to address.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
John Cusack: For my high-risk customers, I always had it at 10% in my financial institutions, and 25% for non-high-risk customers, because I really wanted to ensure that I had almost everybody who could possibly be interested in the company or a relationship. I stuck at 10%, but you can always argue it lower or a bit higher.
Thom Townsend: Yes—whether it should be 5% or not, it needs to be lower. There is an argument to be made between 10% and 5%. My sense is that we have a 25% global standard on this because it is a sort of round number.
Dr Hawley: It is really interesting to look at what Jersey and Guernsey are doing on financial crime. They have a 10% threshold, and they are introducing a lot of other very interesting economic crime measures that go far further than we have in the UK, including a failure to prevent money laundering offence. They also have a measure to forfeit accounts based on a suspicious activity report, so they are really looking at very radical measures in Jersey and Guernsey that will make the UK look quite behind.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Dr Hawley: I would say that that is the easiest. It is a great question and I will jump in, because I have my three. It would be really fantastic if Parliament signalled that its intention is not to pass a Bill that will just stay on paper; it needs to be properly resourced and make a real difference in terms of economic crime. There are three different cost-neutral ways of doing that, some of which you mentioned in earlier discussions. One is cost protection across civil recovery for law enforcement. The US-style system really works. If we want US-style enforcement, we need US-style rules.
Another way is to increase Companies House fees to match the scale of verification that we need. The other way is to invest far more. In the US, 100% of forfeiture goes into a central fund, and local police get up to 80%. We heard earlier that the NCA gets 50%; some police forces only get 18%. We also desperately need to find ways to match the money that law enforcement brings in. Law enforcement brought in £3.9 billion over the last six years. If that had been reinvested in law enforcement, we would have top capability in this country.
There are two other things. I have mentioned AML supervision already. If we could make the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision a body that genuinely raises the consistency of supervision across the board while the Treasury works out the bigger picture on supervision, it would make a really big difference. OPBAS could name and shame supervisors who were not performing, and that needs to apply not just to the legal and accounting sectors, but to HMRC and the FCA.
Finally, there is corporate liability reform, which you also referred to earlier. We have been waiting for it. It was in 2015 that there was the first Conservative party manifesto commitment to have a failure to prevent economic crime offence. The Law Commission has now spoken; we have been waiting a long time for it. Ideally, you would have a failure to prevent fraud offence, a failure to prevent false accounting offence and a failure to prevent money laundering offence, but you also need to bring in a change in the identification doctrine for the schedule 8 offences to make this work.
Thom Townsend: Unsurprisingly, verification—the first thing would be to think very hard about whether it is the trusts and service providers sector that we want to do that, to think much more broadly about what other mechanisms are available to us, and to cast the net widely around the world; there is a lot happening.
Secondly, the statements of beneficial ownership and significant control should be verified too. That is a far harder task, because the world has not figured out entirely how to do that. There are some really good examples; places such as Austria are doing good work, but it is largely about using data from across Government to make sure that you can red flag those statements.
Thirdly, we probably also need something in the Bill about having a more permissive data-sharing environment, to make sure that Companies House is getting what it wants. If you look at how the Bill is currently drafted, we have data that is “in the registrar’s possession” or “available to the registrar”. It is very unclear what that means, and it needs to be much broader than that.
A supplementary fourth point is to think long and hard about how we are using an identity, once verified, persistently in a lifelong way. Australia, New Zealand and India issue unique identifiers to directors—and, in Australia’s case, to beneficial owners—for life, which makes the investigation process much more straightforward. There is a lot of good practice out there. We need to look very hard at that and think about how we incorporate it into what the UK is doing.
John Cusack: As far as the Bill goes, I have mentioned one point already, which is the item in relation to beefing up the obligation on the registrar. The second piece is on the information-sharing provision in the Bill—I think it is clause 148. It is a limited information sharing item that essentially requires a SAR to be filed before private information sharing can take place. There is also the exit, pretty much, of the customer, which is potentially problematic. We are going to find that one potential bad actor leaving one bank cannot then open an account somewhere else, but we will also find that innocent people will be involved in that. I would rather have something broader, which allows the detection of unidentified financial crime, whereas, in this particular case, we are going to get identified suspicion being shared, which will potentially lead to some very serious unintended consequences, even though I am very supportive of the provision.
The last thing that I would say outside the Bill is that, ultimately, it is about asset confiscations and asset seizures. The UK is doing okay, but it is not doing anywhere near as well as it should be, and it is certainly underperforming compared with a number of important countries. I will give you one example. Italy not only seizes the amounts that Susan was talking about, but over four or five years it seizes almost £10 billion a year in asset confiscations, because it treats the Italian mafia as a matter of national security and targets its resources accordingly. I would like to see not a change in the law, but the rightsizing of the resources across the piece, whereby they are directed toward the tip of the spear, so that law enforcement FIUs in the UK and asset recovery can be prioritised and targets set, and we get close to the Italians, rather than being where we are today.
Liam Byrne
Q
Dr Hawley: I alluded to one point earlier, which is that if this is not a registry that companies and people can rely on, it will have been a waste of time and money. I alluded earlier to SMEs particularly not having the resources and having to rely on Companies House in a way that large companies would not; they would do their own intelligence. It will be bad for business and the business community, and it will be bad for the UK’s competitiveness. If you look at our competitiveness rating under the World Economic Forum measures, we are pretty good on quite a lot of things—in the top 10 —but for tackling serious and organised crime we are 70 out of 141. That is a competitiveness rating, so it will dent our competitiveness. Actually going for gold standard practice will be good for the economy, and will make us more competitive.
Liam Byrne
Q
Thom Townsend: Objective 4 does really need to say “prevent”. It is an objective related to the registrar’s functioning. The registrar should be responsible for taking really active and clear measures to prevent criminal activity under its bailiwick.
Liam Byrne
Q
Thom Townsend: That seems like a ridiculously low bar.
Liam Byrne
Q
Thom Townsend: Sorry, what do you mean?
Liam Byrne
We have registries of beneficial ownership for assets and property. We have to try to make it possible for law enforcement to connect companies, individuals and assets. Do you think we have the framework for connecting those three dots effectively?
Thom Townsend: As it stands, no. Some form of this legislation will go a lot further. We need to look at how we are uniquely identifying people. In that case, there is an argument for bringing that ID process in-house so you have clarity around it. You can assign that identifier, which then gets used across the panoply of datasets that law enforcement have in their possession to do that interconnectivity. We run the risk a little bit, as the legislation is currently framed, of creating another island that is a bit better connected but probably will not sit at the heart of the process and be that effective first line of defence that the UK economy should have.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Dr Hawley: Ensuring that companies cannot just liquidate has been incredibly important to law enforcement in the past. I am very sorry, but we might have to get back to you on that because I have not looked specifically at that clause.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Thom Townsend: I think there is a balance between speed and effectiveness. Companies House is fantastic at what it does now—it provides a really good service to register a business quickly, and it is really easy to use—but it has never had to do the kinds of things that we are now proposing it does. It will be a long journey to get from where it is today to the sort of high-functioning all-singing, all-dancing machine that we are proposing.
There is a balance between achieving the objectives of the Bill, and the wider goals of dealing with corruption and countering kleptocracy in the UK. We will probably have to look at some sort of transitional arrangement but, ultimately, we should have a much more aspirational and ambitious vision for what we want Companies House to be in five to 10 years’ time, put the resourcing in place, and ensure oversight and accountability to drive that forward and make it happen.
The Chair
Would anybody else like to answer that question? No? In that case, I thank all three members of the panel for their help in giving evidence.
Examination of Witnesses
Oliver Bullough and Bill Browder gave evidence.
The Chair
We come now to the next panel, for which we have until 4.30 pm. This panel comprises two people, both journalists, authors and experts—if I may put it like that—on the Russian Federation. I extend a very warm welcome to Bill Browder, who is in the room, and to Oliver Bullough, who is appearing via Zoom. Bill, would you like to introduce yourself?
Bill Browder: Good afternoon. Just to correct that, I am not a journalist; I am an activist and author. I am the head of the Global Magnitsky Justice Campaign. Basically, my life for the last 13 years has been the result of the murder of my lawyer in Russia, Sergei Magnitsky. My campaign has taken two tracks. One is to get the Magnitsky Act, which imposes asset freezes and visa bans on human rights violators and kleptocrats, passed in different countries, including the UK—35 countries have the Magnitsky Act.
The second part of my activity has been to trace the $230 million that Sergei Magnitsky discovered, exposed and was killed over. We found that that money was going to 24 different countries, and we filed 16 different criminal complaints. From those criminal complaints, I have had the opportunity to see at first hand who does it well and who does it badly, and let me tell you: this country does it badly.
This country has never opened a criminal investigation into the money laundering connected to the murder of Sergei Magnitsky, even though many other countries have done, and have frozen and seized assets. I hope that we will have the opportunity to talk about why that is the case, because I think I can make some proposals for the legislation that might cause this country not to be at the bottom of the league table.
The Chair
We will come to the questions in a minute. Oliver Bullough, would you introduce yourself, please?
Oliver Bullough: It is great to be here. I am sorry that I am not there in person. It is half-term and I have the children in the other room, with instructions to be quiet. It is an honour to appear alongside Bill, who I have known for a long time and whose work I have been following since even before he was an activist outside Russia—when he was still fighting corruption inside Russia.
I am a Russia enthusiast—a Russophile. I worked in Russia as a journalist for a long time. I inevitably came across corruption, because it is difficult to spend any time in Russia without coming across corruption, but the more that I investigated corruption and the more time I spent looking into it, the more I realised that it cannot be understood as simply a Russian phenomenon. The money does not stay in Russia; it moves out of Russia and too often it ends up in the UK, where it buys real estate, football clubs and many other things. I have been spending, I suppose, most of the last decade attempting to map how money moves from kleptocratic countries via tax havens and ends up in cities such as London, in order to work out how corruption really works and cut through some of the simplifications that are often used.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Bill Browder: Thank you. This is the crux of the whole issue. By the way, it was not just Magnitsky money that was not investigated. We have this problem; since Vladimir Putin has come to power, he and 1,000 people around him have stolen $1 trillion from the Russian people. This has been the largest destination of Russian money laundering. In 22 years since he has come to power, not a single money laundering prosecution has come out of Russia—not one—and we are talking about $1 trillion.
What is going on here? What I have learned is that the law enforcement agencies effectively refuse to open criminal cases unless they are 100% sure that they can win without any tough fight on the other side. Why are they so risk averse in opening cases? It comes down to simple risk-reward for them. Their budgets are very thin, as law enforcement does not have a lot of money, and when they go to court here on any type of civil case—it is not true in a murder case, but it is true in a civil case—if they lose at any point, not just at the end of the case, but at any point procedurally during the case, the loser has to pay the winner’s court fees, and there is no budget for that. Therefore, the UK law enforcement agencies will not take that risk.
I have seen it done differently. We presented the United States Department of Justice with the same information. They do not have that problem; they can open a case, conduct an investigation and build their case as they are doing their investigation, and if they lose, nobody loses their job, nobody is bankrupted, and no departments have to go back and beg for more money from the Government. Whatever money they have spent on their lawyers is the money they have spent.
What has to happen here—this is plain as day—is that you have to get rid of this adverse costs issue in a civil case brought by the Government. You could easily write an amendment to the law as it is written, because it is not here right now, to say that if the Crown Prosecution Service brings a money laundering case or an economic crime case, there are no adverse costs. If you make that point, it will change the whole dynamic—the whole risk-reward—for these people.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Bill Browder: The same thing.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Bill Browder: I was not even aware that in a criminal case, a murder case, nobody pays adverse costs. I am not sure if you bring a criminal case in these other—
Dame Margaret Hodge
I think in a murder case they would, actually.
Bill Browder: Would they?
Dame Margaret Hodge
I think so, yes. I am no lawyer—God, I am looking around the table for a lawyer.
The Chair
When I practised as a lawyer, if somebody was acquitted they would be able to ask for their costs to be paid out of what are called central funds, so the taxpayer would be paying for them, not the prosecuting authority.
Bill Browder: However you want to define it, what I would say is I have seen how it works in other countries and they do not have this issue. Therefore, there is no disincentive to bringing a case. It is just remarkable. In every single aspect of the Magnitsky case, we brought it to law enforcement. We brought it to the National Crime Agency; they refused. We brought the company formation agents that were involved in forming the companies during the stuff connected to the Magnitsky case to HMRC. They never shut down a single company formation agency, even though they regulate them.
Nobody brings any cases at all. There are three possible reasons. It could be the reason I have just stated, which is the most charitable one: that there are economic disincentives. I could also say “incompetence”, but I don’t want to say that, or I could say “corruption”, but I am going to stick with the fact that the economic incentives are not there for them. Whatever the reason is, this country should be ashamed of itself. It is an absolute shame, and nothing will change from this law unless there is actual law enforcement. What can we put in place so that the laws are enforced? At least get rid of the economic disincentives.
I will add one more thing, which is that in countries like the United States, if the Department of Justice wins a forfeiture case, they get the money and then they can fund future investigations from that money. When you are talking about a budget of the prosecution service being several billion pounds, you win one big case and you could fund the entire prosecution service.
The Chair
Q
Oliver Bullough: I agree with Bill that the UK has a shameful record when it comes to its failure to investigate and prosecute financial crime. I would add, however, a fourth explanation to Bill’s list of potential reasons why that is not happening. For many years or perhaps many decades, there has been a belief in Britain that making things as simple as possible is good for business—the idea that it is simple and cheap to set up a business and better to have less regulation than more regulation is invariably good for Britain’s business climate.
Alison Thewliss mentioned Scottish limited partnerships earlier. We saw this phenomenon when Scottish limited partnerships were discussed in the House back in 2017 after the exposing of the Moldovan laundromat. There were suggestions by her colleague then—the SNP’s Treasury spokesman, Roger Mullin—about trying to tighten up the rules around SLPs, but they were torpedoed by the Treasury because of concerns that that would lead to investment funds having to spend extra money on meeting regulations.
I believe the estimates for each fund would be between £14,800 and £27,600 per investment fund. That is the cost supposedly to the UK economy. If you compare that to the cost of fraud to the UK economy, which is estimated by the University of Portsmouth at approximately £130 billion, you see how absurd it is to be worried about saving £14,800: we are faced with a problem that is costing us more than £100 billion.
The cost of fraud, which is rampant—40% of known crimes—is a huge tax on businesses and individuals in the UK. It is made possible by the fact that we have been failing for so long to do anything about economic crime. If you look at that quantity of fraud, as estimated by the academics in Portsmouth—there are higher estimates—it is equivalent to about a fifth of the total tax take. It is like adding another VAT to the UK economy, or twice as much again as all taxes levied on corporations. That is the cost of economic crime on the British economy.
There has been a philosophical failure to realise that making things easy is not always good. At some point, you are making things so easy for criminals that you are essentially making things difficult for honest people. In this case, by adding regulation we will be deterring criminals and therefore making things easier for honest people. That is something that, for far too long, people in public life in the UK have failed to realise.
I am here talking only about the effect on the UK. On top of the cost of fraud to the UK, hundreds of billions of pounds are laundered through the City of London every year; that is the National Crime Agency’s estimate. It clearly a guess—a round number—and it could be more; it could be less. That is money being stolen by criminals, drug traffickers and kleptocrats, and laundered through the UK. They are keeping this money. Essentially, it is being taken away from good people and kept by bad people. If we could stop this happening—instead, confiscate the money and keep it for ourselves or return it to the people it is taken from—it would be what is called in rugby a 14-point swing. We would be taking it away from one team and simultaneously giving it to the other one.
I agree that the three suggestions that Bill made for why the UK has been so bad at fighting economic crime are all possibilities, but my favourite fourth one is that we have been simply philosophically failing to understand why economic crime is a problem. This Bill is a real opportunity to do something about that. I was listening to some of the earlier panels; I would like to second what was said by almost everyone, which is that a new law is very good, but a new law is definitely not enough on its own. We need far more resources for Companies House, the National Crime Agency, the Met, the City police, the Serious Fraud Office and all the police agencies to be able to use this Bill.
As I understand it, the funding per officer at the National Crime Agency is estimated at one third of their counterparts at the FBI. Leaving aside the fact that there are far fewer of them, just per officer they are funded at a third of the level of the FBI. If we want them to be able to do the same job that the Bill is talking about, and that American prosecutors and investigators are able to do, we need to fund them adequately. We should at least be funding them as well as their colleagues at the FBI if we want them to be able to do as good a job.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Bill Browder: People are very simple: they operate on the basis of rewards and punishments. There are big rewards for people in the City of London to launder money. Banks make money off transactions and accounts and so on. Company formation agencies make money off selling directors and forming companies. Lawyers make money setting up these structures. There is no consequence if they are involved in in dirty business—none. Nobody faces any consequence.
What we have just seen at Companies House is remarkable: thousands of companies being registered for no commercial purpose other than to launder money. These companies then set up foreign bank accounts. We know who the directors are. Some of the directors are UK citizens. The company formation agencies are UK company formation agencies. We report it to the police, and nothing happens. If nothing is going to happen, then you are not going to change the culture.
America has the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Most American corporate executives do not want to be prosecuted and therefore do not make bribes abroad. Austria does not, and so they do. We are in a situation where there is no consequence for doing any of this type of stuff. It does not matter what is written in this law; it does not matter what was written in the previous law. There was a great law passed called the unexplained wealth order. It is a beautiful law, which solved a huge problem, which is not having to get evidence from the bad guys in the kleptocrat countries, and just using the evidence that we have here. We have used it in four or five cases, and most of the cases have actually been on behalf of dictators going after their enemies. We have a total failure of law enforcement. It probably should be studied as a separate issue: why is law enforcement not doing its job? Why is it failing?
You can write as many great laws as you want—there is some good stuff in this law, and good stuff in the previous laws—but if no one is going to enforce it, then you are never going to change the risk-reward and people are going to carry on doing stuff. All this will continue, and I will sit here 10 years from now making the same allegations about how this is a centre of money laundering.
Oliver Bullough: I would like to agree with everything Bill just said. People are more or less rational: they act according to their incentives. We can try and change the culture in the City of London as much as we like but, essentially, if there is no prospect of being arrested, prosecuted and jailed, or at the very least given a large fine, for committing these kinds of crimes, then someone will always be available to commit them because the reward will be sufficiently large and there will be no downside.
I gave a talk to a school a couple of years ago. One of the kids had been sitting silently throughout, and he put his hand up and asked me at the end, “Yeah, Mister, if you know all this about money laundering, why don’t you just go and do it?” I still do not really know the answer to that question, because there is no real reason not to do it. It is a gimme of a crime. You are 99.9% likely to get away with it.
What is particularly frustrating is that when we have prosecuted fraud and put resources into prosecuting fraud, it not only pays for itself, but is a huge profit centre. We saw that from Lord Agnew, who ran a small anti-fraud office from the Cabinet Office during the covid pandemic. He had a small anti-fraud budget that returned tenfold the amount of money that was paid. It is a complete no-brainer to go after this money and these crimes. We would be benefiting the country in every way.
I agree with Bill; it is very frustrating to hear talk about changing culture, when what we really need to do is to change people’s incentives. The way to do that is to enforce the laws that we have.
Tom Tugendhat
Q
We will be listening for further ideas in the future, but do you agree that the Bill at least sets out the first steps to where we really do need to be going to make sure that the crimes begin to be prosecuted? Just to answer your question, Oliver, the reason you do not launder money is that you are and remain a person of integrity; sadly, you are not very rich for it, but there you go. That is the price.
Bill Browder: I have never had any trouble with the laws as they are written here. We probably do not even need this. It is a great law—congratulations; I applaud you on putting it together. It is 252 pages of mind-numbing stuff—
Tom Tugendhat
Of detail, Bill!
Bill Browder: It is great. There is no problem with the actual legislation. This is a rule-of-law country, and the laws have been written, and continue to be written, very well. There is just a huge disconnect between that and the enforcement.
I would add one little detail, if you want to get into the nitty-gritty. We have seen that UK companies are used abroad to set up accounts—this was mentioned by Dr Susan Hawley and perhaps one other—because it looks legit to have a British company with a Cypriot or Latvian bank account. Somehow, when you get a transfer from a British company with a European bank, everything then—that is how these people get away with it.
I would therefore add one small provision to this law, which is easily done. When people are setting up their companies, they should have to disclose, on an annual basis, where they have foreign bank accounts. If you were to do that, then every anti-corruption investigator could go around and start looking at that. I do not think that it is a huge additional disclosure requirement. People have to disclose their income, expenses and so on, so why not disclose where they have bank accounts?
The Chair
Q
Oliver Bullough: I think it was Samuel Johnson who said, about a dog walking on its hind legs, that
“It is not done well; but you are surprised to find it done at all.”
I am happy that the Bill exists; I was happy that there was another one earlier in the year. I would prefer it, however, if Parliament sat back and, instead of passing two fairly minor economic crime Bills in one year, put them together into one with all the other things that desperately need doing, take a long time over it and, when passed, really ensure that the law, as passed, is enforced.
Bill mentioned unexplained wealth orders. Those were a fantastic idea—perhaps hugely overhyped when they were brought in, but a great idea—and a real potential silver bullet for tackling top-end economic crime by both organised criminals and kleptocrats. Sadly, after the failure of the case against the daughter of the former President of Kazakhstan, they have not really been used at all. That is because the National Crime Agency does not have the money it needs to do the job, and that is because politicians have not sufficiently prioritised fighting economic crime. That is where the money comes from.
Yes, by all means, it is good to have another Bill, but I would far prefer to see the existing laws properly enforced by properly-resourced law enforcement agencies with continuous political support than have another Bill. I say that as someone who has been banging on about the problems with Companies House for absolutely ages.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
I want to deal with another issue, since you are both Russia experts. There is a mood across the House to tackle the issue of seizing Russian assets as well as freezing them. I know that you have both been working in that space, so could you comment on that? How do you think it could be done, do you think it is a good idea and how much is at stake, to the extent that any of us know the figures?
Bill Browder: Shall I go first, or do you want to, Oliver, since I have been hogging the first response?
Oliver Bullough: No, Bill, you can go ahead.
Bill Browder: We are on our third Prime Minister in seven weeks; there is an economic crisis going on; the purse strings are tight. There will be pressure here not to send as much money to Ukraine because we are worried about our money at home. There is also pressure in the United States. Some 30 Democrats wrote a letter to Biden saying, “Let’s just settle this thing and give the Russians what they want”—or something along those lines—“and not spend this money.” There is also pressure from the Republicans on the other side, saying, “No blank cheque for Ukraine”.
We also cannot let Ukraine go, under any circumstances, because, if we do, Vladimir Putin will be knocking at the door of Estonia or Poland. Therefore, how do we pay for it? Ukraine needs the money and the military equipment. Well, let us let the Russians pay for it. It is a simple thing: the Russians have started this war, created all this conflict, caused all this destruction and killed all these people, and we have $350 billion of their central bank reserves frozen, as a first step.
Why are we not using that money to support the Ukrainians? There are people who say, “That’s never been done before, and therefore we shouldn’t do it.” I would argue that it is pretty straightforward. In Parliaments around the world, what do you do? You make laws. If it has not been done before, make a law so it can be done. It is not a legal issue; it is purely a political issue. Should we dig into our own pockets, or should we let the Russians pay for their own war? We should start by letting the Russians pay for their own war.
I am having the same conversations elsewhere. I was just in Canada, speaking to the Canadian Parliament, last week, and I have been speaking to the US Congress. It is a no-brainer. It is a more complicated issue when you start going to the oligarchs, because you have to prove that somehow they are connected to the Government. But when it comes to the Government themselves, $350 billion is being held right now by the UK, the EU, Canada, the United States, Australia and Japan. That is an easy way to solve this financial problem and help the Ukrainians win this war.
Oliver Bullough: I would like to add to that. One of the reasons why it is complicated to take money away from oligarchs is that, once the money is here, it benefits from the rule of law that we have and so on. It is always harder to take egg out of a cake once it has been baked. It would have been a far better idea not to allow the money to come here in the first place. The lesson I would like to see learned from the current Ukraine crisis is that it is far more cost-effective and efficient not to allow kleptocrats to launder their money through the UK in the first place. If we do not support kleptocratic networks, those networks will not survive. They will not be able to come to such strength and vitality that they threaten their neighbouring countries.
Yes, it is important to confiscate Russian money to return it to Ukraine. Yes, it is important not just to freeze but to seize oligarchic property. But it is also important to put in place the powers, and particularly the law enforcement structures, that we need to prevent more kleptocrats from coming here. Next year, it might not be a threat coming from Russia; it might be a threat coming from China or somewhere else. We would find ourselves in exactly the same situation: trying to work out what to do with money that we had frozen when, if we had not allowed it here in the first place, we would not even have to have this discussion.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Let me put to you another issue. If we strengthened accountability, those working in the Executive agencies might work a little harder at putting into effect the laws that we parliamentarians pass. Bim Afolami has an idea of establishing a Select Committee of the House that would look at the regulators—the enforcement agencies—and could ask for individual cases to be heard by the Committee in private, to see whether there are systemic issues at play, which could lead to public reporting on those issues.
That is one idea. There are others around. Do you think the lack of accountability, particularly for the enforcement agencies, could be a contributing factor to the fact that we just do not do enough—that we do not use our existing structures enough—even without the money and even with the cost issue?
Bill Browder: I think so. This is not the first time I have had this conversation with Members of Parliament. I have been in front of many Committees—the Home Affairs Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee, this Committee and others—to talk about this lack of enforcement, and I have talked with many Members of Parliament. There is no disagreement with me. Every political party supports the idea of not having London be the money laundering capital of the world. I think everybody agrees. Many good Members of Parliament have put pressure on different Governments, put questions to them and had conversations, and I have seen many Government Ministers agree. Then, all of a sudden, we get to this total disconnect: law enforcement cannot be instructed by Parliament or the Government to open or pursue a criminal case or explain why it has not done so. It is living in its own world.
The only thing the Government can do is replace the people in executive positions in law enforcement; that is the only sanction. There has to be a better way. There are arguments about not wanting to politicise law enforcement and I totally sympathise with those, but at the same time if it is completely failing it needs root-and-branch reform—whether parliamentary oversight, Government oversight or some other mechanism. It is just failing and it has continued to fail in a way that is totally unacceptable. I would hate to be sitting here a decade from now having the same conversation.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Oliver Bullough: It is probably fine. Hopefully, if things are actually enforced and Companies House is given the money it needs to do the job and it is ambitious about that, this may work. Personally, I would like the threshold for a person with significant control to be reduced significantly: perhaps to 10% or 5%. Perhaps there should not be a threshold at all, but if you control you need to declare it.
The Bill is potentially an improvement. I still do not think it is the kind of root-and-branch re-evaluation of Companies House that we need. An amazing variety of corporate structures are available in this country. I do not think anyone has stopped to say, “Do we really need limited liability partnerships and limited partnerships? Why do we have both?” Does anyone stop to think about why they exist at all? Limited partnerships were created as a bit of a strange afterthought back in 1906 anyway. Why do they even exist?
I would like to see discussions like that, personally, but as it stands I think that bit of the Bill is probably okay—certainly if it is enforced properly. If there were an Oliver Bullough-ocracy, there would be all sorts of different changes to how companies could be used. I would not allow people to use foreign companies to own UK property at all; you would have to own it via British companies if you wished to use a company. But that is not going to happen so it is silly to talk about it.
On Margaret Hodge’s point, in the Oliver Bullough-ocracy I would definitely like to have something similar to the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, with the power to investigate whatever it likes and do really forceful, well resourced investigations into Government agencies or anything at all. That would really help to cut through some of the failures to understand why the failures are happening and to really bring accountability to these bodies, which have been able to hide behind the lack of oversight for a long time.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Oliver Bullough: I heard the Companies House official talking earlier; I did not join at the beginning so I did not catch his name. He was saying that there would be difficulties with resourcing the verification of all that, particularly when it comes to the issue I wrote about recently in my newsletter, about what I call “offshore shell people”—people essentially acting as a kind of shell company. It is noticeable that while the number of offshore companies owning property in the UK has flatlined over the last decade, the number of people with overseas addresses has increased by 250%. Clearly, scams can always be used and things are always coming in. Making sure that Companies House can have the resources to do all that is a tough ask.
This is perhaps stretching way beyond what is in the Bill, but I am not sure that it would not be a good idea to have what the British Virgin Islands has, which is that an ordinary person cannot just file things with Companies House; they have to go via a lawyer or another registered professional. I am not sure that that would not be a bad idea, because then you would not have this issue at all of people being able to log on.
Just to show how absurd it is, I was at a conference the other day and a participant from Canada could not believe me when I said how easy it is to file things at Companies House, so we logged on together and she created a company then and there. She is a tax consultant; there was no “tax consultant” option on the dropdown menu, so she called herself a taxidermist. That is how absurd the system is. There is a lot of scope for improvement before we need to worry about fine-tuning the details.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Bill Browder: One of the things we have seen is that the same individuals—these money launderers—will find a drunk Latvian person, get their passport and then register them in hundreds and hundreds of companies. If those companies get shut down, then they can register them as the directors of other companies; they then become directors of those companies.
Why is it okay to have a person be a director of 400 companies? That does not make any sense to me. Why should there not be some limitation—maybe 10? Ten companies is a lot of companies—but 400 companies, or a thousand companies? That limitation would be an easy thing to put in here, and that would make it harder for the criminals, because there are not that many people who are ready to give up their passports to do money laundering. The number of people who are involved in this is quite small when you actually look at it, because most people do not want their names being used for these terrible schemes.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Bill Browder: In theory, yes. This whole post-box idea just lends itself to anonymity and so on. Why do people not just register their companies at their own home or their own business address if there is a legit company? What is this business with 2,000 companies in one strange industrial park in Glasgow?
Alison Thewliss
Q
Oliver Bullough: I did an investigation a while ago and there was a woman who was a director of four companies, I think, despite the fact that she had been dead for five years. Clearly, someone had been using her signature to sign off on the companies, and that is clearly a misuse of information. Clearly, that is falsifying company information and is already a criminal offence. Despite the fact that I had written about it, nothing was done; no action was taken. As I say, there are a lot of easy wins here before we need to worry about the details.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Bill Browder: Well, Scotland is so dwarfed by London that you do not have to worry about your reputation, because the reputation is so bad here that no one will even be paying attention.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Bill Browder: I have written a whole book about this. The bad guys in Russia are a big part of the problem, but you cannot export this type of corruption and money laundering unless you have somebody doing the importing. And who is involved in the importing? It is the western enablers—the lawyers.
I have had shocking experiences with western law firms that are benefiting from this. If there were some kind of duty whereby they had to actually look into the source of their funding or the legitimacy of the business, I think that would be an extremely powerful thing, if it was actually enforced. There is a whole other long discussion of law that one could have about the role of western enablers, and particularly the lawyers.
The Chair
I am afraid that under the rules that we operate on, I have no discretion to allow this very interesting sitting to continue, so we have to finish. I thank both our witnesses for a really fascinating sitting. Their great insight and knowledge on this subject has been of immense value. Thank you very much indeed.
Dame Margaret Hodge
On a point of order, Sir Christopher. May I ask whether our proceedings are covered by parliamentary privilege?
The Chair
The answer to that is yes, they are, but it should not be abused.
Examination of Witnesses
Professor John Heathershaw and Thomas Mayne gave evidence.
The Chair
We now come to the ninth panel. We have Professor John Heathershaw from the University of Exeter appearing via Zoom and Thomas Mayne from Chatham House. Good afternoon. I am going to ask Professor Heathershaw, first, to introduce himself briefly.
Professor Heathershaw: My name is John Heathershaw. I am professor of international relations at the University of Exeter. I work on aspects of money laundering related to post-Soviet political elites.
Thomas Mayne: I am Thomas Mayne. I am a research fellow at the University of Oxford and a former visiting fellow at Chatham House. I am one of the authors of “The UK’s kleptocracy problem”, a report we released at Chatham House in December.
First, by way of very quick introductory remarks, on the day we launched the report, the then Foreign Secretary, Liz Truss—how time flies—was also speaking. That was a nice coincidence. She was asked about our report and her response was that the UK has the strongest money laundering regulations and laws in the world. As we have heard today, we could debate whether that is true or not; there is some evidence to suggest that it is. However, as we have heard a lot today, without enforcement, laws are useless.
Secondly, I am an expert in kleptocracy and anti-corruption measures. Kleptocracy and money laundering are two slightly different things, and I hope we will get into some of the differences today.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Secondly, would you expect kleptocrats, in the light of this regulation, just to move their assets to unregulated sectors? Are we going to have the protections we would want for Britain, or are we in danger of seeing some of the behaviour simply displaced?
Thomas Mayne: First, on supervision, I do not think there is enough in the Bill. The findings of OPBAS—that the risk-based approach we have put in place really is not working—are quite shocking. What is the solution to that? I know that Dr Hawley was here earlier; Spotlight on Corruption has just released a report on the supervision of the legal sector. There is a debate in that on whether there should just be a single sector supervisor, which is something we should look at.
Generally, I think supervision is lacking and it is very uneven. Across sectors, we are seeing very different layers of enforcement actions. For example, I think the Council for Licensed Conveyancers—obviously, it deals with real estate, which, as we know, poses some of the highest risks for money laundering—produced zero enforcement actions in a three-year period. There are varying levels of not only supervision but enforcement activity. That is definitely something that we should look at that is not really in the Bill. John, do you want to say anything on that question, before we move on to the second one?
Professor Heathershaw: I think the accountability question pertains to parliamentary supervision of those regulatory agencies. As I understand it, there is nothing in the Bill to enhance that. There would be scope for a specific cross-departmental parliamentary Committee in this area, I think. As we know, money laundering crosses different Departments, so greater accountability for poor performance by the supervisors could be tackled through that kind of oversight.
Thomas Mayne: Was the second question whether we are worried about capital flight from the UK?
Seema Malhotra
Q
Thomas Mayne: That is certainly a risk. We are way ahead of the game, in some respects, in terms of which businesses we regulate. I know that there is an ongoing discussion about whether PR agencies should have regulation. I am not an expert on crypto, but I think we should look at bringing it into the existing regime where, if there is a suspicion of money laundering, you have to report it by law.
Professor Heathershaw: To add to that, it is not simply a matter of liquidating assets to move them into other denominations or unregulated sectors. The nature of money laundering is that it is a social and political phenomenon as well. It is about achieving a place to stay where you can protect your assets through the rule of law, and maybe gain some social influence, get your kids into school, and use your residency to garner a wider profile and clean up your reputation. That means that the property and bank accounts are hugely important; they will not just be liquidated overnight.
When we are talking about the kind of money laundering that Tom and I look at by political elites and those from kleptocracies, they are seeking to gain a whole set of goods that you cannot simply get through putting all your assets into crypto, or into a more loosely regulated jurisdiction such as Dubai. There are certain things that the UK, and London in particular, offer that will not simply fall out of the way in a beggar thy neighbour, “Well, we’ll just move ourselves into a sector or jurisdiction that is loosely regulated,” way. I do not think that that should cause us to worry about losing market share, or the problem shifting into another sector, because the problem will always remain in the legal and regulated sectors that are our principal concerns. They will always be there, too.
Thomas Mayne: I have one thing to add on real estate. We now have the registration of overseas entities as part of the previous Act. It will be fascinating to see what happens in January, when the deadline comes in, with the existing properties that we know are owned by oligarchs or kleptocrats, and what kind of information they put on record. It is not a magic bullet. One problem with the ownership of property is that we will not, and should not, have a searchable database where we put in somebody’s name and see whether they own a property in the UK. It does not work like that, so there may be other properties that are perhaps owned by proxies. Those proxies will have their name on record as the so-called beneficial owner, but they will not be discoverable because we do not know about them, and we do not know that proxies are being used. What will be interesting is, as I say, what information will be revealed about the properties that we do know by January.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Thomas Mayne: Transparency is incredibly important. We know that, and we know that what has happened to Companies House in the past 15 years is ludicrous. We have heard examples of that today. We are one of the first countries in the world to have a beneficial ownership register, and I think that the Bill will take us to the next stage in verifying the information that is put on to Companies House, but, as Dr Hawley said earlier, will we still be able to rely on that information? There is also a risk that it just becomes another layer of what we might call zombie transparency. We have all this data, but so what? If it does not lead to enforcement actions or to people who are breaking the rules and submitting false information being penalised—sanctioned, fined, jailed—it will be all for naught. It needs to be accompanied by robust enforcement action. We have heard that from many speakers today.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Thomas Mayne: Absolutely. If we take the PSC register, which has been in for a few years now, we can point to that and say, “This person has to be the controller of that company. Why is this person living in a shed in Siberia when £100 million is going through their company?” Before the PSC register, we could not say that. Now we have verification procedures coming in, we should be able to say that somebody at least—Companies House or whoever—has checked that this person is real and is the person they say they are, in terms of the information submitted to Companies House. We should definitely have this, but it is only the first step.
Professor Heathershaw: To emphasise that point, we know that even where there is transparency—even where we know the money is going—there is an enforcement gap. For example, Tom and I obviously work together, and we have provided your Committee with two of our most recent reports: one on unexplained wealth and one looking comparatively at the Dariga Nazarbayeva and Zamira Hajiyeva cases, in which we demonstrate that the reason why one failed and the other succeeded was simply the incumbency status of the two. The one who remains in power, has a good relationship with the law enforcement authorities back home and has privileged access—one might argue, an unfair advantage there—is able to defend themselves against that measure.
Unfortunately, the UWO reforms that came through earlier this year in the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 do not fit that part of the problem. It is also part of a bigger problem. When we look at our dataset of £2 billion-worth of properties in the London and the south-east—included at the end of the Chatham House report, the blue one that you should also have—we find that the 73 cases of incumbents, the people who remain in good favour in the kleptocratic states from which they come, get to retain their properties, but 13 out of the 15 cases of exiles, of those who have fallen out of favour, lose their properties. That is not explained by exiles being more corrupt and incumbents less corrupt, so there are problems there around enforcement.
That means, effectively, that however much transparency we have, the measures that are being adopted are not really introducing rule of law at all, because what determines the outcome for people—whether they get to keep their property—depends on whether they are in political favour back in the kleptocratic state. That is a real indictment of the way in which the UK system has hitherto functioned. It shows the limits of what transparency can achieve. As Tom mentioned, with this Bill the UK will be a gold standard of transparency across the world, but it will still lack in terms of accountability and enforcement. That is the real challenge.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Thomas Mayne: Yes.
Professor Heathershaw: Yes, I would agree with that statement entirely.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Thomas Mayne: I think so. Where do you cut it off? It certainly should if there have been large-scale, egregious actions. Oliver mentioned somebody registering companies in the name of a dead person, and I found an example of that in an investigation years ago. People should be penalised for really fraudulent misuse and prevented from registering companies again in the future.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Thomas Mayne: On the point about directors, there certainly should be; it is crazy that you have these people with 1,000 companies. I am not sure on your point about addresses. If you are an investigative journalist or a freelancer and you do not want to register a company with your home address, for example, or if you are the PSC and you have your name on the company, is that enough? Perhaps there needs to be some provision about having an office where you have to physically be and sign your name. I am not sure about the proxy address, but certainly, on your point about proxy directors, limiting the number would be a good idea.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Thomas Mayne: I think so. Obviously it is difficult with PSCs, because I can say I am the PSC of a company and there could be an agreement written in a safe in Liechtenstein somewhere that says it is actually a Kazakh politician or whoever it may be. Certainly, there are probably egregious examples where it is clear that the person is not the PSC. You can do some research on them. There have been some examples today where there is clear evidence that the person is not who they say they are. Yes, there need to be fines, and the fact that there has been only one so far again goes to the point on lack of enforcement over fraudulent information submitted to Companies House.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Thomas Mayne: Possibly; maybe that would overburden it. There are already talks, with the verification coming in, about ramping it up.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Thomas Mayne: It is an option.
Liam Byrne
Q
The Chair
Before you answer that question, is this question directed to that action in relation to measures in the Bill? I hope it is, because otherwise it will not be in scope.
Liam Byrne
Yes, it is a gap in the Bill.
Thomas Mayne: Absolutely, and many thanks for bringing up the case. As you mentioned, none of the authors had any say in the matter and we did not think it was justified, as the evidence we put in the report is entirely accurate. This is a perfect opportunity for some kind of anti-SLAPP legislation to be put in the Bill. Dame Margaret spoke at a recent debate with David Davis; some other examples were given there. If we do not put it into this Bill, will it just be mothballed and we miss our chance? Meanwhile, more journalists are being threatened, and a lot of information is not being put into the public domain because of the threat of a SLAPP. The Bill is related to transparency, as you say, so is there an opportunity to put that sort of measure in the Bill?
Professor Heathershaw: Obviously, I would agree with that. Our report has been subject to these issues. We have also seen many threatening letters over the years. I think it is fair to say that we are some of the leading researchers in the UK on this specific area, at some of the UK’s leading universities. Professionally, it is shocking for me to find that we could be subject to such aggressive letters. The risks were so great, simply because the costs could not be limited.
I think there is a need to introduce a merits test early on to dismiss legislation. I think there is also a need to cap the costs for defendants, because at the moment you have to get very expensive libel insurance to protect yourself, which can be very difficult. Even then, there are huge costs involved.
The question about whether there should be specific legislation from the Ministry of Justice is interesting. At present, that has not been tabled to Parliament and so the opportunity that presents itself—to amend Bills, to provide certain measures, to introduce costs—would definitely be within scope. When you see these cases, many of the people from outside a Government service who have given evidence today—I am sure Oliver Bullough or Bill Browder would speak to this themselves—have been subject to those actions for things they have written that are entirely accurate and in the public interest. In that sense, such a measure is within scope.
It is also within scope because money laundering of this type is always accompanied by reputation laundering, which means seeking to clean the public record of questions about your sources of wealth and misdeeds of the past. It is very much within scope and it would be great for the Bill to consider things like a merits test and a cost cap for defendants in defamation counter-claims.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Thomas Mayne: I mentioned earlier the PR industry. I think there is a debate going on, following the Russian invasion, about whether there should be transparency over who you represent. Should it be put on record and in what sense? There are membership organisations in the PR world, but you do not have to sign up to them, so there is an internal discussion going on about whether that should become mandatory. Do you somehow put PR under the scope of money laundering regulations? Maybe that is going too far, but some kind of oversight and transparency of such PR agencies, who sometimes represent the kleptocrats and use their wealth to threaten journalists, should certainly be considered.
Professor Heathershaw: It is my understanding that there was a consultation on a foreign influence registration scheme under an earlier, different Home Office Bill. That is where you may have something equivalent to what the US has in the Foreign Agents Registration Act. If you are looking specifically at kleptocrats linked to foreign regimes, or who are themselves part of foreign regimes, PR agencies are working on their behalf to clean their reputations, potentially in a wider public realm with public institutions, and, of course, to specifically target Government officials to potentially donate to political parties—a non-British citizen can do that while retaining overseas citizenship.
Those things would be in scope of a foreign influence registration scheme. Again, that crosses over into the territory of the Bill. It has previously been proposed as part of another Bill, but I think it is very much needed for the PR industry.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Thomas Mayne: That is an excellent question; I am not quite sure how to answer it. As researchers—quite akin to journalism—we all play a game of self-censorship in what we say. Even when you have information about donations from people from overseas—kleptocrats or oligarchs—that is certainly in the public interest, there is always a tendency to draw back and not put it in the public domain. If there were some other forum that allowed that information to be put there without the legal threat, that would be fantastic. At the moment, we rely on you as MPs to bring to certain issues up under parliamentary privilege, because the way the libel laws are set up in the UK is stymieing that kind of debate, which needs to be able to continue.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Professor Heathershaw: On the Chatham House paper, two of our authors are Americans, and they have a first amendment right. They think the situation that has arisen with respect to Chatham House is extraordinary and absurd. You could have a first amendment right in some kind of British Bill of Rights, which has been mooted in the past. In terms of academic and journalistic freedom, you could have a specific statement setting out that anything within professional competence that is evidence-based and without malice is counted as free speech.
I think there is obviously a need to revise the Defamation Act 2013 to say that, unless you can determine that a statement has been made with malice, and if it is within professional competence and accurate, it should not even be considered admissible as a potential case of libel or defamation. As researchers, our work goes through ethics committees—
The Chair
Order. I am afraid I have to stop you there. I have no discretion to allow you to continue because under the rules set for the Committee, the sitting has to end now. I thank both our witnesses very much for coming along and helping us with our inquiries.
Ordered,
That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Nigel Huddleston.)
Financial Services and Markets Bill (Fourth sitting)
Tuesday 25th October 2022
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 View all Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 25 October 2022 - (25 Oct 2022)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Before we continue with consideration of the Bill, I have a correction to announce to an earlier Division result. In this morning’s sitting, the Committee divided on amendment 44. The result of the Division was incorrectly announced as two Ayes and 11 Noes. The Noes were, in fact, 10. Apologies for that. Although it does not change the substantive outcome of the Division, I wanted to notify the Committee. The correction will be reflected in the Official Report.
Clause 8
Designated Activities
The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Andrew Griffith)
I beg to move amendment 22, in clause 8, page 7, line 7, at end insert—
“(7) The financial instruments, financial products and financial investments mentioned in subsection (3)(b) may include cryptoassets.”
This amendment clarifies that cryptoassets may be regulated using the new power in Part 5A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (designated activities) which is inserted by clause 8 of the Bill. The new provision relies on the definition of cryptoasset inserted by NC14.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 14—Cryptoassets.
Andrew Griffith
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Maria. Cryptoassets and blockchain could have a profound impact across all forms of the financial services sector. We are still on the cusp of this breakthrough technology, and its uses are continuing to evolve. Clauses 21, 22 and schedule 6 will enable the Treasury to establish an effective regulatory regime for digital settlement assets. Those include cryptoassets referred to as stablecoins. The Committee will consider those clauses in a later session.
Following engagement with industry, the Government recognise the need to move ahead with regulating a broader set of crypto activities beyond stablecoins; that includes activities relating to the trading and investment of cryptoassets such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. Through the Bill, we want to ensure that HM Treasury has the necessary powers to deliver that. The Government believe that creating an effective comprehensive regulatory framework for cryptoassets has the potential to unlock innovation in the UK’s crypto sector and to boost growth.
Martin Docherty-Hughes (West Dunbartonshire) (SNP)
What do the Government mean by “innovation” in a piece of legislation? I wonder why such a term is used, because it is so broad. What does the Minister actually mean?
Andrew Griffith
If the hon. Gentleman will let me continue, I can offer some clarification. It is vital that the Government have the flexibility to develop a world-leading regime for cryptoassets in an agile way. The innovation itself comes from emerging new technologies or new uses for those technologies. The role of the Government and the Treasury in this respect will be to create regulatory frameworks that enable their safe deployment, which I hope all Members of the House agree with. Together, amendment 22 and new clause 14 will ensure that that happens.
Dame Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)
The Minister is quite right that all Governments have to think about how to deal with the emergence of cryptocurrencies, but using that phrase is a bit like using the phrase “genetically modified”. We would certainly want any coin that the Bank of England decided to back to be treated very differently from Bitcoin. Could the Minister say a bit more about how regulating for a piece of electronic money backed by the Bank of England would be different from regulating in a way that would make Bitcoin seem almost reasonable? We know that it is a gigantic gamble that no one in their right mind would want to invest in.
Andrew Griffith
I am cautious of time; this issue would be apt for a debate in itself rather than being discussed as part of the Bill’s technical clauses. Aspects of Bitcoin are already within the perimeter of the regulatory regime. As I said at the beginning of my remarks, that is an emerging area. The hon. Member for Wallasey is quite right that there are trade-offs, and we want to protect consumers while not shutting the regulatory regime off from an emerging set of technologies.
Andrew Griffith
I give way again, but I do not want to turn this into a debate about the underlying societal challenges of an emerging technology; I want us to confine ourselves as much as possible to the Bill.
Martin Docherty-Hughes
I am grateful to the Minister. I disagree that crypto is emerging; it has been around for quite a long time. In terms of parity of regulation and consumers, there are also the producers. It seems that there would be a halo effect: for example, larger companies would control stablecoin, but small or medium-sized companies that could produce stablecoin might be excluded. Will the Minister assure us of the Government’s intention to create equity in the stablecoin market?
Andrew Griffith
It is certainly not the Government’s intention to create anything other than opportunities for different participants to emerge and bring forward products in the sector. Those could include stablecoins, which are asset-backed cryptoassets. Over time, they could include central bank-issued currencies. The Government have indicated a desire to explore that, but have not yet confirmed that the Bank of England or the Treasury intend to issue.
Of course, we must ensure that products already out there being advertised to our consumers are appropriately regulated within the regulatory perimeter. We are not preferring or advantaging one or other part of that, but without the amendment and new clause we would not be able to bring forward the appropriate regulations, which the regulators will consult on with industry in due course. I hope that clarifies the Government’s thinking. Outwith the Committee, it will be appropriate in due course for the Government to update their set of policy objectives for this space. The subject that we are discussing today is somewhat narrower; it is just the remit of the Bill.
Amendment 22 clarifies that cryptoassets are within scope of the designated activities regime introduced by clause 8. We talked earlier about the designated activities regime—the DAR. By bringing cryptoassets within its perimeter for the first time, some of the societal outcomes and concerns that hon. Members have raised can be addressed. If we do not bring them within the perimeter, those concerns cannot be addressed.
New clause 14 clarifies that cryptoassets could be brought within the scope of the existing provisions of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 relating to the regulated activities order. The substance is that cryptoassets will be treated like other forms of financial asset: not preferred, but brought within the scope of regulation for the first time. That is the aim of the new clause. It will ensure that the Treasury is equipped to respond to developments in the crypto sector more quickly and deliver regulation in an agile, risk-based way that is consistent with our approach to the broader financial services sector.
The Treasury will consult on its approach with industry and stakeholders ahead of using the powers, to ensure that the framework reflects the unique features, benefits and risks posed by crypto activities. I think that is the assurance that hon. Members seek: that the Government will consult before seeking to use the powers. Any secondary legislation made to bring new cryptoasset activities into the regulatory perimeter would be subject to the affirmative procedure, so each House will have an opportunity to debate the legislation. That gives Parliament the appropriate oversight.
Tulip Siddiq (Hampstead and Kilburn) (Lab)
We welcome Government amendment 22 and Government new clause 14, which we recognise would extend financial protection to cryptoassets. It is a welcome and important move that will help to prevent high-risk cryptoassets from being falsely advertised to the public.
Does the Minister believe that the definition of cryptoassets is broad enough to capture financial promotions of as yet non-existent cryptoassets? I also wanted to ask him how the broad-ranging definition of “crypto” used in clause 8 takes account of the fact that the Bill only brings stablecoins into payment regulation.
Martin Docherty-Hughes
I draw the Minister and his Department’s attention to the work of Dr Robert Herian, who is one of the primary academics on regulation. I am mindful that he says it is the technology that underpins stablecoin and other related cryptoassets that we seek to regulate through the legislation. I welcome that—it is a step forward—but he has also said that the technology
“may offer an opportunity to recalibrate the powerplay between those who would engage in aggressive tax strategies and planning, and those charged with regulating them”.
Can the Minister advise Members whether he believes that this approach to stablecoin and future innovative technologies, which are already there, will enable a recalibration, so that finance is not utilised in some type of tax dodge? Could he reinforce that point? Every time we hear a discussion about stablecoin and cryptoassets, there is a certain element of finance that I do not think anyone here would really support.
Andrew Griffith
On the question posed by the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn, I do believe that the definition is broad enough. If there are specific concerns or use cases that the hon. Member feels are not encompassed, I am happy to take that back offline or to write to her with advice. The intention is clearly to allow sufficient flexibility to broaden the perimeter.
I am not fully familiar with the works that the hon. Member for West Dunbartonshire talks about, but I am happy to become more familiar with them over time. It is clearly not part of the Government’s intention to legitimise what would not otherwise be legitimate or to create the opportunity for issuers to evade responsibility to society. That is not the Government’s aim and objective.
Amendment 22 agreed to.
Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)
I beg to move amendment 35, in clause 8, page 9, line 25, at end insert—
“(ba) in cases where the regulations make provision for liability, make provision for nominated representatives of organisations against whom liability has been found to be held personally liable for actions undertaken in relation to carrying out a designated activity,”.
This amendment would allow for nominated representatives to be held personally liable for the carrying out of a designated activity when an organisation has been found liable.
This is another amendment that attempts to improve the protection of consumers, small investors and others who in the past have been far too easy prey for unscrupulous company directors and other people in charge of companies. In a number of the recent financial services scams, we have seen that even once the investigatory regulatory process has been completed, which in itself can take five, even 10 years, any attempt to recover money from where it should be recovered from—the pockets of criminals—is frustrated by the fact that the companies at the centre of the scam have at best no money left in their books. Most of the time, they have been placed into liquidation long ago.
Part of that liquidation process is always moving the money into other companies, very often hidden in offshore anonymous companies owned by the exact same person. Effectively, the person who works the scam takes steps to get their money well out of the reach of the UK regulators and enforcers long before the liability of the company is established. Amendment 35 seeks not to require but to allow the designated activity regulations in specific circumstances to make regulations that say, “There will be occasions when individuals who have carried out the misconduct will be held personally liable to people who have suffered.” That means that those who have been scammed in a way that is not covered by the financial services compensation scheme at least have a chance of getting their money back. Possibly more importantly, the amendment would be a further deterrent to those who would carry out such scams, because it will at least partially close down the option of their hiding their ill-gotten gains in a different company, where they are no longer within reach of the regulator.
I appreciate that anything that starts to blur the distinction between a shareholder, a director and the legal personality that is a limited company should be used with caution. I fully understand why, in UK law, a company is its own person with its own legal identity, but there are times when we cannot allow the director of a company to hide behind that—times when natural justice says that if we know who is responsible for people losing their money, and know that they have buckets full of money sitting in a company somewhere, it is perfectly reasonable to say to them, “We will have that money to compensate the people you scammed.”
The victims of Blackmore Bond will never see their money again. I understand that one of its directors is now bankrupt, but the other definitely is not. Most of the victims of Safe Hands Plans will probably not see their money again. Remember, its director bought the company at a time when he knew that it would have to wind up in a year or two; we have to ask why he was so keen to buy it. He is not a poor person; he is extremely wealthy. He just managed to move his money out of that company and into others.
Clearly, the amendment could not be retrospective, but if it was agreed to, it would mean that if any person tried the same dodge in future, their victims could, in court, try to get their money back from the person who stole from them, rather than from the company, which will often no longer exist.
Dame Angela Eagle
I do not want to row in behind the hon. Member and support absolutely everything that he says on his amendment, but I know what he is trying to do: to put something in statute that would solve the problem of fraud, which is more and more prevalent in our financial system, especially in and around the perimeter that we have been talking about. There can be questions about whether a person is inside or outside the perimeter, or whether a bit of their company is inside and a bit outside. That kind of fraudulent hiding behind being regulated when the things being sold are outwith the perimeter does fool a lot of people, and a lot of money is scammed out of our constituents’ bank accounts in that way. Does the Minister have any observations on how we could—
Dame Angela Eagle
Before we were so rudely interrupted, I was saying that, although I do not support the detail of the amendment, it is a hook on which to hang the sheer frustration that many of our constituents feel about a system in which vast amounts of money are scammed. Some of those who have benefited are in plain sight, often with their ill-gotten gains, while our constituents have had their life savings wiped out. It seems that the law can do nothing to touch these people, and I share our constituents’ frustration.
We will get on to fraud and other issues later in the Bill, but I understand and respect the creativity of the hon. Member for Glenrothes in using the amendment to raise them now. In replying to the debate, will the Minister say how the Government think we could massively improve the attack on fraud in our financial system, because it is increasing rapidly? The risks for those who perpetrate fraud are tiny, but the rewards are huge, and that is surely driving the ongoing attacks on the life savings of many of our constituents. That makes engaging with financial services—buying and selling, and buying products from the system—difficult and potentially dangerous, and it puts many people off trying to make the provision for themselves that we would normally want them to make.
Shaun Bailey (West Bromwich West) (Con)
I, too, support the intentions behind the amendment from the hon. Member for Glenrothes, which were very well articulated by the hon. Member for Wallasey. We often see these people swanning around the place with their ill-gotten gains, while many of our constituents have been on the receiving end of a scam. Even when there has been some form of regulatory investigation, some people do not feel that justice has been done. The amendment tries to make tangible something that may appear quite abstract to our constituents. I support the amendment’s aim but, to follow one of the Committee’s themes, perhaps this is not quite the place for it.
That said, I echo the request for reassurances from the Minister on how we will construct a regulatory regime that makes our constituents feel that there is a degree of responsibility. As Members on both sides of the Committee have said, many of our constituents, particularly those who have been victims of fraud and scams, feel that although the letter of the regulatory system may have been followed, justice has not been done. As we consider the Bill, we need to keep that at the forefront of our mind. I can get on board with the intentions behind amendment 35, but we have to first consider its practical effects. I hope that in his summing up, the Minister will give the Treasury’s thinking on this issue.
Tulip Siddiq
Later, I will come to my amendment on the Bill’s fraud provisions, but I want to express my support for the intentions behind amendment 35. Does the Minister oppose in principle the idea of nominated representatives being held liable for the carrying out of a designated activity when an organisation has been found liable?
Andrew Griffith
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich West for his reasoned response; I make common cause with him. The issue of liability compensation vexes the sector, and a huge number of regulatory interventions and compensation schemes are concerned with that. I say to all hon. Members that the battle against fraud and for recompense goes much wider than the Bill. It includes the Government’s fraud strategy, our endeavours on economic crime and the activities of various regulators, but I associate myself with colleagues’ remarks.
It is said that hard cases make bad law, and regrettably the Government feel that the amendment cannot be supported. We need to be conscious that limited liability is an important principle in UK law. Measures elsewhere in the Bill—we will come to them later in our discussions on clause 8—allow the Treasury to make regulations concerning liability and compensation in relation to designated activities. That goes some way to answering the question raised by the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn. In principle, the Government are absolutely on the side of victims; sometimes it is just a question of bringing forward the appropriate regulations that will not have unintended consequences.
Given the breadth and variety of activities that can fall within the designated activities regime, we need a tailored supervision and enforcement framework for each type of activity, rather than over-generalising. The Treasury can use powers in the DAR to design and create separate supervision and enforcement frameworks.
Proposed new section 71P, which will be inserted into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 by clause 8, allows the Treasury to make regulations concerning liability and compensation in relation to designated activities. That means that the Treasury can make provision in secondary legislation for the Financial Conduct Authority to hold liable individuals—this answers the question—working for a company that is carrying out designated activity, where appropriate. We support that in principle, but it is for the FCA to bring forward the regulations for a particular type of activity.
Proposed new section 71Q to FSMA provides that designated activity regulations—
The Chair
Order. The Minister might want to pause his comments on clause 8 and focus for the moment on amendment 35. We will come to clause 8 stand part shortly.
Andrew Griffith
Thank you, Dame Maria. You are right: many of these matters fall within the domain of clause 8, which we shall discuss shortly.
Peter Grant
I thank Members on both sides of the Committee who have supported the intention behind the amendment. As I said in my opening remarks, I accept that it does not sit particularly comfortably in a financial services Bill under the Treasury, because the Treasury is not usually responsible for the general regulation of businesses. Nor does it sit comfortably in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill, which I understand is shared between the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and the Home Office. BEIS, through Companies House, is not responsible for the regulation of financial services and will not be responsible for the regulation of designated activities. Nobody is entirely responsible, and that is the problem.
To those who say, “Yes, we agree with you, but this is not the time,” I say, “If not us, then who, and if not now, then when?”. Tomorrow, some of our constituents will be scammed, and more will be scammed the next day. Every day that we delay, waiting for the Government to introduce the perfect clause that has no unintended consequences, causes unintended consequences for our constituents. I accept that the amendment might have unintended consequences, but the Government’s inexcusable delay in closing the loopholes once and for all has already led to unintended consequences. I intend to press the amendment to a vote for that reason.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Peter Grant
I beg to move amendment 36, in clause 8, page 10, leave out lines 22 to 27.
This amendment would remove the Treasury’s proposed power to make regulations which modify legislation of the Welsh Senedd, Scottish Parliament or Northern Ireland Assembly for purposes connected with the regulation of designated activities.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 37, in clause 8, page 11, line 38, leave out from the first “Parliament” to the end of line 40.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 36.
Peter Grant
The amendment can be summed up in four words: “Hands aff oor Parliament”, whether that Parliament is the national Parliament of Scotland, Senedd Cymru or the Northern Ireland Assembly. Those who claim to respect the devolution settlement cannot do so with any credibility if they continue to give power to Ministers of the reserved Parliament to override decisions of the democratically elected national Parliaments of three of the four equal-partner nations in the Union. This is a power grab of the kind we have already seen in other EU withdrawal legislation. Some of those power grabs will now happen, because the House has voted for them, but that does not make them right or any less of an outrage against democracy. Amendment 36 must be agreed to for the Committee to be able to hold its head up in public and say, “We support democracy and we respect the devolution settlement.”
Amendment 37, although not technically a consequential amendment, is as close to one as makes no difference, because the wording that it would delete on page 11 would no longer be relevant if we agreed to amendment 36. It is my intention to press amendment 36 to a vote.
Emma Hardy (Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle) (Lab)
I hope that when the Minister responds to the debate on the clause, he will cover proposed new section 71R of FSMA 2000 before reaching the point mentioned by the hon. Member for Glenrothes. Subsection (1) of the new section is a Henry VIII power that allows the Treasury to amend legislation, including primary legislation. Will the Minister outline when, why and how the Government intend to use those Henry VIII powers, and what safeguards we have in the Bill against their abuse?
Andrew Griffith
I hope that we can dispense with the amendments quickly. They are meant simply to prevent the Government from making amendments to devolved legislation. The clause deals with matters that are reserved to the UK Government. We consider new section 71R in clause 8 as an essential power that gives the Treasury the ability to ensure that legislation works consistently and effectively when changes are brought about by virtue of the DAR. It also permits the Treasury to amend legislation made by the devolved legislations. The position of the hon. Member for Glenrothes on that is clear, but it is not shared by the Government. Although we do not expect to amend legislation from the devolved Administrations, this is a precautionary power.
Let me reply to the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle. There is no current legislation that we expect to be amended in such a way, but it is possible that legislation made by the devolved Administrations has some references buried within it to aspects of financial services and markets legislation, which is why the power is needed. There is precedent for that approach. Section 144F of FSMA contains a similar power that can be used for legislation made by the devolved Administrations. I hope that that reassures the hon. Member for Glenrothes—although I fear it does not—and ask him to withdraw his amendment.
Emma Hardy
I fear that the Minister did not fully address my point, which is that the clause contains Henry VIII powers. I do not think he clearly outlined exactly when those powers would be used. He has mentioned that there are similar powers in a different piece of legislation, but has not said specifically when the Government would use these incredibly powerful Henry VIII powers to overrule primary legislation.
Peter Grant
I hope that the record of the sitting will clearly indicate that the Minister was given the chance to reply to the hon. Lady’s question—twice, in fact—but chose not to.
It is a fundamental principle of the devolved settlement that the Conservative party insists that it wants to protect that if a decision is made by a devolved Parliament under its devolved powers, nobody should have the right to overturn or amend that decision other than that Parliament. The Minister has said that he is not aware of any circumstances when he would want to use the power, so why not wait until the circumstance arises? Why not speak to the devolved Parliaments then—or, indeed, why have the Government not spoken to them already—to say that devolved legislation is causing problems, and to ask whether they can agree, cross-party and cross-nation, to change it, rather than pushing aside the devolved nations and the devolution settlement, and imposing rules on our people against the devolution settlement? Let us not forget that 75% of our people voted for the establishment of the Scottish Parliament.
I do not agree with everything Senedd Cymru does. It is not my party that is in government in Wales; it will never be my party that is in government in Northern Ireland. I will not agree with everything they do, but I utterly respect the rights of those Parliaments to legislate in the best interests of their people. If the Minister is saying that he does not think that he will be able to trust the devolved Parliaments to make a sensible decision if and when that becomes necessary, we have a big problem.
Martin Docherty-Hughes
My hon. Friend talks about not trusting the Scottish, Welsh or Northern Ireland Government. Any legislation brought forward in those places receives the attention of senior legal advice, whether that be from the Lord Advocate or from others in the devolved Administrations. The amendment defends the legitimacy and independence of the legal advice given by senior legal officers to devolved Administrations.
Peter Grant
My hon. Friend makes a valid point. It is sometimes forgotten that the devolved Parliaments have a number of checks in place to prevent them from attempting to legislate on things that are clearly beyond their powers, and there is a clear example of that happening at the moment, but there is no statutory or constitutional check on this place’s ability to push aside the devolution settlement to legislate on matters that are clearly devolved. That is simply not acceptable. Remember, we were talking about what the Government still call the most powerful devolved Parliament in the world. How can it be anywhere near being that if the Parliament that devolved powers to it can grab those powers back at the drop of a hat or the stroke of a pen? I will not withdraw the amendment. Every time I see such a power grab in legislation, I will speak against it, stand against it, and vote against it.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
Given that amendment 36 has fallen, may I encourage the hon. Member for Glenrothes not to press amendment 37, which is similar?
Peter Grant
It does not make a lot of sense to press amendment 37 now that amendment 36 has gone. In fact, arguably, on its own, amendment 37 would weaken the position of the devolved Governments, so I will not press it.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss that schedule 3 be the Third schedule to the Bill.
Andrew Griffith
Clause 8 inserts a new regulatory regime into FSMA called the designated assets regime. I feel that it is already becoming an old friend; we have referred to it a number of times this sitting. Once retained EU law relating to financial services is revoked, the UK’s regulatory framework must be capable of regulating activities that are currently subject to retained EU law in a proportionate manner suited to UK markets. Under the FSMA model, firms must be authorised in order to conduct regulated activities. The Treasury determines, with Parliament’s consent, which activities are regulated by adding them to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001, the RAO. The type of activities in the RAO are those carried out by banks, and by insurance and investment firms, such as accepting deposits or offering investment services. Authorised firms are regulated as a whole entity. That means that regulators can make rules relating not only to the regulated activity, but to the wider activities of the firm.
Where retained EU law relates to activities covered by the RAO, the regulators already have sufficient powers under FSMA to replace any rules as appropriate. However, there are activities regulated under provisions in retained EU law that are quite different. For example, in retained EU law, there are rules relating to entering into certain types of derivatives contracts. A car manufacturer may enter into a metals derivative contract to protect itself from price fluctuations in the metal that it requires for manufacturing. It would be hugely disproportionate to regulate the car manufacturer entering into that contract in the same way as a bank that offers current accounts or mortgages to customers. However, there is no mechanism in FSMA for regulating these activities in a proportionate way. That is why the Bill introduces the DAR. Under the DAR, the Treasury can designate these activities and make regulations in relation to them, or prohibit them where appropriate.
The Government expect that activities will be designated for regulation under the DAR through the affirmative procedure in the vast majority of cases. However, there is an exemption where, for reasons of urgency, the Treasury must act quickly. The Government are content that this is the appropriate procedure. It is similar to the procedure for adding activities to the RAO. The FCA is already responsible for ensuring compliance with the rules set out in retained EU law, and the clause will ensure that the FCA can also determine what rules are appropriate in future. As the DAR will be a new part of FSMA, the FCA will be required to exercise its responsibilities under the DAR in line with its statutory objectives, which include the new growth and competitiveness objective. The FCA will need to be able to supervise and enforce designated activity regulations and rules.
Emma Hardy
I refer the Minister back to a point I made about the DAR and the response to the consultation by His Majesty’s Treasury. Some of the respondents asked for clarity on exactly what activities would be regulated by the DAR. Can the Minister provide that in writing during today’s sitting, or bring further details to another sitting?
Andrew Griffith
I will do my very best to respond to that question. It is a point of detail. Today we are putting frameworks in place to try to legislate for as many outcomes as possible. By definition, that means that there is not a definitive list, but I will write to the hon. Lady and share the letter with the Committee.
To that point, given the breadth and variety of activities that may be designated under the DAR, a tailored supervision and enforcement framework will be needed for each one. We all recognise that we might want to regulate insurance in a different way from investment banking.
Proposed new section 71Q of FSMA therefore gives the Treasury the power to confer appropriate powers on the FCA for the purpose of supervising and enforcing regulations and rules relating to designated activities. Some activities that the Treasury may designate already have criminal offences attached to them under FSMA—for example, part 6 of FSMA contains two offences related to the offering of securities. Proposed new section 71Q will allow HM Treasury to maintain an existing criminal offence of offering securities and to modify it, including by adjusting the scope of the offence to reflect the scope of the new designated activity. I imagine from comments made that that would get broad support.
The Government will be able to apply and modify only criminal offences that already exist in FSMA. The provisions will not enable the Treasury to create a wholly new criminal offence relating to this activity. Schedule 3 sets out proposed new schedule 6B to FSMA. The schedule is inserted by clause 8 and lists examples of the types of activity that the Treasury may designate using the power introduced by clause 8. That may be the source of my response to the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle. At this stage, schedule 3 is indicative only. The Government intend that a number of market activities currently regulated under retained EU law will be designated for inclusion in DAR. It is anticipated that a wider range of activities will be designated in future to ensure that the regime supports an agile and proportionate approach in the UK.
Martin Docherty-Hughes
Will the Minister help with a quick clarification on proposed new section 71Q? It refers to “conferring powers of entry”. Would that be on His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs? It has UK-wide powers of entry. Does that refer solely and wholly to HMRC, or does it refer to others who might require entry under the legislation?
Andrew Griffith
I will write to the hon. Gentleman to confirm that. It is important that our model of financial services regulation be responsive to emerging opportunities and challenges, and that includes those that can be regulated in future but are as yet unknown. Hon. Members can understand the thrust of what we are trying to do through clause 8 and schedule 3.
Tulip Siddiq
Am I right in thinking that new section 71R gives the Treasury powers to introduce criminal sanctions without reference to Parliament? Does the Minister think it is right to side-step Parliament in this way?
Andrew Griffith
That is not the intent of the Bill. Its intent is essentially to future-proof existing criminal law under FSMA, but to modify its scope as new activities fall within the designated regime.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 8, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3 agreed to.
Clause 9
Rules relating to central counterparties and central securities depositories
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Griffith
Retained EU law contains frameworks to regulate a number of entities that facilitate the proper functioning of financial markets. These entities are collectively referred to as financial market infrastructure, or FMI.
FMI helps to maintain stability in the financial services sector and performs critical functions that help make markets safer and more efficient. To establish a comprehensive FSMA model, the regulators will need the power, when retained EU law is revoked, to make rules to appropriately supervise and oversee FMI. That is provided for in the clauses that we are considering.
Clause 9 gives the Bank of England, which I will refer to as the Bank, a general rule-making power over central counterparties and central securities depositories, or CCPs and CSDs. CCPs sit between two parties to a trade and ensure that if either firm defaults on its obligations, the CCP can fulfil the firm’s trade. This reduces the possibility of contagion to the wider financial system. CSDs settle securities trades—that is, they complete the trade by transferring ownership of the assets, such as shares or bonds, between two parties.
The clause delegates the setting of regulatory standards to the Bank as the expert, operationally independent regulator. That is in line with the overall approach taken to the financial services regulators in the Bill. With the new rule-making powers provided for in the clause, the Bank will be able to adapt the regulatory regime in an agile and responsive way—for example, to take account of changing market conditions, address emerging risks or facilitate innovation. This will be accompanied by appropriate accountability arrangements that will apply to the Bank when it is exercising these new powers; we will discuss those when we get to new clauses 43 to 45.
The clause also enables the Bank to apply some or all of the domestic rulebook to overseas CCPs that are systemically important to the UK.
Peter Grant
Can the Minister give us an indication of whether there are existing institutions that he believes would be regarded as CCPs that are systemically important to this country? Apart from the obvious factor of the amount of business that a body does with the UK, what other factors will be taken into account when deciding whether to designate an institution in that way?
Andrew Griffith
That is a matter on which we would consult and be advised by the Bank. The Bank is the body with the expertise in this space. It would not be appropriate to try to pre-empt its views. This is an emerging area, and we have to be cognisant of how global clearing houses are developing. The UK hosts a number of the most systemic, but that market share cannot always be assured. This provision allows the regulation to follow the market share, or indeed follow the emergence of new CCPs and new clearing houses. The provision reforms the overseas framework so that the Bank has the power to apply domestic rules to CSDs and non-systemic CCPs as well.
Clause 10 provides the Bank of England with the power to direct individual CCPs and CSDs, requiring them to take action to comply with their obligations or to protect financial stability. Using this power, the Bank may either impose a new requirement or vary or cancel an existing one. The power is equivalent to those that the FCA and the Prudential Regulation Authority have under FSMA in relation to authorised firms, and it contains the same procedural safeguards. That includes, for example, a right of appeal.
Clause 12 ensures that the Bank’s regulation of CCPs and CSDs is undertaken in a way that is consistent with the wider financial services regulatory framework under FSMA. It does this by restricting the general power of direction, which the Treasury currently has over the Bank, to provide that it does not apply to its regulation of CCPs and CSDs. That is in line with the existing exemption that covers the exercise by the Bank of its functions as the prudential regulatory authority, in line with the PRA’s position as an independent regulator.
Turning to clause 11, the FCA is responsible for the supervision of certain other entities that help underpin the proper functioning of markets. Clause 11 gives the FCA general rule-making powers over two types of entity: data reporting service providers and recognised investment exchanges. Recognised investment exchanges are bodies such as the London stock exchange that are recognised by the FCA to facilitate the buying and selling of financial instruments and so help drive investment. Data reporting service providers make trade information public to help market participants make informed investment decisions. They also ensure that the FCA has the information it needs to monitor financial markets and protect against insider dealing and other forms of market abuse.
Despite their importance, both data reporting service providers and recognised investment exchanges currently sit outside the core FSMA regime, as they are largely regulated under retained EU law. To ensure that the FCA has sufficient powers to effectively regulate these entities once retained EU law is repealed, clause 11 brings them into the FSMA framework, in line with the approach taken for CCPs and CSDs in clause 9.
Tulip Siddiq
On clause 9, how does the Minister think third country central counterparties and CSDs will be adequately assessed by the Bank of England for the risks they pose to the UK’s financial stability?
I also have questions on clause 12. I am not sure if the Minister wants to answer those now or to come back to them.
The Chair
I suggest that you make all your comments and then we invite the Minister to respond to all of them at the end.
Tulip Siddiq
We support clause 12, which will empower the Treasury to give directions to the Bank where it considers it necessary in the public interest. Does the Minister not agree that such a mechanism is sufficient to direct the Bank of England when the Treasury believes it needs to do so in the public interest? Does he therefore feel that a so-called intervention power is necessary?
In our evidence sessions, which the Minister and other Members were at, we heard very clearly from the deputy governor of the Bank of England and the former chief executive of Barclays that a future intervention power would endanger financial stability and undermine the independence of the Bank of England. There were stark warnings from our witnesses. Does the Minister agree that it would be reckless to ignore that advice from the experts?
Emma Hardy
I want to add to the points made by my hon. Friend on our concerns around clause 12 and the independence of the Bank of England, given that the Treasury has such significant powers over it. I refer the Minister back to the evidence given by Sheldon Mills from the FCA. He said:
“I have worked in regimes with public interest tests. I ran the mergers division at the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition and Markets Authority, and my learning from that is that, if put in place, such a test should be used exceptionally and with care, and that there should be specificity about the matters of public interest—in this case, financial services—on which it would be used.”––[Official Report, Financial Services and Markets Public Bill Committee, 19 October 2022; c. 7, Q3.]
That is the FCA asking for specificity—it is easy for them to say—on exactly when the power would be used and when it would not be used.
Victoria Saporta from the PRA stated:
“A formulation whereby the Government can force or direct us to make or amend rules that we have already made, and that fall squarely within the statutory objectives that Parliament has given us, may be perceived as undermining operational independence and all the benefits that I talked about earlier.”––[Official Report, Financial Services and Markets Public Bill Committee, 19 October 2022; c. 7, Q3.]
Those were really stark warnings from two of our key witnesses from the FCA and PRA, talking about the difficulties they had with this specific clause and how this could be seen as undermining their independence.
Martin Taylor went further in his evidence, when I questioned him on these intervention powers. He said:
“One of the problems that led to the recent turmoil—a very English description of what has just happened—was that the Prime Minister and the former Chancellor chose not to subject the mini-Budget to the scrutiny of the Office for Budget Responsibility.”
He continued:
“However, international investors looking at London will have noted this and it has a bad smell, if I can put it that way.”
Later, he said:
“If you were in Singapore or New York, you might be more tempted to do that than you would have been a month ago. We should not do anything else to make this worse. Everything is being done by the new Chancellor to steady the ship…but moves like this proposed measure just go in entirely the wrong direction as far as I am concerned. I think it is very dangerous.”–– [Official Report, Financial Services and Markets Public Bill Committee, 19 October 2022; c. 76, Q149.]
Every single witness seemed to talk about the concerns they have over the level of intervention the Treasury could have over the Bank of England. I would like to hear reassurances from the Minister that he has been talking to the FCA, the other regulators and the markets about this. What reassurance can he give us that this is not HMT trying to again overrule our independent regulators?
Peter Grant
Again, I fully understand the intention behind these clauses and I am not minded to move against them, but I am a bit concerned by some of the interplay between the clauses. I asked the Minister what factors he thought might be taken into account in determining that a CCP is actually a systemic third country CCP, rather than an unsystemic one.
The Bill, on lines 39 to 42 on page 13, suggests that a systemic third country CCP is
“any third country central counterparty that the Bank has determined is systemically important, or is likely to become systemically important, to the financial stability of the United Kingdom.”
The word “systemically” is doing quite a lot of work in that definition. As far as I know, there is no definition of “systemically” in this Bill, or indeed anywhere else, so I am concerned about whether the wording of the clause is tight enough that everybody, including the Bank of England, knows exactly when it can use these powers and when it cannot.
That is important because of the difference that being designated a systemic third country CCP makes. Under proposed new section 300G to the Financial Services and Markets Act, the Bank of England can exercise most of the powers
“only by the application of corresponding rules”,
according to proposed subsection (1)(a). However, proposed subsection (1)(b) says
“except in the case of systemic third country CCPs…only so far as authorised by regulations made by the Treasury.”
That seems to mean that if the Bank of England forms the view that it is dealing with a systemically important CCP, it is free to act in a way that is not explicitly permitted by Treasury regulations, whereas if the Bank decides that it is not systemically important, the ability to act becomes more restricted.
Dame Angela Eagle
My questions seek some reassurance from the Minister, since I think these clauses are broadly welcome and, indeed, vital in the context of the Bill. One would not want to have this system without giving extra powers to the Bank, the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Treasury.
Problems in some of these markets can erupt suddenly and pose substantial, systemic problems. We saw it happen just a couple of weeks ago in the pensions industry with the sudden increase in gilt prices, which suddenly made a lot of the investment strategies of our defined benefit pension fund managers quite perilous. We can all commend the Bank and the regulatory authorities for taking action to try to stabilise the situation with liquidity in the pension funds. I am sure that all of us want to be content that the structures in place for dealing with these kinds of eruptions will be as implied in these three clauses.
Given the extra powers for the regulatory authorities in the Bill, will the Minister give the Committee some comfort about the extra resources that will be made available to the regulators for their extra oversight? The Bill implies that there is much more work for regulators to do across the piece, and it is very important in the vast majority of cases. I worry that they will not be given enough resource to keep a proper eye on the very fast-moving, complex, interactive system that they will be charged with regulating, keeping an eye on and, if required, intervening in, for reasons of contagion or systemic threats to that very interrelated system. If they do not catch that early enough, we know where it can end. I would appreciate some comfort from the Minister, if he can provide it, on the resourcing implications of the powers. Is he satisfied that the resources are there to do the job adequately and properly?
Andrew Griffith
I will try to respond to all the points in turn. First, in answer to the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle, clause 12 is not an intervention power. It clarifies that the power to direct is effectively removed in respect of the new regulations around CCPs. In many ways, it will give the Bank of England the independence and autonomy that the witnesses she cited sought, although in a more general context. There is a separate point, which is probably not in order for today, about the intervention power, as and when that is tabled. However, that is not the purpose of clause 12, which is a clarifying point in respect of the Bank of England.
The hon. Member for Wallasey raised the issue of resources. The Bill gives the regulators, including the Bank, powers to fund themselves using a levy. That is a stronger financial position than they are in today. The hon. Member knows that I am relatively new—that could change during the sittings of this Committee—but in all my interactions with the regulators, they have expressed themselves satisfied with the resources available to them, but we must be collectively careful about the burdens that we place on them and ensure that those are appropriate.
On the question of what is systemic and whether it is right to regulate overseas CCPs and CSDs, the thrust of what the Bill tries to achieve, and the broad thrust of the debate, is that those are precisely matters that should be decided by the operationally independent regulators in this domain. Although I and others may have views, it will be for the Bank to use its new powers—as now, and as in other domains that are in scope—in consultation with the Treasury, Parliament and others.
Peter Grant
To clarify, if the Bill is enacted as it stands, does the Bank have the option to create a different regulatory regime for overseas parties than it has for those that are based in the UK, or is the intention that the same set of rules will apply regardless of where the organisation is based?
Andrew Griffith
If an organisation is overseas, the approach will be that the Bank, in using those powers, will defer to the overseas regulator where that is appropriate, as it does now. I would not want us to fetter the Bank. It is for the Bank to lay out how it proposes to use the powers that the Bill enables, so as to be able to make the appropriate regulation that it feels comfortable with. I think we can all agree that this is a prudent enhancement of its powers. It broadens their scope, and allows the Bank to follow the risks to this country in a CCP, wherever those may lead it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 10 to 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
Before we come to the next group, could I ask the Parliamentary Private Secretary to remove the brown paper bag? It is not appropriate to have our lunch out on the side.
Clause 13
Testing of FMI technologies or practices
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
That schedule 4 be the Fourth schedule to the Bill.
Amendment 38, in clause 14, page 19, line 35, at end insert—
“(d) the views of the appropriate regulator in response to the consultation mentioned in subsection (5).”
This amendment would ensure that the views of the relevant regulator are included in any Treasury reports on FMI sandbox arrangements.
Clauses 14 to 17 stand part.
Andrew Griffith
Clauses 13 to 17, along with schedule 4, enable the Treasury to set up financial market infrastructure sandboxes. One of the objectives of the Bill is to harness the opportunities of innovative technologies that could disrupt financial services. This is especially important for FMIs, which play an important role in providing the networks and services that underpin financial markets. However, there are currently barriers and ambiguities in legislation that prevent firms from using certain new technologies in FMIs or that prevent the benefit of new technologies from being fully realised.
An FMI sandbox is a safe testing environment that will help address this issue by providing temporary modifications to legislation to participating firms where existing legislation does not accommodate a new technology or practice. Those firms can then test and adopt innovative new FMI propositions while being subject to restrictions on their activities and close oversight from regulators. The provision in these clauses will allow the Treasury to set up FMI sandboxes, and I will now set out what each clause does specifically.
Clause 13 will allow the Treasury to set up an FMI sandbox via a negative statutory instrument that will set out the type of firms that are allowed to participate in a sandbox, the activities they can conduct, the temporary modifications to legislation that will be applied to participants, and the duration of the sandbox. Schedule 4 includes an illustrative list of provisions that could be included in a statutory instrument setting up an FMI sandbox, in order to provide guidance regarding how the powers are intended to be used.
To facilitate parliamentary scrutiny, clause 14 requires the Treasury to prepare and publish a report to be laid before Parliament on the arrangements for each FMI sandbox that is created under clause 13, having consulted the regulators. This will include an assessment of the effectiveness and/or efficiency of the FMI sandbox and how the Treasury intends to make permanent changes to the legislation.
Amendment 38 would explicitly require the Treasury to publish the detailed views given by the FCA and the Bank in response to the consultation. The Treasury is committed to ensuring that the regulator’s views are fully taken into account and represented fairly when any permanent changes are intended to be made to legislation. However, it is essential that during this engagement, regulators are able to express their views candidly, particularly about specific participants, and share commercially or market-sensitive information. It would not be appropriate for that to be published. I therefore hope that the hon. Members for Glenrothes and for West Dunbartonshire will not press their amendment to a vote.
Clause 15 will allow the Treasury to make permanent changes to the relevant legislation based on the outcomes of a sandbox on an ongoing basis. Clause 17 sets out the relevant legislation in more detail. As an FMI sandbox will be designed to test the right regulatory approach to new technologies, clause 15 enables the Treasury to legislate to set different requirements from those within the sandbox. This will ensure that if risks or unintended consequences are identified during the sandbox, these can be appropriately reflected in ongoing legislative changes. Where the Treasury proposes amending primary legislation, the Bill requires that the affirmative procedure is used. Where the legislation being amended is not itself primary, a negative procedure will be used instead. This is to ensure that Parliament gives the greatest scrutiny to the legislative changes that are the most significant—in other words, those that fall within primary legislation.
Clause 16 is intended to enable the Treasury to confer powers on the regulators as part of any statutory instrument setting up a sandbox, so that they are able to operate a sandbox effectively. It also sets out who the Treasury needs to consult before exercising the powers in clauses 13 and 15.
Finally, clause 17 sets out how the various terms and concepts used in the FMI sandbox clauses are to be interpreted. It includes a list of legislation that the Treasury is able to temporarily modify for firms participating in a sandbox, which provides an important constraint on the scope of the Treasury’s powers in relation to the FMI sandbox in the Bill. The Treasury is able to add to the list of legislation via a statutory instrument by using the affirmative procedure to ensure parliamentary scrutiny if the Treasury wishes to bring further legislation into the scope of a sandbox. To summarise, the measure will be a hugely valuable way for financial markets to innovate and enable industry regulators and the Government to learn and change in response to practical experience. For those reasons, I recommend that clauses 13 to 17, and schedule 4, stand part of the Bill.
Tulip Siddiq
We strongly support the clauses. A sandbox for financial markets infrastructure will support innovations in the fintech sector, such as developments in blockchain, which has the potential to boost the transparency and productivity of the UK’s financial services. Could he please explain, however, whether clause 13 gives sufficient flexibility for the sandboxes to be used to support innovation in a wide range of financial technologies? The Bill says that sandboxing testing will occur “for a limited period”. Will the Minister further define that and set out the minimum timescales that he believes are necessary to adequately test a new innovation in financial technology?
On clause 14 and the reports on FMI sandboxes, which criteria will be used in the reporting of sandboxes, so that Parliament can transparently assess their effectiveness in safely supporting innovation? On clause 16, which sets out that prior to conferring such a power, HM Treasury must consult “the appropriate regulators” or such persons that it considers appropriate. Will the Minister please share his understanding of the definition of “consultation”? Which stakeholders would have to be consulted, and what is the estimated timeframe for such a consultation?
Clause 17 provides the Treasury with a power to amend the list of relevant enactments by way of the affirmative statutory instrument procedure. Will the Minister elaborate on how he sees that working in practice? Would every individual amendment to the list of relevant enactments be brought before the House for scrutiny? I presume so, but I want to have that on the record.
Shaun Bailey
The provisions in clauses 13 to 17 are incredibly welcome, because we are dealing with a financial services landscape that is constantly innovating and changing. I should declare that prior to becoming a Member of Parliament, I worked for the legal team at a major big seven bank and saw these developments as part of my role there. The provisions are very important because they will ensure that, as the fintech sector continues to develop and the regulatory framework continues to advance and change, they can do so within the perimeters of the sandbox arrangement introduced by the Government.
I particularly welcome the clause 16 provisions on consulting regulators, and the fact that there is going to be a discourse with them. We cannot cut regulators out of the conversation. The clauses do not seek to do that, but the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn was right to raise queries. We need a bit more clarity on what the consultation will look like. I fully appreciate that it is not always possible to give instant clarity when introducing primary legislation, but it will clearly be incumbent on the Treasury to ensure that, as the process progresses, His Majesty’s Government are as transparent as possible about what the consultation will look like.
We should remind ourselves that the practical application of the clauses will change and develop as the landscape itself develops, because that is the subject matter that we are dealing with. On clause 16, with respect to the development and work with regulators, I urge my hon. Friend the Minister not to forget the important role that lawtech plays in the regulation and monitoring of a lot of the instruments that will be part of the sandbox regime. It is often not talked about, but fintech and lawtech work hand in hand, side by side, particularly in this financial services sector.
I support the clauses; they are the right thing to do. As hon. Members on both sides of the Committee have articulated, they allow not only the financial services sector to innovate and develop, but the regulation to be developed in tandem with them. I would, however, welcome clarity from my hon. Friend the Minister on the what the practical applications will look like, particularly as we build that framework.
Martin Docherty-Hughes
I do not want to be the fly in the ointment, but I would like some assurances from the Minister about the FMI sandboxes. The Clifford Chance briefing notes that
“the FSMA Bill permits HM Treasury to allow broad participation in FMI sandboxes which in practice could include FMI providers, and participants in these systems as well as, conceivably, unregulated service providers such as technology companies and any other person that HM Treasury specifies.”
I am looking for an assurance from the Minister and his civil service team on the notion of unregulated service providers having access to the FMI sandbox. It seems that the EU pilot regime is far more limited in its multilateral trading facilities and securities settlement systems, and that it makes no mention of recognised investment exchanges or any other persons. It is not, therefore, making itself a hostage to fortune with its pilot system. Could the Minister and his team provide reassurance on the broad scope of innovation that they seem to be going for?
Dame Angela Eagle
I find myself rising to try to elaborate on the important points that have been made. I do not think that anyone would argue against the need to think very carefully about how to pilot—or sandbox, to use the jargon—the very rapid development and potential of what is happening. It is also important in the context of financial market infrastructure.
Certain infrastructures in our financial system are really old. One need only consider how long it took to get the bank clearing process vaguely up to date to understand the importance of modernising infrastructures. I do not think that anyone would object to an attempt to come up with a structure that tests activities, which is what these clauses do.
The Minister, however, has not provided any detail on issues such as risk mitigation; whether parallel sandboxes involving similar infrastructures will be developed, almost in competition with each other; whether this will happen in just one area; or how the powers will be used to test whether potential infrastructures might be worth using. Could he add a little more colour to how he sees those things happening? How big will the sandboxes be? How long will they be allowed to continue? The Minister is grinning because this is the kind of detail that an enabling Bill does not contain, but it might be quite important.
Testing regimes in other areas are sometimes very limited. I would be worried if we had an unlimited testing system running for a long period, allowing unregulated organisations in, perhaps running in parallel with each other. If that is what the Minister is suggesting, I would be worried. If he is suggesting something much more minor and limited, to see whether the technology works and whether people can interact with it to redesign the way in which websites work, I would be less worried.
Martin Docherty-Hughes
I am delighted that the hon. Lady has allowed me to intervene. The technology is not new, and that is what concerns me in relation to a lot of the debate on the Bill. There is nothing new under the sun about a lot of the technology, which underpins sandboxes, cryptocurrency and so on, that we are talking about. It just seems that a lot of the terminology takes over the substance of the issue that we are discussing.
Dame Angela Eagle
That is true. Blockchain has certainly been around for quite a while. Its use has implications for transparency and for the levels of employment that there might be in the old, more bureaucratic banks.
What would be the use of artificial intelligence in trying to decide how automated these things could become? Would there be worries about over-automation? How would that be looked at in terms of regulation? How open are we going to be about the way in which AI is applied and how it might evolve in ways that might embed discrimination such that we get a system where certain people may be discriminated against and excluded? There are a range of issues that need to be tested in these kinds of environments. It is hard to do that under a negative resolution procedure. I take the Minister’s point, however, about affirmative resolutions. If one of these things worked during the trial period, was issued and became permanent, it is important, as the Minister has said, that any changes are subject to affirmative regulation.
There are a whole load of black boxes in the Bill that we might need to debate further. Could the Minister give us more colour on whether there will be parallel sandboxes, on transparency on what will be used and how it will be compiled, and on how large the sandboxes will be in terms of money on the exchanges or turnover, or however he wants to put it. Then we could consider whether risk is being mitigated and how we can develop a system using trundling and analogue legislation, if I may put it that way, in an environment where innovation is digital and rapid.
I understand what the Minister is trying to do, but this Parliament must still be aware that we need to be on top of the detail of this Bill, rather than just passing shells of enabling legislation that do not give us enough of a handle on what is intended.
Peter Grant
Thank you, Dame Maria, for clarifying earlier that we are talking about sandboxes, not sandwich boxes. Some Members seem to have been a bit confused about that. I am intrigued by the use of the term “sandbox”. To me, a sandbox can be a road safety feature: it is literally a gravel or sand pit on a bad bend in the road to allow someone who loses control to get off the road safely. Alternatively, a sandbox is something that any cat owner will be familiar with. I am genuinely intrigued as to which of those metaphors somebody thought was appropriate for what we are discussing.
The principle behind these measures is absolutely sound. By this time next year, new practices in financial services will have evolved that none of us can begin to imagine just now. That is how things are moving. I take the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for West Dunbartonshire that the technology itself has not significantly changed—it is certainly not new—but the way in which people will use the technology is. The kinds of products that people will start to devise may well mean that existing regulatory practices need to be changed very quickly. The idea of being allowed to pilot something that is genuinely new in a safe space before letting it loose on the wider world is absolutely correct in my view. However, the devil, of course, is in the detail.
I am a bit concerned that the first in this group of clauses says that the purpose of the sandbox will be to test
“for a limited period, the efficiency or effectiveness of the carrying on of FMI activities”.
It does not say that one of the purposes is to test the effectiveness of any regulation that may go with it, which concerns me. Obviously, if someone knows that the activity they are carrying out in a sandbox will be looked at very carefully, they are going to behave themselves. How can we be sure that as well as being effective, it will work for the purposes of the providers? How do we know that the regulation that goes with it will also be effective? Again, that has to be effective as soon as the thing goes live. We cannot wait and regulate it effectively a few weeks later, because it will be far too late by then.
Emma Hardy
In relation to the sandboxes, and particularly in relation to clause 14, I draw hon. Members’ attention to the written evidence submitted by Spotlight on Corruption—in particular, if anyone wants to read along with me, paragraph 12. The recommendation from Spotlight on Corruption is that the Government should update their regulatory impact assessment
“to ensure that an analysis of the economic crime risks is included as part of the evidence base in each assessment.”
That seems incredibly good and sensible advice. As part of the way someone assesses how effective these sandboxes are, they could look at the potential economic crime risks. Spotlight on Corruption goes on to say that the RIAs should
“include a standalone ‘economic crime risks associated with this intervention’ section based on both quantitative and qualitative indicators. It should also include an assessment of the costs/benefits, and wider impacts as well as establishing how the Treasury intends to monitor and evaluate risks after the regulations come into place.”
If we are going to produce a report on how effective this measure is, one of the key things that I think we can all agree on is the need to look at economic crime. Although I have not tabled an amendment to that effect today, I hope that the Minister will look at the issue seriously and perhaps it is something we can return to on Report.
Andrew Griffith
I thank the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn for her party’s support for these measures, which I hope will be a useful addition to the financial services industry.
I will try to answer some of the questions. By their very nature, there is a discomforting element to trying to create safe spaces for innovation. Let me reassure the Committee that all the existing safeguards, whether they relate to economic crime or to consumer protection duties, relate to any changes that are, as it were, released into the wild after the period of experimentation. There is no attempt to create a back door or any diminution in the high quality of financial regulation throughout.
The overall level of scrutiny for this House was raised by the hon. Member for Wallasey. The statutory instrument would be laid in respect of each potential use of the sandbox. It would not be right for me to fetter whether that will be used in serial or in parallel, so we have to contemplate that there could be multiple sandboxes operating in some really quite separate domains at any one point in time. I do not think that would be a bad thing. In many ways, the test of this legislation’s success is that the sandbox is indeed used, and within that process we should contemplate that many of those pilots should fail, just as many should succeed; that is the nature of risk and innovation.
That statutory instrument would set out what categories are in scope of the sandbox, what sort of securities or products are included within it, traded or settled, the platform involved and what limitations there would be. There was a question about the minimum period of time. That would all be laid out in response to the individual applicant to use the sandbox, so that would be determined, and it would be reviewed by the regulators as part of the process of the Treasury laying the statutory instrument. It could well include any additional regulatory oversight, and the important issue of economic crime and prevention. However, to be clear, that is not the Government’s intention, nor would it be looked on favourably if anyone attempted to use that to create back doors for economic crime. The level of scrutiny of any pilot in a sandbox is generally higher than the level of scrutiny intervention from regulators in general.
Emma Hardy
I do not think that the evidence submitted by Spotlight on Corruption in any way implied that it would be the Government’s intention for these sandboxes to bring about economic crime. However, I think we all accept that economic crime is on the rise. Spotlight on Corruption specifically asks for it to be stipulated that the associated economic crime risks are looked at as part of the report into sandboxes. I would be grateful if the Minister could take that point away to consider further.
Andrew Griffith
I am very happy to take that point away and, if appropriate, I will write to the hon. Lady in response. The construct of regulation in this space is that we have a level of trust in our operationally independent regulators, and prevention of crime and of harm to consumers is at the core of the regulatory structure. She should have some comfort that that issue would not be overlooked.
I will try to give a little bit of colour regarding the intention to use the sandbox. It is the Government’s intention that the sandboxes be used rapidly after Royal Assent; indeed, consultations on the matter have already indicated a strong appetite for things such as the use of distributed ledger technology, both for settlement and for other aspects of the financial regime. Those things would be seen by the Government as an enhancement in many respects—whether dealing with settlement risk, credit risk or the speed of transactions. That is an example of the sort of use case that we would expect to be brought forward.
We talked about the regulatory outcome. The relationship with regulators was one of the first points raised. The Bill contains a provision to ensure that the regulators’ views are taken into account. The regulators will, de facto, have a very strong level of scope. Although we would not want to cut off participants by virtue of not being authorised—that would be to cut ourselves off from a source of potential innovation—it is expected that any participant would have had interaction with the regulators prior to entering a sandbox. As some hon. Members know, the regulators interact intensively with bodies such as the Treasury Committee, which we would expect to have a heightened level of interest in these matters.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 4 agreed to.
Clauses 14 to 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 18
Critical third parties: designation and powers
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Andrew Griffith
Financial services firms increasingly rely on a small number of critical third parties to provide services, such as cloud computing providers. Although outsourcing can have many benefits, the growing dependence of financial services firms on this small pool of critical third parties also carries risks. A failure or disruption at a critical third party could have systemic impacts affecting market confidence and threatening the stability of our financial system. To mitigate that risk, the Bill grants the financial regulators powers to oversee the services that critical third parties supply to the financial sector.
Clause 18 gives the Treasury the power to designate a third party to the finance sector as critical, bringing the services provided by that third party into the regulator’s oversight. Only third parties whose failure could have a systemic impact on the sector can be designated in that way. Designations will be done in consultation with the regulators, taking into account a clear set of criteria. The first is materiality—that is, how important the services are to the delivery of essential services, such as making payments. The second is concentration—the number and type of firms that rely on that provider. The clause provides the FCA, the PRA and the Bank of England with new rule-making powers to ensure the resilience of services provided by critical third parties. The regulators have published a discussion paper setting out how they may use the powers.
Clause 18 also grants the regulators a power of direction and targeted enforcement powers. As an ultimate sanction, the financial regulators may prevent or limit a critical third party from providing services to the financial services sector. Clause 19 then makes the necessary consequential changes to FSMA to ensure that the regime functions properly, in particular in relation to the Bank of England’s ability to make rules. This approach is flexible and proportionate, addressing the systemic risk posed by outsourcing to keep the UK’s financial system safe, while targeting only the services that critical third parties provide to the finance sector. I therefore recommend that clauses 18 and 19 stand part of the Bill.
Tulip Siddiq
On clause 18, could the Minister set out the range of disciplinary powers that the Bank of England, the FCA and the PRA have at their disposal short of preventing a critical third party from providing new or current services to the financial services sectors? I want some reassurance from him that the clause will not produce an all or nothing approach.
Peter Grant
Again, I do not oppose the clauses, but I do have a couple of questions. First, the Minister pointed out that the ultimate sanction that the regulator can take is to prevent somebody from carrying out the actions of a critical third party. However, given that it becomes a critical third party because the system would collapse without it, is that not the nuclear button that can never be used? Simply trying to enforce the protective regulation could cause more damage than allowing the issue to continue. I understand that it is a difficult issue to square, but is there any proposal to, for example, introduce new criminal offences? Rather than being placed in a position where we would have to damage a system in order to protect it, are there proposals at least to give the option of taking criminal action against the individuals concerned?
I understand why the Bill does not go into detail about the kind of directions and requirements that might be appropriate, but will the Minister reassure us that there is no intention to use the powers to restrict the rights of people working for critical third parties to take industrial action, should they consider it to be important? That would take us into a completely different area of legislation, but the Bill does not say that the Government cannot do that. I would appreciate an assurance from the Minister that that will not happen as a result of the Bill.
Finally, proposed new section 312N refers to immunity. Certainly we must ensure that, if an organisation acts in accordance with the requirements of the regulator, they cannot be sued simply for doing what they were required to do. Is there a potential issue that they could be sued by an overseas party in an overseas court? Has the Minister considered how we might prevent that from becoming an issue? Clearly, this Parliament cannot legislate to give anybody immunity from being sued elsewhere, and there are people who will tout around the jurisdictions all over the world to find somewhere they can lodge a legal action. Is the Minister concerned that the inability to give international immunity might mean that some of the provisions become less effective than we might have hoped?
Andrew Griffith
Let me try to answer hon. Members’ questions. Nothing in the clause restricts people’s ability to take industrial action. That is not in scope. The powers are not anticipated as analogous to existing ones elsewhere, and the provision is not intended to be all or nothing. The powers are in essence an extension of scope into this domain and would relate to activities such as reviewing the senior manager regime, the ability to compel the requirement of information and looking at things such as resilience. They are not designed to be binary in that respect.
The hon. Member for Glenrothes made a point about the fact that the functions have been designated as critical, but that does not necessarily mean that they are monopolistic. With respect, while that is an important consideration, which we would expect the Bank, in this case, to take into consideration, it is also perfectly possible that, in the case of cloud providers, for example, a number of providers offer identical services. If one was not able to demonstrate a degree of resilience but another was, it would be possible to direct that one ceases to be used without causing the sort of systemic risk that the Bill seeks to prevent. I will write to the hon. Member in respect of what is a complex question about international immunity in law. I hope that he will respect the fact that I should not answer that on my feet this afternoon.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 20
Financial promotion
Peter Grant
I beg to move amendment 39, in clause 20, page 31, line 37, at end insert—
“(1A) Where the content of a communication for the purposes of section 21 has not in the first instance been approved by an authorised person, approval by another authorised person may only be sought the FCA’s approval for the other authorised person to do so being provided in writing.”.
This amendment would prevent operators from “shopping around” for approval from an authorised person where one authorised person has not given approval, unless the Financial Conduct Authority permits this.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
That schedule 5 be the Fifth schedule to the Bill.
Peter Grant
The amendment is quite simple. I understand the reason behind the concept of the authorised person. The Financial Conduct Authority will never have the resources or capacity to authorise every single financial promotion that somebody wants to publish, so that role needs to be outsourced. My concern is that, in some of the scams that my constituents have fallen victim to, the authorised person has sometimes been a key part of the web of deceit and concealment that has been laid for my constituents and others to fall into. Very often, when it all goes wrong, we find that the authorised person who approved the financial promotion has gone out of business themselves, so there is nobody left to take responsibility.
I am concerned that something that I have seen happen in a small number of cases might become more common. If someone takes a financial promotion that is clearly not compliant with legislation to an authorised person, the authorised person might well say, “No, I am not going to authorise it.” There is nothing to stop the person from then shopping around and finding someone who will agree to approve the promotion on their behalf. Because these promotions are so common, and because there are so many of them being authorised and then issued, it is very difficult for the regulator or anyone else to pick up on the ones that should not have got through. We are relying on the integrity of the authorised person.
The intention behind the amendment is to ensure that, regardless of which authorised person someone goes to, they get a consistent answer—either yes or no. If one authorised person refused to give approval for a promotion, it could then be approved only with the consent of the Financial Conduct Authority. I am not sure that I am minded to press the amendment to a vote, but I hope that the Minister will be sympathetic to the intention behind it. If he feels that the amendment is not necessary, or that its purpose could be achieved by a better route, I would be quite happy to hear his reasons.
Tulip Siddiq
We welcome clause 20, which we recognise would introduce tighter controls on those who approve financial promotions for others, to ensure that consumers are better protected. How does the Minister foresee the clause facilitating improved approver expertise, due diligence and challenges in exercising appropriate regulatory oversight?
Dame Angela Eagle
Obviously this is an extremely important part of the Bill because it creates a regulatory gateway for financial promotions. We know from what the FCA has reported that there is an issue with misleading financial promotions. We all know it from our constituency casework; we know it from some of the scandals that have been carried out successfully.
Part of the trouble is the closeness to the perimeter of regulation. A firm can have part of itself in the perimeter, while other parts are outside the perimeter, but in the promotions, it gives the impression that all the firm is regulated and all of what it is doing is within the perimeter, while advertising in a very misleading way things that are actually unregulated and therefore much riskier. We know that a lot of scams have happened that way. The way in which the FCA tries to deal with this situation is like trying to hold back the tide. The fact that so many of the promotions that it has managed to get a handle on—4,226 of them—have been withdrawn or amended to make them less misleading demonstrates that the FCA is doing its best. However, members of the Committee know that there is a constant battle with scammers, who constantly change how they present information to consumers and potential consumers through an ever-increasing number of gateways, even on things like TikTok. It is difficult for any regulator to get a handle on that, so anything that helps to battle the problem more effectively will be welcomed by all of us.
Will the Minister explain in more detail why he thinks that this is the right way to proceed, and how effective he thinks the powers in clause 20 will be in tackling the problem? We know—I think we will come on to this later in our proceedings—that cracking down on fraud more effectively will also be important. With the financial promotions and unauthorised third parties that deal with granting permissions, we know that the current regime can cause problems. We know that it is failing and that the FCA cannot be expected to do all this work with the resources it has, so will the Minister go into detail about how effective he thinks the measures will be, and say how he will be assessing this approach’s effectiveness? Clearly we want a reduction in the amount of scamming and fraud, and the number of promotions that are misleading or downright lie about the nature of the products they are pushing, so I will be interested to hear how the Minister sees clause 20 as the solution to this difficult problem.
Andrew Griffith
I thank the hon. Member for Glenrothes for raising the issue, which I understand is of concern to Members on both sides of the Committee. I also thank him for indicating that he will not press the amendment to a vote. I think the reason for that is that clause 20 is a genuine enhancement of the regulatory infrastructure. It creates a new, two-tier regulatory structure that speaks directly to the issue of those who have been authorising harmful financial promotions. It does so by introducing a new assessment by the FCA that requires that they be assessed as fit to do so. I will come on to what that could look like in a moment.
We understand what financial promotions are. They are inducements or invitations to engage in investment activity in its broadest form.
Peter Grant
The Minister says that we all understand what financial promotions are, but do we really? Is the existing definition agile enough? One of the dodgy directors I mentioned earlier has now set himself up on TikTok as a lifestyle guru. Everybody knows he is doing this to groom people. He will say to someone, “I’ve got this brilliant investment plan that nobody else knows about. Why don’t you do it?” Does that sort of thing count as a financial promotion or not? Quite clearly it is an inducement and an attempt to get someone to sign up to an investment that may or may not be legitimate.
Andrew Griffith
I am not familiar with the precise incident that the hon. Gentleman talks about. We have to reflect that there will be a continuum from someone being a lifestyle guru to someone promoting a financial product. Our job as legislators is to understand where those cliff edges lie and to bring forward procedures that mean that the scope is laid in the right place, so that cliff edges are legislated for appropriately.
Peter Grant
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 5 agreed to.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Joy Morrissey.)
Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Second sitting)
Tuesday 25th October 2022
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 View all Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 25 October 2022 - (25 Oct 2022)
The Chair
Our first witnesses, the fifth panel, are Martin Swain from Companies House and Adrian Searle from the National Economic Crime Centre.
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
May I just declare an interest, very briefly?
The Chair
Absolutely. We will all listen with bated breath to the Minister’s declaration of interest.
Tom Tugendhat
I simply refer to my wider declaration in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.
The Chair
Thank you. Mr Swain, would you introduce yourself briefly for the record?
Martin Swain: Good afternoon. I am Martin Swain. I am one of the executive directors of Companies House, with responsibility for—
The Chair
You will have to speak up, because the acoustics in this room are very poor.
Martin Swain: Apologies. At Companies House, I have responsibility for policy, strategy and communications, and legal services.
The Chair
Thank you. Mr Searle?
Adrian Searle: Good afternoon. I am Adrian Searle. I am director of the National Economic Crime Centre. I am here with two hats on: as the director of the NECC, as it is called, and as a director within the National Crime Agency—so I can make comments about both the NECC and the NCA. If it helpful, I can explain a little bit about what the NECC is.
The Chair
No, I do not think so; we do not have time for that. I call Seema Malhotra to ask the first question.
Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)
Q
My second question is to both of you. Do you believe the Bill should go further and reform the strike-off procedure for companies? There is a recognised issue where companies are building up debts, not filing a return and then being struck off as one of the routes through which money laundering may be taking place, with limited room for manoeuvre after that. Would there be any benefits to reforming that process? Is there any consideration, for example, of companies being placed in a compulsory liquidation procedure? I would be interested in your thoughts on that.
Martin Swain: As you say, we have £63 million through the spending review for transformation. We are two thirds of the way through our transformation programme at the moment. It is fair to say that we have been clear with the Department and Treasury that we are taking on significant new functions and responsibilities. Some of that will require more people and people with different skills from those that we have now. Companies House is a register of information, so a lot of our people do processing work. We will need to move those people off that. We will need to employ skills that we do not currently have, so we are actively talking to the Department and the Treasury about our funding model.
To your point on fees, yes, we could increase fees to pay for additional resources. I know there is some challenge around the fee being too low. Again, we have taken provision in the Bill to charge fees for different things that we currently cannot charge fees for. For example, we cannot currently recover costs for investigation and enforcement activity, as it is centrally funded. We are taking powers to do things differently. I do not think I am at a stage to be able to say we have a definitive figure that we have agreed with the Department or Treasury that would give us our funding model for the future.
The Chair
Mr Searle?
Adrian Searle: I think the question that was probably targeted towards me is not about the resources in Companies House, but the second, follow-up question relating to striking companies—
Seema Malhotra
It was about how to tackle economic crime and whether the reform of the strike-off process is important to that.
Adrian Searle: The strike-off process is not something I have a detailed understanding of. I suspect Martin might be better placed to answer that question.
Martin Swain: Again, it is something we are very aware of. Companies take advantage of the strike-off route to discharge themselves of debts and so on, and for other purposes. My sense is probably that the Bill as drafted gives us what we need. It is about how we take forward the policy in that area regarding where companies are moved to strike off. For example, we get lots of representation with regard to lots of companies being registered at one address—a registered office being used and abused. The route for that would be to default them to our address at Companies House, for not having a registered office address that is valid. The next step on that would be strike-off, but clearly if we do that we may be having an adverse impact on the system and giving companies a route to use it for criminal activity or to fold without paying their debts. We are very aware of the issue.
The Minister for Industry (Jackie Doyle-Price)
Q
Adrian Searle: I think we have. There is, as you say, a real challenge to get the balance right between a prosperity and a security agenda. As we know, the Companies House reform elements of the Bill are a long time coming, so there has been lots of analysis and consideration of how you get the balance right. What I know from a law enforcement investigative perspective is that the changes being introduced under the Bill will certainly make the job of law enforcement far more straightforward in terms of our ability to investigate criminals and corrupt elites who are exploiting the complexity of the corporate structures to hide their assets, launder their wealth, and so on. I am confident that it gives Companies House and, by extension, the investigative agencies the powers we need. The indications that I have from exchanges with Martin and others in the industry are that the changes do not go so far that they inhibit transparent business practices in a way that undermines our economy. It feels to me that the balance is right.
Martin Swain: It is a very good point. It is a challenge for us as an organisation, because we have very clear direction from our Ministers that we should not create a burden for business, or make it difficult for companies to incorporate or for people to invest in the UK. The concept of balance is always there for us. We will bring in things such as ID verification, but we need to make that really efficient, and make it easy for people to understand the process, so that we do not create a burden for the vast majority of companies on our register that are legitimate businesses. That is quite a tension sometimes, because there is a significant spotlight on Companies House to become more than the passive register that we are at the moment, and to become—I hear this term—an “active gatekeeper” of the register. There is a potential that we move too far into that territory and make it harder for the vast majority of companies to deal with us.
I mentioned our transformation programme. There are two elements to our transformation. One is the legislative reform and all that is involved with that. The second part is digitising our services. That is what we have been focusing on in the last few years: making our systems really quick and easy to use, and to drive data, rather than receiving information on paper. You cannot work effectively with law enforcement from paper transactions; you have to have data.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Martin Swain: It is a huge culture change for us, not least in becoming more of a proactive agency. I hear it said that Companies House will be key to the economic crime ecosystem; what I say to people is that we will also be part of the business growth ecosystem. It is important that we have that dual role.
Adrian Searle: I think there is real value for businesses in being able to trust the other businesses they are dealing with. There is a strong argument that the transparency agenda supports the business agenda.
Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)
Q
Martin Swain: At the moment we are in the design phase for verification. I should say first of all that we will not do the ID verification ourselves; we will outsource that.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Martin Swain: At the moment we are looking at two options. We are working closely with Government Digital Service and others on the potential for the Government solution. We have been clear with them about our requirements with them. We are separately looking at market options, whereby we would go to the private sector and outsource via that route, where a number of providers can do identity checks.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Martin Swain: It goes back to some of the things that I said about ease of doing business. There are two key parts of our specification: whether we can make it really efficient, and fast and easy for people to do, and whether it is at an equivalent standard to the industry standard. We are very clear that we are operating along the same lines as others in the system.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Martin Swain: I heard that, and I am surprised that they are saying that. I will have a conversation with them about where that has come from.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Martin Swain: People with significant control will be subject to verification—beneficial owners, but not shareholders who have less than 25%.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Martin Swain: It was a decision by the Department and Ministers, post consultation. They consulted on the whole area of shareholders, and the information that they hold, and verification. The decision was that they would not be subject to verification.
James Daly (Bury North) (Con)
Q
Martin Swain: One of the main measures is ID verification. That is one of the biggest gaps in our register at the moment. We do not verify people who are setting up and running companies. The fact that we will know them and have verified them is key. We are taking considerable powers in the Bill to do things that we cannot do at the moment. We cannot query information that is filed with us. We cannot analyse and proactively share information. At the moment, we are very reactive. I use the word “passive”, and “reactive” is another word that I would use. We react to colleagues such as Adrian coming to us saying that they want information on certain things. In the future, we will be able to do our own intelligence work and will proactively be able to work with law enforcement.
James Daly
Q
Adrian Searle: For sure. It is a really fundamental change. I already have folk from my intelligence and investigative teams in the National Crime Agency working with colleagues in the Companies House teams to help them to set the road map for how they will transform.
Dame Margaret Hodge (Barking) (Lab)
Q
The Chair
We now resume the evidence session. Mr Swain is going to answer the question that was put to him by Dame Margaret Hodge.
Martin Swain: The question was about the balance of burden against tackling economic crime. I think you asked about the need for smarter regulation. I totally agree. Part of the challenge is how we use our powers in future. I would say that the way in which we use our powers will be around the integrity of the register; we will focus our activity on where we can have the most impact to improve the integrity of the register. In doing so, we do not want to create a burden for legitimate businesses.
The benefit of focusing on the integrity of the register is that we create value. As Adrian said, we already contribute a significant amount of money to the UK economy. If we can improve the integrity of the register so that people are making better decisions based on the data, and people are not being defrauded because of the way in which we are improving the integrity of the register, to me that is what smarter registration should be about.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Martin Swain: We will not be replacing the AML supervision, which rests with the AML supervisors. The Bill introduces a number of measures around ACSPs which we currently do not do. For an ACSP to file with us, they will need to register with us.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Martin Swain: With us. This is separate to their AML supervision. In order to file with us, they will need to register. We will verify the identities of the people who run the agency—the agents—and we will require them to confirm who they are supervised for for AML purposes. We will cross-check that with the AML supervisors. There are also some new offences in the Bill, so people will be required to maintain their records of their supervision with us. If they are suspended from their AML supervisor and do not tell us, that will be an offence. They will also have to maintain records of verification, which we will have the power to check. None of that exists at the moment. An agent can file with us without any of those things happening.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Martin Swain: Yes.
Dame Margaret Hodge
But it does nothing.
Martin Swain: I am not going to answer from HMRC’s perspective. If we are talking about smarter regulation, the benefit is that we will have a power and an ability to go back to HMRC and raise flags where we see activity from agents that is not consistent with what we want.
Dame Margaret Hodge
That is very helpful, thank you. I have a quick question for Adrian.
Adrian Searle: Can I come in on that earlier question? The requirement that the company service provider has a UK footprint is a significant shift. Prior to this Bill, overseas-based service providers could provide that third-party service to registered companies. That is a fundamental challenge. When there is a UK footprint, whether it is the supervisory bodies or, potentially, the investigative agencies, we have got a starting point that we can go after, which you cannot do when there is an overseas base.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Adrian, with your wider remit, there has been a huge decrease in the number of cases that have been taken by the SFO and indeed by all the agencies. One reason is the fear of costs landing on those agencies—for example, the NCA—if they lose the case. Can you give us a view? Do you think we should have a cost cap, in the way we have with unexplained wealth orders? Do you think we should have the American system whereby no costs at all are given to the litigant or the person accused of wrongdoing at the end? What is your view of that?
Adrian Searle: We are certainly very keen to continue to look at that. The cost capping in the UWO regime is attractive. I understand that other colleagues and Government, in particular the Ministry of Justice, have had conversations. They are having concerns raised that that undermines the core principle of loser pays. There are different views on this issue.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Adrian Searle: We find cost capping an attractive proposition, but we also understand that it is challenging. In addition, we are speaking to colleagues in the Home Office and the Treasury about the establishment of a regime that will help us to manage the risk associated with potential big financial costs if we were to lose a case. There is a governance system that they are proposing to put in place that will help us to manage those risks. It is still early days, and conversations are ongoing, but at least colleagues in Government recognise the challenge that we face. There is no doubt a chilling effect on the agency from the risk associated with financial costs.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Adrian Searle: I assume that is a reference to the ARIS system—the asset recovery incentivisation scheme. As it currently stands, we get 50%.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Adrian Searle: It is certainly true for the NCA and policing. I would need to check whether that runs across the whole system. I can come back to you on that.
Liam Byrne (Birmingham, Hodge Hill) (Lab)
Q
Martin Swain: Not yet, to my knowledge. We have had the confirmation of part of our £63 million, but we are in conversations with the Department around future budgets.
Liam Byrne
Q
Martin Swain: It would be very difficult for me to describe what a gold standard would be at this point. We have put in a significant proposal to the Department as part of our spending review preparations.
Liam Byrne
Q
Martin Swain: I cannot give you a figure on the budget, but in terms of numbers of people, it was in excess of an extra 100 people.
Liam Byrne
Q
Martin Swain: That was our assessment at the time. It obviously depends how quickly we can digitise services because, as I said earlier in the session, the quicker we can digitise things, the more we can move people off manual processing into other work. I think it also depends on what the final shape of the legislation is when it gets through. We saw that with the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022, where there were things, as the legislation went through, that changed and we had to adapt and do things differently. It would be wrong of me to estimate it at this point, before the legislation has passed.
Liam Byrne
Q
Martin Swain: I would probably say we do not need to. We have this package of reform, and it is fair to say we have worked really closely with the Department and people like the Treasury on what the package of reform needs to look like. We have been heavily involved, and we have been able to influence some of the thinking around what the reform needs to look like. However, I think nobody would disagree with the need to reform Companies House. Certainly, we would not; we welcome these reforms with open arms. As an agency, it is probably fair to say that we are hugely excited by the prospect of being able to do things that we have not been able to do in the past.
Liam Byrne
Q
Martin Swain: I have not said they failed to agree it. We have not got to that point of agreement yet.
Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)
Q
Martin Swain: I do not think we would have the capacity to do ID verification internally, certainly not within the timescale that we are looking at bringing it in. I go back to my point—and I will pick up the point with UK Finance—that we will be operating ID verification to standards that are appropriate across sectors that use ID verification. With any aspect of these reforms, there is potential for gaps in the system. What we are trying to do is design out gaps in the system. However, I think we know from the current companies framework that there are gaps in the system, and even where you plug those gaps, others will appear.
The Chair
Thank you very much indeed to both of you for your evidence. It has been very helpful. We now move on to the next panel.
Examination of Witnesses
Commander Nik Adams, Simon Welch and Michelle Crotty gave evidence.
The Chair
Good afternoon. We now have Commander Nik Adams from the City of London police, Simon Welch representing the National Police Chiefs’ Council, and Michelle Crotty from the Serious Fraud Office. May I ask each of you to introduce yourselves briefly, please?
Commander Adams: Good afternoon. I am Nik Adams, commander in the City of London police and the current lead on economic and cyber-crime.
Simon Welch: Good afternoon. I am Simon Welch, the national co-ordinator for the National Police Chiefs’ Council on the economic crime portfolio.
Michelle Crotty: I am Michelle Crotty, chief capability officer at the Serious Fraud Office.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Commander Adams: Shall I start, as the City of London senior rep? I have the advantage and the disadvantage of having been in this job only since April, so I can give you a view of where I think things have got to. I obviously was not part of the network when that report was written. I think it reflected an approach to economic crime that has been very much built bottom up historically, which led to the assessment that policing was fairly fragmented, with different levels of investment and different prioritisation across forces.
As long as economic crime and fraud, in particular, are not part of the strategic policing requirement, it is difficult to really get police forces to galvanise that response. We have seen, however, some fantastic work by the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners to get fraud and economic crime into police and crime plans. We have seen through the support that the City of London police has provided, as the co-ordinating force, a great deal of consistency starting to layer on in local forces. In this year alone, we have visited 29 out of all 43 forces to look at their delivery of the economic crime response and of shared good practice across the country. That bottom-up has given us those improved levels of consistency.
Through the spending review and the police uplift programme, we are seeing significant investment at both a regional and a national level to help us to build some of those capabilities. By the end of this year, we will have proactive economic crime teams built around a consistent model in every single regional organised crime unit. With the anticipated investment from the economic crime levy, we will see the growth of regional economic crime teams—proactive financial investigation at a regional level—and, with our support, the continued network of those teams across the country, which will give us a growing and more consistent approach as we go forward.
Stephen Kinnock
Q
Dame Margaret Hodge
I will read out the two figures. The number of crimes under investigation has halved in the past three years, and convictions for fraud offences, according to national crime statistics, have decreased by 67% since 2011. What you are talking about is theoretical; it is not what is happening. At the same time, fraud is going up and up.
Stephen Kinnock
Will you say a word about why that is? The system seems not to be working, so what do we need to do to fix it?
Commander Adams: I will start and then bring in Simon, who is an expert on money laundering. The first thing to say is that fraud is getting increasingly complex. About 70% of all fraud emanates from overseas and, as Adrian touched on, it is very difficult for us to obtain prosecutions and convictions across jurisdictions. That is a real challenge for us, as are the growth in technology, the way in which fraudsters are now exploiting people and the changes in tactics.
Fraudsters are moving away from unauthorised payment fraud, where people’s details are stolen and used fraudulently—banks are now preventing somewhere in the region of 65p in every pound of that type of activity—and we are now seeing much more sophisticated frauds, where people are socially engineered, or manipulated, into physically approving transactions. That of course is much harder for technological solutions to prevent, when the target is a human being.
Of course, all that complexity requires a much more complex and sophisticated policing response. As I described, the growth that is coming down the line—in particular the proactive growth—will not start landing until the end of this year and then, of course, we are several years before we have fully experienced and really competent and effective investigators working on those crimes. All those things will layer on over a period. We anticipate that the technological advances will continue, both in support of us and in challenging us in how we can investigate and progress these crimes. Simon, do you want to comment specifically on money laundering?
Simon Welch: On money laundering, the amount of offences—detected offences—is going down. Criminals are getting a lot more savvy about our tactics and things like that, so we find that they are not having assets in their own names so much—vehicles, houses, things like that—and our opportunities for confiscation are probably going down a bit. However, what you can see from the seizure figures is that the cash value is up, but the volume is down. We are targeting and getting good results from the cases, but it is a smaller number of cases. In reality, POCA is now quite old, and people are used to us going after the money, so they take far more steps to protect that money from us being able to confiscate it.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Michelle Crotty: At the moment, we have those pre-investigation powers for overseas bribery and corruption. They allow us to investigate earlier, in particular to identify banking evidence earlier, and to see whether there is a case to pursue. By extending that to fraud and domestic-based issues, we are enabled to do that in those cases. At the moment, we have to take on a case formally and to commit resource in order to exercise the powers. To some extent, we can negotiate on occasion with companies to get that material, but if we have the power of compulsion, it would make it quicker and easier to get the material and so identify whether there is a case there.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Michelle Crotty: Yes.
Jackie Doyle-Price
And to address some of the questions we heard earlier—if you can act more quickly and establish whether a crime has been committed, that is clearly more efficient.
Michelle Crotty: It is more efficient and means that, if we follow the money and there is a reasonable explanation, we can screen a case out more quickly, rather than committing more resource and taking longer to reach that decision.
Alison Thewliss
Q
“Company formation and related professional services are therefore a key enabler or gatekeeper of”
trade-based money laundering. Is there enough in the Bill to remove that risk?
Simon Welch: It is difficult to say. We have heard about the verification processes going on. With the authorised corporate service providers, if we strengthen all that and make things more difficult, we target harm. At the moment, you can register a company from abroad, and there is little opportunity for us to follow that up, especially in a jurisdiction that it is difficult to get information from. The idea of having ACSPs in this country, where we can see them and start the inquiry from the UK, would be very desirable. I am not sure whether the Bill goes that far; I have not read that bit too much.
The Chair
Sorry, you are going to have to speak up. We all wish to hear the answer.
Simon Welch: Sorry—I appreciate that. Authorised corporate service providers, if they are based in this country so that we have a starting point for our inquiry, would be something that we would welcome. That would make it easier for us to start an inquiry. At the moment, if it is coming from a jurisdiction that is not particularly co-operative with us, it might be difficult for us to get that information, so, clearly, we would want to see that.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Michelle Crotty: No. Anything that will help us to identify suspects is welcome, as my colleague has said.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Simon Welch: If they can still get the companies and they can still make them work, they are going to make them work. It is if we make it prohibitively difficult for them to do that—if we make it difficult for them to create their verifications, because they will have to work harder to get the verification sorted out to make sure they have got the IDs sorted out. We have talked about the fee of £12.50 for registering a company. There are lots of arguments about that—frictionless trade and things like that—but we have the lowest price for registering a company pretty much anywhere in the world.
Alison Thewliss
Yes—by some margin.
Simon Welch: So is there a view for increasing that and using it for Companies House to invest in verification? That is something that could be looked at.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Simon Welch: I do not know. If you were to ask a businessman what they were prepared to start a company for—how many companies they are looking to start? At the end of the day, if you were just building a couple of companies and you knew you were going to get a really good service, you might be quite happy to pay £100 or whatever. I do not know what is a reasonable price.
Commander Adams: One of the challenges for us in our investigations is how desirable shell companies are to criminals who want to create a legacy pattern that an organisation has been running for many more years than it actually has. Of course, if you are then into a large-scale boiler room-type fraud, whether you are paying £12, £100 or £1,000, it is simply a drop in the ocean compared with the amount of money you are going to make at the end of that. Making it harder for people to inappropriately and unlawfully use shell companies in the way they are at the moment is what will help us ultimately.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Commander Adams: If I am right, the Bill allows for retrospective work to take place. However, as you have alluded to, there are simply millions of entities on there. As you heard from colleagues earlier, the resourcing of those retrospective checks, given all the work that has to be done—there are something like 1,500 companies registered every day in the UK; it is phenomenal—is going to be a real challenge. We would want to see resourcing to do those retrospective checks, to remove those companies from the register as quickly as possible.
James Daly
Q
Commander Adams: Again, you heard from colleagues earlier about this. The big thing for us is making sure that checks are undertaken to ensure that individuals who are setting up companies or have a significant stake in them are verified, to give us, as Adrian said, those investigative lines of inquiry into individuals. For us, that is the biggest game changer in what we are currently seeing, but of course it will require the right level of scrutiny and adequate robustness in those checks, and the capacity to do them at speed.
James Daly
Ms Crotty?
Michelle Crotty: The same—anything that allows us to identify the people behind it and then to use that to follow up with lines of inquiry. Capacity is certainly something that we would be concerned about, but the work that the NCA and the NECC are doing with Companies House should help with that, in terms of training Companies House staff.
Simon Welch: It would also be nice to be able to data wash some of the registrations through law enforcement indices before they were actually registered. That is obviously another quantum leap from where we are now. I think we are looking at sharing that data, but that is another thing for Companies House to work out, in liaison probably with the NECC. I think that would be preferable for us. Then we could prevent these companies from opening up in the first place, and stop them being used as vehicles for criminality.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Michelle Crotty: We are very strongly on the record as saying that that is an offence that we would like to see. We have seen good results with it in relation to bribery and corruption since its introduction in 2010. Nine of our 12 deferred prosecution agreements have involved a failure to prevent bribery offence. We think that it not only punishes but helps to reform corporate behaviour. What we have seen with the Bribery Act 2010 is that companies have very much focused on putting adequate procedures in place because that is the defence that it provides them. The prosecution is one part of it, but actually the preventive work in terms of adequate procedures is as important, if not more important.
The other thing that we would say in terms of the impact on business is that for a failure to prevent economic crime offence many of the adequate procedures would already be in place in terms of anti-money laundering and other areas. Clearly that is something that the Committee, and guidance, would need to work through, but the impact on business may not be as heavy as some might fear.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Commander Adams: Yes. Ultimately, as Michelle said, I do not think that the imposition on business would be that significant. There are lots of areas where we see unintended consequences of thresholds upon which, or below which, things are not reported to law enforcement. That sort of legislation would give us the ability to ensure that there are policies and processes in place in institutions to provide the sorts of checks and balances that identify patterns that might fall outside some of the clearly defined breaches of legislation. That, for me, would be the galvanising benefit of that power, in a not dissimilar way to financial institutions reimbursing victims, which helps to galvanise effort and investment into preventing crime, to avoid spending money out the other end. All those sorts of measures are really helpful. Particularly through Adrian’s role as director of the NECC, I think he would say that the things that help to galvanise the partnership and the whole-system response to fraud is where we will ultimately see our biggest successes.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Michelle Crotty: The SFO would like to see those. We understand the concerns that other parts of the system have in terms of how you ringfence a cost regime just for economic crime. In terms of what the SFO can recover in any one year, we can retain £900,000 of legal costs if we win. Clearly, it is the other way if we lose, and there are ongoing discussions with the Treasury. I gave evidence to another Committee last week that, where we do not have a fund available to us for that that sits within our budget, we have to go and negotiate one with the Treasury if we lose. We would certainly welcome some protections, but we understand the challenges around fitting them into the broader scheme.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Simon Welch: Obviously, we are putting more resource into this area. If we are to go after them proactively, we are building up our intelligence around this. Historically, fraud has not been given the same emphasis as other types of criminality, so I think we lack in some areas. If we start to build that up, to get more intelligence that is actionable for us to work on, and to go after some of these people proactively as opposed to reactively, we will be getting ahead of the game, and then we will be able to arrest these people and prevent other people from becoming victims. It is important to invest in this area. It is a difficult time for us, because recruitment and retention of staff are challenging. We are looking to build, and are getting investment streams coming into us. We are looking to develop that all across the piece. We are looking at the intelligence and at the proactive capability and the investigative capability to take this on.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Simon Welch: Resources are a big part of it, but there is experience as well. If we bring in new people, they are unlikely to be the most experienced investigators. Unfortunately, in recent times, we have lost a lot of our middle-ranking, experienced investigators, so we are having to bring people through quite quickly. There is quite a quick turnover now, especially in things like crypto investigations, because those skills are very desirable in the private sector. It is really difficult for us to hang on to those people, so we are going through a bit of a treadmill trying to recruit and hang on to them. Mr Adams is looking at things like structures and strategies within the force to try to hold on to people and to look at different ways of retaining those skills and experience to make us that much better at investigating these things.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Michelle Crotty: It is fail to prevent for us, and it is capacity, capability and retention. As my colleague said, we can train people up with fantastic training, but the real challenge is that they are then very valuable recruits—not just to the private sector, but within the law enforcement community and in how we operate jointly to ensure that we build a pathway for people within law enforcement, as well as out into the private sector.
Commander Adams: The final thing to add to all of that is technology. The licences for the tools that we are able to use at the moment, particularly some of the tools for tracking crypto assets, are expensive. When you start to build up those layers of individual costs that Simon described on the tools and technology, to be really effective we have to bring those together with highly skilled and highly competent individuals. All that is a challenge for us at the moment, in the recruitment environment that we face.
Liam Byrne
Q
Commander Adams: I am not sure that my impression is the thing to take as gospel here. We see from the crime survey, our annual reporting and the growth in trends around victimisation that fraud is growing year on year. We predict that there could be anywhere from 25% to 65% growth in fraud over the next four to five years. If we were to go around the room and ask for a show of hands on who has received a smishing or phishing message, versus those who have been burgled in the past 12 months, I think we would be staggered at the volume.
Liam Byrne
Q
Commander Adams: It is a really complex landscape. We have a great deal of investment from the private sector in some of our specialist capabilities. We need more investment at the frontline of policing in undertaking economic crime investigations at that most basic level. That does not mean more people; it means investment in training to ensure that all frontline officers can deliver that.
Liam Byrne
Q
Simon Welch: As Mr Adams says, we could always do with more people—if you ask, we will always say we want more staff—but the reality is that it is difficult to bring them in at the moment because we are not offering wages that are competitive with some of the other agencies or the private sector. We are struggling to build that up. If we can build that up and maintain some trajectory so we can hang on to some of the staff to get them to an experienced level, we will start to see more impact on performance there, but we need to work on that really hard.
Commander Adams: I touched at the beginning on the investment and the proactivity around both financial investigation and fraud investigation. We have to see some of that investment land, get people into the posts, do the work that City of London police is doing as the national lead force to co-ordinate that activity across the country, and see what effect that has. That will then inform the business case and the arguments that we make for more or different resource in the future.
Liam Byrne
Q
Commander Adams: That might be one for Simon.
Simon Welch: Yes. You can identify a person of significant control, but sometimes it can be difficult if you are looking at the people who ultimately have control of some of those companies, because you have people stood up saying they are that person, but there are people sitting behind that person. It depends how good your intelligence is whether you can work these things out. Very often, if you investigate these people, you will be able to see that they have control of the company. If you do not investigate them, you will not be able to tell. You need to be on them with the right intelligence to work it, and then you might have an opportunity to show that they were running that company.
Liam Byrne
Q
Simon Welch: As an ex-policeman, I will always say yes to that, but obviously there are implications, because you need the resources down there to do it. Obviously, we will always go for the gold standard wherever possible, because if you are doing that, you are stopping people getting in at the first level, but there are obviously implications of the cost of that. But yes, of course we want the highest standards of verification.
Liam Byrne
Q
Michelle Crotty: It is certainly an issue for us. We would be interested in the proposal. If the evidence is overseas, even if the offence is based here, I think we would want to think through the mechanics of the prosecution. There would be some detail to work through, but in principle, I think we would welcome looking at that kind of offence.
The Chair
If there are no more questions, I thank the witnesses for their attendance and their contributions.
Examination of Witnesses
Dr Susan Hawley, John Cusack and Thom Townsend gave evidence.
The Chair
We now have evidence from Dr Susan Hawley from Spotlight on Corruption, John Cusack—via Zoom—from the Global Coalition to Fight Financial Crime, and Thom Townsend, representing the UK Anti-Corruption Coalition. Can I ask Dr Hawley and Thom Townsend to introduce themselves first?
Dr Hawley: Hello. I am Dr Susan Hawley, executive director of Spotlight on Corruption. We are a UK anti-corruption charity that monitors how the UK enforces its anti-corruption laws and keeps its international anti-corruption commitments.
Thom Townsend: Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Thom Townsend. I am the executive director of Open Ownership and the incoming chair of the UK Anti-Corruption Coalition. Open Ownership supports more than 40 Governments around the world to implement exactly these types of reforms.
John Cusack: Hello everyone. My name is John Cusack. I am the chair of the Global Coalition to Fight Financial Crime, which is an NGO. It is a 20-member organisation, both public and private, with large members such as Interpol and Europol, as well as Open Ownership—Thom’s organisation—and RUSI, which you may well know in the UK too.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Secondly, does the Bill provide enough mechanisms to help with transparency around the new responsibilities of Companies House, and should there be reporting—to Parliament, or certainly publicly available—on new powers? What would you want to see in order to have confidence that measures are having impact?
The Chair
Who wants to go first?
Thom Townsend: I think that there are significant areas of improvement for the piece of legislation that we see before us. Primarily, from our perspective, we focus on reform of company registrars around the world, so my focus is very much on how Companies House can better operate. The key area we would identify is around the verification mechanism, as you would expect, and that splits out into two points.
One is around how we verify someone’s identity versus how we identify and verify the statement of control and ownership that they are giving about their involvement with the company. That second part—their status—is not covered here. We are not putting in place mechanisms to understand whether the disclosure of beneficial ownership is accurate, and that is a significant problem. A colleague talked previously about having a gold standard, but we are far off that. We see company registrars in countries around the world taking meaningful steps to attempt to use their data and powers to begin to understand whether those statements are true. That needs to be significantly beefed up in this legislation.
On the second part—the ID of individuals—there are grave misgivings about that being outsourced to the trust or company supervisor profession. There are other ways of identifying people: in an ideal world, Companies House should be doing that. That is a big change for this piece of legislation, but frankly, that is where most of the world is going.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Thom Townsend: It is worth saying that countries that are doing very well on this typically have a national identity card system that is the foundation of their ID process. There are other ways of doing it. I think about Estonia, France, Germany—the list could go on, but it is based around their national ID card system. Clearly, we do not have that. The Government have done significant work on their own identity verification programme, which has had mixed results. We know we can do this. It does not necessarily need to be outsourced to that profession, which of course is supervised, but we collectively have severe misgivings about it.
On the second point around the accountability mechanism, we would like to see a very strong mechanism for Companies House to be coming to Parliament on a regular basis to talk about how this is looking and how it is performing. It is a much broader conversation about the kinds of indicators we would like to see reported on. That is a much longer conversation, but I will pass over to colleagues at this point.
John Cusack: I share Thom’s views, principally, on this. I spent 30 years working in banking as an MLRO—that is the previous history to my current role—and I spent many, many occasions trying to establish beneficial ownership. It is not easy, but it is the key to understanding risk and understanding who owns and controls a bank account, real estate or a company. That is absolutely key. I would like to see an obligation on the companies register that is essentially equivalent to that which a bank has in relation to knowing its customer, to the extent that that is possible. That is where we need to get to. Thom was explaining that some of the better countries are trying to get to that kind of standard.
Secondly, I believe that the registrar of companies needs to have a much stronger obligation than is currently set out in the proposed legislation—it needs, again, to be slightly similar to my old obligations as an MLRO. There needs to be an obligation to operate an AML programme that is worthy of the name, and to have strong and meaningful controls in order to be able to demonstrate that Companies House and the companies register are doing a similar job to what other people do in the private sector.
Dr Hawley: I would like to strongly back that up. It is essential that the “know your customer” rules that the private sector has to use are used by Companies House as well. There is no point having a registry that SMEs cannot rely on because it is not as accurate as it needs to be. That has been a problem now that the big companies simply do not use the corporate register because it is so inaccurate. There is a long way to go on that.
We also have real concerns, as Thom mentioned, about the authorised corporate service provider provision in the Bill. In essence, it relies on another part of the system—the anti-money laundering supervision system—and the danger is that we are just playing whack-a-mole. We are just pushing the problem down the road. We know that HMRC, in its supervision of TCSPs, has had lots of very serious questions about whether it is up to the job, and it just recently revised its average fine level down from £250,000 to £8,000. There are real questions about whether that is a serious deterrent. In its recent report, it found that nearly 50% of its cases that went up to the governance panel had to be returned to the case officer for serious work to be done again. Either the Bill needs to address the AML supervision regime—I can tell you some of our suggestions, because it would not be that difficult to come up with a transition—or there are real questions over whether that clause should be in it at all.
A final point, which was picked up earlier by colleagues from law enforcement, is about how this will be funded. The registry will be meaningful only if there are proper resources. It can be completely cost-neutral to the Treasury. We are heading into a difficult fiscal time, so it needs to be cost-neutral. As the gentleman from the National Police Chiefs’ Council said earlier, we have almost the lowest registry fee. We are the 6th lowest, in company with Rwanda, Timor-Leste, Ukraine and South Africa. Most other countries charge an average of £150 to £300, compared with £12. That could go an enormous way to getting the right IT infrastructure. We know a lot of this will have to be done with technology and AI. Making sure that the fees for Companies House are set at a realistic level to make this properly verified is essential.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Dr Hawley: Absolutely. The key thing is what John alluded to—clause 88. What is the requirement in the Bill for how far the registrar has to go? If it is the minimum amount, the fees will be minimal. If we are going for the gold standard, the fees will need to be higher to reflect the greater verification work.
Thom Townsend: Just a quick thought: what strikes me, reading the Bill, is that it is not quite clear what Government want Companies House to be, when you delve into the detail. Is it around minimising criminal activity, as in the fourth objective? Is it about preventing, which comes up in clause 88? That needs to be resolved to give a very clear idea in primary legislation of what we want Companies House to be. It should be the first line of defence in the UK economy from the perspective of integrity and preventing crime.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Thom Townsend: Absolutely. My point was just that countries that do have been able to go further and faster as a result of having the underlying infrastructure. But no, absolutely, you can do that. We have brought down the cost of identifying people in this country very rapidly, with KYC for new banking, and taking a video of yourself. We have a lot of technology and lots of ways to achieve that end. It does not have to be done through the trust and corporate service provider industry—it simply does not.
Jackie Doyle-Price
That is helpful.
John Cusack: I will just add to Thom’s point about clause 88. The language concerns me greatly. This will be dependent on the registrar’s diligence and, essentially, on the financing that the registrar has in order to carry out their activities. The language—that the
“registrar must carry out such analysis of information within the registrar’s possession as the registrar considers appropriate”—
is extremely timid. If there is no money for it, the registrar will not be doing anything. That is really problematic. We would not apply that in any other circumstance; we would want to set out the obligation—the expectation—and to fund that appropriately, not the other way around.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Dr Hawley: We focused more on what is not in the Bill. I do not know whether John or Thom want to address that.
Thom Townsend: I would hand over to John on this one.
John Cusack: The Bill is positive. It is one of the contributions that will definitely help, and it is trying to fix a long-standing problem. At the end of the day, however, if we want to deal with financial crime, economic crime, we need convictions—investigations, prosecutions and convictions—and asset recoveries. That comes from resourcing the public sector, as well as demanding high expectations from the private sector. I am worried that in the UK the financing of law enforcement, and of the FIU in particular, is insufficient to assure the objectives that we all want, which are to mitigate, manage and reduce harms from economic crime. This is a long-standing weakness in the UK, as it is in many other countries, and that would definitely help, but let us not kid ourselves that it will make a material difference to the economic crime situation in the UK.
Alison Thewliss
Q
John Cusack: Yes, of course. I would support that. However, I would also say, with respect, that the idea is to do prevention with the changes. When we put a lock on the door of an aeroplane, the fact that no one has stormed the cockpit is not how we judge whether a lock on the door is appropriate. We are tightening things up and preventing financial crime, but yes, absolutely, we need to see more enforcement. You would hope that these measures will mean that people will no longer necessarily look to UK companies and Scottish limited partnerships as the vehicle of choice for abuse, and they will look elsewhere.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Thom Townsend: When this legislation passes, there will be a lot of remedial work to sort out what is there—there is no doubt about that. Everything that you have just described is true, and it is probably a lot worse even than we are aware of. As you just mentioned, we are clearly starting from such a low bar that any legislation will have some kind of deterrent effect, but it is important to think not just about ensuring that we hit the gold standard with a piece of primary legislation. It is also the resourcing, but ultimately nothing that we can do will create a 100% perfect system.
Essentially, we are trying to remove as much noise as possible from the system to give law enforcement the best possible chance of focusing its resource where it can make the most difference. It is important not to think about this in zero-sum terms of: is it possible to commit crime or not? It is really just about making an environment where it is somewhat more manageable to detect, and then enforce. As it stands it, is the wild west on that register. If you wanted to do enforcement, we would be here until the end of time.
Alison Thewliss
Q
John Cusack: Not necessarily, because what I am most interested in is getting the Bill out in its current form with a financed and adequate registrar with obligations, and resolving that underlying issue. One of the reasons people use UK companies is not so that they can open UK bank accounts, because then you go through the gamut of UK obligations in the regulating sector, even though that happens occasionally when buying real estate and other things. Actually, people buy and acquire UK companies and Scottish limited partnerships so that they can open accounts abroad, because the UK is seen as a first-class jurisdiction. That means that when they open those accounts abroad, not many questions are asked, or not as many as would be if they were acquiring a Nigerian company, for example, which would ring all sorts of alarm bells. The interesting thing about the companies registry is that the abuse by foreigners does not necessarily translate into a UK economic crime issue per se, even though it is something that we also all want to address.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
John Cusack: For my high-risk customers, I always had it at 10% in my financial institutions, and 25% for non-high-risk customers, because I really wanted to ensure that I had almost everybody who could possibly be interested in the company or a relationship. I stuck at 10%, but you can always argue it lower or a bit higher.
Thom Townsend: Yes—whether it should be 5% or not, it needs to be lower. There is an argument to be made between 10% and 5%. My sense is that we have a 25% global standard on this because it is a sort of round number.
Dr Hawley: It is really interesting to look at what Jersey and Guernsey are doing on financial crime. They have a 10% threshold, and they are introducing a lot of other very interesting economic crime measures that go far further than we have in the UK, including a failure to prevent money laundering offence. They also have a measure to forfeit accounts based on a suspicious activity report, so they are really looking at very radical measures in Jersey and Guernsey that will make the UK look quite behind.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Dr Hawley: I would say that that is the easiest. It is a great question and I will jump in, because I have my three. It would be really fantastic if Parliament signalled that its intention is not to pass a Bill that will just stay on paper; it needs to be properly resourced and make a real difference in terms of economic crime. There are three different cost-neutral ways of doing that, some of which you mentioned in earlier discussions. One is cost protection across civil recovery for law enforcement. The US-style system really works. If we want US-style enforcement, we need US-style rules.
Another way is to increase Companies House fees to match the scale of verification that we need. The other way is to invest far more. In the US, 100% of forfeiture goes into a central fund, and local police get up to 80%. We heard earlier that the NCA gets 50%; some police forces only get 18%. We also desperately need to find ways to match the money that law enforcement brings in. Law enforcement brought in £3.9 billion over the last six years. If that had been reinvested in law enforcement, we would have top capability in this country.
There are two other things. I have mentioned AML supervision already. If we could make the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision a body that genuinely raises the consistency of supervision across the board while the Treasury works out the bigger picture on supervision, it would make a really big difference. OPBAS could name and shame supervisors who were not performing, and that needs to apply not just to the legal and accounting sectors, but to HMRC and the FCA.
Finally, there is corporate liability reform, which you also referred to earlier. We have been waiting for it. It was in 2015 that there was the first Conservative party manifesto commitment to have a failure to prevent economic crime offence. The Law Commission has now spoken; we have been waiting a long time for it. Ideally, you would have a failure to prevent fraud offence, a failure to prevent false accounting offence and a failure to prevent money laundering offence, but you also need to bring in a change in the identification doctrine for the schedule 8 offences to make this work.
Thom Townsend: Unsurprisingly, verification—the first thing would be to think very hard about whether it is the trusts and service providers sector that we want to do that, to think much more broadly about what other mechanisms are available to us, and to cast the net widely around the world; there is a lot happening.
Secondly, the statements of beneficial ownership and significant control should be verified too. That is a far harder task, because the world has not figured out entirely how to do that. There are some really good examples; places such as Austria are doing good work, but it is largely about using data from across Government to make sure that you can red flag those statements.
Thirdly, we probably also need something in the Bill about having a more permissive data-sharing environment, to make sure that Companies House is getting what it wants. If you look at how the Bill is currently drafted, we have data that is “in the registrar’s possession” or “available to the registrar”. It is very unclear what that means, and it needs to be much broader than that.
A supplementary fourth point is to think long and hard about how we are using an identity, once verified, persistently in a lifelong way. Australia, New Zealand and India issue unique identifiers to directors—and, in Australia’s case, to beneficial owners—for life, which makes the investigation process much more straightforward. There is a lot of good practice out there. We need to look very hard at that and think about how we incorporate it into what the UK is doing.
John Cusack: As far as the Bill goes, I have mentioned one point already, which is the item in relation to beefing up the obligation on the registrar. The second piece is on the information-sharing provision in the Bill—I think it is clause 148. It is a limited information sharing item that essentially requires a SAR to be filed before private information sharing can take place. There is also the exit, pretty much, of the customer, which is potentially problematic. We are going to find that one potential bad actor leaving one bank cannot then open an account somewhere else, but we will also find that innocent people will be involved in that. I would rather have something broader, which allows the detection of unidentified financial crime, whereas, in this particular case, we are going to get identified suspicion being shared, which will potentially lead to some very serious unintended consequences, even though I am very supportive of the provision.
The last thing that I would say outside the Bill is that, ultimately, it is about asset confiscations and asset seizures. The UK is doing okay, but it is not doing anywhere near as well as it should be, and it is certainly underperforming compared with a number of important countries. I will give you one example. Italy not only seizes the amounts that Susan was talking about, but over four or five years it seizes almost £10 billion a year in asset confiscations, because it treats the Italian mafia as a matter of national security and targets its resources accordingly. I would like to see not a change in the law, but the rightsizing of the resources across the piece, whereby they are directed toward the tip of the spear, so that law enforcement FIUs in the UK and asset recovery can be prioritised and targets set, and we get close to the Italians, rather than being where we are today.
Liam Byrne
Q
Dr Hawley: I alluded to one point earlier, which is that if this is not a registry that companies and people can rely on, it will have been a waste of time and money. I alluded earlier to SMEs particularly not having the resources and having to rely on Companies House in a way that large companies would not; they would do their own intelligence. It will be bad for business and the business community, and it will be bad for the UK’s competitiveness. If you look at our competitiveness rating under the World Economic Forum measures, we are pretty good on quite a lot of things—in the top 10 —but for tackling serious and organised crime we are 70 out of 141. That is a competitiveness rating, so it will dent our competitiveness. Actually going for gold standard practice will be good for the economy, and will make us more competitive.
Liam Byrne
Q
Thom Townsend: Objective 4 does really need to say “prevent”. It is an objective related to the registrar’s functioning. The registrar should be responsible for taking really active and clear measures to prevent criminal activity under its bailiwick.
Liam Byrne
Q
Thom Townsend: That seems like a ridiculously low bar.
Liam Byrne
Q
Thom Townsend: Sorry, what do you mean?
Liam Byrne
We have registries of beneficial ownership for assets and property. We have to try to make it possible for law enforcement to connect companies, individuals and assets. Do you think we have the framework for connecting those three dots effectively?
Thom Townsend: As it stands, no. Some form of this legislation will go a lot further. We need to look at how we are uniquely identifying people. In that case, there is an argument for bringing that ID process in-house so you have clarity around it. You can assign that identifier, which then gets used across the panoply of datasets that law enforcement have in their possession to do that interconnectivity. We run the risk a little bit, as the legislation is currently framed, of creating another island that is a bit better connected but probably will not sit at the heart of the process and be that effective first line of defence that the UK economy should have.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Dr Hawley: Ensuring that companies cannot just liquidate has been incredibly important to law enforcement in the past. I am very sorry, but we might have to get back to you on that because I have not looked specifically at that clause.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Thom Townsend: I think there is a balance between speed and effectiveness. Companies House is fantastic at what it does now—it provides a really good service to register a business quickly, and it is really easy to use—but it has never had to do the kinds of things that we are now proposing it does. It will be a long journey to get from where it is today to the sort of high-functioning all-singing, all-dancing machine that we are proposing.
There is a balance between achieving the objectives of the Bill, and the wider goals of dealing with corruption and countering kleptocracy in the UK. We will probably have to look at some sort of transitional arrangement but, ultimately, we should have a much more aspirational and ambitious vision for what we want Companies House to be in five to 10 years’ time, put the resourcing in place, and ensure oversight and accountability to drive that forward and make it happen.
The Chair
Would anybody else like to answer that question? No? In that case, I thank all three members of the panel for their help in giving evidence.
Examination of Witnesses
Oliver Bullough and Bill Browder gave evidence.
The Chair
We come now to the next panel, for which we have until 4.30 pm. This panel comprises two people, both journalists, authors and experts—if I may put it like that—on the Russian Federation. I extend a very warm welcome to Bill Browder, who is in the room, and to Oliver Bullough, who is appearing via Zoom. Bill, would you like to introduce yourself?
Bill Browder: Good afternoon. Just to correct that, I am not a journalist; I am an activist and author. I am the head of the Global Magnitsky Justice Campaign. Basically, my life for the last 13 years has been the result of the murder of my lawyer in Russia, Sergei Magnitsky. My campaign has taken two tracks. One is to get the Magnitsky Act, which imposes asset freezes and visa bans on human rights violators and kleptocrats, passed in different countries, including the UK—35 countries have the Magnitsky Act.
The second part of my activity has been to trace the $230 million that Sergei Magnitsky discovered, exposed and was killed over. We found that that money was going to 24 different countries, and we filed 16 different criminal complaints. From those criminal complaints, I have had the opportunity to see at first hand who does it well and who does it badly, and let me tell you: this country does it badly.
This country has never opened a criminal investigation into the money laundering connected to the murder of Sergei Magnitsky, even though many other countries have done, and have frozen and seized assets. I hope that we will have the opportunity to talk about why that is the case, because I think I can make some proposals for the legislation that might cause this country not to be at the bottom of the league table.
The Chair
We will come to the questions in a minute. Oliver Bullough, would you introduce yourself, please?
Oliver Bullough: It is great to be here. I am sorry that I am not there in person. It is half-term and I have the children in the other room, with instructions to be quiet. It is an honour to appear alongside Bill, who I have known for a long time and whose work I have been following since even before he was an activist outside Russia—when he was still fighting corruption inside Russia.
I am a Russia enthusiast—a Russophile. I worked in Russia as a journalist for a long time. I inevitably came across corruption, because it is difficult to spend any time in Russia without coming across corruption, but the more that I investigated corruption and the more time I spent looking into it, the more I realised that it cannot be understood as simply a Russian phenomenon. The money does not stay in Russia; it moves out of Russia and too often it ends up in the UK, where it buys real estate, football clubs and many other things. I have been spending, I suppose, most of the last decade attempting to map how money moves from kleptocratic countries via tax havens and ends up in cities such as London, in order to work out how corruption really works and cut through some of the simplifications that are often used.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Bill Browder: Thank you. This is the crux of the whole issue. By the way, it was not just Magnitsky money that was not investigated. We have this problem; since Vladimir Putin has come to power, he and 1,000 people around him have stolen $1 trillion from the Russian people. This has been the largest destination of Russian money laundering. In 22 years since he has come to power, not a single money laundering prosecution has come out of Russia—not one—and we are talking about $1 trillion.
What is going on here? What I have learned is that the law enforcement agencies effectively refuse to open criminal cases unless they are 100% sure that they can win without any tough fight on the other side. Why are they so risk averse in opening cases? It comes down to simple risk-reward for them. Their budgets are very thin, as law enforcement does not have a lot of money, and when they go to court here on any type of civil case—it is not true in a murder case, but it is true in a civil case—if they lose at any point, not just at the end of the case, but at any point procedurally during the case, the loser has to pay the winner’s court fees, and there is no budget for that. Therefore, the UK law enforcement agencies will not take that risk.
I have seen it done differently. We presented the United States Department of Justice with the same information. They do not have that problem; they can open a case, conduct an investigation and build their case as they are doing their investigation, and if they lose, nobody loses their job, nobody is bankrupted, and no departments have to go back and beg for more money from the Government. Whatever money they have spent on their lawyers is the money they have spent.
What has to happen here—this is plain as day—is that you have to get rid of this adverse costs issue in a civil case brought by the Government. You could easily write an amendment to the law as it is written, because it is not here right now, to say that if the Crown Prosecution Service brings a money laundering case or an economic crime case, there are no adverse costs. If you make that point, it will change the whole dynamic—the whole risk-reward—for these people.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Bill Browder: The same thing.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Bill Browder: I was not even aware that in a criminal case, a murder case, nobody pays adverse costs. I am not sure if you bring a criminal case in these other—
Dame Margaret Hodge
I think in a murder case they would, actually.
Bill Browder: Would they?
Dame Margaret Hodge
I think so, yes. I am no lawyer—God, I am looking around the table for a lawyer.
The Chair
When I practised as a lawyer, if somebody was acquitted they would be able to ask for their costs to be paid out of what are called central funds, so the taxpayer would be paying for them, not the prosecuting authority.
Bill Browder: However you want to define it, what I would say is I have seen how it works in other countries and they do not have this issue. Therefore, there is no disincentive to bringing a case. It is just remarkable. In every single aspect of the Magnitsky case, we brought it to law enforcement. We brought it to the National Crime Agency; they refused. We brought the company formation agents that were involved in forming the companies during the stuff connected to the Magnitsky case to HMRC. They never shut down a single company formation agency, even though they regulate them.
Nobody brings any cases at all. There are three possible reasons. It could be the reason I have just stated, which is the most charitable one: that there are economic disincentives. I could also say “incompetence”, but I don’t want to say that, or I could say “corruption”, but I am going to stick with the fact that the economic incentives are not there for them. Whatever the reason is, this country should be ashamed of itself. It is an absolute shame, and nothing will change from this law unless there is actual law enforcement. What can we put in place so that the laws are enforced? At least get rid of the economic disincentives.
I will add one more thing, which is that in countries like the United States, if the Department of Justice wins a forfeiture case, they get the money and then they can fund future investigations from that money. When you are talking about a budget of the prosecution service being several billion pounds, you win one big case and you could fund the entire prosecution service.
The Chair
Q
Oliver Bullough: I agree with Bill that the UK has a shameful record when it comes to its failure to investigate and prosecute financial crime. I would add, however, a fourth explanation to Bill’s list of potential reasons why that is not happening. For many years or perhaps many decades, there has been a belief in Britain that making things as simple as possible is good for business—the idea that it is simple and cheap to set up a business and better to have less regulation than more regulation is invariably good for Britain’s business climate.
Alison Thewliss mentioned Scottish limited partnerships earlier. We saw this phenomenon when Scottish limited partnerships were discussed in the House back in 2017 after the exposing of the Moldovan laundromat. There were suggestions by her colleague then—the SNP’s Treasury spokesman, Roger Mullin—about trying to tighten up the rules around SLPs, but they were torpedoed by the Treasury because of concerns that that would lead to investment funds having to spend extra money on meeting regulations.
I believe the estimates for each fund would be between £14,800 and £27,600 per investment fund. That is the cost supposedly to the UK economy. If you compare that to the cost of fraud to the UK economy, which is estimated by the University of Portsmouth at approximately £130 billion, you see how absurd it is to be worried about saving £14,800: we are faced with a problem that is costing us more than £100 billion.
The cost of fraud, which is rampant—40% of known crimes—is a huge tax on businesses and individuals in the UK. It is made possible by the fact that we have been failing for so long to do anything about economic crime. If you look at that quantity of fraud, as estimated by the academics in Portsmouth—there are higher estimates—it is equivalent to about a fifth of the total tax take. It is like adding another VAT to the UK economy, or twice as much again as all taxes levied on corporations. That is the cost of economic crime on the British economy.
There has been a philosophical failure to realise that making things easy is not always good. At some point, you are making things so easy for criminals that you are essentially making things difficult for honest people. In this case, by adding regulation we will be deterring criminals and therefore making things easier for honest people. That is something that, for far too long, people in public life in the UK have failed to realise.
I am here talking only about the effect on the UK. On top of the cost of fraud to the UK, hundreds of billions of pounds are laundered through the City of London every year; that is the National Crime Agency’s estimate. It clearly a guess—a round number—and it could be more; it could be less. That is money being stolen by criminals, drug traffickers and kleptocrats, and laundered through the UK. They are keeping this money. Essentially, it is being taken away from good people and kept by bad people. If we could stop this happening—instead, confiscate the money and keep it for ourselves or return it to the people it is taken from—it would be what is called in rugby a 14-point swing. We would be taking it away from one team and simultaneously giving it to the other one.
I agree that the three suggestions that Bill made for why the UK has been so bad at fighting economic crime are all possibilities, but my favourite fourth one is that we have been simply philosophically failing to understand why economic crime is a problem. This Bill is a real opportunity to do something about that. I was listening to some of the earlier panels; I would like to second what was said by almost everyone, which is that a new law is very good, but a new law is definitely not enough on its own. We need far more resources for Companies House, the National Crime Agency, the Met, the City police, the Serious Fraud Office and all the police agencies to be able to use this Bill.
As I understand it, the funding per officer at the National Crime Agency is estimated at one third of their counterparts at the FBI. Leaving aside the fact that there are far fewer of them, just per officer they are funded at a third of the level of the FBI. If we want them to be able to do the same job that the Bill is talking about, and that American prosecutors and investigators are able to do, we need to fund them adequately. We should at least be funding them as well as their colleagues at the FBI if we want them to be able to do as good a job.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Bill Browder: People are very simple: they operate on the basis of rewards and punishments. There are big rewards for people in the City of London to launder money. Banks make money off transactions and accounts and so on. Company formation agencies make money off selling directors and forming companies. Lawyers make money setting up these structures. There is no consequence if they are involved in in dirty business—none. Nobody faces any consequence.
What we have just seen at Companies House is remarkable: thousands of companies being registered for no commercial purpose other than to launder money. These companies then set up foreign bank accounts. We know who the directors are. Some of the directors are UK citizens. The company formation agencies are UK company formation agencies. We report it to the police, and nothing happens. If nothing is going to happen, then you are not going to change the culture.
America has the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Most American corporate executives do not want to be prosecuted and therefore do not make bribes abroad. Austria does not, and so they do. We are in a situation where there is no consequence for doing any of this type of stuff. It does not matter what is written in this law; it does not matter what was written in the previous law. There was a great law passed called the unexplained wealth order. It is a beautiful law, which solved a huge problem, which is not having to get evidence from the bad guys in the kleptocrat countries, and just using the evidence that we have here. We have used it in four or five cases, and most of the cases have actually been on behalf of dictators going after their enemies. We have a total failure of law enforcement. It probably should be studied as a separate issue: why is law enforcement not doing its job? Why is it failing?
You can write as many great laws as you want—there is some good stuff in this law, and good stuff in the previous laws—but if no one is going to enforce it, then you are never going to change the risk-reward and people are going to carry on doing stuff. All this will continue, and I will sit here 10 years from now making the same allegations about how this is a centre of money laundering.
Oliver Bullough: I would like to agree with everything Bill just said. People are more or less rational: they act according to their incentives. We can try and change the culture in the City of London as much as we like but, essentially, if there is no prospect of being arrested, prosecuted and jailed, or at the very least given a large fine, for committing these kinds of crimes, then someone will always be available to commit them because the reward will be sufficiently large and there will be no downside.
I gave a talk to a school a couple of years ago. One of the kids had been sitting silently throughout, and he put his hand up and asked me at the end, “Yeah, Mister, if you know all this about money laundering, why don’t you just go and do it?” I still do not really know the answer to that question, because there is no real reason not to do it. It is a gimme of a crime. You are 99.9% likely to get away with it.
What is particularly frustrating is that when we have prosecuted fraud and put resources into prosecuting fraud, it not only pays for itself, but is a huge profit centre. We saw that from Lord Agnew, who ran a small anti-fraud office from the Cabinet Office during the covid pandemic. He had a small anti-fraud budget that returned tenfold the amount of money that was paid. It is a complete no-brainer to go after this money and these crimes. We would be benefiting the country in every way.
I agree with Bill; it is very frustrating to hear talk about changing culture, when what we really need to do is to change people’s incentives. The way to do that is to enforce the laws that we have.
Tom Tugendhat
Q
We will be listening for further ideas in the future, but do you agree that the Bill at least sets out the first steps to where we really do need to be going to make sure that the crimes begin to be prosecuted? Just to answer your question, Oliver, the reason you do not launder money is that you are and remain a person of integrity; sadly, you are not very rich for it, but there you go. That is the price.
Bill Browder: I have never had any trouble with the laws as they are written here. We probably do not even need this. It is a great law—congratulations; I applaud you on putting it together. It is 252 pages of mind-numbing stuff—
Tom Tugendhat
Of detail, Bill!
Bill Browder: It is great. There is no problem with the actual legislation. This is a rule-of-law country, and the laws have been written, and continue to be written, very well. There is just a huge disconnect between that and the enforcement.
I would add one little detail, if you want to get into the nitty-gritty. We have seen that UK companies are used abroad to set up accounts—this was mentioned by Dr Susan Hawley and perhaps one other—because it looks legit to have a British company with a Cypriot or Latvian bank account. Somehow, when you get a transfer from a British company with a European bank, everything then—that is how these people get away with it.
I would therefore add one small provision to this law, which is easily done. When people are setting up their companies, they should have to disclose, on an annual basis, where they have foreign bank accounts. If you were to do that, then every anti-corruption investigator could go around and start looking at that. I do not think that it is a huge additional disclosure requirement. People have to disclose their income, expenses and so on, so why not disclose where they have bank accounts?
The Chair
Q
Oliver Bullough: I think it was Samuel Johnson who said, about a dog walking on its hind legs, that
“It is not done well; but you are surprised to find it done at all.”
I am happy that the Bill exists; I was happy that there was another one earlier in the year. I would prefer it, however, if Parliament sat back and, instead of passing two fairly minor economic crime Bills in one year, put them together into one with all the other things that desperately need doing, take a long time over it and, when passed, really ensure that the law, as passed, is enforced.
Bill mentioned unexplained wealth orders. Those were a fantastic idea—perhaps hugely overhyped when they were brought in, but a great idea—and a real potential silver bullet for tackling top-end economic crime by both organised criminals and kleptocrats. Sadly, after the failure of the case against the daughter of the former President of Kazakhstan, they have not really been used at all. That is because the National Crime Agency does not have the money it needs to do the job, and that is because politicians have not sufficiently prioritised fighting economic crime. That is where the money comes from.
Yes, by all means, it is good to have another Bill, but I would far prefer to see the existing laws properly enforced by properly-resourced law enforcement agencies with continuous political support than have another Bill. I say that as someone who has been banging on about the problems with Companies House for absolutely ages.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
I want to deal with another issue, since you are both Russia experts. There is a mood across the House to tackle the issue of seizing Russian assets as well as freezing them. I know that you have both been working in that space, so could you comment on that? How do you think it could be done, do you think it is a good idea and how much is at stake, to the extent that any of us know the figures?
Bill Browder: Shall I go first, or do you want to, Oliver, since I have been hogging the first response?
Oliver Bullough: No, Bill, you can go ahead.
Bill Browder: We are on our third Prime Minister in seven weeks; there is an economic crisis going on; the purse strings are tight. There will be pressure here not to send as much money to Ukraine because we are worried about our money at home. There is also pressure in the United States. Some 30 Democrats wrote a letter to Biden saying, “Let’s just settle this thing and give the Russians what they want”—or something along those lines—“and not spend this money.” There is also pressure from the Republicans on the other side, saying, “No blank cheque for Ukraine”.
We also cannot let Ukraine go, under any circumstances, because, if we do, Vladimir Putin will be knocking at the door of Estonia or Poland. Therefore, how do we pay for it? Ukraine needs the money and the military equipment. Well, let us let the Russians pay for it. It is a simple thing: the Russians have started this war, created all this conflict, caused all this destruction and killed all these people, and we have $350 billion of their central bank reserves frozen, as a first step.
Why are we not using that money to support the Ukrainians? There are people who say, “That’s never been done before, and therefore we shouldn’t do it.” I would argue that it is pretty straightforward. In Parliaments around the world, what do you do? You make laws. If it has not been done before, make a law so it can be done. It is not a legal issue; it is purely a political issue. Should we dig into our own pockets, or should we let the Russians pay for their own war? We should start by letting the Russians pay for their own war.
I am having the same conversations elsewhere. I was just in Canada, speaking to the Canadian Parliament, last week, and I have been speaking to the US Congress. It is a no-brainer. It is a more complicated issue when you start going to the oligarchs, because you have to prove that somehow they are connected to the Government. But when it comes to the Government themselves, $350 billion is being held right now by the UK, the EU, Canada, the United States, Australia and Japan. That is an easy way to solve this financial problem and help the Ukrainians win this war.
Oliver Bullough: I would like to add to that. One of the reasons why it is complicated to take money away from oligarchs is that, once the money is here, it benefits from the rule of law that we have and so on. It is always harder to take egg out of a cake once it has been baked. It would have been a far better idea not to allow the money to come here in the first place. The lesson I would like to see learned from the current Ukraine crisis is that it is far more cost-effective and efficient not to allow kleptocrats to launder their money through the UK in the first place. If we do not support kleptocratic networks, those networks will not survive. They will not be able to come to such strength and vitality that they threaten their neighbouring countries.
Yes, it is important to confiscate Russian money to return it to Ukraine. Yes, it is important not just to freeze but to seize oligarchic property. But it is also important to put in place the powers, and particularly the law enforcement structures, that we need to prevent more kleptocrats from coming here. Next year, it might not be a threat coming from Russia; it might be a threat coming from China or somewhere else. We would find ourselves in exactly the same situation: trying to work out what to do with money that we had frozen when, if we had not allowed it here in the first place, we would not even have to have this discussion.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Let me put to you another issue. If we strengthened accountability, those working in the Executive agencies might work a little harder at putting into effect the laws that we parliamentarians pass. Bim Afolami has an idea of establishing a Select Committee of the House that would look at the regulators—the enforcement agencies—and could ask for individual cases to be heard by the Committee in private, to see whether there are systemic issues at play, which could lead to public reporting on those issues.
That is one idea. There are others around. Do you think the lack of accountability, particularly for the enforcement agencies, could be a contributing factor to the fact that we just do not do enough—that we do not use our existing structures enough—even without the money and even with the cost issue?
Bill Browder: I think so. This is not the first time I have had this conversation with Members of Parliament. I have been in front of many Committees—the Home Affairs Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee, this Committee and others—to talk about this lack of enforcement, and I have talked with many Members of Parliament. There is no disagreement with me. Every political party supports the idea of not having London be the money laundering capital of the world. I think everybody agrees. Many good Members of Parliament have put pressure on different Governments, put questions to them and had conversations, and I have seen many Government Ministers agree. Then, all of a sudden, we get to this total disconnect: law enforcement cannot be instructed by Parliament or the Government to open or pursue a criminal case or explain why it has not done so. It is living in its own world.
The only thing the Government can do is replace the people in executive positions in law enforcement; that is the only sanction. There has to be a better way. There are arguments about not wanting to politicise law enforcement and I totally sympathise with those, but at the same time if it is completely failing it needs root-and-branch reform—whether parliamentary oversight, Government oversight or some other mechanism. It is just failing and it has continued to fail in a way that is totally unacceptable. I would hate to be sitting here a decade from now having the same conversation.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Oliver Bullough: It is probably fine. Hopefully, if things are actually enforced and Companies House is given the money it needs to do the job and it is ambitious about that, this may work. Personally, I would like the threshold for a person with significant control to be reduced significantly: perhaps to 10% or 5%. Perhaps there should not be a threshold at all, but if you control you need to declare it.
The Bill is potentially an improvement. I still do not think it is the kind of root-and-branch re-evaluation of Companies House that we need. An amazing variety of corporate structures are available in this country. I do not think anyone has stopped to say, “Do we really need limited liability partnerships and limited partnerships? Why do we have both?” Does anyone stop to think about why they exist at all? Limited partnerships were created as a bit of a strange afterthought back in 1906 anyway. Why do they even exist?
I would like to see discussions like that, personally, but as it stands I think that bit of the Bill is probably okay—certainly if it is enforced properly. If there were an Oliver Bullough-ocracy, there would be all sorts of different changes to how companies could be used. I would not allow people to use foreign companies to own UK property at all; you would have to own it via British companies if you wished to use a company. But that is not going to happen so it is silly to talk about it.
On Margaret Hodge’s point, in the Oliver Bullough-ocracy I would definitely like to have something similar to the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, with the power to investigate whatever it likes and do really forceful, well resourced investigations into Government agencies or anything at all. That would really help to cut through some of the failures to understand why the failures are happening and to really bring accountability to these bodies, which have been able to hide behind the lack of oversight for a long time.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Oliver Bullough: I heard the Companies House official talking earlier; I did not join at the beginning so I did not catch his name. He was saying that there would be difficulties with resourcing the verification of all that, particularly when it comes to the issue I wrote about recently in my newsletter, about what I call “offshore shell people”—people essentially acting as a kind of shell company. It is noticeable that while the number of offshore companies owning property in the UK has flatlined over the last decade, the number of people with overseas addresses has increased by 250%. Clearly, scams can always be used and things are always coming in. Making sure that Companies House can have the resources to do all that is a tough ask.
This is perhaps stretching way beyond what is in the Bill, but I am not sure that it would not be a good idea to have what the British Virgin Islands has, which is that an ordinary person cannot just file things with Companies House; they have to go via a lawyer or another registered professional. I am not sure that that would not be a bad idea, because then you would not have this issue at all of people being able to log on.
Just to show how absurd it is, I was at a conference the other day and a participant from Canada could not believe me when I said how easy it is to file things at Companies House, so we logged on together and she created a company then and there. She is a tax consultant; there was no “tax consultant” option on the dropdown menu, so she called herself a taxidermist. That is how absurd the system is. There is a lot of scope for improvement before we need to worry about fine-tuning the details.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Bill Browder: One of the things we have seen is that the same individuals—these money launderers—will find a drunk Latvian person, get their passport and then register them in hundreds and hundreds of companies. If those companies get shut down, then they can register them as the directors of other companies; they then become directors of those companies.
Why is it okay to have a person be a director of 400 companies? That does not make any sense to me. Why should there not be some limitation—maybe 10? Ten companies is a lot of companies—but 400 companies, or a thousand companies? That limitation would be an easy thing to put in here, and that would make it harder for the criminals, because there are not that many people who are ready to give up their passports to do money laundering. The number of people who are involved in this is quite small when you actually look at it, because most people do not want their names being used for these terrible schemes.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Bill Browder: In theory, yes. This whole post-box idea just lends itself to anonymity and so on. Why do people not just register their companies at their own home or their own business address if there is a legit company? What is this business with 2,000 companies in one strange industrial park in Glasgow?
Alison Thewliss
Q
Oliver Bullough: I did an investigation a while ago and there was a woman who was a director of four companies, I think, despite the fact that she had been dead for five years. Clearly, someone had been using her signature to sign off on the companies, and that is clearly a misuse of information. Clearly, that is falsifying company information and is already a criminal offence. Despite the fact that I had written about it, nothing was done; no action was taken. As I say, there are a lot of easy wins here before we need to worry about the details.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Bill Browder: Well, Scotland is so dwarfed by London that you do not have to worry about your reputation, because the reputation is so bad here that no one will even be paying attention.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Bill Browder: I have written a whole book about this. The bad guys in Russia are a big part of the problem, but you cannot export this type of corruption and money laundering unless you have somebody doing the importing. And who is involved in the importing? It is the western enablers—the lawyers.
I have had shocking experiences with western law firms that are benefiting from this. If there were some kind of duty whereby they had to actually look into the source of their funding or the legitimacy of the business, I think that would be an extremely powerful thing, if it was actually enforced. There is a whole other long discussion of law that one could have about the role of western enablers, and particularly the lawyers.
The Chair
I am afraid that under the rules that we operate on, I have no discretion to allow this very interesting sitting to continue, so we have to finish. I thank both our witnesses for a really fascinating sitting. Their great insight and knowledge on this subject has been of immense value. Thank you very much indeed.
Dame Margaret Hodge
On a point of order, Sir Christopher. May I ask whether our proceedings are covered by parliamentary privilege?
The Chair
The answer to that is yes, they are, but it should not be abused.
Examination of Witnesses
Professor John Heathershaw and Thomas Mayne gave evidence.
The Chair
We now come to the ninth panel. We have Professor John Heathershaw from the University of Exeter appearing via Zoom and Thomas Mayne from Chatham House. Good afternoon. I am going to ask Professor Heathershaw, first, to introduce himself briefly.
Professor Heathershaw: My name is John Heathershaw. I am professor of international relations at the University of Exeter. I work on aspects of money laundering related to post-Soviet political elites.
Thomas Mayne: I am Thomas Mayne. I am a research fellow at the University of Oxford and a former visiting fellow at Chatham House. I am one of the authors of “The UK’s kleptocracy problem”, a report we released at Chatham House in December.
First, by way of very quick introductory remarks, on the day we launched the report, the then Foreign Secretary, Liz Truss—how time flies—was also speaking. That was a nice coincidence. She was asked about our report and her response was that the UK has the strongest money laundering regulations and laws in the world. As we have heard today, we could debate whether that is true or not; there is some evidence to suggest that it is. However, as we have heard a lot today, without enforcement, laws are useless.
Secondly, I am an expert in kleptocracy and anti-corruption measures. Kleptocracy and money laundering are two slightly different things, and I hope we will get into some of the differences today.
Seema Malhotra
Q
Secondly, would you expect kleptocrats, in the light of this regulation, just to move their assets to unregulated sectors? Are we going to have the protections we would want for Britain, or are we in danger of seeing some of the behaviour simply displaced?
Thomas Mayne: First, on supervision, I do not think there is enough in the Bill. The findings of OPBAS—that the risk-based approach we have put in place really is not working—are quite shocking. What is the solution to that? I know that Dr Hawley was here earlier; Spotlight on Corruption has just released a report on the supervision of the legal sector. There is a debate in that on whether there should just be a single sector supervisor, which is something we should look at.
Generally, I think supervision is lacking and it is very uneven. Across sectors, we are seeing very different layers of enforcement actions. For example, I think the Council for Licensed Conveyancers—obviously, it deals with real estate, which, as we know, poses some of the highest risks for money laundering—produced zero enforcement actions in a three-year period. There are varying levels of not only supervision but enforcement activity. That is definitely something that we should look at that is not really in the Bill. John, do you want to say anything on that question, before we move on to the second one?
Professor Heathershaw: I think the accountability question pertains to parliamentary supervision of those regulatory agencies. As I understand it, there is nothing in the Bill to enhance that. There would be scope for a specific cross-departmental parliamentary Committee in this area, I think. As we know, money laundering crosses different Departments, so greater accountability for poor performance by the supervisors could be tackled through that kind of oversight.
Thomas Mayne: Was the second question whether we are worried about capital flight from the UK?
Seema Malhotra
Q
Thomas Mayne: That is certainly a risk. We are way ahead of the game, in some respects, in terms of which businesses we regulate. I know that there is an ongoing discussion about whether PR agencies should have regulation. I am not an expert on crypto, but I think we should look at bringing it into the existing regime where, if there is a suspicion of money laundering, you have to report it by law.
Professor Heathershaw: To add to that, it is not simply a matter of liquidating assets to move them into other denominations or unregulated sectors. The nature of money laundering is that it is a social and political phenomenon as well. It is about achieving a place to stay where you can protect your assets through the rule of law, and maybe gain some social influence, get your kids into school, and use your residency to garner a wider profile and clean up your reputation. That means that the property and bank accounts are hugely important; they will not just be liquidated overnight.
When we are talking about the kind of money laundering that Tom and I look at by political elites and those from kleptocracies, they are seeking to gain a whole set of goods that you cannot simply get through putting all your assets into crypto, or into a more loosely regulated jurisdiction such as Dubai. There are certain things that the UK, and London in particular, offer that will not simply fall out of the way in a beggar thy neighbour, “Well, we’ll just move ourselves into a sector or jurisdiction that is loosely regulated,” way. I do not think that that should cause us to worry about losing market share, or the problem shifting into another sector, because the problem will always remain in the legal and regulated sectors that are our principal concerns. They will always be there, too.
Thomas Mayne: I have one thing to add on real estate. We now have the registration of overseas entities as part of the previous Act. It will be fascinating to see what happens in January, when the deadline comes in, with the existing properties that we know are owned by oligarchs or kleptocrats, and what kind of information they put on record. It is not a magic bullet. One problem with the ownership of property is that we will not, and should not, have a searchable database where we put in somebody’s name and see whether they own a property in the UK. It does not work like that, so there may be other properties that are perhaps owned by proxies. Those proxies will have their name on record as the so-called beneficial owner, but they will not be discoverable because we do not know about them, and we do not know that proxies are being used. What will be interesting is, as I say, what information will be revealed about the properties that we do know by January.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Thomas Mayne: Transparency is incredibly important. We know that, and we know that what has happened to Companies House in the past 15 years is ludicrous. We have heard examples of that today. We are one of the first countries in the world to have a beneficial ownership register, and I think that the Bill will take us to the next stage in verifying the information that is put on to Companies House, but, as Dr Hawley said earlier, will we still be able to rely on that information? There is also a risk that it just becomes another layer of what we might call zombie transparency. We have all this data, but so what? If it does not lead to enforcement actions or to people who are breaking the rules and submitting false information being penalised—sanctioned, fined, jailed—it will be all for naught. It needs to be accompanied by robust enforcement action. We have heard that from many speakers today.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Thomas Mayne: Absolutely. If we take the PSC register, which has been in for a few years now, we can point to that and say, “This person has to be the controller of that company. Why is this person living in a shed in Siberia when £100 million is going through their company?” Before the PSC register, we could not say that. Now we have verification procedures coming in, we should be able to say that somebody at least—Companies House or whoever—has checked that this person is real and is the person they say they are, in terms of the information submitted to Companies House. We should definitely have this, but it is only the first step.
Professor Heathershaw: To emphasise that point, we know that even where there is transparency—even where we know the money is going—there is an enforcement gap. For example, Tom and I obviously work together, and we have provided your Committee with two of our most recent reports: one on unexplained wealth and one looking comparatively at the Dariga Nazarbayeva and Zamira Hajiyeva cases, in which we demonstrate that the reason why one failed and the other succeeded was simply the incumbency status of the two. The one who remains in power, has a good relationship with the law enforcement authorities back home and has privileged access—one might argue, an unfair advantage there—is able to defend themselves against that measure.
Unfortunately, the UWO reforms that came through earlier this year in the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 do not fit that part of the problem. It is also part of a bigger problem. When we look at our dataset of £2 billion-worth of properties in the London and the south-east—included at the end of the Chatham House report, the blue one that you should also have—we find that the 73 cases of incumbents, the people who remain in good favour in the kleptocratic states from which they come, get to retain their properties, but 13 out of the 15 cases of exiles, of those who have fallen out of favour, lose their properties. That is not explained by exiles being more corrupt and incumbents less corrupt, so there are problems there around enforcement.
That means, effectively, that however much transparency we have, the measures that are being adopted are not really introducing rule of law at all, because what determines the outcome for people—whether they get to keep their property—depends on whether they are in political favour back in the kleptocratic state. That is a real indictment of the way in which the UK system has hitherto functioned. It shows the limits of what transparency can achieve. As Tom mentioned, with this Bill the UK will be a gold standard of transparency across the world, but it will still lack in terms of accountability and enforcement. That is the real challenge.
Jackie Doyle-Price
Q
Thomas Mayne: Yes.
Professor Heathershaw: Yes, I would agree with that statement entirely.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Thomas Mayne: I think so. Where do you cut it off? It certainly should if there have been large-scale, egregious actions. Oliver mentioned somebody registering companies in the name of a dead person, and I found an example of that in an investigation years ago. People should be penalised for really fraudulent misuse and prevented from registering companies again in the future.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Thomas Mayne: On the point about directors, there certainly should be; it is crazy that you have these people with 1,000 companies. I am not sure on your point about addresses. If you are an investigative journalist or a freelancer and you do not want to register a company with your home address, for example, or if you are the PSC and you have your name on the company, is that enough? Perhaps there needs to be some provision about having an office where you have to physically be and sign your name. I am not sure about the proxy address, but certainly, on your point about proxy directors, limiting the number would be a good idea.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Thomas Mayne: I think so. Obviously it is difficult with PSCs, because I can say I am the PSC of a company and there could be an agreement written in a safe in Liechtenstein somewhere that says it is actually a Kazakh politician or whoever it may be. Certainly, there are probably egregious examples where it is clear that the person is not the PSC. You can do some research on them. There have been some examples today where there is clear evidence that the person is not who they say they are. Yes, there need to be fines, and the fact that there has been only one so far again goes to the point on lack of enforcement over fraudulent information submitted to Companies House.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Thomas Mayne: Possibly; maybe that would overburden it. There are already talks, with the verification coming in, about ramping it up.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Thomas Mayne: It is an option.
Liam Byrne
Q
The Chair
Before you answer that question, is this question directed to that action in relation to measures in the Bill? I hope it is, because otherwise it will not be in scope.
Liam Byrne
Yes, it is a gap in the Bill.
Thomas Mayne: Absolutely, and many thanks for bringing up the case. As you mentioned, none of the authors had any say in the matter and we did not think it was justified, as the evidence we put in the report is entirely accurate. This is a perfect opportunity for some kind of anti-SLAPP legislation to be put in the Bill. Dame Margaret spoke at a recent debate with David Davis; some other examples were given there. If we do not put it into this Bill, will it just be mothballed and we miss our chance? Meanwhile, more journalists are being threatened, and a lot of information is not being put into the public domain because of the threat of a SLAPP. The Bill is related to transparency, as you say, so is there an opportunity to put that sort of measure in the Bill?
Professor Heathershaw: Obviously, I would agree with that. Our report has been subject to these issues. We have also seen many threatening letters over the years. I think it is fair to say that we are some of the leading researchers in the UK on this specific area, at some of the UK’s leading universities. Professionally, it is shocking for me to find that we could be subject to such aggressive letters. The risks were so great, simply because the costs could not be limited.
I think there is a need to introduce a merits test early on to dismiss litigation. I think there is also a need to cap the costs for defendants, because at the moment you have to get very expensive libel insurance to protect yourself, which can be very difficult. Even then, there are huge costs involved.
The question about whether there should be specific legislation from the Ministry of Justice is interesting. At present, that has not been tabled to Parliament and so the opportunity that presents itself—to amend Bills, to provide certain measures, to introduce costs—would definitely be within scope. When you see these cases, many of the people from outside a Government service who have given evidence today—I am sure Oliver Bullough or Bill Browder would speak to this themselves—have been subject to those actions for things they have written that are entirely accurate and in the public interest. In that sense, such a measure is within scope.
It is also within scope because money laundering of this type is always accompanied by reputation laundering, which means seeking to clean the public record of questions about your sources of wealth and misdeeds of the past. It is very much within scope and it would be great for the Bill to consider things like a merits test and a cost cap for defendants in defamation counter-claims.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Thomas Mayne: I mentioned earlier the PR industry. I think there is a debate going on, following the Russian invasion, about whether there should be transparency over who you represent. Should it be put on record and in what sense? There are membership organisations in the PR world, but you do not have to sign up to them, so there is an internal discussion going on about whether that should become mandatory. Do you somehow put PR under the scope of money laundering regulations? Maybe that is going too far, but some kind of oversight and transparency of such PR agencies, who sometimes represent the kleptocrats and use their wealth to threaten journalists, should certainly be considered.
Professor Heathershaw: It is my understanding that there was a consultation on a foreign influence registration scheme under an earlier, different Home Office Bill. That is where you may have something equivalent to what the US has in the Foreign Agents Registration Act. If you are looking specifically at kleptocrats linked to foreign regimes, or who are themselves part of foreign regimes, PR agencies are working on their behalf to clean their reputations, potentially in a wider public realm with public institutions, and, of course, to specifically target Government officials to potentially donate to political parties—a non-British citizen can do that while retaining overseas citizenship.
Those things would be in scope of a foreign influence registration scheme. Again, that crosses over into the territory of the Bill. It has previously been proposed as part of another Bill, but I think it is very much needed for the PR industry.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Thomas Mayne: That is an excellent question; I am not quite sure how to answer it. As researchers—quite akin to journalism—we all play a game of self-censorship in what we say. Even when you have information about donations from people from overseas—kleptocrats or oligarchs—that is certainly in the public interest, there is always a tendency to draw back and not put it in the public domain. If there were some other forum that allowed that information to be put there without the legal threat, that would be fantastic. At the moment, we rely on you as MPs to bring to certain issues up under parliamentary privilege, because the way the libel laws are set up in the UK is stymieing that kind of debate, which needs to be able to continue.
Dame Margaret Hodge
Q
Professor Heathershaw: On the Chatham House paper, two of our authors are Americans, and they have a first amendment right. They think the situation that has arisen with respect to Chatham House is extraordinary and absurd. You could have a first amendment right in some kind of British Bill of Rights, which has been mooted in the past. In terms of academic and journalistic freedom, you could have a specific statement setting out that anything within professional competence that is evidence-based and without malice is counted as free speech.
I think there is obviously a need to revise the Defamation Act 2013 to say that, unless you can determine that a statement has been made with malice, and if it is within professional competence and accurate, it should not even be considered admissible as a potential case of libel or defamation. As researchers, our work goes through ethics committees—
The Chair
Order. I am afraid I have to stop you there. I have no discretion to allow you to continue because under the rules set for the Committee, the sitting has to end now. I thank both our witnesses very much for coming along and helping us with our inquiries.
Ordered,
That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Nigel Huddleston.)