House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 3rd March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My noble friend Lord Caithness is right to point out that the effect of this Bill is to make your Lordships’ House a second Chamber almost entirely nominated by the Prime Minister. I say “almost” because his amendment refers only to the Lords temporal; as noble Lords know, the Lords spiritual come here by a different means. As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has reminded us, a small number of Cross-Bench Peers have come in through nomination by the House of Lords Appointments Commission and what was at one time called the “people’s Peers” process.

Having served as a political secretary to a former Prime Minister, my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead, I know that even those recommendations made by the independent commission are laid before the Prime Minister. It is at a time of the Prime Minister’s choosing—not the commission’s choosing—when those nominations are made. The rate and regularity with which those nominations can be made is often a cause of some consternation between the commission and the Government.

When the noble Baroness the Lord Privy Seal stands up, she can perhaps say a little bit about that. I think that the noble and learned Baroness, indeed many of us, would be delighted if there were some commitments on codifying that process a bit more formally, or at least a commitment to the number or regularity—

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

In view of what my noble friend, Lord Strathclyde, and, indeed, the Minister have said, is there not a case for putting HOLAC on a statutory basis, as relating both to its existence and to its manner of appointment?

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My noble friend asks a very good question, but that is a question for a different group. The question of the House of Lords Appointments Commission is, rightly, worthy of a debate in a group of its own. If the noble Baroness wants to respond to my noble friend’s question when she rises, she can do so, but I will not anticipate the debate that we will have on HOLAC.

The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, is of course right in what she pointed out about Amendment 2 from my noble friend Lord Caithness. In broad terms, however, he has done us a useful service by reminding us that what is being proposed in this Bill is out of keeping with the history of our Parliament and almost without precedent among other legislative bodies around the world. My noble friend dealt with the similarities and differences with the Canadian Senate; that is about the only other example—in a much smaller House, with term limits—that one can find of a House of Parliament that is entirely nominated by the head of the Executive.

What is before us today is a Bill that will weaken the legislature and strengthen the Executive, tilting the balance of power away from those who believe that power ought to be held very robustly to account, and it will leave those scales unbalanced for as long as the Government see fit, for there is nothing in this Bill to compel them to set those scales right again or even to fulfil the promises of further reform that they made in their most recent manifesto. What we are debating today is an incomplete job.

At Second Reading the Lord Privy Seal spoke at perhaps surprising length about a full stop in the Government’s manifesto. Never has so much constitutional weight been placed on such a small punctuation mark. The same punctuation was used in Labour’s 1997 manifesto, on which the noble Baroness was first elected to Parliament. In that instance, it meant a very full stop indeed. The Blair Government fulfilled their commitment that, to quote from their manifesto,

“the right of hereditary peers to sit and vote in the House of Lords will be ended by statute”.

That sentence, like all sentences in the English language eventually do, ended with a full stop and we did not think very much about it at the time. But, after that full stop, the next sentence in the 1997 manifesto promised:

“This will be the first stage in a process of reform to make the House of Lords more democratic and representative”.


For more than a decade later in that Labour Government, however, the legislative pen was stuck on that spherical stumbling block. Stage 2 never followed.

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[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

I do trust that the noble Earl is not suggesting that members of the Royal Family should participate in debates. That would be wholly disastrous.

[The Earl of Devon (CB)]

If the noble Viscount listens to my next paragraph, I will clarify that point.

I should also note, for the record, that we have a recent precedent for a grandchild of a sovereign seeking to join your Lordships’ House as an elected hereditary. In 2018, when I stood for a Cross-Bench vacancy upon the retirement of Earl Baldwin, one of the other 19 hereditary Peers to stand against me was the second Earl of Snowdon, previously Viscount Linley, who is a grandson of His late Majesty King George VI. I believe he withdrew his candidacy before the voting took place—obviously cowed by the strength of the other candidates. The publicly proffered reasoning for his withdrawal was that, as a member of the Royal Family, he should not sit in Parliament by convention—a reason which may indeed render my amendment dead in the water.

This aside reminds us that the only Members of your Lordships’ House that have any democratic legitimacy whatsoever happen to be the hereditary Peers. While we may be tainted by our hereditary privilege, we have at least vanquished multiple highly qualified competitors in transparent elections to obtain our seats. Indeed, I think we fulfil the second sentence in Labour’s 1997 manifesto, highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, by increasing the democratic legitimacy of this House. It is, I submit, a pity that we cannot fill other seats in your Lordships’ House by equivalent means.

I look forward to the debate on this topic. I am particularly interested to hear the views of the Front Benches of each of the main political parties, including the Minister, as this offers an opportunity for them all to clarify for posterity exactly how they view the role of the hereditary principle in the context of our monarch and how they expect to protect and support His Majesty the King in this House once we hereditary Peers have left the building.

In parting, I note that in earlier debates on this Bill, both the Government and the Liberal Democrats have pointed to the King’s legitimacy being based not upon the hereditary principle but upon his popularity and how well he does his job. This is transparently not the case. The monarch is not a competitor in a reality television show; he is our sovereign Head of State. He is born to his position and anointed, for those with Anglican faith, by God by the Archbishop of Canterbury. We all watched the Coronation, and I hope that is a fact we can all agree to. I beg to move.

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[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, I too have put my name to this amendment. These two Great Officers of State have been in existence since 1386, in the case of the Earl Marshal, and 1130, in the case of Lord Great Chamberlain. It was intended that they were required not only to perform their constitutional duties at the State Opening of Parliament and other events related to the sovereign but to be a vital link between the Crown and Parliament. To sever that link is a severe challenge to the monarch and deeply regrettable. Therefore, they should be allowed to remain as Members of the House.

I have it on reasonable authority that, originally, the Cabinet Office informed the officeholders that their positions were safe. Apparently, two weeks later, the change of mind was made. I highlight the contributions over the years, and since I have been in the House, of the noble Duke, the Duke of Norfolk, and the current Lord Great Chamberlain.

The Leader of the House has issued conflicting messages on how the officeholders will continue to have access to the House of Lords. She concluded at Second Reading:

“On the specific issue of access … for the Earl Marshal and the Lord Great Chamberlain, I completely recognise that they need access. I have written to the commission to ask that they keep their access passes, and the usual channels have agreed that … There is nothing that impedes the work they do or their roles in this House”.—[Official Report, 11/12/24; col. 1861.]


However, in opening that debate, she had stated:

“I have already raised this with the Lord Speaker to ensure that necessary arrangements can be made”.—[Official Report, 11/12/24; col. 1723.]


Quite apart from the lack of clarity as to whether these two officeholders have to rely on the approval of the commission or the Lord Speaker, what would happen if one refused to give them access? I therefore propose that, if the Government cannot agree to this amendment, there should be an alternative one in the Bill to guarantee that they have access to the Chamber to perform their ceremonial duties.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I too put my name to the amendment. My point is wholly pragmatic. It seems that the Earl Marshal and the Lord Great Chamberlain would be better placed to perform their functions, which they have to perform, if they were entitled to come here on a regular basis and were familiar with this place and the staff. To deny them that opportunity makes it more difficult for them to perform the functions that they will be required to perform.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howard of Rising (Con)]

My Lords, this country is being slowly but inexorably paralysed by committees of all shapes and sizes—departmental public bodies, quangos, you name it. New ones are being created on a regular basis, and every single one of them—new and old—is doing its best to expand its remit, thereby increasing its power and, frequently, its budget. The result, more often than not, is that Ministers are unable to take decisions. They are obliged to seek advice from this committee or that. If something goes wrong, however, it is the Minister who is held responsible and has to take the blame, while these unelected bodies, populated by the people who know best, remain unaccountable. Even the Chancellor of the Exchequer has to consult the Office for Budget Responsibility, an organisation that gets things wrong more often than right. What is wrong with our own vast department, the Treasury—or even the Bank of England, which has been known to get things wrong? When it comes to misjudgments, it is but a rank amateur compared with the OBR.

I draw your Lordships’ attention to one organisation that could be got rid of with no loss: the House of Lords Appointments Commission—HOLAC. It is a non-departmental public body. If His Majesty the King wishes, on the advice of the Prime Minister, to appoint someone to the House of Lords, what is the commission needed for, when exactly the same advice that the commission calls on to take its decision is available to the Prime Minister? Why does this advice need to be filtered through a separate body? What is the point of having an organisation to collate information from government departments to present it to the Prime Minister?

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

One reason is that we do not always trust the Prime Minister.

[Lord Howard of Rising (Con)]

He can already get this information.

I regret having to say this, but on more than one occasion HOLAC has taken a decision, or made a recommendation, that has been biased by a political view and not as an arm’s-length appraisal, resulting in the rejection of candidates of the highest calibre. That is not what the commission should be doing. I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, for whom I have the greatest respect and admiration, will stop HOLAC going beyond the bounds of what it should be doing.

At this very time, this Chamber is coming under increasing scrutiny. We need to welcome into our ranks individuals of talent, vision and extraordinary achievement. I strongly believe that HOLAC is a hindrance to this process and is damaging the future health and viability of the House of Lords. I beg to move.

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[The Earl of Dundee (Con)]

My Lords, in this grouping, there are two connected proposals in my name. Amendment 43 would not prevent political patronage creating non-parliamentary peerages.

Yet it would abolish the right of parliamentary political patronage to appoint Members to this House, replacing that practice, as advocated by Amendment 45, with a statutory appointments commission responsible for appointing 200 independent Cross-Benchers within a reformed House of 600 temporal Members, where the balance of 400 Members are political Members indirectly elected by an electoral college representative of the different parts of the United Kingdom.

These amendments also indicate three background considerations. The first is how thereby, in appointing 200 non-political independent Members, the new statutory commission appoints the largest group within a reformed House of 600. The second is the purpose of doing that and, thirdly, how membership, within a total of 20 appointment commissioners, reflects the proportions of different Benches sitting in a reformed House.

Among the 400 political and temporal Members, the Government and the Opposition would have exactly 150 each, while all other political parties, including the Liberal Democrats, would have 100. With 200, the independent Cross Benches, therefore, would have 50 more Members than either the Government or the Opposition.

The purpose of this is not House of Lords composition; instead, it is continuity of House of Lords quality function. So many of your Lordships have eloquently stressed that point today, including the noble Lord, Lord Moore, and my noble friends Lord Tugendhat and Lady Laing. This quality function is not just our current high standard of legislative scrutiny. As my noble friend Lord Attlee pointed out, it includes our achievements in revisions, and thus also the quality of that evidence. This quality of function would be undermined if the party of any Government having a majority in another place also had one here. That is why the Government and the Opposition ought to have equal numbers in a reformed House, while the non-political Cross-Benchers should be in the majority.

With a total of 20 commissioners appointing 200 non-political Members, subsection (5) of the new clause that would be inserted by Amendment 45 gives the ratios allocated to the different temporal Benches: five commissioners each for the Government and the Opposition; seven for the Cross-Benchers; and three for the Liberal Democrats as the third-largest temporal group. Amendment 46, referring to that subsection (5) in Amendment 45, proposes the additional words,

“or from a party-political group in the House of Lords not otherwise identified in this table”,

for which I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Hailsham.

I also thank my noble friend for the qualification in his Amendment 44A, referring to Amendment 43, that with appointments to this House the statutory Appointments Commission can only select people who are properly reliable and independent-minded. In addition, I am grateful to him and to the noble Lord, Lord Newby, for their proposed Amendments 47 and 12 respectively, envisaging that, in the period of time before a statutory Appointments Commission has replaced political patronage, life peerages can still not be conferred against the recommendations of HOLAC or the present non-statutory Appointments Commission.

In Amendment 51, the strengthening of HOLAC is also urged by the noble Earl, Lord Devon, who has just spoken to that, supported by myself and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. As outlined, the aim should be for HOLAC to become statutory, replacing political patronage and appointing one-third or 200 non-political Members of a reformed House, temporal membership being 600 of which 400 are political Members. As a revising Chamber, this arrangement is best able to protect our present very high standard of legislative scrutiny to the advantage of the United Kingdom democracy here and, by example, to that of national democracies elsewhere.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I very much endorse what my noble friend Lord Dundee has been saying, and what he has said has enabled me—your Lordships will be pleased to know—to abbreviate my remarks very significantly. I have put down four amendments, to which I want to say something briefly: namely, Amendments 43, 44A, 46 and 47. I shall also comment briefly on Amendment 45.

So far as Amendment 43 is concerned, I agree very much, for the reasons advanced by my noble friend Lord Dundee, that HOLAC should be the sole source of recommendations for appointments. In substance, there is too great a risk that individuals will be appointed by a party or Prime Minister in circumstances that will offend the public sense as to what is appropriate. Unfettered discretion on the part of a Prime Minister raises serious questions as to suitability and propriety of additional appointments. That risk will be diminished by giving the right of nomination to HOLAC.

In response to the point made by my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising, the truth is that the decisions of Prime Ministers cannot always be trusted, and we have seen some pretty rum events over the last few years which give force to that conclusion. I prefer the approach set out in the amendment which my noble friend Lord Dundee has moved to the negative approach suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Newby—I think he himself would accept that his amendment does not go far enough.

That takes me to Amendment 45, which puts HOLAC on a statutory basis. I think that it is highly desirable that the existence, composition, role and powers of HOLAC should be enshrined in statute. I have come to this conclusion very much for the reasons advanced by the noble Earl and for the reasons that were advanced by my noble friend Lord Strathclyde in the debate of last Monday. It is very important that the powers and role of HOLAC should be statutory. There is a very good model for this. It is in a Bill which was introduced in the 2022-23 Session by the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, and it may well be that he is going to repeat those points in the debate on Friday when he has a Bill before your Lordships’ House.

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[Lord Howard of Lympne (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 45 and the other amendments in this group that would make HOLAC a statutory body. I was a member of the commission for a number of years and, despite the fact that I hold the proposers of these amendments in very high regard, it would be a great mistake to put it on a statutory basis. I say so for the same reason as that given by the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, a distinguished former chairman of the commission, to your Lordships on 18 November 2022.

In a nutshell, making HOLAC a statutory body would make it subject to judicial review. This would mean that someone who was unsuccessful in their application to become a Member of your Lordships’ House could challenge that decision in the courts. It would mean that an appointment that had been announced and, indeed, confirmed could be challenged in the courts. The courts would be drawn into deciding who should and should not be a Member of your Lordships’ House—a Member of this Chamber of Parliament—which is a flagrant breach of what we have always understood by the separation of powers.

It may be suggested that the legislation contemplated by these amendments to make HOLAC statutory could in some way circumscribe the power of the courts to intervene. I am afraid that history demonstrates that in a contest of that kind between the parliamentary draftsman and the courts, the courts usually win.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend is making a very serious point. Would he perhaps consider that the power of judicial review would be reduced if HOLAC was obliged, before making a public statement, to give the person affected the opportunity to respond?

[Lord Howard of Lympne (Con)]

On the contrary, if reasons were given, those reasons could be the basis of a challenge in the courts. I fear I entirely disagree with the last point my noble friend made in his speech, when he suggested that reasons should be given. If reasons are given, they can form a stronger or a particular basis for a challenge in the courts.

I shall content myself with one example of the attitude of the courts to attempts to circumscribe their powers to intervene. When I was Home Secretary, a decision was made, though not by me, to refuse British nationality to someone whom I will not name. The relevant statute says that in such cases the Home Office is not obliged to give reasons for its decision. The High Court decided that these words meant what most people would think they meant, which was that the Home Office did not have to give any reasons. The Court of Appeal, however, decided that because the statute gave the Home Office discretion as to whether it could give reasons, it was wrong not to give the reasons. Your Lordship will see what I mean when I say that it is extremely difficult to circumscribe the determination of the courts to intervene.

I do not think that the courts should have a role in determining the membership of your Lordships’ House. That would be a consequence of these amendments. I urge your Lordships to reject them.

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Moved by

[Viscount Hailsham]

14: In subsection (2), at beginning insert “Until the conclusion of the Parliament in which this Act is passed but not beyond,”

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendments 14 and 15 would have very limited impact. The problem with Amendment 13 from the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, is that it flies in the face of the attempt—which I think is felt within your Lordships’ House—to get the numbers down and to refresh this House. I have nothing against the extension proposed by the noble and right reverend Lord provided that it is confined to this Parliament and limited to five years. Otherwise, we will run the risk of extending terms for substantial periods. That is not what I think this House wants.

[Baroness Garden of Frognal (LD)]

My Lords, I have added my name to the amendment from the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, although, with apologies to the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, it does not actually mention hereditary Peers. This debate has ranged much more widely. At some stage we will need to discuss the next steps for reform. I hope that we will not overlook the work of either the noble Lord, Lord Wakeham, or the noble Lord, Lord Burns, who had some very sound proposals in his report that we somehow seem to have swept under the carpet.

I have been here for nearly 18 years and I have no wish to retire, but it is possible that, if I still have my marbles in another 12 years, I would be grateful for an honourable way to go. Most of us are appointed because we have expertise in a particular field, but it is quite possible that, after 15 years, our expertise is not quite as lively as it was when we first came in, so having this sort of term seems to make quite a lot of sense.

I cannot understand why noble Lords have not grouped more amendments in this debate. This seems an unnecessary waste of your Lordships’ time and, I fear, the sort of thing that brings this House into disrepute. I note that the ungrouped amendments all seem to come from the Conservative Benches. I wonder why.

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[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, it has been an interesting debate to listen to. I was brought up properly and told that you are never to discuss a woman’s age, but, in the context of the debate today, it does feel slightly relevant given my own, and that of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson. I believe we are currently in the prime of our economic earning, in the phrase used by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell.

The current average service of your Lordships’ House is 13.74 years, and the average age on appointment in the last Parliament was 56. I will be 57 if we get to 15 years of service, so I would be leaving very quickly and would still be a very young member of your Lordships’ House.

With regard to the substance of the debate today, these amendments concern the imposition of term limits, as we have discussed. It may be useful to summarise what the themes of the amendments in this group have been, not least because they demonstrate that there is not yet a consensus on next steps.

Amendment 13, tabled by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, provides for a 15-year term limit for life Peers. His proposal includes the possibility of applying to HOLAC for reappointment while providing that no Member can sit for more than 30 years in total. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, has sought to further amend this by proposing that Members can apply for reappointment only during the Parliament in which this Bill passes and not beyond. His amendments also seek to limit the length of reappointment to five years, therefore reducing the original total limit proposed by the noble and right reverend Lord from 30 to 20 years.

Amendment 66, tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso—in an excellent speech—goes for a term limit of 20 years, but also for life peerages granted after the end of this year. Amendment 73, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, would require the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a draft Bill with proposals for a term limit of up to 10 years.

The underlying intent of the majority of these amendments is to reduce the size of your Lordships’ House—an aspiration the Government share. Some noble Lords, including the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, made clear that they were motivated by the principle that no one should automatically be a Member of this place for life. Both he and I have experienced that at the other end, so making it happen here seems appropriate.

The smattering of amendments in this group demonstrate a range of different ways that term limits could be introduced. It is clear there is not a settled view among your Lordships on the arrangements of introducing a term limit. More importantly, however, the Bill before this House today is not the legislative vehicle for implementing these issues. The Bill is focused solely on removing the right of hereditary Peers to sit and vote in this House. These amendments, while both thoughtful and considered, are not the central issue of this Bill.

Furthermore, the Government’s view is that the introduction of retirement age, as promised in our manifesto, is a more effective way of reducing our numbers, rather than the introduction of a term limit. As your Lordships are aware, my noble friend the Leader of the House has been having an ongoing dialogue with the House on how the manifesto commitment of introducing a retirement age can best be implemented. The Leader has already had in excess of 60 meetings and she is keen for that dialogue to continue. With respect, these amendments would cut across those conversations. With this in mind, I respectfully ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment standing in my name.

Amendment 14 (to Amendment 13) withdrawn.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, in speaking to my amendment I will be very brief. My noble friend Lord Blencathra articulated a very powerful argument in favour of retirement with which I agree; I have suggested the age of 85 in my amendment. I wish to make three general points and two specific ones.

The general points are these. First, we do need to get the numbers in this House down, and retirement age is one way of doing it. Secondly, and coupled with that, is the need to refresh the membership; that too is important and points to a retirement age. The third point is a difficult one to dwell on too long. In a long political career, both at the Bar and in politics, I have seen an awful lot of people who reached the age of 85 who should have retired—both judges and Members of Parliament, and indeed Members of this House. We need to focus on that.

Turning to my two specific points, the first was touched on earlier in the debate: the fact that our expertise does decay. There was a time when I knew an awful lot about criminal law and practice. I have not practised as a criminal barrister since 2010, and I would hesitate to express any really informed view as to the practice and procedures in the criminal courts today. That is an example of one’s expertise decaying. Similarly—although not quite the same—as one gets older, one has to recognise that one’s expertise on many current subjects is not what the House would wish to have. For example, we are going to be regulating on artificial intelligence. If you ask me what I know about artificial intelligence, the answer is nothing. The same is true of social media too. I do not do social media at all, but we are asked to regulate it. The truth is, there does come a point in one’s life when one’s expertise is not such that the electorate would want us to regulate in any kind of detail.

Therefore, to be brief, I am in favour of a retirement age. We could argue sensibly whether it should be 75, 80, 85 or 90. I plonk at 85, but the truth is that we could properly go for any of those figures.

[The Earl of Devon (CB)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to speak to Amendment 65 in my name, which is a further variation on the introduction of a retirement age. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, for adding his name. I would also like to thank the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, who discussed this amendment with me, and who addressed the topic so wisely in his speech at Second Reading.

As with the other amendments in this group, Amendment 65 gives effect to the Labour Party manifesto commitment. However, contrary to the other retirement-age amendments, this one introduces important leeway for those who join your Lordships after the age of 70, as it provides that retirement is at 80 or the 10th anniversary of the Member’s introduction to the House, whichever is the later. This is an important distinction, as it does away with the arbitrary 80 year-old age limit. Having noted the number of recent appointments of Members over the age of 70, my amendment would permit such Members to enjoy at least a full decade of activity in your Lordships’ House, irrespective of the age at which they are appointed.

I should perhaps note in the spirit of full disclosure that I am not an octogenarian. Indeed, as a hereditary Peer in his late 40s, I will likely be removed from this House before I turn 50, let alone 80, so I have no dog in the fight. However, I have hugely appreciated the wise contributions of elder Peers and consider the sagacity of our membership to be one of the House’s most valuable features. I remember vividly a Cross-Bench discussion on the constitutional crisis arising from Boris Johnson’s ill-advised efforts to prorogue Parliament, during which a wise voice piped up, saying, “It wasn’t as bad as this during the Suez crisis”.

Just as hereditary Peers provide a length of institutional memory that spans centuries, so individual Members over the age of 80 provide an invaluable personal memory that spans decades. We abandon that at our peril in our rush for youth and the appearance of vigour. Amendment 65 permits us to temper the age-based guillotine, at least a little. On that basis, I recommend it to your Lordships.

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[Lord Newby (LD)]

My Lords, I should begin by saying that the reason I am speaking to this group rather than my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire is not simply that he has a conflict of interest, which he would have to declare. My noble friend has his 84th birthday this coming Wednesday. He intends to spend it as he has spent today, which shows that he has a great sense of fun.

This group of amendments, the previous group and the next two groups are all about how to reduce numbers and make sure that people who are in the House of Lords play a full and proper part. To state the blindingly obvious, there is one way to deal with this, which is to make sure that the House of Lords is elected—but I think we may have discussed that previously.

As for a retirement age, I think I am right in saying that every profession has a retirement age. In your Lordships’ House, we see the Bishops retiring at 70.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, that is actually not right. The self-employed, for example members of the Bar, do not have a retirement age, and nor indeed do solicitors.

[Lord Newby (LD)]

It is always very dangerous to make a general comment in your Lordships’ House. But judges have a retirement age of 75.

We know that bishops aged more than 70, and indeed judges aged more than 75, in many cases have undiminished mental powers and are able to play a very considerable part in whatever it is they continue to do. But there is a reason for retirement ages, which is that exceptions do not prove a rule. We know here that many Members of your Lordships’ House stay on well beyond a point at which it would be in their best interests to retire. We, the usual channels, have no levers in order to help them leave at a point when, objectively, it would be in their and the House’s best interest. My Chief Whip and I had a signal success last week in persuading someone in their mid-90s to retire, but it was slightly touch and go—and that, frankly, is not acceptable in my view.

If we are to have a retirement age, the question is: what should it be? The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said that 80 was clearly too young. He prefers 85; the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, prefers 90. We often talk about the dissonance between the ways in which the House of Lords and the outside world view things. I can think of no case where there is a greater dissonance than in the view of a reasonable retirement age.

I am afraid that I find it very difficult to accept the idea that 80 is far too young. The noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, made a suggestion about how we might persuade Peers to retire without having a set retirement age: by having a retirement age that applies only to new Peers, in the expectation that many existing Peers who are over that age, whatever it is, would retire on the basis that that is what the judges did. In my experience, the problem is that people who most should retire are often the ones who are most reluctant to retire. I am afraid to say to the noble Earl, because it is a very attractive proposition in other ways, that I do not think that it would work, and I certainly do not think it would work to the extent that we would want it to.

This debate has shown that there is absolutely no consensus in your Lordships’ House about what a retirement age should be. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who said on a previous group that this subject should not be part of the consideration of the Bill. The Government say that they will bring forward a consultation and proposals on it and I believe that it is very important that the impetus for this change, particularly the exact retirement age, should not come from your Lordships’ House. If ever there was a case of turkeys and Christmas, it is Members of the House of Lords determining when they should retire. Therefore, it is incumbent on the Government to come forward with their own proposals—I would be very happy if they were in line with their manifesto commitment—but I do not think an amendment passed by your Lordships on a Bill that is, in essence, about the hereditaries is a sensible way to deal with it.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 12th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, the Labour manifesto said that

“we will introduce a new participation requirement”.

My Amendment 26, in the next group, deals specifically with the very small number of Peers who turn up and then do nothing.

The Government keep complaining that many amendments to this Bill have nothing to do with the removal of hereditary Peers, saying that the Bill is narrowly focused. That is true, but it was a political decision by the Government to make it so narrow and not include the other priority issues from their manifesto. The Government are seeking to give the impression that dealing only with hereditary Peers is somehow sacrosanct or ordained from on high. If we were in the Moses Room right now, I would be looking at the tablets that he brought down from Sinai to see if there was an 11th commandment saying, “Thou shalt have no other provisions in thy Bill except the removal of hereditary Peers”. Governments often widen the scope of Bills and adjust the Long Title. Indeed, today in the other place the Government have tabled Amendments 262 and 263, which will amend the Long Title to the Employment Rights Bill. They could do so for this one also if they were so minded.

With these amendments, I am seeking to explore the possibility of retiring Peers who have attended few of our sittings. Let me make it crystal clear that I reject the idea of a full-time House of political professionals. The great strength of this revising Chamber is that, with a very wide range of expertise to call on, most noble Lords do not sit here all the time intervening on issues that are not their speciality, but participate in our debates and Select Committees on issues on which they are expert.

I recall a debate on an amendment to the precision breeding Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Krebs, was debating a point with the noble Lord, Lord Winston, concerning recombinant DNA—whatever that is. The rest of us sat there watching a very civilised ping-pong match, and they were the only two in the whole Chamber who knew what they were talking about. Indeed, when my noble friend the Minister wound up, he said that neither he nor his officials in the Box knew anything about the subject, either, and would both noble Lords come to the department and explain it to them? That is one tiny example of the superb strengths of this House—that is the House of Lords in action. For the record, both noble Lords had attendances in the last Parliament well above 30% and 40%.

I turn once again to the Excel spreadsheets produced by the Library, which have the attendance record for all Peers in the last Parliament. There may be some names missing and there are other little technical errors; however, these figures are not the full picture, since the attendance data is based on contributions made in the Chamber and Grand Committee and does not include participation in other committee meetings. The Library tells me:

“This is because of the way in which different types of data are stored in the House of Lords’ internal systems and the challenges in extracting it to provide a dataset which we can be confident is accurate for all members and across the full duration of the Parliament, unlike chamber contributions which we can be sure is robust. We are actively looking at ways of incorporating committee attendance into this analysis and hope to resolve this in future releases, conscious that we want to present as comprehensive a picture as possible.”


Nor do the attendance figures count all the days that Ministers are working away from the Lords in their departments, or abroad. Nor do they include the 25 days per annum when 23 Members of this House are away serving at the Council of Europe, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the OSCE.

With those caveats, the figures are nevertheless accurate enough for us to debate the concept of retiring Peers below certain attendance thresholds, and they give us a fairly good picture of attendance. If we retired Peers who attended fewer than 20% of possible sitting days in the previous Parliament, that would be 154 Peers. What does 20% mean in actual sitting days? Over the past 10 years—I have done the number-crunching myself —the number of sitting days has averaged 148.1 per annum. That ranged from just 15 days in 2019 to 350 during the 2017-19 Session; thus, an annual average is more accurate than a sessional average. Peers who attended 20% of the time therefore attended for just 30 days out of 148. Peers who attended 15% of the time attended 22 days out of 148, and those who attended just 10% of the time were present here for just 15 days.

If noble Lords access the spreadsheet, they can come to their own conclusions on whether the occasions on which some of those 154 Peers spoke or participated merit continuance in this House. I have seen a few names who made worthwhile speeches, but my recollection is that the vast majority of the 154 Peers in this category have not contributed much to the work of this House. Those who attended fewer than 15% of possible sittings number 118 Peers. When I look at the 10% and below—the 70 Peers who turned up for a maximum of 15 days per annum—I cannot see, in my opinion, any whose contribution was so essential or vital that we should retain their presence in this House for their very rare words of wisdom. Indeed, I can recall only three of them making any speech, and none has served on any of our committees.

This is not one of my amendments, but if we opted for removing those who have attended 5% or less of the time, that would be just 39 Peers. My noble friend Lord Hailsham has suggested a 1% threshold, but that is 12 Peers and, in my opinion, it would make us look a bit silly if we went that low. However, I agree with his other amendments: of course we must exempt those on leave of absence—but not for too long—or those with royal duties, such as the noble Duke, the Duke of Norfolk, or the new Lord Chamberlain, the noble Lord, Lord Benyon.

These figures are out by about eight because of judicial appointments and some deaths since the Library compiled them last year, but noble Lords can see the ballpark figure—if that American term is still acceptable. Noble Lords may say, “What does it matter if they don’t turn up? They are not getting any allowance and not costing anything”. I agree with that view, but we are here today because the Government say that there are too many Peers, and the Government’s solution is to get rid of 88 hereditaries, many of whom are assiduous attenders. Indeed, there are only 14 hereditaries who have attended less than 20% of sittings.

I do not have a firm view on my options, but I think that noble Lords would consider the 20% or 15% thresholds to be on the high side and a bridge too far to begin with. When noble Lords look at the names of the 70 who would be retired for an attendance figure of fewer than 15 days per annum, I think we might have some consensus around that, with the necessary exemptions suggested by my noble friend Lord Hailsham.

Now, where this gets really interesting is if one combines an age cut-off and an attendance cut-off. The Excel spreadsheet gives some interesting figures. I will not waste time by running through the extremes: at one end, a retirement age of 90 and an attendance of just 1% would retire 89 Peers; at the other, retirement at 80 and a 20% attendance cut-off would retire 420 Peers, which I think would be a tad excessive. 

The more sensible criteria might be a retirement age of 85 and an attendance of 10%; that would retire 304 Peers by 2029. A retirement age of 85 and an attendance of 5% would retire 213 Peers. I suggest that that figure is on the edge of a possible solution, reducing our numbers to those who turn up, take part and are not perceived from outside as too old to do the job.

I have a couple of final points on attendance. I think that it has to be retrospective and based on attendance in the previous Parliament. That is highly contentious, but if we introduced, say, a 10% threshold for about 15 days in future, we would have some colleagues counting their attendance and rushing in to attend for a few days at the end of the year just to get over the threshold. We would also need some special appeal mechanism—a committee to which Peers could appeal if they felt that they were being wrongly excluded. I will say more about that when we debate Amendment 26. 

I appreciate that this is contentious and goes against the precedents we have had for centuries. But I come back to my starting point that retirement of those who turn up infrequently and say little is infinitely preferable to throwing out all hereditaries, over 70 of whom who turn up regularly and participate fully in the work of this House. 

Of course, if we were to go down this route in future, we would need complete and accurate figures for attendance in the Chamber, the Grand Committee and all our committees, as well as on Ministers and shadow Cabinet Ministers working away from the precincts of this building and those Peers on foreign delegations. 

In conclusion, I look forward to the unanimous support of my noble friends, and I beg to move.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

I rise very briefly to speak to the four amendments in my name, Amendments 22 to 25. The first three would amend the lead amendment, Amendment 19, moved by my noble friend. For reasons that I shall come to shortly, I very strongly disagree with it.

First, I express some cautious agreement with my noble friend as regards future participation. My noble friend Lord Blencathra has urged the case for requiring a future minimum degree of engagement as a condition of membership of this House, and there is clearly a case for that. My own Amendment 25 suggests a participation record of 10%. However, I would be a bit cautious about setting too high a requirement; first, because occasional interventions from those who are not regular attenders can be very valuable, sometimes on esoteric subjects, although not exclusively so.

Moreover, and more generally, there is a danger that too demanding a requirement could encourage interventions for the purpose of meeting the criteria from those who are not currently great participators. We all know that speeches in major debates are time-limited, and very often the time available is very short. The question that arises is: do we want to make a more restrictive timetable? I think not, but that could well be a consequence of an increased participation requirement. As my noble friend touched on, there needs to be a degree of flexibility with regard to minimum requirements. Members may very well have good reasons for not participating: illness, leave of absence, overseas commitments, family problems and so forth. My suggestions in Amendments 22, 24 and 25 are designed to address these problems.

Where I actively and positively disagree with my noble friend is in his Amendment 19 and his related Amendments 20 and 21. Your Lordships will have noticed that those amendments relate to the 2019-24 Session. That is retrospective in character, and my noble friend is suggesting that if a Member fails to satisfy the stated participation level in the past Parliament, he must retire.

I am against retrospective requirements or sanctions. My noble friend’s proposal is just that. It imposes a penalty which is entirely retrospective in character, in respect of a failure to meet a requirement which did not exist at the relevant time. I regard that as a thoroughly objectionable proposition and I very much hope that this Committee will not go down that road.

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Moved by

[Viscount Hailsham]

27: In subsection (1) after “if” insert “, not having been granted leave of absence and in the absence of other good reason,”

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, my amendment is very technical. It provides simply that the sanction should not apply if the Member has good reason for not participating.

[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 63 in this group. If we can help the Front Bench with musical lyrics, it is surely:

“Oh what a circus, oh what a show”.


I declare my interest as a so-called hereditary Peer. I will make two general points before I turn to the detail of my amendment.

First, as earlier speeches from right across the House have made clear, it is accepted that the hereditary principle is no longer suitable and that the suspension of by-elections should become permanent. The Bill achieves that, full stop—a piece of punctuation that seems to have taken on unparalleled significance in our debates on this Bill.

Secondly, on Monday some noble Lords stated either on their feet or in not very sotto voce sedentary mutterings that all amendments are irrelevant, because this is a single-objective Bill. While I understand that view and share the intense frustration with the speed of the debate, some of the degrouping and the gratuitous rudeness to the Leader of the House, particularly on the first day, I nevertheless understand that amendments have been put down and marshalled in the usual way. Most are probing and, while they may seek to go beyond the tight circumference of the current text of the Bill, I am not sure that they can simply be dismissed as irrelevant. Such amendments have arisen because there is a widely expressed concern that, once the expulsion of the hereditaries is done, all further reform will again grind to a halt and the House will sink quietly back into a pattern of prime ministerial patronage and ever-growing size, neither of which enhance its reputation or credibility.

My amendment does not seek to obstruct the purpose of the Bill, but it does invite the Government to take some practical steps to enable the further reform to which their manifesto commits them. Amendment 63, like some others, addresses the issue of participation, but not by prescribing in advance and in detail exactly what such reform should comprise—rather, by seeking simply to put in place a process and timeline to progress it, something that speaker after speaker has been calling for over the days of this debate. It is thus complementary to the single purpose of the Bill and could be added to it without obstructing that purpose in any way.

The focus of this amendment is participation, for the following reasons. First, it is a Member’s participation and contributions, be they aged 91 or 21, that most affect both the quality and the reputation of this House. To touch briefly on a related point of age limits, I understand the convincing argument for imposing an age limit as a matter of public perception, and a wide range of dates was suggested in the debate on Monday and examples given of very competent individuals who would be lost at each gradation. I am not against an age limit, but what the debate on Monday actually highlighted was the inability of Whips to require Members to retire when—and there is no point tiptoeing around this—participation in the work of the House has become too challenging for them. Maybe that is the problem that needs to be addressed.

Secondly, a participation requirement is a commitment that needs to be transformed from a manifesto statement to an implementable set of actions. Finally, and I apologise for introducing a personal note, it does rather sting to be dismissed en bloc but leave behind some Peers—and there is no shortage—who do not attend, or who attend, claim their allowances and then do not participate.

The amendment has three key features. First, it requires, within six months of the Bill becoming an Act, that a cross-party group be set up to consult, to define participation and to establish suitable metrics to measure it. I have been told that defining participation is too difficult. It is not. The “too difficult” mantra has been given as an excuse for far too long. No doubt a range of views will be contributed to the cross-party group, as other amendments in this group illustrate, and account should be taken of previous work in this area. This amendment embraces both those factors. We already collect most of the necessary data, but previous Governments have, I am afraid to say, simply lacked the firmness of purpose to act on it.

This brings me to the amendment’s second feature: it enables the setting up of the processes required to implement the participation requirement as a basis for continued membership. Not all aspects of the outcome will please everyone completely, but we need to move beyond the wringing of hands and the gnashing of gums in order to resolve the participation gap in a practical way.

Some time ago we had the excellent Burns report, which made recommendations that Members across the House supported, but these have not been implemented. Other speakers on Monday recited a long list of failures to implement change. We need to do better. That is why the third and final feature of this amendment is to require the Government to bring forward measures to ensure that the findings are implemented. While the amendment as drafted anticipates the Government getting a grip on this, the House might itself, if it has the powers to do so, take responsibility for setting up the group, ensuring its work is done and carrying it forward to implementation. That is certainly worthy of consideration, so long as it does not become yet another consultation that, in the best traditions of Sir Humphrey, in “Yes Minister”, simply delays and dissolves what actually needs to be done.

In conclusion, this amendment does not—and I underline this—seek in any way to thwart the single-minded purpose of the Bill. It does not prescribe how participation should be defined, quantified or implemented, but it does put in place a process and a timeframe of 20 months for reform, based on participation, once the Bill is passed. For a Government who are serious about reforming this House, it is an opportunity to address its size, effectiveness, cost and reputation—all things that most Members agree are not currently what they should be. I therefore hope that the Minister will seize on this amendment, both as a means to move forward with the Bill and to demonstrate in practical terms the Government’s absolute commitment to resolving the participation issue: not in a general, aspirational sense, or as something that, in a phrase heard earlier in the debate, “we are working on”, but with a structure and a timetable so that the House can both understand and benefit from long-overdue change. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

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Moved by

[Viscount Hailsham]

30: After “indictment” insert “and who has received an immediate custodial sentence or a suspended sentence of more than six months”

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I think the Committee would agree that disqualification from membership of this House should follow only a serious conviction. My suggestion is that a better indicator of the gravity of the conviction lies in the sentence rather than simply in the fact of conviction. That is why I have tabled an amendment whereby disqualification should follow the imposition of an immediate custodial sentence or a suspended sentence of at least six months. I suggest that that is a better mark of the gravity of the offence than simply the fact of a conviction, albeit on indictment.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I want to make sure that in this debate we do not forget the case of our late noble friend, Lord Montague of Beaulieu, who was imprisoned for 12 months for homosexual acts and would have fallen foul of my noble friend’s amendment, even as amended by my noble friend Lord Hailsham. He was charged under the same Act of Parliament as Oscar Wilde and many other gay men. The Montague case of 1954 gave direct rise to the Wolfenden report of 1957 and the decriminalisation of homosexuality 10 years later—a campaign led in your Lordships’ House, incidentally, by a Conservative hereditary Peer, the eighth Earl Arran, following the sad suicide of his brother.

On his release from prison, Lord Montague of Beaulieu returned to your Lordships’ House and remained an active and greatly esteemed Member, as well as highly engaged in civic life. He chaired the Historic Houses Association and English Heritage. He was elected to remain in your Lordships’ House in 1999 and announced his plans to retire only in 2015, the year that he died. So, while I agree with the sentiment that lawmakers should not be lawbreakers, it is important to remember that what constitutes a criminal offence is a question for legislation, and I for one am glad that the late Lord Montague was able to remain a legislator.

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[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, we have spent 15 minutes on this, so I hope we will not be accused of filibustering in this small but rather important debate. I take on board the complexities that my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie and the Minister have described. Nevertheless, it has been a worthwhile debate.

There has been a surprising amount of consensus over the deprivation of titles. If one can take away a knighthood, it should be possible, in very controlled circumstances, to take away the title of Peer. It is a matter for this House in conjunction with the Commons, because the Titles Deprivation Act 1917 said that a Joint Committee of privy counsellors from both Houses should look at peerages and decide who had aided the enemy. If we had removal for serious offences, however we determine “serious”, again, it would be determined by a committee of privy counsellors from both Houses. And it would not be automatic; we would not be looking back at someone like Lord Montague and automatically doing it. The committee would determine whether the seriousness of the offence, whether in the last few years or further back, was worth taking forward. It would not be an automatic removal of title.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 30 (to Amendment 29) withdrawn.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 12th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 33 in my name, which would reduce the number of Bishops in the House from 26 to five: the most reverend Primates the Archbishops of Canterbury and York and three other right reverend Prelates nominated by the synod of the Church of England. I am delighted to see the right reverend Prelate in his place—he has booked his slot among my remaining three by being here tonight.

I accept that this is not in the Bill, and nor was it in the Labour Party manifesto, but spending perhaps 20 or 30 minutes on this will be worthwhile, and I cannot see any other way to raise the topic. Naturally, I expect all Front Benches to keep a million miles away from this subject. I shall be very brief and leave it to other noble Lords to speak in favour of or against this probing amendment.

I shall give the House some statistics for consideration. The number of Church of England baptisms in 2023 was 67,800. The average Sunday attendance is about 700,000. The average Christmas attendance is about 2.3 million. Of course, we have 26 Bishops and an electorate of 48.2 million people, as of the last election. Therefore, there is one Bishop per 27,000 people at attending church on Sunday. There is one Bishop per 88,500 people at Christmas attendance. The maximum size of a constituency is 77,000.

Last year, the daily attendance in this House was 397. Of course, we do not have constituencies and neither do the Bishops, but the number of Peers who attend divided into the electorate would mean one Peer for every 121,000 electors. But, even with Christmas attendance, we have one Bishop for every 88,000 Church of England attendees.

I accept that it would not take an expert statistician to find fault with my conclusions from these statistics, which I admit are highly flawed, but it seems to me that we are overrepresented by Bishops in this House and I leave it to other noble Lords to offer a view for or against that view. I beg to move.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 48 in my name and the consequential Amendment 49. Perhaps I might begin by saying that I am not making any personal criticism of any of the present Lords spiritual. Most, and perhaps almost all, are important contributors to our debates. However, in a debate of this kind, we have to ask the question: on what basis do the Lords spiritual sit here? My suggestion to the House is that we should examine the criteria and ask ourselves whether they are well founded.

The objection to hereditary Peers is very similar to the objection to the Lords spiritual. In the case of hereditary Peers, while both the pool of candidates and the electorate are small, there are, at least on the Conservative Benches, both hustings and elections. But the way in which individuals become Bishops is very far from transparent, and there is no filter of elections and hustings. Moreover, the pool of candidates for the episcopacy is a very small one, and indeed the selectorate is even smaller. The process itself is very discreet.

Once an individual becomes a fully fledged bishop, that person, subject to gender preferences, has a very good chance of becoming a Member of this House. It is, in short, a case of the Rt Rev Buggins. In the case of the two Archbishops and the Bishops of London, Westminster and Durham, membership of this House is automatic—a self-perpetuating oligarchy. That is obviously not a good way to constitute our legislature.

So one has to ask: what about the tests of suitability and propriety? Most of the Committee agree that such tests are important. These debates—the last three days—have shown that the Committee values the role of HOLAC. Some of us, in fact, want to enhance its role. But HOLAC has no role to play in assessing the propriety or suitability of individual bishops to become Members of this House. I note, incidentally, that my noble friend Lady Berridge’s Amendment 90B addresses this matter. I know of no scrutiny—certainly none of a publicly transparent kind—that addresses the question of the propriety or suitability of appointment.

Then there is regional representation. Again, that is an issue viewed as important by most of this Committee. The Lords spiritual are drawn exclusively from dioceses in England—there are none from Scotland, none from Wales and none from Northern Ireland. So one has to ask: on what basis are the Lords spiritual here? As with the hereditaries, it is historic. The Bishops once represented a landed interest—no longer. The Lords spiritual once reflected the pre-eminent national Church—no longer, I say with regret, as an Anglican who regularly attends my local church. This country is now a secular society and, to the extent that it is not, Anglicanism is no longer pre-eminent.

Then there is the question of numbers: 24 Bishops and two Archbishops—not, I acknowledge at once, a large proportion of the House. But, once we embark on a serious attempt to reduce numbers and refresh our membership—and if, as I suggest, it is very hard to discern reasons of principle to justify the presence of the Lords spiritual in this House—I am afraid that the occupants of the episcopal Bench become candidates for removal. I know that will not be the consequence of the Bill, but I hope that we will be prepared to debate the issue with honesty and candour.

[Lord Moore of Etchingham (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I must say that I am a little distressed to hear from Conservative Benches the nature of this criticism of the Bishops. It is unfortunate. I understand, however, that people get cross with the Bishops for all sorts of reasons—I certainly frequently do in columns that I write.

I also hesitate to speak on this subject because these are high and complicated matters. But I do feel that somebody has to speak for the Bishops here, because they will not speak for themselves. After all, our Lord said,

“let this cup pass from me”,

and that is more or less so for the Bishops. They cannot say, “No, I want to keep the cup. I want to go on and have another pint in the Bishops’ Bar”. They have to express a becoming humility, which basically means that they have to shut up on this subject—or so they will tend to feel.

Of course, we feel cross about this sometimes and I believe that there is a problem with the Bishops in this period. I will illustrate it with an example. I had a very lovely, pious aunt, who, as a child, attended her parish church. Two clergy preached there: one was very good at it and one was very bad. She said to her parents, “When Mr X preaches, I listen, and when Mr Y preaches, I keep my mind on higher things”. Sometimes, with some of the episcopal utterances we hear nowadays, we need to keep our minds on higher things.

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[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My noble friend’s amendment to ensure that no one party has a majority in the House of Lords is a relatively new idea. In the pre-1999 House of more than 1,000 noble Lords, there was often a majority well-disposed to the Government of the day. I remember observing, as an adviser in the Conservative Government after 2015, that this was perhaps the first Conservative Government in history who did not enjoy a majority in the House of Lords. What we are confronting here is a relatively new phenomenon.

Of course, it was a problem that the Labour Party faced much earlier, and had to contend with under the leadership of my noble friend Lord Attlee’s grandfather, after 1945. Out of that arose what we know as the Salisbury convention, though really it should not be called that. Viscount Cranborne had not acceded to the marquisate at that time, and poor old Viscount Addison never gets remembered.

Under that convention, your Lordships’ House agreed that it would not seek to thwart the main lines of Labour’s legislation provided it derived from the party’s manifesto for the previous election. Sadly, the then-future fifth Marquess did not tell us what to do about full stops or other punctuation in Labour manifestos, but it was a convention that certainly helped the Attlee Government get its business through and make all the changes that it did to this country. It echoed the referendal theory, which was developed under the third Marquess, in relation to legislation that was brought forward by Liberal Governments, but it is clear there was a lack of clarity on this convention.

I remember the noble Baroness the Lord Privy Seal arguing to your Lordships’ Committee on the Constitution, when I was in Downing Street advising my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead, that it was far from clear that the Salisbury-Addison convention was ever intended to apply to minority Governments and that was not an eventuality that was foreseen by the Marquess of Salisbury in the 1940s.

There are clearly a lot of gaps to fill. There was an attempt by your Lordships’ House—indeed, there was a Joint Committee—to look at the conventions and the two Houses’ understanding of how they operated, back in 2006. I wonder whether the noble Baroness or the present Government have any intention of repeating that exercise, in looking to codify or clarify the convention or to point out other unforeseen circumstances, such as minority Governments in another place.

In the 1997 Labour manifesto, there was a sentence that said:

“No one political party should seek a majority in the House of Lords”.


There was no such statement or commitment in the 2024 manifesto. I think the noble Baroness the Lord Privy Seal has been clear from the Dispatch Box before that it is her view that no party should seek a majority in your Lordships’ House, and I would be grateful if she would expand on that in a moment.

But I think my noble friend Lord Hailsham, who has spoken a few times—

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

Briefly.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My noble friend, who has spoken briefly and enjoyably on every occasion, is keen to hear from the Lord Privy Seal, as are we all, so I leave it to her.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, I am very attracted to what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has just said. I find what my noble friend Lord Banner had to say extremely attractive, and I hope that the Government will find it their—

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

Wisdom?

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

Yes, wisdom—I was clutching for the word. I hope they will find it in their wisdom to reach a conclusion similar to that advanced by my noble friend.

Quickly, while the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, is still in the Chamber—

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[Lord Garnier (Con)]

He is never far absent from it. This series of amendments does not appeal to the noble Lord because it does not deal with the hereditary peerage, but of course, right in front of us—of me—is my noble friend Lord Hailsham, the third Viscount, whose grandfather and father were both Lords Chancellor and therefore senior members of the judiciary in their day. He demonstrates the agility of the British constitution, in that, although a hereditary Peer, he sits here as a life Peer.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

I cannot be culled.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

Exactly; and we are all the better off for that. However, I think it very important to recognise that, although our constitution is odd, strange and, in many ways, not very neat, it does function all the better by having people from a variety of backgrounds in this place.

The fact that we do not any more regularly have the presence of what used to be called Law Lords, and now are justices of the Supreme Court, is a disbenefit to us. Also, I suspect that there was a time when the Law Lords gained advantage by, if not speaking and voting in the Chamber, at least being here and listening to or discerning the political mood of the moment. This is particularly so when they are dealing with cases involving public policy. I suspect that we have missed a trick by informing the Supreme Court and our being informed by it in our respective deliberations.

--- Later in debate ---

I have raised this point before in your Lordships’ House. The last time I did so from the Government Benches, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, whom we all miss, wryly commented, with that twinkle in his eye, that this was, he thought, the first job application ever made on the Floor of the House of Lords. This is not meant to be a job application, but I beg to move.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I sympathise with a very great deal of what my noble friend said. I speak with a certain family background, and I too regret the diminution of the role and status of the Lord Chancellor. That said, we are where we are and we cannot sensibly address this amendment without asking ourselves what the role of the Lord Chancellor is and should be. Since 2007, the Lord Chancellor has also been Secretary of State for Justice, sitting in the House of Commons. The Secretary of State for Justice has a very large number of responsibilities that touch on the constituency interests of Members of Parliament. I find it very difficult to believe that Members of Parliament would accept the Secretary of State for Justice sitting in the House of Lords.

That takes one directly to the role. Are we to separate the role of the Lord Chancellor from that of Secretary of State for Justice? That is certainly possible; it could be done. But what other departmental responsibility would the Lord Chancellor then have? I accept that there are some senior offices that can be represented in this House—if I may say so, the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General does so with distinction. He has been preceded by other Attorneys-General in this House, and I regard that as perfectly proper because there are a relatively few constituency interests that would engage Members of the House of Commons.

That, to a lesser extent, was also true of the Foreign Secretary. My noble friend Lord Cameron occupied the role of Foreign Secretary with great distinction. It caused real problems in the House of Commons, as indeed did the role of Lord Carrington at the time of Lady Thatcher’s Government. In both cases, this had to be met by having a very effective deputy. But, again, the Foreign Secretary’s role, although hugely important, raised relatively few constituency interests.

My point is this: if the Lord Chancellor is to have a serious departmental responsibility, which has constituency interests engaged so far as Members of the House of Commons are concerned, that Lord Chancellor, Secretary of State for Justice or whatever, has to be in the House of Commons. If this Committee accepts that, one is then driven to ask: what, if any, departmental role would a new Lord Chancellor have? I find it very difficult to identify one. If that is the case, we are diminishing and not enhancing the role of the Lord Chancellor. So, while I agreed with an awful lot of the underlying sentiments expressed by my noble friend, I cannot back him on this one.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I have my name on Amendment 60. It seems to me that the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, in this regard—the Lord Chancellor having by law to be a Member of your Lordships’ House—is sensible. My noble friend Lord Hailsham’s point is easy to answer. Part of the constitutional pottage made by the Blair Government when they passed the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 was the creation of the Ministry of Justice, with its Orwellian-sounding name. It has not been a happy experience melding the operation of the prison system with the court system, and I suggest that the answer is that that is broken up and the Prison Service returned to the Home Office. Accordingly, there would be no need for a separate Secretary of State for Justice, thus answering my noble friend Lord Hailsham’s point, and the Lord Chancellor could therefore return to this House and protect the interests of the judiciary in the Cabinet. He could indeed also return to being Speaker of this House, which would further guarantee his independence from the Government of the day. That, of course, is for another day, but, at the moment, I strongly support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Brady of Altrincham (Con)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for introducing my remarks so capably. I hate to disappoint him, but my intention is to speak briefly in support of my noble friend Lady Laing’s Amendment 67, not to move Amendment 90C in my name. I tabled it intending for it to sit with the earlier amendment that I proposed, which we debated at an earlier stage. My intention was to draw out a broader debate about the importance of a separation of powers. We heard earlier about the separation between the judiciary and the legislature, but we do not speak very often about the possible separation between the Executive and the legislature. That is the debate I was wishing to have, but it does not sit comfortably at this point in our proceedings.

I do, however, very strongly support my noble friend Lady Laing’s amendment, which serves quite an important purpose—and sits naturally with the avowed intention of the Bill. Most of us across the House recognise that the odd process of exempted hereditary Peers being chosen by by-election has become very difficult to justify. It has been widely said at previous stages that it had already really fallen into disuse and most people have been happy to see that there would not be future by-elections.

In dealing with what appeared to be an anomalous route for appointment to your Lordships’ House, it is very hard to see how the appointment of a Peer for life simply because they are being appointed to do a specific job for a specific period of time is not at least as anomalous.

I strongly support my noble friend in her intention. As she has said, it would increase the freedom of Prime Ministers to bring in people to act as Ministers from a much broader field or a much wider spectrum of life experience—and it would not have the unintended consequence of constantly swelling the ranks of your Lordships’ House.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I wish to make two brief points. First, with regard to what has just been said by the noble Baroness, I strongly support the idea of time-limited persons in this House, whether they are Ministers, appointed for a particular short term or—my own favoured proposal—for fixed terms of, say, 10 years, which addresses some of my noble friend’s point.

Amendment 90C, which my noble friend Lord Brady does not intend to move, would be seriously bad news. If this House is to perform its function as a revising Chamber by scrutinising legislation, it is essential that the Government of the day are represented by competent Ministers who can answer questions from the Opposition or their own Benches. If my noble friend’s amendment, which he does not intend to move, was ever to find favour, the role of this House would be hugely diminished.

[Lord Rennard (LD)]

My Lords, I, too, support Amendment 67 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Laing of Elderslie, which I have signed.

As a stalwart participant in debates about the future of your Lordships’ House, in particular on the principle of its hereditary membership, it has been a source of constant frustration to me that the House has been unable since 2015 to make even minor and sensible reforms to our composition, until now. There are several sensible amendments to this Bill that go beyond removing the hereditary basis for membership, and I support the principle of this one.

I have looked at ministerial appointments made by way of creating a new peerage since 2015. There have been 29 in this period, of which nine—or approximately one-third—have lasted as Ministers for less than a year. Only seven of the 29 new Peers created in this way have lasted as Ministers for more than two years. Therefore, 76% of them have not lasted as Ministers for two years, but all of them have been granted lifetime membership of the House. I then looked at the record of those appointed Ministers in this way after they ceased to be Ministers. Of the 29, 11 have gone on to make fewer than 10 spoken contributions and only 12 have made more than 50. Fifteen did not serve on a committee, 17 took part in fewer than 50 Divisions and only eight took part in more than 100 Divisions. It is a great source of frustration to many in the House that we have seen so many ministerial appointments which involved the granting of a life peerage, with the newly appointed Ministers lasting only a very short period of time in office and then mostly disappearing without trace from our Chamber but without choosing to resign from it.

If ministerial appointments created in that way continue at the same rate over the next decade, we will add another 30 Members to the House. That would make the cull of the hereditary Members less justified, if it were simply about numbers. One ministerial Peer would be created for every three hereditary Peers removed, and the ministerial Peers are likely to be of less value to the House in the long run.

All the evidence suggests that peerages created to enable ministerial appointments inflate our size while not invariably providing Members who are very active beyond the term of their ministerial office. We need to end the practice of a peerage for life being granted simply to enable ministerial appointments to be made from outside the membership of the House of Commons. Almost everyone agrees that the House of Lords is too large and that it is not well served by having Members who inflate our numbers without properly participating in our work.

Therefore, I hope that the Government will look favourably at ending the link between a life peerage and ministerial office. They could, at the very least, expect any new Ministers appointed in this way, at the end of their term of ministerial office, either to remain as active in the House as expected by the standards of the House of Lords Appointments Commission or to resign immediately from membership of the House. A public statement from the Prime Minister that this will be the case would be a welcome step, pending more wide-ranging reforms of the House. It would make an amendment such as this less necessary and avoid further debate.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 1st April 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Mobarik (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Foster of Aghadrumsee and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, for their support.

My amendment proposes the nomination of life peerages equivalent to the number of hereditary Peers, split proportionally between the parties and groups affected. I shall speak to the detail of it shortly. I came to this conclusion after a number of conversations and considerable thought on how to resolve this matter in a way that reflects the disposition of our House: of respect, courtesy and consideration towards our colleagues —something that one should expect in any place of work.

When I spoke at Second Reading, I expressed the view that current hereditary Peers should be awarded life peerages if this Bill removes their ability to sit in this House as hereditary Peers. It was a wish to protect valued and respected colleagues from eviction from this House, prompted, as I said then, by a feeling that there may be an element of discrimination or prejudice at play. I hope, having been sensitive to such things from a young age and from experience, that I will always stand up to prejudice no matter from where it comes or to whom it is directed. It is simply a principle that I wish to uphold.

Having listened carefully to the debates on this Bill over these last weeks, I am still trying to understand why it is being brought forward by the Government when there are so many other more pressing issues for them to address. Nevertheless, if noble Lords will indulge me with their attention for a little longer, I will share some more background to this amendment.

I came to this House just over a decade ago and was introduced by my noble friend Lord Strathclyde, a pre-eminent hereditary Peer and former Leader of this House. I knew my noble friend from serving on the Strathclyde commission, which he so ably chaired, and was hugely honoured that he agreed to be one of my supporters.

During my first few weeks here, my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie, another hereditary Peer, became my mentor. I do not think there could have been anyone kinder and more conscientious. He did everything he could to ensure that I understood the workings of your Lordships’ House. Several months on, my noble friend Lord Taylor of Holbeach, then Chief Whip, asked whether I would consider being a party Whip. I said yes. My group, or flock as we called them, had something in common—they were all Scots, and a fair number of them were hereditary Peers.

If anyone is concerned about representation of the regions, Scotland is very well represented by our hereditaries. I will mention just a few of those in my old flock. My noble friend Lord Lindsay currently serves on our Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, is president of the Chartered Trading Standards Institute, and has been president of the National Trust of Scotland and Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Scotland. My noble friend Lord Caithness, the chief of Clan Sinclair, currently serves on our procedure committee and the Food, Diet and Obesity Committee. He has also been a Minister of State in no less than five government departments: the Department for Transport, the Home Office, the Department of the Environment, His Majesty’s Treasury and the Foreign Office. My noble friend Lord Dundee is the royal standard-bearer for Scotland. He is a farmer who runs two charitable trusts that he founded, and he has served for many years on the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. He has also been a Government Whip and government spokesman for education, Scottish affairs, home affairs and energy. All of them made me feel so welcome and showed me the utmost respect and kindness. I could not have asked for better colleagues looking out for me when I joined this House.

What I am trying to say is that the people affected by this Bill are our friends. Not only that: they are distinguished parliamentarians who contribute so much to this House to which we all belong.

A more recent colleague and friend of mine in this House is my noble friend Lord Minto. He has served as a Minister of State in the Department for Business and Trade and as Minister of State for Defence—both unpaid positions, might I add—and we have regular catch-ups over tea. On our very first meeting, my noble friend and I discovered some common threads: the family of a very close friend of my late father, an eminent gentlemen by the name of Shaharyar Khan, a former ambassador of Pakistan to the United Kingdom, had a strong connection to my noble friend’s grandfather. Historical photographs and information were shared, but that is where the cozy backstory ends.

My noble friend’s grandfather was the viceroy of pre-partition India. I have rather a dim view of empire, as noble Lords would expect, but I do not choose to see my noble friend through the lens of history. When we enter this place, those strange concepts of class and privilege are left outside. We are here as equals—as Peers. The clue is in the name but, to be clear, I do not argue for the hereditary principle. It belongs in the century before last. The point is that if we do not believe that someone should become a Member of this House because of who their parents were, surely it is not right to remove people from this House because of who their parents were. With that in mind, I come to my amendment.

I hope that the noble Baroness the Leader of the House—the Leader of our whole House—knows that I hold her and her Front-Bench team in the highest esteem. She has told us that this Bill is not a cunning attempt at gerrymandering, and we should believe her. My amendment follows on from that understanding. If this Bill is not about gerrymandering then on the day that it passes into law, which it will, as it was a manifesto commitment, the Prime Minister should at that point recommend to His Majesty that life peerages be granted to replace the number of hereditary Peers who are to be lost.

It would be up to the leaders of the parties in the House of Lords or, in the case of the Cross-Bench Peers HOLAC, to replace the hereditary Peers they have lost with life Peers. There would be no back-room deals, a term used more than once during these debates; let us just be transparent. Here are the numbers lost and they should be replaced. If we feel that some, even most, of our hereditary Peers are worthy of being appointed as life Peers, then there really should be no objection; and where there are hereditaries who do not attend the House or who intend to retire, this will be a good opportunity to replace them with fresh talent. Some more women on these Benches would be a good idea.

In all cases, qualification for this House can and should be based on life experience, knowledge, commitment and a quality not often mentioned: wisdom. I really hope that we can overcome the prejudices that I fear I am detecting. We should judge each other on what we do and say, rather than on who we are and where we come from. We should respect the huge contributions that so many hereditary Peers have made over the years. We should allow for a smooth and fair transition to the next stage of our illustrious history, in readiness for the challenges and opportunities of a new and exciting age, by bringing with us the best of our talent and recruiting what more we need. I believe that my amendment addresses all these points, and I beg to move.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, with regret, I oppose this amendment, despite the fact that I often agree with some of the views of some of its proposers. It seems to me to have at least three quite serious objections.

First, it does absolutely nothing to reduce the numbers in this Chamber—quite the reverse. Together with the numbers already appointed and those likely to be appointed, we will greatly increase the size of this House well beyond the 600 which has often been recommended as desirable.

Secondly and differently, it greatly enhances the influence of party leaders and I really do not want to do that. What if Mr Johnson was the leader of the Conservative Party now? I certainly would not want to give him these unlimited powers.

Lastly, and much the same, it does not address the concerns frequently expressed in this Committee as to the lack of any proper criteria to ensure that the individuals concerned are fit and proper persons or, for that matter, will participate fully in the business of this House. While I can understand the reasons that it is put forward, I think it is a thoroughly bad amendment.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I profoundly disagree, almost for the first time, with the noble Viscount. I put my name to this amendment, and I want to say to the Committee that I am concerned, as he clearly is, about the size of the House. We are the second largest second Chamber, apart from China, and 237 Members of this House have attended less than 20% of the time they should, of which 127 have attended less than 10% of that time. We have leave of absence, and one Peer has had 8.5 years of leave of absence, while others have had several years but remain on the list of Peers who could attend at any time. We now have a system for Peers who do not do anything and do not attend: they could be asked to leave. So far, only 16 have been asked to leave, despite the numbers who really do not attend and do not contribute.

For comparison, we can look at the hereditary Peers in your Lordships’ House. Out of the 88 hereditary Peers that we had until yesterday, two only have failed to do more than 20% of attending this House, which if I may say so compares rather well with the other Peers in this House who do not attend. I attend fairly regularly, as your Lordships will know, and I have noticed over the years that I have been here the enormous hard work of the majority of the hereditary Peers. Not only do they play their part by coming and contributing, but they contribute substantially; they play a valuable part in the work of this House. Among many hereditary Peers, two are more hard-working than many others among us.

If the successive efforts of the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, to get rid of elections of hereditary Peers had been successful, there would be no question about the current hereditary Peers remaining. Unfortunately, it was not accepted, and it is disappointing that it was not accepted. I think that the last Government and the Conservative Benches were at fault in not recognising the writing on the wall, because we would not be here if the Grocott proposals had been allowed.

But in recognising the enormous contribution that those Peers make to this House, it would be very sad if this Government did not do what this amendment asks for. What saddens me even more is that this Government, by taking this particular Bill forward, without offering the opportunity to consider those Peers who do not attend and do not contribute, are allowing them to remain technically as Members of the House, and doing nothing about it. Getting rid of those who do the work and leaving in those who do not seems to me something that the Government should really reflect on, and I ask them to look seriously at this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, my probing Amendment 93A would safeguard the current process of proving succession to a peerage. According to the College of Arms:

“The Royal Warrant of 2004 requires that a person wishing to be recognised as a Peer prove succession to the relevant dignity, to the satisfaction of the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice. Garter King of Arms provides a ruling to the Crown on whether each claim has been satisfactorily made out”.


For more complex claims, the current process is that

“advice should be sought from an officer of the College of Arms in London, the Court of the Lord Lyon in Edinburgh (for Peerages of Scotland), or a solicitor”.

As my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar said, claims are currently made

“by submission of a formal Petition to the House of Lords and Statutory Declaration to the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice via the Crown Office, made on behalf of the claimant by a suitable person”.

According to the Ministry of Justice guidance notes, the current situation is that the Lord Chancellor is charged with keeping a Roll of the Peerage to ensure that, as far as possible, records of successions of peerages are kept in good order. The point of my amendment is to ensure that, when the House of Lords is removed from any role in determining new peerages, the existing roles of the College of Arms and the Lord Lyon are fully taken into account, as well as the procedures for proving succession to a peerage. As the noble Lord, Lord Collins, said, this Bill is about hereditary Peers. My worry is that if the Ministry of Justice is to be in sole charge of approving hereditary peerage claims, further legislation could be brought in to abolish hereditary peerages in their entirety.

Finally, as a non-lawyer, may I ask the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General how contested peerage claims are going to be dealt with in detail? Do they go to the lower courts first and up through that process? Why is the final Court of Appeal going to be the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council? From my layman’s understanding, the committee mainly handles cases from our overseas territories and certain Commonwealth countries. Why is it not to be the Supreme Court? I have read that judgments of the Judicial Committee are not binding on UK courts, having only persuasive authority. Does this not add an unnecessary extra layer of complexity to this issue, and could this not be resolved by just replacing the Judicial Committee with the Supreme Court?

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I really think we are giving these matters a significance they do not deserve. I absolutely do not think that the Privy Council should be made responsible for the adjudication. That might have been the case in 1833 and while we had hereditary Peers dominant in this House, but the truth is that the possession of a hereditary peerage will confer no right to sit in this House of Lords. That being so, what is the purpose of this amendment? There is often dispute between prospective Peers: one says that they are entitled and the other says that they are. Well, that is a matter for them. It is a sort of boundary dispute. It would perhaps be a proper matter for a county court—or if, for that matter, there was a financial settlement of some substance, maybe for the High Court—but the idea that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council or the Supreme Court should be involved in a quarrel between two people claiming to be a hereditary Peer is complete nonsense.

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, seemed to indicate that hereditary Peers may not exist here in the House of Lords in the future, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, indicated something similar. At what point will there be no hereditary Peers in the House of Lords, and how might that situation—which I would strongly support—come about?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendment 101, which calls for a constitutional conference. We have spent much time debating what the composition of your Lordships’ House should be in the future, but I am afraid that we have the cart before the horse: before you decide on how you would like to reconstitute the membership of your Lordships’ House, you have to decide what they are going to do.

This is the problem that we have at the moment: the Bill does not address the question of the powers of your Lordships’ House. However, until you have decided on the powers of your Lordships’ House, you cannot really decide how you are going to change the membership. At that point, you will get completely bogged down, because you will not then be able to tell people who are elected to your Lordships’ House that they cannot vote at Second Reading, that there is a limit on the amount of ping-pong you can play with the elected House, and so forth.

I sincerely hope that the Government will institute a constitutional conference on the relative powers, because that will be a vexed and difficult issue. I am sure that the other place rather revels in the fact that this House is so illegitimate. Since it can claim that it is legitimate and has a democratic mandate, it can basically overrule what happens in your Lordships’ House, which is reduced to the role of a revising Chamber. On the other hand, the Government have to decide what this House really does. I suggest that it would be very sensible to set up a constitutional conference to work on the relative powers, which could be introduced to your Lordships’ House as it stands today. The Government could then see the results of the decisions made by a constitutional conference on what should and should not happen in this House with the existing membership before they perhaps decide to change the membership overall.

The composition of your Lordships’ House is an extremely complicated issue as well, because there are many different facets to your Lordships’ House, not least the Cross Benches, which play a very valuable role in the deliberations of your Lordships’ House in revising legislation. On the other hand, it is very difficult to see how you can combine the Cross Benches with an elected House; I do not see how you elect independent Members. The political parties would have something to say about elections. It is complicated. Perhaps you could appoint Members of the Cross Benches and have other Members elected, but this is all quite difficult. What happens to the Lords spiritual? Are we to continue to have them in this House if it becomes elected?

Many different issues are raised on the whole question of the composition of your Lordships’ House, not least the issue of elections. Are you going to have elections on the same day as you have a general election for the other place, or at a different time? Do you want the composition of this House politically to be different from that of the House of Commons, or do you want it to be the same?

There are many different issues that come up on this, and it needs a lot of deliberation and cross-party discussions, and we have to give serious thought to how this will all work out in the future. Unless we do think through all this, we will get ourselves into a terrible muddle. It is no good people just getting up saying, “I believe in an elected House”, as the Prime Minister did the other day. You have to think through the ramifications of having an elected House. Would an elected House challenge the House of Commons? I suspect it would. Therefore, you come back to the relative powers of each House.

We are in grave danger of getting into a complete muddle over all this. If we want clear thinking into the future, we will have to work these things out with cross-party consensus, and through constitutional conferences, to arrive at some form of system for the future. This is nothing other than very complicated; we should be giving serious thought to it now.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly on Amendments 95 and 96 to which I have put my name. In doing so, I have basically three concerns. First, I have a strong suspicion that the Government will bring no further proposal for the reform of the House of Lords during the lifetime of this Parliament. Secondly, related to that, a review would act as a spur, so there is just a chance that a review might encourage them to do so. Thirdly, I think the public should know that many of us in this House favour a much more radical solution to the composition and powers of this House. I am one of those: I believe in an elected Chamber.

That takes me to the point made by my noble friend Lord Hamilton. I entirely agree with him that fundamental to any debate should be the powers of this House, because from a decision on the powers stems the decision as to composition. If you are content with being but a revising Chamber, then a process very similar to what we now have is perfectly appropriate. But if, as I believe, you need to have a Chamber which has powers commensurate with the House of Commons and can face the House of Commons down in appropriate cases, then it has got to be elected. I have always believed that, to stand against the elective dictatorship of which my father wrote and spoke, we need an elected House with powers similar to those in the House of Commons.

[Lord Swire (Con)]

My Lords, I very largely agree with the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Hamilton of Epsom. My Amendment 101A is slightly more ambitious—perhaps too ambitious for the taste of your Lordships this evening. We have debated this Bill for four full days now. I do not wish to test the patience of noble Lords much further, but I do think we are missing an opportunity here.

I rather share the view that, as far as the Government are concerned, this will be it in relation to this House. I do not see them moving to any further stage, certainly not in this Parliament. All the evidence, for instance, on an age restriction in this House suggests that it is slightly eclipsed by the average age of the most recent appointments made by the Government to this House.

However, it is worth pausing to consider that, since two fundamental issues have arisen with implications for the constitution—those being devolution and Brexit—we have had no deep thought as to how we now wish this country to be governed. In fact, the last royal commission, which is what my amendment calls for, was instigated in 1969: Lord Crowther started it, and it was finished by Lord Kilbrandon in 1973. It was a contentious commission. Two people resiled from signing it, and people did not agree on it, but at least there was a debate about how we wished this country to be governed.

We have seen a lot of things happen without there being any thorough or clear thought as to whether they are the sort of things that we want to happen. We have seen an expansion in the Welsh Parliament; just recently, they have extended the number of Members. We have seen debates within the Scottish Parliament as to whether you can be a Member of Parliament as well as a Member of the Scottish Parliament. We have had debates about there being no English Parliament when all the component parts of the United Kingdom now have their own Assemblies.

We have heard how in Northern Ireland there has been paralysis over recent years. Do we want to look again at the d’Hondt process? Do we want to look again at how we select the First Minister in Northern Ireland? Do we want to look again at how political parties can self-designate in Northern Ireland?

We have seen recently moves to reorganise local government in England without much debate—a move to unitaries, getting rid of a lot of our district authorities. I personally support that in most cases, but we have had no consideration as to what that means for the representation of the voters in being represented properly.

In the House of Lords itself, in the last Parliament—my noble friend Lord Forsyth was very quick on this the whole time—we had Ministers in this Parliament who were unpaid. I would suggest that, in a democracy, when we have a bicameral system of legislation, to have unpaid Ministers performing the roles of Ministers in the other House is absolutely unacceptable. I very much hope that the Treasury Bench will confirm that there are no Ministers currently doing this unpaid. Incidentally, as we have heard, the majority of Ministers who were doing it unpaid when we on this side of the House were in Government were actually, yes, hereditary Peers.

When I first came to this House, which was not very long ago, the Lord Speaker told me that he thought the difference between the other place and this place was that in the other place you get up and you tell people, and in this place you get up and you ask people. In that spirit, I would ask whether your Lordships agree that what we are doing with this Bill is just spraying a bit of body paint on to a rotting carcass. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Wallace: I think the British public are in a febrile state and do not feel that they are being properly represented. We need to do something about that as a matter of urgency, and what better way than to have a root and branch royal commission to look at how this country is governed and should be governed, how the balance of power is distributed around the country, and whether we need a bicameral system of government going forward?

If we do not need that, so be it; we will have to have some other check on the Executive. If we do, and I suspect that most of your Lordships would think that we do, then we need to decide what the powers of that second body—us, your Lordships’ House, whatever we want to call it—need to be.

I personally believe—I have changed my mind on this—that what we are seeing with this Bill is a move towards a completely different second Chamber. I would not be at all surprised if, in the next decade-plus, we do have an elected senate. Maybe that is a good thing; I do not know if it is a good thing or not. What I do know is that we need to have the debate, on all the issues that I have mentioned. I do not believe that this Bill should become an Act until we have thoroughly thought through the implications of what we are doing.