Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)
(8 years, 9 months ago)
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The Chair
Before we begin, I have a few preliminary points. Please switch electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings. Members may, if they wish, remove their jackets during Committee meetings. Today, we will first consider the programme motion on the amendment paper. We will then consider a motion to enable the reporting of written evidence for publication. In view of the time available, I hope we can take those matters formally, without debate.
Ordered,
That—
(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 9 February) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 9 February;
(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 11 February;
(c) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 23 February;
(2) the proceedings shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 13; Schedule 1; Clauses 14 to 16; Schedule 2; Clause 17; Schedule 3; Clauses 18 to 20; Schedule 4; Clauses 21 to 38; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
(3) the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Tuesday 23 February.—(Harriett Baldwin.)
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Harriett Baldwin.)
The Chair
Copies of any written evidence that the Committee receives will be sent to Members and made available in the Committee room and online.
We will now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room. It shows how the selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. Amendments grouped together are generally on the same or similar issues. A Member who has put their name to the leading amendment in a group is called first. Other Members are then free to catch my eye to speak on all or any of the amendments within that group. A Member may speak more than once in a single debate.
Please note that decisions on amendments take place not in the order in which they are debated, but the order in which they appear on the amendment paper. In other words, debate occurs according to the selection and grouping list, and decisions are taken when we come to the clause that the amendment affects. I hope that that explanation is helpful. I will use my discretion to decide whether to allow a separate stand part debate on individual clauses and schedules following the debates on the relevant amendments.
Clause 1
Membership of court of directors
Richard Burgon (Leeds East) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 9, in clause 1, page 1, line 7, at end insert—
“(2A) In section 1(2)(e), at end insert “who shall include four designated representatives including—
(i) Practitioner Representative,
(ii) Smaller Business Practitioner Representative,
(iii) Markets Practitioner Representative and
(iv) Consumer Representative.”
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 2—Composition of the Court of Directors of the Bank of England—
“In making nominations to the Court of Directors of the Bank of England, the Chancellor of the Exchequer must have regard to the importance of ensuring a balanced representation from the nations and regions of the United Kingdom.””
New clause 5—Publication of transcripts of meetings of the Court—
“In paragraph 12A of Schedule 1 to the Bank of England Act 1998, replace the word “record” with the word “transcript” in each place where it occurs.””
Clause stand part.
Richard Burgon
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Wilson, and to serve opposite the Minister.
On part 1 of the Bill, which is on the Bank of England, it is our intention to make the case for increased transparency and increased accountability at the Bank. At a time when the financial services sector, as the political system does, faces a lack of public support and public trust—or rather, not as much as we would like—it is in the interests of the sector as a whole and the Bank of England itself for it to present itself and its decisions in the most open way possible.
Clause 1 relates to membership of the court of directors. Amendment 9 regards representation on that court. We accept the proposals in the clause regarding membership of the court, but I note that concern was expressed in Committee in the House of Lords about a potential reduction in the number of non-executive directors in the court. Will the Minister clarify the number of non-executive directors that the Government foresee sitting in the court? In the light of amendment 9, which is in my name, and new clause 2, tabled by Scottish National party Members, the Government should make use of the option of nine non-executive directors in the legislation to ensure the widest possible representation and fullest possible input into and scrutiny of the Bank’s work through the court.
Through amendment 9, we seek to amend the Bank of England Act 1998 to insert a requirement that, of the nine non-executive directors, four be designated as representatives of specific practitioner sectors, including a consumer representative. We recognise that the court, as it stands, includes representatives of a variety of backgrounds, including, historically, the trade union movement. We welcome that and believe that that tradition and representation should continue.
To improve that representation, we propose drawing on the practice at the Financial Conduct Authority and the categorisation of its statutory panels to ensure that a practitioner representative for larger firms, a smaller business practitioner representative for smaller firms, a markets practitioner representative and a consumer representative are included. That is all I have to say directly in relation to amendment 9.
We believe that providing transcripts of the court’s proceedings, such as Hansard provides of our own discussions in Parliament, allows for rich scrutiny of lines of argument and is a clear way to increase transparency and public awareness. In the United States of America, it is the practice to broadcast meetings of the chairs of the various Federal Reserve banks. In the new clause, Members have not asked the Bank to go that far, but we believe that that is a positive example. The aim is to enable the public to understand what is going on and to allow greater scrutiny of the Bank of England’s valuable work.
George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP)
I want to speak to new clause 2, which is a probing amendment. My response will be determined by the Minister’s response. We are asking that, when making nominations to the Bank’s court of directors, the Chancellor should have due regard to the importance of ensuring balanced representation from the UK’s regions.
Overall, the Bill is useful in tightening regulation and in refocusing the organisation and direction of the Bank of England. In particular, there is much merit in tidying up the operation of the Bank’s three main committees overseeing micro and macroprudential activity and the operation of the Monetary Policy Committee and, if that is accepted, in ensuring that the Bank’s court becomes essentially the organiser of the organisation, with responsibility, as the main oversight, for how the Bank’s operation works and for ensuring that there is managerial competence and value for money and that resources are well deployed between the Bank’s various functions.
It has been generally recognised over the years that the court has sometimes had an ambiguous position halfway between being a proper corporate board and a policy-making institution. The Bill, correctly, separates the policy functions that go to the committees, leaving the board with the essential corporate governance. That is a step forward. My point is that, if we do that —if we redefine and concentrate the board’s activity—we must look at the composition of the board and ensure that it is fit for purpose—a new board for a new competence.
The composition of the current board is a little too narrow. I accept that it has moved beyond the days when the court consisted simply of City grandees. In recent years, appointment to the board has widened; the international influence has widened. It includes a South African and an American. There is some industrial representation, but by and large there is still a feeling in the wider financial community outside London and in the wider industrial and commercial communities outside London that it is too City focused. For a board that is about not simply managing the City, but managing the central bank, it would be in the interests of the central bank and of commanding the respect of the central bank if there were a wider remit in relation to appointments to the board.
In the new clause, I am trying not to be too specific. A board should not be federalised; it should not consist of delegates. A board has overall responsibility. I presume that most people around this table have been on the boards of companies, large and small. I have been on at least two dozen boards in my rather geekish lifetime. When boards have discussions about who should be on them, they say, “Well, what experience do we have? Who is not represented? What area of competence do we need that will help the board to function?” That is perfectly proper.
I am just saying that, given the key role that the Bank of England plays in the UK, there should be more representation of the regions and nations of the UK. That is particularly the case because the banking community is no longer concentrated simply in the City of London. There are operations in Manchester, Bristol, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Cardiff and beyond, and the industries and sectors there want to feel some confidence that the Bank of England listens to them.
I know of course that the Bank of England has long had a system of agents. I suppose that many of us around the table will have met the agents in our region over the years. However, the agents have a different function. We are talking about a new board for a single bank.
Let me say—I hope that the Government will respect this—that the principle has already been conceded in one respect, which has been referred to. It has been traditional since the post-war period for the Bank to have a representative of the labour movement, the trade union movement, on the grounds that labour and capital were the two great elements of the economy. Given that that principle has already been conceded, all we are talking about is extending it.
My final point is that the distinguished Governor of the Bank of England, Mr Carney, of course comes from Canada, where the principle is already accepted. There is a rule that, in composing the board of the Bank of Canada, due consideration should be given to the provinces being represented. There is not a rule that every province has to be represented on the board of the Bank of Canada; it is not as specific as that and nor should it be. However, if we look at the board of the Bank of Canada, we see that, strangely enough, all the provinces are represented. Mr Carney is perfectly comfortable with that, so we are not trying to impose a burden that he has not had to face in the past.
Richard Burgon
I will comment on new clause 2, in the name of the hon. Member for East Lothian. As I said, we see merit in the proposal for wider geographical representation on the board and we believe that it complements our proposals to ensure that different stakeholders are represented. We would be interested to hear a little more detail if possible. He spoke about different centres of employment—Birmingham is one example—but I would be interested to hear specific comments on whether this proposal relates to personal residency or employment and, crucially, does the SNP believe that devolved bodies should make recommendations to the Chancellor?
To clarify, our new clause 5, on the publication of transcripts of meetings of the court, is a small tidying amendment, but we hope that it would have a significant impact by opening up the discussions of the court to wider scrutiny and that it would ensure increased transparency and accountability. That is why I will seek a Division on new clause 5 and why I invite all hon. Members to consider voting for it.
John Mann (Bassetlaw) (Lab)
It is an honour and a privilege to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Wilson. The issue of the court and its lack of transparency— the amendments attempt to bring in some transparency—is one that has bypassed the majority of commentators and the general public. Hidden in the rather grand depths of the Bank of England, the court holds significant potential power, yet it has become embodied by not a concept of nepotism within the financial sector, but something akin to that. Perhaps “revolving door” is a better term. Someone goes in one door, they fail and go out of another door, and then they turn up in the same industry and at the same heights, time and again.
The criteria for who is on the board have always been shrouded in some secrecy. The hon. Member for East Lothian raised the question of the representation of the labour movement. That is a good and interesting point to examine in this context, because it remains the case today that Mr Prentis of Unison is on the court, as was Mr Brendan Barber of the TUC before him. I believe that Mr Bill Morris was on the court before that, and Mr Gavin Laird was too, in the distant past. Indeed, I used to see the papers that Mr Laird received at the time and the contributions he made. If they had been listened to at the time it would have had a significant impact on British competitiveness. Mr Laird used to argue repeatedly, very eloquently and in beautifully scripted speeches, that we were in danger of overemphasising the importance of finance at the expense of manufacturing. That is an issue not only for the Government, but for the Bank of England itself. Industry, as opposed to finance, needs to be in at the Bank. That is a fundamental weakness, because at present it is financiers as opposed to industrialists who are evident at the Bank, not so much in the expertise but in the mindset and the thinking which lead to decision making. The Bank thinks as financiers do, and it does not think more widely.
In the same way, my hon. Friends on the Front Bench propose to broaden the court with consumer champions and others who are missing at the moment. The Chancellor is decisively, deliberately and calculatedly removing consumerism and the consumer interest from regulation. Why? Because that is seen as a barrier to the ever onward growth and recovery of the big banks, not least RBS and Lloyds. Some commentators are speculating that there might be a fuel tax increase. That is quite wrong, in my view. What the Chancellor wishes to do is maximise his returns on the sale of shares in RBS and Lloyds. In itself, that is very sensible, and it is something that the Bank of England would support, does support and will support. However, speed and timing are critical in all of this. We have the Bank of England being unduly influenced by the Chancellor and the Treasury, while at the same time it is losing external influences from the world of industry. That includes both the employer and, potentially, the trade union influence.
There is the intriguing possibility of a more regional Bank. What would the world come to if there were people in the Bank of England who did not live in London or, more likely, in the commuter belt outside London? How would the world survive? It is a shame that my hon. Friends did not go even further and suggest that the court ought to meet not in the hallowed chambers on the third or fourth floor of the Bank, but in Manchester, Birmingham, Cardiff, Edinburgh, Aberdeen or Sheffield, in order that the public can see and hear it and get a feel for it. That would be an easy, significant win, and I am sure that the Bank’s representatives listening in will take note of that. I commend the amendments to the Committee; they are excellent and should be agreed.
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Harriett Baldwin)
May I say what a pleasure it is to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Wilson? I will speak to clause 1 and why it should stand part of the Bill before dealing with the amendments.
The clause makes the deputy governor for markets and banking a member of the court of directors—an important position that is not currently a statutory member of court. It also provides enhanced flexibility to add or remove a deputy governor or alter the title of a deputy governor, as well as the corresponding ability to make changes to the composition of the court, the Financial Policy Committee, the Monetary Policy Committee or the new Prudential Regulation Committee where a deputy governor is added or removed. Those important provisions will simplify the governance of the Bank.
Following the expansion of the Bank’s responsibilities through the Financial Services Act 2012, a deputy governor for markets and banking was appointed with responsibility for reshaping the Bank’s balance sheet, including ensuring robust risk management practices. That important position is currently filled by Dame Minouche Shafik, who is not a statutory member of court. We have talked about regional diversity this morning, but she ticks many boxes in terms of other forms of diversity, having been born in Egypt, worked a lot in America and being a British citizen. The clause amends the Bank of England Act 1998 to make that deputy governor a member of the court, ensuring equal status for all the Bank’s deputy governors and simplifying the Bank’s governance structure.
It should be noted that the power to add or remove a deputy governor will not permit the Treasury to remove a deputy governor or change his or her title while that deputy governor is in office. The measure will ensure flexibility for future need. At present, changes such as the creation of the new position of deputy governor for markets and banking can only be affected through changes to primary legislation. Instead, as a result of the clause, the Government will in future be able, by order and after consulting with the Governor, to adjust the size and shape of the Bank’s senior management team to meet future requirements—for example, to bring in new expertise if that proved to be necessary.
The hon. Member for Bassetlaw asks why we are changing the number of non-executive directors on the court. To be clear, that change is not being made by the Bill. The Bank of England Act 1998 requires up to nine non-executive directors, and following retirements there are currently seven non-executive directors on the court. A smaller board will be better for the Bank. The strong view of the Bank’s non-executive chair, Anthony Habgood, is that a smaller board makes for more effective challenge and accountability of the executive. When there are fewer non-executive directors, each member has greater opportunity to pose questions to executive members and to debate with them. A larger court might encourage a round table of individual speeches, rather than enabling effective back-and-forth discussions with and challenge to the executive.
Harriett Baldwin
The hon. Gentleman serves as a member of the Treasury Committee, and I believe he was also a member of that Committee in the previous Parliament, so he will remember that it produced a report in 2011 called “Accountability of the Bank of England” which recommended that the court’s membership be reduced to eight—smaller than we propose. It emphasised that a smaller court would allow for
“diversity of views and expertise”
while still being
“an efficient decision-making body”.
He may want to go back and look at the evidence base that the Committee looked at. It is important to emphasise that the Bill does not make a change in terms of the membership, which remains at possibly up to nine.
Roger Mullin (Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath) (SNP)
Does the Minister therefore believe that the Cabinet should be reduced in size?
Harriett Baldwin
The Cabinet, as the hon. Gentleman knows, has fluctuated in size over the years. On the evidence base, we are obviously talking about the experience of the Bank of England having in the past, particularly in the run-up to the financial crash, had a significantly larger court. I think there were 19 members in the run-up to 2009, and it was thought that that was a very large and unwieldy body. I think it still falls short of the number of people who currently attend Cabinet. There is a range of different views of effectiveness, but the important point to emphasise is that the Bill does not intrinsically make any changes to what is already there, although in practice we currently have seven non-executive directors on the court.
Importantly, the Bill also provides for the continued balance of internal and external members on the MPC, the FPC and the newly formed PRC. Following the addition or removal of a deputy governor, the Government may make a corresponding change to the number of members appointed by the Chancellor in the case of the FPC or PRC or the Governor in the case of the MPC.
New clause 5 would require the court to publish transcripts of its discussions within six months. I agree completely with the hon. Member for Leeds East that transparency is critical. The Bank of England makes decisions that affect all of us and it must be accountable to the public, and enhancing transparency is central to that. That is why I am so pleased to bring this Bill to the Committee: it makes governance of the Bank much more transparent in several ways. First, it makes the entire court responsible for the oversight functions. No longer will an oversight committee oversee the work of an oversight board. Every member of the board, executive or non-executive, will be clearly responsible for oversight of the Bank.
Secondly, the Bill removes a greater barrier to transparency and unnecessary complexity. In 2013, the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards noted the complexity of the present regime. It said:
“The accountability arrangements of the new structures”—
that is, the structures that exist now—
“are more complex than those of the previous regulatory regime. The PRA is a subsidiary of the Bank, and the FPC is a sub-committee of the Court of the Bank.”
The Bill will change the FPC’s status from a sub-committee of the court to a committee of the Bank and will end the PRA’s subsidiary status, establishing the Bank’s three policy committees on a common statutory footing.
The final and perhaps most significant means of enhancing transparency is bringing the whole Bank into the purview of the National Audit Office for the first time in its history. Allowing the NAO to conduct value-for-money reviews across the Bank will increase its accountability to Parliament and to the public. In turn, this will build greater public trust in the Bank’s operations and governance, supporting its vital independence role in the UK economy.
I agree with the hon. Member for Leeds East that transparency is important: it improves accountability and ultimately makes the Bank’s governance better. However, I disagree with him that mandating transcripts of court sessions will make governance better. As hon. Members are aware, the court is now required to publish the minutes of every meeting within six weeks. That was not always the case, but I am glad to see that the court has published historical records of its minutes, including those during the financial crisis. Through this, Parliament and the public now have greater insight into the governance of the Bank and the key decisions made. Transcripts are a different matter entirely.
We are fortunate in this debate because the impact of transcripts on Bank discussions has already been examined by Governor Warsh in his review, “Transparency and the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee”. He said:
“Creating a safe space for true deliberations is among the most critical indicia of organisations that make good decisions, according to the leading academic and empirical literature and my own observation”.
I am sure we all want a court that makes good decisions. The alternative would be extremely costly for all of us. Governor Warsh looked at the MPC’s two discussion days and found that the different nature of the day one and day two discussions required different approaches to transcript publication. It makes sense to see which of those days is most like a court session and what Governor Warsh recommended. Day one is when the MPC members deliberate, challenge the evidence before them and question one another—exactly the kind of role that the court performs very effectively. Day two is very different. In Governor Warsh’s words:
“With few exceptions, the deliberations are nearly complete, policymakers are heard, and their judgments tallied.”
I think it is clear that day one is closer to the deliberations and discussions of a board.
Roger Mullin
I thank the Minister for explaining Governor Warsh’s views, but I would like to challenge his view that the academic literature is all one way. In fact, some of the academic literature points out that in more private settomgs, people are more prone to groupthink.
Harriett Baldwin
As a distinguished academic himself, the hon. Gentleman will know that academics often differ in their points of view. It is clear that in this case the distinguished Governor Warsh has come down in one way, and here in our deliberations we have come down in favour of producing a transcript, and Hansard performs that incredibly valuable role for us. I will make some further points, which I hope will convince him of the wisdom of the position that the Government are taking on transcripts.
When Governor Warsh looked at releasing transcripts of the day one deliberations, which he described as “safe space” deliberations, he found that
“Should the transcripts of the Day 1 deliberations be made public, the quality of the deliberative process would risk being materially impaired, to the detriment of sound policymaking.”
He went on to make a clear recommendation that
“the Day 1 policy discussions should no longer be recorded nor should they be transcribed.”
Publication of transcripts of meetings of the court would have a “chilling effect” on discussion and the quality of debate and harm decision making. I therefore hope that the hon. Member for Leeds East will not press his new clause.
John Mann
Having gone through in some detail an analysis of whether transcripts of meetings of the Monetary Policy Committee should be made available, on which there has been a thorough debate, including with members of the MPC, the Minister translates that to an amendment relating to the court. In relation to the court, what is the evidence base that suggests that the hearings or decision making of the court, as opposed to the MPC, would in some way be restricted by a transcript?
Harriett Baldwin
The hon. Gentleman makes an important point. The court oversees the MPC, the FPC, and the PRC under the proposals in the Bill. We have not discussed yet—I will be happy to do so—the fact that on the prudential side of discussions, the people on that committee will looking at material that constitutes, by any judgment, non-public information on the soundness of important financial institutions in this country. I am sure that, as a member of the Treasury Committee, the hon. Gentleman will agree that such material ought to be treated as extremely market-sensitive in any circumstances.
John Mann
The Minister is now jumping to a third body. The amendment relates to the court. The court does not make decisions on interest rates. The court does not delve into the financial situation of individual banks or other financial institutions. The court oversees; the court is strategic. Will she explain the relevance of her case in relation to the court, as opposed to the committee dealing with prudential regulation or with monetary policy?
Harriett Baldwin
I would have thought that it spoke for itself. The fact that the court is overseeing all these different committees, some of which will be considering material that is non-public information—
Harriett Baldwin
If the hon. Gentleman will allow me, I will give way to him when I have replied to his previous point. We are proposing the publication of a record of the court’s meeting, and I agree with him that it is important for that record to be in the public domain. There is a clear difference between that record and a transcript.
John Mann
I thank the Minister for giving way again. I have the advantage over her of having been in the deliberations of the Treasury Committee on these matters. There is a world of difference between decision making on interest rates or the examination of whether a particular financial institution is in danger of collapse and going into that in a committee and the role of the court. The Minister seems to misunderstand the role of the court. Has she looked at and understood the transcripts the discussions of the Treasury Committee and the banking review on the question of the court? She is talking about different bodies. This amendment is about the court. The Minister said, in response to my earlier intervention, that this is self-evident. No, it is not self-evident—
Harriett Baldwin
In responding to the hon. Gentleman’s intervention I will be a little bit cheeky, if I may, and highlight the fact that even that august body, the Treasury Committee of this House, sometimes meets in private. There is a need for a safe space for discussions at certain points. We agree with the hon. Gentleman that it is important to have a degree of transparency in terms of the court. We think that the record provided is adequate. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not press the amendment.
Harriett Baldwin
I would like to move on, but I will take another short intervention.
John Mann
I thank the Minister for giving way. Debate is important. The Minister now cites in evidence the Treasury Committee, which is a good example. The reason that minutes and transcripts of Select Committees are available is because of the strategic overview and public accountability that they provide. That is the whole point about the court. It is not making decisions on the minutiae or on the specifics. It is providing an overview and oversight, on precisely the same democratic logic as a Select Committee. That is the point of this excellent amendment. The Minister does not seem to understand the point of the court and what it is there for.
Harriett Baldwin
With great respect to the hon. Gentleman, I do understand that. Perhaps he would like some further examples. The court plays an important role in relation to emergency liquidity assistance at the time of a financial crisis. We have to agree as a Committee that there will be times when the court is discussing something that we do not want to have transcribed and put into the public domain. Personally, I thought that Governor Warsh was very convincing in comparing what happens on day one of the Monetary Policy Committee and what can happen at other times—not necessarily all the time—and how a record will be published. The hon. Gentleman will vote one way and I will vote another. I do not agree with the amendment.
Amendment 9 would require representation on the court of particular sectors, and require the Chancellor to have regard for balanced regional and national representation on the court. Obviously, the Bank of England plays a central role in the UK economy, and its policy decisions are vital to everyone in the United Kingdom. I therefore entirely agree with hon. Members about the importance of the Bank of England giving careful consideration to how its policy decisions affect people throughout the country. This is at the heart of the Bank’s mission of promoting the good of the people of the United Kingdom by maintaining monetary and financial stability—indeed, that is precisely what the Bank does.
I will give a few examples. The Bank has representatives around the country; those agents work from 12 agencies, in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and the regions of England, to gather information from businesses operating across many different sectors, including financial and non-financial firms. The regional agents, often joined by the Bank’s governors and members of the policy committees, regularly meet and hold panel discussions with companies of a range of sizes across the UK to gauge economic conditions and inform the Bank’s monetary policy and financial stability work. I trust that all members of the Committee have had an opportunity to observe that activity in their constituencies. If they have not, I strongly recommend that they do so, because those Bank activities are extensive. To give hon. Members an idea of how extensive they are: in 2014-15 the agents visited some 5,200 companies drawn from firms in all sectors and in all corners of the country; also, panel discussions were held with 3,700 businesses. Undoubtedly, the Bank goes to great lengths to ensure that it develops a detailed understanding of the conditions for businesses in all sectors across the whole United Kingdom.
In addition, the Prudential Regulation Authority’s practitioner panel ensures that the interests of those who must put the PRA’s rules into practice are communicated to the regulator. The panel includes representatives of banks, insurers, building societies and credit unions. The Financial Conduct Authority’s consumer panel has a statutory right to make representations to the PRA, and the FCA chief executive sits on the Financial Policy Committee and the PRA board, and will sit on the new Prudential Regulation Committee.
Through this Bill we are going further in ensuring that the regulators take into account the diversity of business models operating in the financial sector. Specifically, we are making it clear that both the PRA and the FCA must take account of the differences between different types of firm, including mutuals, whenever they are discharging their general objectives. We argue that these amendments are unnecessary and, indeed, unhelpful. They would cloud the appointments process.
George Kerevan
Does the Minister not accept that there is a difference between being consulted and having a right to be consulted and having a right to feel that one is represented on a deliberative body?
Harriett Baldwin
There is, but the purpose of the deliberative body, as we have heard, is effectively to act as the board of the Bank of England, supervising the different committees. Prior to the financial crisis, members of the court were often selected specifically to represent a range of sectoral interests, including many of those proposed in the amendments. The first problem with the amendments is that requiring representatives of different sectors and regard to regional representation will entail a much larger and therefore oversized and dysfunctional court. Before the financial crisis, when the court had non-executives specifically to represent different interests—why stop at the four listed in the amendment?—the court had an incredible 16 non-executives, rendering it far too large to operate effectively and unable to hold the executive properly to account.
Roger Mullin
I think the Minister may have been in error when she implied that the new clauses would introduce a requirement. Our new clause 2 simply says
“the Chancellor of the Exchequer must have regard to the importance”
of balanced representation.
Harriett Baldwin
The hon. Gentleman is right to highlight that difference. Of course, what the Chancellor of the Exchequer would have regard to is the quality and ability of those individuals to perform the function they are asked to perform. The Banking Act 2009 sensibly limited the court to nine non-executives, and in practice we have now reduced the number of non-executives to seven while keeping that non-executive majority, which means that the court is now sufficiently small to form an effective body that can challenge the executive. The amendments before the Committee would inevitably mean a return to a large, inefficient and ineffective court.
A second problem with amendment 9, which would require sectoral representation on the court, is that it would give rise to conflicts of interest. The amendment calls for several practitioner representatives on the court. We have tried that in the past, too. During the crisis, the conflicts of interest meant that some of those on the court who could have been of most assistance to the Bank had to leave the room for the most important decisions, such as on liquidity provision to the markets and on individual firms. That hampered the court’s ability to respond effectively.
George Kerevan
Does the Minister agree that her statement about the ineffectiveness of the board, because of its narrow composition during the crisis, makes our point that we need wider representation across the country, across areas and across industrial sectors?
Harriett Baldwin
I do not think anyone disagrees with the idea that we would want to have a range of different abilities and skills on the court of directors. What we are fighting against in opposing the amendments is the propensity of such amendments to lead to a larger and larger group of individuals on the court. Importantly, in relation to highlighting the potential for conflicts of interest, the conflicts policy now makes it clear that, among other restrictions, members of the court should not accept or retain any interest that is in conflict with membership and should not normally be associated with a PRA or Bank-regulated firm, whether as a director, employee or adviser. That ensures that the wide-ranging expertise—we all agree that that is necessary—appointed to the court can be deployed without obstacles, and leaves the court better equipped to respond to a crisis. The amendment would unravel those arrangements, and I argue that we should oppose it; we should not allow it to take us backwards.
The third and most important concern about the amendments is that they would impose unnecessary and undesirable constraints on appointments to the court. In the past three years, the court has been transformed. The Chancellor has appointed the highest-quality team, with significant experience of running large organisations and deep expertise in matters relevant to the Bank. The Government look far and wide for the best candidates, with roles advertised in the international press. Let me be clear: obviously, there are highly competent and highly qualified individuals who work in the sectors proposed and from all the regions across the UK. The amendments would constrain the appointments process utterly unnecessarily, potentially preventing us from forming the highest-quality, most experienced board for one of the most important institutions in the country.
Harriett Baldwin
Not off the top of my head. I cannot specifically think of anything, other than to highlight the fact, in relation to the previous life of the court, when we were dealing with a much larger organisation, that all the reviews since the financial crash have highlighted the unwieldiness of that organisation and the lack of clarity in terms of conflicts of interest as being among the underlying imperfections in the financial regulation that we inherited in 2010.
John Mann
The decision in Sweden, for example, to move to negative interest rates, the collapse in oil prices, the mistake that the Chancellor made with the timing of the RBS shares sale and the successful prosecution in relation to LIBOR are all issues that have originated within the past three years. Did the court in its wisdom say anything about any of them in giving advice to the Bank?
Harriett Baldwin
As the hon. Gentleman will be aware, a number of different independent reviews have been commissioned by the oversight committee during the past few years. I completely dispute his point about the sale of RBS shares. Given how much lower they are today, I would have thought he would welcome the fact that the Government were able to sell the first £2 billion-worth in the market last August. He and I will clearly vote along different lines on this matter. The Government feel that the amendment would constrain the appointment process, to the detriment of effective decision making in the court and in effect, therefore, to the detriment of the Bank’s overall effectiveness. Undoubtedly the court should have a breadth of experience and knowledge, and we certainly want different perspectives to be brought to bear.
It is also important that the court is able, when necessary, to commission the kind of review about which the hon. Gentleman speaks. There has been the Plenderleith review to increase emergency liquidity assistance capabilities and the Stockton review, which made recommendations on how the Bank communicates its forecasts. We have even spoken this morning about the Warsh review, which has made the very recommendations that we are considering, regarding MPC procedures and the governance of the Bank of England.
The current court contains a remarkable collection of experience and talent. Among the directors are the chief executive of a major telecoms provider.
George Kerevan
The Minister is being very sporting in giving way this morning. Can I take it from the tenor of everything she has said that the place for the trade union representative on the court, which we have had since world war two, is now in jeopardy?
Harriett Baldwin
I do not know where the hon. Gentleman would get that impression from. It is important that we have a chief executive of a major telecoms provider, a chief executive of a major power utility, a private equity specialist, a leader of a global information services group and a leader of a major public sector trade union. The chair, Mr Anthony Habgood, is one of the most experienced and respected company chairmen in the country.
George Kerevan
There has always been, since world war two, a place reserved on the court for a leading trade union figure. That is not written down anywhere, but it has always been accepted. Will it continue?
Harriett Baldwin
Nothing in my remarks this morning has suggested any change whatsoever in that policy, but it is important that the best people are selected for the roles and we do not accept the Opposition amendments, which would further constrain the selection process. I hope we can all agree that every member of the court, wherever they are from, should consider in their decision making the Bank’s impact on everyone in the UK, across the UK, not just in one region or one individual sector.
The amendments call for a different kind of court, made up of representatives from UK regions and representatives of narrow interests, and that would result in a court riven by conflicts of interest. We have tried that kind of court before and we know how the story ends. I hope that members of the Committee agree that we should not allow the amendment to take us back there.
Richard Burgon
We will not seek to divide the Committee on the amendment, but we might, of course, revisit the matter on Report.
On new clause 5, we have heard powerful interventions from the hon. Member for East Lothian, and insightful ones from my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw, who speaks, on this and other matters, not only with great experience because of his role on the Treasury Committee but with great common sense about transparency and representation. I am disappointed, therefore, by the Minister’s lack of support for the new clause. She says that she supports transparency but, with respect, I do not believe that she has offered greater transparency in this regard, not even with the compromise of an above-the-line and below-the-line model for transcripts, which is used by local authorities and school governor boards. On that basis. I will wish to press the new clause to a Division and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The Chair
I remind colleagues that votes on new clauses will be taken at the end of the Bill proceedings.
Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
Term of office of non-executive directors
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Harriett Baldwin
I am glad that you are finding it as confusing as I am, Mr Wilson, that there is a group 2 and a clause 2 and what have you. Clause 2 enables the Government to extend the appointment of a non-executive director. The standard length of appointment for a non-executive director is currently four years, and this will be maintained following the passage of the Bill. However, if necessary, the Government will have the power to extend the appointment by up to six months. If the individual is subsequently reappointed to the court, the length of their new tenure will be reduced by the length of the extension.
The ability to extend a non-executive director’s appointment provides a number of key benefits. First, the ability to extend the terms of appointments by a few months enables the end dates of non-executives to be staggered, which supports smooth transitions in membership, preventing a significant change in personnel at any one time. Secondly, should a member of the court resign or retire unexpectedly, extending the term of one or more non-executive directors can provide resilience during a potentially turbulent time. Finally, enabling this extension will bring the court in line with the FPC and the MPC, whose members can already have their term extended by up to six months.
Richard Burgon
I will be brief, because the Opposition are happy with the proposal to provide for the extension of the term of office of non-executive directors. However, we feel that this is an opportunity to highlight again the important role that non-executive directors can and should play, a point made effectively by my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw in the debate on clause 1. There was a clear suggestion in the other place that the Government believe that a smaller body of non-executive directors on the court would be more efficient, and the Minister has made that clear again. I take this opportunity to reiterate the point that it is necessary to ensure broad representation and the appointment of active and dedicated members. As my hon. Friend has indicated, the world would not come to a stop if there was broader representation, both geographically and in terms of life experience.
John Mann
I warmly welcome—warmly—this clause, as I do the Minister’s confirmation to the hon. Member for East Lothian that the Government have no intention of removing the trade union representative from the court. I warmly welcome that. It is an exceedingly sensible approach that will resonate well beyond this place. This clause should be unanimously adopted.
Harriett Baldwin
Excuse me if I faint from astonishment, Mr Wilson. I do not think that that has ever happened to me before with the hon. Member for Bassetlaw.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Abolition of Oversight Committee
Richard Burgon
I beg to move amendment 10, in clause 3, page 4, line 5, after “would” insert “materially”.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 11, in clause 3, page 4, line 7, leave out “may” and insert “shall”.
Amendment 12, in clause 3, page 4, line 11, after “directors” insert—
“and
(c) for the review to be conducted by a person who is not an employee or director of the Bank.”
Richard Burgon
The abolition in clause 3 of the oversight committee was clearly a very controversial part of the original Bill, as evidenced at each stage of the debate in the House of Lords. My colleague in the other place, Lord Tunnicliffe, supported Lord Sharkey in seeking to challenge it. Labour Members believe that the abolition of the oversight committee is an attack on accountability within the Bank, and yet another example of the Government rolling back recent legislation. I am sure that we will come to that topic on another day.
Not only is the reverse burden of proof or the presumption of responsibility being removed before it is even implemented, but the oversight committee was established only in the Financial Services Act 2012, as hon. Members will remember. The Government clearly felt unable to sustain their line of argument, and in amending the clause to allow a majority of non-executive directors the power to initiate reviews, they have made a welcome concession. It remains our view that the abolition of the committee is a retrograde step. We are yet to be convinced that affording the non-executive directors this power without the existence of the previous forum for discussion will mean that power can be exercised effectively. Perhaps the Government can say how they believe the non-executive members will discuss their concerns outside of the meetings of the court. Will they have to organise something akin to a stand-alone non-executive directors meeting? Perhaps such a forum exists, and the Minister can inform and enlighten me about it.
Following the negotiations in the other place, we have decided to allow this change in the Bill to be made. We will keep a watching brief on how it works over the coming months and we will seek to take advice from the non-executive directors on how they feel it has affected their ability to carry out their oversight functions.
We have proposed a number of amendments to improve the clause, particularly amendment 12, which seeks to increase the authority of the non-executive directors. On Report in the Lords, the Government stated that the initiators of a review among the non-executive directors would determine that they have the power to decide who should carry it out. It could be someone external or someone internal, from the independent evaluation office.
During a Treasury Committee hearing, the Governor was questioned at length, and told the Chair of the Committee that the IEO’s work is set by the court. Therefore, our amendment seeks to give the non-executive directors a duty to bring in external expertise and analysis to conduct such a review into the work of the Bank. Amendments 10 and 11 would further clarify and strengthen the Bill in that regard.
George Kerevan
I, too, had reservations about the abolition of the oversight committee. I warm to it to the extent that we have clarified, or are in the process of clarifying, the role of the court in a narrower sense as a proper functioning board of a wider organisation, although the Minister’s responses in the previous debate have given me some cause for concern.
It is important to grasp that the existing oversight committee is nothing more than the non-executive directors meeting as a body, so the existing oversight body gives some official grounds for the non-executives to meet. I have been on many boards where it was quite the norm for non-executives to meet informally, and one trusts that the non-executives on the court are of sufficient experience to be able to do that. Nevertheless, there must be a worry if the current ability to meet separately and to be resourced as the oversight committee is taken away. Therefore, the amendments being proposed to the clause are a useful way of just stressing on the part of Parliament that what I have described is what we expect the non-executives to do.
It might be important to consider circumstances where the non-executives might want to discuss the overall direction of the Bank. We have had one such experience in the last couple of years. The major activity of the Prudential Regulation Authority, which is soon to be the Prudential Regulation Committee, has been to conduct the stress tests on the banks. It does so under separate legal obligations from Europe. The stress testing is a highly extensive and highly resource-driven activity, and there were issues in the first round of stress testing because resources were clearly being directed from other parts of the Bank to help the PRA to do its job. There were issues about who was making decisions, and about whether enough resources and staff time were being made available from the other parts of the Bank to the PRA. A number of the non-executive directors became slightly alarmed about how the stress tests would be conducted and about the availability of the necessary resources.
There can be quite significant points when the non-executive directors would have to say, “We are worried about the deployment of resources by the executive directors. We want to stand back and look at how this is being done.” The non-execs must have the power as a body to lean against the significant influence of the executive. The Bank of England is one of the major institutions of the UK and of global banking, and the Governor of the Bank, Mr Carney, for whom I have a great deal of respect, is one of the most senior central bankers in the entire world. Leaning against him when he says, “Do this or do that,” is difficult. The amendments would give the non-executives some backbone, so when they are worried about the direction of resources they can say, “Whoa.”
John Mann
My view is similar to that of the hon. Member for East Lothian, in that I do not object to removing the oversight committee if the functions are effectively outlined. In addition to the example of the stress tests, there are various potential events—some would call them calamities, others opportunities—that would affect the structure and ethos of the Bank of England. They include British exit from the European Union or Scottish independence. They would require the court to act effectively and strategically. If there is a feeling of conflict in direction—direction being what should happen and what people should spend their time on—the ability to draw in external reserves and expertise is key. The power to do that has to be there.
Amendment 12 in particular would be useful to the Government and would complement their approach. I put it to the Minister that it would be helpful, given the direction of travel. I tend to concur with the Treasury Committee’s general view on this point, but only if the court is right and the non-execs have that power. The Treasury Committee, on behalf of Parliament, has made it clear that bringing the non-execs from the court into the Treasury Committee and having that dialogue in public and producing transcripts of it, which has not happened in the past, will be an important feature in the future.
Harriett Baldwin
The line-by-line consideration of this provision in the other place and here this morning has been extremely helpful. Before I speak to the amendments, let me give the Committee an example of the problems in the oversight committee’s current arrangements which I think will inform our debate. The hon. Member for Bassetlaw mentioned the 2013-14 foreign exchange market investigation, which sought to establish whether any Bank officials were involved in or aware of the FX market manipulation. In October 2013, the Bank’s governors initiated an extensive internal review, and they regularly briefed the court at its meetings from November 2013 onwards. In March 2014, it became clear that an independent investigation would be appropriate. The oversight committee took over the investigation and appointed Lord Grabiner QC. That is a very good example of the oversight functions. In practice, the executive needed to join the oversight committee discussions for the oversight functions to work and be effective, both as the investigation progressed and once attention turned to delivering the recommendations. It would be better practice to make the oversight functions the responsibility of the whole court. That is the purpose of the clause.
I welcome the opportunity to speak to the amendments and to explain the improvement in the oversight arrangements at the Bank of England and the power we have ensured for the court’s non-executive majority. The Bill brings the court closer to the model envisaged by the Treasury Committee, which called for a board with powers to conduct ex-post reviews of the performance of the Bank; for board members to be authorised to see all the papers submitted to the Monetary Policy Committee and the Financial Policy Committee; and for the board to be responsible for reviewing the processes of the Bank’s policy committees. Making the oversight functions the responsibility of the whole court makes it clear that every member of the court, executive and non-executive, can be held to account for the use of these functions. No member of court can claim that the oversight functions were not their job, since they will now rightly be the responsibility of all.
That replaces the current arrangement in which there is effectively an oversight committee overseeing the work of an oversight board. That is neither efficient, nor best practice. In fact, on Second Reading my right hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie), Chair of the Treasury Committee, put it well when he said:
“The oversight of the executive will be the responsibility of the court itself, rather than a sub-committee. Even though it was not called a sub-committee, it was, in fact, a sub-committee, and a weaker committee than the court.”—[Official Report, 1 February 2016; Vol. 605, c. 668.]
During the Bill’s passage through the House of Lords, we introduced the power, which has been welcomed by members of that House, that this amendment seeks to alter. This part of the Bill ensures that a majority of non-executives can always initiate performance reviews without needing to secure the agreement of a majority of the whole court. If just four non-executive directors want a review, they will be able to initiate it. Under our proposal to give more powers to the non-executive directors to do their job effectively, the initiators of a review would determine who should carry it out. This could be someone external or someone internal, including the Bank’s relatively new Independent Evaluation Office. The amendment would take away their discretion and make the new Independent Evaluation Office irrelevant.
The Bank’s Independent Evaluation Office reports directly to the non-executive chair of court. A few months ago, it published a review into the Bank’s use of forecasting—a clear example of where an internal review is appropriate. In our opinion, Lord Grabiner’s inquiry into Bank officials’ awareness of market manipulation in the foreign exchange market was an example of where an external review was appropriate.
The Bank’s non-executive directors, as we have heard in a previous debate, are selected for their ability to bring new perspectives and experience and to challenge and scrutinise the Bank’s executive. It is right to give them the powers to ensure they are able to fulfil this role. The amendment would send a message that we do not trust the non-executive directors to do their job. For the discretion of those high-quality non-executives to determine what reviews should be carried out and who should carry them out, it would substitute a conveyor belt of external reviews.
Those commissioning a review, whether the court as a whole or the non-executive directors, are best placed to decide whether an internal or external review is most appropriate. The Bill rightly allows that discretion for the whole court and for the non-executives. The amendment would take away that choice, which we think would be bad news for effective oversight. I hope the hon. Member for Leeds East has listened to the arguments. We all agree that the important power in the Bill for the non-executives to act independently to initiate reviews of the banks should not be constrained in this way, and I hope that after due consideration, and after the extremely valuable debate in both Houses, he will withdraw his amendment.
Richard Burgon
We do not intend to divide the Committee on the amendments to clause 3, although I will make one observation. I might get the quote wrong, but I remember a line in Shakespeare’s “Julius Caesar”:
“I come to bury Caesar, not to praise him.”
The oversight committee was praised by the Minister, but now, under clause 3, it is to be buried. It was praised by the Minister in response to an intervention by my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw, and now we see that it is about to be buried, which we regret. We welcome the concessions that have been made. We do not wish to press the amendment, but we reserve the right to return to these issues on Report. I also point out that the Internal Evaluation Office can continue, tasked by the court. The amendment refers to decisions by non-executive directors. Internal evaluation is the Bank marking its own homework, which should worry us all. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Harriett Baldwin
The clause gives the oversight functions previously delegated to the oversight committee, which has been a sub-committee of the court, to the full court. What do we gain by making the oversight functions the responsibility of the whole court? We want to keep those functions, which we all agree are important, and now every member of the court, executive and non-executive, can be held to account for the use of those functions. Should something go wrong, no member of court could ever claim that the oversight functions were not part of their job. They will now rightly be everyone’s responsibility.
We have heard how that arrangement was endorsed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chichester on Second Reading, but it is worth harking back to what the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards recommended when it set up the oversight committee. In its report, the commission endorsed the Treasury Committee’s recommendation that the Bank’s board should be responsible for conducting the ex-post reviews of the Bank’s performance and we believe that that is precisely what the Bill will achieve. The commission went further—I am sure that hon. Members will have read its report before arriving this morning. On page 482, the commission rejected the oversight committee created in the 2012 Act. The commission denounced the committee and despaired that
“It, rather than the Court as a whole, will be responsible for monitoring the Bank’s response to, and implementation of, the recommendations of any review it commissions.”
It is therefore important to stress that, through the Bill, the court as a whole will be made responsible for ensuring oversight of the Bank.
We have also talked about how the clause will enable full and frank discussion involving both the executive and the non-executive majority on how best to exercise the court’s oversight functions. The non-executives bring challenge, scrutiny and outside experience while the executive minority provides the in-depth knowledge of the Bank’s operations. By abolishing the oversight committee, we bring the court closer to the model envisaged by the Treasury Committee, which called for: a board with powers to conduct ex-post reviews of the Bank’s performance; board members to be authorised to see all the papers submitted to the MPC and the FPC; and the board to be responsible for reviewing the processes of the Bank’s policy committees.
It is important to emphasise that the Bill protects the ability of those non-executive directors to initiate performance reviews. We do not need them to secure the agreement of a majority of the whole court. Should a majority of non-executives wish to initiate a review, the rest of the court will not be able to block it. The initiators of such a review would determine who should carry it out. It should be someone external or internal, including the Bank’s new Independent Evaluation Office.
The clause safeguards the non-executives’ oversight of the Bank and provides additional protection against the emergence of groupthink. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4
Functions of non-executive directors
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Harriett Baldwin
I can canter right through the clause, which requires the court to establish a sub-committee of at least three non-executives to determine the remuneration of the Governor and deputy governors. Clearly, we would not want the executive to set its own pay, so to require that that power be delegated to at least three non-executives brings the legislative requirements for the Bank’s remuneration committee in line with UK corporate governance code. The current remuneration committee has four members.
Richard Burgon
I too will be brief. I will not be cantering as I know very little about horses, but as we have already discussed non-executive directors in the debate on our amendment to clause 1, I have nothing further to add.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Financial stability strategy
Harriett Baldwin
This will be more of a trot—[Interruption.] There are no Trots opposite me today, obviously.
Clause 5 will provide the court of directors with an express power to delegate the production of the financial stability strategy within the Bank. Subsection (3) makes it clear that the court retains the ultimate responsibility for any delegated duty or power, including its duties in relation to the financial stability strategy. The clause will allow the Bank to utilise its internal expertise to produce the strategy, while maintaining a clear line of accountability to the court. The drafting reflects the discussion in the other place, where it was felt that the Government’s initial proposal lacked sufficient clarity. Those concerns were addressed by the Government amendments that bring us the clause as it stands today. I hope that the Committee agrees that the clause will afford the Bank the necessary flexibility when producing the strategy while ensuring that the court will be held to account for its contents. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Richard Burgon
In the debates on the clause both on Second Reading and in Committee in the Lords, it was argued that it should not simply confer on the Bank the power to set the financial stability strategy. The original proposal was vague, but although it was subsequently clarified by the Government amendment that conferred the power on the court of directors, the Opposition are not convinced that that is sufficient.
The impact assessment says:
“At present, the Bank’s financial stability strategy is set by the Court after consultation with the FPC…and HMT.”
It goes on to say that making the Bank responsible for setting the strategy and allowing the court to delegate its production within the Bank will ensure that the court is responsible for the running of the Bank and the Bank’s policy committees are responsible for making policy. The clause does not make it clear exactly what the financial stability strategy is supposed to be. All it does is create a power and impose the responsibility to create such a strategy relating to systemic risk in the UK financial system.
I shall repeat a concern raised by my colleague Lord Tunnicliffe regarding the financial stability strategy, because the response in the other place was not sufficient. Lord Tunnicliffe highlighted how a five-page strategy document was produced in 2013; it was then revised and published in the 2014-15 report, wherein it had been reduced to one column. In the Bank’s 2015-16 report, there was no mention of a financial stability strategy in the court’s ownership. Will the Minister confirm the importance of the financial stability strategy? It should be clear who is responsible for such a strategy.
Clause 5 creates a problem. A future financial stability strategy will emerge from somewhere within the Bank of England. It would be preferable if the people who are to be directly responsible for its production were identified in the Bill, rather than responsibility being conferred on the court with powers to delegate elsewhere. It would make most sense if the people made responsible for producing the strategy were the members of the Financial Policy Committee, as we have set out in new clause 6, which we will discuss later.
John Mann
The debate on the clause is very important, because the little-discussed danger is that we are creating an all-powerful Governor who determines, in his or her ultimate wisdom, a financial stability strategy for the country—as if everything will then be fine.
The current Governor obviously has a bit more time on his hands because interest rates have not risen since 2009. The MPC, with its monthly meetings having gone down to eight a year, has not had a great deal to do other than maintain the status quo. In some ways, that is precisely the problem that was there previously. Before the 2008 crisis the Governor was responsive—looking at things, making speeches about what had happened in the past month or two and trying to tweak the system—and examination of the underlying problems in the system, in the sector and on occasion in the economy as well simply did not happen. The danger is that we again become complacent about such things. That is precisely why the Treasury Committee was keen to see an enhanced and powerful court of directors taking responsibility. It would be useful to have a clear statement from the Minister, endorsed by Parliament, that the model being created is not that of the all-powerful Governor, and nor is it one that we expect to see in future.
The Treasury Committee is a wonderful body, with great membership over the years and reasonable membership even to this day, but a clear message about what is expected of it by Parliament would be valuable: the Committee, on behalf of Parliament, is expected to hold the court to account properly and effectively. That has not been the case over the past decade. The chair of court has appeared, but the non-execs have been invisible. With the court having a more important role, it is critical that the Treasury Committee be given a clear indication by Parliament that it is expected to give a reasonable amount of its time to holding the court to account publicly for the new powers, whether the Committee likes it or not, or does it joyously or reluctantly.
It will be useful to hear from the Minister about those two points, so that we get her views on the record.
George Kerevan
In itself, the clause is innocuous. It is a tidying-up operation, but lurking beneath it is a danger. Standing back from the restructuring of the policy committees of the Bank, we appear to be ending up with an exercise in bureaucratic symmetry—a committee to do this and a committee to do that, micro, macro, prudential or supervision, and the Monetary Policy Committee. The different committees are not supposed to talk to each other, doing discrete policy. That looks all right—someone is doing it—but what we are in fact ending up with is what I want to underline to the Minister and, through her, to the Treasury team.
The danger is that in creating bureaucratic symmetry, we have not got very far in creating a workable regulatory regime that is robust enough to meet the next crisis. One of the problems is that we are creating a silo for fiscal stability—basically, checking when a bubble arises and stopping it—and a silo for monetary policy, but the two are not talking to each other, so we are in danger of creating conflicts between the two main policy committees.
It is perfectly possible for the Monetary Policy Committee to go in a separate direction. At the moment it is refusing to raise interest rates, but that is leading to the committee in charge of fiscal policy and financial stability starting to discuss whether it should use its financial buffers to slow down a bubble in the housing market. It is possible, but a bit crazy, for the two different committees to take two different stances when the whole point of putting financial stability and monetary policy under the same roof—the Bank—was meant to be a co-ordinated policy.
Assigning responsibility for financial stability to the Financial Policy Committee does not get us off the hook of someone somewhere laying down broad policy objectives. The MPC has broad monetary policy objectives—I think that in the present climate of deflation, they are probably the wrong ones—but the FPC has very vague guidelines as to what it should be doing, and so suddenly we discover, in default, that the only person in the land who is actually overseeing all the different policy options is the Governor himself, and he is not even getting clear enough direction from the Treasury. By all means support clause 5 as a tidying-up operation, but it still leaves big holes in terms of who is actually laying down the major policy directions for the committee.
Harriett Baldwin
Opposition Members have suggested that the Bill, in and of itself, makes a change to the power and importance of the role of the Governor of the Bank of England. I would submit that the Governor of the Bank of England is an incredibly powerful and important appointment, but I would not say that the statutory powers of the Governor are increased from their already elevated level by the Bill. Obviously, he is the one who has a role across all the different committees, but he has always had a very important role.
The hon. Member for Leeds East is absolutely right to highlight the fact that in the other place there was extensive debate on the precise wording of the clause. Convincing arguments were made to change it and the Government tabled amendments to provide the court with an express power to delegate determination of the strategy. That is a change from the original intention after the consultation undertaken in the summer. To be clear, it will be for the court, as the governing body of the Bank, to decide who is best placed to set and review the strategy.
The hon. Member for Bassetlaw asked specifically about the role of the Treasury Committee in continuing to scrutinise the role played by the Bank of England, the Governor and the court. I see nothing before us today that would change the current arrangements whereby the Committee has an important role in taking evidence.
Hon. Members asked about the co-ordination between the Monetary Policy Committee and the Financial Policy Committee. They are independent committees with separate objectives. It is important that the Governor sits on both committees and is able to see what is going on in both committees, but we think it right to strike a balance to ensure that each of the committees remains focused on its individual remit while fostering interaction between monetary and macroprudential policy.
There has been a good debate in both Houses, illustrating the value of line-by-line scrutiny. I think that we have landed in the right place and I commend clause 5 to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Monetary Policy Committee: membership
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 6—Financial Policy Committee: procedure—
“In paragraph 11 of Schedule 2A to the Bank of England Act 1998, after subsection (7) there is inserted—
‘(7A) The Financial Policy Committee shall inter alia at least each year commission and publish promptly external research into the level of systemic risk to the stability of the financial system in the UK.
(7B) As soon as reasonably practicable after each meeting of the Financial Policy Committee, the Bank shall publish a record of the meeting before the end of the period of 6 weeks beginning with the day of the meeting.””
Harriett Baldwin
It will be useful to consider the new clause, tabled by the hon. Members for Leeds East and for Wolverhampton South.
Clause 6 brings the Financial Policy Committee into line with the Monetary Policy Committee and the Prudential Regulation Committee. It makes the Financial Policy Committee a policy committee of the Bank, rather than a sub-committee of court.
Richard Burgon
As the Minister explained, the Financial Policy Committee is to be transformed into a committee of the Bank of England. As she explained, it had existed previously as a sub-committee of the court. Again, we see what one commentator, Professor Alastair Hudson, described as a spaghetti of committees. Perhaps we need to look at simplifying them so that the people we represent can understand better the system that is intended to serve them.
The FPC should be a body that takes a much more visible role when there are systemic challenges to the UK financial system. The problem that is created by the so-called spaghetti of committees issue is that it is unclear when and if it will relate to finance as opposed to economic policy more generally, and when it will relate to systemic risk rather than simply to the solvency risk associated with an individual financial institution. The spaghetti of committees issue means that the individual bodies have to fight for their role within the regulatory structure, instead of having their regulatory role clearly established by statute.
We believe that considerable thought should be given to how the FPC could play a more active role in the creation of policy relating to systemic risk. At one level, the body that is supposed to analyse the highest levels of risk to the UK economy ought to be one that regularly takes the lead in relation to policy formulation in that context. The Minister explained and reiterated quite rightly how many external views are published, but it would be helpful for the economy as a whole if the views of the members of the FPC were given greater publicity.
Our intention in proposing new clause 6 is to propose requirements on the FPC to regularly publish external research into the level of systemic risk to the stability of the financial system in the UK. I note the points that the Minister has made on that. Furthermore, as we seek greater transparency, we have again sought publication of a record of the meetings of the Financial Policy Committee within a reasonable timeframe. I am delighted that the Minister has clarified that that is indeed the case, and that that takes place within six weeks. I am reassured by much of what she has said regarding the provisions of section 9W of the 1998 Act on research and surveys and the provisions of section 9U on the publication of that research. Given that, and given the comments made by the Minister, we will not press new clause 6.
John Mann
The shadow Minister is such a moderate these days. I am feeling nervous, because new clause 6 is an excellent amendment that I wholeheartedly endorse. If we look at the FPC’s membership, they have huge experience of being in companies that have not paid a great deal of tax in the United Kingdom, so some expertise is brought to bear. The multinational structure of the UK economy, lauded as being the most open in the world, is also a potential systemic risk. The tax avoidance scandal demonstrates the scale of that potential systemic risk, not only in terms of the amount of money we are not getting in—that is an ongoing problem—but in terms of the structure of our economy.
For example, if some of the commentators are right about the response of capital to a British exit from the European Union, and if that coincided with a collapse in the euro, our economy would be vulnerable. The FPC needs the ability to work through the scenarios and the options and to see whether our structures are sufficiently good—I put it to the Minister that they are not and that we remain hugely vulnerable. That is one reason.
The second reason is that our housing market has a perverse structure that is worse than that of any other advanced economy. We have an absurdity that we have not been able to deal with, whereby there is huge housing price inflation in London and the south-east, yet the vast majority of houses we are building are in areas such as mine. They take a long time to sell because there is not a huge amount of demand for that new housing, but there is plenty of land and plenty of people willing to build housing, especially if the Government subsidise it. The Government are pressing for more and more housing, yet at the same time they face a systemic risk in the housing market. That is not a problem created by this Government; it goes back several generations. If the housing bubble were to burst in a range of different ways, that would be a fundamental problem.
The third systemic risk, which we saw in 2008, is the level of indebtedness. It was the American sub-prime market that led to the chain of events that caused the world financial crisis, not a specific collapse in this country, but we are hugely vulnerable. We, as a nation, are far too indebted. What is different now from any time in our history for both the corporate sector and individual households is that interest rates are at a record low. There is therefore a whole generation of people—two generations, in effect—whose expectations and economic behaviour is predicated on permanent low interest rates.
Commentators machinate—the Treasury Committee machinates at great length—about whether there will be a 0.25% increase in interest rates, yet we only need to go back 25 years and they were at 15%. That is part of the systemic risk. We therefore do not want to rely on the same old commentators—the OECD or the IMF—who got it wrong before 2008 and are using the same old paradigms.
The FPC should do precisely what the new clause suggests: ensure robustness in the British system. In a sense, that is the point of the FPC; otherwise, it has no point at all. What is proposed in the new clause is exactly what is needed. Indeed, we probably need more than that, but it is a good start. It will get minds concentrated on the scenarios and the options and, critically, whether the financial culture in this country’s businesses and households is sufficiently understanding to deal with the shock to the system that could come and which, by definition, will be outside our national control. That seems to be the point.
I will end on this point. It is quite a feasible scenario that at 7 o’clock in the evening of 12 March, after the German regional elections, the German media will be announcing the end of Chancellor Merkel. It is also a feasible scenario that the main opposition party—Labour’s sister party, the Social Democratic party—will come an unprecedented fourth. It is being seen as the most significant political day in 50 years in Germany, and it will have a huge immediate impact on the euro and the stability of the eurozone. We do not have an approach to dealing with that, because we presume that such major shocks to the system are not going to come. That is precisely the point of having the FPC and that is why the new clause is such a good one. We ought to be robust.
Harriett Baldwin
I would certainly be very concerned if the hon. Member for Leeds East were developing a reputation as a moderate, not least because that might cause him not to be put forward as a Labour candidate at any future election. That would be a very worrying development. My analysis of his political point of view is that no one in this country could describe him as a moderate. This may be the first occasion on which he has been described as such. “Trot” might have been a more appropriate description of some of his political views, but I digress in an entirely inappropriate way.
I want to respond to some of the points raised and indeed to the important speech made by the hon. Member for Bassetlaw about the fact that the UK is an open economy. Therefore, by its very nature, it is open to economic developments in the rest of the world. He highlighted three topics with which the Financial Policy Committee should rightly be concerned. The first was the importance to financial stability in this country of the UK Government being able to receive tax revenues in order to pay for public services. He will know that it is incredibly important in this regard that we work with other countries and, notably, the OECD on the base erosion and profit shifting work, which is an important matter, perhaps not so much for this Committee but for other Committees in this House. That is an incredibly important issue on which we work internationally.
I reassure the Committee that, in terms of the overall resilience of the UK banking sector today, compared with the resilience at the time of the last shock, it does appear to be increasingly resilient. We would like to put that on record. The aggregate capital ratio, the common equity tier 1 ratio, is currently 12% for the banking system as a whole, which is a full 3.7% higher just since the end of 2013. The major UK banks all came through their stress test with the FPC at the end of last year without being asked to raise more capital. The FPC concluded that the UK banking system would have the capacity to support lending to the real economy even in the context of a severe global economic slowdown triggered by a downturn in the emerging economies.
The hon. Member for Bassetlaw also mentioned the housing market. Again, I think that it would be really valuable for the Committee to put on the record that the Government have granted the FPC powers of direction regarding residential mortgages and are also consulting—I hope that Opposition Members will support this—on extending its remit to cover powers regarding buy-to-let mortgages as well. Those are important points.
The hon. Gentleman also mentioned the rise of private sector borrowing. On that point, we argue that progress has been made to improve the personal financial position of households in the UK. Household debt relative to income has fallen from 168% in 2008 to 142% at the last reading. That includes both mortgage and unsecured debt. The FPC does study these numbers very closely. It stated, the last time that it looked through them, that given the actions that it has taken household indebtedness currently does not pose an imminent threat to financial stability, not least because underwriting standards are currently more prudent than in the past. Of course, however, the FPC must and will continue to monitor the household sector and will take further action if necessary.
George Kerevan
I appreciate the Minister’s overview of the financial markets and how stable they are. Obviously, she has not read the financial press this morning. The whole basis of the international bank resolution regime that we have brought in since 2008 is based on convertible bonds. The convertible bond market has gone berserk in the past two days. Constant default rates on commercial paper covering bonds have spiked by a whole number of points. Let me assure the Minister that the markets are not anywhere near as quiescent as she tells us.
Harriett Baldwin
Again, the hon. Gentleman puts words into my mouth that I did not utter. However, I did want to point out that the FPC looks at the financial sector’s resilience. No one would deny that the markets are going through rough and troubled times, but the FPC’s role is important and I hope he will agree that its powers to look at different aspects of the economy have improved the architecture of financial regulation since the last crisis. I highlight the way in which the Bank of England, as part of its monetary policy remit, has kept inflation as low as it has.
The hon. Member for Leeds East pointed to the “spaghetti” of the Bank’s organisation. I agree that we need clarity to be able to tell our constituents about how the architecture works. I share that objective. The Bill improves the pasta-related shapes of financial architecture. I would argue that the current situation, with a subsidiary and so on, is more like spaghetti. When I was trying to think of an appropriate pasta-related analogy for what the Bill does in establishing new architecture that we can explain to our constituents in simple terms, I came up with the idea of three ravioli—independent, but, importantly, in the same bowl.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7
Monetary Policy Committee: membership
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Harriett Baldwin
With all this talk of food, I was hoping that we might break for lunch. I am not sure what time we will do that, but I will deal with clause 7, which I think will be quite brief. It makes the deputy governor for markets and banking an ex-officio member of the Monetary Policy Committee. Previously, the only ex-officio members of the committee were the Governor, the deputy governor for monetary policy and the deputy governor for financial stability.
As I set out in my remarks on clause 6, following the expansion of the Bank’s responsibilities, the Government and the Bank made a number of new appointments, including the creation of the post of deputy governor for markets and banking. It is currently held by Dame Minouche Shafik and she sits on the MPC as one of the two members appointed by the Governor of the Bank of England after consultation with the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The clause formalises that arrangement and ensures that expertise for monetary policy operations is maintained on the committee.
The clause also reduces the number of members of the committee who may be appointed by the Governor of the Bank of England from two to one, ensuring that the committee’s current balance is preserved. It provides that anyone appointed as a member of the committee by the Governor must carry out monetary policy analysis in the Bank and it gives that member the title of chief economist of the Bank.
In addition, the clause formalises existing practice in relation to conflicts of interest by introducing a statutory requirement for the Chancellor to take account of the interests of potential appointees in deciding whether they would be able to do the job. I do not think that the clause will be controversial.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)
(8 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Harriett Baldwin)
The clause is the last one to do with the governance of the Bank of England; the others we covered this morning.
The clause amends the existing statutory requirement to publish the Monetary Policy Committee minutes within six weeks of the occurrence of the meeting so that they will be published as soon as is reasonably practicable. That, too, was a recommendation of the Warsh review, which set out that it would improve “effective communication” of the MPC’s policy judgment and stated:
“Publishing the details of the vote contemporaneously would bolster individual members’ independence and accountability.”
The MPC accepted the recommendation and since last August has published the minutes of its policy meeting at the same time as its policy decision. The clause simply formalises that arrangement, enhancing the transparency and accountability of MPC practices.
The clause also reduces the number of times that the Monetary Policy Committee is required to meet each year, changing the requirement to meet at least once a month to a requirement to meet at least eight times in each calendar year and at least once in every 10-week period. That, too, is implementing a recommendation of the Warsh review, which concluded that the change would bring the Bank’s practice into line with that of
“other leading advanced-economy central banks”
and support effective policy making.
The clause also amends the quorum rules in line with the changes to the MPC membership that I set out in my remarks on clause 7. Finally, clause 8 formalises processes and strengthens procedures on conflicts of interest for the MPC that are already delivered in practice.
Richard Burgon (Leeds East) (Lab)
Clearly, the decisions of the MPC are important for the financial markets. In essence, those markets may react immediately upon seeing the detailed minutes of the MPC meetings. A system in which all discussion between committee members was made public would be the ideal, because financial markets and, importantly, the general public would then understand the discussions being held behind closed doors. Running as a distant second to that is the less desirable policy of simply producing minutes of the meeting. The minutes, however, record only a general sense of the participants’ contributions. However, we have tabled no amendments to the clauses on the Monetary Policy Committee while the former committee member David Blanchflower conducts a review commissioned by the shadow Chancellor. We look forward to returning to debate the MPC in another forum at a future date, when we will be pursuing our amendments on the measure.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Audit
Richard Burgon
I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 9, page 7, line 15, at end insert—
“(6A) The Comptroller may enquire into the Bank’s success in achieving its stated policy objectives but shall not enquire into the desirability of such objectives having been set.
(6B) Reports by the Comptroller into the functioning of the Bank shall be published promptly unless in the opinion of the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons such publication would be likely materially adversely to affect the stability or functioning of the UK’s financial or banking system.”
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 21, in clause 11, page 11, line 30, at beginning insert—
“Subject to sections 7E(3) and 7ZA(6A) of the Bank of England Act 1998,”
I remind the Committee that if amendment 14 is withdrawn or negatived, amendment 21 falls.
Richard Burgon
Here we turn to the role of the National Audit Office and the new proposals to afford the NAO power to investigate the functions of the Bank. This is a positive development, which we welcome, but it is important to get the legislation right and to ensure that no loopholes are left to prevent the NAO from conducting its necessary work.
The Comptroller and Auditor General was clearly concerned about the proposals in the Bill as published that would have allowed the court of directors a veto over the new powers for the NAO. There was significant discussion, however, at the Treasury Committee and at all stages in the other place. At the Treasury Committee Andrew Bailey said that the issue was to do with
“getting the boundary right between what is appropriate, in my view, which is value for money in terms of the way we run the Bank of England, and questioning the basis of monetary policy, which would not be in my view appropriate.”
Our amendment fits in with that, though I expect that the Government will disagree with us.
The draft memorandum of understanding that the Minister provided the other day stated that the comptroller does not expect to second-guess expert discussions by Bank officials. The amendment asserts that the comptroller may inquire into the Bank’s success in achieving its policy objectives. We believe that that does not encroach beyond the boundaries of questioning the merits of policy decisions, but would assist the National Audit Office in ascertaining whether the Bank is delivering value for money. Amendment 21, which is consequential on amendment 14, would require that reports by the comptroller into the functioning of the Bank be published promptly to allow relevant Select Committees, should they wish, as well as other Members of the House, to make an assessment of the National Audit Office’s findings.
Harriett Baldwin
We are moving on to the part of the Bill that covers the role of the National Audit Office and the publication of its reports. One of the Bill’s objectives is to enhance the Bank of England’s accountability and clauses 9 to 11, which allow the National Audit Office to conduct value-for-money examinations of the Bank for the first time, are key in that respect.
The independence of the Bank and of the National Audit Office, which are two vital public bodies, was carefully considered in developing the arrangements, and I believe that the clauses in the Bill strike the appropriate balance. It is probably best if I first set out some background on the important role of the National Audit Office’s value-for-money studies in supporting transparency to Parliament and the public.
The National Audit Office scrutinises public spending on behalf of Parliament. It reviews whether public bodies have used public money efficiently, effectively and with economy and makes reports on those issues to Parliament. In carrying out its work, the NAO is precluded by the National Audit Act 1983 from reviewing the merits of policy objectives. That is the case in relation to all the bodies with which it currently engages and the Bill ensures that the same restriction will apply in relation to its oversight of the Bank.
That is an important point in relation to amendment 14, which I believe is unnecessary. The amendment states that
“The Comptroller may enquire into the Bank’s success in achieving its stated policy objectives but shall not enquire into the desirability of such objectives having been set.”
The Bill as drafted will have that exact effect. The comptroller will be free to question the Bank’s success in achieving its policy objectives, but not the merits of the objectives. The Bill reinforces that by setting out specific areas in which the NAO cannot question the merits of the Bank’s policy decisions. That extra protection, which has been agreed to by both the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Governor, reflects the crucial importance of protecting the independence of the Bank’s policy decisions.
In all of those areas, the Bill will allow the NAO to examine the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of policy decisions and of the resources underpinning them, but not the merits of the decisions themselves. Specifically, the Bill carves out the merits of policy decisions taken by the Monetary Policy Committee, the Financial Policy Committee and the Prudential Regulation Committee, the merits of policy decisions taken by the body within the Bank responsible for the supervision of financial market infrastructures and the merits of policy decisions taken by the body within the Bank responsible for the exercise of its resolution functions, but where the Bank has used its statutory resolution powers in relation to a financial institution in difficulty, the NAO would be able to consider any resolution policy decisions relating to the institution concerned. That is particularly important given that the Bank is now the resolution authority for the UK and has primary operational responsibility for financial crisis management. In future, therefore, the NAO will be able to examine the role of the Bank in interventions like Northern Rock—it is a shame that the hon. Member for Bassetlaw is not in his place to hear that exciting news. That bespoke arrangement recognises the unique and crucial role that the Bank plays in UK economic policy. I believe that it strikes the right balance and will bring about a significant improvement in the Bank’s accountability.
The second part of amendment 14 would require the comptroller to publish reports promptly, unless the Treasury Committee judges that publication was likely to have a material adverse effect on financial stability. Again, I submit that that is unnecessary. Adequate protections are already built into the legislation to prevent the disclosure of certain types of sensitive information. Proposed new section 7H of the Bank of England Act 1998, inserted by clause 11, will ensure that the comptroller is subject to the same limitations on disclosure as the FCA in relation to information received by the Bank. Those limitations are set out in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and will restrict the NAO from disclosing information held by the Bank for the purposes of monetary policy; financial operations intended to support financial institutions for purposes of financial stability; and the provision of private banking services.
Furthermore, the subject of sensitive information is covered by the memorandum of understanding between the NAO and the Bank, which ensures that there is a codified agreement between them on how sensitive information should be treated. It makes it clear that there may be instances in which the Bank is prohibited from disclosing information. Where that is the case, it will explain why that is the case to the comptroller. The memorandum also makes it clear that there may be situations in which the Bank is able to disclose information to the comptroller but legal restrictions apply to onward disclosure or publication.
In terms of the timing of publication, Parliament has rightly delegated to the comptroller discretion over the content of NAO reports and the timing of their publication. He acts independently on Parliament’s behalf, and it is important that he is able to use his judgment on how Parliament and the public are best served.
I hope that I can reassure the Committee by saying that once the comptroller has signed off a report for publication, there is an in-built incentive to lay it in Parliament and publish it within a short timeframe. Prompt publication mitigates the risk of the report’s conclusions being overtaken by events. Moreover, the process from completing the report to publication is very simple. Typically, it takes between two and four days, but it can be speeded up if required.
Amendment 21 seeks to disapply the restrictions on the disclosure of specially protected information that the National Audit Office has received from the Bank for certain reports by the Comptroller and Auditor General. As I have said, information is specially protected from time to time if it is held by the Bank for the purposes of monetary policy or for financial operations supporting financial institutions to maintain financial stability. A good example, which we heard about this morning, is emergency liquidity assistance.
The reason why restrictions are placed on the disclosure of such information is that its publication could harm the financial stability of the UK or adversely affect the Bank’s monetary policy operations. A report by the NAO on the extent to which the Bank has achieved its financial stability objective could, in fact, be destabilising if, for example, it revealed market-sensitive information about financial operations undertaken by the Bank to preserve financial stability in a particular period.
I trust that all Committee members will agree that those restrictions on disclosure are entirely appropriate and, indeed, vital. I urge the hon. Gentleman not to press his amendment.
Richard Burgon
My colleagues and I have listened to what the Minister has said. She went, with characteristic detail, into the Government’s position on this matter. My hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw, who is not in his place, scolded or praised me—I do not know which—for moderation earlier. We did not press our amendment to a Division on that occasion, but having listened to what the Minister has said, and because transparency is a key principle when it comes to the work of the Bank of England and we want to expand that transparency, we seek a Division on amendment 14.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Richard Burgon
I beg to move amendment 15, in clause 10, page 7, line 37, at end insert—
“(6A) The Treasury must lay before Parliament a copy of any report it receives under subsection (5) within one calendar month of receipt.”
As the Bill reads, clause 10 applies where the Treasury gives an indemnity or guarantee to the Bank in respect of an activity or series of activities that it undertakes. Our amendment 15 simply seeks to maximise transparency and accountability with regard to this by requiring the Treasury to publish a copy of such a report within a reasonable timeframe. We hope that the Government will accept this amendment.
Harriett Baldwin
If I may, I will speak to clause 10 at the same time as speaking to amendment 15. Clause 10 obviously defines the process which will deliver greater oversight of activities undertaken by the bank or a company of the bank, where that activity has been indemnified by the Treasury. In such circumstances, the Treasury takes on the risk of the activity and will bear any associated losses. It is right that the Bill allows for full NAO oversight of these activities.
The occasions on which the Treasury grants an explicit indemnity to the Bank of England are very rare. Examples include the provision of emergency liquidity during the financial crisis and, more recently, the asset purchase facility, which is the vehicle by which the Bank of England has purchased £375 billion of Government bonds to deliver the Monetary Policy Committee’s quantitative easing policy. Clearly, these are very different examples. The former relates to an operation undertaken on the Bank’s balance sheet to provide assistance to an institution in distress. The latter case is an example of an activity undertaken by a subsidiary company of the Bank. Given the Bank’s varied role, it is difficult to predict every circumstance in which an indemnity of a Bank activity might be considered necessary in the future. Clause 10 allows for discretion to be applied to each case of indemnified activity. In some circumstances a financial audit may not be required. However, the objective of this clause is clear. It will facilitate greater accountability of indemnified activities where this is appropriate.
Amendment 15 would require the Treasury to lay a report on activity indemnified by the Treasury before Parliament one calendar month after receiving it from the Bank. Let me say first that Treasury indemnities of specific Bank activities are very rare. I have cited a couple of examples. In the example of the provision of emergency liquidity during the financial crisis, clearly the information being shared between the Bank and the Treasury would have been extremely sensitive. It would have included commercially confidential material and potentially information that put at risk the stability of the wider financial sector. It is clear from just that one example that publishing a report of this kind could really work against the public interest in the future, especially if the Treasury were bound by a specific statutory deadline. The Treasury must retain that flexibility over whether and when such reports should be published. I urge the hon. Gentleman to think hard about that and withdraw the amendment, while urging the Committee to agree that clause 10 stand part of the Bill.
Richard Burgon
I mentioned earlier the possibility of compromise on the part of the Government when it comes to balancing the protection of information they believe needs to be confidential because of financial risk with the requirement for transparency. I mentioned the practice of having some matters under the line and some over the line in local authorities and on boards of school governors. I encourage the Government to think further about that possibility in relation to the areas where transparency has been requested. We reserve the right to return to the matter on Report but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 11
Examinations and reviews
Harriett Baldwin
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 11, page 9, line 11, at end insert—
“(b) the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which a Bank company has used its resources in discharging its functions.”
Amendments 1, 2 and 3 extend inserted section 7D of the Bank of England Act 1998 to enable the Comptroller and Auditor General to examine the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of Bank companies, as well as the Bank itself. “Bank company” is defined by amendment 3.
Harriett Baldwin
Mr Wilson, you will have to bear with me, because we have quite a few Opposition amendments to this clause to cover and I will seek your guidance on when you would like me to touch on those. I will start with Government amendment 1 and move on to Government amendments 2 to 6.
The Chair
Can I just ask you to stick to the first group of the Government amendments? We can then move on after that debate.
Harriett Baldwin
Thank you, Mr Wilson. That is what I am trying to do. I am just buying some time while I go through great wodges of paper here, to ensure that I do not rush ahead.
I will speak to Government amendments 1 to 6 on National Audit Office oversight of Bank subsidiaries. As we know, the Bill makes provision for the first time for the NAO to initiate its value-for-money studies of the Bank of England. As we have discussed, that delivers an important increase in the accountability of the Bank and its operations. The intention in the Bill was to grant the NAO these powers to the Bank in the broadest sense, subject to the bespoke policy carve-out, which also features in the Bill, protecting the independence of the Bank’s policy decisions, but as the Bill is drafted, the NAO’s powers to conduct value-for-money examinations in relation to companies owned by the Bank differ from its powers to conduct value-for-money examinations of the Bank itself. That was not the Government’s policy intention. The amendments will ensure that the NAO’s value-for-money powers apply on the same terms to the Bank, its subsidiaries and other Bank companies that are indemnified by the Treasury.
I will briefly outline the inconsistencies that arise through the current drafting. First, the NAO would have powers to conduct value-for-money examinations of Bank companies that have been indemnified by the Treasury only where the Treasury has directed the company concerned to send its accounts to the NAO, as provided for in section 7C of the Bank of England Act 1998, inserted by clause 10 of this Bill, and the NAO’s examination would be made under the powers given to it in section 6 of the National Audit Act 1983. Those NAO examinations would not, therefore, be subject to the bespoke policy carve-out that has been defined in the Bill. Secondly, under the Bill as drafted, subsidiaries or companies of the Bank that do not benefit from a Treasury indemnity would not be within the scope of NAO examination.
I hope that the Committee agrees that we should make the NAO’s power to initiate value-for-money examinations applicable on the same terms across the Bank, its subsidiaries and other companies indemnified by the Treasury in which the Bank has a minority interest. The amendments seek to do just that.
Richard Burgon
Having considered this matter and listened to the Minister’s detailed explanation, I can confirm that we will not oppose amendment 1.
Amendment 1 agreed to.
Amendments made: 2, in clause 11, page 9, line 12, leave out
“of the Bank (however described)”
and insert
“(however described) of the Bank or the Bank company”
Amendment 3, in clause 11, page 10, line 3, at end insert—
““Bank company” means—
(a) a company which is a subsidiary undertaking of the Bank, within the meaning of section 1162 of the Companies Act 2006;
(b) a company not within paragraph (a) in respect of which a direction under section 7C(2) has effect;”
Amendment 4, in clause 11, page 10, line 16, at end insert “or a Bank company” —(Harriett Baldwin.)
This amendment extends inserted section 7D(11) of the Bank of England Act 1998 (which provides that section 6 of the National Audit Act 1983 does not apply to the Bank) to Bank companies. Section 6 provides for economy, efficiency and effectiveness examinations by the Comptroller and Auditor General.
Richard Burgon
I beg to move amendment 16, in clause 11, page 10, line 19, at end insert
“and the Comptroller must lay a copy of the first memorandum of understanding to be prepared, and of any subsequent revisions, before both Houses of Parliament”.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 17, in clause 11, page 10, line 26, after “procedure” insert
“which may be reviewed by the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons”
Amendment 18, in clause 11, page 10, line 32, at end insert—
‘(3) The Comptroller must lay before Parliament a copy of the Memorandum within one calendar month of its preparation.”
Amendment 19, in clause 11, page 10, line 32, at end insert—
‘(4) The Treasury Committee of the House of Commons may in its absolute discretion enquire into the genesis and contents of the Memorandum.”
Richard Burgon
There was significant discussion of the extent to which the Comptroller and Auditor General is to be involved in the audits of the Bank during the Treasury Committee autumn hearings attended by the Chancellor and the Governor of the Bank of England and at various stages of the Bill’s passage through the other place. From statements made by the National Audit Office’s chair, Lord Bichard, and from the Chairs of the Treasury Committee and the Public Accounts Committee, I am aware that positive movement is believed to have been made following significant early criticism.
On Report in the House of Lords, the Government spokesperson said that
“to protect the Bank’s independent status the Bill provides for a policy carve-out from the scope of NAO value-for-money reviews”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 15 December 2015; Vol. 767, c. 1996.]
and that there had been significant discussions between the Bank, the NAO and the Treasury. We welcome the removal of the original proposal to allow the court a veto over NAO investigations. I thank the Minister for forwarding to my office yesterday a copy of the memorandum of understanding being discussed by the Bank and the NAO. I understand that it may be approved or finalised in the days ahead. I stated on Second Reading that I had written to the Minister asking that the memorandum be published during the lifetime of the Bill, and she acknowledged in her response that that would be her preference, so I am pleased that that has been possible.
I believe the draft memorandum has been circulated only to members of this Bill Committee—I hope the Minister will correct me if I am wrong and it has been seen anywhere else. We tabled amendment 16 to require that the memorandum be published and laid before both Houses of Parliament, which it appears will now happen. I also recognise that amendment 18 is somewhat repetitious on this point. We may require further discussion on the draft memorandum on Report. When it appears, it will have been finalised or approved by all parties to it. My initial reading of the draft memorandum is that it does not move us on significantly, in that both sides are able to publish letters that set out whether they agree with each other’s proposals to carry out or refuse an investigation, but there is no clear information in the memorandum on how such a dispute would be resolved. Of course, resolution is key in such matters.
We tabled amendments 17, 19 and 20 to allow for further scrutiny of the dispute procedure. It is our view that a role for the Treasury Committee could be a useful one, where such a dispute was left unresolved and it was clear the procedure was not working.
George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP)
I speak as a member of the Treasury Committee, although obviously I do not speak for the Committee. I remind the Minister of the Committee’s view that one of our principal roles is to protect value for money on behalf of the taxpayer. Regulatory bodies are often, for very good reasons, concerned with regulating and may be remiss when it comes to consideration of value for money. This is particularly important because regulatory functions have to be carried out effectively, and there is a cost in terms of resources: sometimes regulators do not have these resources, and sometimes resources are put in in the wrong way. The Select Committee is keen to ensure that the auditor plays a distinct and effective role. I underline to the Minister that, regardless of formal decisions here, the Treasury Committee has an ongoing brief to ensure that the relationship between the Bank and the auditor runs smoothly and the auditor is allowed to do his business.
Harriett Baldwin
I thank the hon. Member for Leeds East for his good summary of the deliberations so far on this. As I said in my letter to him last week, I did push both the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Governor on whether or not they would allow the draft memorandum of understanding to be shared with this Committee. I confirm that yesterday we were able to send copies of that draft memorandum of understanding to all members of this Committee, the Chair of the Treasury Committee and the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, which of course scrutinises and works most closely with the National Audit Office. That is the extent to which the draft memorandum of understanding has been shared at this point.
The expectation, as I understand it, is that the court will meet on Thursday, and that is the forum in which amendments to the current draft may be suggested or approved. I assure hon. Members that as soon as we have the final version, the memorandum can be more widely disseminated—certainly in time for Report and Third Reading. Amendments 16 and 18 are therefore not necessary.
Amendments 17 and 19 would give the Treasury Committee express powers to consider various aspects of the memorandum. I am sure that the hon. Members for East Lothian and for Bassetlaw know that the Treasury Committee already has the power to examine all matters connected with the policy and administration of the Bank of England and can choose what inquiries it undertakes. In addition, the National Audit Office works closely with the Public Accounts Committee, so one can imagine conversations taking place between the Chairs of those two very important Committees about what aspects they want to look at. If the Treasury Committee or indeed the Public Accounts Committee determines that it would be appropriate to conduct an inquiry into the memorandum of understanding, it could do so. The amendments might suggest that the powers of the Select Committees to conduct inquiries are in some way limited to those powers that have expressly been given to them in this primary legislation. That would be an unfortunate suggestion, so I hope that the amendments will not be pressed.
The hon. Member for Leeds East asked about arbitration in a dispute resolution process. The memorandum of understanding sets out the dispute resolution process, as required by the Bill, but we should not expect that process to be called upon. We expect that the Comptroller and Auditor General would be able to reach an agreement with the Bank regarding his work, in the same way that he does with all the other public bodies with which he engages. The dispute resolution process set out does not call upon any independent arbiter. The draft document simply indicates that the Bank and the Comptroller and Auditor General are both content with attempting to resolve any disputes between themselves, and that they commit to the publication of their difference of view where any disputes remain unresolved. If this is a framework with which they are both content, I do not see any need to involve a third party in that process. When we have received the final version of the memorandum of understanding and are considering the Bill again on Report, I am sure that we will return to this question. On that basis, I urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.
Richard Burgon
Again, I welcome the Minister’s confirmation that the court will consider the draft memorandum further on Thursday and that it will be approved or amended that day. I also welcome the fact that the final version will be more widely circulated in time for Third Reading and Report. We recognise that events have overtaken our amendments and therefore will not pursue them. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Richard Burgon
I beg to move amendment 20, in clause 11, page 11, line 6, after “must” insert “promptly”.
We wish to make the point that we need the report to be published promptly. Otherwise, for example, the Treasury Committee, with all its expertise, cannot review using its powers, as the Minister has just referred to.
Harriett Baldwin
With regard to amendment 20 and the Treasury value-for-money reports, new section 7F of the Bank of England Act 1998, which is inserted by clause 11, preserves the existing power for the Treasury to commission value-for-money reviews of the way the functions of the Prudential Regulation Authority are exercised by the Bank. There is an equivalent power for the Treasury to commission such reviews of the functions of the Financial Conduct Authority. Taken together, these important powers ensure that the Treasury can carry out cross-cutting reviews of the operation of financial regulation in this country.
Amendment 20 would require the Treasury promptly to lay before Parliament any reports it receives following reviews into the PRA. It is, of course, vital that those reports are made available to Parliament to inform its deliberations into the regulation of financial services. Indeed, the Treasury is already required to lay reports into the operation of the PRA and the FCA before Parliament and to publish them. I assure the hon. Gentleman that the Treasury takes its obligations to this House very seriously and is concerned to fulfil them in good time. I am happy to confirm that any such reports will indeed be promptly laid before the House. There is no need for that requirement to be in the Bill.
Richard Burgon
I welcome the Minister putting on the record her desire for the reports to be published promptly. I would welcome it even more if she would, therefore, accept the amendment in order to insert the word “promptly” into statute. That would be one of many pieces of history that I am sure she will make in her role of shadow City Minister.
Richard Burgon
I do apologise for the role reversal. I was even called a moderate today so we are getting confused, although I am most moderate. I invite the Minister to reconsider her position on the amendment. Or shall I assume, unless she intervenes, that the matter is closed?
Harriett Baldwin
I am afraid the hon. Gentleman has not convinced me at this stage. I am sure we will return to this on Report.
Richard Burgon
Like the Minister, we have put on record our thoughts on this matter. Although we reserve the right to return to it at a later stage, we will not be pushing for a vote, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments made: 5, in clause 11, page 11, line 20, leave out “only”.
Amendments 5 and 6 amend inserted section 7G of the Bank of England Act 1998 to provide that where the Comptroller is examining a Bank company under inserted section 7D, he will have access to documents and information held by that company and its auditors.
Amendment 6, in clause 11, page 11, line 24, at end insert—
‘( ) In the case of an examination under section 7D(1)(b), subsection (1) also applies to documents in the custody or under the control of—
(a) the company to which the examination relates;
(b) the auditor or auditors of that company.”—(Harriett Baldwin.)
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Harriett Baldwin
At this point I will simply commend clause 11 to the Committee. I cannot be certain of the Committee’s enthusiasm, but I cannot imagine that anyone disagrees with a clause that will increase the Bank’s accountability while protecting its independent status and recognising the complex nature of its activities. The clause, as amended, will achieve that.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 11, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Sarah Newton.)
Enterprise Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)
(8 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text
Bill Esterson (Sefton Central) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 38, in clause 1, page 1, line 11, at end insert—
‘(c) to consider complaints from small businesses relating to their access to finance, and, where the Commissioner considers it appropriate, to make recommendations to the Secretary of State about measures that should be taken to improve small businesses’ access to finance.’
This amendment would extend the remit of the Commissioner to receive complaints about the access of small businesses to finance, and would enable the Commissioner to make recommendations to the Secretary of State about measures to improve small businesses’ access to finance.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 39, in clause 1, page 1, line 11, at end insert—
‘(2A) The complaints at subsection 2(b) include complaints from
(a) small businesses relating to cash retentions and
(b) construction firms regarding cash retention by companies.’
This amendment would make it clear that the Small Business Commissioner’s remit included complaints from small businesses about cash retentions and from construction firms about cash retention by other companies.
New clause 12—Payment practices: protection of retention monies in the construction industry—
‘(1) Any clause in a construction contract or related contract enabling a party to withhold retention monies shall be of no effect unless, upon their withholding, the monies are deposited forthwith in a retention deposit scheme authorised by the Secretary of State.
(2) Where a clause is rendered ineffective under this section any retention monies already withheld and not placed in a retention deposit scheme must be refunded in full to the party providing them.
(3) For the purpose of section (1) the Secretary of State shall make regulations to govern arrangements for establishing and operating retention deposit schemes.
(4) Arrangements under section (3) must be arrangements under which a body or person (“the scheme administrator”) undertakes to establish and maintain a retention deposit scheme (“the scheme”).
(5) The regulations made under section (3) must include requirements relating to—
(a) the selection and appointment of the scheme administrator;
(b) the funding and management of the scheme; and
(c) the release of retention monies from the scheme.
(6) Where the Secretary of State is satisfied that a proposed scheme complies with the regulations made under section (3) he may give authority for the proposed scheme to operate as a retention deposit scheme.
(7) The Secretary of State may delegate his power under subsection (6) to the Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive.
(8) The monies held in the scheme must solely be retention monies and any interest accruing on the monies.
(9) In this section—
“construction contract” has the same meaning as in the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996.
“retention monies” refers to monies which are withheld from monies which would otherwise be due under a construction contract, the effect of which is to provide the paying party with security for the current and future performance by the party carrying out construction operations of any or all of the latter’s obligations under the contract.’
This new Clause would require retention monies provided for within construction industry contracts to be placed in an approved retention deposit scheme.
New clause 16—Information on the Enterprise Investment Scheme and Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme—
‘The Secretary of State must publish information and guidance, for investors, about the Enterprise Investment Scheme and the Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme.’
This new Clause would place a requirement on the Secretary of State to publish information and guidance on the availability of Enterprise Investment Scheme and the Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme, which provide tax relief for investors in early stage small businesses.
Bill Esterson
Welcome to our deliberations, Ms Buck. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship.
This group of amendments and new clauses covers access to finance, cash retention, the enterprise investment scheme and seed enterprise investment scheme, and how they relate to the small business commissioner. When we talk about the small business commissioner’s remit being extended to cover complaints about access to finance, it is not so much about dealing with specific complaints about specific funding applications, but about having someone who will listen to small businesses’ concerns about access to finance, who can signpost them to help them navigate the system—one of the roles that the Government do envisage for the commissioner—who can take complaints about flaws in access to finance and who can advocate at a high level for small and medium-sized enterprises, something which the US Small Business Administration does extremely well.
In the 2014 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills small business survey, 39% of SMEs said that they had difficulty in getting the money they wanted when applying for finance. For microbusinesses, that figure rose to 42%. It was 32% for small businesses and 25% for medium businesses. Some 48% of SMEs had difficulty accessing finance through bank loans. For Government grants, it was 53%. It seems odd that the small business commissioner’s remit would be so narrow as to overlook such a basic issue faced by so many SMEs. Most small businesses who talk to me say that late payment is the No. 1 issue, but that is closely followed by a lack of access to finance, as borne out by the Federation of Small Businesses, which is why this is such a potentially important area of interest for somebody called a small business commissioner.
If the commissioner is to offer a signposting service, although that is not what is needed on late payments, it would certainly suit the question of access to finance, particularly when it comes to the opportunities of peer-to-peer lending and Government contracts, because SMEs cannot navigate the system and do not know what is available to them. As the Chair of the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee told us on Second Reading last week:
“The problem of access to finance remains a pertinent issue for firms, which is why the Select Committee has launched an inquiry into it. If the Bill’s purpose is to make the UK the best place in Europe to grow a business, why does it not tackle access to finance? If the Government are serious about ensuring growth, why does the Bill not put in place measures to facilitate an expansion of scale-ups to power employment and economic growth?”—[Official Report, 2 February 2016; Vol. 605, cc. 837-838.]
Lord Mitchell, using his vast experience in business, spoke on the matter during deliberations in the Lords and discussed the problems in various Government schemes, saying that there had been good growth in non-Government schemes, but not so much in Government initiatives. He said that the market for alternative finance had grown, but
“largely as a result of the paralysis of the high street banks”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 3 March 2015; Vol. 760, cc. 129-130.]
Challenger banks have made good progress—Metro Bank and Aldermore, and Santander, if it can be regarded as a challenger bank, are changing the landscape. Peer-to-peer lending has taken off and is providing an interesting opportunity for many small firms. The changes are welcome and most hon. Members would accept that the traditional high street banks have not done the job of providing good sources of finance, to smaller businesses in particular, over many years. Having alternative sources of finance stepping in is welcome.
We need to know what is happening, and this is where the opportunity for the small business commissioner comes in. We need to know whether what is happening or what is changing is adequate.
Lord Mitchell gave the example of a start-up company from Merseyside, similar to the one I quoted earlier. A start-up company director found access to government funding so incomprehensible she gave up searching—a young entrepreneur with a tech start-up in the north-west, a prime example of the sort of start-up the Government have said repeatedly that they want to help to get off the ground. When she ran her postcode on the Government site she was presented with several hundred schemes for Wales and Scotland. When she entered her details for updates on suitable funding schemes she could bid for, she received a call from a company that wanted several hundred pounds upfront, not to help her put together bids, but to navigate the Government website on her company’s behalf, and email her with a list of schemes she could bid for. Many companies exist to charge start-ups for understanding the Government funding scheme for them. While this is clearly an example of entrepreneurialism on one level, I suggest it says more about the difficulties in navigating the Government’s funding processes.
A small business commissioner would be in a very strong position to represent the interests of small businesses, especially start-ups, when it comes to championing their interests on access to finance, whether from Government or elsewhere. Traditional lending is not doing the job that it needs to do. Alternative finance is a major opportunity and the small business commissioner should be a part of that.
Research undertaken by Everline and the Centre for Economics and Business Research towards the end of last year found that although small businesses have big growth plans for 2015, they are unable to carry them out due to a lack of finance and talent with the right skills. In the current market, most SMEs will only approach larger banks when seeking finance, even though the process can be time consuming and the rejection rate is about 50%. Those small businesses have the potential to drive growth and employment in the UK but are hampered by not only a lack of finance but a lack of confidence in trying to access the working capital they need—more than half think that traditional lenders are not interested in lending to them, and they may well be right, given the feedback that I have received.
Although a large number of alternative finance providers are willing to lend, and might also have more suitable product solutions, small business owners often are not even aware of their existence. As a result, small businesses need support to increase their knowledge of other finance options and prevent banks from always being the default choice. That should ultimately improve the supply of cash flow to viable small businesses who need additional working capital to aid growth, fill a cash gap or take advantage of a market opportunity.
How can we improve access to finance for small businesses? There is clearly a significant demand for easier access to finance for small businesses. To date, the market has been dominated by banks, whose products are often not adequately tailored to the specific requirements of small businesses. Particularly problematic are short-term cash flow needs, which demand a level of control and flexibility around speed of access and repayment timeframes that simply is not available from traditional lenders.
The small business commissioner could provide two things, if we are considering the scope of the office, both of which sit logically with the signposting and advocating approach that the Government want the office to take. They both also offer a shift from a person who reacts to complaints to one who actively supports SMEs and helps them to grow. The first thing it could provide is an accessible signposting service that offers clear advice to SMEs about the finance options available to them and helps them to capitalise on alternative funding, similar to that offered by the Small Business Administration in the United States. The other provision is also similar to what is offered by the US system. It would give the interests of small businesses on the issue of access to finance a real voice before Government. So much of the problem is not about whether the money is there or not, but about making sure that the Government do the right thing in making SME funding available. The Public Accounts Committee report in 2013 made many of the same points: SMEs do not know what is available to them, or their appeal rights, and the Government are not doing enough to link them to finance options.
Let me move on to cash retentions. Cash retentions in the construction industry are a particular problem of late payment covered by this group of amendments. They have been particularly problematic over many years, particularly for smaller firms in the supply chain. For example, a firm in my constituency, Jenkins, showed me the shelf full of files of cash retentions from contracts it has been involved in—some of them reaching back two or three years or more, some five, six or even 10 years.
Lucy Frazer (South East Cambridgeshire) (Con)
I am looking at the amendments—does the hon. Gentleman think that they are really necessary? Clause 1(2)(b) refers to “payment matters”, and clause 4(4) defines “payment matter” as relating to a request for payment, which generally relates to a question of supply. Is it not possible to say that cash retentions, which are in effect a request for payment, are included in the Bill? Would that definition not give some flexibility to the small business commissioner to focus on what really matters to him, whether that is late payments per se or some aspect of late payment?
Bill Esterson
That is an interesting point. I am sure that the Minister will have some theories in response to that intervention. This was debated at length in the Lords, and the Minister there accepted that cash retentions are an important, separate set of issues. I am sure the Minister will talk in detail about why the Government have agreed to set up a review of the issue and make proposals. These are very much probing amendments to consider this particularly acute issue of late payment within the construction sector. That is why we have tabled the amendments and why the Lords spent so long on this issue and a similar amendment.
Cash retentions in the construction industry are withheld as a form of security to encourage firms to return to remedy defects. In practice, the prime motivation for the withholding can be to improve the working capital of the withholding party. In our deliberations this morning, we talked about some of the problems of late payment being used as a form of working capital, or to support treasury in the public sector; a similar point applies in the construction sector. Cash retentions are ultimately funded by small and medium-sized enterprises in construction supply chains. Each year, small businesses lose millions of pounds of retention moneys because of upstream insolvencies or because they give up chasing the release of the moneys. New clause 12 is designed to ring-fence retention moneys by placing a statutory obligation on organisations withholding retentions to deposit moneys in a retention deposit scheme. It should be noted that retention moneys legally belong to the party from whom they have been withheld. They are required to be released to that party—half on handover of the work and the other half normally 12 months later. In practice, the period is considerably longer. I mentioned Jenkins, a firm in my constituency where that has often been the case, but where it is common for it to take three or four more years.
Subsection (1) of new clause 12 states that unless the party withholding retention moneys deposits them immediately in a deposit retention scheme, any contractual clause enabling such withholding has no legal effect. Any moneys previously deducted must be returned in full. Construction firms already have a statutory right under part 2 of the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 to suspend their work for non-payment. The retention deposit scheme could be modelled on the tenancy deposit schemes introduced by regulations issued under the Housing Act 2004, as amended by the Localism Act 2011. Currently, three tenancy deposit schemes are Government-approved. Landlords of shorthold tenancies must place tenants’ deposits in one of these schemes. Tenants’ deposits are provided as security for the performance of the tenants’ existing and future obligations; retention moneys serve the same purpose.
One of the schemes is run by a not-for-profit enterprise. The Dispute Service Limited, not surprisingly, operates a scheme called the Tenancy Deposit Scheme. The scheme held—at least when my notes were written—more than a million deposits. It is funded by the interest earned on the deposits and any excess profit is channelled into a charitable foundation to be used to raise standards in the letting sector of the property industry. I am informed that the CEO of the scheme has already expressed his interest in expanding the scheme for the purpose of depositing retention moneys. Therefore much of the new clause reflects the requirements of the Housing Act 2004 in so far as they relate to tenancy deposit schemes.
The Chair
I am not minded to allow a stand part debate on clause 1. If any Members want to make any general remarks, this would be the right time for them to do so.
Alan Brown (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (SNP)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Buck. I want to focus on the issue of retentions, which relates to amendment 39 and new clause 12. I spoke about retention on Second Reading, and one of the reasons I wanted to serve on the Bill Committee was to push for this.
We have already had two votes—very much partisan votes—on amendments that I had imagined were uncontroversial. This is a major issue for the industry, so I was hoping for some cross-party consensus on these amendments. I note the intervention from the hon. and learned Member for South East Cambridgeshire, which seemed to be an intervention against new clause 12 and amendment 39. If the setting up of the new small business commissioner was a way of addressing this long-standing issue, I do not think the business experts would be lobbying so hard for these amendments to resolve it. Also, if this was a method of dealing with it, it seems strange that the Government should set up a review specifically to looks retentions. That seems counterintuitive to me.
Just to recap the main issues, retentions are basically to do with a cash-flow problem. Retentions usually equate to about 5% of the cost of a job, which is held until the end of the maintenance period, which is usually a year after completion and commission of the main job. That 5% quite often equates to the profit margin, especially for small companies, so if major companies are not releasing these retentions, then companies do not have access to their profits. That is a major cash-flow issue, and it does not take a genius to see that if there is no profit, there is no company in the long run.
We heard earlier that up to £3 billion can be held at any one time in retentions. Last year, £40 million was lost due to insolvencies—that is, one company going bust that was holding retentions that were due to other companies. Those companies lose that money and, of course, end up paying off workers.
The cash-flow issue also means that companies cannot invest in training and apprenticeships. I tried to draw a parallel on Second Reading, in that one good aspect of the Bill is the attempt to create new apprenticeships in England and Wales, yet retention actually prevents the creation of apprenticeships in the engineering industry. These are specialist apprenticeships, which can lead to rewarding and well paid jobs. We should be doing everything we can to sustain that industry, to sustain those jobs and that training.
The suggested model is for a retention deposit scheme, modelled on a tenancy deposit scheme. This accords with housing legislation in this country and legislation in other countries that, as we have heard, have already looked at resolving the matter of retentions. Retentions in trust still provide a waiver over subcontractors who pay cash retentions. It is still a method of getting subcontractors back on site if there are defects to be fixed, or it provides money that can be accessed to pay for the defects. More importantly, it means that subcontractors can get the money that is legitimately due to them.
I urge Members to think carefully about amendment 39, which would help to address the question of cash retentions, and new clause 12, which would resolve the matter once and for all.
Hannah Bardell (Livingston) (SNP)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairwomanship, Ms Buck.
I want to speak briefly to amendment 38 and new clause 16. Small and medium-sized enterprises have a vital role in driving the UK’s economic recovery, and it is a vital task of Government to ensure that finance is available to them to encourage investment and growth.
We welcome the findings of the British Business Bank’s small business finance markets report, which was published this month. It paints an encouraging picture of lending to small businesses in the past year, with an increase in equity finance for smaller businesses—there was growth of 43% in the year to October 2015. Bank lending, which continues to be the main form of finance for smaller businesses, continues to improve too, but obviously there are still significant challenges there.
However, as was mentioned earlier, 56% of smaller businesses are looking to grow their turnover this year. It is essential that suitable finance should be available to support those growth ambitions and that the Government should not rest on their achievements of the past year. By accepting the amendment, which we support, the UK Government would give the small business commissioner the power to champion lending for small businesses and to make constructive recommendations to the Government on how to encourage lending to SMEs.
As for new clause 16, we recognise that new rules were introduced for venture capital trusts, enterprise investment schemes and seed investment schemes by the Chancellor, and that the scheme would be a mechanism for incentivising investment in small enterprises. Again, we support the new clause, and encourage the Government—I hope we can see some cross-party consensus—to bring forward details and guidance about the availability of the scheme. What we are talking about is somewhat of a marketing exercise, but it is a question of getting the information out. All too often—certainly when I worked in the private sector, in the oil industry—the schemes that were available were various. Companies were not aware of what was available. It is important that we market schemes and put them out there, so that as many companies as possible take up opportunities.
The Minister for Small Business, Industry and Enterprise (Anna Soubry)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Buck. I join the hon. Member for Sefton Central in welcoming you to your Committee Chair role for the first time. I am sure that we will all do all we can to make your experience one that you will remember enjoyably.
I will speak to the amendments—and oppose them—beginning with cash retentions. We had an extremely good debate just the other week in Westminster Hall. It was called by the hon. Member for Upper Bann (David Simpson), who rightly brought the matter before the House yet again. It is fair to say that there is absolute cross-party agreement about the need to reform cash retentions in the construction industry. I am very open about it: I think they are outdated and I do not think they are fair. They are particularly unfair to small businesses.
If the Committee will forgive me, let me say that the amendment has come too soon, and the reason is the work we are doing. We have set up a full review, and I am grateful to the Construction Leadership Council. Andrew Wolstenholme, the chief executive of Crossrail, is overseeing a full review of cash retentions in the construction industry. His work will not be completed until some time in March. His review will then come forward with recommendations.
It could be that the trust—an idea that I am familiar with—is the best way to make sure we sort out the problem of cash retentions, but there are other ideas that were debated in Westminster Hall. For example, a better way to do it might be some sort of bond scheme. Many hon. Members will be familiar with that from section 106 agreements in our work in our constituencies. To make sure that roads in housing developments are completed, the developer has to put money into a bond scheme.
There may be merit in what is being proposed, but now is not the time to do it. I think that the hon. Members for Livingston and for Kilmarnock and Loudoun have come to it too soon, because there may be alternatives. It may be that, as a result of Mr Wolstenholme’s review, other things might need to be added to legislation in the future. I think it has come too early, though I have huge sympathy for where it is going in its thrust.
Hannah Bardell
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her comments. I appreciate that we are in the middle of a review, but is she not tempted to put this in legislation, given there is such support for it across the parties and the industry? I met with the specialist contractors association recently. We are talking about businesses that are going out of business because of this issue. I wonder whether the hon. Lady would consider a pilot scheme—perhaps we will write to her collectively.
Anna Soubry
Everybody is jumping too quickly. Let us have the review. One of the big mistakes we make in this place, whichever party is in control, is that we often rush into legislation in a knee-jerk way. What is important is that we all agree there are problems that need to be solved. Let us trust Mr Wolstenholme to do a thorough review and come up with recommendations. Those will then go out to public consultation. If legislation is needed, we can draft that, with, it is hoped, cross-party support—that would be marvellous. We can then make sure that we address every single feature of it and get the right result for our construction industry.
Jo Churchill (Bury St Edmunds) (Con)
May I say what a pleasure it is to serve under your first chairpersonship, Ms Buck? I want to say how much I concur with the Minister. I have run a construction firm for over two decades and retention has blighted that industry for that time. If we rush at this and get the wrong solution, we will merely be knotting the ball of wool in a different place. That will not serve any construction firm well, small or large. I welcome the review and look forward to being able to work on a cross-party basis, because we all have builders and we all need builders and small businessmen to work with those large companies, so that the system is not sclerotic but works well.
Anna Soubry
I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. Only yesterday I met somebody with whom I specifically discussed the problem of the retention scheme and the adverse effect it has on small businesses. I hope that this matter would not necessarily need to be pushed to the vote, if only because we are in agreement. We are all going in the right direction, but now is not the time.
Alan Brown
I hear what the Minister is saying about not rushing in with a knee-jerk solution, but let us not be kidded: this problem has been around for a long time. It is not that this solution came from nowhere recently; it has been mooted before. Is it not the case that when the Bill was in the other place, an amendment was tabled that effectively put a review on a statutory footing in the Bill, which was not passed? Therefore it seems a bit contradictory that we are now having a review. How can we have any comfort that the review is going to come to something? The opposite of a knee-jerk reaction is a Government review that kicks things into the long grass. I am not saying that the Minister wants to kick it into the long grass, but there is always a risk that things get delayed and delayed. We want to do something now, but how can we get a firm commitment that it is going to happen?
The Chair
Order. I gently reinforce the fact that we must have short interventions, not speeches.
Anna Soubry
I know that we do not know each other well, but the hon. Gentleman can be assured that this Minister gives absolutely her word that this matter is not going to be kicked into any long grass. In fact it is very short grass, which has only just grown, because the review will be completed by March and then recommendations will go out to public consultation. If legislation is required as a result of that consultation, I will be happy to be the Minister to take that through.
I do not wish to chide the hon. Gentleman, but he may not realise that there is a statutory adjudication scheme already in place for disputes in relation to the construction retention problem that we know is there. That system does exist. I know that small businesses often do not want to go to the adjudicator because they are fearful of complaining about a big business and souring relations—they fear that future business relations will be damaged—but it must be said that the system does exist. I wanted to put that on the record.
Kevin Brennan (Cardiff West) (Lab)
Until the Minister made that point, I think the whole Committee was with what she was saying about legislating in haste and repenting at leisure, but she then seemed to say not that she was looking forward to legislation in the next Queen’s Speech—which seemed to be the road she was going down—but that she thought what was already in place might well be adequate. Is that what she is telling the Committee?
Anna Soubry
No—the hon. Gentleman knows I do not mean that. Do not be silly.
Kevin Brennan
If not, she must clarify it on the record. That is why we are here. She does not need to look at the clock every five minutes. We need to hear it and have it on the record.
Anna Soubry
Some might say I was being slightly patronised there, Ms Buck, but I am sure that that was not the hon. Gentleman’s intention. There will be a review, which will report in March, from which a series of recommendations will go out for public consultation. I am very keen that we reform the retention system in the construction industry. If anyone wants me to repeat that, I will say it yet again, because I have said it not only in this Committee, but in the Westminster Hall debate last month: it needs reforming and we need to get on with it. I could make the point that some people were in government for 13 years and did not deal with the problem, but that would be churlish of me and I would not do such a thing. Nevertheless, the point I am making is that there is an adjudication system to help those companies that suffer.
I have also conceded that I am told on very good authority that, for reasons that we know and understand, the existing system is not working as we would like it to. In any event, I think it is out of date and unfair and it needs sorting out. I would be delighted to be the Minister who sorts it out once and for all, so that we have a modern, fair system that protects those who need to take care of all the snags and things that come to light after a build has been completed and, at the same time, ensures that the money is there so that they can make good any defects. There is a way to sort it out. It might not be what is proposed in the amendment—there might be a better way to do it—but those are exactly the things that the review will explore.
Amendment 38 specifically says that the new small business commissioner would consider complaints relating to access to finance, not complaints about whether or not small businesses have knowledge about the various schemes. One of my predecessor’s achievements was bring together as many of the Government’s schemes as possible through one portal: the British Business Bank. If someone wants access to finance, they can go to their bank or to their accountant and ask for advice, or they can seek the advice of the Federation of Small Businesses. Equally, they can google it, and one of the results will be the British Business Bank, which gives all the details of all the various schemes, not only those operated by the Government—start-up loans being an extremely good example—but also advice on peer-to-peer lending, the angel schemes, crowdfunding and so on. We are beginning to see a real change in the amount of information available, especially from that one-stop-shop, the British Business Bank, so that small businesses know where to go if they are looking for finance.
The amendment, though, is about small businesses’ complaints about their access to finance. With respect, the Financial Ombudsman Service already deals specifically with such complaints. Were we to extend the role of the small business commissioner, all we would be doing is duplicating an existing system that everyone seems to accept is working well. As I said earlier, we learned from the consultation that the one thing no one wants is the duplication of services.
The Financial Ombudsman Service is working well, and it has respect. Small businesses can go there to make their complaints; Members may well have referred their constituents. We already have exactly the device required. I argue strongly that expanding the remit of the small business commissioner would not be appropriate when it comes to finance, because we already have a very good system. Small businesses are within the remit of the Financial Ombudsman Service if they have a turnover of less than €2 million and fewer than 10 employees. So it is there for the microbusinesses.
The Financial Conduct Authority is currently consulting on whether even more small businesses should be given access to the FOS. The FOS analyses the complaints it receives from microbusinesses and reports on them every year. It also publishes occasional stand-alone reports, such as, in August 2015, “Micro-enterprises and financial services—a review of complaints”, which had the express purpose of highlighting areas of good practice and promoting change where it is needed. Access to finance for businesses is also regularly considered by Select Committees.
With respect, I really believe that the amendment would represent an unnecessary extension of the remit of the small business commissioner. Again, we must make it very clear that the primary function of the small business commissioner is to address the big problem that all small businesses complain about, which is late payment. That is where I want his or her focus and resources to be.
I turn to other matters. I think I have dealt with cash retentions in the construction industry, but I want to deal with the other amendment, which deals with the enterprise investment scheme and the seed enterprise investment scheme. Details are already published, with guidance and information, on gov.uk. We in BIS support and complement this work with promotional activity. Again, with respect, I really do not think the amendment is necessary, because what it wants to achieve is already being done.
I think that is it, unless there is anything else I need to add. I ask for the amendment on cash retentions to be withdrawn because I honestly think we are going to make huge progress very quickly and we are all on the same page. I respectfully suggest that the other amendment is just not needed: we do not need to extend the remit of the small business commissioner in this way, because others are doing the job very well for small businesses.
Bill Esterson
Let us deal with access to finance and the EIS and seed schemes. The Minister needs to read the whole of amendment 38 to consider where it is going. If the word “complaints” were replaced by the word “representations”, it might be easier to follow. The point is for the commissioner to make recommendations to Government about improving access to finance; that is the intention behind the amendment, as I thought I had explained. That is also in the explanatory statement that came with the amendment, but I will not pursue the point by pushing it to a vote.
When the Minister says that late payment is the priority, I understand that. Clearly, one has to start somewhere and that is what the Government want to do. However, as I said in my opening remarks, the second issue—it is a very big second issue—is access to finance. It is really important that we get to grips with that as well. Please understand the importance of the amendment and what it is driving at.
The Minister commented on the schemes and their advertisement on the gov.uk website. I understand that. The point I made earlier was that not enough businesses are finding them. That is why if the small business commissioner has a signposting role, he or she should use it as much as possible. Perhaps the Minister will take that away and consider it.
Anna Soubry
We want the small business commissioner to have his or her own website, and I want there to be portals—the hon. Gentleman understands these things—so somebody can click on something that says “access” and go through to the various information. That is terribly common on so many websites, so I want there to be that sort of access. The hon. Gentleman makes a very good point, and we agree that one-stop shops are the way to get information about a lot of this work out there.
Bill Esterson
That is a fair point. I will come back to some of the challenges and our concerns about the portals. Many small businesses do not use the web, so encouraging greater digital use is one of the many challenges for the Government.
There is great concern about retentions. The amendment has cross-party support, and hon. Members who spoke made their points extremely well. Often, between 2.5% and 5% of moneys are retained under the cash retention system, so it is massively difficult for small businesses to be as effective as possible. The hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun made a point about businesses not taking part in apprenticeships and not investing in the future as a result of the scale of retention.
Hannah Bardell
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that it is important that the review and these proposals are added to the Bill before Report?
Bill Esterson
It is incredibly important that that happens as quickly as possible, but SNP Members are in the same position as us: we are ultimately dependent on the Government for this to work, so we have to take the Minister’s bona fides. She is now on the record as saying that she will take action. I made the point that the recommendation was first made 52 years ago and it has been made on numerous occasions since. The problem is that businesses do not understand why we are waiting and why the Government and Parliament are taking so long to act. It is probably not until we come to this place that we start to understand why.
The Minister said it is too soon. A similar point was made in the Lords, and Labour peers accepted similar comments from Baroness Neville-Rolfe. We will wait and see for now, but if the review is finalised in March, the Bill’s Report stage may happen at about the same time.
I leave this thought with the Minister: if there is the opportunity, will she consider tabling amendments to take that into account? Let us challenge her Department and officials to table such amendments on Report to satisfy Members on both sides of the House. With that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn,
Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Clause 2
Small businesses in relation to which the Commissioner has functions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Bill Esterson
The clause deals with the definition of small businesses. I do not intend to detain the Committee for long on this subject, but it is important to consider what it says. There have been wide-ranging debates in the Lords and here about what the small business commissioner ought and ought not to do. The clause, which defines the small business commissioner and who they will serve, is an opportunity to reflect on the importance of exactly that remit.
Although debate on the Bill has covered a variety of issues, I believe that on both sides it has had at its heart the recognition of the value of small businesses to the UK economy. Members across the House have had an opportunity to offer valuable support to the companies and entrepreneurs that fall within the definition laid out in the clause. The debate is an opportunity to speak about the importance of small businesses, but the Bill carries an opportunity to boost the prospects of companies all over the UK.
What are we talking about when we lay down these technical definitions of a small business? There are now thought to be 5.2 million small businesses in the UK. They employ 48% of the UK’s workforce and, on the back of sheer hard work, account for 33% of private sector turnover. The definitions laid out in the clause single out incredibly hard-working people. My wife still runs a small business and is a constant reminder to me of how much effort and how many sleepless nights it takes to start, grow, run and maintain a business—all those things and more. The Bill is for those who deserve our support on late payment, which is one of the most vexing issues facing small businesses today and one that we simply have not done enough to resolve. It is also one of the issues that my wife lobbies me on almost daily.
The Bill presents us with an opportunity radically to change the outlook for some of the most important contributors to our economy. It offers the small businesses in the definition some level of support or guidance on late payments, but it could serve the business owners or the budding entrepreneurs also captured in the definition who have brilliant ideas but do not have the knowledge base needed to grow. It could serve the businesses that are struggling with not only late payments but investment challenges, ongoing legal disputes, access to finance, lack of mentoring and difficulties with public sector and private sector clients.
The clause captures a body of people whose challenges go far beyond late payment and who need far more than supportive words and signposting to systems that, as time has shown us, simply have not tackled the problem. All the challenges they face are tackled by specialists in big companies, but the definition in the clause demarcates a group who largely are so busy keeping the wheels of local economies turning that they do not have time to be legal or financial experts. The Bill is an opportunity for us to provide them with real support.
Beyond the technical definitions laid out in the clause are the owners of 5.2 million small UK businesses. If they are not watching this debate, they will still feel over the coming months and years the outcome of whether we focus on limited support for the specific challenge they face or whether we take this chance to offer meaningful answers to some of the key issues that stifle their growth and prosperity—and by extension, the growth and prosperity of the local economies in which they operate.
We would like the small business commissioner’s remit to go much further than the one in the Bill. Even if we just focus on late payments, it does not take a great deal of prodding of the definitions to see how limited the scope of support is. One fifth of UK small businesses—more than 1 million firms—have experienced or come close to insolvency as a result of a total estimated by BACS to be £26.8 billion in outstanding late payments. Sage estimates a significantly higher figure—I cannot remember it.
Bill Esterson
I thank my hon. Friend. The Government’s proposed small business commissioner is likely, according to the Government’s own predictions, to help just 500 small businesses a year. The commissioner will serve as a signposting service to mediation services that already exist and have failed to deal with the crippling problem of late payment in the past. In fact, it was the Minister’s colleague, the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly), who said on Second Reading:
“On capacity, the new £1.1 million SBC website should handle 390,000 disputes from 70,000 businesses, yet the SBC will deal with only 500 complaints a year. That gives rise to the question of what will happen with the rest of the disputes and what the real impact of the proposal will be. Could the site cope with the workload of significant numbers qualifying for assistance? That remains unclear.”—[Official Report, 2 February 2016; Vol. 605, c. 828.]
That is just the website, which the Minister mentioned. The small business commissioner will employ only a handful of staff, and there is nothing in the Bill to say that they will be legal, financial or even business experts.
We have to be honest when we look at the definitions laid out in the clause. The aspiration to support small business is lofty and laudable, but it prompts a question: without the legal clout of the Australian small business commissioner or the wide-ranging agreement with the US Small Business Administration, and without anything like the budget or staff numbers of either of them, how many such companies is the legislation actually likely to help?
Anna Soubry
I will keep this as short as I can, because I do not think that there will be a vote on the clause.
I agree with a large part of what the hon. Gentleman says. The clause defines small businesses that may access the commissioner’s functions as those with a headcount of fewer than 50 people. Financial thresholds may also be applied under secondary legislation—for example, if it transpires that there are businesses with relatively few employees, but high financial worth. They might be excluded from the commissioner’s scope, because our emphasis is small business.
I think Lord Mendelsohn talked about the “asymmetry of power”; the measure is about small businesses, especially very small businesses—the actual definition for small business is 250 employees, but we are taking that down to 50 and fewer, because those businesses simply do not have the sort of power that other, bigger businesses have. We want to redress that and to change the balance.
Perhaps the small business commissioner will not at the moment deliver as we all want them to deliver, but it is a terrifically good beginning to have someone in situ specifically looking after the needs of small businesses, concentrating on the primary role—I will be boring by repeating this—of tackling the problem of late payment, because that is the big issue that troubles the majority of small businesses. The commissioner will be their champion.
I hope to be—I like to think I am—the champion of small businesses, and that is why I was appointed. I do not know whether there has been a small business Minister before and, although I do other things as well—I seem to do everything—the emphasis is on small business. I actually sit in Cabinet because the Prime Minister wanted a Minister with responsibility for small businesses at the Cabinet table—unfortunately, he could not find one, so he got me. No! To be serious, that is why the role was created.
I am so proud that we will have the small business commissioner as the small business champion, especially for late payment. I do not think that there will be any dispute about the clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
General advice and information
Bill Esterson
I beg to move amendment 40, in clause 3, page 3, line 10, at end insert—
“(d) tax rates, allowances and thresholds of relevance to small business owners.”
This amendment would extend the general information and advice that may be published by the Commissioner to include tax rates, allowances and thresholds of relevance to small businesses.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 41, in clause 3, page 3, line 10, at end insert—
“(e) guidance on payday loan rates and their appropriateness.”
This amendment would extend the general information and advice that may be published by the Commissioner to include information about payday loans.
Amendment 43, in clause 3, page 3, line 29, at end insert—
“(5B) The Commissioner must publish, or give to small businesses, general advice or information about the relationship between the Small Business Commissioner’s complaints scheme and any other legal remedy available to a complainant.”
This amendment would require the Small Business Commissioner to give general advice or information to small businesses about the relationship between the Small Business Commissioner complaints scheme and any other legal remedies available.
Amendment 44, in clause 3, page 3, line 43, at end insert—
“(9A) Where a recommendation is made under subsection (8), the Commissioner may take the relevant action in response to the recommendations where she sees fit.”
This amendment would give the Small Business Commissioner the power to act directly on recommendations he has made.
New clause 14—Guidance for local authorities—
“The Commissioner must prepare and publish guidance to local authorities outlining—
(a) the functions and services she may offer to small businesses, and
(b) related to the complaints process.”
This new clause would require the Small Business Commissioner to provide information about her functions and services to local authorities.
Bill Esterson
The group of amendments and new clause 14 look at tax rates, payday loans, the small business commissioner’s complaints scheme and other remedies, at ensuring that the commissioner has power to act on his or her recommendations, and at providing information to local authorities.
We want the small business commissioner to have not only a broader remit as the office develops, but greater powers to investigate, to mediate and to advocate for small businesses on regulation and legislation. If the Government want the commissioner to be a signposting service, we at least need the remit for it to be broader. The start would be to equip the commissioner with the tools to advise and signpost on the main issues that matter to small businesses—we talked about access to finance in our debate on the last group of amendments—so that the commissioner can in turn equip entrepreneurs with the knowledge necessary to access the support available to them. The amendments deal with some of those issues.
Bill Esterson
I thought the Minister might say that. However, we have included it precisely because it does not seem to happen every time. After the introduction of the Groceries Code Adjudicator, both the GCA herself and commentators found that the take-up of her services by suppliers was hampered by the fact that not enough people knew about her and the services she provides. It is a simple issue of communication, or good marketing, but it takes more people than the postholder himself or herself to ensure that an awareness that they exist and an understanding of what they do reaches more than 5 million small businesses.
On a whole host of issues that we will come to later in another new clause, it seems that the Government are going to great lengths not to learn important lessons from the introduction of the Groceries Code Adjudicator. This is a simple one: make sure people know that the office exists and use the local authorities as an ideal vehicle for raising that awareness. Raising awareness is not done straight from the small business commissioner and it is not currently done from the Groceries Code Adjudicator to the many people they are trying to help. That would not be possible, given that, under the small business commissioner, we are talking about reaching more than 5 million companies. By equipping local authorities with the understanding of the post, they need to triage small local businesses into signposting the small business commissioner where appropriate, and in that way we can make light work of spreading the news. The website on its own will not do it. Local authorities will also no doubt appreciate that, not least because it will plug the gap left by so many of the Government’s cuts to councils and to national schemes designed to give advice to small businesses.
Anna Soubry
In resisting the amendments I will put the following arguments. The commissioner will give small businesses general advice and information that would be helpful for their dealings with larger businesses. I have given one such example as portals through websites. Many of us as Members of this place have our own websites, so we are more than familiar with how best to talk to constituents and provide them with information. We know that there are ways to do it that never existed before, but that will be for the commissioner to decide. I respectfully suggest that we do not need to write all this stuff down in legislation. We can allow him or her to use the abilities that they will undoubtedly have to ensure they provide the services and the general advice and information that they believe will best suit small businesses.
The commissioner will also direct to relevant bodies and sources of assistance, as I described. Our consultation showed that there is widespread support for that function, and that small businesses—I think the hon. Gentleman will agree—do not always know about the services available to them. The commissioner will address those information gaps. For example, I have no doubt that some small businesses will contact the small business commissioner with a complaint about a utility company. The small business commissioner will ensure that their complaints go to the right place, such as Ofgem or Ofcom. We all know small businesses that have huge problems accessing superfast broadband or have difficulties with their landline, BT and so on. The commissioner can give them direct access at the click of a mouse or a button to Ofcom. I have already talked about the financial services ombudsman, which is another way of helping small businesses to resolve problems and disputes.
The commissioner will not cover specific issues such as taxation, because such information and advice is already available. Nobody wants duplication. I am confident that good advice is available, so why would we double it up and confuse people further? The commissioner’s information will be sensibly integrated with other sources of business advice—as I said, access to finance is a very good example. The commissioner will decide what advice and information will assist small businesses. It can already include his or her own schemes and remedies.
I agree that awareness of the commissioner is crucial. However, he or she will be best placed to decide how to promote their services. I will absolutely trust whoever is appointed, because part of the skill set I expect them to have is the knowledge of how to get out there and ensure that everybody knows about them.
I recognise that the payday loans market has caused serious problems for consumers, but, with respect, I do not think it should be in the Bill because we took the action that was needed to address it in the previous Parliament. The Financial Conduct Authority’s more stringent regulatory regime is already having an effect on the payday loan market. It found that the volume of payday loans fell by 35% in the first six months of regulation, even before a cost cap was introduced last year.
The commissioner’s power to make recommendations about the information that the Secretary of State gives simply allows for different ways of providing information. The commissioner already has the power to publish and provide information.
New clause 14 is a good example of bad legislation. We do not need legislation to tell people to talk to one another. While the hon. Gentleman was talking about it, I wrote down off the top of my head what local authorities can and should do—many are already doing these things—to support small businesses. They should ensure that they have good, sensible business rates; create the right environment; free businesses from unnecessary regulation and undue checks; support high streets with imaginative parking by, for example, providing access for wheelchairs and buggies; ensure their local plans, core strategies and planning matters are small business-friendly; and support the high streets and all of the wonderful small businesses that we have in our constituencies. Finally—as I said, this is just off the top of my head—they should ask whether planning applications include access to superfast broadband. Good digital technology must be at the heart of their planning decisions and everything they do as local authorities.
I respectfully suggest that that sort of legislation is not needed. Local authorities, with few exceptions, know how best to work with small businesses, but it is not their job to give them advice. It is their job to create the right environment in which they can thrive and grow. That is why I urge everybody to reject the amendments.
Bill Esterson
The Minister talked about constituents contacting us via our websites. I have constituents who contact me via my website, too. I have an electorate of something like 68,000. [Interruption.] That is quite a small electorate, but not all 68,000 contact me via my website.
Anna Soubry
I am sorry; I did not say that they contact me via my website, but I understand how websites work and how they can disseminate information and enable people to access the information they need by way of portals. Obviously, an MP’s website does not have many portals, but we are all familiar with how websites operate in a modern world so that people can get the information that they need. That is all I am saying.
Bill Esterson
We can also measure how many people are looking at a website. I do not have the technical know-how to do that, but some do. I know that 68,000 people do not visit my website or anything similar to that, and 250,000—the borough’s voting population—do not visit Sefton Council’s website, either. I do not think that websites are therefore anywhere near the answer to providing access to the small business commissioner.
The Minister talked about new clause 14, which is not about getting local authorities to work on how they access business, much as I want them to do all the things that she talked about. I do not disagree with that, but that is not what the new clause is about. It is actually about ensuring that local authorities know that the small business commissioner exists and what he or she does so that they can work together to improve life for small businesses. It is a shame that she did not grasp that.
On tax, in my experience most small businesses want to pay tax; they just want to ensure that they pay the right tax. Whether that is true of some rather larger businesses, we can all speculate from time to time. To pay the right tax, however, businesses sometimes do not find that the advice from HMRC is what they need. In the Lords, we heard an example of a business attending a seminar organised by HMRC so that it could get its tax right and when, having followed HMRC’s advice, it approached HMRC to say what it thought it should be doing, HMRC disagreed and said:
“We are not bound by our own advice”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 26 October 2015; Vol. 765, c. GC137.]
That was something of a shock to the company, which had invested all that time and effort in dealing with its tax affairs in an attempt to pay the right level of tax. That is why it is important that the small business commissioner is involved in helping businesses to understand tax rates and to pay the right tax so that they are not dependent on HMRC, which does not always act as we might reasonably expect. As that was a probing amendment, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Bill Esterson
I beg to move amendment 42, in clause 3, page 3, line 29, at end insert—
“(5A) The Commissioner may assist small businesses by taking an active and direct role in resolving, mediating or facilitating the resolution of disputes.”
This amendment would give the Small Business Commissioner the power to take an active role in resolving, mediating or facilitating the resolution of disputes.
We are talking about the important topic of mediation and facilitating the resolution of dispute, which is sometimes known as alternative dispute resolution. The amendment looks to learn from what goes on in Australia and would provide the commissioner with the opportunity to insist on mediation as a better way of solving disputes between two business parties than going to court, for example.
In the foreword to the July 2015 BIS publication “A Small Business Commissioner”, the Minister said:
“In Australia, the Victorian Small Business Commissioner is having a real impact on the ground.”
She told us earlier about her meeting with him. One reason why that commissioner is having an impact on the ground is that he has so many more powers than is proposed in the Bill. One such power involves being able to insist on mediation and to ensure that unfair payment practices are dealt with on a case-by-case basis. That is not what is being proposed here. If the Minister really wants the United Kingdom’s small business commissioner to match the performance we see in Australia, she must give them the same tools and powers to do the job.
The staff of the New South Wales small business commissioner are formally trained in mediation. In Australia, attendance at mediation may be legally required by a court, and the small business commissioner may insist on mediation after the initial consideration of the complaint. Any decisions or agreements reached during mediation are signed by both parties and are returned to the small business commissioner, who can hold them to account if they do not keep their side of the agreement. Mandatory mediation is vital as far as the Australian model is concerned. The office of the Australian small business commissioner says:
“Mediation is so successful that most of all matters referred to us for mediation are resolved prior to having a court decide the matter… The mediation process is essential in minimising the costs of business and commercial disputes.”
Compulsory attendance at mediation in the Australian model is enshrined in the legislation that set up the New South Wales small business commissioner. Section 17 of the Small Business Commissioner Act 2013 states:
“If an application is made to the Commissioner for assistance in resolving a complaint or other dispute involving a small business and the Commissioner decides to deal with the complaint or dispute, the matter to which the complaint relates or the dispute may not be the subject of any proceedings before any court unless and until the Commissioner has certified in writing that alternative dispute resolution services provided by the Commissioner under this Act have failed to resolve the matter or dispute.”
There are various other requirements in other sections of the Australian legislation. At a national level, the Australian small business commissioner has similar powers. The Australian Government are undertaking to absorb the role into the proposed small business and family enterprise ombudsman, but the legislation is clear about mediation.
The value of mandatory mediation is not only in enabling the small business commissioner to see a complaint through to resolution but in ensuring that both parties follow a process that minimises cost and the risk of the complaint ending up in court. The balance of power must not be so weighted against the small business supplier that it is put off pursuing a complaint for the lack of cheap, accessible dispute resolution, something which we discussed earlier. This is about fairness, ensuring a level playing field, reducing costs, and producing commercially realistic solutions to disputes, including those involving late payment. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Hannah Bardell
Following on from the hon. Gentleman’s comments, we also welcome, as we did on Second Reading, the creation of a small business commissioner, but as we said then and as we believe now, it is important that the commissioner has real power and teeth to arbitrate and to take on issues when they are brought to them, rather than just to give advice. The Federation of Small Businesses has said that it is important that the commissioner is endowed with real powers to assist small business. It is important for the integrity of the office of the commissioner that it is regarded by small businesses as a route by which they can achieve a meaningful outcome. The current suggestion of a commissioner making recommendations or highlighting particular cases is simply not enough if they are to gain a reputation as a small business champion. All too often, such bodies do not have the power to bring companies into line. If we want a fair system across the board, further powers, such as those in the amendment, are important.
Anna Soubry
It is important to refer to our consultation because it represents the voice of small business, and it showed us that small businesses want to understand what options are available through existing dispute resolution services. Small businesses have told us that there are plenty of existing resolution services and that we should not—here comes the word again—“duplicate” them. They need support to navigate the services more easily. The commissioner will provide general advice and information to raise awareness of alternative dispute resolution and direct firms to those approved mediators. Obviously, I am an old lawyer, though, of course, I was a criminal barrister, but one thing that has struck me about the changes that have occurred in the civil side of English law—I cannot speak for the situation up in Scotland—is the widespread use now of mediation, which means that people do not end up in court.
We know the cost of going to court, we know that it can actually be very traumatic. It is not just matrimonial or family matters; a business dispute can still exert a huge pressure, especially for a small business. There is a human as well as a financial cost. So the court system, certainly in England and Wales, has bent over backwards to encourage people to go to mediation, for all the very good reasons that I hope are obvious to everybody.
When we looked at the creation of the small business commissioner and what we were seeking to achieve, I was very keen to understand—I was worried, to be very honest—whether there were enough mediation services available to businesses in the event of a dispute. I was encouraged that there definitely are enough. So it is not the job of the small business commissioner to mediate, because, frankly, there are other people out there who will do the job and are doing the job.
I should say that I have not actually had the honour of meeting Mark Brennan, the Australian small business commissioner; unfortunately I could not attend the meeting, but I spoke to him at length on the phone. I will be very blunt about it: it was one of the best conversations I have ever had in this job. He spoke with all the frankness and robustness that I was hoping for—“This is difficult, you cannot legislate for this, but in tackling late payment, which is what this is all about, what we seek to achieve is to change the culture so that small businesses no longer feel the need to complain about this problem, because it does not happen, because we have changed the culture.” At the moment there are already laws to prevent unfair terms and conditions in contracts, late payment penalties and so on. There is a code of practice and, of course, if someone has already signed up to a contract and somebody has, in effect, breached the contract, they can go to law. So there are lots of protections there, but we want to change the culture so that people are not paid late in the first place.
Mark Brennan impressed on me that it is very difficult to legislate for this; this is why we are doing it in this way. He said, “The real power I have on late payments is that when I am aware of a trend or a practice by a particular business, I pick up the phone and speak directly to the chief executive”. He said that nine times out of 10—I think it was actually more than nine times of out 10, if there is such a thing—the chief executive took the phone call. That is why we need to make sure we have somebody big business respects; there was no messing about, they took the phone call. He said that as soon as he said to the chief executive, “Do you know what your finance team are saying to a whole group of small businesses?”, the chief executive said “What? They’re doing what? This is not how this business works, I had no idea this was going on” and then he or she sorted out the problem.
That is the huge power of the small business commissioner in Australia and that is what I want ours to have. I want them to have the respect of businesses—so they will take the phone call and listen to what is being said—as well as the confidence of small businesses.
John Howell (Henley) (Con)
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right to speak of the power of mediation. I happen to be the chairman of the alternative dispute resolution APPG. We had a meeting only the other evening on this, and I can assure her that she is absolutely right about the number of mediators that are available to deal with late payment disputes and other forms of dispute.
Hannah Bardell
I recognise what the Minister is saying and that there is a range of mediation services. Does she not recognise, however, that in the example she gave where the small business commissioner could phone up the chief executive, it would force the hand and have greater power if he or she were able to say, “If you can’t get this sorted out, we have an overarching power”?
Anna Soubry
We can talk about powers, which will come up later in the Bill, but we are talking about remit. It is not the remit, in my view, of small business commissioners to offer services that are already available. They can point people in the right direction, but Members must be under no illusion about what the commissioner’s role will be. If someone comes to the small business commissioner with a case that is within scope and says, “Will you mediate?” the commissioner will say, “No, I’m not going to mediate. You go off to mediation, but if you’ve got a complaint about bad practice relating to late payment, come back to me. I’ll deal with it.”
The services are there. Let us concentrate on what the commissioner’s role is. The role is to tackle late payment and to change the culture, so that we do not have so many small businesses that are not paid in time or have unfair conditions put on them in terms of when they are paid. That is why I urge hon. Members not to support the amendment. It is not the direction of travel. Mediation services are already out there, and it is the job of the commissioner to direct people to existing services.
Bill Esterson
Well, we will find out in time whether that works. The reason for quoting the Australian example is that both parties have to accept that mediation will have consequences. I think I am right in saying—the Minister will correct me if I am wrong—that if a party refuses to engage in mediation, there may be penalties if matters end up in court. That is an interesting approach.
Anna Soubry
If someone has a legal dispute and therefore issues proceedings, they will be pointed—there is no debate about it—to mediation. If they are a belligerent party and refuse to use mediation, when they come to court and lose, they will take the heavy toll of costs accordingly. At the moment, all the courts point people in the direction of mediation, and it is a very belligerent party that does not go down the mediation route. In fact, it may be almost impossible in the English system for a case to get into a county court or the High Court unless it has gone through mediation or some judge has determined that the case needs to go before it because mediation is not the correct route. In other words, we have a good system that is working.
Bill Esterson
That is interesting, but we come back to the huge problem of late payment that we are still grappling with after all these attempts. The Minister mentioned the number of pieces of legislation that have attempted to help with that.
The Minister has mentioned a number of times, including on this matter, her concern about not duplicating. If we have things that are not working, we need to consider new approaches; that is at the heart of the creation of the small business commissioner. However, it is about making the commissioner as effective as possible. That is why we have looked at mediation in the way we have. The amendment does not make the power compulsory, but it gives the commissioner the opportunity to be one of the services available.
While I do not dispute what Members on both sides of the Committee have said—that plenty of mediation services are available—if the system was working well, businesses would be finding those mediation services and using them. Something is not quite right, because it sounds like that is not happening. The constituents who have come to me have certainly not been taking advantage of such services; they have been suffering in silence when it comes to challenging those who owe them money.
I agree with the Minister; we need to change the culture. I have no doubt about that, but the question is how best to do it. This probing amendment was about doing just that. We absolutely need to raise awareness of the services that exist. If that is not sufficient in time, I hope that she and the Secretary of State—she may by then be the Secretary of State—will decide to give the small business commissioner those additional powers. Perhaps then we will have made further progress in helping to achieve the outcomes we want in reducing the level of late payments. As she quite rightly says, ideally we want it to stop being the problem that it is now. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4
The SBC complaints scheme
Bill Esterson
I beg to move amendment 47, in clause 4, page 4, line 25, at end insert?
“or is made by a small business (“the complainant”) which has an agreement to supply, or has supplied or may supply, goods or services to another small or medium sized business (“the respondent”), which has the same meaning given by section 7(1) in the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015.”
This amendment would extend the Small Business Commissioner’s remit to complaints made by an SME against another, to which it is providing goods or services.
One day, someone else will be moving an amendment, but not today. Amendment 47 is about the remit of the commissioner and the ability to consider complaints made by one small business against another, which can be due to supply chain issues. Behind a problem in payment from one small business to another, there often lies a chain in which larger businesses and, indeed, the public sector are the real problem. A small business cannot pay another small business if it is owed money itself. That was addressed in detail in the Lords. In Grand Committee in the Lords, we found out that 70% of small businesses trade with other small businesses.
The amendment is an attempt to unpick some issues and challenges that enable the commissioner to be as effective as possible. It would protect small and medium-sized businesses and enhance competition, creating a fairer environment for all businesses. Government involvement in small business matters should aim to ensure that prospective and ongoing small businesses have sufficient knowledge to make informed business decisions. Although any business has a fundamental right of control over positioning and maximising its business opportunities, that right does not extend to engaging in unfair business practices. This is not just about situations where small businesses cannot pay; it is also about situations where they choose not to.
I could not understand from the explanatory notes why the Government have not included complaints made by small businesses in the remit of the small business commissioner. The amendment would set that straight.
Alan Brown
I echo what has been said. The amendment seems to be a logical extension. Earlier we supported the extension to public bodies, which I thought would strengthen the Bill, and I think this amendment would too. Fellow SMEs should be protected as well. There should not be a loophole. We do not want to get to a stage where there is an argument about what constitutes an SME. All businesses should be treated equally, and this simple amendment would allow that opportunity.
Anna Soubry
This is why we have done it in this way. As we see from the clause, the commissioner will handle complaints by small business suppliers about payment-related issues with larger businesses—that is, any medium-sized or large business. The intention of all this legislation is to help small firms where they suffer from the imbalance in bargaining power. I have referred to the words of the noble Lord Mendelsohn about asymmetry. We know that smaller firms, by virtue of their smallness—especially microbusinesses—are at a disadvantage, especially against medium and larger companies. We believe that that is where the real problem is, and that is what we particularly want the small business commissioner to address.
That is not to say that if a small business is in dispute with another small business, it will not have access to all the sorts of dispute mechanism that we have heard about, but we do not believe that is where the real problem is, or the real imbalance of power. That is why we have specified businesses of fewer than 50 employees. They are disadvantaged by their size against medium and larger companies. We know that such businesses often feel unable to challenge contract terms proposed by larger businesses, as I think we have all agreed and mentioned, because it could breach or damage existing or potential commercial relationships with those companies.
Smaller businesses may not have the time, money or expertise to take a legal challenge, which is another consideration. However, as we know, sometimes it is because they are simply frightened that if they take any form of legal action—even something like mediation—it will completely thwart the future commercial relationship between them. They are in a much weaker position by virtue of their size, so that is where we are putting all the emphasis. Their big problem is medium and larger businesses. That is why I resist the amendment.
Bill Esterson
The Minister rightly makes the point about the imbalance in bargaining power, but I repeat that 70% of trade is with other small businesses and that when a larger firm is behind the problem due to delays elsewhere in the supply chain, there does not seem to be a mechanism for addressing that. Perhaps she can take that away, if she is resisting our attempts to include small businesses: how can we deal with problems in the supply chain that come ultimately from a large or medium-sized business? With those comments, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Bill Esterson
I beg to move amendment 48, in clause 4, page 4, line 26, after “(4))” insert
“or relates to allegations of unfair treatment or unfair contracts”.
This amendment would empower the Small Business Commissioner to investigate allegations of unfair treatment or unfair contracts.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 54, in clause 5, page 6, line 10, at end insert—
‘(12) On application by the Commissioner a court may declare an unfair contract term void.”
This amendment would empower the courts on application from the Small Business Commissioner to declare void a contract term that is unfair.
Amendment 57, in clause 8, page 8, line 32, at end insert—
‘(3) The Commissioner must ensure that all information provided by complainants, litigants and other parties against respondents is handled with confidentiality.
(4) The Commissioner must not release the information outlined in subsection (3) without the consent of the complainant, litigant or relevant party.”
This amendment would provide protections for those either providing information to the Small Business Commissioner or from complainants or litigants with large businesses.
New clause 7—Companies: Payment terms with suppliers—
‘(1) On the advice of the Commissioner, the Secretary of State may make regulations—
(a) imposing a limit on the number of days after receipt of a supplier’s invoice a company can seek to challenge that invoice,
(b) prohibiting the practice of a company seeking to change the payment terms of a supplier company unilaterally, and
(c) prohibiting a company from requiring a supplier company to make a payment in order to join that company’s list of suppliers.
(2) The regulations may make provision for a prescribed breach by a prescribed description of person of a requirement or prohibition imposed by the regulations to be an offence punishable on summary conviction—
(a) in England and Wales by a fine, and
(b) in Scotland or Northern Ireland, by a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.
(3) The regulations may specify the size of company and supplier company to which they will apply.
(4) Before making regulations under this section the Secretary of State must consult such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(5) Regulations under this section are subject to affirmative resolution procedure.
(6) For the purposes of this section—
“company” has the meaning given by section 1(1) of the Companies Act 2006,
“prescribed” means prescribed by the regulations.”
This new Clause would empower the Secretary of State to make regulations: (a) to impose a limit on the number of days after the receipt of a supplier’s invoice a company may challenge that invoice; (b) to prohibit a company changing the payment terms to a supplier company unilaterally; and (c) to prohibit a company from requiring a supplier company to make a payment in order to join that company’s list of suppliers.
Bill Esterson
We move to the topic of unfair treatment or unfair contracts and how they are or might be dealt with by the small business commissioner, starting with amendments 48 and 54. The issue is similar to some of the problems faced by consumers that were dealt with in the Consumer Rights Bill—is it an Act now?
Bill Esterson
I look for inspiration, and I am sure that we will get it. [Interruption.]
Bill Esterson
Thank you. Whips always know.
I think that there was an agreement in Committee on that Bill, which is now an Act, that microbusinesses have a lot in common with consumers, and that there is merit in considering them in the same way when they are purchasing goods and services, and certainly those that are not their core business. Examples include a hairdresser, who would buy shampoo or scissors as part of the business, whereas an individual would perhaps buy such things from Boots. When the hairdresser was buying coffee or a kettle for staff, however, it would perhaps be reasonable for them to be treated as a consumer. One-off business-to-business purchases made by a small business, such as somebody who is self-employed, should attract the same protection as would be afforded to consumers.
Anna Soubry
I think I ought to say to the hon. Gentleman, and to hon. and right hon. Opposition Members, that I am actually enjoying this Committee. I do not mean to be rude to previous Committees, but—[Laughter.] Members know what I mean, though. Some important points have been made by the hon. Member for Sefton Central and I want to be clear that I am listening. It is not that my mind is absolutely set and that I will not budge on anything—although I am not making any promises. What I am saying is that we are setting up a new commissioner, and the hon. Gentleman has made a good point that the Government might look at that if it is not working, so I am in listening mode. However, I am not convinced by these amendments.
The hon. Gentleman talks about the rights of the consumer apropos the rights of a small business owner, and there are arguments about that. I am not saying that it is working just because it is there, but there is quite old legislation—that does not mean to say that it is not good, just because of its age—such as the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, so we have to set this against pre-existing legislation. The reason that legislation is often not relied on is because, as we have already understood, very small businesses are reluctant, for all the reasons we have identified, to use existing legislation, or indeed to sue for a breach of contract. We all know the reasons—because we have already debated them—but there is existing legislation covering unfair terms and conditions, by way of example. I strongly suggest that the amendments are not necessary.
As we discussed earlier, business groups have said that the commissioner’s role should be to focus on the business of late payment and changing the culture. The commissioner absolutely should not alter the fundamental basis of contract law. It is not the role of the small business commissioner to get involved in contractual negotiations, contractual relations and, indeed, changing the law of contract. That is the role of Government. The Bill provides appropriate protection against identifying complainants to third parties, and the Government are already implementing a package of measures to address late payment to small businesses.
Alan Brown
On the previous point about it being up to the Government to change the law, amendment 54 would allow the commissioner to apply to a court to declare an unfair contract. That would not interfere with Government law. The commissioner would be making an application to a court of law for the court to decide, which is different from interfering with Government law.
Anna Soubry
If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, amendment 54 is a very bad idea because the commissioner would be able to undermine the fundamental freedom of two businesses to agree commercial transactions on such terms as they see fit. I strongly resist that amendment.
The commissioner will consider a complaint on the basis of what is fair and reasonable in the particular circumstances, but it is absolutely not the role of the commissioner to begin to interfere with a contractual relationship between two parties, any more than it is for the commissioner in any way to undermine or begin to change contract law, for example. Laws are made in this place, not by a commissioner. Otherwise, we would be getting into the very dangerous territory of a quasi-judicial role, and I hope the hon. Gentleman might trust my admittedly very old knowledge of jurisprudence, certainly in the English and Welsh law, to know that that would be a very bad route to go along.
On amendment 57, if a complainant does not want to be identified to the respondent—[Interruption.]
Anna Soubry
I shall now deal with new clause 7, which is really not necessary given the package of legislative and non-legislative measures we have taken to tackle late payment. I shall give some examples.
We plan to make regulations this year to require large companies to report six-monthly on payment practices and policies. That information will be available for public scrutiny. We have strengthened the prompt payment code to enforce a maximum 60-day payment term for all signatories from this year. Public sector buyers are required to have 30-day payment terms in contracts and throughout their supply chains, as we discussed this morning. We have to sharpen that up—we have to be better—but it is there. From 2017, public sector buyers must also publish annually their liability to debt interest payments. Central Government will publish quarterly on liability to debt interest from April 2016, and we will monitor the effectiveness of the measures.
There has been a little jollity—if one can be jolly about the mystery shopper service—but, in all seriousness, I have been absolutely convinced by that service because I have seen the evidence of the work it does. I might not be happy with the name, but it does investigate poor payment performance by public sector bodies and in their supply chains, and it is having an effect and making a difference.
Stakeholders—that dreadful word, but they are important people who have an interest—tell us that they want more public exposure of the payment practices of larger companies, and I agree with them. Bans on certain practices would be easy to sidestep and substitute with others. However, as we all know, publicity—casting a spotlight—is one of the best disinfectants against bad practice. That is the way forward. Were we to go down the sort of legislative route suggested by the new clause, it would become all too easy to sidestep and get around, so we would not make the advances that we need to make. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the clause or, if he pushes it to a vote, I urge the Committee not to support it.
Bill Esterson
I am still intrigued about the mystery shopper—at some point we may find out.
Bill Esterson
The Minister is making a joke of it. I am intrigued to discover what it is finding and what is happening with its findings. I hope that we might hear that at some point. We do not need to hear today, but I would be very interested. I do agree that mystery shoppers can be very important in improving the quality of service and operation in a number of organisations.
I accept the Minister’s assurances on new clause 7, but, again, when the commissioner has been up and running for a while, it might be good for them to look at some of the payment-terms issues in the new clause and how well things such as the prompt payment code are bedding in—that is, is it as effective as we want it to be? That might be something useful that the commissioner could do in future to make a real difference.
Before the Division, the Minister talked about whether the commissioner should take unfair contract terms to court. She said that a quasi-judicial role would be inappropriate. Take the example of somebody in an imbalanced business relationship being offered a three-month payment term on an invoice, knowing full well that it is unfair and completely wrong, but, given their dependence on that contract and business relationship, feeling they have no choice but to go ahead with it. At a later date—this is what the amendment is getting at—there might be an opportunity for them to get some kind of redress. That would be the sort of issue in which the commissioner might intervene. The amendment suggests the commissioner might recommend to the court that the term was inappropriate, rather than take a quasi-judicial role. Nevertheless, I take the Minister’s points and, as the amendments were intended to be probing, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The Chair
Let me see who is speaking to the next group of amendments—ah yes, Mr Esterson.
Bill Esterson
Thank you very much, Ms Buck. I have never been more popular—often this popular, but never more.
I beg to move amendment 46, in clause 4, page 4, line 27, at end insert—
‘(3A) A relevant complaint may be made anonymously.”
This amendment would enable the Commissioner to act on anonymous complaints from small businesses against a larger business.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 49, in clause 4, page 4, line 27, at end insert—
‘(3A) A “relevant complaint” at subsection (3) may be made anonymously by a small business (“the complainant”) which has an agreement to supply, or has supplied or may supply, goods or services to a larger business”.
This amendment would allow the Small Business Commissioner to be able to act on anonymous complaints.
Amendment 51, in clause 5, page 5, line 37, at end insert—
‘(4A) In enquiring into, considering and determining a complaint, the Commissioner must take all reasonable steps not to identify the complainant, unless the complainant consents.’
This amendment would provide anonymity to complainants who raise a complaint with the Commissioner.
Bill Esterson
The amendments deal with anonymity and confidentiality. I do not intend to spend too long on them, but this is an important subject area, because it is one of the places where we can learn lessons from the Groceries Code Adjudicator. One concern raised by the adjudicator was that many of the supermarket suppliers that wanted to make complaints were nervous of doing so for fear of loss of business. That explains why the investigation into Tesco that recently concluded was not the direct result of complaints being investigated; it was prompted only when the adjudicator herself decided to intervene because of suppliers’ fear of the consequences of complaining and being publicly identified. She has encountered that theme on far too many occasions over the past two years. Indeed, there are some unfortunate examples of that confidentiality not being maintained for a number of reasons when suppliers have approached the adjudicator that has no doubt created a concern among businesses, which have therefore chosen not to approach her.
Anna Soubry
I have to say, of course, that the Bill already protects the complainant from being identified to third parties. A Government amendment was introduced in the other place to ensure that complainants are not identified through freedom of information requests, which is also an important protection. Complaints made anonymously could be covered in the annual report, if they were significant—exactly the point that the hon. Gentleman made about a pattern emerging among complaints, some of which may be anonymous and some not. If the commissioner sees a pattern, that is absolutely something that he or she can pursue. To consider a complaint fully, however, the commissioner will invariably need some detail, notably the name of the complainant.
The commissioner will not, of course, have to name the complainant to the respondent. So someone can go to the commissioner and say, by way of example, “My name is Fred Bloggs”, and then make it clear that they do not want their name to be disclosed: “I am making a complaint about Freda Bloggins Ltd. I do not want my name disclosed to them, but this is the nature of my complaint”.
If the complaint is completely anonymous, that could make the commissioner’s job difficult if not almost impossible, because they can go to Bloggins and Co. and say, “I’ve had a complaint from someone. I haven’t got a clue who it is, but they have emailed me.” That person could be vexatious and there could be an underlying dispute between them, but the commissioner would be almost bound to take up and try to pursue the complaint while not knowing anything about the complainant. That is just plain wrong and could involve a great deal of wasting the commissioner’s time.
There is no difficulty with someone coming forward and then saying, “I want to be anonymous.” That will curtail the commissioner’s ability to investigate, because if they go to Bloggins and Co. and say, “Look, I am told that one of your people who is in charge of contracts has said to someone from another business, ‘I’m going to impose payments of 180 days’ and that is absolutely outrageous and wrong,” it would be difficult for the person receiving the complaint to make full representations. They may say, “I’ve spoken to our representative and he spoke to 10 people that day. We need a bit more detail as to who he is meant to have said this to.” In other words, it is very difficult for them to defend themselves.
We have to ensure that things are done fairly, and it would be quite wrong for someone to be able to make a complaint completely anonymously. The Bill allows someone to make a complaint and then retain their anonymity and, depending on the nature of their complaint, they will be properly advised as to the consequences that might flow. Anonymity will prevent the small business commissioner from making the sort of investigation that he or she may want to make.
Mary Creagh (Wakefield) (Lab)
I apologise to the Committee for arriving late. May I pose an alternative view? During the horsemeat scandal a stream of anonymous tip-offs came in through my email that were helpful in pointing me in the right direction of where to look to see who was putting horsemeat into the human food chain. That enabled me to ask questions in Parliament and of Ministers that revealed that a variety of very large companies had knowingly or unknowingly been accepting it in. Most of those tip-offs came from legitimate suppliers who were looking around and saying, “I don’t understand how X can supply burger meat at this price when for me to do it legitimately it has to cost Y.” Does the Minister agree that it may sometimes be useful for the small business commissioner to know where to look when issues are happening?
Anna Soubry
I do not disagree at all. That is why a flexible approach rather than an overly prescribed legislative approach is what I seek, and I am told that our model reflects the small business commissioner model in Australia. If as the hon. Lady describes the small business commissioner receives a flood of anonymous complaints and—even better—some have substance to them, it is difficult to believe that the commissioner would not grab that and take it forward. However, this is about accepting and understanding the difficulty of anonymity for the person against whom the charge or complaint is made, because they cannot take part in the investigation without some more detail to answer the charge. The small business commissioner must act and be seen to act in a way that is fair to both parties.
That is why the Bill does not prohibit anonymous complaints from being made. In legislation we are making the dangers of anonymity clear and ensuring that it is fair, but not for small businesses alone. We might be biased in favour of small businesses, but when looking at complaints the commissioner must be absolutely fair to both parties.
Bill Esterson
I think the point was well made by my hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield and by the Minister that if a pattern of anonymous complaints emerges, that is absolutely something the commissioner may act on. Having carefully reread amendments 46 and 49, I accept that they might potentially be read in that way—that was the intention—but I am satisfied by what the Minister says and having it on the record is extremely helpful. Amendment 51 deals with confidentiality and I agree that in an individual case it might be difficult for the commissioner to act if complainants did not give information to the commissioner. Granted they might want to give it confidentially, but those are two separate matters and I am satisfied by what the Minister said. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Enquiry into, consideration and determination of complaints
Bill Esterson
I beg to move amendment 50, in clause 5, page 5, line 35, at end insert—
‘(3A) Where the respondent fails to provide information voluntarily the Commissioner may investigate the failure and can enforce compliance with information requests on contract terms.’
This amendment would allow the Small Business Commissioner to investigate and require compliance with information requests on contract terms.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 52, in clause 5, page 5, line 37, at end insert—
‘(4A) In support of the consideration and determination of a complaint made under the Small Business Commissioner complaints scheme, the following bodies may be required to provide information or answer questions during the course of the Commissioner’s investigations—
(a) Government departments,
(b) local authorities,
(c) public sector bodies, and
(d) companies.’
This amendment would require Government, local authorities and public sector bodies and companies to provide information or to answer questions when a complaint is made.
Amendment 53, in clause 5, page 5, line 44, at end insert—
‘(6A) A recommendation made under subsection (6) may be that the complainant and respondent enter mediation to resolve their dispute.
(6B) Where a party declines mediation the relevant party shall provide an outline to the Commissioner on costs relating to litigation.’
This amendment would allow the Small Business Commissioner to recommend that the parties attend mediation and to make a commentary on costs in litigation where a party declines mediation.
Bill Esterson
All three amendments are drawn from what happens in Australia. The Australian small business commissioner is a great success and we have discussed that in some detail, so it would be as well for the Government to consider what happens in Australia.
Legal powers to demand information relevant to an investigation form a crucial part of what the Australian commissioner does—note that that includes the public as well as the private sector. That is an important reminder that as the office of the small business commissioner in this country develops, the opportunity to continue to learn from the very best practices in the world remains available. The amendments are probing ones designed to allow the Government to do just that. We have discussed such matters previously, so I need say no more. I will wait to hear the Minister’s response.
Anna Soubry
It is really important that the commissioner wins the trust of small and large businesses. We need to ensure that we do not take an overly heavy-handed approach at the outset.
The commissioner will seek to change the culture of payment. The best way to do that is to take an approach that balances disincentives to encourage larger businesses to behave reasonably towards smaller businesses with support for those smaller businesses, so that they may become more savvy contractors. To do that, the commissioner needs to build trust.
The commissioner may publish a report about the inquiry, consideration and determination of a complaint, or any of those aspects. This could include reporting on whether or not a party provided information and should be sufficient to obtain engagement on all sides. In other words, it uses the huge power of naming and shaming. Compelling the production of information—I do not like that as an idea—from the parties or third parties will get us into an awful quasi-judicial situation and bring an adversarial flavour to the process, and it will invite legal argument and therefore delay. That is why I resist that.
The key issue from consultation responses on alternative dispute resolution is the need to raise awareness of what it is and what it can achieve. The commissioner will do that, as we have described. Adverse costs inferences can already be drawn by the courts, as I described in my previous comments, in the event of an unreasonable refusal to participate in mediation. I think we have got the balance right. I am grateful for the probing nature of the amendments, and I hope that what I have said will satisfy the hon. Gentleman. We have made it very clear that if things need to come back in some way after the commission has been set up—if it is not working—we are always here to listen, but we want this person to work for the benefit of small businesses in relation to late payment.
Bill Esterson
I agree that there needs to be trust and the right relationship between businesses of all sizes. I have used the term level playing field a number of times. I am not against the concept of naming and shaming, either. But there is the matter of what happens if it does not work. To be fair to the Minister, she has acknowledged that we might have to come back to some of these points. The prompt payment code is not compulsory, and perhaps we will revisit that. So, there is the question of businesses that do not co-operate and provide information and do not go through mediation. Equally, we still have the challenge of those businesses that feel unable or scared of the consequences, or feel that it will disadvantage them if they complain. We do not know what will happens then, so I think there is a long way to go. This is the start of a process, and the amendments, as I said in my earlier remarks, are about drawing on the good practice from Australia.
I am reassured that the Minister has every intention of this being a learning organisation and that it will continue to evolve. With those remarks, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Stephen Barclay.)
Enterprise Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)
(8 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Good morning and welcome. Without wanting to seem pompous or arrogant, I should say that the Panel of Chairs has been told to tighten up on procedure because, nine months after the election, it is easy to get into bad ways.
If new Members, including our two Scottish National party Members, who are taking part in Public Bill Committee proceedings for the first time need any guidance, they should come and see me or the very wise Clerk. Tea, coffee and champagne are not allowed during proceedings. Wednesday is Lent so it is sackcloth and ashes, and just water. First, we will consider the programme motion, followed by the motion to enable the reporting of written evidence for publication. As time is tight, I hope those matters can be taken formally.
Ordered,
That—
(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 9 February) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 9 February;
(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 11 February;
(c) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 23 February;
(d) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 25 February;
(2) the proceedings shall be taken in the following order: Clause 1; Schedule 1; Clauses 2 to 14; Schedule 2; Clauses 15 to 19; Schedule 3; Clauses 20 to 35; Schedule 4; new Clauses; new Schedules; Clauses 36 to 40; and remaining proceedings on the Bill; and
(3) the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Thursday 25 February. —(Anna Soubry.)
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Anna Soubry.)
The Chair
Copies of written evidence received by the Committee will be made available in the Committee Room. If, for any reason, Members cannot get hold of those papers, let the Clerk and me know.
Before we begin our line by line consideration of the Bill, I would like to tell Opposition Members that my fellow Chair Karen Buck and I do not intend to call starred amendments, which are those not tabled with adequate notice. The required notice period for amendments in Public Bill Committees is three working days, so amendments should be tabled by the rise of the House on Monday for consideration on Thursday, and by the rise of the House on Thursday for consideration on the following Tuesday. The Public Bill Office will be open on Thursday 18 February, during the recess, from 11 am to 4.30 pm to receive amendments for sittings on Tuesday 23 February, when we return.
The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the Committee Room and on the website, and it shows how the selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. Amendments on the same or similar issues are generally grouped together. A Member who has put their name to the lead amendment in a group is called first. Other Members are then free to catch my eye on all or any amendments within that group.
A Member may speak more than once in a single debate. At the end of a debate on a group of amendments, I shall call the Member who moved the lead amendment again. Before they sit down, they will need to indicate whether they wish to withdraw the amendment or seek a decision. I emphasise that if any Member wishes to press any other amendment in the group to a vote, they need to let me know. I shall work on the assumption that the Minister wishes the Committee to reach a decision on all Government amendments.
Please note that decisions on amendments do not take place in the order in which they are debated, but in the order in which they appear on the amendment paper—in other words, debate occurs according to the selection and grouping list. Decisions are taken when we come to the clause to which the amendment relates. In accordance with the programme order, new clauses will be decided after we have finished clause 35 and schedule 4, and before clause 36. I shall use my discretion to decide whether to allow separate stand part debates on individual clauses and schedules following debates on the relevant amendments. I hope that is helpful and answers a few questions.
Bill Esterson (Sefton Central) (Lab)
On a point of order, Mr Amess. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship on this important Bill. I am delighted to be on the Front Bench with this opportunity to talk about enterprise, which is very dear to my heart; I have run my own business.
There are many good attributes to the Bill, which has been described as something of a Christmas tree of a Bill, with a number of not immediately obviously related parts. It could be described as having had baubles hung on it, some of which sparkle more brightly than others. Some of the sparkle is due to amendments tabled in the Lords, including on the ability of the small business commissioner to appoint his or her own staff and the market rent-only option in the pubs code.
However, some new clauses have yet to be tabled, and that is the reason for my point of order. The new clause I am thinking of relates to the Sunday trading laws. It was not tabled in the Lords, when there was ample opportunity. We were told that it was going to be included only in answer to BIS questions last Tuesday, as was confirmed on Second Reading the same afternoon.
The Government have not been short of time. I want your guidance, Mr Amess, on how to approach the matter. Have you had an indication of when the new clause—a whole new element in this Christmas tree Bill—will be tabled? How will we adequately scrutinise the new clauses? What opportunity will we have to table our own amendments, given your advice at the start on the short time that we have and how difficult it is to get our amendments debated unless we table them in enough time?
The Sunday trading issue is a cause of widespread interest—some would say concern—not just in this Committee, but around the country. It causes concern to faith groups, families with workers affected by Sunday trading, trade unions and the independent retailers. Some larger retailers also have great concerns.
At the moment, we have what is often described as a good old-fashioned British compromise. What advice can you give me, Mr Amess, about when the new clause is likely to come forward, how we as an Opposition can adequately address it and whether we will be able to table our own amendments? Is there some other way in which we can deal with what is—we must face it—a very contentious matter, possibly the most contentious element of the Bill? We do not know, because we do not know the wording of the new clauses to be put forward by the Government.
The Chair
I am being generous and kind to the hon. Gentleman because this is his first point of order. Points of order must be brief and succinct; they cannot be like a Second Reading debate. I am very pleased to tell the Committee that new clause 21 on extended Sunday opening hours and Sunday working was tabled last night. I think the hon. Gentleman heard what I had to say about the Opposition’s tabling of further amendments.
Bill Esterson
Further to that point of order, Mr Amess. I asked whether we were able to amend the clauses that have already been tabled by the Government.
Bill Esterson
Thank you for clearing that up.
Clause 1
Small Business Commissioner
Bill Esterson
I beg to move amendment 33, in clause 1, page 1, line 5, at end insert—
‘(1A) Her Majesty may by Letters Patent from time to time appoint a person to be the Commissioner.
(1B) A person appointed to be the Commissioner shall hold office until the end of the period for which he is appointed.
(1C) A person appointed to be the Commissioner may be—
(a) relieved of office by Her Majesty at his own request, or
(b) removed from office by Her Majesty on the ground of gross misconduct.
(1D) Her Majesty may declare the office of Commissioner to have been vacated if satisfied that the person appointed to be the Commissioner is incapable for medical reasons—
(a) of performing the duties of his office; and
(b) of requesting to be relieved of it.
(1E) A person appointed to be the Commissioner is not eligible for re-appointment.”
This amendment would provide a level of independence for the Small Business Commissioner, adapted from the arrangements for the appointment of the Information Commissioner and the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration who are appointed by the Crown following advice from both Houses of Parliament.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 34, in schedule 1, page 56, line 7, leave out paragraph 2.
This amendment in conjunction with amendment 33 would establish the Small Business Commissioner as an appointment by the Crown.
Amendment 35, in schedule 1, page 56, line 19, leave out sub-paragraph (d).
This amendment in conjunction with amendment 33 would establish the Small Business Commissioner as an appointment by the Crown.
Amendment 36, in schedule 1, page 56, line 21, leave out sub-paragraph (e).
This amendment would remove the Secretary of State’s powers to dismiss the Small Business Commissioner.
Bill Esterson
Small businesses are the lifeblood of our economy and are at the heart of communities up and down the country. There are more than 5 million businesses employing 10 people or fewer. It is vital that the people running such enterprises are given the opportunity to thrive and that their businesses can flourish.
The creation of a small business commissioner is a good step towards helping small businesses and follows the examples of the Small Business Administration in the US and the small business commissioner in Australia. In our manifesto, we proposed the idea of creating a UK small business administration and we support the principle of a small business commissioner as a step forward. The Enterprise Bill provides an opportunity to explore the proposed terms of reference of the small business commissioner and to look at how he or she can be as effective as possible in championing the cause of small business, in creating a level playing field and encouraging enterprise from the start-up to growth and beyond.
According to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills impact assessment, the purpose is to
“make it easier, quicker and cheaper for small businesses to settle payment issues with larger companies by setting up a Small Business Commissioner. The Commissioner will give advice, provide information and refer businesses to services that can mediate in disputes. It will have the power to look into complaints about poor payment practices and report back on its findings.”
Small and medium-sized businesses, particularly new entrants to the market, drive economic growth by stimulating innovation, acting as a competitive spur to existing businesses. That occurs through the process of productive churn, when new entrants and existing firms become more and more enterprising, with new ideas for products and processes, and win market share, and less productive businesses exit the market. New and small businesses also complement larger firms by operating in local or niche markets and by being the first to enter new markets. Small and medium-sized businesses stimulate innovation with research, suggesting that such businesses in particular act as an important seed bed for innovations. Those businesses either grow in their own right or are taken over by larger businesses that take on board their ideas.
As global competition intensifies, the ability of businesses and individuals to identify and take advantage of entrepreneurial opportunities becomes increasingly important, hence the need for Government to ensure that support for small businesses is in place. It is in the spirit of the Government’s role in creating a level playing field that we approach the Bill, to scrutinise, challenge and propose amendments.
The purpose of the small business commissioner is to support small business. We want that commissioner to be as effective as possible and believe that he or she will therefore need to work independently of large business and Government. The small business commissioner is being set up to support small business, according to the BIS impact assessment. That includes making it easier to resolve commercial disputes, not least relating to late payment, and to resolve contract negotiations related to late payment or otherwise. It also includes having someone to turn to for dispute resolution and in respect of being treated unfairly in tendering for work, as well as being able to maintain business relationships while in dispute, ensuring that good mediation options are available and dealing with supply-chain matters.
We welcome the small business commissioner’s having a remit that supports small business in addressing those challenges. As the impact assessment says,
“…small businesses thrive and grow, to help support our economy, both locally and nationally”.
The impact assessment goes on:
“It is proposing to establish a service to complement existing provision and lead a culture change in how businesses resolve—and ultimately avoid—commercial disputes. It is proposed that the new Small Business Commissioner (SBC) would: empower small businesses to resolve disputes and avoid future issues through general advice and information, related to dispute resolution and contract principles; signpost to appropriate services eg sector ombudsman or regulator, existing independent advice service, approved alternative dispute resolution (ADR) provider or SBC complaints handling function and; consider complaints by small business suppliers about payment matters arising with larger businesses which they supply. These disputes may relate to pre-contractual negotiations as well as terms of the contract and new arrangements proposed once a contract is in place; for instance, if a firm feels it is being harmed by the other party’s unfair behaviour.”
Helping small businesses thrive and grow to help our economy is very much the right way for Government to intervene in support. The list of intended responsibilities I have just read out are all concerns shared by many small businesses. There are too many examples of larger customers treating their smaller suppliers in an unfair way, but one large group of larger customers is the public sector.
The Bill at present gives the Secretary of State the power to appoint and to dismiss. The Lords amended the Bill to allow the small business commissioner to appoint his or her own staff. However, the Secretary of State still has the power to appoint and dismiss the small business commissioner. This group of amendments seeks to make the appointment a Crown appointment, to ensure that the small business commissioner is in a position to help when the source of complaint or unfairness is the public sector. If the Secretary of State appoints and has the power to abolish, there may well be a reluctance on the part of the small business commissioner to challenge the very organisation that appointed him or her and which can abolish his or her role.
Kevin Brennan (Cardiff West) (Lab)
My hon. Friend makes a very interesting point. Perhaps there is a contemporary analogy with what the Government are currently doing in relation to charities: they are saying that where Government funding has been given to charities, those charities should not be able to use it to campaign in any way against Government policy. If the Government have such influence over the appointment and the very existence of the small business commissioner, does my hon. Friend think there is a danger, without our amendments, that the Government might seek to exert the same kind of influence on the small business commissioner as they do over the charities?
Bill Esterson
My hon. Friend makes a very good comparison. There are many examples where the closeness of the relationship means there is the potential for a conflict of interest. There are other examples, which I will come to, where there is an arm’s length relationship: our amendment attempts to forestall this potential conflict.
We certainly do not want the Secretary of State to have undue influence and the commissioner to feel constrained in his or her ability to act. After all, if we want small businesses to be as successful as possible, we want them to have independent support from the small business commissioner. People will rightly look to the commissioner to give a lead and give support, advice and encouragement to small businesses, which are, as I said at the start of my remarks, the backbone of our economy.
The Government do not intend the small business commissioner to have a role when it comes to disputes between small businesses and the public sector. As that is a source of much concern among small businesses, it seems certain that many complaints will go to the commissioner about the public sector. Even in relation to complaints against larger public sector businesses, if the Government do not like the way the commissioner is operating—this is at the heart of my hon. Friend’s intervention—the Secretary of State may decide to intervene and that implied threat could cause the commissioner to be less effective, through a reluctance to act.
Mary Creagh (Wakefield) (Lab)
I apologise to colleagues on the Committee, Mr Amess; I was cycling through and dropping my daughter at school.
The definition of what constitutes the public sector for the purposes of the Bill is an interesting one. We have all been up and down the Embankment and seen Transport for London’s cycle super-highway, but the definition of the contractors working on it, two or three steps removed from a Government body, is interesting. Perhaps Ministers might like to explore that further in their response to my hon. Friend’s comments.
Bill Esterson
I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention. The whole area of the supply chain and whether the Government have thought through some of the implications of exactly that example are among the challenges that we have tried to deal with not just through this group of amendments but elsewhere by giving the small business commissioner the opportunity to be as effective as possible. One of the problems of the commissioner only dealing with larger businesses is that they miss an opportunity and may be constrained in many ways, an example of which my hon. Friend has just given.
This group of amendments seeks to remove a potential obstacle to the small business commissioner’s being as effective as possible. Other amendments attempt to do the same thing with other elements of the way in which the Government have structured the office.
The Minister for Small Business, Industry and Enterprise (Anna Soubry)
indicated assent.
Bill Esterson
I am pleased that the Minister is confirming that from a sedentary position.
If the small business commissioner is to be as effective as possible on late payments, we need someone who can work not on the basis of a press release or the exhortations of Members of whichever House but constructively with businesses, learning the right lessons and creating the right solutions. That means not being an appointee of the Secretary of State, doing the Secretary of State’s bidding or wondering whether the Secretary of State will intervene with the potential for abolition.
It is important to note that the Institute of Directors has been forthright in its support of the amendments. The institute represents many directors, owners and operators of small businesses, so I suggest that it is worth listening to what it has to say:
“Together, these amendments would give the Small Business Commissioner a stronger footing from which to be a champion for small business. We fear that the possibility of abolition by the Secretary of State could potentially negatively impact the ability of the Small Business Commissioner to challenge that same Secretary of State. We hope for and anticipate a positive working relationship between the Commissioner and the Secretary of State”.
Lucy Frazer (South East Cambridgeshire) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir David. I want to ask the hon. Gentleman a question, for clarification. Do these two clauses stand alone, or are they conjoined? Would the hon. Gentleman be pressing for the appointment he suggests if there were not a successful amendment to include public authorities?
Bill Esterson
We are debating the first set of amendments, which are about appointment and dismissal. We will come to public bodies later. However, it is relevant to speak about them both; I have done so because the independence of the commissioner enables small businesses to have confidence that they can deal with the commissioner and that the commissioner will not be constrained by their relationship with Government, either in relation to other businesses or the public sector.
Mary Creagh
It is, of course, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir David—my apologies for failing to pay that courtesy earlier.
Is there not a wider point about public appointments and open competition? The Groceries Code Adjudicator was appointed after open competition. The great merit of putting out an advertisement and seeing who wants the job is that all sorts of people apply who may not be on the cocktails and canapés circuit frequented, perhaps, by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills. Is there not also a gender equality point, which is that people sometimes appoint in their own image and we end up, sadly, with an establishment group of figures who all—dare I say it— tend to look like many of the MPs in this place? We end up with a self-perpetuating group of people who may not be acting in the interests of the entrepreneurs. Many of the new entrepreneurs who have started will be young, tech savvy people. To see one of the usual suspects appointed to this position might risk alienating some of the people who might have need for his or her services.
Bill Esterson
I thank my hon. Friend for reminding us about the difference in how the Groceries Code Adjudicator has been set up. We will talk about the Groceries Code Adjudicator at a number of points during our deliberations. Indeed, we will be discussing an amendment later on the need to review the performance of that office so far.
Catherine McKinnell (Newcastle upon Tyne North) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir David.
Does my hon. Friend share my view that this is such an important issue for small businesses because we know that the issue of late payment, in particular, is a real challenge for them? It is in the Government’s interest that this body is as influential and powerful as it can be and that those small businesses see it as a visible presence and feel that it is their champion, not the Government’s or anybody else’s.
Bill Esterson
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. This is why we have tabled not just these amendments, but others, which are about making the post as effective as possible, so that it really is about championing business. This is the Enterprise Bill: it is about promoting enterprise as best we can. Small businesses are absolutely critical to driving enterprise, pushing forward productivity and improving the overall state of the economy. Getting this post right is a great opportunity to do just that. The interventions of both my hon. Friends just now demonstrate the importance of getting that appointment process right, so that the best person possible is appointed. As my hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield said, opening it up to the widest field possible is an important way of doing just that.
The commissioner will be someone whose terms of reference are quite clear. As things stand, he will be the creature of, and appointed by, the Secretary of State, and will have little security of employment, given the ability of the Secretary of State to dismiss him or her at the drop of a hat. He will be capable of being thrown out at the whim of a Minister. It would afford the business community a sense of confidence if our amendments were adopted. A small business that has problems with payment and other concerns about administration will find that this place person is in a job that affords the small business little or no protection or opportunity for redress of an independent character. At the end of the day, the operation of the office, as things stand, will be subject to the most minimal scrutiny and the report will be given, not to Parliament, but to the Secretary of State alone, which leaves one with grave concerns.
In the other place, the Minister said that if the commissioner was ineffective, there would be grounds for abolition. Surely the point is to set the post up in the first place to ensure that it is effective by giving him or her the necessary powers and independence. That means being outside the control or remit of the Department or the Secretary of State.
The Regulatory Reform Committee made an assessment which said:
“We therefore consider that it is inappropriate for the Bill to confer on the Secretary of State a Henry VIII power to abolish the Small Business Commissioner without any of the procedural restrictions (beyond the need for an affirmative resolution in each House) of the nature set out in the Public Bodies Act 2011, particularly that requiring consultation”.
I am concerned, as are my hon. Friends, that the general perception of how this provision was planned and developed under-appreciated the role that the body should play. The estimate is that it will deal with 500 complaints. I mentioned the Victoria commission in Australia. It dealt with 430 complaints of a comparative nature in its first year. Victoria is a state with 5.8 million people, a GDP perhaps one-tenth the size of that of the UK and with perhaps one-fifteenth of the number of small businesses. It had 430 cases, while our commissioner is planning to handle 500. That does not seem very ambitious for the role of the small business commissioner. Perhaps that is related to the way that it has been set up as part of the Department, reporting directly to the Secretary of State.
If the small business commissioner is set up only to address a tiny amount of work, it might raise the question how serious the Government are about making a difference to small businesses. Some might even suspect that the Government do not really intend for the office to be a great success and that therefore they will be in a position to deliver abolition down the line. It would be a great shame if that were the case.
The Government say that they envisage the role of the small business commissioner evolving over time. The workload grows and as businesses grow accustomed to the idea that there is someone to turn to, that is a likely development. If that happens, how will the office cope with the increased workload? Perhaps the Minister will consider that in her response. Remember, BIS faces sizable budget cuts. How will the small business commissioner be protected from those cuts, let alone be in a position to recruit additional staff?
We know that late payment is a significant problem, as my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne North reminded us in her intervention. The 500 anticipated cases a year will be the tip of the iceberg. What will happen if the small business commissioner does not have the opportunity to expand his or her office? The issue of who appoints and whether the office can be abolished by Ministers is part of the wider question of whether the office will be effective or not, a point made very well on Second Reading by the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly). It was also made many times by Members of the other place across the parties.
Catherine McKinnell
My hon. Friend is making a very important point. I wonder whether the Government have considered the importance of the role of the small business commissioner and the number of businesses that are likely to get in touch with them, because there is such a gap in the market for advice for small businesses. I know that from my constituency postbag, many small businesses come to me looking for advice and signposting for where they can get help and advice. My hon. Friend rightly points out that the proper resourcing and independence of the post are important for businesses to feel confident in the service provided.
Bill Esterson
My hon. Friend is right: businesses will expect this office to be able to handle their complaints. We might reasonably expect the level of complaints to be significantly higher than 500 from a small-business population of well over 5 million. It is not a good idea when standing on one’s feet, Mr Amess, to calculate the proportion of small businesses that would be involved if more than 500 out of 5 million were to approach the small business commissioner. I am sure somebody can work it out and give us the figure at some point. It is certainly a very small number.
Catherine McKinnell
To clarify, I feel the reason so many businesses come to me as an MP for advice on this issue is because the support and assistance provided to small businesses under the previous Labour Government disappeared in 2010. That has had a huge impact on small businesses and their ability to understand and navigate the system to find help and advice. Therefore, they come to their MP. I am always pleased to hear from businesses but it is a gap in the system in that they do not know where to go locally.
Bill Esterson
That is an excellent point. Like my hon. Friend, I find myself performing some of the roles and responsibilities set out for the small business commissioner on behalf of my constituents. Having been owner of a small business, I have sometimes been able to point them in the right direction. We would expect the small business commissioner to be in a position to give advice, support and encouragement. Later amendments will look at how that might be achieved if that office is to be given additional responsibilities.
Hannah Bardell (Livingston) (SNP)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir David. Does the hon. Gentleman share our concern? We are aware that the Government have targets for prompt payment but, as some Governments do, they have occasion to miss those targets. If the commissioner does not have the power in that jurisdiction, he or she cannot bring the Government and other larger organisations into line.
Bill Esterson
I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention, with which I agree. We will deal with that point in more detail in the next set of amendments, although it does have an impact on the appointment and dismissal process, as she rightly points out.
We want the commissioner to be effective. We want him or her to be able to help with late payments and to look at what other functions might make good additions as the office evolves, and that includes the point made by the hon. Lady.
The Federation of Small Businesses, the Institute of Directors and the British Chambers of Commerce often offer good advice, legal services and access to discounted business products such as insurance, and they are also good at helping businesses with disputes, but they are member organisations. Not every small business has a lawyer or accountant who is able to offer the full range of services. Many small businesses will need the office of the commissioner—just as an advice service was available under the previous Labour Government for businesses that had nowhere else to go—to provide advice, support, encouragement and dispute resolution directly, rather than just signposting elsewhere.
If the Minister expects the small business commissioner to signpost to those excellent organisations, she will need to ensure they can cope, because they might face a deluge of additional work. They have raised that concern with me, and no doubt also with the Minister. She will need to ensure that every business that approaches the small business commissioner wants to go to a membership organisation, where, of course, they will have to pay a fee—because I suspect that the Institute of Directors, the Federation of Small Businesses and the chambers of commerce will continue to charge for their services, as will solicitors, accountants and other professionals, if that is what the intention is when it comes to signposting. The small business commissioner will therefore also need to be in a position to develop his or her own capacity to help with disputes, whether related to late payment or not, to consider developing an advice and support function, and to look at areas such as procurement in the supply chain.
The ability to explore the options as the office develops will be restricted if the small business commissioner is, in reality, restricted by his or her relationship with the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. We want the small business commissioner to have the chance to be as effective as possible, and an important part of developing that effectiveness will be the way in which the small business commissioner is set up and his ability to operate as independently as possible. Otherwise, the question will remain whether the small business commissioner has the teeth to deliver for business and do the job of enabling enterprise to flourish.
The amendments to make the small business commissioner a Crown appointment are based on the legislation that set up the office of the Information Commissioner. The Information Commissioner is a public body, sponsored by a Department—the Ministry of Justice. In the case of the small business commissioner, we propose that BIS would sponsor the small business commissioner, so that he would not simply be part of the Department, answerable only to the Secretary of State. The Information Commissioner reports directly to Parliament. The office cannot be abolished by the Secretary of State; the individual office holder cannot be removed by the Secretary of State. The office’s decisions are supervised by the courts, not the Department. That is the level of independence afforded by a Crown appointment, and that is what is needed for the small business commissioner to be as effective as possible and to deliver for small businesses and enterprise.
The Australian model, for example, is not an appointment by a Minister; it is an appointment by the Governor-General, the Queen’s representative. That is the direct equivalent of what we are proposing. Three significant steps in the right direction were taken in the other place on this matter. The first was the designation of the small business commissioner as a corporation sole. The second was the amendment to have the small business commissioner appoint his own staff. The third was the new requirements on the Secretary of State to consult on any proposal to abolish the role. That is certainly a sign that we are moving in the right direction. It is a heartening indication that there is a shared sense that the small business commissioner needs to be free to act in the interest of small business. [Interruption.] I am fascinated to know what the Minister thinks is interesting, having heard what she has just said—she is very welcome to intervene and tell me. She is going to wait until her response.
Late payments and unfair payment terms are a long- term problem and they call for a long-term solution, with a role that is absolutely protected from the outset. These amendments to strengthen the independence of the small business commissioner offer that protection. The current commitment to establishing the role—the commitment to championing the interests of small businesses—is laudable. By strengthening the independence of the small business commissioner, our amendment would capture that commitment and change the conditions of appointment, removal and abolition of the post, which, as they stand, may leave the small business commissioner vulnerable in future.
That is a level of protection that remains even if the small business commissioner’s role sets him on a collision course with the Government of the day, as happened with the Information Commissioner over NHS IT programmes and the citizen information project. The Information Commissioner disagreed with the Government and did so publicly. We need that protection for the role of the small business commissioner—a clear statement in the legislation that says, “This post is here to stay and it will stand independent of Government, no matter the political priorities or budget constraints of the day.”
Establishing the small business commissioner as a corporation sole is a step in the right direction, but a corporation sole is more about the continuity of the post. It allows the post to pass without interval from one office holder to the next. It lays powers and legal status with the office, not the office holder, securing a level of continuity as the post passes from one person to the next. It gives the office holder some guarantee of independence, but the level of independence needed for the small business commissioner is not guaranteed purely by virtue of a designation of corporation sole.
Removing the ability of the Secretary of State to abolish the role is the key. If the small business commissioner is not appointed by, cannot be removed by and cannot be abolished by the Secretary of State, then he really achieves independence. This is the distinction between a corporation sole and a Crown appointment, and that is why our amendments are so important.
Anna Soubry
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir David. I hope that I am right in this, but I would like somebody to check: I note that 50% of the members of this Committee are men, which means that membership is half men and half women. I do not know whether that is a first, but it certainly must be for a business Bill going through this House. It is a welcome development. Too often, in my experience, the highest levels of businesses tend to be dominated by men. I just thought I would say that.
Catherine McKinnell
I very much agree with the point that the Minister has made, but I must say that it is Labour that has upped the ante in terms of female representation on this Committee. As ever, in terms of 50:50, the Government are letting us down.
Anna Soubry
I am not responding to that; the hon. Lady may be right.
I will address my comments to the amendment moved by the hon. Member for Sefton Central. I will rebut much of what has been said by establishing the history of how the small business commissioner came to be placed within the Enterprise Bill. I agree with everything he said about the value to the economy of small businesses. We are absolutely and utterly agreed on that. We understand their huge value and their importance to building a successful economy.
The idea started with the Conservative party manifesto commitment to consider setting up a conciliation service specifically on the point of late payment, which as we all know is a serious matter for concern, notably for small businesses. Having come into office, as I considered how to achieve that, it became obvious that there are already a number of ways to supply such a service. That is the sort of matter that we will undoubtedly debate in this Committee. Having learned of the great workings of the Australian small business commissioner—hon. Members will hear much about the work of Mark Brennan; I have spoken to him at length—I came to the conclusion, and I assure hon. Members that my Secretary of State absolutely agreed, that a small business commissioner should be created specifically to address the problem of late payment.
I put it on the record clearly: it would be utterly bizarre of this Government to want to positively create an office with the apparent intention of abolishing it at some later date. The idea has come from me and the Secretary of State; it is a position that we want. We would love for the position to abolish itself in time, because we would love it if there were no complaints about late payment. Unfortunately, we think that is an ideal that we will not achieve, however much we might strive.
Kevin Brennan
The Minister is making a reasonable point, but she knows that she cannot fetter what future Administrations of any party do. Neither can we, but we can ensure that the body cannot be abolished at the whim of a Minister rather than by going through some other due process.
Catherine McKinnell
I agree that the Minister is making a reasonable point, but does she accept that the Government are being cautious in setting up the body, possibly out of fear that it could become more powerful than she anticipates? If it begins to direct any concern towards the Government or state changes that the Government ought to be making to support small businesses, it will run the risk of a conflict of interest with the Government’s direct appointment of the commissioner.
Anna Soubry
It may be a surprise, but I do not agree with the hon. Lady. I can understand why she might raise that concern, but I honestly believe that because of how we are introducing the office—it will be a public appointment just like any other—the sort of proposal made by the hon. Lady through the shadow Minister would not make much difference, if any, to the person appointed. I am going to explain why that is.
Hannah Bardell
The right hon. Lady is making a powerful speech and strongly advocating for the commissioner. We support the notion of the commissioner, but does she agree that if the commissioner does not have the powers or the teeth to enforce its decisions, it cannot ultimately do justice to its office?
Anna Soubry
That is not part of these amendments, and I want to confine my comments to these. We will have that debate later, as we discuss other amendments.
Mary Creagh
The hon. Lady says that she wants the person appointed to command not just the respect of the large companies and organisations that will be accountable to this person, but the confidence of small businesses. Is not the lesson from the Groceries Code Adjudicator that it is imperative to gain the confidence of small businesses and small suppliers, and that any perception—real or imagined—that this person is the creature of big business would be devastating to this office? This person’s authority comes from the office that they will hold.
Anna Soubry
Hon. Members on both sides need to have confidence in the system that exists, whereby the person we appoint will have all the qualities that we know they must have in order to do the job. That person is going to be the most critical factor in the success of this office. We absolutely know that.
Anna Soubry
I am not going to give way; otherwise, we will be full of interventions.
Anna Soubry
I am sorry, but we need to make some progress. The appointment of the small business commissioner by the Secretary of State will not compromise his or her independence. It will be a public appointment, subject to all the usual public appointments rules and procedures. There would be little material difference to the appointment process if this were a Crown appointment.
Catherine McKinnell
While the Minister is on her feet, will she clarify exactly why this should not be a Crown appointment, rather than a ministerial one? Will she clarify that for the Committee and members of the public, because it is not clear why that is the case?
Anna Soubry
I absolutely will. A Crown appointment is made on the advice of Ministers. Effectively, we get exactly the same process, but with a different stamp on it. This will be a public appointment that will go through the usual procedures. It will be advertised. As for the idea that this is going to be somebody from the cocktail and canapés circuit, forgive me, but those days have long gone. That is certainly not the way that I operate or that my Secretary of State operates. We take considerable care to make sure we get the right person in place. I actually take a little exception to the idea that I go to cocktail and canapé parties to select someone. I personally make a great effort to ensure that we have people who represent the diversity in our society. I am quite robust in my views, as I am rather anti-establishment, and I will bend over backwards to ensure that we get the right person in place. I am confident that when we advertise this job, a large number of people will come forward with exactly the sort of qualities we need.
The amendments made by the Government in the other place have already increased the independence of the commissioner by giving him or her a separate legal identity as a corporation sole. As we know, the commissioner can appoint staff and receive public funding. Those are the key hallmarks of an independent body. Nothing stands to be gained in practice from the suggested amendments, which would only add considerable delay and complication to getting the commissioner up and running. It is normal practice for the Secretary of State to be able to terminate public appointments. The Secretary of State cannot dismiss a commissioner at will, but only if the individual is unable, unwilling or unfit to perform their functions.
It is good that we are having this debate so that we can give people the confidence in what we hope to achieve and in the mechanisms by which we will make the appointment to get what we all want—an independent small business commissioner who will be utterly focused on looking at late payments, free from any form of interference or abuse of office. The commissioner will have an independent spirit but will come from the right background, so that they have the confidence, most importantly, of small businesses to be their champion in solving the problem of late payments.
Bill Esterson
Thank you, Sir David. I apologise for omitting your title earlier. I thank the Minister for her brief response, but I do not think that she has really answered the questions we posed. I am glad that there is broad agreement about the value to the economy of small businesses, and I reiterate that our approach to part 1 of the Bill is about trying to strengthen the post as much as possible so that businesses and the wider economy really can benefit from it. I understand why the post has been set up to look at late payments, rather than at some of the wider issues, as the problem of late payments has existed for more years than many of us will remember. I understand why the Government have gone down that route, although it is a shame that the commissioner has not been set up to draw on some of the successful experiences as well as the remits of the arrangements in America and Australia.
The Minister said that the commissioner would not—I am not sure whether she said “could not”, so I will assume that she said “would not”—be abolished at will. However, the role can be abolished by affirmative resolution of both Houses and, in Parliament, that is pretty close when one party has an overall majority in the Commons. It is unlikely that the Lords would object. I take on board the point that if it were proved that the commissioner was not up to the job, the commissioner would be removed, but there is a difference between that and abolishing the post.
The Minister said that the small business commissioner needs to command the respect of large and small businesses alike. I completely agree but there is a concern among the representative organisations that the lack of independence that comes from being an effective part of the Department will make it difficult for the commissioner to command that respect, particularly the respect of the small business community. Large business is effective at lobbying and has effective relationships with the Government, and that is much harder for individual small businesses and for small businesses collectively.
Catherine McKinnell
The Minister gave a short but fairly robust response to some of the concerns that our amendment seeks to address. Would my hon. Friend agree that it is not just about the reality—whatever that might be—but about the perception as well? It is really important for small businesses to have confidence in the commissioner. Perhaps the Minister is not taking on board some of the concerns that people have, whether real or perceived, about the Government’s relationship with big business.
Bill Esterson
That is right. We are trying to achieve a level playing field. This is not about preferring small business over large, it is about making sure that the relationship is equitable. In the same way, the Groceries Code Adjudicator was set up to make sure that the behaviour of some of the large supermarkets was not excessive and their relationship with their suppliers was fair and equitable.
I did not get the sense of an answer or a justification of why this should not be a Crown appointment. I thought the Minister’s argument could equally have reached the conclusion that it should have been a Crown appointment. For that reason, I would like to test the will of the Committee and press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Bill Esterson
I beg to move amendment 37, in clause 1, page 1, line 9, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
“(b) to consider complaints from small businesses relating to matters in connection with the supply of goods and services to—
(i) larger businesses and
(ii) public authorities
and to make recommendations.”
This amendment would widen the consideration of complaints function to cover complaints from small businesses relating to matters in connection with the supply of goods and services to larger businesses and to public authorities (as defined in clause 13).
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss:
Amendment 45, in clause 3, page 4, line 9, leave out paragraph (c)
This amendment would include public authorities in the definition of “larger business”, and therefore extend the Small Business Commissioner’s remit to include consideration of complaints by small businesses relating to public authorities.
The Chair
I refer the hon. Gentleman to the remarks I made at the start of the proceedings. That comes after this debate; the hon. Gentleman is a little ahead of himself.
Bill Esterson
I apologise. My notes are slightly out of order. Some might say that there is much about me that is out of order, but I leave that to others to decide. Amendments 37 and 45 relate to the public sector, which we have already touched on once or twice. While late payment in the public sector is less prevalent than in the private sector, with £187 billion spent annually on goods and services by the public sector, any level of late payment is damaging to the economy and to small business.
Government Departments’ target to pay 80% of invoices within five working days might look good on the surface, but it tends to mask a culture of late payment to small and medium businesses, which fare far worse than large companies in dealing with the Government. EU directive 2011/7 on combatting late payment and commercial transactions makes payments within 30 days mandatory for public authorities, with administration fees and interest applied to late payments, but there is no evidence of public authorities automatically adding these penalties when invoices are paid late. More has to be done, and the small business commissioner should be championing small businesses’ rights with public authorities, as well as with larger companies. It is what small businesses will expect when they see the phrase small business commissioner, and when they approach that office.
Mary Creagh
I might be anticipating the Minster unfairly, but I remember from my days as a councillor and from working with small businesses that cash is king. That is not necessarily understood by civil servants working for local authorities. Does my hon. Friend remember the days of local authorities being able to get interest rates as high as 9% with certain Icelandic banks? I am thinking of several of the ones that collapsed in 2007-08.
When interest rates are high, there is an incentive for treasury managers in public authorities, such as councils and generally central Government, to take that money and use it. When interest rates are 9%, if an authority has £10 million, that is a significant amount of money that could be earned while, unintentionally I am sure, it starves small local businesses of the cash they need to survive.
Bill Esterson
My hon. Friend is right. I was a councillor at the time as well and remember the investments in certain Icelandic banks. More than a few local authorities were caught badly as a result. Her point is well made.
On the benefits to larger firms—and we will deal with this when we discuss cash retentions in the construction sector—there is evidence of the use of moneys due, particularly to smaller firms, to help the cash flow of the larger firm. That is potentially true in the public sector, as my hon. Friend said. Dealing with that is one reason to explore bringing the public sector within the remit of the small business commissioner.
The last Federation of Small Businesses members’ survey assessing late payments by the public versus the private sector was conducted in 2012. It consisted of responses from nearly 9,000 FSB members and confirmed that although larger companies are the worst offenders with late payments, late payment in the public sector is still a big issue. According to the survey, 27% of Government agencies paid SMEs late and 29% of SME invoices from the UK central Government were paid late, so central Government were slightly worse than local. A more up-to-date assessment of late payment by central Government is found in the National Audit Office’s paper “Paying Government suppliers on time” from January 2015. The study covered all central Government Departments but looked in detail at the payment practice of the Ministry of Defence, the Home Office, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Cabinet Office.
Central Government spend £40 billion a year on goods and services, of which about £4.5 billion is spent directly with SMEs. An additional £4 billion is spent with SMEs indirectly where SMEs are subcontractors to Government contracts. The wider public sector—for example, local authorities and NHS trusts—spends £147 billion a year on goods and services.
Government Departments have a target to pay 80% of undisputed invoices within five working days and report good performance against those targets, but the NAO study calls into question the idea that Departments are paying their suppliers promptly.
Caroline Flint (Don Valley) (Lab)
My hon. Friend mentions the role of local authorities and health trusts as regards the supply chain in local communities. In my area of Doncaster, I would add the Prison Service. I have three prison establishments in my constituency, and there is another prison within Doncaster town, and we can add to that the fire service and policing. A huge number of our more provincial towns and communities do not necessarily have the big corporate companies but are the supply chain for the public service in all its diversity and in meeting the needs of local people. It would be short-sighted not to look at how we can ensure within our communities that those public services pay our small businesses in good time.
Bill Esterson
My right hon. Friend makes a very good point. The public sector is an incredibly important part of the economy in many parts of the country. We have a collective responsibility, whether in Parliament or elsewhere, to get this right and ensure that the public sector is doing its bit. That is really important.
Catherine McKinnell
Speaking of areas of the country that depend on these issues, I have a useful figure that may help my hon. Friend. The accounting, payroll and human resources corporation Sage, which is based in my constituency, has suggested that £55 billion in outstanding invoices is currently owed to the UK’s small and medium-sized businesses. That is an astounding figure and of great concern. The CBI’s recent survey of north-east SMEs found that 53% of the worst offenders are large firms, but that a third come from the public sector, so the public sector represents a significant proportion of the significant sum of money that is outstanding.
Bill Esterson
Yes, and those figures are higher than in the 2012 Federation of Small Businesses survey. The figures demonstrate that, as I touched on earlier, the smallest firms that lack the ability to pursue cases are the most vulnerable to the problem of late payment, wherever it comes from. Certainly in the case of the public sector, we have a duty and a responsibility to ensure that payment is on time and to look after the smallest firms in particular and business in general. That is an important part of what the Government should be doing to encourage and generate our enterprise culture—this is the Enterprise Bill—and to ensure that the economy is successful through the support that the public sector can give to business.
I was talking about the four Departments that the National Audit Office looked at in detail: the Ministry of Defence, the Home Office, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Cabinet Office. The National Audit Office shows that those Departments’ apparently good payment record is skewed by a high volume of low-value e-transactions with a few large suppliers. Those payments are dominated by large companies, such as the ones the Departments use to book train tickets and order office supplies. Basically, Departments can get close to hitting their payment performance targets just by using their procurement cards and by paying their e-invoices from a few large companies straightaway.
If we dig past the misleading top line and look past the e-invoices from large companies, we see a different picture. None of the four Departments that the NAO looked at measures its performance in paying SMEs, which typically use paper invoices. Looking at the average payment time for paper invoices shows that the time taken by the four Departments to hit the 80% payment target jumps from five days to between three and seven weeks—a very different picture.
The Asset Based Finance Association conducted research in 2014 that showed that the average wait for payment is still in excess of 40 days for some local authorities, and that the average wait for payment from local authorities is virtually unchanged over the past six years, from 17.7 days then to 17.3 days more recently. EU directive 2011/7 makes make it mandatory for all public authorities to settle invoices in a maximum of 30 days from receipt. It is aimed at making pursuing payment a simpler process across the European Union and making payment on time the norm. One point that occurs to me from my experience of invoicing is that sometimes the date on which an invoice is received is a matter of great debate, because accounting departments may say that they have not received an invoice for many days, if not weeks. It will be interesting to see how that is to be defined; there are ways around the problem using electronic invoicing or recorded postal delivery, or suchlike, but most SME invoicing does not happen in those ways.
Under the directive, the failure of public authorities to pay within 30 days leads to interest of 8% being added from day one of late payment, subject to agreement on when the late payment is recognised. There is an admin fee of £40, £70 or £100, depending on whether the invoice is under £1,000, under £10,000 or over £10,000. That is a step in the right direction. However, the Local Government Association released a paper in 2014 saying that there is no evidence of any public authorities automatically adding the penalties when invoices are paid late. The Institute of Credit Management has said it is not aware that interest is automatically being paid. The House of Commons Library has also confirmed that it has not seen evidence of public authorities automatically adding the penalties—so the question is, how is this going to happen unless there is automatic addition of interest and penalties?
Although the user guide is clear, the automatic nature of the obligation is less clear when we review the specific statements in both the EU directive on late payment and the Late Payment of Commercial Debts Regulations 2013. Essentially, without automatic penalties, the interest and admin fees imposed for late payments still require SMEs to stick their head above the parapet and challenge their public sector customers. As I am sure all hon. Members are aware, that is a real problem. Once businesses start to challenge their own customers, they risk losing their custom later on, which is a real dilemma. It is the same dilemma that small businesses face with large suppliers, and it happens in the public sector as well. It is about businesses being asked to sour relations with their own customers.
I have an example from my own constituency. One start-up company had a contract with a public authority. The company was paid 30 days after the five-day terms laid out in the invoice. It had paid up front for the supplies needed to carry out the work, so it was left in a precarious financial position within six months of starting up. It could have made use of the rights available to it within existing legislation—a £70 administration fee and interest on the contract value. However, when the debtor did not automatically add the interest and fee, the company chose not to pursue it. It told me:
“As a start-up, repeat business with the public sector is no different to repeat business with the private sector: we rely on both to get by, and we know that they have more options than we do about who to do business with. Of course we don’t have to keep quiet, avoiding admin fees and interest on invoices—just like they don’t have to use us again. It’s a bad situation when you’re lurching from one loan to the next because you aren’t getting the money you’re owed. But whether it’s the public or private sector it’s the same point—you don’t bite the hand that feeds you.”
The Bill sets up the small business commissioner only to address complaints or disputes against large businesses. It currently excludes complaints against public sector organisations. Many small businesses find trading with the public sector very difficult, and we have seen some of the reasons why.
Mary Creagh
My hon. Friend has made an excellent point about the psychology of start-up businesses in particular—the David and Goliath psychology between the very small supplier and the very large purchaser. Does he agree that making the commissioner work with public authorities as well would force better financial management practice on those authorities? If the law states that they should pay within five days and they do not, but instead pay within 30, 60 or 90 days, the financial managers in the public sector who are doing that should be held to account. Levying fines and interest payments is a poor use of public sector money in these straitened times. At the end of the day, this is all taxpayers’ money, and it should not matter to the financial managers whether it is sitting in their Treasury account or going to the small businesses who are in the community and creating jobs.
Bill Esterson
Yes, that is right. We are trying to create an opportunity for the small business commissioner to make sure that payment practices are carried out correctly in the public sector. As my hon. Friend says, there is a massive opportunity here to make sure that all public authorities are doing their bit to support the economy. The money could be out in the economy, going through small businesses that will then reuse it elsewhere. We get the benefits and the economic growth that comes from that.
Mary Creagh
It also occurs to me that if we end up with a two-tier system with the small business commissioner, we could end up in a paradoxical situation where small businesses would choose to supply the private sector rather than deal with public sector purchasers, and the public sector would miss out.
Bill Esterson
I thank my hon. Friend for that point: we might almost think that the Government had designed it so that that would be the consequence.
Many small businesses find trading with the public sector very different, because of late payment and retentions in the construction sector, and because of the arrangements for contracting, procurement and tendering. Given that the public sector is such a large part of the trade of small firms and one of their biggest markets, it seems odd that the small business commissioner is not going to be constituted in a way that will allow support to be provided when the public sector is involved. That is the point my hon. Friend made. In fact, the issues of late payment and retentions, contracting, procurement and tendering are the same whether the business being contracted for is with the public or the private sector. The imbalance in the relationship between large and small is the same in both sectors, and the need for a level playing field is the same.
Public sector organisations that buy from the private sector should treat large and small businesses equally, yet many of the complaints from small businesses suggest that large firms have the advantage in tendering and other contractual matters in their relationships with both public and private sectors. Certainly my own experience in business was that it was almost impossible, as a small business, to get anywhere in tendering or even in getting past the pre-qualifying questionnaire. I know that that is a complaint often made by small firms: there seems to be an automatic decision to choose the larger firm when it comes to contracting.
If we want the small business commissioner to be as effective as possible, we should enable and, indeed, encourage him or her to explore and address the challenges where they lie and where small business wants support and advice. It makes sense for small businesses to have one place to go to for help, no matter the cause of complaint. If what the Government want the small business commissioner to address late payment as a priority, it makes sense for the commissioner to address late payment, not just some late payment. Whether a small business has difficulty being paid, progressing with tenders or developing its business with large customers, many of the same difficulties of anonymous organisations present themselves. The idea of a one-stop shop seems to make a lot of sense, and this group of amendments is an attempt to give teeth to the commissioner from the outset and not to limit his or her remit.
In the Lords, the Government said they did not want to include the public sector because there are other arrangements for complaints against the public sector, and for mediation. The obvious answer is that the difficulties that small businesses face are such that the existing arrangements are not sufficient, just as the existing arrangements are not sufficient in relation to late payment and other relationships between large and small firms in the private sector.
Alan Brown (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (SNP)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir David.
The hon. Gentleman makes a valid point. I agreed with what he said earlier about the relationships between businesses and their clients in the public sector. He pointed out that the current arrangements do not work. There is also a risk associated with Government cuts in the public sector, because one of the easiest places to make cuts is in the backroom staff who process invoices and so on. If the current system is not working, there is a risk that things will get worse for small businesses. It is really important that the public sector is included along with private businesses, so that the small business commissioner can hold them to account.
Bill Esterson
That is an excellent point, because it highlights the fact that when Ministers and Government MPs say that cuts can be made in administration or in non-essential roles, there are consequences. As the hon. Gentleman says, one of the consequences is in accounting departments, and there is a potential knock-on effect of the late payment of small businesses. One reason why it would be a good idea to include the public sector is that the commissioner could shine a light on some of those problems, gaps and staff shortages. They could say to the Government that they should rethink the scale of cuts in the public sector, that the consequences of those cuts also have an effect on the private sector and the wider economy, and that perhaps those Treasury decisions should be reconsidered. Of course, that is much harder to do if the commissioner is part of the Department and owes his survival in post to the Secretary of State.
The Groceries Code Adjudicator was set up, albeit on a limited scale, and we could learn much from that experience when considering how best to set up the small business commissioner. When I say “a limited scale”, I mean that a three-day-a-week adjudicator with five members of staff is responsible for 7,000 suppliers with 300,000 indirect suppliers that are not even part of her remit.
The Groceries Code Adjudicator was set up to address the imbalance between large supermarkets and their suppliers, because there had been a long-standing problem. There is also a long-standing problem in how many small businesses are treated by some public sector organisations, and the creation of the small business commissioner is an opportunity to address problems for small businesses, regardless of where those problems originate. That includes working with the Groceries Code Adjudicator.
One learning point from the Groceries Code Adjudicator, by the way, is that she has spent much of her time explaining to suppliers and others what her role and remit are, leaving her much less time to devote to addressing the concerns of the industry, which was why the office was set up in the first place. Maybe that is one reason why, after two years, she has held only one investigation, welcome though that investigation of Tesco is. We should take that experience on board.
The adjudicator has raised concerns about suppliers’ reluctance to complain and difficulties in ensuring confidentiality in the complaints process. We will move amendments on those points later in our discussions. Hopefully, we can learn from the Groceries Code Adjudicator to ensure that the small business commissioner is as effective as possible, as early as possible.
On the relationship between small businesses and the public sector, there are sometimes supply chain situations in which a small business supplies goods to a private sector customer, who in turn contracts with the public sector. My hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield made that point earlier. Construction is a good example; we will come to the issue of cash retentions in the construction industry numerous times in our deliberations.
If a small business is not paid by a larger customer, which in turn is struggling because of delays by a public sector organisation, I can see how the small business might approach the small business commissioner for help but be told that the complaint is beyond the scope of the small business commissioner due to the involvement of the public sector. The simple answer to that and other disputes with the public sector is for the small business commissioner to be able to intervene in all cases brought to him or her by small businesses. As the Minister did not respond earlier to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield about supply chains involving the public sector, perhaps she will do so this time.
The amendment also address the fact that most small business trade is with other small businesses; again, larger firms and the public sector are often somewhere in the supply chain. I believe that such disputes are also excluded from the small business commissioner’s remit, unless the Minister tells us otherwise. There is a wider business environment, and for the small business commissioner to deliver, it needs to be able to do so regardless of the nature of the parties involved.
During the debate in the other place, I noticed that there was discussion of how late payment could not be considered in isolation. It was suggested that to address late payment effectively, the small business commissioner would also have to consider commissioning and operations. As hon. Members will know, payment in business is due only if a contract has been properly agreed and completed to the satisfaction of both parties. There are legal definitions of what constitutes the completion of a contract, which go beyond my limited knowledge of the law. The argument was made in the Lords that late payment is often the result of disagreement about contract matters and about whether a product or service has been delivered as agreed. As a result, it is difficult to see how the small business commissioner will be able to consider late payment in isolation.
The point was also made in the Lords that if small businesses want help with late payments or anything else and are told that the Government have set up a wonderful new service, but are then told that the small business commissioner is not allowed to help with their particular problem, they will feel let down by the Government. It will reinforce the impression that the Government are not really interested in helping; that they are not really on their side; that they stand up for some groups, but not others; that they are there for the Googles and tax havens of this world but not for small businesses. That impression already exists through measures such as the introduction of quarterly filing of tax returns, the scrapping of the growth fund and business accelerator and the movement from grants to loans for small businesses. The creation of the small business commissioner is an opportunity to put some balance back, but only if it is done in the right way. That means not restricting where the small business commissioner investigates. It should be able to look at other elements of the business relationship, including commissioning, procurement and operations, and its remit should include the public sector and other small businesses.
The Government want the small business commissioner to concentrate on late payments. Given the scale of the problem, we do not object to that, although it is not the way in which the Australian commissioners have been set up. The advice from Australia, from the excellent Mark Brennan, has been that having late payments as the commissioner’s main focus might limit the role, because late payment is about a lot more than the immediate issue of whether a particular invoice is late. The commissioner could and should be able to do a lot more, and should have an important role in improving the wider business environment for small business and the economy as a whole. Better information is an important part of having a successful economy, with low barriers to entry, that encourages and supports the growth of businesses or all ages and sizes. Having the appropriate regulations to ensure fair competition is another important element.
It is clear from the successful work of Mark Brennan that there is an opportunity for our small business commissioner to provide information and work towards the right kind of regulation that ensures a fair economy. On Second Reading, the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly) raised concern about the narrow remit of the small business commissioner, and I agree with him that it lacks teeth. There is an opportunity for the commissioner to do much more than look at 500 late payments a year when there are 5 million small businesses. That sounds like just scratching the surface.
Lord Mendelsohn made the point that the small business commissioner could look at so much more, including
“access to information and education; advocacy to government; investigation of small business complaints and business behaviour; facilitating the resolution of disputes, including and especially through mediation; influencing small business-conscious government and other key stakeholders, including regulators, media and the business community; and ensuring that such a commissioner would operate with an attitude of being concerned with substance rather than technicality and a dedication to resolving disputes by encouraging commercially realistic attitudes”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 25 November 2015; Vol. 767, c. 733]
He also made the point that an effective small business commissioner should be expected to help the wider business environment and the economy as a whole, as his or her role is to ensure fairness, not to see one party succeed at the expense of another.
The Lords were also concerned that a mediation role was to be excluded from the function of the small business commissioner. In Australia, the ability to resolve disputes through mediation and direct involvement has been one of the reasons for the success of the office across the country and in a number of different states. Mediation has meant the commissioner working with large businesses as well as small and has enabled the small business commissioner to build profile, credibility and influence. In Australia, if a large firm refuses to take part in mediation with the small business commissioner, that can be taken into account when costs are being considered during court action. The Australian small business commissioner has teeth—very sharp ones—and it is a great shame that ours appears to be lacking in bite. The small business commissioner’s ability to direct small businesses to another organisation that may be able to help clearly has value, but in some cases the commissioner may well be best placed to help and, as in Australia, may be more effective in a wider sense. The purpose of the amendments, which relate to the public sector, is to give a wider sense of how we can build on the commissioner’s initial role of tackling late payments.
Anna Soubry
Again, I shall keep my comments specifically to the amendments. The small business commissioner’s main role will be to address the problem of late payments, and the biggest problem that small businesses face with late payments is bigger businesses not paying them in the way that they want. However, there is also a problem with the public sector. Our consultation made it clear that people did not want a duplication of existing ways and means by which small businesses can ensure that public bodies pay on time. If we expanded the small business commissioner’s remit to include public bodies, we would duplicate pre-existing ways of raising a complaint and dealing with the problem.
Anna Soubry
I am going to continue. I will take some interventions, but not yet.
This Government are on the side of small businesses and, in the Public Contracts Regulations 2015, we now have strict rules obliging central Government to ensure that 80% of undisputed invoices are paid within five days. As a result, I am pleased to say that my Department paid 98.6% within five days and 99.5% within 30 days. The first quarter statistics for 2015-16 show that, on average, central Government Departments paid 89% of undisputed invoices in five days. We have set clear rules for how we expect all public authorities to deal with small businesses in particular.
However, notwithstanding the regulations that we introduced, the strong messages that we are sending out and the way in which we are putting into practice what we preach, there is evidence that that does not necessarily go all the way through the supply chain. I think that was the point that the hon. Member for Wakefield was making, and no doubt the concern of the hon. Member for Doncaster—
Anna Soubry
Oh, she’s not right honourable. Anyway, that was their point, and it is important. At first blush, it looks like a good idea, but there are pre-existing ways of tackling the issue. If we were to extend the small business commissioner’s powers, the danger is that we would duplicate existing ways of curing the problem. It was made clear in our consultation that that was exactly what small businesses did not want. For that reason, I urge hon. Members not to support what looks, at first, like a good idea. The Public Contracts Regulations 2015 are in place, and the guidance is absolutely clear to everyone involved in the spending of public money through public authorities, whether local government or hospital trusts.
If the process is not working, there are ways of curing mischiefs. First, any small business will the ombudsman service available to it. The local government ombudsman is a good example of a pre-existing body that can take up complaints. The second—although I accept that it may not be well known—is the mystery shopper service. I completely accept that its title does not give much clue about the huge work it can do, but we know that it is working. I refer hon. Members to one of the excellent speeches—in fact, all her speeches were excellent—of my noble Friend Baroness Neville-Rolfe, who is a Minister in my Department. In Committee in the other place, she gave a really good example from the Ministry of Defence of where a small business in a supply chain had found it was not being paid in the way it should have been. It used the mystery shopper service, which can be done anonymously. The problem was solved and that small business got exactly the result it wanted.
I have no difficulty with ensuring that the influence and investigatory powers of the mystery shopper service are made more widely available. It is a good example of the pre-existing means and methods by which small businesses can take action against public authorities other than going to law. No doubt we will come to this in debates on further amendments, but we have to be very careful, because if a company has agreed to a contract and seeks redress, it will have to go to law. We are looking at alternatives to that, because of what we know about companies pursuing things by way of legal action.
Mary Creagh
I am delighted to hear about Baroness Neville-Rolfe’s conversion to being on the side of the small company, given that she spent most of her career working for Tesco, which has just been censured by the Groceries Code Adjudicator for its massive, systematic non-payment and late payment of small businesses, which was a clear use of late payment for treasury management and an abuse of its suppliers in asking them to pay up-front fees for the privilege of supplying Tesco. There is more joy in heaven over one small sinner that repented, as the prodigal son parable tells us.
I would expect the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills to pay its suppliers on time. If the Government Department charged with looking after small businesses does not do it, what hope is there for the rest of Government? Where is the evidence that the regulations brought in last year have forced changes in payments? For example, is there any evidence of that in the case of the largest purchaser of goods, services and equipment, the Department of Health?
The Chair
Order. This is an intervention rather than a speech, so will the hon. Lady come to a conclusion?
Mary Creagh
I now regret not making a speech—this only came to me as I was listening to the Minister. Is there evidence of any behaviour change towards small businesses in national or local government? Will she set out, for the record, what the mystery shopper service is, because I am sure that people reading Hansard will be keen to know.
Anna Soubry
I thought I had read out the figures that show a huge change; I am happy to read them out again. I am resisting all temptation to say that it is rather strange that the Labour party seems to have done diddly squat during the 13 years when they could have solved all these problems. This Government have made a significant change. For the purposes of Hansard, I repeat that BIS paid 96.8% of those undisputed invoices within five days and 99.5% within 30 days. I am happy for us to get all the statistics, if they exist, that show the real strides we are taking.
Anna Soubry
I will give way in a moment. I know that it is difficult for Labour Members—they can dish it out, but they can’t take it. There is real evidence that we are seeing this trickling all the way down. However, as I have conceded—I am being as fair as I hope to be—I am concerned that it is not going all the way down through the supply chain. I have conceded that the name of the mystery shopper service may be a little not brilliant, but what is important is whether it delivers. There is absolute evidence that it does.
I think my noble Friend Baroness Neville-Rolfe would take exception to the rather cheap dig made about her, because she is absolutely on the side of small businesses. I know that she has been involved with a number of small businesses. For the record, she was not on the board of Tesco when it behaved in that unacceptable way. Thank goodness that a Conservative-led Government introduced the Groceries Code Adjudicator to bring Tesco to book—but we are going off the point. She gave a good example from the Ministry of Defence of exactly how the mystery shopper service is working. The more we advertise it, the better.
Caroline Flint
Of course, as head of public affairs, Baroness Neville-Rolfe spent a lot of time defending how Tesco treated farmers and everyone else. The problem is not going to go away, whatever the outcome of these proceedings.
Can the Minister, to help the Committee, provide us with full details in writing of the record of every Department, and maybe also some other parts of the public sector, on payments? The issue is not just about payment from a Department to one supplier; often other, smaller suppliers are subcontracted as well. It goes way beyond that. It is a missed opportunity, particularly for the number of areas of the country, including my own, in which small and medium-sized businesses depend on the public sector in all its variety, not to include them in the Bill.
Anna Soubry
If those figures exist, of course I am more than happy to share them. However, as I have said, the first quarter statistics for 2015-16 show that on average, central Government Departments paid 89%—we have exceeded our own target—of undisputed invoices within five days. However, I absolutely agree with the point that the right hon. Lady was trying to make, which is—
Anna Soubry
At least let me finish my point. My point is that the problem may well exist within the supply chain. We know that regulations from central Government are hugely important in driving the change required. We also know three things. First, there are ombudsmen who can absolutely assist in curing such mischief. That is the first place where many small businesses can go. Secondly, there is the mystery shopper service, which, as I have said, is already providing evidence that it is curing the problem.
The third way in which we ensure that cultural change occurs—we must be honest about this—is when a small business comes to us as constituency MPs: we are in a unique position to go to our local authorities. We usually do so rather quietly; it does not have to involve bells and singing and dancing. We speak to the leadership of our local authorities, both officers and councillors—often of our own persuasion, although that matters not—to say, “I have an example of a small business. I won’t give you their name, but I have evidence, and I am concerned. Let’s change the culture within our local authority and do something about it.”
For example, somebody has approached me with a problem relating to a construction project of which I am aware. As the Minister, I am taking that up directly with the chief executive of the hospital trust involved to ensure that the trickle-down of cultural change goes all the way through the supply chain.
Caroline Flint
The Minister makes an interesting point about the role of MPs. One could say the same about MPs going to businesses in communities and making the point there, but the Bill offers support for the small business commissioner to deal with the private sector.
On the point that the Minister made about the percentage of undisputed bills that are sorted, does she not agree that the extent of business that goes on varies enormously across Government? I gently suggest that it might be interesting to compare the transactions between the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and SMEs with the volume and size in monetary terms of the contracts between the Department of Health, for instance, and the small business community. I would say they are very different. I hope she will write to the Committee to provide more detail about volume and monetary value, because 89% in BIS may be very different from, say, 70% in the Department of Health or elsewhere.
Anna Soubry
The Department of Health, no doubt, has very few contracts because it is not the Department that delivers, but the clinical commissioning groups and hospital trusts. It is important that the Labour party understands how the Government and business work. The Government and the previous Conservative-led Government simplified public sector procurement and abolished the pre-qualification questionnaires for low-value contracts, to back up and assist small businesses and make our lives considerably easier. Those are examples of the real-life things that we have done.
Alan Brown
On the previous point about the trickle-down effect, the Scottish Government are trialling a project bank account system for public procurement, whereby payments to the main contractor go into a project bank account and smaller payments that would normally trickle down to the supply chain are ring-fenced for sub-contractors and other people in the supply chain. They get their money right away without going through middle men or the main contractor. Is that something that the UK Government will consider in due course?
Anna Soubry
As I said, I am going to try to confine my remarks to the amendments.
Lucy Frazer
The Minister is making a very good point about why public authorities are in a very different position from private entities, but does she agree that the duty of candour in litigation is an additional reason why they are different? When a case is taken against a public authority, it has a duty not to fight it as a commercial entity; fairness, not commercial success, must prevail at the end of the day. That is an additional reason why public authorities are in a different position.
Anna Soubry
I am grateful for my hon. and learned Friend’s very sensible contribution. She reminds us that this is not necessarily about Government. Public authorities are a huge sector in our society, and they rightly have different levels of accountability.
I remind hon. Members of Lord Mendelsohn’s words when this matter was debated in the other place:
“Of course, the origins of the Small Business Commissioner in Australia…came from very different circumstances and functions. In fact, late payment was never really part of the role. It still does not do that much.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 26 October 2015; Vol. 756, c. GC116.]
We can learn from that experience, but we need to understand that it has different roots and seeks to tackle different problems. We can learn much from it about the qualities needed in the small business commissioner. We must ensure that he or she focuses on the real mischief, which is late payment between bigger and small businesses. We are determined to tackle that problem.
Bill Esterson
There has been a very interesting series of exchanges during the Minister’s remarks. She mentioned the Australian experience and quoted Lord Mendelsohn’s analysis of what happened. The Australian small business commissioner was set up not to resolve late payment, but to deal with a number of other matters, including advice, complaints, mediation and small business support. Mark Brennan, the Victorian small business commissioner, advised that this approach should not be used to go after late payments.
Anna Soubry
I am sorry, Sir David. I did not intend to intervene, but this is important. I spoke to that gentleman, and he gave the most outstanding advice about and support for the small business commissioner’s ability to deal with late payments. He advised me about the qualities that the commissioner needs to act as effectively as he did. It is important that I put that on the record.
Bill Esterson
Lord Mendelsohn had a long meeting with that commissioner and spoke to him a number of times. The clear sense we were given was that the success in Australia has been about other matters; actually, when it comes to late payment, there has not been a success. There has not been the progress on late payment and Australia is probably not the place to go to learn about action on late payment. That was the evidence that was taken and very clearly set out by Hansard in the Lords. That is, of course, one reason why we are tabling these amendments: they are about learning from the success that Mark Brennan has had and the advice he has been able to give on those matters.
The Minister talked about success. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Don Valley said in an intervention, we would expect BIS to pay every invoice on time—of course we would. It would be not just bizarre but quite disturbing if BIS did not have a very high success rate when it came to undisputed invoices being paid on time, but that does not take away from the fact that, right across those four Departments, a significant level of late payment still exists. The Federation of Small Businesses figures for 2012 show 27% in local government and 29% in national Government, and my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne North cited a higher figure of 34%. There is still a phenomenally big problem of late payment in the public sector when it comes to small businesses.
The Minister cited the example of trying to support a construction firm involved with the NHS—I commend her for trying to solve the problem, as others of us have tried. She will have found it almost impossible, I suspect, to prevent the NHS trust from knowing the identity of that construction firm when she took that complaint to them. There is always the risk, as I said earlier, of a loss of business later on. That is one of the concerns expressed again and again by small businesses: that when they complain and put their heads above the parapet, they lose future business. It damages the business relationship irreparably. This is one reason why it is so important that there should be an independent opportunity. We will come to anonymity and confidentiality later.
A large number of small businesses are still involved. The Minister mentioned the point about prequalification questionnaires having been removed. I am sure that she speaks to businesses, as I do, who say they consider it a complete and utter waste of their time to even try to get business directly with the public sector. Their experiences and the experiences of associates, friends, business competitors and collaborators alike, has been of a lack of success in the past.
I do not think we have had an adequate response. I do not think we have dealt with the issues around the supply chain or with the problems around the scale of the problem of paper invoices for small businesses. We did not get an answer about how the mystery shopper scheme works; it is something of a mystery, the Minister seemed to say. I do not think she sounded confident in it herself.
Bill Esterson
I would love to know what the remedy is when the scheme identifies a problem, but we did not hear about that; perhaps we will later. With those remarks, I would like to press the first amendment in the group and test the will of the Committee.
Question put, That the amendment be made.