Financial Services and Markets Bill (Fourth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateAngela Eagle
Main Page: Angela Eagle (Labour - Wallasey)Department Debates - View all Angela Eagle's debates with the HM Treasury
(2 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIf the hon. Gentleman will let me continue, I can offer some clarification. It is vital that the Government have the flexibility to develop a world-leading regime for cryptoassets in an agile way. The innovation itself comes from emerging new technologies or new uses for those technologies. The role of the Government and the Treasury in this respect will be to create regulatory frameworks that enable their safe deployment, which I hope all Members of the House agree with. Together, amendment 22 and new clause 14 will ensure that that happens.
The Minister is quite right that all Governments have to think about how to deal with the emergence of cryptocurrencies, but using that phrase is a bit like using the phrase “genetically modified”. We would certainly want any coin that the Bank of England decided to back to be treated very differently from Bitcoin. Could the Minister say a bit more about how regulating for a piece of electronic money backed by the Bank of England would be different from regulating in a way that would make Bitcoin seem almost reasonable? We know that it is a gigantic gamble that no one in their right mind would want to invest in.
I am cautious of time; this issue would be apt for a debate in itself rather than being discussed as part of the Bill’s technical clauses. Aspects of Bitcoin are already within the perimeter of the regulatory regime. As I said at the beginning of my remarks, that is an emerging area. The hon. Member for Wallasey is quite right that there are trade-offs, and we want to protect consumers while not shutting the regulatory regime off from an emerging set of technologies.
I beg to move amendment 35, in clause 8, page 9, line 25, at end insert—
“(ba) in cases where the regulations make provision for liability, make provision for nominated representatives of organisations against whom liability has been found to be held personally liable for actions undertaken in relation to carrying out a designated activity,”.
This amendment would allow for nominated representatives to be held personally liable for the carrying out of a designated activity when an organisation has been found liable.
This is another amendment that attempts to improve the protection of consumers, small investors and others who in the past have been far too easy prey for unscrupulous company directors and other people in charge of companies. In a number of the recent financial services scams, we have seen that even once the investigatory regulatory process has been completed, which in itself can take five, even 10 years, any attempt to recover money from where it should be recovered from—the pockets of criminals—is frustrated by the fact that the companies at the centre of the scam have at best no money left in their books. Most of the time, they have been placed into liquidation long ago.
Part of that liquidation process is always moving the money into other companies, very often hidden in offshore anonymous companies owned by the exact same person. Effectively, the person who works the scam takes steps to get their money well out of the reach of the UK regulators and enforcers long before the liability of the company is established. Amendment 35 seeks not to require but to allow the designated activity regulations in specific circumstances to make regulations that say, “There will be occasions when individuals who have carried out the misconduct will be held personally liable to people who have suffered.” That means that those who have been scammed in a way that is not covered by the financial services compensation scheme at least have a chance of getting their money back. Possibly more importantly, the amendment would be a further deterrent to those who would carry out such scams, because it will at least partially close down the option of their hiding their ill-gotten gains in a different company, where they are no longer within reach of the regulator.
I appreciate that anything that starts to blur the distinction between a shareholder, a director and the legal personality that is a limited company should be used with caution. I fully understand why, in UK law, a company is its own person with its own legal identity, but there are times when we cannot allow the director of a company to hide behind that—times when natural justice says that if we know who is responsible for people losing their money, and know that they have buckets full of money sitting in a company somewhere, it is perfectly reasonable to say to them, “We will have that money to compensate the people you scammed.”
The victims of Blackmore Bond will never see their money again. I understand that one of its directors is now bankrupt, but the other definitely is not. Most of the victims of Safe Hands Plans will probably not see their money again. Remember, its director bought the company at a time when he knew that it would have to wind up in a year or two; we have to ask why he was so keen to buy it. He is not a poor person; he is extremely wealthy. He just managed to move his money out of that company and into others.
Clearly, the amendment could not be retrospective, but if it was agreed to, it would mean that if any person tried the same dodge in future, their victims could, in court, try to get their money back from the person who stole from them, rather than from the company, which will often no longer exist.
I do not want to row in behind the hon. Member and support absolutely everything that he says on his amendment, but I know what he is trying to do: to put something in statute that would solve the problem of fraud, which is more and more prevalent in our financial system, especially in and around the perimeter that we have been talking about. There can be questions about whether a person is inside or outside the perimeter, or whether a bit of their company is inside and a bit outside. That kind of fraudulent hiding behind being regulated when the things being sold are outwith the perimeter does fool a lot of people, and a lot of money is scammed out of our constituents’ bank accounts in that way. Does the Minister have any observations on how we could—
Before we were so rudely interrupted, I was saying that, although I do not support the detail of the amendment, it is a hook on which to hang the sheer frustration that many of our constituents feel about a system in which vast amounts of money are scammed. Some of those who have benefited are in plain sight, often with their ill-gotten gains, while our constituents have had their life savings wiped out. It seems that the law can do nothing to touch these people, and I share our constituents’ frustration.
We will get on to fraud and other issues later in the Bill, but I understand and respect the creativity of the hon. Member for Glenrothes in using the amendment to raise them now. In replying to the debate, will the Minister say how the Government think we could massively improve the attack on fraud in our financial system, because it is increasing rapidly? The risks for those who perpetrate fraud are tiny, but the rewards are huge, and that is surely driving the ongoing attacks on the life savings of many of our constituents. That makes engaging with financial services—buying and selling, and buying products from the system—difficult and potentially dangerous, and it puts many people off trying to make the provision for themselves that we would normally want them to make.
I, too, support the intentions behind the amendment from the hon. Member for Glenrothes, which were very well articulated by the hon. Member for Wallasey. We often see these people swanning around the place with their ill-gotten gains, while many of our constituents have been on the receiving end of a scam. Even when there has been some form of regulatory investigation, some people do not feel that justice has been done. The amendment tries to make tangible something that may appear quite abstract to our constituents. I support the amendment’s aim but, to follow one of the Committee’s themes, perhaps this is not quite the place for it.
That said, I echo the request for reassurances from the Minister on how we will construct a regulatory regime that makes our constituents feel that there is a degree of responsibility. As Members on both sides of the Committee have said, many of our constituents, particularly those who have been victims of fraud and scams, feel that although the letter of the regulatory system may have been followed, justice has not been done. As we consider the Bill, we need to keep that at the forefront of our mind. I can get on board with the intentions behind amendment 35, but we have to first consider its practical effects. I hope that in his summing up, the Minister will give the Treasury’s thinking on this issue.
My questions seek some reassurance from the Minister, since I think these clauses are broadly welcome and, indeed, vital in the context of the Bill. One would not want to have this system without giving extra powers to the Bank, the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Treasury.
Problems in some of these markets can erupt suddenly and pose substantial, systemic problems. We saw it happen just a couple of weeks ago in the pensions industry with the sudden increase in gilt prices, which suddenly made a lot of the investment strategies of our defined benefit pension fund managers quite perilous. We can all commend the Bank and the regulatory authorities for taking action to try to stabilise the situation with liquidity in the pension funds. I am sure that all of us want to be content that the structures in place for dealing with these kinds of eruptions will be as implied in these three clauses.
Given the extra powers for the regulatory authorities in the Bill, will the Minister give the Committee some comfort about the extra resources that will be made available to the regulators for their extra oversight? The Bill implies that there is much more work for regulators to do across the piece, and it is very important in the vast majority of cases. I worry that they will not be given enough resource to keep a proper eye on the very fast-moving, complex, interactive system that they will be charged with regulating, keeping an eye on and, if required, intervening in, for reasons of contagion or systemic threats to that very interrelated system. If they do not catch that early enough, we know where it can end. I would appreciate some comfort from the Minister, if he can provide it, on the resourcing implications of the powers. Is he satisfied that the resources are there to do the job adequately and properly?
I will try to respond to all the points in turn. First, in answer to the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle, clause 12 is not an intervention power. It clarifies that the power to direct is effectively removed in respect of the new regulations around CCPs. In many ways, it will give the Bank of England the independence and autonomy that the witnesses she cited sought, although in a more general context. There is a separate point, which is probably not in order for today, about the intervention power, as and when that is tabled. However, that is not the purpose of clause 12, which is a clarifying point in respect of the Bank of England.
The hon. Member for Wallasey raised the issue of resources. The Bill gives the regulators, including the Bank, powers to fund themselves using a levy. That is a stronger financial position than they are in today. The hon. Member knows that I am relatively new—that could change during the sittings of this Committee—but in all my interactions with the regulators, they have expressed themselves satisfied with the resources available to them, but we must be collectively careful about the burdens that we place on them and ensure that those are appropriate.
On the question of what is systemic and whether it is right to regulate overseas CCPs and CSDs, the thrust of what the Bill tries to achieve, and the broad thrust of the debate, is that those are precisely matters that should be decided by the operationally independent regulators in this domain. Although I and others may have views, it will be for the Bank to use its new powers—as now, and as in other domains that are in scope—in consultation with the Treasury, Parliament and others.
I do not want to be the fly in the ointment, but I would like some assurances from the Minister about the FMI sandboxes. The Clifford Chance briefing notes that
“the FSMA Bill permits HM Treasury to allow broad participation in FMI sandboxes which in practice could include FMI providers, and participants in these systems as well as, conceivably, unregulated service providers such as technology companies and any other person that HM Treasury specifies.”
I am looking for an assurance from the Minister and his civil service team on the notion of unregulated service providers having access to the FMI sandbox. It seems that the EU pilot regime is far more limited in its multilateral trading facilities and securities settlement systems, and that it makes no mention of recognised investment exchanges or any other persons. It is not, therefore, making itself a hostage to fortune with its pilot system. Could the Minister and his team provide reassurance on the broad scope of innovation that they seem to be going for?
I find myself rising to try to elaborate on the important points that have been made. I do not think that anyone would argue against the need to think very carefully about how to pilot—or sandbox, to use the jargon—the very rapid development and potential of what is happening. It is also important in the context of financial market infrastructure.
Certain infrastructures in our financial system are really old. One need only consider how long it took to get the bank clearing process vaguely up to date to understand the importance of modernising infrastructures. I do not think that anyone would object to an attempt to come up with a structure that tests activities, which is what these clauses do.
The Minister, however, has not provided any detail on issues such as risk mitigation; whether parallel sandboxes involving similar infrastructures will be developed, almost in competition with each other; whether this will happen in just one area; or how the powers will be used to test whether potential infrastructures might be worth using. Could he add a little more colour to how he sees those things happening? How big will the sandboxes be? How long will they be allowed to continue? The Minister is grinning because this is the kind of detail that an enabling Bill does not contain, but it might be quite important.
Testing regimes in other areas are sometimes very limited. I would be worried if we had an unlimited testing system running for a long period, allowing unregulated organisations in, perhaps running in parallel with each other. If that is what the Minister is suggesting, I would be worried. If he is suggesting something much more minor and limited, to see whether the technology works and whether people can interact with it to redesign the way in which websites work, I would be less worried.
I am delighted that the hon. Lady has allowed me to intervene. The technology is not new, and that is what concerns me in relation to a lot of the debate on the Bill. There is nothing new under the sun about a lot of the technology, which underpins sandboxes, cryptocurrency and so on, that we are talking about. It just seems that a lot of the terminology takes over the substance of the issue that we are discussing.
That is true. Blockchain has certainly been around for quite a while. Its use has implications for transparency and for the levels of employment that there might be in the old, more bureaucratic banks.
What would be the use of artificial intelligence in trying to decide how automated these things could become? Would there be worries about over-automation? How would that be looked at in terms of regulation? How open are we going to be about the way in which AI is applied and how it might evolve in ways that might embed discrimination such that we get a system where certain people may be discriminated against and excluded? There are a range of issues that need to be tested in these kinds of environments. It is hard to do that under a negative resolution procedure. I take the Minister’s point, however, about affirmative resolutions. If one of these things worked during the trial period, was issued and became permanent, it is important, as the Minister has said, that any changes are subject to affirmative regulation.
There are a whole load of black boxes in the Bill that we might need to debate further. Could the Minister give us more colour on whether there will be parallel sandboxes, on transparency on what will be used and how it will be compiled, and on how large the sandboxes will be in terms of money on the exchanges or turnover, or however he wants to put it. Then we could consider whether risk is being mitigated and how we can develop a system using trundling and analogue legislation, if I may put it that way, in an environment where innovation is digital and rapid.
I understand what the Minister is trying to do, but this Parliament must still be aware that we need to be on top of the detail of this Bill, rather than just passing shells of enabling legislation that do not give us enough of a handle on what is intended.
Thank you, Dame Maria, for clarifying earlier that we are talking about sandboxes, not sandwich boxes. Some Members seem to have been a bit confused about that. I am intrigued by the use of the term “sandbox”. To me, a sandbox can be a road safety feature: it is literally a gravel or sand pit on a bad bend in the road to allow someone who loses control to get off the road safely. Alternatively, a sandbox is something that any cat owner will be familiar with. I am genuinely intrigued as to which of those metaphors somebody thought was appropriate for what we are discussing.
The principle behind these measures is absolutely sound. By this time next year, new practices in financial services will have evolved that none of us can begin to imagine just now. That is how things are moving. I take the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for West Dunbartonshire that the technology itself has not significantly changed—it is certainly not new—but the way in which people will use the technology is. The kinds of products that people will start to devise may well mean that existing regulatory practices need to be changed very quickly. The idea of being allowed to pilot something that is genuinely new in a safe space before letting it loose on the wider world is absolutely correct in my view. However, the devil, of course, is in the detail.
I am a bit concerned that the first in this group of clauses says that the purpose of the sandbox will be to test
“for a limited period, the efficiency or effectiveness of the carrying on of FMI activities”.
It does not say that one of the purposes is to test the effectiveness of any regulation that may go with it, which concerns me. Obviously, if someone knows that the activity they are carrying out in a sandbox will be looked at very carefully, they are going to behave themselves. How can we be sure that as well as being effective, it will work for the purposes of the providers? How do we know that the regulation that goes with it will also be effective? Again, that has to be effective as soon as the thing goes live. We cannot wait and regulate it effectively a few weeks later, because it will be far too late by then.
We welcome clause 20, which we recognise would introduce tighter controls on those who approve financial promotions for others, to ensure that consumers are better protected. How does the Minister foresee the clause facilitating improved approver expertise, due diligence and challenges in exercising appropriate regulatory oversight?
Obviously this is an extremely important part of the Bill because it creates a regulatory gateway for financial promotions. We know from what the FCA has reported that there is an issue with misleading financial promotions. We all know it from our constituency casework; we know it from some of the scandals that have been carried out successfully.
Part of the trouble is the closeness to the perimeter of regulation. A firm can have part of itself in the perimeter, while other parts are outside the perimeter, but in the promotions, it gives the impression that all the firm is regulated and all of what it is doing is within the perimeter, while advertising in a very misleading way things that are actually unregulated and therefore much riskier. We know that a lot of scams have happened that way. The way in which the FCA tries to deal with this situation is like trying to hold back the tide. The fact that so many of the promotions that it has managed to get a handle on—4,226 of them—have been withdrawn or amended to make them less misleading demonstrates that the FCA is doing its best. However, members of the Committee know that there is a constant battle with scammers, who constantly change how they present information to consumers and potential consumers through an ever-increasing number of gateways, even on things like TikTok. It is difficult for any regulator to get a handle on that, so anything that helps to battle the problem more effectively will be welcomed by all of us.
Will the Minister explain in more detail why he thinks that this is the right way to proceed, and how effective he thinks the powers in clause 20 will be in tackling the problem? We know—I think we will come on to this later in our proceedings—that cracking down on fraud more effectively will also be important. With the financial promotions and unauthorised third parties that deal with granting permissions, we know that the current regime can cause problems. We know that it is failing and that the FCA cannot be expected to do all this work with the resources it has, so will the Minister go into detail about how effective he thinks the measures will be, and say how he will be assessing this approach’s effectiveness? Clearly we want a reduction in the amount of scamming and fraud, and the number of promotions that are misleading or downright lie about the nature of the products they are pushing, so I will be interested to hear how the Minister sees clause 20 as the solution to this difficult problem.
I thank the hon. Member for Glenrothes for raising the issue, which I understand is of concern to Members on both sides of the Committee. I also thank him for indicating that he will not press the amendment to a vote. I think the reason for that is that clause 20 is a genuine enhancement of the regulatory infrastructure. It creates a new, two-tier regulatory structure that speaks directly to the issue of those who have been authorising harmful financial promotions. It does so by introducing a new assessment by the FCA that requires that they be assessed as fit to do so. I will come on to what that could look like in a moment.
We understand what financial promotions are. They are inducements or invitations to engage in investment activity in its broadest form.