Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (Second sitting)

Jackie Doyle-Price Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Seema Malhotra]

It was about how to tackle economic crime and whether the reform of the strike-off process is important to that.

Adrian Searle: The strike-off process is not something I have a detailed understanding of. I suspect Martin might be better placed to answer that question.

Martin Swain: Again, it is something we are very aware of. Companies take advantage of the strike-off route to discharge themselves of debts and so on, and for other purposes. My sense is probably that the Bill as drafted gives us what we need. It is about how we take forward the policy in that area regarding where companies are moved to strike off. For example, we get lots of representation with regard to lots of companies being registered at one address—a registered office being used and abused. The route for that would be to default them to our address at Companies House, for not having a registered office address that is valid. The next step on that would be strike-off, but clearly if we do that we may be having an adverse impact on the system and giving companies a route to use it for criminal activity or to fold without paying their debts. We are very aware of the issue.

[The Minister for Industry (Jackie Doyle-Price)]

Q What we have here are the twin objectives of making it easier to do business and to tackle economic crime. I am really interested to hear from both of you whether we have the balance right in the Bill as it stands.

Adrian Searle: I think we have. There is, as you say, a real challenge to get the balance right between a prosperity and a security agenda. As we know, the Companies House reform elements of the Bill are a long time coming, so there has been lots of analysis and consideration of how you get the balance right. What I know from a law enforcement investigative perspective is that the changes being introduced under the Bill will certainly make the job of law enforcement far more straightforward in terms of our ability to investigate criminals and corrupt elites who are exploiting the complexity of the corporate structures to hide their assets, launder their wealth, and so on. I am confident that it gives Companies House and, by extension, the investigative agencies the powers we need. The indications that I have from exchanges with Martin and others in the industry are that the changes do not go so far that they inhibit transparent business practices in a way that undermines our economy. It feels to me that the balance is right.

Martin Swain: It is a very good point. It is a challenge for us as an organisation, because we have very clear direction from our Ministers that we should not create a burden for business, or make it difficult for companies to incorporate or for people to invest in the UK. The concept of balance is always there for us. We will bring in things such as ID verification, but we need to make that really efficient, and make it easy for people to understand the process, so that we do not create a burden for the vast majority of companies on our register that are legitimate businesses. That is quite a tension sometimes, because there is a significant spotlight on Companies House to become more than the passive register that we are at the moment, and to become—I hear this term—an “active gatekeeper” of the register. There is a potential that we move too far into that territory and make it harder for the vast majority of companies to deal with us.

I mentioned our transformation programme. There are two elements to our transformation. One is the legislative reform and all that is involved with that. The second part is digitising our services. That is what we have been focusing on in the last few years: making our systems really quick and easy to use, and to drive data, rather than receiving information on paper. You cannot work effectively with law enforcement from paper transactions; you have to have data.

[Jackie Doyle-Price]

Q That feels like a slight change in culture within Companies House, which has been very much a function for business. We probably need to communicate to the business community that part of their obligation to make the world a safer place is that they need to accept their changed relationship with Companies House.

Martin Swain: It is a huge culture change for us, not least in becoming more of a proactive agency. I hear it said that Companies House will be key to the economic crime ecosystem; what I say to people is that we will also be part of the business growth ecosystem. It is important that we have that dual role.

Adrian Searle: I think there is real value for businesses in being able to trust the other businesses they are dealing with. There is a strong argument that the transparency agenda supports the business agenda.

[Jackie Doyle-Price]

I agree. Thank you.

[Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)]

Q How exactly will the verification scheme that you propose work?

Martin Swain: At the moment we are in the design phase for verification. I should say first of all that we will not do the ID verification ourselves; we will outsource that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

Will you say a word about why that is? The system seems not to be working, so what do we need to do to fix it?

Commander Adams: I will start and then bring in Simon, who is an expert on money laundering. The first thing to say is that fraud is getting increasingly complex. About 70% of all fraud emanates from overseas and, as Adrian touched on, it is very difficult for us to obtain prosecutions and convictions across jurisdictions. That is a real challenge for us, as are the growth in technology, the way in which fraudsters are now exploiting people and the changes in tactics.

Fraudsters are moving away from unauthorised payment fraud, where people’s details are stolen and used fraudulently—banks are now preventing somewhere in the region of 65p in every pound of that type of activity—and we are now seeing much more sophisticated frauds, where people are socially engineered, or manipulated, into physically approving transactions. That of course is much harder for technological solutions to prevent, when the target is a human being.

Of course, all that complexity requires a much more complex and sophisticated policing response. As I described, the growth that is coming down the line—in particular the proactive growth—will not start landing until the end of this year and then, of course, we are several years before we have fully experienced and really competent and effective investigators working on those crimes. All those things will layer on over a period. We anticipate that the technological advances will continue, both in support of us and in challenging us in how we can investigate and progress these crimes. Simon, do you want to comment specifically on money laundering?

Simon Welch: On money laundering, the amount of offences—detected offences—is going down. Criminals are getting a lot more savvy about our tactics and things like that, so we find that they are not having assets in their own names so much—vehicles, houses, things like that—and our opportunities for confiscation are probably going down a bit. However, what you can see from the seizure figures is that the cash value is up, but the volume is down. We are targeting and getting good results from the cases, but it is a smaller number of cases. In reality, POCA is now quite old, and people are used to us going after the money, so they take far more steps to protect that money from us being able to confiscate it.

[Jackie Doyle-Price]

Q Clause 156 extends the pre-investigation powers of the Serious Fraud Office. What is the benefit of that? How will that improve the ability to track all economic crime?

Michelle Crotty: At the moment, we have those pre-investigation powers for overseas bribery and corruption. They allow us to investigate earlier, in particular to identify banking evidence earlier, and to see whether there is a case to pursue. By extending that to fraud and domestic-based issues, we are enabled to do that in those cases. At the moment, we have to take on a case formally and to commit resource in order to exercise the powers. To some extent, we can negotiate on occasion with companies to get that material, but if we have the power of compulsion, it would make it quicker and easier to get the material and so identify whether there is a case there.

[Jackie Doyle-Price]

Q So it enables you to be fleeter of foot—

Michelle Crotty: Yes.

[Jackie Doyle-Price]

And to address some of the questions we heard earlier—if you can act more quickly and establish whether a crime has been committed, that is clearly more efficient.

Michelle Crotty: It is more efficient and means that, if we follow the money and there is a reasonable explanation, we can screen a case out more quickly, rather than committing more resource and taking longer to reach that decision.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q The Home Office report, “National risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing 2020”, states:

“Company formation and related professional services are therefore a key enabler or gatekeeper of”

trade-based money laundering. Is there enough in the Bill to remove that risk?

Simon Welch: It is difficult to say. We have heard about the verification processes going on. With the authorised corporate service providers, if we strengthen all that and make things more difficult, we target harm. At the moment, you can register a company from abroad, and there is little opportunity for us to follow that up, especially in a jurisdiction that it is difficult to get information from. The idea of having ACSPs in this country, where we can see them and start the inquiry from the UK, would be very desirable. I am not sure whether the Bill goes that far; I have not read that bit too much.

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[Seema Malhotra]

Q Could you give an example?

Thom Townsend: It is worth saying that countries that are doing very well on this typically have a national identity card system that is the foundation of their ID process. There are other ways of doing it. I think about Estonia, France, Germany—the list could go on, but it is based around their national ID card system. Clearly, we do not have that. The Government have done significant work on their own identity verification programme, which has had mixed results. We know we can do this. It does not necessarily need to be outsourced to that profession, which of course is supervised, but we collectively have severe misgivings about it.

On the second point around the accountability mechanism, we would like to see a very strong mechanism for Companies House to be coming to Parliament on a regular basis to talk about how this is looking and how it is performing. It is a much broader conversation about the kinds of indicators we would like to see reported on. That is a much longer conversation, but I will pass over to colleagues at this point.

John Cusack: I share Thom’s views, principally, on this. I spent 30 years working in banking as an MLRO—that is the previous history to my current role—and I spent many, many occasions trying to establish beneficial ownership. It is not easy, but it is the key to understanding risk and understanding who owns and controls a bank account, real estate or a company. That is absolutely key. I would like to see an obligation on the companies register that is essentially equivalent to that which a bank has in relation to knowing its customer, to the extent that that is possible. That is where we need to get to. Thom was explaining that some of the better countries are trying to get to that kind of standard.

Secondly, I believe that the registrar of companies needs to have a much stronger obligation than is currently set out in the proposed legislation—it needs, again, to be slightly similar to my old obligations as an MLRO. There needs to be an obligation to operate an AML programme that is worthy of the name, and to have strong and meaningful controls in order to be able to demonstrate that Companies House and the companies register are doing a similar job to what other people do in the private sector.

Dr Hawley: I would like to strongly back that up. It is essential that the “know your customer” rules that the private sector has to use are used by Companies House as well. There is no point having a registry that SMEs cannot rely on because it is not as accurate as it needs to be. That has been a problem now that the big companies simply do not use the corporate register because it is so inaccurate. There is a long way to go on that.

We also have real concerns, as Thom mentioned, about the authorised corporate service provider provision in the Bill. In essence, it relies on another part of the system—the anti-money laundering supervision system—and the danger is that we are just playing whack-a-mole. We are just pushing the problem down the road. We know that HMRC, in its supervision of TCSPs, has had lots of very serious questions about whether it is up to the job, and it just recently revised its average fine level down from £250,000 to £8,000. There are real questions about whether that is a serious deterrent. In its recent report, it found that nearly 50% of its cases that went up to the governance panel had to be returned to the case officer for serious work to be done again. Either the Bill needs to address the AML supervision regime—I can tell you some of our suggestions, because it would not be that difficult to come up with a transition—or there are real questions over whether that clause should be in it at all.

A final point, which was picked up earlier by colleagues from law enforcement, is about how this will be funded. The registry will be meaningful only if there are proper resources. It can be completely cost-neutral to the Treasury. We are heading into a difficult fiscal time, so it needs to be cost-neutral. As the gentleman from the National Police Chiefs’ Council said earlier, we have almost the lowest registry fee. We are the 6th lowest, in company with Rwanda, Timor-Leste, Ukraine and South Africa. Most other countries charge an average of £150 to £300, compared with £12. That could go an enormous way to getting the right IT infrastructure. We know a lot of this will have to be done with technology and AI. Making sure that the fees for Companies House are set at a realistic level to make this properly verified is essential.

[Jackie Doyle-Price]

Q To follow up on that point, we have a principle in this country that the fees should match the operational costs. We are adding to what Companies House will be doing in that active management. That would make a case for an increase in the fee to meet the costs, would it not?

Dr Hawley: Absolutely. The key thing is what John alluded to—clause 88. What is the requirement in the Bill for how far the registrar has to go? If it is the minimum amount, the fees will be minimal. If we are going for the gold standard, the fees will need to be higher to reflect the greater verification work.

Thom Townsend: Just a quick thought: what strikes me, reading the Bill, is that it is not quite clear what Government want Companies House to be, when you delve into the detail. Is it around minimising criminal activity, as in the fourth objective? Is it about preventing, which comes up in clause 88? That needs to be resolved to give a very clear idea in primary legislation of what we want Companies House to be. It should be the first line of defence in the UK economy from the perspective of integrity and preventing crime.

[Jackie Doyle-Price]

Q I guess it comes back to the discussion that we are having about the twin-track objectives that pull in opposite directions: to enable it to be part of the framework for tackling economic crime, but also to enable business. In your opening comment, you stated that we are a way away from the gold standard. I think we would all agree with that—that is why we have this Bill, frankly, and I certainly have ambitions for it—but I want to probe you on what you said about a national identity card system. Surely you are not suggesting that we cannot improve this kind of scrutiny without a national identity card system. There are other ways to establish that, and other ways of knowing your customer.

Thom Townsend: Absolutely. My point was just that countries that do have been able to go further and faster as a result of having the underlying infrastructure. But no, absolutely, you can do that. We have brought down the cost of identifying people in this country very rapidly, with KYC for new banking, and taking a video of yourself. We have a lot of technology and lots of ways to achieve that end. It does not have to be done through the trust and corporate service provider industry—it simply does not.

[Jackie Doyle-Price]

That is helpful.

John Cusack: I will just add to Thom’s point about clause 88. The language concerns me greatly. This will be dependent on the registrar’s diligence and, essentially, on the financing that the registrar has in order to carry out their activities. The language—that the

“registrar must carry out such analysis of information within the registrar’s possession as the registrar considers appropriate”—

is extremely timid. If there is no money for it, the registrar will not be doing anything. That is really problematic. We would not apply that in any other circumstance; we would want to set out the obligation—the expectation—and to fund that appropriately, not the other way around.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q I have some questions about whether the Bill is sufficient to deter the abuse of shell companies, limited partnerships or Scottish limited partnerships.

Dr Hawley: We focused more on what is not in the Bill. I do not know whether John or Thom want to address that.

Thom Townsend: I would hand over to John on this one.

John Cusack: The Bill is positive. It is one of the contributions that will definitely help, and it is trying to fix a long-standing problem. At the end of the day, however, if we want to deal with financial crime, economic crime, we need convictions—investigations, prosecutions and convictions—and asset recoveries. That comes from resourcing the public sector, as well as demanding high expectations from the private sector. I am worried that in the UK the financing of law enforcement, and of the FIU in particular, is insufficient to assure the objectives that we all want, which are to mitigate, manage and reduce harms from economic crime. This is a long-standing weakness in the UK, as it is in many other countries, and that would definitely help, but let us not kid ourselves that it will make a material difference to the economic crime situation in the UK.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Q Mr Bullough, do you want to answer those questions as well?

Oliver Bullough: I agree with Bill that the UK has a shameful record when it comes to its failure to investigate and prosecute financial crime. I would add, however, a fourth explanation to Bill’s list of potential reasons why that is not happening. For many years or perhaps many decades, there has been a belief in Britain that making things as simple as possible is good for business—the idea that it is simple and cheap to set up a business and better to have less regulation than more regulation is invariably good for Britain’s business climate.

Alison Thewliss mentioned Scottish limited partnerships earlier. We saw this phenomenon when Scottish limited partnerships were discussed in the House back in 2017 after the exposing of the Moldovan laundromat. There were suggestions by her colleague then—the SNP’s Treasury spokesman, Roger Mullin—about trying to tighten up the rules around SLPs, but they were torpedoed by the Treasury because of concerns that that would lead to investment funds having to spend extra money on meeting regulations.

I believe the estimates for each fund would be between £14,800 and £27,600 per investment fund. That is the cost supposedly to the UK economy. If you compare that to the cost of fraud to the UK economy, which is estimated by the University of Portsmouth at approximately £130 billion, you see how absurd it is to be worried about saving £14,800: we are faced with a problem that is costing us more than £100 billion.

The cost of fraud, which is rampant—40% of known crimes—is a huge tax on businesses and individuals in the UK. It is made possible by the fact that we have been failing for so long to do anything about economic crime. If you look at that quantity of fraud, as estimated by the academics in Portsmouth—there are higher estimates—it is equivalent to about a fifth of the total tax take. It is like adding another VAT to the UK economy, or twice as much again as all taxes levied on corporations. That is the cost of economic crime on the British economy.

There has been a philosophical failure to realise that making things easy is not always good. At some point, you are making things so easy for criminals that you are essentially making things difficult for honest people. In this case, by adding regulation we will be deterring criminals and therefore making things easier for honest people. That is something that, for far too long, people in public life in the UK have failed to realise.

I am here talking only about the effect on the UK. On top of the cost of fraud to the UK, hundreds of billions of pounds are laundered through the City of London every year; that is the National Crime Agency’s estimate. It clearly a guess—a round number—and it could be more; it could be less. That is money being stolen by criminals, drug traffickers and kleptocrats, and laundered through the UK. They are keeping this money. Essentially, it is being taken away from good people and kept by bad people. If we could stop this happening—instead, confiscate the money and keep it for ourselves or return it to the people it is taken from—it would be what is called in rugby a 14-point swing. We would be taking it away from one team and simultaneously giving it to the other one.

I agree that the three suggestions that Bill made for why the UK has been so bad at fighting economic crime are all possibilities, but my favourite fourth one is that we have been simply philosophically failing to understand why economic crime is a problem. This Bill is a real opportunity to do something about that. I was listening to some of the earlier panels; I would like to second what was said by almost everyone, which is that a new law is very good, but a new law is definitely not enough on its own. We need far more resources for Companies House, the National Crime Agency, the Met, the City police, the Serious Fraud Office and all the police agencies to be able to use this Bill.

As I understand it, the funding per officer at the National Crime Agency is estimated at one third of their counterparts at the FBI. Leaving aside the fact that there are far fewer of them, just per officer they are funded at a third of the level of the FBI. If we want them to be able to do the same job that the Bill is talking about, and that American prosecutors and investigators are able to do, we need to fund them adequately. We should at least be funding them as well as their colleagues at the FBI if we want them to be able to do as good a job.

[Jackie Doyle-Price]

Q It is partly about powers and laws. It is partly about resource, but fundamentally it is about the behaviour of the regulators. Mr Browder, some of the things you alluded to earlier would be about informing those behaviours. Coming back to the extent of laundered money that goes through the City of London, to what extent do we need to make sure that we are driving behavioural change within the institutions through which these monies are being routed?

Bill Browder: People are very simple: they operate on the basis of rewards and punishments. There are big rewards for people in the City of London to launder money. Banks make money off transactions and accounts and so on. Company formation agencies make money off selling directors and forming companies. Lawyers make money setting up these structures. There is no consequence if they are involved in in dirty business—none. Nobody faces any consequence.

What we have just seen at Companies House is remarkable: thousands of companies being registered for no commercial purpose other than to launder money. These companies then set up foreign bank accounts. We know who the directors are. Some of the directors are UK citizens. The company formation agencies are UK company formation agencies. We report it to the police, and nothing happens. If nothing is going to happen, then you are not going to change the culture.

America has the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Most American corporate executives do not want to be prosecuted and therefore do not make bribes abroad. Austria does not, and so they do. We are in a situation where there is no consequence for doing any of this type of stuff. It does not matter what is written in this law; it does not matter what was written in the previous law. There was a great law passed called the unexplained wealth order. It is a beautiful law, which solved a huge problem, which is not having to get evidence from the bad guys in the kleptocrat countries, and just using the evidence that we have here. We have used it in four or five cases, and most of the cases have actually been on behalf of dictators going after their enemies. We have a total failure of law enforcement. It probably should be studied as a separate issue: why is law enforcement not doing its job? Why is it failing?

You can write as many great laws as you want—there is some good stuff in this law, and good stuff in the previous laws—but if no one is going to enforce it, then you are never going to change the risk-reward and people are going to carry on doing stuff. All this will continue, and I will sit here 10 years from now making the same allegations about how this is a centre of money laundering.

Oliver Bullough: I would like to agree with everything Bill just said. People are more or less rational: they act according to their incentives. We can try and change the culture in the City of London as much as we like but, essentially, if there is no prospect of being arrested, prosecuted and jailed, or at the very least given a large fine, for committing these kinds of crimes, then someone will always be available to commit them because the reward will be sufficiently large and there will be no downside.

I gave a talk to a school a couple of years ago. One of the kids had been sitting silently throughout, and he put his hand up and asked me at the end, “Yeah, Mister, if you know all this about money laundering, why don’t you just go and do it?” I still do not really know the answer to that question, because there is no real reason not to do it. It is a gimme of a crime. You are 99.9% likely to get away with it.

What is particularly frustrating is that when we have prosecuted fraud and put resources into prosecuting fraud, it not only pays for itself, but is a huge profit centre. We saw that from Lord Agnew, who ran a small anti-fraud office from the Cabinet Office during the covid pandemic. He had a small anti-fraud budget that returned tenfold the amount of money that was paid. It is a complete no-brainer to go after this money and these crimes. We would be benefiting the country in every way.

I agree with Bill; it is very frustrating to hear talk about changing culture, when what we really need to do is to change people’s incentives. The way to do that is to enforce the laws that we have.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Q Mr Browder and Mr Bullough, thank you very much for coming. We have spoken about these issues at the Foreign Affairs Committee, which I used to chair. In the past, we have consistently covered the need for transparency. I hope you will agree that the Bill demonstrates a desire to be much more transparent. I hope you will also agree that many of the anti-money laundering provisions go much of the distance towards addressing the concerns we have raised in the past.

We will be listening for further ideas in the future, but do you agree that the Bill at least sets out the first steps to where we really do need to be going to make sure that the crimes begin to be prosecuted? Just to answer your question, Oliver, the reason you do not launder money is that you are and remain a person of integrity; sadly, you are not very rich for it, but there you go. That is the price.

Bill Browder: I have never had any trouble with the laws as they are written here. We probably do not even need this. It is a great law—congratulations; I applaud you on putting it together. It is 252 pages of mind-numbing stuff—

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[Jackie Doyle-Price]

Q Mr Mayne, you have endorsed what we have heard from the previous panel and to some extent the one before that, which is that rules are one thing, but that unless we enforce them, they are meaningless. You said that in the context of money laundering. In the Bill are quite significant reforms to Companies House and limited partnerships. To what extent are they important tools in the armoury, if your starting proposition is that enforcement is the weakness?

Thomas Mayne: Transparency is incredibly important. We know that, and we know that what has happened to Companies House in the past 15 years is ludicrous. We have heard examples of that today. We are one of the first countries in the world to have a beneficial ownership register, and I think that the Bill will take us to the next stage in verifying the information that is put on to Companies House, but, as Dr Hawley said earlier, will we still be able to rely on that information? There is also a risk that it just becomes another layer of what we might call zombie transparency. We have all this data, but so what? If it does not lead to enforcement actions or to people who are breaking the rules and submitting false information being penalised—sanctioned, fined, jailed—it will be all for naught. It needs to be accompanied by robust enforcement action. We have heard that from many speakers today.

[Jackie Doyle-Price]

Q But it will provide the foundations for that.

Thomas Mayne: Absolutely. If we take the PSC register, which has been in for a few years now, we can point to that and say, “This person has to be the controller of that company. Why is this person living in a shed in Siberia when £100 million is going through their company?” Before the PSC register, we could not say that. Now we have verification procedures coming in, we should be able to say that somebody at least—Companies House or whoever—has checked that this person is real and is the person they say they are, in terms of the information submitted to Companies House. We should definitely have this, but it is only the first step.

Professor Heathershaw: To emphasise that point, we know that even where there is transparency—even where we know the money is going—there is an enforcement gap. For example, Tom and I obviously work together, and we have provided your Committee with two of our most recent reports: one on unexplained wealth and one looking comparatively at the Dariga Nazarbayeva and Zamira Hajiyeva cases, in which we demonstrate that the reason why one failed and the other succeeded was simply the incumbency status of the two. The one who remains in power, has a good relationship with the law enforcement authorities back home and has privileged access—one might argue, an unfair advantage there—is able to defend themselves against that measure.

Unfortunately, the UWO reforms that came through earlier this year in the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 do not fit that part of the problem. It is also part of a bigger problem. When we look at our dataset of £2 billion-worth of properties in the London and the south-east—included at the end of the Chatham House report, the blue one that you should also have—we find that the 73 cases of incumbents, the people who remain in good favour in the kleptocratic states from which they come, get to retain their properties, but 13 out of the 15 cases of exiles, of those who have fallen out of favour, lose their properties. That is not explained by exiles being more corrupt and incumbents less corrupt, so there are problems there around enforcement.

That means, effectively, that however much transparency we have, the measures that are being adopted are not really introducing rule of law at all, because what determines the outcome for people—whether they get to keep their property—depends on whether they are in political favour back in the kleptocratic state. That is a real indictment of the way in which the UK system has hitherto functioned. It shows the limits of what transparency can achieve. As Tom mentioned, with this Bill the UK will be a gold standard of transparency across the world, but it will still lack in terms of accountability and enforcement. That is the real challenge.

[Jackie Doyle-Price]

Q So transparency will have no teeth without greater focus on enforcement.

Thomas Mayne: Yes.

Professor Heathershaw: Yes, I would agree with that statement entirely.

[Alison Thewliss]

Q I will pick up on a couple of the recommendations from the “The UK’s kleptocracy problem” report. You were calling for the investigation of and penalties for those who submit fraudulent information to Companies House. Would you like to see Companies House doing that retrospectively with the new powers that they take, by actively going back through that register to prosecute people who have submitted fraudulent information in the past?

Thomas Mayne: I think so. Where do you cut it off? It certainly should if there have been large-scale, egregious actions. Oliver mentioned somebody registering companies in the name of a dead person, and I found an example of that in an investigation years ago. People should be penalised for really fraudulent misuse and prevented from registering companies again in the future.