Small Payments Consultation

Tom Pursglove Excerpts

Tuesday 16th November 2021 Written Statements

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Tom Pursglove)]

Today I am launching a public consultation on proposals for a small payments scheme for individuals who lack mental capacity.



Many people think that being a parent, spouse, civil partner or sibling—more commonly referred to as being “next of kin”—means that if their loved one is unable to deal with their property and finances they will be able to step into their shoes and access their property and finances on their behalf.



However, it is a long-held legal principle that an adult must have proper legal authority to access or deal with property belonging to another adult. A common form of this legal authority is an ordinary power of attorney. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 established a new framework for the granting of legal authority in circumstances where an adult lacks mental capacity by allowing third parties to obtain legal authority through applications to the Court of Protection.



Since coming into force in 2007, the Mental Capacity Act has been a vital piece of legislation, protecting and supporting individuals lacking mental capacity and empowering families to prepare for the future, but we are aware that there is a lack of awareness of the Act, the protections it provides and the Court of Protection.



Where relatively small sums of money are involved, some families have said that the Court of Protection process is disproportionate and could have a detrimental effect in delaying, for example, the ability of a bank account holder to benefit from their funds.



This issue was initially brought to our attention by the families of children and young adults who lack the mental capacity to access their matured child trust funds when they turn 18. However, these issues will not just be faced by parents and carers of young adults, but by anyone who cares for someone who lacks mental capacity. There will be individuals who may require access to small amounts of money to support the specific needs of a person without mental capacity but may not feel a full deputyship order is appropriate for them or find the application process for a one-off order off-putting.



We believe an alternative to the Court of Protection process may be appropriate in some circumstances.

It is for this reason that the Ministry of Justice has been examining the case for a new process to enable third-party access to smaller balances without the need to obtain the form of legal authority currently required under the Mental Capacity Act.



We want any small payments scheme to be simple and quick, while also containing appropriate protections and safeguards for vulnerable individuals. It must not be seen as a replacement for obtaining the recognised legal authority as provided by either an LPA or an order of the Court of Protection, nor should it undermine the protections and support offered by the Mental Capacity Act. Rather, it should offer an interim solution while longer term arrangements are put in place where appropriate.



Creating a small payments scheme will require changes to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and supporting secondary legislation. I have launched this consultation to invite views on the feasibility and desirability of such a scheme, and the potential changes to legislation.



To develop the proposals put forward in this consultation, we have engaged stakeholders from a range of sectors, including finance, legal, charity and social care. We now want to gather evidence from a much wider group and are asking for views on the following:



the purpose of the scheme;

the value and duration of payments;

the financial products in scope;

administrative arrangements for the scheme;

current barriers in the system; and

security measures and liability.

The consultation is available in full at:

https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/mental-capacity-act-small-payments-scheme and a copy has been presented to Parliament.

[HCWS393]

Nationality and Borders Bill (Fifteenth sitting)

Tom Pursglove Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 4th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. We enter the final lap. I have the usual announcements: electronic devices off, please, and no food or drink. Mr Speaker requests that Members wear face coverings as a courtesy to others; they are for the protection of others, not for the protection of yourself. I am not a terribly good example, but I cannot breathe with a mask on. Hon. Members are also asked to take covid lateral flow tests twice a week if coming on to the estate. I do not know whether hon. Members have done that; it might be a good thing to do before we depart for a week. Finally, Hansard would appreciate speaking notes.

New Clause 6

Expedited appeals: joining of related appeals

“(1) For the purposes of this section, an ‘expedited section 82 appeal’ is an expedited appeal within the meaning of section 82A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (expedited appeals for claims brought on or after PRN cut-off date).

(2) For the purposes of this section, a ‘related appeal’ is an appeal under any of the following—

(a) section 82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (appeals in respect of protection and human rights claims), other than one which is an expedited section 82 appeal;

(b) section 40A of the British Nationality Act 1981 (appeal against deprivation of citizenship);

(c) the Immigration (Citizens’ Rights Appeals) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/61) (appeal rights in respect of EU citizens’ rights immigration decisions etc);

(d) regulation 36 of the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 (S.I. 2016/1052) (appeals against EEA decisions) as it continues to have effect following its revocation.

(3) If a person brings an expedited section 82 appeal at a time when a related appeal brought by that person is pending, the related appeal is, from that time, to be continued as an appeal to the Upper Tribunal and accordingly is to be transferred to the Upper Tribunal.

(4) If an expedited section 82 appeal brought by a person is pending, any right that the person would otherwise have to bring a related appeal to the First-tier Tribunal is instead a right to bring it to the Upper Tribunal.

(5) A related appeal within subsection (3) or brought to the Upper Tribunal as mentioned in (4) is referred to in this section as an ‘expedited related appeal’.

(6) Tribunal Procedure Rules must make provision with a view to securing that the Upper Tribunal consolidates an expedited related appeal and the expedited section 82 appeal concerned or hears them together (and see section 82A(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002).

(7) Tribunal Procedure Rules must secure that the Upper Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice in the case of a particular expedited related appeal to do so, order that the appeal is to be continued as an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal and accordingly is to be transferred to that Tribunal.

(8) For the purposes of this section, an appeal is ‘pending’—

(a) in the case of an appeal under section 82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (including an expedited section 82 appeal), if it is pending within the meaning of section 104 of that Act;

(b) in the case of an appeal under section 40A of the British Nationality Act 1981, during the period—

(i) beginning when it is instituted, and

(ii) ending when it is finally determined or withdrawn;

(c) in the case of an appeal under the Immigration Citizens’ Rights Appeals (EU Exit) Regulations 2020, if it is pending within the meaning of regulation 13 of those Regulations;

(d) in the case of an appeal under the regulation 36 of the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016, if it is pending within the meaning of Part 6 of those Regulations (see regulation 35).

(9) In section 13(8) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (decisions excluded from right to appeal to the Court of Appeal), after paragraph (bza) (inserted by section 21) insert—

‘(bzb) any decision of the Upper Tribunal on an expedited related appeal within the meaning given by section (Expedited appeals: joining of related appeals) of the Nationality and Borders Act 2021 (expedited appeals against refusal of protection claim or human rights claim: joining of related appeals),’.”—(Tom Pursglove.)

This new clause (to be inserted after clause 21) provides that where a person brings an appeal under section 82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 that is subject to the expedited procedure under the new section 82A of that Act, certain other appeals brought by that person are also to be subject to the expedited procedure.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Tom Pursglove)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would be inserted after clause 21. It forms part of a package of measures that will enable the swift removal of those who have no right to be in the UK. It complements clause 21 by ensuring that individuals cannot utilise the appeals system as a tool to delay their removal from the UK.

Frequently, those facing removal or deportation from the UK utilise delay tactics, such as late claims and repeated appeals, to thwart removal action. That leads to unnecessary costs to the taxpayer and an increased burden on the court and tribunals system. Clause 21 addresses that issue by creating a new expedited appeal for late human rights or protection claims brought by recipients of a priority removal notice, as provided by clause 18. Expedited appeals will be determined quickly, and the decisions of the upper tribunal will be final. Therefore, clause 21 removes the incentive for bringing claims late and protects the appeal system from abuse.

However, there may be additional appeal rights generated by other claims that individuals may seek to exercise in parallel with an expedited appeal. Such additional appeals would usually be heard in the first tier tribunal. Consequently, an expedited appeal may conclude while an individual has an outstanding appeal in the first tier tribunal, which would prevent their removal from the UK.

New clause 6 enables other appeals in the first tier tribunal brought by a person with an expedited appeal to be heard and determined by the upper tribunal alongside the expedited appeal. That will ensure that, following the conclusion of the expedited process, final determination will have been made on the appellant’s right to remain in the UK and, where the upper tribunal decides that they have no right to remain, removal action can take place.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

I welcome the Minister back to his place. I do not follow the logic of the new clause at all. If somebody is trying to play the system—and I do not like talking in those terms—surely all they need to do is not make a late claim in terms of the PRN notice; then, their existing appeal would proceed normally, with onward rights of appeal and so on. This proposal just does not make sense, even if we accept the Government’s logic, which I do not.

[Tom Pursglove]

The point is exactly as I have set out: in the immigration system, we see repeated appeals deliberately designed to frustrate the system, and the new clause is an appropriate way, with appropriate safeguards, to ensure that the tribunal process can handle those appeals appropriately. It makes sense for appeals to be considered together so that attempts to frustrate the removal process cannot happen and cases are determined as quickly as possible. As I say, there are appropriate judicial safeguards in place in the tribunal process to ensure that appeals are heard appropriately and are directed through the appropriate tribunal. I commend the new clause to the Committee.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Briefly, there are two reasons why I do not think this new clause makes any sense at all. First, there is the point that I just alluded to. The danger is that if someone who has a PRN served on them is contemplating disclosing further information or making a claim and the deadline passes, and they are acting in the way that the Minister wants to get at here and trying to “play the system”, they will simply not make that disclosure. Their existing claims will proceed to appeal through the normal channels, to a first tier tribunal with onward appeal rights. So the proposals do not make sense, even by the Government’s own logic. Can the Minister address that?

Secondly, we object to the new clause from a point of principle. The rare occasions when I would accept that an expedited appeals process can be justified are where the justifications relate solely to manifestly unfounded or repeat claims, but that is not what this is about; this is about expediting appeals and rights to appeal, but not because of the substance of the appeal—it has absolutely nothing to do with the merits of the claim or the related appeal at all. So the proposals make no sense from the point of view of principle, as well as being rather illogical.

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

Again, briefly, I agree with everything the Scottish National party spokesperson, the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, has just said. We do not know at what stage the other appeal will be; it may not be ready to be heard. One problem we have in this country is the delay in the appeals processes because of severe underfunding in our court and tribunal systems, so it seems that the new clause will not work.

The new clause will also cause more problems than it solves. I am not sure that there is a huge problem with multiple outstanding appeals in any event, but the new clause could actually make things worse. If the intention in the Bill is to provide fairness, the new clause will not achieve that, because speeding up an appeal could cause unfairness. So for the reasons outlined by the SNP spokesperson we will not support the new clause.

[Tom Pursglove]

The bottom line is that we simply disagree on this matter. Clause 21 ensures that appeals relating to late human rights or protection claims are dealt with expeditiously, with decisions by the upper tribunal being final. This provides appellants with a swift determination of their claim. It also disincentives late claims and seeks to prevent sequential or multiple appeals from being utilised as a tactic to thwart removal.

However, the Government recognise that in certain circumstances an individual may exercise other appeal rights, in parallel with their expedited appeal. This could give rise to a situation whereby a person has an appeal in a first tier tribunal and an expedited appeal in the upper tribunal. Consequently, the expedited appeal may conclude while an individual has an outstanding appeal in a first tier tribunal. If the appellant was unsuccessful in their expedited appeal, the ongoing appeal in the first tier tribunal would prevent their removal from the UK. This outcome is undesirable and undermines the Government’s intention to disincentivise late claims by ensuring that appeals relating to such claims are determined quickly and conclusively.

The new clause ensures that where a person has an expedited appeal, any related appeal will also be subject to the same expedited process. Therefore, following the conclusion of the expedited process, the appellant’s right to remain in the UK will be determined with finality and, where an individual has no right to remain in the UK, removal action can take place. That is the logical and sensible approach that we propose to take.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 6 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

[The Chair]

Let me explain the process from now on for about the next 10 minutes. We now come to a sequence of Government new clauses, all of which have been debated already with other clauses or amendments. I shall say to the Minister, “Will the Minister move formally?” The Minister, being obedient, will say, “Moved formally.” The Clerk will then read the title of the clause and I will put the questions that it be read a second time and that it be added to the Bill. I gently suggest to the Opposition that there is not much point in calling a Division on both those questions—you can, but it will take a lot longer. Let us see how we get on.

New Clause 7

Accelerated detained appeals

“(1) In this section ‘accelerated detained appeal’ means a relevant appeal (see subsection (6)) brought—

(a) by a person who—

(i) was detained under a relevant detention provision (see subsection (7)) at the time at which they were given notice of the decision which is the subject of the appeal, and

(ii) remains in detention under a relevant detention provision, and

(b) against a decision that—

(i) is of a description prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State, and

(ii) when made, was certified by the Secretary of State under this section.

(2) The Secretary of State may only certify a decision under this section if the Secretary of State considers that any relevant appeal brought in relation to the decision would likely be disposed of expeditiously.

(3) Tribunal Procedure Rules must secure that the following time limits apply in relation to an accelerated detained appeal—

(a) any notice of appeal must be given to the First-tier Tribunal not later than 5 working days after the date on which the appellant was given notice of the decision against which the appeal is brought;

(b) the First-tier Tribunal must make a decision on the appeal, and give notice of that decision to the parties, not later than 25 working days after the date on which the appellant gave notice of appeal to the tribunal;

(c) any application (whether to the First-tier Tribunal or the Upper Tribunal) for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal must be determined by the tribunal concerned not later than 20 working days after the date on which the applicant was given notice of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision.

(4) A relevant appeal ceases to be an accelerated detained appeal on the appellant being released from detention under any relevant detention provision.

(5) Tribunal Procedure Rules must secure that the First-tier Tribunal or (as the case may be) the Upper Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice in a particular case to do so, order that a relevant appeal is to cease to be an accelerated detained appeal.

(6) For the purposes of this section, a ‘relevant appeal’ is an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal under any of the following—

(a) section 82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (appeals in respect of protection and human rights claims);

(b) section 40A of the British Nationality Act 1981 (appeal against deprivation of citizenship);

(c) the Immigration (Citizens’ Rights Appeals) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/61) (appeal rights in respect of EU citizens’ rights immigration decisions etc);

(d) regulation 36 of the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 (S.I. 2016/1052) (appeals against EEA decisions) as it continues to have effect following its revocation.

(7) For the purposes of this section, a ‘relevant detention provision’ is any of the following—

(a) paragraph 16(1), (1A) or (2) of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 (detention of persons liable to examination or removal);

(b) paragraph 2(1), (2) or (3) of Schedule 3 to that Act (detention pending deportation);

(c) section 62 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (detention of persons liable to examination or removal);

(d) section 36(1) of the UK Borders Act 2007 (detention pending deportation).

(8) In this section ‘working day’ means any day except—

(a) a Saturday or Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday or 26 to 31 December, and

(b) any day that is a bank holiday under section 1 of the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971 in the part of the United Kingdom where the appellant concerned is detained.

(9) Regulations under this section are subject to negative resolution procedure.”—(Tom Pursglove.)

This new clause expands the categories of immigration appeals that can be subject to the accelerated detained appeals process that was introduced by clause 24.

Brought up, and read the First and Second time.

Question put, That the clause be added to the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

There used to be a time when the Government used the phrase “whatever it takes” about other crises. It would certainly be apt to apply it here. Clearly, it does not apply in the case of Afghans who have clear links to the UK but who are trapped and in fear of their lives, because the Government have been clueless about getting them out. I urge the Minister to agree to the new clause and lift the arbitrary 5,000 person cap on the number of Afghan refugees we can help this year—they have already been badly let down by the Government—because doing so will save lives.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate and for Halifax for tabling new clause 1 and providing the Committee with this opportunity to consider placing the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme on a statutory footing and lifting the 5,000 person limit for the first year.

The UK has a proud history of supporting those in need of protection, and I understand the concerns that Members of the House have about the plight of people from Afghanistan. During Operation Pitting, the Government and military worked around the clock to airlift about 15,000 people out of Afghanistan—the biggest airlift from a single country for a generation. The Government have relocated thousands of people who loyally served our military in Afghanistan, and we continue to help more.

In addition, the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme is one of the most ambitious resettlement schemes in our country’s history. It will give up to 20,000 people at risk a new life in the UK. Our current schemes are non-legislative, operating outside the immigration rules and on a discretionary basis. Operating in this way has seen us resettle over 25,000 vulnerable people since 2015. Placing the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme on a statutory footing would make it less flexible and less able to respond to changing circumstances internationally.

A huge programme of work, called Operation Warm Welcome, is under way across the whole of Government to ensure that Afghans evacuated to the UK receive the vital support they need. This work, overseen by the Minister for Afghan Resettlement, my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins), spans different Government Departments, charities, non-governmental organisations, local authorities and communities. The aim is to ensure that Afghans can be properly supported as they rebuild their lives in the UK, while also ensuring that local services are not put under undue strain. The support being provided is similar to that of the vulnerable persons resettlement scheme in response to the conflict in Syria, to ensure that people get the vital healthcare, education, support into employment and accommodation they need to fully integrate into society.

There are many who need our protection, and the UK plays a leading role as one of the world’s largest refugee resettlement states. However, regrettably the UK is not able to provide protection to everyone, and it is essential that any decisions regarding the number of people we resettle take into consideration our capacity to support people to rebuild their lives in the UK. We are clear that the number of people we can resettle depends on a variety of factors, including local authorities’ capacity.

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

I just want to pick up on the Minister’ point, which he has made time and again, about the UK leading on resettlement. Does he accept the figures that show that since the start of 2020, the UK has resettled 1,991 refugees, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees? That is less than France, less than half the number for Germany, and about a quarter of the number for Sweden. In what way is that a leading role?

[Tom Pursglove]

I think it is fair to say that this country historically has had a leading role in resettling refugees, and the hon. Gentleman will recognise that we have debated this many times during the course of this Committee’s proceedings, and I have referred to the figure of 25,000 people on several occasions. I am confident that that proud tradition will continue. I am not privy to the figures that he has just cited, but I make the point that we have also been in a pandemic, which clearly has had knock-on effects across life and society in our country and in the international environment.

[Jonathan Gullis (Stoke-on-Trent North) (Con)]

It sounded as though the hon. Member for Sheffield Central was asking for unfettered, uncontrolled, open-border access to this country. We have already had 20,000 illegal economic migrants crossing the English channel. I was down in Dover yesterday with Baroness Hoey, the former Labour Member of Parliament, and saw with utter shock the situation regarding the illegal attempts at crossing. Does the Minister agree that the hon. Gentleman’s words show that the Labour party is out of touch with what people want?

[Tom Pursglove]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention, and no doubt we will have a conversation about his visit to Dover.

[Bambos Charalambous]

As I mentioned in my speech, the Government chose who came into the UK through the voluntary resettlement scheme and they will do so under this scheme as well. Remarks about giving unfettered or unlimited access to everyone are therefore ludicrous, because the Government will be in control of who can enter the UK from Afghanistan through this scheme. To make such aspersions is clearly wrong and misleading.

[Tom Pursglove]

The shadow Minister interrupted me while I was responding to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent North, and, of course, I was happy to take his intervention. The scheme we intend to bring forward is structured and it should not be seen in isolation in relation to Afghanistan. It is important to consider it in the context of the Afghan relocations and assistance policy, which has been invaluable and plays an important role in our efforts to provide sanctuary to those fleeing Afghanistan. That is very important to consider.

To continue with my point about the participation of civil society in community sponsorship, we have been working around the clock to stand up support with local authorities and to secure accommodation for the scheme. There is a huge effort under way to get families who have already been evacuated to the UK into permanent homes so that they can resettle and rebuild their lives. Clearly, we do not want families to remain in bridging accommodation for long periods, so it is sensible to have a limit on the number of places we offer on the scheme.

The new clause seeks to bring the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme into force within 30 days from the date of Royal Assent. We are working at pace to open the scheme, and the new clause would likely result in significant delays in resettling individuals under the scheme.

During the passage of the Bill, we have had many debates relating to Afghanistan. I said previously that I would ensure that the Minister for Afghan Resettlement was made aware of the Committee’s comments, and I will endeavour to do that again. It is important that all views are heard as we work at pace to shape this scheme and to make sure that we get it right, so that we are able to provide sanctuary to those to whom Members across the Committee and across the House want to provide it.

Previous schemes have not been delivered through legislation. I would argue that it is best to be responsive and flexible, and that not putting the scheme on a statutory basis has that effect. The shadow Minister used the word “rigid”. I would argue that not going down the statutory route ensures we can be flexible as to the evolving situation, and provide proper care and support to people who come here.

We want coming to the UK to be a positive and life-changing experience, and we want to provide sanctuary and care for those individuals. I am confident that that is precisely what we will do in delivering this scheme and that our country will be able to be incredibly proud of it. We owe it to those individuals to provide them with sanctuary, and that is precisely what we will do. With that, I ask the hon. Members to withdraw the new clause.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I am not convinced by the Minister’s arguments, which clearly amount to a new cap on immigration. I will repeat the number for the benefit of the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent North: there are 5 million people potentially eligible to come to the country via the British national overseas visa scheme; we are just asking that more than 5,000 people are able to come from Afghanistan. If that limit is rigidly applied, people’s lives could be in danger.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I have said a lot about asylum accommodation in previous years and months. I agree that there are huge problems with the asylum accommodation system, such as over-concentration, too often poor-quality accommodation, a lack of funding for the local authorities that actually step up to the plate and volunteer to undertake the task, and a lack of control and power for those local authorities. Too often they play second fiddle to the companies and organisations contracted to the Government.

I support broadening dispersal, but I am not on board at this stage with mandating it. Repeatedly, local authorities, whether in the west midlands, Glasgow or elsewhere, and other organisations such as the Home Affairs Committee, on which I sit—we have had a couple of reports on this issue—have listed all the things that the Home Office could engage with and undertake to improve the system. I know from speaking to authorities that if the Home Office did those things and increased the powers and financing of local authorities, more would come on board. If the Home Office did that, I do not think that mandation would be required.

If the Home Office fixes its end of the bargain and local authorities are still not getting on board, at that stage I would have no choice but to support mandation, but I do not think that we are at that stage yet. I, too, will quote Abi Brown, who was very measured in her comments when local authorities from the west midlands were writing to the Home Office. She said:

“This is about trying to open up a discussion about how the asylum dispersal system works. So far it’s been very frustrating trying to get the Home Office to engage with us on this issue. We want them to talk to us about how the system can be improved, and we’ve made a number of suggestions in the letter.”

She went on to say:

“This isn’t about party politics, it’s about parity.”

I absolutely agree with that. There is a growing consensus that the Home Office has to up its game on how the dispersal system works. That is what we have to look at, rather than mandating local authorities.

[Tom Pursglove]

I agree with some of the intention behind new clause 2. It is right that all parts of the UK make a reasonable contribution to ensuring that adequate accommodation is available for asylum seekers who would otherwise be destitute, but it is important to recognise that not every area of the UK has appropriate services or affordable accommodation to appropriately support them. Additionally, some local authorities have very few asylum seekers accommodated by the Home Office in their areas but support large numbers of other migrants. For example, the Home Office does not accommodate many adult asylum seekers and their children in Kent or Croydon, but both local authorities support large numbers of unaccompanied asylum-seeking children.

It is also important to note that not all asylum seekers are accommodated by the Home Office. The proportion varies over time, but historically around 50% find accommodation with friends or family. That group often live in areas where there are few supported asylum seekers, but they still require access to the same health and education services. It is not therefore sensible to have a rigid set of rules that require destitute asylum seekers to be accommodated in areas in direct proportion to the population of those places. The other factors that I have described must be taken into consideration.

Since the introduction of part 6 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, successive Governments have employed a policy of seeking the agreement of local authorities prior to placing asylum seekers within an area. However, the legislation does not provide local authorities with a veto on the placement of asylum seekers in their areas. If a local authority objects to proposals by our providers to use accommodation not previously used to house asylum seekers, the Home Office can consider and adjudicate on the matter.

A lot of work has none the less been done on increasing local authority participation in asylum dispersal since 2015. Prior to 2015, there were around only 100 local authorities participating. There are now around 140. We have established the local government chief executive group to bring together senior representatives from local authorities, with the aim of expanding the dispersal system and improving the process for the people who use it. We are planning a wider review of the dispersal process and will be consulting local authorities and others.

The local government chief executive group is working collaboratively to evidence any additional costs to local authorities by the dispersal proposal and to identify the appropriate funding mechanism. In light of what I have said, I hope that the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate will withdraw the motion.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I am sorry, but I suggest that we vote on the new clause.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bambos Charalambous]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

We believe that new clause 3 is necessary because of an issue relating to comprehensive sickness insurance, which has been affecting EU citizens and babies born in the UK to EU parents. The issue is preventing naturalisation or automatic access to the right to be registered as British born. We believe that that is unfair and incorrect. Historically, access to the NHS for European economic area and Swiss citizens was free at the point of use, on the same terms as residents who are British citizens, without the need for any further insurance.

The Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 included a requirement for comprehensive sickness insurance, but this requirement was not routinely communicated to EEA and Swiss citizens, and was only required at the point of applying to the Home Office. This has led to a situation where individuals have been refused permanent residence documents, naturalisation applications and citizenship at birth, and have lost family reunion rights under the separation agreements following a discretionary grant of naturalisation. Not only was the requirement for comprehensive sickness insurance not made clear prior to applying to the Home Office, but CSI might not have been relevant to EEA or Swiss citizens, such as during periods of study or self-sufficiency.

I will set the issue in a wider context. The UK has set up the EU settlement scheme, which allows EU citizens to acquire settled status, but many want to become British. They want the right to vote and the security of the nationality of their adopted home, the United Kingdom. However, the requirement to have an obscure health insurance policy is putting applications at risk of refusal and is discouraging many from applying. The British Nationality Act 1981 requires applicants to have not been in breach of immigration laws for any period relied on in the application. While a lot of EU citizens need only to have been living in the UK, students and those who are self-sufficient must also be in possession of comprehensive sickness insurance. However, the possession of CSI has never been a requirement for EU citizens to live in the UK or use the NHS, so most people do not and never have had it.

More concerning is the fact that the Home Office never communicated clearly to EU students and self-sufficient people that they would need to have CSI to become British. The Home Office, which is in charge of decisions relating to applications for citizenship, has maintained the policy despite questions from various organisations, including the3million. In May 2020, updated guidance to caseworkers confirmed the policy, changing the application process to ask for CSI and directing caseworkers to check for it. The guidance introduced a vague power of discretion, but no details were provided as to how that discretion should be applied.

In the Opposition’s view, it is clearly unfair that this anomaly relating to CSI has led to historical and ongoing injustices. It is not fair that what appears to be an additional random requirement for one group of citizens—not communicated prior to application—has, in effect, defined people’s ability to naturalise or claim citizenship.

We therefore believe that the new clause is needed to make the law fair. The historical requirement demanding that individuals hold CSI should also be satisfied by them having had free access to the NHS at the point of use without further insurance. The addition of historical access to the NHS as a satisfying condition would be much fairer. I will give some examples to further illustrate the need for this.

Roberto is Portuguese and arrived in the UK in 2006. He did an undergraduate degree in the UK, where he met his wife. During their university years, they studied full time and did not have CSI as they were never made aware of that requirement for full-time EU students in the UK. They had a son in the UK in 2011 and applied for his British passport, believing that he would automatically be born British.

However, when Roberto and his wife contacted the Home Office for information about the passport application, they were told that as they had not had CSI in the five years preceding the birth, he was not considered to be British. This new clause would address this problem, as the parents’ CSI requirement would have been met by their having had access to the NHS. Consequently, the fact that the child should have been born British can now be addressed by registering for British citizenship at no charge.

I would like the Committee to consider another example illustrating the need for this new clause. Lara is a Brazilian-Italian citizen who has been living in the UK since 2014. Between 2014 and 2017, Lara was in work, but she started a full-time degree at the University of Cambridge in September 2017. In July 2019, Lara was granted settled status under the EU settlement scheme and was looking forward to applying for naturalisation as a British citizen in 2020 after holding settled status for a year. Lara has since started working again, and has been made aware that she should have held CSI while she was at university—a requirement she was never made aware of by either her university or her GP.

If Lara applies for naturalisation, she may fail the lawful residence requirements due to the absence of CSI and may have her application refused. Since late 2020, caseworkers have had the discretion to grant citizenship when there are compelling grounds, although those are not clearly defined in any Home Office guidance. Therefore, like many other EU citizens, Lara is afraid of taking the risk of paying the £1,330 naturalisation fee and not obtaining a positive outcome.

Our new clause would mean that the period of residence that led to the grant of settled status would be considered to be lawful residence, and that the good character requirement could not be failed for a lack of CSI. That would give EU citizens like Lara the confidence to apply for naturalisation, knowing that they would meet all the criteria.

It is important to note that if Lara applies for citizenship and is granted it through caseworker discretion, the CSI issue is likely to still affect her in the future. If she then wished to be joined by a family member in the UK, the complex appendix EU immigration rules, which define the EU settlement scheme, mean that she would fall outside the definition of “qualifying British citizen” due to her historical lack of CSI, and therefore lose the scheme’s right to family reunion. If Lara does not become a British citizen, she would have that right through having settled status.

The new clause would mean that for future decisions taken under the immigration rules, the CSI requirement would be met by access to the NHS, meaning that EU citizens like Lara would not unexpectedly lose the rights they had before naturalising. We believe that this new clause is needed to address this unfair anomaly around CSI.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank the hon. Members for tabling the new clause, which relates to the requirement, in certain circumstances, for EEA nationals to have had comprehensive sickness insurance to have been residing lawfully in the UK. Regulations set out the requirements that EEA nationals needed to follow if they wished to reside here lawfully on the basis of free movement. In the case of students or the self-sufficient, but not those who were working here, the possession of CSI has always been a requirement.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It is useful that guidance exists, but does the Minister appreciate that if somebody is considering spending more than £1,000 to make an application and there is no clarity—nothing stronger—they almost certainly will not take the risk? Is it not possible to put something firmer into the guidance for caseworkers to say that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the lack of CSI should be ignored?

[Tom Pursglove]

The hon. Gentleman will appreciate that this matter falls within the portfolio of the Minister for Future Borders and Immigration, so if the hon. Gentleman does not mind, I shall take away that suggestion and ask the Minister to consider it. If the hon. Gentleman wants to follow up in writing with the Minister, I am sure my hon. Friend would consider that and come back to him. I will certainly make sure that he is aware of the suggestion the hon. Gentleman raises.

The new clause would amend the naturalisation requirements for EEA nationals who did not have CSI and so had not been in the UK lawfully before they acquired settled status. We cannot accept that, as all applicants are required to meet the same requirements for naturalisation in terms of lawful residence and it would not be right to treat certain nationalities differently.

The third part of the new clause would amend the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 such that a person is treated as having had CSI if they had access to the NHS in practice or held a CSI policy. However, there is no mention of CSI in the rest of that Act, nor is there any mention of CSI in residence scheme immigration rules. The EU settlement scheme does not test for CSI and there is no need to have held it in the past, or to hold it now, in order for EEA nationals to obtain settled or pre-settled status. As such, that part of the new clause would have no practical effect. I therefore ask the hon. Members to withdraw their new clause.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I will press the new clause to a Division.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

Despite our deep concerns about other measures in the Bill, it provides an opportunity for the UK to end this injustice for the descendants of the Chagos islanders and rectify a long-standing anomaly in British nationality law. I hope this opportunity is taken.

[Tom Pursglove]

I appreciate the positive intent behind new clause 4, which seeks to create a means whereby, in the future, British citizens who were born on, or descended from a person born on, the British Indian Ocean Territory will be able to bring their foreign national spouse or partner to the UK, without their being subject to the current financial and English language requirements for family migration.

I remind hon. Members that the minimum income requirement is based on in-depth analysis and advice from the independent Migration Advisory Committee. The purpose of the requirement, implemented in July 2012 along with other reforms of the family immigration rules, is to ensure family migrants are supported at a reasonable level so they do not become a burden on the taxpayer and can participate sufficiently in everyday life to facilitate their integration into British society. Family life must not be established here at the taxpayer’s expense and family migrants must be able to integrate if they are to play a full part in British life.

The minimum income requirement was set following advice from the independent Migration Advisory Committee, at £18,600 for sponsoring a partner, rising to £22,400 for also sponsoring a non-qualifying child and an additional £2,400 for each further such child. There is no flexibility in the level of the minimum income requirement, which must be met in all cases subject to the requirement; it is right and fair it should be consistently applied in all cases. Expecting family migrants and their sponsors to be financially independent is reasonable, both to them and the taxpayer.

In February 2017, the Supreme Court upheld the lawfulness of the minimum income requirement under the family immigration rules. The Court found the minimum income requirement is not a breach of the right to respect for a private and family life under article 8 of the European convention on human rights and is not discriminatory. The Supreme Court endorsed our approach in setting an income requirement for family migration that prevents burdens on the taxpayer and ensures migrant families can integrate into our communities. The Supreme Court agreed that it strikes a fair balance between the interests of those wishing to sponsor a partner to settle in the UK and of the community in general.

Being able to speak English is also fundamental to successful integration into British society.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I would just gently say that the response is slightly tone deaf. First, the Migration Advisory Committee has asked the Government to revisit the financial thresholds the Minister mentions. Secondly, we are talking about Chagossians who were forcibly removed from their islands. Consistency is fine, but these are truly exceptional circumstances. Surely most taxpayers would perfectly understand that different rules have to apply in these outrageous circumstances.

[Tom Pursglove]

In fairness, the hon. Gentleman has intervened early in my remarks on the new clauses. Let me continue, but I hear the point he raises, and I of course take it on board, in the way I take all comments from hon. Members on the Committee on board.

We expect those coming to the UK on a family visa with only basic English to become more fluent over time, as a means of encouraging better integration into our society, to make it easier for families to access vital public services and to enable parents to support their children’s education.

New clause 4 would undermine the sound basis on which family migration to this country has been placed in recent years. It would circumvent the need for family migration to be on a basis whereby families are financially independent and able to contribute to the UK. It would also remove the English language requirement, which is fundamental to a migrant’s successful integration into British society. There is no justifiable reason to give preferential treatment to family members based solely on their sponsor’s nationality. Without a clear justification for doing so, that would also likely constitute unlawful discrimination.

The immigration rules on family migration, which new clause 4 would undermine, are designed to prevent burdens on the taxpayer, promote integration and tackle abuse, and thereby ensure that family migration to the UK is on a properly sustainable basis that is fair to migrants and the wider community. The rules are helping to ensure public confidence in the immigration system and, well intended as the new clause may be, it has the potential to reverse that.

In the same way, the introduction of a dual family migration system as required by the new clause would not be seen in a uniformly positive way by British citizens and persons settled here. It would lead to an undesirable two-tier system of family migration in which a group of family members whose sponsor is a British citizen with a connection to the British Indian Ocean Territory would be given preferential treatment over other sponsors. Furthermore, the Government have the power under the Immigration Act 1971 to set out the requirements for entry into and stay in the UK in immigration rules, which are laid before Parliament. The rules allow flexibility to amend policy as appropriate, and the Government continue to review them regularly to ensure that they are fair and effective. Work is ongoing on simplification of the rules following the Law Commission’s recommendations. The new clause would have the effect of undermining that process and prescribing the rules in primary legislation for one particular cohort.

I turn to new clause 15. We are already making changes through the Bill to address historic unfairness so that all those born on the British Indian Ocean Territory and their children are either automatically British citizens or have the right to acquire British nationality. The new clause, tabled by the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate and for Halifax, seeks to go much further and would address what is seen as the consequences of historic unfairness. Although I am sympathetic with the aim, I am concerned that that is not the correct approach. The new clause would offer British citizenship in perpetuity to those born outside the UK and overseas territories regardless of their connection to the UK as long as they are descendants of someone born on the islands making up the British Indian Ocean Territory.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am not entirely surprised that the Minister’s first point is about the lack of any limit. Would the new clause be more amenable to him if there was a limit on the degree of relationship there had to be with a Chagossian?

[Tom Pursglove]

If the hon. Gentleman lets me conclude my remarks, I hope that that will give him a little comfort on that point. The approach proposed by the new clause cannot be right and would undermine the long-standing principle of British nationality law that nationality or entitlements to nationality are not passed on to the second and subsequent generations born and settled outside the UK and territories.

I recognise, however, that the Chagossians present a unique case. My hon. Friend the Member for Crawley, who has long campaigned on behalf of the Chagossian communities both in his constituency and throughout the UK as vice chair of the Chagos islands (British Indian Ocean Territory) all-party parliamentary group, has indicated his intention to table an amendment on this issue on Report. I would like to reflect further on the complex issues faced by Chagossian communities in the UK and those in Mauritius and the Seychelles that have been raised by hon. Members on both sides of the Committee—I am mindful of the cross-party view—before making any significant changes to nationality law.

Hon. Members from different parties have expressed views, and I have taken on board the points raised. I say to the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East that there is a willingness to look closely at the Chagossian issue. With that, I hope that hon. Members will be willing not to move their new clauses.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

As the Minister said, we will consider what has been said before we revisit this issue on Report. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 5

Former British-Hong Kong service personnel: right of abode

‘(1) The Immigration Act 1971 is amended as follows.

(2) At the end of section 2(1) insert—

“(c) that person is a former member of the Hong Kong Military Service Corps or the Hong Kong Royal Naval service, or

(d) that person is the spouse or dependent of a former member of the Hong Kong Military Service Corps or the Hong Kong Royal Naval service.’—(Stuart C. McDonald.)

This new clause would mean that all former British-Hong Kong service personnel, plus their spouses and dependents, would have right of abode in the UK.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Sixteenth sitting)

Tom Pursglove Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 4th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

Question again proposed.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Tom Pursglove)]

I thank the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East for tabling new clause 5, which provides the Committee with the opportunity to consider granting the right of abode in the United Kingdom to former British-Hong Kong service personnel, their spouses and dependants.

The Government remain extremely grateful to former British-Hong Kong service personnel. Under the British nationality selection scheme, a limited number of personnel who were settled in Hong Kong could apply to register as British citizens. All veterans would have been eligible to acquire British national overseas status between 1986 and 1997. Therefore, many should hold BNO status. Those who hold BNO status may be eligible for the BNO visa that was launched in January this year and which provides a route to settlement in the UK, meaning that many former British-Hong Kong service personnel, their spouses and dependants will already have, or be on the path to having, settlement and subsequently British citizenship, which would confer on them a right of abode in the UK.

We must consider the impact on public services both of increased usage generated by the right of access granted by expanded citizenship, and of the additional costs in granting such rights, such as casework resource and resettlement resulting in lost income that is not budgeted for and is therefore not affordable. Additionally, although I recognise the significant contribution made by this group, it may be difficult to justify why this specific cohort should be granted the right of abode when others from former colonial garrisons are not. For these reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw the new clause.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

I am grateful to the Minister for his response. I do think there are very specific reasons why this cohort should indeed be granted what this new clause is looking for, and I suspect we will be looking at this again on Report. In the meantime, however, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 13

Reporting to Parliament in relation to the prevention of death

“(1) The Secretary of State must within 12 months of the commencement of this section, and thereafter within each successive 12 months’ period, lay before Parliament a report concerning the deaths of people subject to asylum and immigration powers.

(2) A report required by this section must state the number of people subject to asylum and immigration powers who have died since—

(a) state the number of people subject to asylum and immigration powers who have died since—

(i) the commencement of this section (in the case of the first report laid under this section); or

(ii) the previous report laid under this section (in all other cases); and

(b) set out the support arrangements that the Secretary of State has implemented in that year to assist those directly affected by the deaths, and what changes in these arrangements are planned for the next year.

(3) Subject to subsection (5), the report required by this section must—

(a) in relation to each death to which subsection (2) refers, identify—

(i) whether the deceased was at the time of death detained under immigration powers,

(ii) whether the deceased had an asylum claim outstanding,

(iii) whether the deceased was in receipt of accommodation or support from the Secretary of State,

(iv) whether the deceased was a relevant child or young person,

(v) whether the deceased was under the control of any person acting under the authority of the Secretary of State,

(vi) the age, nationality and gender of the deceased,

(vii) any protected characteristic of the deceased,

(viii) the steps taken by the Secretary of State to support any family member of, or other person directly affected, by the death,

(ix) such further information as the Secretary of State shall consider relevant; and

(b) include a statement by the Secretary of State in relation to each such death concerning the impact, if any, of any relevant function, power, decision or discretion upon the circumstances causally connected to that death; and

(c) set out any changes to legislation, policy or practice that the Secretary of State proposes or has made to prevent the occurrence or continuation of circumstances creating a risk of death or to eliminate or reduce that risk in those circumstances; and

(d) describe the Secretary of State’s policy and practice in providing assistance to or receiving assistance from statutory bodies with responsibilities relating to the investigation or prevention of death.

(4) In making any statement to which subsection (3)(b) refers, the Secretary of State shall take into consideration both acts and omissions in relation to the exercise of any function, power or discretion and the making of any decision (including any omission to make a decision).

(5) Where the Secretary of State is unable to fulfil the requirements of subsection (3) in relation to any particular death by reason of there being insufficient time to compile and consider the relevant circumstances relating to the person who has died, the Secretary of State shall state this in the report and shall fulfil those requirements in the next report required by this section.

(6) In this section—

a person is “subject to asylum or immigration powers” if that person—

(a) is detained under immigration powers;

(b) has made an asylum claim that remains outstanding (including where it is being treated as inadmissible but the person remains in the UK);

(c) is in receipt of accommodation or support provided or arranged by the Secretary of State;

(d) is a relevant child or young person; or

(e) is under the control of any person acting under the authority of the Secretary of State in pursuance of asylum or immigration functions;

“relevant function, power, decision or discretion” refers to functions, powers, decisions or discretion in relation to asylum or immigration functions that are exercised or may be exercised by the Secretary of State, an immigration officer or a person to whom the Secretary of State has delegated that exercise;

“protected characteristic” has the same meaning as in the Equality Act 2010;

a “relevant child or young person” means a person who is subject to immigration control and—

(a) is in the care of a local authority; or

(b) is receiving support from a local authority as a result of having been in such care;

a person (P) is “under the control” of another person (A) where—

(a) P is being escorted by A within or from the UK,

(b) P in the custody of A,

(c) P is reporting (including remotely) to a designated place (including remotely) in compliance with a requirement imposed by A, or

(d) P is residing at a designated place in compliance with a requirement imposed by A;

“young person” means a person below the age of 25 years.” —(Stuart C. McDonald.)

This new clause would seek to ensure there was transparency and accountability about the deaths of people subject to certain asylum and immigration powers, and policies designed to prevent them.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Everyone in this Committee has expressed concern at the loss of life in the channel when people make dangerous journeys to seek asylum here. This new clause brings us to loss of life among people already in the immigration and asylum systems. It asks: what do we know about such deaths, what do we do in response to prevent other deaths from happening, and what do we do to ensure dignity in death? I am grateful to Amnesty International, Migrant Voice, Bail for Immigration Detainees, the Scottish Refugee Council and Liberty Investigates for all their work on this.

I particularly want to mention the Da’aro Youth Project, which was established in 2018 by members of the Eritrean community in London in response to the suicides of several unaccompanied teenage Eritreans who came to the UK to seek asylum, and supports the wellbeing of young people in the UK asylum system from countries in the horn of Africa. Its research found that at least 12 teenagers who arrived in the UK as unaccompanied children seeking asylum have died by suicide in the past five years, most of them Eritrean, including several in recent months. All had either been children in the care of local authorities or care leavers, while one was subject to an age dispute, one had been denied family reunion, and several had been waiting for significant periods for an asylum decision or had in fact been refused asylum.

More recently, Scottish Refugee Council freedom of information requests initially identified 51 deaths in asylum accommodation between April 2016 and June 2021. A slightly different set of FOIs from Liberty Investigates received a different number from the Home Office: 95 in the period to August 2021. Alarmingly, 69 of those deaths—about three quarters—were in the period from 2020, so there has been a significant increase. By August this year, nearly as many people had died in the asylum system as in the whole of last year.

The first issue is why it is only through the work of Da’aro Youth Project, the Scottish Refugee Council and Liberty Investigates that we know this. Surely the Home Office should be reporting regularly on the deaths of those in its system. Can lessons be learned from these deaths, what could be done to prevent further deaths, and do the deaths have implications for broader policy? For example, there has been a significant increase in deaths over the past couple of years, suggesting that moving to institutional accommodation is a dangerous policy, but are there other reasons? What about new policies, including those in this Bill? What impact might they have on deaths in the asylum and immigration system? We cannot do very much of that analysis because it does not seem that the Home Office gathers information never mind publishes it. Which other Government Department would get away with it if deaths of those in its care and caught up in its processes were not being thoroughly investigated and responded to? It should be absolutely no different here.

The second issue is: what happens in response to every individual death? I am not even sure whether there is in existence a proper Home Office policy on this. Is any effort made to find and contact family members, or even to return the body to the family? What is done to support friends and family here in the UK, particularly those who are in the asylum system or local authority care?

Since Windrush, we have been told repeatedly that the Home Office is undergoing a culture change to see “the face behind the case”. I suggest that a vital starting place could be taking much greater interest in those who have lost their life while within the Home Office’s own asylum and immigration systems and being transparent and accountable about what has happened. The new clause simply asks for what really should have been happening for years. It is a simple matter of human decency and proper accountability.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank the hon. Member for tabling the new clause. I note his concerns around transparency and accountability in relation to deaths of people subject to immigration powers. I can assure him that transparency and accountability remain a key priority for the Department. We currently publish data every year on the number of deaths of people under our care in immigration detention. I recognise the importance of transparency in these circumstances to ensure that there is accountability and that we can develop effective policies and processes to prevent such instances from occurring in future. One death of a person in our care in one death too many. We must do everything in our power to ensure that these do not occur. Thankfully, deaths in detention are rare. There were no deaths in detention in 2020 and just one in 2019, where the individual died of natural causes.

We regularly review the statistics that we publish as a Department and, where it is clearly in the public interest to do so, it is our duty to consider the feasibility of publishing new statistics. We must weigh that up against other considerations. While we have a duty of care to all of those in our remit, there are many people in the asylum and immigration system who are either not required to, or choose not to, maintain regular contact with us. Some may even leave the UK without informing us while they have an open immigration claim. That means that there may be instances where we are not informed of the person’s death or we do not have all the relevant facts.

Additionally, it can take months and even years for inquests to reach conclusions. It is important that we know the facts before we publish the information. This highlights the kind of practical and deliverability challenges that we face and which affect the scope and accuracy of any information in this space. However, I acknowledge the importance of transparency. We regularly review the information that is published by the Department on the context of transparency, but also in line with the changes that the Bill will bring about. I note the interest of the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East in this particular area and will ensure that it is considered in line with the wider and ongoing review of statistics published by the Department. I trust that that addresses his concerns and I encourage him to withdraw the new clause.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I appreciate the Minister’s answer and the sentiments that he expresses. I am concerned that what he says does not always necessarily reflect exactly how things are operating on the ground. On the gathering and publishing of information, that is something that we will watch very closely. What he has not done is set out anything in relation to how the Home Office responds and whether there is a policy in relation to individual deaths—for example, those issues around returning the body, trying to approach family and friends, and the duty of care that we have to those individuals as well. That is something I will need to return to and raise with him again. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 14

Immigration health surcharge: exemption for international volunteers

‘(1) The Immigration Act 2014 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 38, insert—

“38A Immigration health surcharge: exemption for international volunteers

(1) A charge under section 38 may not be imposed on persons who have leave to enter, or to remain in, the United Kingdom through a visa to work voluntarily for a period of no more than 12 months, or for such period as may be prescribed by regulations, for a registered UK charity advancing the charity’s primary purpose.

(2) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section must not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament”.’ . —(Stuart C. McDonald.)

This new clause would ensure that international volunteers, including those working in health and social care, will be exempt from paying the immigration health surcharge.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move that the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would introduce an immigration health surcharge exemption for international volunteers. On this occasion, I am particularly indebted to Camphill Scotland, which does fantastic work to support around 600 people with learning disabilities and other support needs, ranging from children to older people. It has built a formidable alliance of almost 50 organisations across the UK that support this new clause, including the National Council for Voluntary Organisations, the Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations, the Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action, the Wales Council for Voluntary Action and many, many more which, unfortunately, I do not have time to mention. All members of the Committee will have received briefings and representations directly on this issue, and I urge them to consider it carefully.

My party objects to the immigration health surcharge altogether, but that debate is for another day. What we do welcome, as do the organisations behind this new clause, is the Government’s decision to exempt health and social care workers from other countries from paying it. The new clause seeks to ensure that those who want to come to work as volunteers in the charitable sector, including in health and social care, are also exempt. We believe that charging this surcharge to volunteers working in health and social care in charitable settings is unfair, inequitable and counterproductive. Volunteers from the EU and beyond make a significant contribution to the work of charities across the UK; Camphill Scotland currently has about 215 international volunteers, helping it to support people with learning disabilities and other support needs.

These young people have chosen to stay in the UK to provide social care to UK citizens during a national health emergency, displaying considerable dedication to and compassion for the people they support. It would be an injustice if the immigration health surcharge exemption was not extended to international volunteers working in the charitable sector. It is all the more essential that this change is made post Brexit, with volunteers from the EU and Switzerland now being caught by visa fees and other expenses. If we cannot continue to attract volunteers, the people who will suffer will be those who benefit from their care, including those with learning disabilities and support needs in the care of Camphill Scotland. The logic of the Government’s immigration health surcharge is that everyone should contribute but, just like the health and social care workforce, the volunteers are already doing just that, so surely the same logic applies. Given that such volunteers cannot have a salary here and will receive a subsistence allowance at most, there is even more reason to exempt them altogether. They are already facing considerable costs to take up these posts. It cannot be right that we also charge them a surcharge to support the very system that they are currently voluntarily supporting. I therefore ask the Minister to consider the representations made by the almost 50 organisations that have contacted him, to consider meeting them and to look carefully at these proposals.

[Tom Pursglove]

The Government recognise the important contribution that international volunteers make to our communities, and are committed to attracting people from overseas who wish to gain experience of our voluntary sector. The temporary work-charity worker visa is available to those who wish to undertake unpaid voluntary fieldwork for up to 12 months, where the work contributes directly to the achievement or advancement of the sponsor’s charitable purpose. The route offers volunteers the chance to experience life in the UK while making a valuable contribution to the aims of their chosen charity. At the same time, the involvement and contribution of these individuals has benefits for the UK charity sector and the wider community, and the UK Government welcome this involvement.

This is not an economic route and it should not be used to fill gaps in the labour market. Volunteers using the charity worker visa must not receive any payment beyond being reimbursed for expenses incurred during their duties. It is therefore not unreasonable to expect costs to be considered and planned for before they apply for a visa. As this is a temporary work category, the cost of a visa is already significantly less than any other work and study routes, at a rate of £244, and sponsors pay a lower licence fee, which reflects their own charity status. The immigration health charge, which applies to this route, ensures that temporary migrants who come to the UK for more than six months make a direct contribution to the comprehensive range of NHS services available to them during their stay. Income from the charge is shared between the health administrations in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, using the formula devised by Lord Barnett. The charge is an essential part of income for the NHS and has raised almost £2 billion in much-needed income since it was introduced in 2015.

Those who make an application to come to the UK for six months or less do not pay the charge, and we know that a sizeable number of volunteers come for less than the 12 months the route allows. If they opt to stay longer than six months, however, it is right that they pay the charge, as is consistent with others who base themselves in the UK for extended periods. I understand that there are concerns about the financial impact of the charge on volunteer workers, alongside visa fees and other payments that a person may make when they choose to come to the UK. However, the Government are clear that the charge is great value, considering the wide range of NHS services, free at the point of use, for charge payers. From the moment they arrive in the UK, charge payers can use the NHS in broadly the same manner as a permanent resident, without having made any prior tax or national insurance contributions. They may access health services as often as they need, including treatment for pre-existing health conditions, and do not need to worry about unexpected health charges or obtaining appropriate health insurance.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Minister knows that I do not support the idea of an additional surcharge but, even if we accept his logic, the Government have exempted health and social care workers from the surcharge because they contribute to the healthcare system. Should that same logic not apply even more so to volunteers who are working in the health and social care system?

[Tom Pursglove]

In relation to the approach taken for health and social workers, the view widely felt across the House, which was subsequently reflected in policy, was that, given the enormous contribution made by those working directly in this sector during the pandemic, it was appropriate to try and put in place a form of recognition of that work, as well as other measures we have talked about, for example the pay rises that have quite rightly been afforded to NHS workers. It was seen as one means of recognising the enormous contribution that some of those who had come from overseas to work in our health and social care settings had made and rewarding them for that. There were particular circumstances that meant that it was felt that that was appropriate.

Charge payers pay only those charges a UK resident would pay, such as prescription charges in England. They may, however, be charged for assisted conception services in England, should they wish to use them. We welcome talented individuals to the UK and are immensely grateful to them for the important contributions they make, but if a person chooses to come to the UK as a worker, student, family member or volunteer, it is fair and reasonable to expect them to contribute to the high-quality NHS services available to them.

It is vital, particularly given the challenges posed by the pandemic, for the NHS to continue to be properly funded. The immigration health charge directly benefits the NHS and plays an important role in supporting its long-term sustainability. The Government are confident that the charity worker visa provides an attractive offer to voluntary workers. Individuals on some other routes can also volunteer their time to help others, and, depending on the route, they either pay the immigration health charge or may be charged by the NHS for their healthcare.

The youth mobility scheme, for example, is subject to the charge. Those on this route are free to take up work in any sector, paid or unpaid. The standard visitor visa allows people to volunteer for up to 30 days with a registered charity. The visit rules allow visitors to stay for a maximum of six months, which means that they are not subject to the immigration health charge but may instead be charged for NHS care, in line with the rules set by the relevant, devolved health administration.

The Government believe that it is right for the health charge to apply to the charity worker visa. Many nations expect newly arrived individuals to contribute, in some form, to the cost of healthcare. It is right we do the same. For the reasons I have set out, I ask the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to withdraw the new clause, but I take on board the passion with which he made his case in relation to this issue and the various representations he referred to that have been made to me as Minister with responsibility for this Bill. I will certainly ensure that they are shared with the Minister with responsibility for this area of policy in the Department as part of their consideration of these matters.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the Minister for his response and those assurances. He is quite right about the reasons for the recognition that was given to health and social care staff. We are just calling for the same recognition for volunteers as well. I would be interested to know more. I get the impression that this would be a tiny hit for the Treasury, but it could have real benefit for charities. Before we think about that and make the case again before we reach Report stage, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 17

Duty regarding rights to British citizenship or British overseas territories citizenship

“(1) It is the duty of the Secretary of State to encourage, promote and facilitate awareness and exercise of rights to British citizenship or British overseas territories citizenship among persons possessing these rights.

(2) In fulfilment of that duty, the Secretary of State—

(a) must take all reasonable steps to ensure that all persons with rights to British citizenship or British overseas territories citizenship are able to exercise those rights;

(b) must make arrangements, including with local authorities, to ensure that all children in a local authority area are aware of their rights to British citizenship or British overseas territories citizenship and of the means by which to exercise those rights;

(c) must, when considering any application for confirmation or registration of British citizenship or British overseas territories citizenship, have regard to information held by or available to the Secretary of State that would demonstrate the applicant to be a British citizen or British overseas territories citizen or entitled to that citizenship; and

(d) shall have, and where reasonably necessary to ensure that all persons are able to exercise those rights shall exercise, the power to waive any requirement to attend a ceremony or in connection with biometric information.

(3) For the purposes of this section—

“rights to British citizenship” means rights of acquisition of British citizenship by birth, adoption, commencement or registration under the British Nationality Act 1981;

“rights to British overseas territories citizenship” means rights of acquisition of British overseas territories citizenship by birth, adoption, commencement or registration under the British Nationality Act 1981; and

“to exercise those rights” means to be registered as a British citizen or British overseas territories citizen on the making of an application under the British Nationality Act 1981 or to obtain documentation from the Secretary of State confirming British citizenship or British overseas territories citizenship (including by receipt of a passport) on the making of an application to the Secretary of State.”—(Stuart C. McDonald.)

This new Clause would require the Government to encourage, promote and facilitate awareness and exercise of rights to British citizenship or British overseas territories citizenship.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. The new clause would place on the Government an obligation and a duty to undertake promotion of British citizenship rights and British overseas territories citizenship rights.

If there is one thing that members of the Committee can all agree on, it is that nationality law is complicated, and British nationality law is particularly complicated. As I have said, nationality law is also absolutely fundamental to people’s identity, and their ability to fulfil their potential and to exercise so many other rights. That is why it is enshrined in the UN convention itself. It is much superior to any form of immigration leave, which is no form of substitute for holding nationality. The very need for the Bill indicates, however, that lots of people miss out on their entitlements. That is terrible for them as individuals, and it is terrible for the country as a whole—bad for social cohesion—if people are missing out on rights of citizenship that they could have and that are set out in law.

An example is looked-after children. During the registration process for the EU settlement scheme, it was clear that a number of local authorities might have been signing children up for EU settled status when in actual fact they were probably entitled to register as British citizens. The new clause therefore simply calls for the Government to take a more proactive approach and to work with organisations such as local authorities and others to ensure that as many people as possible are aware of and know about their right to register or to access citizenship in other ways, so empowering them to do so.

One welcome thing about the EU settlement scheme was that the Home Office caseworkers did not say, “This or that is missing, so I am going to refuse the application.” There was a concerted attempt to work with people to ensure that all the necessary evidence was found. A lot of the time, the Government took it on themselves—by liaising between Departments—to track down the necessary evidence to allow that person to achieve the status to which they were entitled. We call for the same approach on the more fundamental right to nationality.

That is the reasoning behind the new clause. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and for Glasgow North East for their new clause. I understand their thinking behind it: people who are entitled to citizenship should be able to find the information that they need and that the process should be simple and straightforward. That is a sentiment I would echo.

The measures the new clause proposes represent best practice, much of which already exists in the nationality and passport processes. For example, both UK Visas and Immigration and Her Majesty’s Passport Office publish information and guidance on gov.uk, and use information that is already available on their systems when processing applications. As part of considering Windrush applications in particular, UKVI caseworkers have demonstrated a proactive approach, helping people to locate the information needed and consulting internal sources.

The existing legislation already contains discretion to excuse or exempt a person from attending a citizenship ceremony or to enrol their biometrics. The Home Secretary can disapply the requirement to attend a ceremony in the special circumstances of a case and, if it would be too difficult for an applicant to enrol their biometrics in the form of a facial image and fingerprints, an authorised person such as an official acting on behalf of the Secretary of State can defer or waive the requirement to enrol some or all of the biometrics. I am happy to listen to the thoughts of the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East about the areas where we could do more.

I do not think that we can accept the new clause, however. It would impose a statutory requirement that I am not sure is measurable. For example, while we could take steps to ensure that local authorities have information about citizenship and are encouraged to pass on that information to children in their area, I do not see that we could fulfil a statutory requirement to ensure an awareness for every child—that would be outside our control.

Similarly, the new clause is not specific about the steps that the Home Secretary would be expected to take—the lengths she would be expected to go to, for example, to obtain “available” information when considering an application, without being in breach of such a statutory duty. I take on board the sentiment of what the hon. Gentleman is trying to achieve, but I ask him to withdraw his new clause.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the Minister for his reply and for his constructive approach to the issue. Perhaps we may continue the conversation in the weeks and months ahead. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 23

Safe and legal routes

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 30 days of the date of Royal Assent to this Act and annually thereafter, publish a report on—

(a) all current safe and legal asylum routes to the United Kingdom,

(b) the eligibility criteria for legal entry into the United Kingdom, and

(c) details of the application process.

(2) The Secretary of State must publish a report on its resettlement target of refugees per year, and report on this every year.”— (Paul Blomfield.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish a summary of safe and legal routes to refuge in the UK each year, alongside their eligibility criteria and application process. It would also commit the UK and Secretary of State to publishing its resettlement targets, and reporting on this annually.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Blomfield]

The hon. Member endorses my comments, I am pleased to hear.

If the Government are serious about their words, they need to be honest about where our ambition lies in this area and how we will provide sanctuary for those who need it. As I say, that leadership and transparency on resettlement targets would not only allow safe and legal routes to ensure that those in great need can come to the UK for protection; it would also, taken alongside the discussion we had earlier about more equitable arrangements for distribution, inform local councils, our healthcare system, schools and social services how they can plan effectively to receive and welcome and integrate into our country those seeking refuge. I hope that the Government will accept the new clause.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank the hon. Member for Sheffield Central for tabling new clause 23, which would require the Government to publish an annual summary of safe and legal routes to refuge in the UK, including eligibility criteria and application process, and to report on their resettlement targets for each year. The UK has a long history of supporting refugees in need of protection and we are a global leader in resettlement.

[Paul Blomfield]

I am curious to know how the Minister sustains that line about the UK’s being a global leader when all the statistics published by the Home Office and others demonstrate that we are not—we are a laggard.

[Tom Pursglove]

I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman and I simply do not concur on this point. The simple truth is that this country is generous in the opportunities that it provides for people seeking sanctuary, and that will continue to be the case. We have had many debates on that point in this Committee, and I personally believe that that is beyond any doubt whatever.

Our resettlement schemes have provided safe and legal routes for tens of thousands of people to start new lives in the UK. Overall, since 2015, we have resettled more than 25,000 refugees direct from regions of conflict and instability, more than any EU member state. We can be proud as a country of our ambitious commitments and achievements.

On 25 February 2021, we completed our commitment to resettle 20,000 refugees under the vulnerable persons resettlement scheme. That achievement was made possible because of the outstanding commitment of local authorities, the devolved Administrations, non-governmental organisations, our international partners, community and faith groups, and individual members of the public.

The UK continues to welcome refugees through the global UK resettlement scheme, as well as through the community sponsorship and mandate resettlement schemes. That commitment, alongside a fair and firm asylum system, will ensure that we continue to offer safe and legal routes to the UK for vulnerable refugees in need of protection.

Through the new plan for immigration, we have been clear that this Government will continue to provide safe refuge to those in need, ensuring that our resettlement schemes are accessible, fair and responsive to international crises. This has been evident with the Home Office being at the heart of the UK’s response to the Afghanistan crisis, including supporting, under intense pressure, the biggest humanitarian airlift in the history of this country.

On 18 August, the Prime Minister announced a new and bespoke resettlement scheme to relocate 5,000 people at risk in its first year, rising to up to 20,000 over the long term—one of the most generous schemes in our history. Ultimately, the number of refugees that we resettle every year depends on a variety of factors, including local authorities’ capacity for supporting refugees, the extent to which the community sponsorship approach continues to thrive, and funding. We work closely with our partners to assess the capacity for resettlement and will continue to welcome those in need of protection in the years to come. Committing to an annual public target would remove the flexibility that this approach provides.

Additionally, we have announced plans for a pilot to support access to work visas for highly-skilled displaced people that will run in addition to existing safe and legal routes. Furthermore, the Government also provide a safe and legal route to bring families together through the family reunion policy, which allows a partner and children aged under 18 of those granted protection in the UK to join them here, if they formed part of the family unit before the sponsor fled their country, and can demonstrate a genuine and subsisting relationship.

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

Does the Minister agree that in many cases under the Dublin regulation, children were placed with quite distant relatives here in the UK who they had never met, when their families and parents were in the country from whence they had fled because it was they who had paid the people traffickers to get the children to the UK?

[Tom Pursglove]

As I have said, it is very important that those established relationships exist. As we have debated on many occasions in the course of this Committee, we do not want anybody to place themselves in the hands of evil people smugglers and criminal gangs. We should all be very concerned about that particular issue, as I know colleagues on the Government Benches are.

[Paul Blomfield]

It is welcome for the Minister to reference the importance of family reunion visas, as they are clearly a vital safe route. He will be aware that more than 90% of visas are given to women and children. Will he, then, explain why in clause 10 the Government are taking away reunion rights from the majority of refugees?

[Tom Pursglove]

On the issue of safe routes for children, unaccompanied asylum-seeking children in Europe with family members in the UK are able to apply to join eligible sponsors, such as those with refugee leave or British settled status. The immigration rules make provision for children to be reunited with their parents. Paragraphs 319 and 297 of the immigration rules are extremely flexible and allow for children to apply to join adult family members if requirements are met, and if there are serious or compelling reasons that make the exclusion of a child undesirable and suitable arrangements are needed for a child’s care. Again, these matters are considered on a case-by-case basis, taking proper account of all the circumstances at play.

Let me finish the point that I was making before I took the interventions. Under the family reunion policy, we have granted reunion to over 37,000 partners and children of those granted protection in the UK since 2015; that is more than 5,000 a year. Our policy makes it clear that there is discretion to grant visas outside the immigration rules that caters for extended family members in exceptional and compassionate circumstances—for example, young adult sons or daughters who are dependent on family here and who are living in dangerous situations. Refugees can also sponsor adult dependent relatives living overseas to join them, when, due to age, illness or disability, that person requires long-term personal care that can only be provided by relatives in the UK.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I suggest the Minister goes away and does some investigations into just how frequently these types of application are granted. My recollection is that some of the thresholds are so high—exceptional and compassionate circumstances, and so on—that in reality, it is almost impossible for some of these applications to be successful. I do not think it is an answer at all to what the hon. Member for Sheffield Central is advocating.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I hear the hon Member’s point, which again I will take away and reflect on with colleagues in the Department.

In the light of the Government’s track record and commitment to safe and legal routes, I hope that the hon. Member for Sheffield Central agrees that the new clause is unnecessary. In particular, I highlight that information on our safe and legal routes is readily available on gov.uk including, where relevant, details about eligibility and the referral or application process.

The Home Office is committed to publishing data on arrivals in an orderly and transparent way as part of the regular quarterly immigration statistics, in line with the code of practice for official statistics. We already publish statistics on the numbers arriving through safe and legal routes. A statutory requirement to publish targets would therefore be unnecessary and unhelpfully limit the flexibility of future Governments in responding to emerging situations.

For all those reasons, I invite the hon. Member not to move the new clause. Given what has been said on family reunion, it might be helpful if I write to the Committee with more information to address some of those points, having reflected on Hansard.

[Paul Blomfield]

I would certainly welcome a letter on family reunion. However, I must disappoint the Minister, because he has failed to convince me about the balance in the Bill, which is central, on the Government’s commitment to develop safe and legal routes as an alternative to dangerous channel crossings. I must therefore press the new clause.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

I have been as quick as I can. This is a common-sense new clause that would save the Government money and take the pressure off individuals, housing associations, councils and charities. It would combat destitution by giving refugees more time to find a home and collect the documents they need, while being in line with the Homelessness Reduction Act, social security legislation, and offering considerable savings for those who care about value for money.

[Tom Pursglove]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark for tabling his new clause. In simple terms, the longer successful asylum-seekers remain in asylum accommodation, the fewer the beds available for those newly entering the asylum support system, including those temporarily accommodated in hotels at great expense to the taxpayer. We are aware of reports that some refugees do not access universal credit or other benefits, or adequate housing, within 28 days. The reasons for that are complex, but the available evidence to date does not show that the problem can be solved by increasing the 28-day “move on” period.

I also reassure the hon. Member that we have implemented several initiatives with the aim of securing better outcomes for refugees in the 28 day “move on” period. These include ensuring that the 28-day period does not start until refugees have been issued with a biometric residence permit—the document that they need to prove that they can take employment and apply for universal credit—and that the national insurance number is printed on the permit, which speeds up the process of deciding a universal credit application.

We also fund Migrant Help, a voluntary sector organisation, to contact the refugees at the start of the 28-day period and offer practical “move on” assistance, including advice on how to claim universal credit; advice on the importance of an early asylum claim and the other types of support that might be available; booking an early appointment at their nearest Department for Work and Pensions jobcentre, if needed; and advice on how to contact their local authority for assistance in finding alternative housing.

We evaluated the success of the scheme that books an early appointment with the local jobcentre for those who want one. That showed that all applicants for universal credit in the survey received their first payment on time—that is, 35 days from the date of their application—and that those who asked for an earlier advance payment received one.

Asylum accommodation providers are also under a contractual duty to notify the local authority of the potential need to provide housing where a person in their accommodation is granted refugee status. Refugees can also apply for integration loans, which can be used, for example, to pay a rent deposit or for essential domestic items, work equipment or training.

The UK has a proud history of providing protection to those who need it, and I reassure the hon. Member that the Government are committed to ensuring that all refugees can take positive steps towards integration and realising their potential. Although we keep the “move on” period under review, we must also consider the strong countervailing factors that make increasing that period difficult. I therefore invite him not to press his new clause.

[Neil Coyle]

I am almost sorry, but the Minister’s answer ignores the reality and the situation in which people find themselves. He does not have an answer about the anomaly in housing or social security policy, and he has not even tried to explain why the Government are ignoring the potential savings to the public purse. I will press the new clause to a Division.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil Coyle]

New clause 25 proposes a humanitarian visa route, and new clause 26 grants a right of appeal—something that made Tory MPs very excitable yesterday. I do not intend to push the new clauses to a vote; they are aimed at opening dialogue, and they link back to the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central.

If the Government are serious about finding solutions to people smuggling and trafficking, they should consider providing practical routes for people seeking sanctuary, in the way that they do for Syria and Afghanistan, and undertake to review humanitarian routes and how they could work. I thank Bella Sankey of Detention Action for her work on these clauses. There are some fantastic people working on these issues.

The purpose of the new clauses is to offer the Government a constructive solution for safe routes. They would have the benefit of cutting smuggling and potentially saving money in the long term. If they are serious about safe and regular routes, the humanitarian visa option would create them. The new clauses also make use of the border anomaly in Calais.

The Government should commit to exploring safe routes if they are serious about preventing dangerous options. The example from Detention Action is of Dylan Footohi, an Iranian refugee who says,

“I came to the UK seeking asylum. I came irregularly simply because there was no legal way for me to do so. My journey to the UK took two years; two years of exploitation and abuse and life-threatening experiences.”

He felt that that way was the only option. If there had been an alternative, he would have taken it. These new clauses offer that alternative.

The new clauses provide for certain persons in France to be granted entry clearance to allow them to claim asylum in the UK. The new clauses set out who qualifies: they have to be in France; they cannot be an EU national or a national of Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway or Switzerland; they have to intend to make a protection claim in the UK; their protection claim, if made in the UK, must have a realistic prospect of success; and there must be good reasons why their protection claim should be considered in the UK.

The first three criteria are self-explanatory. The fourth criterion—the realistic prospect of success—is a well-established test in UK immigration law. It is used in paragraph 353 of the immigration rules, which deals with a person who has been refused asylum and has later made further submissions on asylum grounds and says that they have a fresh right of appeal against the refusal of their further submissions. Home Office officials, courts and tribunals are well used to applying that test. The leading case on the realistic prospect of success is WM (DRC) [2006] EWCA Civ 1495.

To give an example of how the criterion could work in practice, applicant X applies for a France asylum visa. She is from country A and claims that she is wanted by the authorities of country A for a political offence. The applicable country guidance accepts that if a person is detained for political offence in country A, they are likely to be subjected to serious ill-treatment, so if applicant X’s claim is found to be credible she would be entitled to asylum. The appropriate decision maker believes that applicant X is credible. Applicant X’s claim is likely to have realistic prospect of success, so the criterion is likely to be satisfied. I will keep examples brief in the interest of time.

The fifth criterion is about good reasons and is intentionally open-ended. It allows the appropriate decision maker to make a fact-sensitive evaluation of the merits of the case. In considering whether there are good reasons, the decision maker will take into account the relative strength of their family or other ties to the UK and France; their mental and physical health and any particular vulnerabilities; and any other matter the decision maker thinks is relevant.

To give a brief example, applicant X applies for a France asylum visa. She is street homeless in France due to a shortage of available accommodation. She has PTSD and depression as a result of being tortured and has not been able to seek treatment due to her insecure living situation. She has no family and friends in France but has a brother in the UK with whom she has a close relationship and who could support her if she were here. She speaks good English but does not speak French. There are likely to be good reasons for her claim to be dealt with in the UK, so the criterion is likely to be satisfied. That is an illustrative example, but decision makers would make up their minds on the facts of each individual case, having regard to all relevant factors.

The procedure for making the application would be to the appropriate decision maker—an entry clearance officer authorised by the Secretary of State—and they would be required to waive biometric and other procedural requirements if satisfied that the applicant could not be reasonably expected to comply. There would be no fee for the application.

The successful applicant would be given leave to enter for a period of not less than six months, prescribed by the Secretary of State, who would also prescribe the conditions of such leave. On arrival, they would be deemed to have made a protection claim in the UK and go through the normal asylum process. They would have access to legal aid and there would be a right of appeal in the first-tier tribunal against the refusal of a France asylum visa application. That would be a full merits appeal and would not be limited to a review of the original decision-maker’s decision. The tribunal will decide for itself whether the criteria are met.

That appeal process utilises the existing machinery of immigration appeals under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. There would be onward rights of appeal to the upper tribunal and Court of Appeal under sections 11 and 13 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, as with other types of immigration appeal.

I ask that the Government consider those practical solutions that could take the power away from people smugglers and traffickers, who the Minister routinely calls evil, with which I agree, while honouring our commitment to the refugee convention. I commend the new clauses to the Committee.

[Tom Pursglove]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for tabling the new clauses; it is fair to say that during the course of the Committee we have had many debates around many aspects of what they refer to. The Government’s position is clear: we are trying to stop dangerous journeys wholesale—in relation not just to the channel, but to the Mediterranean. We believe in upholding the long-standing principle that people should claim asylum in the first safe country that they reach. Of course, people should also avail themselves of our safe and legal routes. With that, I urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the new clause.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil Coyle]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I thank the British Red Cross for its help with the new clause, which is very simple and is line with what the Government have said they are committed to elsewhere. It would simply entail publishing a strategy to cover Home Office accommodation, and it aims to ensure an equitable distribution of people across England, Scotland and Wales, that financial support is provided to local authorities in areas where people are seeking asylum in Home Office accommodation, and other elements.

Although the Committee has heard that the Government’s intention is to move towards the use of reception centres, it is fundamentally unclear where accommodation is aimed to be and what the Government consider accommodation to be. I intend to table an amendment on the specific issue of what is and is not an accommodation centre on Report, especially with some of the sites being used as contingency accommodation, including a hostel in my constituency that Public Health England suggested should not be used for accommodation for the Everyone In scheme. The Home Office chose to override that advice and use it for refugee and asylum seeker accommodation. The Government now seem to think that dispersal is broken, and they want to open a parallel system of accommodation, but they want to use what they refer to as “reception centres”. I hope the Minister can provide some clarity on that and on whether the Government feel that they need to use the 2002 Act. Perhaps the Minister can clear up this messy situation.

Napier barracks has become synonymous with this issue. Its use has just been extended for five years, with the Home Office using a special development order to do so. In his letter to the Committee on 21 October, the Minister said Napier is not classified as an accommodation centre. I think that is a mistake, and I hope the Minister can explain why the Home Office is using a special development order, when the High Court has ruled that the standards and operational systems at Napier barracks are unlawful.

As things stand, we do not know what is and is not accommodation according to the Home Office. We have reports and court rulings on unlawful and unfit accommodation. We do not know where reception centres will be or the types of accommodation that the Government intend to provide while seeking to move away from dispersal in communities where service providers have argued that it is better for integration. That is why a strategy is required, and I hope the Government accept that they need to move towards a more co-ordinated approach.

On dispersal, the British Red Cross has said there is currently nothing in legislation that says people supported under sections 95, 98 and 4 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 have to be accommodated in any particular way. Dispersal is not underpinned in the current legislation, so a strategy would help clarify the situation for the Home Office and the rest of us.

Like hotels, Napier and Penally barracks were seen as contingency accommodation—temporary measures because of a lack of suitable dispersal. The Government need to get the dispersal system in place. We do not know what the Government reception centres would look like or where they would be located, nor have the Government said whether people would be accommodated for the entirety of their asylum process. It is proposed that the centres would “provide basic accommodation” and

“allow for decisions and any appeals following substantive rejection of an asylum claim to be processed”,

but we are conscious of the delays in the asylum system, and it is possible that people could be living in the centres for several months, potentially in remote locations. I hope that the Minister will outline whether children are intended to be placed in those centres.

[Tom Pursglove]

I refer the hon. Gentleman to my comments on earlier clauses, when I confirmed that children would not be placed in those accommodation centres.

[Neil Coyle]

That is helpful, but it has been brought to my attention this week that a 16-year-old is in a Home Office accommodation hotel in my constituency. I do not know whether that is an age-disputed case for the Home Office, but there is clearly a mismatch between the Government’s intent and what is actually happening.

Rewan has been living with his two sons, aged 11 and 18, in a hotel room for 10 months. His sons cannot study, and although he is desperate to get work, their living circumstances do not allow for that. Umar was told in October 2020 when he moved into a hostel with his wife and four children—aged 7, 9, 13, and 14—that they would be there for a matter of weeks. They are still there. That is what is happening on the ground and why a strategy on dispersal is required. Dispersal is better in the local community: through work with the local community, and by using dispersal accommodation, people are better able to make connections and start feeling part of a city. As Asylum Matters states:

“Providing support for people seeking asylum, including finding suitable accommodation, should be carried out in partnership with local government and local community groups.”

That is not what we are seeing.

For the almost 700 recent arrivals in Southwark, there was absolutely no in-advance co-ordination with the council; the Home Office alerted the council only after opening accommodation. Bearing in mind that accommodation would have been commissioned and procured in advance, there was ample opportunity for discussions to ensure that support was in place, but the Home Office failed to engage. In fact, when I asked the Home Office what resources the council would receive to support the hundreds of new people, it wrote back saying, “We have given some money to the clinical commissioning group.” That is not part of the council.

I had a really useful discussion with the Local Government Association, which said that it would welcome a dispersal strategy and that it wants people to be able to work. There are workplaces that are desperate to take people on, but they cannot get them in. A proper dispersal strategy should look at employment levels in certain areas. Moving people into areas with high levels of employment, rather than into the cheapest accommodation across the country, would actually benefit the workforce and the economy. That strategy would be adopted by any sensible Government, so I do not hold high hopes.

I will give some background stats: in December 2020, around one in five people in Home Office accommodation were living in a hostel, B&B or hotel—triple the December 2019 figures. In Southwark, there were 1,022 people in dispersal accommodation in June, but, as I have just said, hundreds have arrived since then. The Red Cross suggested:

“The Home Office should, as a matter of urgency, address the supply of suitable asylum accommodation, and work with local authorities, devolved governments”,

and it pointed out an increase in the demand for asylum accommodation and a rise in the number of people living in inappropriate places. The increase in decision-making delays since 2018—prior to the pandemic—has resulted in people staying in asylum accommodation for far longer, which is something the Minister has just said he is determined to tackle, so a strategy should be welcome. The situation is unsustainable and only a strategy to build out of it will address the problem.

In April, we had a Backbench Business debate on accommodation, focusing on the National Audit Office and Public Accounts Committee reports into asylum accommodation. The NAO reported last July that the system the Government have adopted caused costs to escalate by 28%, and saw a 96% increase in short-term and more expensive accommodation. In November 2020, the Public Accounts Committee warned of a system in crisis, and it recommended:

“The Home Office should, within three months, set out a clear plan for how it will quickly and safely reduce the use of hotels and ensure that asylum seekers’ accommodation meets their individual needs.”

It would be great to hear from the Minister on how that clear plan is being developed. The new clause would help to address the problem that the Government have created.

The time involved comes with escalating costs to the Home Office and the taxpayer. Will the Minister update us on average times and what he is doing to tackle them? I have two examples from Bermondsey and Old Southwark. I have raised the cases of an Eritrean woman and a Mongolian man who have both been seeking asylum since 2017. Not only do they not have decisions four years later, but the Home Office cannot even give a timeframe for when their cases will be concluded. Perhaps the Minister can tell us today when and how the Home Office will cut the horrific backlog that his Government have created.

At the end of September 2020, there were 3,621 Sudanese, Syrian and Eritrean nationals who had been waiting longer than six months for a decision on their application. The grant rate across those countries was 94% in the most recent stats. That is an incredibly expensive waste. A strategy, as outlined in the new clause, would help address the underlying costs and focus Ministers’ and civil servants’ minds on cutting delays and lowering the cost to the public purse.

Earlier this year the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron) asked the Home Office what the Government were doing to engage with local authorities to understand why offers for dispersal were not matching demand, and to ensure that there was true collaboration. He received a letter in response from the Home Office that stated:

“We remain fully committed to working towards the agreed change plan once we have been able to move people out of hotels and into more appropriate Dispersal Accommodation.”

I hope the new clause helps the Minister with that aim. I commend it to the Committee.

[Tom Pursglove]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I want to pick up on a few of the points that he raised. In relation to Napier, as I have said previously, we have seen several improvements recently: offering all residents covid vaccinations and personal cleaning kits, the introduction of NGOs on the site to provide assistance and advice, free travel to medical appointments and dentistry services or for meetings, sports and recreation. Those significant improvements have been made since the court judgment was handed down.

Hotels are provided as a contingency because of the lack of availability of other accommodation, but it is important to make the point that those are not accommodation centres. On the unaccompanied asylum-seeking children situation, it is difficult to comment on individual cases and a hotel in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency—I do not have the specifics to hand—but I can say that, broadly, the UASC, but not other children, would be accommodated in a hotel. That is my understanding of the situation.

On a broader point, we had a significant debate on new clause 2 and dispersal accommodation, where I set out the steps that the Government are taking to try to address that. That is being considered, and I refer Members to what I said before.

[Neil Coyle]

The Minister says that things have improved since the court judgment and that, for example, NGOs now have more routine access. The hostel accommodation in Bermondsey and Old Southwark was open for three months before the first visit of Migrant Help on site. I am just not convinced that the Minister has given an accurate portrayal of the current picture and the real situation in a real building affecting hundreds of people in my own constituency.

--- Later in debate ---

[Holly Lynch]

Before I start, I draw hon. Members’ attention to the Red Box article written by the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, Dame Sara Thornton, and published in The Times today. Entitled “Rushed borders bill will fail victims of modern slavery”, it is damning. Against that backdrop, I will have another go at mitigating the worst elements of part 4 with new clause 43. I start by paying tribute to ECPAT UK and the Children’s Society, which have shared their insight and invaluable expertise in helping us to shape these new clauses.

New clause 43 would amend section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, to ensure that an independent guardian was provided for all child victims of trafficking and separated children. For clarity, I point out that when I refer to “separated children”, I am referring to migrant children who are unaccompanied. The independent guardian would be a central part of a child’s life, acting as a connection to all the support services that they required, having the ability to instruct solicitors on their behalf and representing their best interests throughout. These guardians would be experts on trafficking and modern slavery, whose purpose was to safeguard and improve the wellbeing of trafficked children, as well as ensuring that statutory services could function more effectively, securing a route both to recovery and to prosecution of those ultimately responsible for their abuse. As specified in the functions laid out in the new clause, an independent guardian would ensure that the child was informed of any relevant legal proceedings, clearly communicate the views of the child and promote the future welfare of the child based on what was in the child’s best interest.

I have cited the numbers previously, but I will remind the Committee. In 2020, 47% of referrals to the national referral mechanism were children, and of the referrals for UK-based exploitation only, 57% were children. It was the case that 51% of the referrals of children were for child criminal exploitation. According to the National Crime Agency, the increase in referrals to the NRM of British children has been driven largely by so-called county lines criminality.

A great deal of the provision in new clause 43 should already be happening and be provided for between international laws, including the UN convention on the rights of the child, the EU trafficking directive of 2011 and the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings, as well as domestic provisions. However, the measure has been only partially adopted across the UK. The Children’s Society has supported calls for it to be enshrined in statute, stating that a guardian’s role should be independent from the state, have legal authority and have adequate legal powers to represent the child’s best interests, as well as being respected by an existing regulatory body.

As the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner highlighted in her annual report for 2020-21, despite clear evidence of good practice she remains extremely disappointed that six years on from the Modern Slavery Act 2015 the independent child trafficking guardian service is not yet a national provision.

There has been very much a staggered approach to roll-out, with the service still not in operation across around a third of all local authorities, several years after it was adopted in three early adopter areas in Greater Manchester, Hampshire and the Isle of Wight. That shows a real lack of urgency on the Government’s part and we echo the statement by the anti-slavery commissioner that

“access to this specialist support for children should not be a postcode lottery”.

In the year ending June 2021, the UK received 2,756 applications for asylum from unaccompanied children. The majority of unaccompanied children are cared for on a voluntary agreement under section 20 of the Children’s Act 1989, rather than under a section 31 care order, whereby the local authority has full parental responsibility for the child.

Although I pay tribute to the dedicated social workers up and down the country, in reality many social workers will not have received training on the asylum and immigration system, and may lack the skills to aid children with their immigration applications. Therefore, the new clause will provide much needed consistency and security for children who have had some of the worst possible starts in life, supporting them towards recovery and through their relationship with the relevant agencies, in the hope that we can secure child victims a degree of restorative justice, which would be a service for both migrants to the UK and UK nationals.

The report conducted by the Home Office evaluating independent child trafficking guardians supported the argument that they provide a sense of stability and continuity:

“Investing time in trafficked children’s lives by a single trusted, well-informed, reliable adult became a distinct early feature of the ways child trafficking guardians stood out from other professions.”

This is demonstrated by one young person who responded to the evaluation. Speaking about their guardian, they said:

“She is so amazing... I don’t know if they’re all like that, but for me it was different, because I told her things that I haven’t told my social worker and that was beneficial. I think that’s because of her personality...she seems really open, I can talk to her about anything.”

Police offers working to combat exploitation and help young people told me recently that they were becoming aware that the drive to keep young people out of police cells for all the right reasons had led to instances where children were arrested in possession of, say, drugs and cash. Rightly, the police would have taken those items from the children before they were released, pending further inquiries, but before proper consideration of their circumstances could be made.

Officers identified that children and young people were having to go back to serious criminals to inform them that they no longer had their drugs or cash, without any of the risks to them having been identified and without safeguarding support having been wrapped around them. Thankfully, those officers were working through the best practice alternatives, but those are the types of scenarios where guardians would be able to play an invaluable role.

It is notable that the devolved nations have been far more proactive in this area, with Scotland having made greater progress and Northern Ireland introducing a comprehensive independent guardians model, which provides an individualised service for all separated children. If we are to consider the UK a world-leader in combating modern slavery, I ask the Minister to put into primary legislation what should already be happening, as a means of addressing the gaps in provision, which will help us to do what is right for these children as well as assisting the authorities in identifying and apprehending perpetrators of some of the most heinous crimes.

New clause 44 would ensure that the provision of independent child trafficking advocates is subject to an inspectorate regime. As colleagues may be aware, the measure is currently not subject to an inspection framework, which is applied to other services for children under the Education and Inspections Act 2006. We believe than an inspection framework is necessary to ensure that Ofsted can inspect the quality and effectiveness of the service.

In conclusion, I find it hard to believe that any colleagues do not support the aims and objectives of the new clause, which builds upon the commitments in the Modern Slavery Act 2015. As the campaign group Every Child Protected Against Trafficking UK has highlighted, those who are eligible under new clause 43 may have had to flee their country due to conflict and may have faced exploited en route to the UK. Others may be British children in the care system, who have been let down by the adults around them. There is a breadth of vulnerability here and we believe that the new clauses better acknowledge and cater to all child victims’ physical and psychological needs. I hope that the Minister shares the ambition behind the new clauses and understands the need for all trafficked and separated children to be recognised and supported within primary legislation.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank hon. Members for tabling their new clauses. They have raised important issues about the support available for child victims who have faced the most heinous crimes. Independent child trafficking guardians are an independent source of advice and support for potentially trafficked children, irrespective of nationality, and somebody who can advocate on a child’s behalf. Provision for the independent child trafficking guardian already exists in section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, as does the requirement to make regulations.

The Government have developed detailed policy for the provision of this service, which is set out in the interim independent child trafficking guardians guidance, published under section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. This guidance is kept under review through consultation with stakeholders. The correct place for the detail regarding the function of the service is in guidance, rather than, as new clause 43 suggests, the legislation itself. That enables the Government to respond flexibly to best practice and victims’ needs. The guidance is clear that acting in the child’s best interests must always be a primary consideration for the service.

New clause 43 would also ensure that an independent child trafficking guardian can continue to provide support to a child until the age of 25, to the extent that their welfare and best interests require such an appointment. Following a recommendation from the independent review of the Modern Slavery Act, the Government are currently trialling the provision of support, when appropriate, to individuals beyond the age of 18 in London, West Yorkshire and Warwickshire. An independent evaluation will look at the added value of implementing that change and consider appropriate next steps. The new clause would expand the scope of the independent child trafficking guardian service to all separated children when there are already existing provisions for separated children to receive support and assistance through other means.

I assure the Committee that the Government take their responsibility for the welfare of unaccompanied children extremely seriously. We have comprehensive statutory and policy safeguards in place for caring for and safeguarding unaccompanied asylum-seeking children in the UK, including those who are victims of trafficking. When an unaccompanied asylum-seeking child becomes looked after by a local authority, they are entitled to the same level of support and care from their local authority as all looked-after children. Under these arrangements, a looked-after child must be provided with access to education, healthcare, legal support and accommodation. They will be allocated a social worker who will assess their individual needs and draw up a care plan that sets out how the local authority intends to respond to the full range of those needs. Our record demonstrates the Government’s determination to ensure that unaccompanied children and child victims of modern slavery are appropriately safeguarded and have the support they need.

[Holly Lynch]

Will the Minister give way?

[Tom Pursglove]

I am conscious that we need to make progress, but I will take a quick intervention.

[Holly Lynch]

I am grateful. I do not dispute that the provision already exists in legislation for independent child trafficking guardians; my dispute is that, as we have heard, they are not available in reality for a third of the country. If the Minister is saying that we do not need a requirement in legislation to do this, how does he plan to ensure that those guardians are available right across the country?

[Tom Pursglove]

If I may, I will write to the Committee. I have undertaken to write to the Committee with more information in relation to another matter we discussed earlier, and I am very happy to provide more information to the Committee in answer to that question.

Turning to new clause 44, I appreciate that appropriate methods of assessing the effectiveness of independent child trafficking guardians are required. The current independent child trafficking guardian service model is informed by the findings of the evaluation of early adopter sites, published in July 2019, and the evaluation of the regional practice co-ordinator role, published in October 2020. The provision of independent child trafficking guardians in section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 provides the Secretary of State with a duty to make such arrangements considered reasonable to ensure that specialist independent child trafficking advocates are

“available to represent and support children who there are reasonable grounds to believe may be victims of human trafficking.”

Section 48(6) places a duty on the Secretary of State to make regulations about independent child trafficking advocates, which must include the circumstances and conditions under which a person may act as an independent child trafficking advocate, arrangements for the approval of the appointment of such advocates, the timing of appointment and the advocates’ functions. As mentioned earlier, the roll-out of the independent child trafficking guardian service is being informed by the findings of the evaluation of early adopter sites. As such, regulations will be brought forward in due course.

Independent child trafficking guardians are now operating in two thirds of all local authorities in England and Wales, as the hon. Lady said. It is important that the provision is able to support those vulnerable children appropriately, and it is precisely for this reason that a staggered approach has been adopted, with built-in evaluations along the way. We will continue to monitor closely the independent child trafficking guardian service to ensure practitioners are acting in the child’s best interests and that resource is being allocated appropriately. We will adjust guidance as needed to ensure that these vulnerable victims are protected and supported to recover from their exploitation. For the reasons I have outlined, I invite the hon. Lady not to press her new clauses.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bambos Charalambous]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point and I hope beyond hope that hon. Members will support our new clause.

In December 2018, the then Home Secretary stated that a Home Office review of the policy would be taking place. Subsequent contributions in 2019 from the Prime Minister and Home Office Ministers confirmed that the review would continue under the new Government, but to date no detail has been provided regarding the content or methodology of that review. The Government have appeared divided in their own ranks on the issue. In recent months, senior Cabinet Ministers have expressed disquiet about the Government’s position. Surely, it is therefore time that the Government listen to voices from across the political spectrum on this issue and do the right thing by adopting our clause on lifting the ban on work for people seeking asylum.

[Tom Pursglove]

I should start by noting that, as hon. Members know, the Government’s current policy does allow asylum seekers to work in the UK if their claim has been outstanding for 12 months, where the delay was caused through no fault of their own. Those permitted to work are restricted to jobs on the shortage occupation list, which is based on expert advice from the independent Migration Advisory Committee.

I should like to set out the rationale for that policy position. The policy is designed to protect the resident labour market by prioritising access to employment for British citizens and others who are lawfully resident, including those granted refugee status, who are given full access to the labour market. That is in line with wider changes we have made through the points-based immigration system. We consider it crucial to distinguish between those who need protection and those seeking to come here to work, who can apply for a work visa under the immigration rules. Our wider immigration policy would be undermined if individuals could bypass the work visa rules by lodging unfounded asylum claims in the UK.

[Neil Coyle]

Will the Minister give way?

[Tom Pursglove]

I have been very generous throughout the duration of the Committee, but I am afraid I need to make some progress at this point.

It is also the case that unrestricted access to employment opportunities may act as an incentive for more migrants to choose to come here illegally, rather than claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. While pull factors are complex, we cannot ignore that access to the UK labour market is among the reasons that an unprecedented number of people are taking extremely dangerous journeys by small boat to the UK. I trust that hon. Members would agree with me that the UK cannot have a policy that raises those risks, and that we must do everything in our power to put a stop to those journeys.

Relaxing our asylum seeker right-to-work policy is not the right approach in this respect. Indeed, in an article earlier this month, the French newspaper Le Figaro noted the perspective in France that the “economic attractiveness” of the UK is a reason migrants attempt to cross the channel in small boats. In addition, removing restrictions on work for asylum seekers could increase the number of unfounded claims for asylum, reducing our capacity to take decisions quickly and support genuine refugees.

I would like to take this opportunity to make it clear that I do acknowledge the concerns of hon. Members. The Government are committed to ensuring that asylum claims are considered without unnecessary delay to ensure that individuals who need protection are granted asylum as soon as possible and can start to integrate and rebuild their lives. It is important to note that those granted asylum are given immediate and unrestricted access to the labour market.

I absolutely agree with hon. Members that asylum seekers should be allowed to volunteer. That is why we strongly encourage all asylum seekers to consider volunteering, so long as it does not amount to unpaid work. Volunteering provides a valuable contribution to their local community and may help them to integrate into society if they ultimately qualify for protection.

We have been clear that asylum seekers who wish to come to the UK must do so through safe and legal routes. Where reasons for coming to the UK include family or economic considerations, applications should be made via the relevant route: either the new points-based immigration system or the refugee family reunion rules. We absolutely must discourage those risking their lives and coming here illegally.

The Nationality and Borders Bill will deliver the most comprehensive reform in decades to fix the broken asylum and illegal migration system, and our asylum seeker right-to-work policy must uphold that wider approach. There is, of course, a review of the 2018 report currently under way and I reassure hon. Members that the findings of the updated recent report will be built into this. For all those reasons, I invite the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate and for Halifax to withdraw the new clause.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I am not convinced by the Minister’s response, so I will be pushing this to a vote. Hopefully, we will be joined by other Members across the Committee.

Question put,

 That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman that it is imperative that we think carefully about the issue. Expanding our family reunion policy as proposed by the new clause would significantly increase the number of people who would qualify to come here and to seek protection. Indeed, the new clause is global in scope, meaning that any asylum seeker in the world with extended family in the UK could qualify to claim asylum. That could easily run to the hundreds of thousands.

To give just one example of how that could have challenging consequences, foreign nationals already illegally present in the UK could potentially be incentivised to claim asylum to circumvent immigration rules in order to bring their family over. We need to ensure that our limited resources are focused on helping refugees who are in the UK to reunite and integrate with immediate pre-flight family. We have a proud record of helping those facing persecution, oppression and tyranny, and we stand by our moral and legal obligations to help innocent civilians fleeing cruelty from around the world, but we cannot help all the people displaced worldwide and who want to come to the UK.

Allowing extended family members to come to the UK for the purpose of claiming protection under new clause 47 might simply create further incentives for more adults and children to be encouraged—even forced—to leave their family and risk hazardous journeys to the UK in order to later sponsor qualifying extended family. That plays into the hands of criminal gangs who exploit vulnerable people and goes against the main intention of the Bill. We must do everything in our power to stop that dangerous trend. The new clause would also result in chain migration, where granting entry to each family member has the potential to bring in even greater numbers of their family members to claim protection under the rules. That is simply not sustainable.

We recognise, however, that families can become fragmented because of the nature of conflict and persecution, as well as the speed and manner in which those seeking protection are often forced to flee their own country. That is why the Government strongly support the principle of family unity. We already have a comprehensive framework for families to be reunited here safely. I will add, because this will be of interest to both Government and Opposition Members, that we are committed to reviewing the family refugee reunion rules, as we set out in the new plan for immigration. At all times, as the Committee would expect, we will be fully compliant with our international obligations.

Given that and the issues raised in Committee, everything will be taken into account when looking at the policy.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

First, that was not a fair interpretation of the new clause: it was certainly not advocating for an unlimited number of people to have access to that route. Nevertheless, it is surprising that we are expected to be encouraged about family reunion at a time when this very Bill is proposing to strip the overwhelming majority of asylum seekers and refugees of those family reunion rights. At the end of the day, the issue is one we will have to revisit on Report. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 48

Six month time limit for determining asylum applications

“(1) The Secretary of State must make regulations providing for—

(a) a six month time limit for determining applications for asylum; and

(b) an officer of Director level or above to be required to write to the Home Secretary a letter of explanation on a quarterly basis in the event of any failure to meet the six month time limit.

(2) The Secretary of State must report to Parliament any failure to meet the six month time limit.”—(Bambos Charalambous.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bambos Charalambous]

There is so much to respond to in that. I question the hon. Gentleman’s facts first of all, but clearly we are talking about the situation as it is now, which has been built up over the past decade, and not as he would like it to be. In any event, I disagree about what this Bill does. It does not solve the problem; it keeps people here for longer.

As I was saying, what is masked by these numbers are the hundreds of people who have waited nearly 10 years or more for a decision on their asylum claims, left in limbo while they wait for an answer. In August, a freedom of information request from The Independent newspaper revealed that there were more than 1,200 asylum seekers in the system who had been waiting more than five years for a decision, with 399 people who had been waiting more than a decade. Separate figures obtained by the Refugee Council through an FOI request earlier this year revealed that the number of applicants waiting for more than a year for an initial decision, not including appeals, increased almost tenfold between 2010 and 2020, from 3,588 to 33,016. More than 250 people had been waiting for five years or more for an initial decision on their case, with dozens of children among them. As of December 2020, 36,725 asylum seekers had been waiting more than a year for a decision.

Those kinds of figures just smack of a broken system. Having tens of thousands of people waiting for more than a year for an initial decision is just totally unacceptable. I am sure that most MPs can think of asylum cases they have been dealing with that have stretched on and on, sometimes for years. I can cite the case of a constituent—I shall call them F—who came to the UK from Afghanistan as a child and applied for asylum in August 2013. It took seven and a half years, and my involvement as his MP, for the matter to be resolved in February this year. It really should not take an MP’s involvement to reach such a conclusion.

The human cost to people’s mental health and the cost to the taxpayer of these endemic delays in the system is high. We know that people in the asylum system become increasingly mentally unwell as the years of uncertainty, trauma and demonisation erode their mental and physical health. The Refugee Council reported earlier this year that this has led to an increase in the numbers of individuals self-harming and reporting suicidal thoughts. The Children’s Society report “Distress Signals” also outlined serious concerns about the damage done to children’s mental health in those conditions— this is damage done at a formative age that will last a lifetime.

Beyond the human cost of these delays is the financial cost. The backlog adds considerably to the overall cost of the asylum process. The Refugee Council has calculated that for every month of delay the additional cost to the Home Office per person is at least £730.41, equating to £8,765 per year. The delays make absolutely no financial sense. Not only that, but on the Home Office’s own figures more people are being employed but they are processing fewer cases. Paying more for less productivity is not acceptable. If this was a business, it would go bust.

A commitment to a six-month target as set out in the new clause would therefore save a huge amount of money to the Treasury and taxpayers, improve the mental health of those caught in the system, and help with integration.

[Tom Pursglove]

I have been clear throughout Committee proceedings that the Government are committed to overhauling the current asylum system, which is obviously broken and in critical need of reform. The number of non-straightforward cases awaiting a decision has grown rapidly, meaning that in October 2018 it became clear to us that the service standard of six months from the date of claim no longer best served those who used our services. For those reasons, former Ministers agreed that we should move away from the service standard.

Although I cannot accept the new clause, as we consider it too restrictive, Members will have detected from what I have said throughout the proceedings that we want to see the faster processing of cases. I entirely recognise the shadow Minister’s point on the financial costs of delay, and the impact on individuals of delay. That is why I and my ministerial colleagues want cases to be dealt with more speedily. That is, of course, the right objective to be working towards. We are working to reintroduce a service standard that will align with changes brought about by the new plan for immigration. I encourage the shadow Minister to withdraw the new clause.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I will push the clause to a vote; we are not convinced by the Minister’s response.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jonathan Gullis]

I reiterate that, having gone down to Dover to meet the Kent intake unit in Dover docks, having met in the joint control room with deputy director Dave Butler of the clandestine threat command, and having been to Tug Haven and western Jetfoil on a cross-party parliamentary visit, it was fantastic to learn and understand. I share concerns expressed by the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate about the use of this money by the French, and I have been quite open in my view that the French are simply not doing enough, but it was great to hear from Dave and others in the control room that what the French are doing inland is quite substantive. Dave was very happy to share the details.

I can only implore the hon. Gentleman, rather than pressing this new clause, to go on down and visit, and have a chat with Dave and the gang down there to hear what is going on in France. They were trying to say to us that the French are operating inland and trying to stop people from coming over to France and travelling through. The local Parisian community, for example, were getting very angry about being a path route towards Calais. That was a fascinating conversation.

That is why the new clause is unnecessary; we saw, after the threat of no payment was made, that suddenly we could not stop being inundated with video footage and photography of what was being done. I thought it was absolutely brilliant. The one thing the French are not doing is their job at sea. They need to step up and support the British Border Force and other British services in stopping boats once they have already launched into the English channel—not just by tracking them, as they currently do, but by tugging them back to France. They are simply not doing their job.

While I absolutely share the hon. Gentleman’s concerns about money, ultimately I believe the Home Secretary has a firm grip of this, and as we are seeing, the results are starting to pay dividends. However, I agree that more can be done, and the Bill goes a long way to achieving that.

[Tom Pursglove]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his proposed new clause. He will appreciate that there is always a balance to be struck in these matters, and I should add that we have published joint statements that set out the nature of our work with France following arrangements made in July 2021 and November 2020. The content of the Sandhurst treaty, which underpins our illegal migration relationship with France, is also published.

Those arrangements are underpinned by additional administrative and operational documentation. However, it is not possible to publish that material where it includes sensitive details relating to the UK and our international partners. To disclose that information would hinder our operational response and our ability to target criminals driving illegal migration and ultimately protect the public. We must do nothing that aids their evil work—we simply must not entertain that, and that is something I am exceptionally mindful of in responding to the proposed new clause.

[Paul Blomfield]

Will the Minister give way?

[Tom Pursglove]

I will, but I am conscious of the need to make progress.

[Paul Blomfield]

If the Minister is concerned to see that we do nothing to aid the evil work of people smugglers, what consideration has he given to the impact assessment by his own Department, which said:

“There is a risk that increased security and deterrence could encourage these cohorts to attempt riskier means of entering the UK.”?

According to his own Department, these proposals are counterproductive.

[Tom Pursglove]

What is being sought is further detail on the relationship that we have with France in particular to tackle these dangerous channel crossings. As I say, we must put nothing in the public domain that risks undermining that constructive collaboration through the arrangement that we have with the French, which is vital to stopping these dangerous crossings and protecting lives at sea. To do so would also result in a betrayal of trust with our international partners, who own some of this information, and could prevent us from reaching future agreements with international partners, impacting our ability to prevent illegal migration and small boat crossings. That is why the Government feel unable to support the new clause and I encourage the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate to withdraw it.

[Bambos Charalambous]

There is not enough scrutiny, so we wish to press the new clause to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bambos Charalambous]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would shorten the route to settlement from 10 years to five years for children and young people who have grown up in the UK and know no other home. This issue has a big impact on a relatively small number of people. These are bright young people who want to contribute to society but face a long, uncertain and financially demanding journey before their futures in the country they call home are secure.

I pay tribute to the brilliant charity We Belong, which is led by young people who themselves have been impacted by the unforgiving immigration rules. The Greater London Authority estimates that more than 330,000 children and young people who came to the UK as children have precarious immigration status. The young people who face this predicament are mainly Commonwealth citizens who are bright and want to contribute, but they have to wait 10 years before they reach settlement, at a cost of £12,771, through applications for leave to remain every 30 months.

Costs for leave to remain applications have risen astronomically in recent years, increasing by 331% since 2014. Often, more than one family member will be going through the process at the same time, so there are multiple fees to pay. That means that in many families, for at least a decade, earnings that could otherwise go towards securing a decent home or be invested in a child’s education instead have to be funnelled out of the family and paid to the Home Office. Before we even start to consider legal fees, we are asking families and young people to save more than £1,200 per year per person just to remain in the UK, when 30% of people in the UK have less than £1,000 in total savings and the average low-income family has just £95 in savings.

Each time they have to apply for leave, we raise the bar for these young people, asking far more of them than we ever would of those fortunate enough to be born with a British passport. Each time, they meet these almost impossible hurdles, often working several jobs to keep themselves and their families on this long and narrow 10-year path to security. These are clearly exceptional individuals, but it is not fair that we keep asking this of them.

For Arkam, who came to the UK aged 10, the 10-year route has meant being stuck in unsuitable accommodation. His family has lived in a one-bedroom house for 10 years because, he says

“the rent is so low and it has to be low because the Home Office fees are so high and our quality of life was non-existent.”

For Andrew, it has been the trigger for a string of evictions. His family were left without enough money to pay their rent and lost their home several times.

My own constituent, Tashi, arrived in the UK when she was seven and has since lawfully resided in the UK for almost two decades. When Tashi was just 10 years old, she was held unlawfully in immigration detention, and that experience has traumatised her ever since. Each limited leave renewal ignites the uncertainty and precarious nature of her status. If she makes a mistake on an application form, she could be back in detention and face deportation, even though she knows no other home. Living with limited leave to remain means decades of living with unrelenting uncertainty.

The more times that young people go through the LLR application process, the more they have to lose. If applicants are unable to afford the fee or fail to renew on time, they will have to begin the 10-year process from the very beginning.

That happened to Natasha, who came to the UK from Nigeria at the age of seven. Natasha was granted limited leave to remain when she was 18. When it came to renewing her visa, her family could not afford to renew due to the high fees and Natasha fell out of legal status. Unable to work, Natasha became homeless. Living in the shadows of society, it was only when she was 26 that she was able to raise enough money from family and friends to apply for LLR again and restart the 10-year route. She must renew this status every 30 months over a 10-year period. She will be 36 before she can apply for settlement and 37 years old when she can finally apply for citizenship.

How is this fair? For all this Government’s rhetoric about the importance of social integration, they continue to preside over an immigration system that isolates and stigmatises young migrants who have no other home but the UK. As highlighted by We Belong, many young people will undoubtedly be driven into poverty or lose their lawful status as a result of these high costs.

Speaking in July 2019, during his campaign to become leader of the Conservative Party, the Prime Minister said:

“I want everybody who comes here and makes their lives here to be, and to feel, British—that’s the most important thing”.

Across this Committee, I think we all agree with that sentiment. We should be proud of our country and encourage our residents to seek British citizenship, so why are we putting every hurdle in the way of ambitious young people who are already integrated into the fabric of our society? We Belong’s experience with young people on the 10-year route reveals how the demands of this process can reverse years, even decades, of integration.

The unforgiving 10-year route sows division and fear among young people, damages mental health, limits life chances and condemns even the hardest-working families to at least a decade of intense financial strain. The instability and onerous demands created by the limited leave to remain route serve nobody, and certainly not employers, educators or communities.

The financial and other constraints imposed by the 10-year process mean that many young migrants reaching early adulthood are denied the opportunity to realise their ambitions, causing prolonged financial and emotional stress. Ten years of multiple applications and multiple fees only increase the likelihood that young people will inadvertently fall out of status and have their lives ruined as a result. A five-year LLR path to settlement would be fairer and give them parity with other migrant groups, which is what this new clause aims to do.

We welcome the Home Office’s recent published guidance to case officers, which opens up a narrow discretionary five-year route for some young people. It shows that the Home Office acknowledges that there is a problem here. However the guidance is limited to those between 18 and 25, among other limitations. Many of the people in the case studies I mentioned, and many others who came to the UK as young children, are now over the age limit and will not be able to benefit from this scheme. Can the Minister tell me when the Home Office plans to rectify this anomaly?

[Tom Pursglove]

I hope I might be able to satisfy the Committee by saying that both this proposed new clause and the related proposed new clause 45 are commendable, but we are already doing what they seek. We will consolidate our actions in the immigration rules as part of the simplification of the rules in the next 12 months. Home Office officials have discussed the proposed changes with the We Belong group of young migrants, who have indicated that they are supportive of the way the changes will be implemented. With that, I hope the hon. Gentleman will feel able to withdraw this proposed new clause.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I very much welcome the Minister’s comments, and I look forward to having more information. Based on what he has told me, I am willing to withdraw the new clause, and I look forward to progress being made in this area. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 51

Safety plan for child victims of human trafficking

“(1) The Children Act 1989 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 22, after subsection (3C) insert—

“(3D) In respect of a suspected child victim of trafficking who is looked after by the local authority, the duty of a local authority under subsection (3)(a) to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child shall include in particular a duty to consider and take all reasonable steps to ensure that arrangements of accommodation and support to meet the child’s needs and takes account of and addresses the child’s safety with a view to preventing the risk of re-trafficking.”

(3) In section 22, after subsection (4)(d) insert—

“(e) independent guardians (within the meaning of Section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015) as a relevant person who the local authority shall, so far as is reasonably practicable, consult with before making any decision with respect of a child who they are looking after and who is entitled to an independent guardian.”

(4) In section 22C, after subsection (7)(c) insert—

“(d) where accommodation is arranged for a suspected or identified child victim of trafficking, due regard shall be paid to the potential risks of harm and re-trafficking and the child’s safety shall be a primary consideration.””—(Holly Lynch.)

This new clause seeks to provide child victims with a safety plan to prevent retrafficking.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Holly Lynch]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

In the same spirit as new clauses 43 and 44, new clause 51 sets out the duty for local authorities to make arrangements for child victims of modern slavery, with a view to prevent their retrafficking, by amending section 22 of the Children Act 1989. As things stand, an unaccompanied child will become looked after by the local authority if they have been accommodated by the local authority for 24 hours under section 20 of the Children Act 1989. This will mean that they will be entitled to the same local authority provision as any other looked-after child. The Care Leavers (England) Regulations 2010 set out duties regarding care leavers and require that those duties are fulfilled with regards to the child’s circumstances and needs as an unaccompanied or trafficked child. The regulations apply to all children, regardless of their immigration status, nationality or documentation.

As we have heard previously, child victims of modern slavery are at increased risk of going missing and being retrafficked. In 2017, as many as one in four identified trafficked children were reported as having gone missing. The average missing incidents for each trafficked child have increased from an average of 2.4 times to 7.4 times between 2014-15 and 2017. The new clause therefore seeks to bring clarity to the duty on local authorities to protect victims, particularly those at risk of retrafficking. Subsection (2) highlights that there is a need to ensure that accommodation is a serious consideration for child victims. We know that concerns have been raised about the lack of agreed safety standards for accommodating child victims of trafficking, which can include the use of residential homes, shared flats and houses, bed-and-breakfast emergency housing and foster care.

In 2017, the Home Office and the Department for Education commissioned a report that found that there was

“limited availability of specialist provision”

and

“a lack of resources and specialist knowledge within local authorities and partner services.”

The report identified the placement of non-EEA migrant children in “semi-independent accommodation”, such as

“supported accommodation and/or shared housing”,

as being a cause for concern. Since the report was published, the Government have outlawed the provision of accommodation without care and supervision for under-16s, but they have continued to allow such provision for 16 and 17-year-olds.

A recent serious case review has further highlighted the problems of local authorities arranging inappropriate placements for children, and the impact of failing to conduct full risk assessments for both the needs of the child and the accommodation itself. Sarah was a looked-after child in the care of Worcestershire social services, and she died in independent accommodation away from her home borough in June 2019, at the age of 17. From an early age, Sarah had suffered from epilepsy, which had been managed by medication. In 2017, Sarah became a looked-after child under a voluntary agreement between the local authority and her parents, which meant that both Sarah’s parents maintained parental responsibility. Sarah became looked after and was accommodated with foster carers, but when these placements broke down, she resided in residential accommodation and then had semi-independent living arrangements.

Over a period of time, there were numerous occasions where Sarah was reported as missing from the placements. There were concerns regarding Sarah’s vulnerability and the effect of her medical condition. There were also concerns regarding Sarah’s relationships with older men, particularly her relationship with one man. Sarah was considered to be at risk of being criminally and sexually exploited. Sarah tragically died, having suffered a seizure at the home address of the older male in question in 2019, aged just 17. It is an incredibly sad case study and serves as an example of what can happen if the needs of vulnerable victims are not thoroughly assessed.

Currently, there is statutory guidance that outlines a local authority’s duties, such as the Department for Education’s guidance for local authorities, which was updated in 2017, entitled “Care of unaccompanied migrant children and child victims of modern slavery.” It states that:

“Local authorities have a duty to protect and support these highly vulnerable children. Because of the circumstances they have faced, unaccompanied migrant children and child victims of modern slavery, including trafficking, often have complex needs in addition to those faced by looked after children more generally. The support required to address these needs must begin as soon as the child is referred to the local authority or is found in the local authority area. It will be most effective where this support is provided through a stable, continuous relationship with the child.”

We unequivocally support the sentiments and measures incorporated in the guidance, but it should be strengthened through the adoption of the new clause, which would create a duty for local authorities to consider the risk of retrafficking and safeguard against children going missing. I have already made the case for the need, highlighted in subsection (3), for local authorities to work closely and consult independent guardians before making decisions on behalf of the child.

There is a clear, urgent need for the new clause, given the vulnerability of such children. There is also a practical requirement, given that, for multiple local authorities, missing, trafficked or unaccompanied children account for a significant proportion of the children they look after—in the case of one local authority it was as high as 15%. The new clause seeks not only to raise awareness of the needs of child victims but to provide greater definition on the role of local authorities in meeting such needs.

As this is likely to be the last time that I will be on my feet in the Committee, with your permission, Ms McDonagh, may I put on record my sincere thanks to the Children’s Society, ECPAT UK, the British Red Cross, the Immigration Law Practitioners Association, the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit, the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, Dame Sara Thornton, and all the hard-working, dedicated frontline police officers disrupting modern slavery? I am eternally grateful for all their expertise. Finally, I thank Isabelle Bull from my team, who has worked like a trojan in preparation for the Bill, as well as the incredible Clerks of the House.

[Tom Pursglove]

I, too, am grateful to the hon. Lady for the constructive way in which she has gone about her work on the Committee. I know how passionate she is about these issues.

Support for potential victims, including children, is a fundamental pillar of our approach to assisting those impacted by the horrendous crime of trafficking and modern slavery and reducing the risk of such victims being retrafficked. As the Committee may be aware, independent child trafficking guardians are an independent source of advice and support for potentially trafficked children, irrespective of nationality, and they can advocate on a child’s behalf. So far, the Government have rolled out the service to two thirds of local authorities across England and Wales. We have developed detailed policy for the provision of the service, which is set out in the interim independent child trafficking guardians guidance published under section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The guidance is kept under review through consultation with stakeholders.

Within the guidance, the Government are already clear that acting in the child’s best interests must always be a primary consideration for the independent child trafficking guardian service. We are also clear that independent child trafficking guardians must be invited and provided with the opportunity to take part in all agency meetings and discussions that relate to and impact on the children that they are supporting. That is the correct place for detail on the function of the independent child trafficking guardian service. By keeping that detail in guidance—rather than putting it in legislation, as the new clause would—the Government can respond flexibly to best practice and victims’ needs.

Local authorities are responsible for safeguarding and promoting the welfare of all children in their area, including child victims of modern slavery. The “Working Together to Safeguard Children” statutory guidance is clear that the individual needs of children, including the risk of re-trafficking, should be taken into account when determining their recovery needs. That is to ensure that safeguarding processes and multi-agency support can be put in place to protect and prevent harm to children at risk of a range of exploitation harms and abuse. The approach enables us to focus on a range of exploitation harms, whereas the new clause would stipulate that we focus specifically on the risk of retrafficking. Although I am sure that that was not the new clause’s intention, prioritising safeguarding against the risk of retrafficking could consequentially lead to the prioritisation of action against specifically the risk of retrafficking in place of other risks, which would inherently pose a risk to individuals whose risk of retrafficking may not be the primary consideration. With that, I encourage the hon. Lady not to press her new clause.

[Holly Lynch]

I think I followed what the Minister said and that he heard my concerns about some of the gaps in the provision. I will look to that statutory guidance for further detail. I will not press the new clause, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 52

Effect of British National (Overseas) visas

‘(1) Within six months of this Act being passed, the Secretary of State must commission and lay before Parliament an independent assessment of the effect of British National (Overseas) visas and the Government’s implementation.

(2) The Secretary of State must appoint an Independent Chair to conduct the assessment.

(3) The assessment must consider such matters as are deemed appropriate by the said Independent Chair.’—(Bambos Charalambous.)

This new clause would require the Government to publish an independent assessment of the effect of the British National (Overseas) visa scheme.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

In conclusion, we believe that the Government’s decision to offer the Hong Kong BNO scheme is a welcome expression of the UK’s historic relationship with the citizens of Hong Kong. We believe that individuals and families arriving from Hong Kong will enrich the cultural life of the UK and contribute to our economy, but unless the Government look at the existing loopholes in the BNO scheme and how it is being implemented, the scheme is in danger of being mainly warm words, rather than actually helping the people we have promised to help. An independent assessment of the scheme would allow the Government to improve it and offer help to those vulnerable young people most likely to be politically targeted by Beijing. In that way, the scheme could provide the genuine protection that we all believe people from Hong Kong deserve.

[Tom Pursglove]

The Hong Kong British national overseas route was launched on 31 January 2021, and the route has already been a success. As of 30 June, approximately 64,900 applications to the route have been made by BNO status holders and their family members who have chosen to make the UK their home. An impact assessment was published on 22 October 2020, setting out the projected impacts of the BNO route on the UK. As well as the direct impacts for the Government of operating the route, the impact assessment sets out the expected net benefit to the UK of between £2.4 billion and £2.9 billion over five years.

We believe that a review is not necessary. The policy is generous and barriers have been minimised. As the shadow Minister said, the Home Affairs Committee recently published a report on the route, and we have responded in full. I encourage him to withdraw the new clause.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I will not press new clause 52 to a vote, but I do hope that the Government will keep monitoring the system and provide the protection for young Hongkongers that I outlined. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 53

Electronic monitoring: conditions and use of data

“(1) Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016 is amended as follows.

(2) In paragraph 2, in sub-paragraph (3)(a), leave out ‘must’ and insert ‘may’.

(3) In paragraph 2, in sub-paragraph (3)(b), leave out ‘by virtue of sub-paragraph (5) or (7)’.

(4) In paragraph 2, after sub-paragraph (3) insert—

‘(3A) If immigration bail is granted to a person subject to an electronic monitoring condition, the electronic monitoring condition shall cease to apply on the day six months after the day on which immigration bail was granted to the person, unless sub-paragraph (3B) applies.

(3B) This sub-paragraph applies if the Secretary of State or the First-tier Tribunal (as the case may be), when granting immigration bail to the person, has directed that the electronic monitoring condition shall not cease to apply in accordance with sub-paragraph (3A).

(3C) But the Secretary of State or the First-tier Tribunal (as the case may be) shall not make a direction under sub-paragraph (3B) unless the Secretary of State or the First-tier Tribunal (as the case may be) is satisfied that there are very exceptional circumstances which make the continued application of the electronic monitoring condition necessary in the interests of—

(a) public protection; or

(b) national security.’

(5) In paragraph 2, after sub-paragraph (7) insert—

‘(7A) Sub-paragraph (3)(a) does not apply to a person who is granted immigration bail by the First-tier Tribunal if the Tribunal considers that to impose an electronic monitoring condition on the person would be—

(a) impractical, or

(b) contrary to the person’s Convention rights.

(7B) Where sub-paragraph (7) or (7A) applies, the First-tier Tribunal must not grant immigration bail to the person subject to an electronic monitoring condition.’

(6) In paragraph 4, after sub-paragraph (2) insert—

‘(2A) The Secretary of State must not process any data collected by a device within the meaning of sub-paragraph (2) which relates to the matters in sub-paragraph (1)(a) to (c) except for the purpose of, and to the minimum extent reasonably necessary for, determining whether P has breached a condition of his bail.

(2B) In sub-paragraph (2A), “processing” has the same meaning as in section 3(4) of the Data Protection Act 2018.’”.—(Stuart C. McDonald.)

This new clause would place certain safeguards and restrictions on use of electronic monitoring.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 53 is really just to probe the Government on a new issue that has started to arise this year: the significant increase in the use of the GPS monitoring of certain people on bail for immigration purposes, largely foreign national offenders awaiting deportation. I am not for a moment suggesting that such monitoring does not have its role. It absolutely does; indeed, there would be occasions on which I would be upset with the Home Office if it did not use it. There is a genuine concern, however, about the lack of safeguards and limits on its use, and on how data from GPS tracking is being used. Indeed, even compared to the criminal justice system, it seems that the safeguards and limits are somewhat light touch. Cases have arisen where it seems that use was totally inappropriate.

New clause 53 suggests putting in place some appropriate safeguards and restrictions. It is designed to prompt the Minister, if not today then in due course, to answer certain questions. First and foremost, how will data be used in practice and in what circumstances will it be used in relation to somebody’s article 8 claim? That is an area of controversy, in that the use of tracking goes way beyond the original intention in previous relevant legislation, which was to prevent people from absconding.

Secondly, the criminal justice system imposes strict limits and safeguards on how long electronic monitoring is used for and in what circumstances, with limits on collection, processing, storage and use of data. Why, therefore, are those electronic monitoring safeguards absent in the immigration system?

Thirdly, why have the Government not made the data protection and equality impact assessment for such an intrusive scheme available to the public? Fourthly, what guarantee can the Government give that they will not expand their use of this technology and use it on people who have come to the United Kingdom to seek asylum? Can the Minister give us assurances on that today?

Finally, the Government’s own data suggests that absconding rates are exceptionally low. A recent FOI response found that of people granted bail between February 2020 and March 2021, there were 43 cases of absconding out of 7,000, so what evidence does the Home Office have that this intrusive measure is really necessary on anything other than a very limited scale?

[Tom Pursglove]

Our immigration system must encourage compliance with immigration rules and protect the public. Electronic monitoring of foreign national offenders using satellite tracking devices was a Government manifesto commitment, which the public voted for, and the measure which enacts it was passed into primary legislation under the Immigration Act 2016. It has already been subject to parliamentary scrutiny and debate during the passage of the 2016 Act.

Electronic monitoring is a condition of immigration bail. During the debate on the Immigration Act 2016, it was open to Parliament to set a limit on how long a person can be made subject to electronic monitoring, but it chose not to do so. However, I want to be clear that a person’s electronic monitoring conditions are already automatically reviewed on a quarterly basis as a minimum. Compliance with bail conditions, including electronic monitoring, will be a major factor in deciding whether it will remain a condition of that person’s bail. Any representations regarding the person’s electronic monitoring conditions or a breach of those conditions will also generate a review.

Prior to being placed on electronic monitoring when released, a person is given an opportunity to advise the Department as to why electronic monitoring may not be appropriate for them. That includes where there is strong evidence to suggest that an electronic monitoring condition would cause serious harm to the person’s health. A person can also make representations at any point while wearing a tag and those representations will be considered promptly.

Currently, there is a duty on the Secretary of State to consider electronic monitoring for those who are subject to a deportation order or deportation proceedings, known as “the duty”. The proposed clause makes the consideration of imposing an electronic monitoring condition discretionary. However, there is already a caveat within current legislation that electronic monitoring will not be applied to a person who is subject to the duty where its imposition would be impractical or contrary to the person’s convention rights. The proposal to remove the compulsory consideration of electronic monitoring for all those subject to the duty could lead to a scenario where serious offenders who should be electronically monitored are not considered for electronic monitoring and are granted bail without that condition.

I turn to the new clause’s reference to the use of data. Any data that is gathered from the devices will be processed automatically and will not be routinely monitored by the Department. We have undertaken a data protection impact assessment in relation to the introduction of GPS tagging, which sets out the specific permitted circumstances where data can be accessed, and any access outside those circumstances is considered a data breach. Those who are subject to electronic monitoring are made aware of the circumstances as to when their data can be accessed during the induction process.

Restricting the data in the way the new clause sets out will impact on the ability to use data to try to locate a person after it has been identified that they have breached their immigration bail conditions and are viewed as an absconder. The inability to share data with other law enforcement agencies where a lawful request had been made would be out of alignment with the agreement on sharing data for the purposes of preventing or solving crime. In the broadest terms, only knowing that a person had breached their bail conditions and not being able to use the data for any other purpose would greatly limit the efficacy of electronic monitoring.

I do not consider that the new clause would have the effect that hon. Members intend. Rather, it would impair our ability to monitor and deport those who had committed crimes and were not entitled to remain in the UK. Foreign criminals should be in no doubt of our determination to deport them. We make no apology for keeping the public safe and clamping down on those who have no right to be in the UK.

In summary, the restriction of the use of electronic monitoring as proposed in new clause 53 would significantly impair our ability efficiently to remove foreign national offenders who have no right to be here. I am conscious that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East raised a number of questions at the outset. I have covered quite a lot of ground, but if there are any matters that he feels I have not addressed and he would like to follow up, I of course invite him to please do so.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the Minister for that response. I will have a look through everything that has been said and consider whether any follow-up is necessary. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 54

Instructions to the Migration Advisory Committee

“Within two months of this Act coming into force, the Secretary of State must instruct the Migration Advisory Committee to undertake the following work—

(a) a review of the minimum income requirements for leave to enter and remain as a family member of persons who are British citizens or settled in the United Kingdom;

(b) a report making detailed recommendations on the design of a work visa for remote areas.”—(Stuart C. McDonald.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to seek further advice in order to take forward certain recommendations made by the Migration Advisory Committee in recent reports.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

The recommendations were made two or three years ago, but the current situation—with, as we all know, labour market issues and worker shortages in all sorts of areas—makes the idea all the more imperative for remote areas. I have been to some remote areas recently, where restaurants are having to close at ridiculous hours and for half the week, because they just cannot get the staff. It is time for us to look at this suggestion again. The then Home Secretary was absolutely right to say that the Government would look at it, and I wish that the Home Office would revisit it and get on with doing what the MAC recommended.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for the way in which he has gone about his work during the course of proceedings, and for pursuing a number of angles with great tenacity and vigour.

The Migration Advisory Committee is an independent, non-statutory, non-time limited, non-departmental public body that advises the Government on migration issues. The minimum income requirement was implemented in July 2012, following advice from the MAC and has not changed since its introduction. We will consider whether to commission the MAC to review the minimum income requirement within the next three months.

In addition, the MAC considered the issue of work visas for remote areas in is January 2020 report, “A Points-Based System and Salary Thresholds for Immigration”. The MAC recommended a pilot for remote visas, but the Government did not accept this. The UK has a single, flexible immigration system that works for the entirety of the UK. Applying different immigration rules to different parts of the UK would overly complicate the immigration system and would cause significant difficulties for employers who need the flexibility to deploy their staff across the UK. As the MAC itself has said, when considering sustaining remote communities we need to consider why people leave these areas. This is more important than bolstering local communities with migration. I therefore do not consider re-reviewing this issue to be a good use of the MAC’s time or public money.

It is not appropriate to put an amendment such as new clause 54 into primary legislation, as the commissioning of the MAC is done on a priority basis. The Secretary of State retains the power to change the topics, which the MAC reviews at short notice, if a more pressing matter becomes a priority. The Secretary of State should be able to respond flexibly to any new priorities. For those reasons, I encourage the hon. Member to withdraw his new clause.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the Minister for his answers. He is certainly candid, as he has been throughout Committee proceedings. I am bitterly disappointed about the answer in relation to the remote areas pilot scheme. Those areas are really suffering, not just in terms of labour shortages and the accompanying economic challenges, but even with depopulation.

I will hang on and finish on an optimistic note in that there is a possibility that the Government will commission a review of the salary threshold for family visas. I very much hope that that does happen and they look at how that route operates all together. I cling to that little bit of silver lining. With that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Schedule 1

Prisoners returning to the UK: Modifications of Criminal Justice Act 2003

‘This is the Schedule to be inserted after Schedule 19A to the Criminal Justice Act 2003—

“Schedule 19B

Prisoners returning to the UK: Modifications of Chapter 6 of Part 12

Modification of dates for referral to the Board

1 Paragraph 2 applies where section 244ZC(2), 244A(2) or 246A(4) (when read with section 260(4A)) would require the Secretary of State to refer a person’s case to the Board on a day falling before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the person is returned to custody.

2 The applicable provision is to be read as requiring the Secretary of State to refer the person’s case to the Board at any time up to the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the person is returned to custody.

3 For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, a person returns to custody when the person, having returned to the United Kingdom, is detained (whether or not in prison) in pursuance of their sentence.

Person removed after Board had directed release but before being released

4 Paragraphs 5 and 6 apply where, before a person’s removal from the United Kingdom—

(a) the Board had directed their release under section 244ZC, 244A or 246A, but

(b) they had not been released on licence.

5 The direction of the Board is to be treated as having no effect.

6 The person is to be treated as if—

(a) they had been recalled under section 254 on the day on which they returned to the United Kingdom, and

(b) they were not suitable for automatic release (see section 255A).

Person removed after referral to the Board but before disposal of the reference

7 Paragraph 8 applies where—

(a) before a person’s removal from prison their case had been referred to the Board under section 244ZB(3), 244ZC(2), 244A(2) or 246A(4), and

(b) the reference lapsed under section 260(4B) because the person was removed from the United Kingdom before the Board had disposed of the reference.

8 Section 244ZC(2), 244A(2) or 246A(4) (as applicable) is to be read as requiring the Secretary of State to refer the person’s case to the Board before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the person is returned to custody.

9 For the purposes of paragraph 8, a person returns to custody when the person, having returned to the United Kingdom, is detained (whether or not in prison) in pursuance of their sentence.

Person removed after having been recalled to prison

10 Paragraphs 11 and 12 apply where, at the time of a person’s removal from prison under section 260, the person was in prison following recall under section 254.

11 Any direction of the Board made in relation to the person under section 255C or 256A before their return to the United Kingdom is to be treated as having no effect.

12 The person is to be treated as if—

(a) they had been recalled under section 254 on the day on which they returned to the United Kingdom, and

(b) they were not suitable for automatic release (see section 255A).”’—(Tom Pursglove.)

This new schedule inserts a new Schedule 19B into the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to make modifications of that Act in relation to prisoners who have returned to the UK after their removal from prison. It is introduced by section 261 of that Act, which is amended by NC12.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Schedule 3

Working in United Kingdom waters: consequential and related amendments

‘Immigration Act 1971

1 The Immigration Act 1971 is amended as follows.

2 In section 8 (exceptions for seamen etc), after subsection (1) insert—

“(1A) Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to a member of the crew of a ship who is an offshore worker within the meaning of section 11A.”

3 In section 11 (references to entry etc), after subsection (1) insert—

“(1ZA) See also section 11A (additional means by which persons arriving in United Kingdom waters for work can enter the UK).”

4 In section 28 (proceedings for offences)—

(a) before subsection (1) insert—

“(A1) Proceedings for an offence under this Part that is committed in the territorial sea adjacent to the United Kingdom may be taken, and the offence may for all incidental purposes be treated as having been committed, in any place in the United Kingdom.”;

(b) in subsection (2A), for “section 25 or 25A” substitute “this Part”.

5 In section 28L (interpretation of Part 3) —

(a) in subsection (1), at the beginning insert “Subject to subsection (1A)”;

(b) after subsection (1) insert—

“(1A) In this Part ‘premises’ also includes any artificial island, installation or structure (including one in the territorial sea adjacent to the United Kingdom).”

6 In section 28M (enforcement powers in relation to ships: England and Wales), in subsection (2)(a)—

(a) for “section” substitute—

“(i) section 24B,”;

(b) for “, and” substitute “, or

(ii) section 21 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, and”.

7 In section 28N (enforcement powers in relation to ships: Scotland), in subsection (2)(a)—

(a) for “section” substitute—

“(i) section 24B,”;

(b) for “, and” substitute “, or

(ii) section 21 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, and”.

8 In section 28O (enforcement powers in relation to ships: Northern Ireland), in subsection (2)(a)—

(a) for “section” substitute—

“(i) section 24B,”;

(b) for “, and” substitute “, or

(ii) section 21 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, and”.

9 (1) Schedule 2 (administrative provision as to control on entry etc) is amended as follows.

(2) In paragraph 2—

(a) in sub-paragraph (1), for the words from “who have” to “United Kingdom)” substitute “within sub-paragraph (1A)”;

(b) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—

“(1A) The persons are—

(a) any person who has arrived in the United Kingdom by ship or aircraft (including transit passengers, members of the crew and others not seeking to enter the United Kingdom);

(b) any person who has arrived in United Kingdom waters by ship or aircraft who the immigration officer has reason to believe is an offshore worker.

(1B) In sub-paragraph (1A), ‘offshore worker’ and ‘United Kingdom waters’ have the same meaning as in section 11A.”

(3) In paragraph 27—

(a) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—

“(1A) Sub-paragraph (1) also applies to the captain of a ship or aircraft arriving in United Kingdom waters if—

(a) there are offshore workers on board, or

(b) an immigration officer has informed the captain that they wish to examine any person on board in the exercise of the power under paragraph 2.

(1B) In sub-paragraph (1A), ‘offshore worker’ and ‘United Kingdom waters’ have the same meaning as in section 11A.”

(4) In paragraph 27B—

(a) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—

“(1A) This paragraph also applies to ships or aircraft—

(a) which have offshore workers on board, and

(b) which—

(i) have arrived, or are expected to arrive, in United Kingdom waters, or

(ii) have left, or are expected to leave, United Kingdom waters.”;

(b) after sub-paragraph (9A) insert—

“(9B) ‘Offshore worker’ and ‘United Kingdom waters’ have the same meaning in this paragraph as in section 11A.”

(5) In paragraph 27BA—

(a) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—

“(1A) The Secretary of State may also make regulations requiring responsible persons in respect of ships or aircraft—

(a) which have offshore workers on board, and

(b) which—

(i) have arrived, or are expected to arrive, in United Kingdom waters, or

(ii) have left, or are expected to leave, United Kingdom waters,

to supply information to the Secretary of State or an immigration officer.”;

(b) in sub-paragraph (2), after (1) insert “or (1A)”;

(c) after sub-paragraph (5) insert—

“(5A) For the purposes of this paragraph, ‘offshore workers’ and ‘United Kingdom waters’ have the same meaning as in section 11A.”

10 (1) Schedule 4A (maritime enforcement powers) is amended as follows.

(2) In paragraph 1(2), after the opening words insert—

“‘the 2006 Act’ means the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006;”.

(3) In paragraph (2)(1)(a), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

(4) In paragraph (3)(1)(a), for “25, 25A and 25B” substitute “24B, 25, 25A or 25B of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

(5) In paragraph 4(1), for “25, 25A or 25B” substitute “24B, 25, 25A or 25B of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

(6) In paragraph 12(2), after the opening words insert—

“‘the 2006 Act’ means the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006;”.

(7) In paragraph 13(1)(a), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

(8) In paragraph 14(1)(a), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

(9) In paragraph 15(1), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

(10) In paragraph 23(2), after the opening words insert—

“‘the 2006 Act’ means the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006;”.

(11) In paragraph 24(1)(a), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

(12) In paragraph 25(1)(a), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

(13) In paragraph 26(1), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006

11 In section 21 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (offence of employing a person who is disqualified from employment by their immigration status), after subsection (3) insert—

“(3A) Proceedings for an offence under this section that is committed in the territorial sea adjacent to the United Kingdom may be taken, and the offence may for all incidental purposes be treated as having been committed, in any place in the United Kingdom.

(3B) Section 3 of the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878 (consent of Secretary of State for certain prosecutions) does not apply to proceedings for an offence under this section.”’—(Tom Pursglove.)

This new schedule makes consequential and related amendments in NC20.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I want to put on the record my thanks to the Clerks, in particular Sarah Thatcher and Rob Page, for their amazing work in getting our new clauses and amendments into some form of legible parliamentary-type wording. I also thank the other staff, those in the room in particular, the Doorkeepers and those keeping a record of our sometimes very long speeches. I also thank you, Ms McDonagh, and Sir Roger, for the excellent way in which you chaired proceedings of the Committee.

I thank the members of the Committee—the Minister and all members, but in particular my friends and colleagues in the Opposition for their support and for helping us get to where we are today. I put on the record my thanks to my fellow shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax, and my hon. Friends the Members for Bermondsey and Old Southwark, for Sheffield Central and for Coventry North West, and to the hon. Members for Glasgow North East and for—I will attempt to say the name—Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East.

Finally, I thank my staff, Katherine Chibah, Giulia Monasterio, Cian Fox, Charlotte Butterick and Tashi Tahir, for all their hard work on the research and the speeches, and for their general support. It has been a challenging Bill Committee and I am pleased that we have got to the end of it in one piece.

[Tom Pursglove]

Before you adjourn the Committee for the final time, Ms McDonagh, I also take the opportunity to thank everyone who has been involved, in particular the Opposition spokesmen of both parties, who have put an awful lot of work into their preparations. I know that it is not just them involved in their work, but their teams, who go to extraordinary lengths and really look at the detail of the measures that the Government are proposing to draw up suggested new clauses. It is a herculean effort, so I thank the spokesmen and those working with them.

I thank you, Ms McDonagh, and Sir Roger, for your firm but fair chairing of the proceedings. That is always much appreciated, and you have done a brilliant job at keeping us all in order in—I think it is fair to say—a controversial Bill, which Members come at with very strong opinions on all sides.

I also thank my colleagues and in particular our departmental Whip, who as ever has done a fantastic job and stood in at very short notice for my absence on Tuesday. It was extraordinary.

[Bambos Charalambous]

We were gentle with him.

[Tom Pursglove]

He did very well. I was concerned that I would not be wanted back. I also thank our standing departmental Parliamentary Private Secretary.

I also thank my officials, without whom it simply would not be possible to do this, for all the work they put in behind the scenes. I thank the Clerks of the House, too, who do a fantastic job in structuring the proceedings and ensuring that everything runs in an orderly fashion.

To finish, Sir Roger’s comments as he departed the Chair this morning put it rather well. These are controversial matters that people feel strongly about. Passions run high, but it is fair to say that the Committee has considered the matters in great detail and, I would argue, has done consideration of the Bill great justice.

[Mr Goodwill]

I thank the Minister, because everyone else has been thanked. He had not been long in his position when the Committee started, and he has shown tremendous skill and adeptness. I am pleased indeed that he recovered from the dodgy prawn he had the other week, which caused the Whip to have to stand in. The Minister started his career as my PPS, and I like to say that I taught him everything he knows, but not everything I know.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Tom Pursglove Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 28th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

The usual housekeeping notes: switch off your electronic devices, please, or put them on silent; and no food or drink is allowed in Committee—I do not think there is any, so that is good. Members are encouraged to wear masks, and I remind colleagues that they are worn not for your own protection, but for the protection of others, as a courtesy. Those who have speaking notes, will you please make them available to Hansard at the appropriate time, together with any documents that you are quoting from?

Clause 37

Illegal entry and similar offences

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Tom Pursglove)]

I beg to move amendment 110, in clause 37, page 36, line 4, at end insert—

“(C1A) A person who—

(a) is required under immigration rules not to travel to the United Kingdom without an ETA that is valid for the person’s journey to the United Kingdom, and

(b) knowingly arrives in the United Kingdom without such an ETA,

commits an offence.”

This amendment inserts a new offence into the Immigration Act 1971 of a person knowingly arriving in the United Kingdom without a valid electronic travel authorisation (ETA) in circumstances where they require such an ETA.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 111 to 117.

Amendment 188, in clause 37, page 37, line 17, at end insert—

“(10) Before this section comes into force, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report on the implications of this section for devolved criminal justice functions and bodies in Northern Ireland and Scotland, including but not restricted to those of—

(a) the Director of Public Prosecutions in Northern Ireland;

(b) the Lord Advocate;

(c) the Police Service of Northern Ireland;

(d) Police Scotland;

(e) the Northern Ireland Prison Service;

(f) the Scottish Prison Service;

(g) the Northern Ireland Courts and Tribunals Service; and

(h) the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service.

(11) A report under subsection (10) must include the following information—

(a) an assessment of the how the functions and bodies listed in (10) will be affected by this section;

(b) the financial implications for those bodies;

(c) the implications for existing devolved criminal justice and related policies;

(d) details of any consultation and engagement with those bodies; and

(e) the Secretary of State’s findings, conclusions and proposed actions.”

This amendment would require the Government to report on the implications of clause 36 for bodies involved in devolved criminal justice functions and to obtain Parliamentary approval for such a report, before the clause enters into force.

Clause stand part.

Government amendment 125.

Clause 60 stand part.

Government amendment 120.

Government new clause 21—Electronic travel authorisations.

Government new clause 22—Liability of carriers.

[Tom Pursglove]

Amendment 110 will add to the other offences in the clause the additional offence of knowingly arriving in the UK without an electronic travel authorisation where that is required. The current offence of knowingly entering the UK in breach of a deportation order or without leave dates back to the Immigration Act 1971, and is no longer considered entirely apt, given the changes in ways that people seek to come to the UK through irregular routes, and in particular the use of small boats.

Many of the individuals involved are intercepted in UK territorial seas and brought to the UK. They arrive in, but may not technically enter, the UK. However, we need to deter migrants from risking their lives and those of their families by taking such dangerous routes to the UK, and to take back control of our borders. We are committed to strengthening our border security by ensuring that everyone wishing to travel to the UK, except British and Irish citizens, seeks permission to do so before travelling.

The clause introduces new arrival offences to deal with the issue. I reassure the Committee that we do not seek to criminalise genuine refugees who come to the UK to seek asylum, but safe and legal routes can be used for that purpose, without risking lives.

Government amendments 111 to 117 and 125 are consequential amendments; they ensure that where the clause and schedule 5 cross-reference to the offence of arrival in the UK without the required entry clearance, they also refer to the new offence.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

The Minister has slightly skirted over the most fundamental point in all this, which is that lots of refugees who come to seek asylum in this country will be criminalised by the provision—a good 60% or 70%, even according to the Home Office’s explanatory memorandum. How can he possibly feel comfortable about criminalising them through an offence that could see them imprisoned for up to four years?

[Tom Pursglove]

Clearly, any such cases would be referred to the Crown Prosecution Service or the relevant prosecuting authorities. They must make a judgment as to whether it is in the public interest to pursue such a prosecution. I will say more about that in due course, but it is important to highlight that point.

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Tom Pursglove]

I will, but I will say more on this in due course.

[Paul Blomfield]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way, but he may want to reflect on this now, although he might have been about to do so in due course. He referred to the CPS, but in July the CPS confirmed that, following an agreement made by prosecutors, police, Border Force, the National Crime Agency and the Home Office, it will no longer prosecute illegal entry.

[Tom Pursglove]

As I said—I will come on to this in more detail—it is for the prosecuting authorities to decide whether it is in the public interest to pursue a particular case.

On amendment 188, I reassure the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East that consideration of the issues he has listed is already taking place. I fully recognise that, while immigration offences are a reserved matter, the devolved Administrations in Scotland and Northern Ireland have responsibility for their criminal justice systems, and decisions on prosecutions are independently taken by the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service in Scotland and the Public Prosecution Service in Northern Ireland.

My officials have been in contact with the Scottish Government criminal justice division, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service and the Department of Justice Northern Ireland, and have shared information about potential impacts and costings. The amendment would add an extra and unnecessary layer of parliamentary scrutiny to a process that is under way at official level. It would also have a critical impact on the commencement of the clause; it would add delay, but we need the measures in place to respond to the expected surge in dangerous small boat crossings when the weather improves in spring next year. I urge the hon. Member not to press his amendment.

On clause 37, the UK is experiencing a very serious problem of small boat arrivals; illegal migrants are crossing from the continent in small craft that are often equipped with only an outboard motor. They are unseaworthy and wholly unsuitable for a crossing of a minimum of 21 miles across some of the busiest sea lanes in the world. Many of the vessels break down and are intercepted by UK personnel on the grounds of safety of life at sea. The rescued migrants, including pregnant women and children, are generally brought to Dover.

The maximum sentence of six months does not reflect the seriousness of the offence of entering in breach of a deportation order. Increasing the maximum sentence to five years will disrupt the activities of foreign national offenders involved in criminal networks, including organised immigration crime.

The current offence of knowingly entering the UK without leave is ineffective and does not provide a sufficient deterrent to those wishing to enter the UK illegally by small boat. We accordingly propose increasing the maximum sentence from six months’ to four years’ imprisonment.

We also intend to create a new offence of arriving in the UK without an entry clearance where that is required. While some migrants seek to evade immigration control, for example by landing on a deserted beach, many more now arrive in the UK after being rescued at sea. It would not be right, and would be perverse, to have to let migrants take the risk of completing their journey without assistance, and of landing at a small beach, rather than rescuing them at sea, just because under current legislation, the act of intercepting them and bringing them to the UK could cast doubt on whether the migrants entered unlawfully.

It is worth repeating that we are not seeking to criminalise those who come to the UK genuinely to seek asylum, and who use safe and legal routes to do so. We will be targeting for prosecution those migrants in cases where there are aggravating factors—where they caused danger to themselves or others, including rescuers; where they caused severe disruption to services such as shipping routes, or the closure of the channel tunnel; or where they are criminals who have previously been deported from the UK or persons who have been repeatedly removed as failed asylum seekers. The increased prison penalty will allow appropriate sentences to be given to reflect the seriousness of this behaviour.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Minister is at his most reassuring when he tells us, basically, “Don’t worry; we are not really going to apply the full provisions of the clause.” The key point is that none of this is in the Bill. I want to remove these measures altogether, but could we at least put some of the restrictions in the Bill? Otherwise, we are putting in statute a law that criminalises the overwhelming majority of asylum seekers coming into the United Kingdom.

[Tom Pursglove]

I hope I will be able to provide the hon. Member with further reassurance by going on to say that, of course, the decision on whether prosecution is in the public interest rests with the Crown Prosecution Service in England and Wales, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service in Scotland and the Public Prosecution Service in Northern Ireland. In many cases, we will continue to seek the illegal migrant’s removal, rather than their prosecution.

The amended and new offences will apply to all types of unlawful entry and arrival, rather than being limited to entry via small boats. We should not limit our response to the evasion of proper immigration procedures and controls depending on the method of entry employed. Doing that would risk causing displacement to another, potentially equally dangerous, route. The offences will therefore also apply equally to other means of evasion, such as concealment in a lorry.

We are also amending the offence of assisting unlawful immigration to the UK in breach of immigration law, known as facilitation, to include arrival in the UK. That will ensure that the offence of facilitation also applies to those assisting the new offence of arriving without a valid entry clearance.

Clause 60 is one of the six clauses drafted as marker clauses at introduction. As indicated in the explanatory notes and memorandum for the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, it was drafted as such in the interest of transparency—to make clear our intention of bringing forward substantive provisions on electronic travel authorisations. New clauses 21 and 22 are intended to replace clause 60.

Amendment 120 ensures the provisions in new clauses 21 and 22 can be extended to the Crown dependencies by Order in Council, should they wish to introduce their own electronic travel authorisation scheme by amending the Bill’s extent provisions in clause 69. As I noted earlier, the Government are committed to strengthening the security of our border by ensuring that everyone who wishes to travel to the UK—except British and Irish citizens—has permission to do so before they travel. The Government will introduce an electronic travel authorisation scheme—the ETA scheme—to close the current gap in advance permissions, and to enhance our ability to prevent the travel of those who pose a threat to the UK.

At present, non-visa nationals coming to the UK for up to six months as visitors, and in limited other categories, can travel to the UK solely on the basis of their nationality, evidenced by their passport or other travel document. That information is sent to the Government by the majority of carriers as advance passenger information shortly before the individual embarks on their journey. The ETA scheme will allow security checks to be conducted and more informed decisions to be taken at an earlier stage in advance of travel. The introduction of an ETA scheme is in line with the approach that many of our international partners have taken to border security, including the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia.

New clause 21 would insert proposed new section 11C into part 1 of the Immigration Act 1971, which will allow the Secretary of State to make immigration rules to administer an ETA scheme. Those rules will include, but are not limited to, who must apply for an ETA, what that application must contain, how long an ETA will be valid for, and when an ETA should be granted, refused, varied or cancelled.

Additionally, new clause 21 also inserts proposed new section 11D into part 1 of the 1971 Act, allowing the Secretary of State to administer an electronic travel authorisation scheme on behalf of a Crown dependency, if requested to do so, in the event that a Crown dependency chooses to operate its own ETA scheme. It also enables the Secretary of State to make regulations to recognise an electronic travel authorisation issued by a Crown dependency as valid for travel to the UK, in line with the UK’s commitment to maintaining the integrity and security of the common travel area.

To enforce the ETA scheme, new clause 22 builds on the existing carriers’ liability scheme by incentivising carriers to check prior to boarding that a traveller holds an ETA—or another form of permission, such as a visa in electronic form—or risk a civil penalty. Such checks are necessary to enforce our requirement for everyone, except British and Irish nationals, to get permission to come to the UK before they travel.

At present, carriers are incentivised to check for the presence of a valid immigration document that satisfactorily establishes identity and nationality or citizenship, and any visa required. New clause 22 incentivises carriers to check that all passengers have the appropriate permission— including by checking with the Home Office, if that permission may be held only in digital form—or risk a penalty. The new clause also provides a statutory excuse against the imposition of a penalty, to cater for circumstances where it has not been possible for the carrier to check for the presence of an ETA, or another form of permission, through no fault of their own.

[The Chair]

I will call Mr McDonald first, because he has tabled an amendment that is in this group.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

Notwithstanding what I have already said about the prosecution services taking a case-by-case approach, the hon. Member inquired about aggravating factors not being added to the Bill. The factors for prosecution when someone comes to the UK may change depending on the circumstances. We need to be able to react flexibly, so putting the factors in primary legislation would be too restrictive. I return to the point that I would expect prosecution services to look carefully at individual cases and to take all factors into account, so I would not accept his depiction.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I take a small crumb of comfort from the fact that the Minister does seem to be evidencing some discomfort about how the clause is drafted. He is trying to reassure us by saying it will not be implemented as it is set out now, but that is not satisfactory. We parliamentarians are concerned with what is in the Bill. It is fine for the Minister to say that; I do not know how long he will be in office—hopefully many years—but there will be other Immigration Ministers to come, and they may take a completely different approach.

It may be challenging to put restrictions or a statutory defence in the Bill, but the Minister has to try. He must try much harder. We cannot leave such a broad criminal offence in the Bill simply on the basis of reassurances. I am absolutely of the view that the measures should be removed—for the reasons relating to the refugee convention, and that is even before we get to the ethical considerations and the impact the measures will have on asylum seekers and trafficking victims.

What the clause actually says will make it infinitely harder for refugees or trafficking survivors who eventually make it all the way through the horrendous new system to integrate, put down roots and rebuild their lives. There are questions about how the measures would operate in practice; they raise the spectre of families being separated on arrival if one member is accused of committing this criminal offence. How much harder will it be for somebody to get a job in due course if they have this criminal conviction and spend years in prison? UK citizenship will essentially be near impossible for them.

As we have heard repeatedly, particularly from the hon. Member for Sheffield Central, all of this will achieve absolutely nothing. As Tony Smith, the borders expert, told us in the Committee’s evidence sessions, use of the criminal justice system just has not worked. For smugglers and traffickers, it absolutely has, but not for their victims.

I have a question on scope. Will the Minister clarify whether someone who arrives with an entry clearance that is invalidated because it turns out that it was applied for on a false basis—for example, somebody who has secured a visit visa, when they are arriving to claim asylum—will have committed a criminal offence under the clause, because the leave to enter was obtained fraudulently? From the wording, I guess that they will, but it would be useful to hear the Minister’s clarification.

On amendment 110, we broadly support the ETA regime and encouraging carriers to ensure that the conditions are met, but we are still not absolutely convinced of the need for yet another criminal offence. Why can the remedy for turning up without an ETA not simply be to require that person to leave, or to send them back again? What group of people are being targeted here who are not already impacted by one of the other offences?

Even the wording on the state of knowledge of the person committing the offence raises questions. It says the person must “knowingly” arrive here without the ETA or entry clearance. The required knowledge seems to relate only to knowledge of arrival without the ETA or entry clearance, and not knowledge of whether he required that ETA or entry clearance. If we put that together with the fact that the measure will apply to people arriving in the UK rather than entering it, there is a danger that this will cover people who rock up in ignorance at airport border security, rather than anyone who is trying to do anything sinister. Simple ignorance and a mistake could lead to years in prison. I might be wrong about that; it would be useful to have clarity. Why is a criminal offence necessary?

Our amendment 188 was tabled to prompt discussion about consultation with the devolved criminal justice systems and the personnel in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Again, it gives me some comfort that the Minister has had some of these discussions—at least, the Home Office has—and there has been the important recognition that decisions about public interest will be for devolved prosecutors. It is important to acknowledge that, and it is welcome.

In short, as clause 37 stands, it sets out a framework for arresting, prosecuting and imprisoning several thousand asylum seekers, refugees and trafficking victims every year. Is there an estimate of what the cost will be, regardless of how it is implemented in practice? What will that do the backlogs in courts struggling to recover from covid, and what would be the impact on prison capacity? Putting all that to one side, the fundamental issue is the impact on asylum seekers, refugees and trafficking victims. The clause, as drafted, will compound the already slow and needlessly painful process of securing protection and add a criminal sanction. It is going to achieve absolutely nothing except more human misery.

--- Later in debate ---

I give notice that we will vote against clause 37.

[Tom Pursglove]

I will pick up on a few points in concluding our deliberations on the clause.

The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East spoke about costs. We are working with the various UK criminal justice systems and we have shared estimates of costs at official level as part of operationalising the plan. He sought further clarity about that and I hope that has provided reassurance. He also asked about entry clearance invalidation. If the leave is valid on arrival and is subsequently cancelled, no offence would have been committed, but if it is invalidated prior to arrival and the person knows that, the offence would have been committed.

Finally, I reiterate the point about the application of offences in this area. It bears repeating that we are targeting for prosecution those migrants for whom aggravating factors are involved—for example, those causing danger to themselves or others, including rescuers; those causing severe disruption to services such as shipping routes or closure of the channel tunnel; or those who have previously been removed from the UK as failed asylum seekers. The increased prison penalty will allow appropriate sentences to be given to reflect the seriousness of this behaviour.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Has the Minister done an analysis of whether there are already criminal offences that cover the scenarios he has just outlined?

[Tom Pursglove]

We believe that this measure is required so that we can take appropriate action to deal with the sorts of circumstances I have just set out. I have made that clear on several occasions, and Members will have heard what I have said. I fully expect that that will continue to be the case, and that will be made clear at every opportunity.

I go back to the point that prosecuting services must judge cases on a case-by-case basis. They must of course take all the factors relevant to the individual case into account in deciding whether to proceed with it. They must also decide whether that is in the public interest. That is a very clear and established position, and will continue to be the case.

I am comfortable that the proposed approach is the right one to take in addressing the issues I have set out, which are particularly egregious and concerning and which require further action.

Amendment 110 agreed to.

Amendments made: 111, in clause 37, page 36, line 5, leave out “or (C1)” and insert “, (C1) or (C1A)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 110.

Amendment 112, in clause 37, page 36, line 19, leave out “or (C1)” and insert “, (C1) or (C1A)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 110.

Amendment 113, in clause 37, page 36, line 29, after “(C1)” insert “, (C1A)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 110.

Amendment 114, in clause 37, page 37, line 2, after “(C1)” insert “, (C1A)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 110.

Amendment 115, in clause 37, page 37, line 4, after “(C1)” insert “, (C1A)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 110.

Amendment 116, in clause 37, page 37, line 12, after “(C1)” insert “, (C1A)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 110.

Amendment 117, in clause 37, page 37, line 15, after “(C1)” insert “, (C1A)”. —(Tom Pursglove.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 110.

Question put, That clause 37, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I wish briefly to associate myself with everything the shadow Minister just said; he covered pretty much all the ground that I would have covered. This ridiculous clause tramples all over our international obligations. I suspect what will happen today, as happened on Second Reading, is that we will be reassured that the clause will be used in a certain way so that the RNLI and others will not be targeted. Maybe I am wrong, which would be good, but the scope of the clause is extraordinary.

If the defence, as it was on Second Reading, is, “We’re not going to go after these people,” that is not good enough. You have to put that on the face of the Bill. We cannot create criminal offences and ask folk to go about breaching those laws and committing crimes in the hope that the Government keep their promise that they will not be prosecuted. It is a fundamental rule of legal principle—[Interruption.] The Minister is shaking his head: if that is not the defence, I look forward to hearing what is.

[Tom Pursglove]

I am grateful to the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate and for Halifax for providing the opportunity to explain the difficulties involved in securing convictions for an odious crime that targets and exploits vulnerable people and allows organised criminals to thrive.

Gain can be obtained in many ways, but cannot always be proved to the evidential standard required for a successful prosecution: for example, money transfers made by other family members abroad or made cash in hand, promises of servitude by the asylum seeker or others, or the provision of assistance in the facilitation act, such as by avoiding paying a fee by agreeing to steer a small boat. It is right that all available evidence should be considered and all relevant behaviour taken into account in investigating a serious offence. We are, at present, limited by what is an unrealistic evidential requirement that does not take account of the reality of how international organised crime operates.

In amending the offence, we are mindful of the excellent work of those acting from humanitarian motives both now and in the past. I understand fully hon. Members’ concerns that the wrong people will be drawn into the investigative and judicial process. We are therefore retaining the defence available to organisations whose aim is to assist asylum seekers and who do not charge for their services. I also recognise the bravery of volunteers working for the RNLI and lifeboat crews who undertake vital work in protecting lives at sea.

I will set out my intention to amend this clause on Report to ensure that organisations such as the RNLI, those directed by Her Majesty’s Coastguard, and individuals who fulfil their obligations in rescuing those in distress at sea may continue as they do now. We also intend to ensure that this provision does not prevent those responsible for vessels from complying with their obligations if they discover stowaways on board as they journey to the UK. I understand that some members of the Committee would prefer to have those amendments ready to debate now, but the issues are complex and we must ensure that we do not inadvertently provide loopholes to be exploited by criminal gangs who will look for any means to avoid prosecution.

The effect of amendment 33 is that, by retaining the constraint and having to prove the offence was committed again, we will only rarely be able to respond to and deter those committing the offence and will continue to place an unrealistic burden on our law enforcement officers and prosecutors. I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment, although I hope he will be reassured that I intend to table on Report an amendment to address the crux of the issues that he raised. I hope that hon. Members across the House will feel able to support the amendment that I intend to table.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I heard what the Minister said, but Second Reading was back in July and there has been plenty of time to table an amendment. What could be achieved by his amendment can easily be achieved by voting for this one, so I wish to press our amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Tom Pursglove]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, of whom I am very fond, for tabling the amendment. When I referred to him in a previous sitting as a crafty parliamentarian, I meant that in the nicest of ways. I am very fond of him, and I know that he is a canny parliamentarian who is passionate about the issues he raises.

Let me touch on various points that the hon. Gentleman made. The RNLI does, rightly, have a proud royal connection, and long may that continue. Of course, the RNLI, Her Majesty’s Coastguard and others provide an invaluable service in saving lives at sea. We as a Government are conscious of that, and that tradition and that vital service must continue to be upheld. The hon. Gentleman mounted a passionate defence of the monarchy, and I think I speak for the whole Government when I say that we are proud monarchists. Perhaps he might have a word with some of his colleagues about the stance they have traditionally taken in relation to the monarchy over the years, but we have proud support for our monarchy in this country.

I also want to say that the behaviour the hon. Gentleman talked about as being exhibited towards members of the RNLI and volunteers is completely unacceptable and despicable. There is a responsibility on Members across the House to speak with one voice in saying that such behaviour is despicable, and we should condemn it in the strongest terms. I think the Committee is united in that, and I hope the hon. Gentleman will take that message back to the RNLI volunteers he is engaging with in his constituency, because we do speak with one voice in that regard.

On that note, I want to mention the incident off the coast of Harwich during the past few days. Two men were rescued, but, unfortunately, an extensive search and rescue operation had to be called off after a man was reported to have entered the water. That incident highlights yet again the extreme danger of crossing the channel in small boats and the callous disregard for life shown by the criminal gangs responsible for facilitating crossings. I want to place on record my thanks to all those who responded to the incident and who continue to work tirelessly to protect lives at sea while securing our border. Their work is invaluable—it is incredibly important—and I know all Members would wish thanks to be expressed to them for the work they do.

I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman’s amendment seeks to protect those who act to save lives at sea, but as I have already set out, it is the Government’s intention to amend the clause on Report to do just that. The only thing I would add—Members have rightly spoken passionately about the importance of the issue—is that I want to be confident that the amendment delivering that is as robust as it needs to be, and that it achieves properly and to the fullest extent the objective I think we all share.

I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman to let me take the matter away. What has been said in Committee has been heard. There are already efforts under way to develop this amendment for consideration on Report. I hope that gives the hon. Gentleman the confidence to withdraw his amendment. We will make sure that we table an appropriate amendment on Report, which I like to think Members from across the House will feel able to vote for, and that will deliver on the objective that we all share.

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[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendment 82.

Amendment 144, in schedule 5, page 74, line 30, at end insert—

“provided that the relevant officer may not do any of the things mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) where they would risk the welfare or safety of persons on board the ship.”

This amendment would require officers to assess welfare risk before stopping or boarding a ship, requiring it to be taken elsewhere or requiring it to leave UK waters, and not act if doing so would exacerbate these risks.

Government amendment 83.

Amendment 145, in schedule 5, page 75, line 8, at end insert—

“(7A) The Secretary of State must publish a list of States and relevant territories with which agreement has been reached for the purposes of sub-paragraph (7) within 30 days of the date of Royal Assent to this Act, and the Secretary of State must update that published list from time to time.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish which states or territories she has agreed arrangements with for returning or removing asylum seekers to, within 30 days of Royal Assent.

Amendment 146, in schedule 5, page 76, line 24, at end insert—

“(9) A relevant officer may only exercise powers under this paragraph if they have passed relevant training, including training on the requirement to exercise powers under this paragraph in accordance with the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998.”

This amendment would require the relevant officer to have passed relevant training before acting under these powers, and only acts with regards to the Human Rights Act.

Amendment 148, in schedule 5, page 77, line 18, at end insert—

“(7) A relevant officer may only exercise powers under this paragraph if they have passed relevant training, including training on the requirement to exercise powers under this paragraph in accordance with the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998.”

This amendment would require the relevant officer to have passed relevant training before acting under these powers, and only acts with regards to the Human Rights Act.

Amendment 147, in schedule 5, page 78, line 12, at end insert—

“(10) A relevant officer may only exercise powers under this paragraph if they have passed relevant training, including training on the requirement to exercise powers under this paragraph in accordance with the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998.”

This amendment would require the relevant officer to have passed relevant training before acting under these powers, and only acts with regards to the Human Rights Act.

Amendment 149, in schedule 5, page 78, line 32, at end insert—

“(c) the act was carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998.”

This amendment would require the relevant officer to only act with regards to the Human Rights Act.

That schedule 5 be the Fifth schedule to the Bill.

[Tom Pursglove]

In response to numbers of migrants using dangerous maritime routes to enter the UK illegally, this Government are committed to providing Border Force with the tools and legislation they need to combat this illegal migration threat more effectively. We need to strengthen and broaden our current powers not only to improve the effectiveness and capability of Border Force’s current maritime interception tactics, but to better equip them for future operational developments, which may be enhanced through agreements with our near border partners.

The clause and schedule will also provide new powers allowing Border Force to return vessels and those on board, when appropriate, to non-UK locations. Finally, the Government will use this clause to provide bespoke seizure and disposal powers intended for Border Force use against the small boats threat specifically. It will provide far more flexible options for the seizure and disposal of the vast majority of unflagged, ownerless vessels that are being used to transport illegal migrants.

I turn to Government amendments 82 and 83. We are seeing an unacceptable rise in dangerous and unnecessary small boat crossings. Our primary focus is on preventing people from embarking on dangerous channel crossings to enter the UK illegally, tackling the criminal gangs responsible and protecting lives. We must send a powerful message that people should not leave the safety of countries such as France or Belgium to enter the UK illegally in an unseaworthy boat, and if they do, they could be taken back.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

On the question of legality, Government amendment 82 is pretty extraordinary, because it seems to remove a restriction on the power of the Secretary of State so that she is unconstrained by the United Nations convention on the law of the sea; I am just looking at the explanatory note. Is that amendment designed to allow the Secretary of State to break the international law of the sea?

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising that point, and I will come on to it imminently. To finish the point I was making, the Government amendments will remove text from the Bill that is now considered not to be essential to achieving the aim that I have set out.

The UK has ratified, and is therefore fully committed to upholding, the United Nations convention on the law of the sea. The Government are committed to utilising their maritime enforcement tactics in full compliance with international law. The re-statement of that in the clause is therefore unnecessary. It is also unnecessary to state in legislation, where it is already beyond doubt, that Border Force would seek permission from a foreign country before taking a migrant boat back to that country. That statement adds nothing to the powers being created in this part of the Bill.

We want to make it explicit that operating these maritime enforcement powers in UK waters or international waters to simply divert a migrant vessel from UK territorial seas does not require the permission of a foreign state where that vessel may then enter their waters. These amendments will not result in the UK failing to abide by its international obligations, whether that be in the context of the safety of lives at sea or when seeking permission if intending to return migrants to another country, such as France.

I thank the hon. Member for Sheffield Central for what he will no doubt say about amendments 144 to 149. I will start by addressing amendment 144, which proposes to add an additional requirement to the maritime powers where the options available to officers intercepting a vessel at sea are spelled out. In order for the tactics intended for use in the exercise of these powers to be safe and legal, officers will have to carry out risk assessments before and during any exercise of the powers. That requirement will be laid out in operating procedures to ensure we meet our international obligations on safety of life at sea.

As any deployment of the tactics under the powers will be carried out in full accordance with those obligations, the welfare and safety of those on board vessels will be the priority throughout. With international obligations in this context not being a matter for UK legislation, we do not consider it necessary to add the amendment. I also note that any deployment of maritime tactics will be carried out in full compliance with obligations under the European convention on human rights and the Human Rights Act.

I turn now to amendment 145. The schedule that it would amend deals with new powers allowing Border Force and others to require vessels to be taken to a non-UK port if necessary. There are a number of reasons why we may wish to have the capability to do this, and they are not all related to the return or removal of asylum seekers. For example, any potential future agreement with partners to patrol waters jointly may require rescued or intercepted migrants to be taken back to the country from which they embarked on their maritime journey. As such, we do not consider that the amendment is needed or appropriate in schedule 5, and we are not prepared to commit to providing a running commentary to update on the progress of sometimes sensitive international negotiations.

I understand that the intention of amendments 146 to 148 is to emphasise the need to ensure that account be taken of human rights obligations by appropriately trained officers exercising these maritime powers. However, the amendments are unnecessary and would have no practical impact on the operation of the powers by Border Force officers and others. All operational officers within Border Force receive, and must have passed, appropriate training in order to exercise their duties. In order to be appointed as an immigration officer, an official must successfully complete and pass a foundation course that includes understanding the European convention on human rights as it relates to the Human Rights Act 1998, and their resulting obligations in the context of exercising powers.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Tom Pursglove Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 28th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Government Amendment 82.

Amendment 144, in schedule 5, page 74, line 30, at end insert—

“provided that the relevant officer may not do any of the things mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) where they would risk the welfare or safety of persons on board the ship.”

This amendment would require officers to assess welfare risk before stopping or boarding a ship, requiring it to be taken elsewhere or requiring it to leave UK waters, and not act if doing so would exacerbate these risks.

Government amendment 83.

Amendment 145, in schedule 5, page 75, line 8, at end insert—

“(7A) The Secretary of State must publish a list of States and relevant territories with which agreement has been reached for the purposes of sub-paragraph (7) within 30 days of the date of Royal Assent to this Act, and the Secretary of State must update that published list from time to time.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish which states or territories she has agreed arrangements with for returning or removing asylum seekers to, within 30 days of Royal Assent.

Amendment 146, in schedule 5, page 76, line 24, at end insert—

“(9) A relevant officer may only exercise powers under this paragraph if they have passed relevant training, including training on the requirement to exercise powers under this paragraph in accordance with the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998.”

This amendment would require the relevant officer to have passed relevant training before acting under these powers, and only acts with regards to the Human Rights Act.

Amendment 148, in schedule 5, page 77, line 18, at end insert—

“(7) A relevant officer may only exercise powers under this paragraph if they have passed relevant training, including training on the requirement to exercise powers under this paragraph in accordance with the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998.”

This amendment would require the relevant officer to have passed relevant training before acting under these powers, and only acts with regards to the Human Rights Act.

Amendment 147, in schedule 5, page 78, line 12, at end insert—

“(10) A relevant officer may only exercise powers under this paragraph if they have passed relevant training, including training on the requirement to exercise powers under this paragraph in accordance with the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998.”

This amendment would require the relevant officer to have passed relevant training before acting under these powers, and only acts with regards to the Human Rights Act.

Amendment 149, in schedule 5, page 78, line 32, at end insert—

“(c) the act was carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998.”

This amendment would require the relevant officer to only act with regards to the Human Rights Act.

That schedule 5 be the Fifth schedule to the Bill.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Tom Pursglove)]

In terms of schedule 5, let me just say that clause 42 is one of the six drafted as placeholder clauses, as indicated in the explanatory notes and memorandum for the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. It was drafted as such in the interests of transparency, to make clear our intention to bring forward substantive provisions on working in the territorial seas. The placeholder clause is now to be replaced by new clause 20.

The Government’s clear position has always been that permission to work is needed for all foreign nationals intending to work in the United Kingdom landmass—that includes all UK waters. New clause 20 will bring legislative clarity: migrant workers wishing to work in the territorial seas or internal waters of the UK will need permission to do so. To obtain that permission, they will need to apply for a visa under the points-based system in the same way as when coming to work on the UK landmass.

New clause 20 will clarify the legal framework, but will not change the existing position that migrant workers need permission to work in UK waters. As such, the new clause does not invent a policy change and its effect should be negligible. The new clause does not impact on those engaging in innocent passage or crew who are covered by section 8 of the Immigration Act 1971.

Government amendments 126 to 128 are minor and technical. They are intended to ensure that the regime I have just talked about can be enforced.

[The Chair]

Order. Apologies, but I think you have strayed into the debate on schedule 5, which includes Government amendments 126, 127 and 128 and clause 43 stand part. I appreciate that there are a lot of different moving parts.

[Tom Pursglove]

I apologise if that is so, Ms McDonagh. The groupings on the selection list are not clear, because they are talking about schedule 5. I am happy to leave that there and return to it separately in a moment.

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

Despite the Minister’s request, I would like to speak to amendments 144 to 149, which seek to address a couple of pretty serious issues: the immorality and the impracticality of the Government’s approach to the policy of pushback.

As regards Australia, the United Nations special rapporteur expressed real concern that the policy could intentionally put lives at risk. We have also seen the reports on those who lost their lives as a result of pushbacks in the Mediterranean. Clearly, the Government do not want to risk death or injury. Ministers have told us repeatedly that the objective of the legislation is to prevent drowning in the channel. Amendment 144 therefore seeks simply to put that commitment in the Bill.

I heard the Minister’s comments earlier, but a constant theme throughout our debate over the past few days has been that we identify real problems with the Bill and the Minister says, “Oh, don’t worry, we’ll sort it out.” We are trying to say, “If we’re in the same place on the issue, let’s sort it out by putting something on the face of the Bill.” Amendment 144 would do that by requiring officers not to act under powers granted by proposed new paragraph B1(2) if they risked the welfare of those on board. It would simply ensure that an officer who wants to stop a ship, board it or require it to be taken elsewhere in the UK or internationally and detained or to leave UK waters must first consider the implications for those on board. Given that we are in the same place in our intentions, I hope the Minister can accept amendment 144.

Amendment 145 addresses the issue of practicality. Clause 41 is disturbing enough in itself, but it also reflects a wider problem with the Bill. The Government are trying to talk tough and grab headlines but with proposals that are actually undeliverable and that will not solve the problem of people smuggling that we all agree needs to be tackled. We have discussed offshoring and third country returns on previous clauses, and here we are again. Amendment 145 seeks to press the Govt on the issue.

In schedule 5, proposed new paragraph B1(7) makes it clear that the Government can proceed with the policy of pushback only where the relevant territory

“is willing to receive the ship.”

So where are the agreements? Amendment 145 would require the Home Secretary simply to publish a list of states with which she has secured agreement under sub-paragraph (7) to send ships with asylum seekers to, and to do so within 30 days of Royal Assent. That is not 30 days from today; that is 30 days from Royal Assent. That is a considerable amount of time. The Government have put a lot of thought into the Bill apparently, although there seem to be a lot of last-minute amendments. The Minister has said repeatedly that he does not want to provide a running commentary on negotiations. Let me reassure him: we do not want a running commentary. We just want some indication that there are agreements, or agreements in the pipeline, but there absolutely do not seem to be any. That is key.

The Government have so far failed to secure any agreements for returning asylum seekers. Instead, they encourage rumours that they are so close to securing an agreement with one country or another, but every country that has been mentioned has slammed those rumours. Rwanda said it had no agreement with Denmark, whose Government have been condemned by the African Union —an entire continent—in the strongest terms possible. The African Union said that offshore processing amounted to “responsibility and burden shifting” and criticised European attempts to extend border control to African shores as “xenophobic and completely unacceptable.” As my hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark pointed out, the UK Government were rebuffed by Albania. The Albanian Foreign Minister told the press:

“Albania will proudly host 4,000 Afghan refugees based on its good will, but will never be a hub of anti-immigration policies of bigger and richer countries. We have instructed our Embassy in the UK to demand the retraction of this fake news.”

There are not just no agreements, but the Government are managing to offend countries around the world by implying that they are prepared to enter into agreements when they are clearly not. How many other countries are the Government deciding to burn bridges with over this issue? When will they come clean on this empty rhetoric?

Amendment 145 is intended to be helpful. We want to see transparency and, at the end of this process, to give the Government the opportunity, which they have so far failed to take, to publish the agreements they have secured. I hope that by accepting the amendment the Minister can prove us wrong in our doubts about the Government’s work in this area, and that he will agree that this information should be published well before the Bill takes effect.

Amendments 146 to 149 seek to ensure that officers adhere to the Human Rights Act 1998 and have completed relevant training before searching asylum seekers. These amendments relate to officials carrying out searches of people during maritime enforcement for documents, evidence of crime and other purposes. They seek to ensure that those officials have received training that is relevant to the task, and at all times are adhering to the Human Rights Act 1998.

As we have discussed many times in Committee, those fleeing persecution and danger to build new lives in the UK are likely to be victims of violence and trauma. They are vulnerable, and personal searches in particular could be extremely difficult or upsetting. Schedule 5 allows for officials to search a person, but forbids them to

“remove any clothing in public other than an outer coat, jacket or gloves.”

That is welcome as a bare minimum, but there is no stipulation or description of what can be done in searches in private, so this amendment seeks to ensure that the Home Office designs and delivers training to officers to ensure they are sensitive to the needs of the vulnerable people they may search. Additionally, it would ensure that all those searches are conducted with consideration given to the Human Rights Act and the right to a private life, to encourage the use of these powers only in extreme circumstances and when absolutely necessary.

Again, I draw the Minister’s attention to the lived experience of those who have come to our shores. In 2015, Women for Refugee Women published a report, “I Am Human”, which details the impact of searches on those who have experienced sexual violence. The searches triggered mental health problems, flashbacks and traumatic memories because people felt handled and scared by the process. When addressing my earlier amendments, the Minister sought to reassure me on these points too, saying that the Government would of course be compliant with the Human Rights Act and would take account of all the issues I am raising—fine. So why not put that commitment on the face of the Bill?

--- Later in debate ---

Labour does not want to see the Government legislating to grant immunity to officials who have exercised new powers to push back asylum seekers trying to cross the English channel. Under the Bill, a relevant official is not liable for any criminal or civil proceedings for anything done in the purported performance of these functions if the court is satisfied that the act was done in good faith, and there were reasonable grounds for doing it. This cannot be guaranteed; there are clear breaches of international law in relation to the pursuit of those duties. I would like to call these proposals out for what they are: pushback powers. These are controversially designed powers to stop, board, divert and detain; in other words, to enforce hostility. Labour stands against these new pushback powers, which will be callous, ineffective and designed to distract from the abysmal mismanagement of the Government’s Home Office operations, such as the speed of asylum decision making. Ultimately, these proposals are extremely dangerous, and, if attempts were made to exercise the powers, lives at sea will surely be endangered. If attempts are not made to exercise them, then what is the point of passing them into law? This is a mere exercise to allow the Government to posture their opposition to small boats. For these reasons, we strongly oppose clause 41 and schedule 5 standing part.

[Tom Pursglove]

There are a few points that I briefly want to address in concluding the debate on this clause. The first is the training that immigration officers have to undergo. I clarify again that all immigration officers have to pass the immigration foundation course to be appointed. This includes training on the Human Rights Act. Further specialist training is given to those officers working in the maritime environment, which includes vulnerability assessments in the context of human rights obligations. They will be exercising maritime powers using operational guidance that emphasises the need to take full account of relevant human rights aspects of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Human Rights Act, in the context of safety of life at sea obligations. I know that the hon. Member for Sheffield Central is very keen that we include this in the Bill, but I respectfully disagree. There is already an established process in place that is delivering exactly what the hon. Gentleman wants to see. We are very mindful of these obligations on an ongoing basis.

The issue of immunity has also been raised; however, these protections are nothing new. Border Force has existing powers to intercept vessels in UK territorial seas; an officer is not liable in any criminal or civil proceedings if the court is satisfied that the act was done in good faith and there were reasonable grounds for it. This provision is also included in the Policing and Crime Act 2017, the Modern Slavery Act 2015, and applies in other contexts. This provision follows the same approach as the Immigration Act 1971.

The hon. Member for Glasgow North East raised a number of points in relation to search and rescue operations, which we had an extensive debate about during this morning’s session. Again, I make the point that this Government are absolutely committed to search and rescue operations, as would be rightly expected. That is an important function and service, and it is right that it continues to be a strong commitment. We are committed to it and that service must be provided. Again, I will emphasise that this Government will abide by their international obligations at all times.

[Neil Coyle]

Can the Minister be absolutely clear that no new powers, or attempts at immunity that arguably do not follow international law, are being sought? This is contrary to some of the Government reports on this issue.

[Tom Pursglove]

All I can say in response, is that I refer the hon. Member to what I have just said. There is an established position in relation to this; these protections are nothing new.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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This amendment is consequential on Amendment 110.

[Tom Pursglove]

I beg to move amendment 126, in schedule 5, page 73, line  23, at end insert “24B,”.

This amendment and Amendments 127 and 128 are consequential on NC20.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 127 and 128.

Clause 42 stand part.

Government amendment 124.

Government new clause 20—Working in United Kingdom waters: arrival and entry.

[Tom Pursglove]

As you noted, Ms McDonagh, I have spoken to various aspects of the grouping in my earlier remarks, so I do not propose repeating what I said. Amendments 126, 127 and 128 are changes to existing maritime enforcement powers to ensure that these are available in relation to illegal working offences in the UK’s territorial sea. Amendment 124 brings new clause 20 into force automatically two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent for the purpose of making regulations.

Amendment 126 agreed to.

Amendments made: 127, in schedule 5, page 73, line  31, after “(S.I. 2020/1309),” insert—

“(ba) an offence under section 21 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006,”.

See the explanatory statement to Amendment 126.

Amendment 128, in schedule 5, page 73, line  37, leave out “paragraph (a) or (b)” and insert “paragraphs (a) to (ba)”.—(Tom Pursglove.)

See the explanatory statement to Amendment 126.

Amendment proposed: 144, in schedule 5, page 74, line 30, at end insert—

“provided that the relevant officer may not do any of the things mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) where they would risk the welfare or safety of persons on board the ship.”—(Paul Blomfield.)

This amendment would require officers to assess welfare risk before stopping or boarding a ship, requiring it to be taken elsewhere or requiring it to leave UK waters, and not act if doing so would exacerbate these risks.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

The shadow Minister has raised lots of sensible questions. I have one other brief question for the Minister, on new clause 28. He may not be able to answer it today, but I would like it clarified, if possible.

Proposed new section 10E to the 1999 Act that the new clause would add is supposed to apply when a person has applied for judicial review and the court has made a decision authorising the removal. To be clear, does that decision relate to the judicial review, or could it relate to any prior decision? That point will not affect lots of people, but it will be important. I appreciate that the Minister may not be able to answer immediately, but I hope we will get clarity on that in due course.

[Tom Pursglove]

It may be easier if I explain that the power in amendment 137 already exists—albeit for 10 days—in published policy that is available on gov.uk. The purpose of putting the policy into statute is not to introduce a new power, as it already exists. Rather, we want to place it on a statutory basis to enable parliamentary scrutiny.

We can currently rearrange a migrant’s removal on another flight within 10 days of a failed removal without the need to give the migrant a fresh notice period. Clause 43 will increase the period to 21 days. Our recent experience during the pandemic has shown us that organising flights and complying with travel restrictions is difficult—dealing with self-isolation and rebooking escorts, for example. It is therefore entirely reasonable and sensible to allow the flexibility of 21 days to remove the migrant if the removal fails for reasons that are reasonably beyond the Secretary of State’s control.

It may be helpful to provide some examples to illustrate that point. A migrant has already had time to access justice and is due to be removed, but the flight is cancelled because of bad weather. The removal fails, but we manage to book a flight for the next day. We do not want to be in the position of having to wait another five working days before we can remove that migrant. As a second example, if a removal fails because the migrant is deliberately disruptive, that person should not be rewarded with another five working days in which they can try to defer their removal further. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate to withdraw his amendment.

To pick up on the point about access to legal aid during the notice period, migrants who are detained in immigration removal centres during the notice period will have access to the free legal advice surgery.

New clause 28 replaces clause 43 in its entirety. Our expert drafters have advised that it is better to do it that way because the text flows better and it is easier to navigate.

Unfortunately, migrants subject to enforced removal often wait until the last minute to challenge their removal from the UK. Consequently, flights are cancelled and removals are inevitably delayed at great cost to the taxpayer. We think it right that migrants subject to enforced removal must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to access justice. The sole purpose of the notice period is to give migrants time to seek legal advice. That is the rationale underpinning the clause.

Our current policy is complicated. Some migrants are given a minimum notice period of 72 hours, while others are given five working days. Calculating when the 72 hours start and end is confusing. They must include at least two working days, and the last 24 hours must include a working day. Evidently, there is scope for simplifying the process and making it consistent across the board. New clause 28 will do just that by placing in statute a single statutory minimum notice period of five working days for migrants. The new clause requires us to serve a written notice of intention to remove, setting out the notice period. Before the migrant can be removed, we must serve a written notice of departure details containing the date of removal.

A limited exception to the single statutory notice period relates to port cases. Migrants who are refused entry at the border can be removed within seven days without receiving a notice period. It is unlikely that they would have developed ties to the UK within that week.

The clause will create more clarity for Home Office staff, legal representatives and migrants. Migrants will know how long they have to access justice—in fact, some will have more time to access justice—and will therefore have fewer excuses to frustrate removal.

To be clear, we are not reintroducing removal windows, which were found to be unlawful by the Court of Appeal. Under the new clause, the migrant cannot be removed during the notice period. If the removal is cancelled or deferred because the migrant raises a fresh or further claim, a fresh notice period must be given before removal can proceed. Individuals will also be given a fresh notice period if there is a change to the previously notified destination or route, unless the place of transit is in a safe country.

The new clause provides that migrants can be removed within 21 days of a failed removal that was caused by their disruption. In such circumstances, a further notice period is not required because the migrant has already had sufficient opportunity to access justice, which is entirely reasonable when there are no significant changes to the migrant’s circumstances. That is in our current published policy but with a timescale of 10 days. Extending the time from 10 to 21 days will give us more time to rearrange removal.

The pandemic has highlighted the fact that organising escorts and rebooking flights cannot always be turned around quickly. Migrants frequently challenge their removal by way of judicial review, and of course that is their right. As per the clause, once a court decides that the migrant can be removed, we can remove them within 21 days without a fresh notice period. The migrant has already had time to access justice, and the removal decision has been subject to judicial scrutiny. There is no justification for further time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil Coyle]

I beg to move amendment 143, in clause 44, page 41, line 7, at end insert—

“(1A) A prisoner who arrived in the United Kingdom before their tenth birthday is not eligible for removal from the United Kingdom under subsection (1).”

This amendment would prevent deportation as an FNO for those who arrived in the UK before their tenth birthday, in line with the age of criminal responsibility.

The amendment is not down in my name; it was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central, who has an urgent constituency engagement. Forgive me if I am not as eloquent as my hon. Friend. I will try to do justice to his amendment.

In recent months and years we have seen a multitude of cases of individuals who have lived in the UK almost all of their lives, and in some cases were even born here, being deported as a result of past convictions. The amendment seeks to prevent that happening if the individual came to the UK before the age of 10, the age at which the UK deems one becomes criminally liable for their actions. Assuming that the age at which criminal liability kicks in is the age at which we believe someone starts to become at least partly responsible for their actions, why should their previous country of residence change how they are dealt with in the criminal justice system years or decades down the line? My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central has provided a case study.

We hear of cases such as that of Sam Trye, who was born within sight of this room, just over the river in St Thomas’ Hospital, where my daughter was born and where perhaps the son of the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent North will be born. We might not agree on many things, not least a scattergun approach to facts, but I congratulate him on his news, which I hope his wife gave permission for him to share before breaking it to us this morning. I hope our children have better life chances than Sam was afforded because he has since served a prison sentence for a non-violent crime, and the Home Office has been trying to deport him to Sierra Leone, from where his family moved to the UK. Despite Sam being born in the UK, he is treated differently as he lacks birthright citizenship. He has two British children and cares for his mum here in London, so his right to family life is therefore well established.

There is a question here about the UK’s responsibility. When a child is born here and has been through our education system and our support services, and has grown up British in every sense, we have a duty to ensure that if they commit a crime, the British state takes responsibility for that individual. It is nonsensical to deport those who have never known another country, who came to the UK before they were ever criminally liable in UK law, let alone an adult with full independence and responsibility.

That issue was raised during the Windrush report, and by Sir Stephen Shaw in his 2016 “Review into the Welfare in Detention of Vulnerable Persons” and his 2018 follow-up progress report. Sir Stephen stated:

“I found during my visits across the immigration estate that a significant proportion of those deemed FNOs had grown up in the UK, some having been born here but the majority having arrived in very early childhood. These detainees often had strong UK accents, had been to UK schools, and all of their close family and friends were based in the UK… Many had no command of the language of the country to which they were to be ‘returned’, or any remaining family ties there… The removal of these individuals raises real ethical issues. Not only does their removal break up families in this country, and put them at risk in countries of which they have little or no awareness. It is also questionable how far it is fair to developing countries, without the criminal justice infrastructure of the UK, for one of the richest nations on earth to export those whose only chance of survival may be by way of further crime.”

Sir Stephen’s recommendation 33 was that

“The Home Office should no longer routinely seek to remove those who were born in the UK or have been brought up here from an early age.”

That recommendation has been routinely ignored by Ministers, but we do know that the Government accept that premise in specific circumstances, so there is a precedent. Last year, when there was an outcry over their attempted deportation of people to Jamaica, the Government reached a private agreement with the Jamaican high commission that it would not deport those who came to the UK under the age of 12. When there were further charter flights this year, despite Ministers refusing to answer parliamentary questions from my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central on the subject, as they wanted to hush up the agreement, we know that when the flights departed, no one who came to the UK under the age of 12 was on board. So which other countries does the Minister have other such agreements with, and which other countries are negotiating with him or others in the Government to secure such agreements? If the Minister has an agreement with Jamaica, which we know is sensible, why will he not make it a blanket policy? I invite him to respond if he can.

The amendment reflects British values, in the opinion of my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central, and it take steps to enact Sir Stephen Shaw’s recommendations. I urge the Government to accept it.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank hon. Members for raising these important issues. Amendment 143 aims to prevent the deportation of a foreign national offender where they arrived in the UK before the age of 10. The clause enables the removal of a relevant prisoner at an earlier point in their sentence. The amendment would exempt FNOs who arrived in the UK before the age of 10 from the provision enabling them to be removed at an earlier point in their sentence, but it would not exempt them from deportation. I cannot see a rationale for exempting FNOs who arrived in the UK before the age of 10 from the provision enabling them to be removed at an earlier point in their sentence, given that they will still be liable to deportation at the end of the custodial part of their sentence if they have not been removed earlier.

The hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark stated that the purpose for the amendment is to align the age on arrival in the UK at which an exemption to deportation applies with the age of criminal responsibility. Almost all foreign national offenders that the Government deport from the UK have committed offences since they were adults. It does not make sense to provide an exception based on the age of criminal responsibility. Unlike England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the age of criminal responsibility in Scotland is 12.

[Neil Coyle]

I am keen to explore this on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central. Will the Minister tell us more about the arrangement with Jamaica, and those with any other countries? He says that it would not make sense to have such an arrangement, but there is an existing one with a country. Perhaps he can tell us more about that specific arrangement, and any other countries we have entered into similar arrangements with.

[Tom Pursglove]

I am grateful for that question. The hon. Member for Sheffield Central is not here. I promised earlier to write to Committee members on the RNLI issue. I will make sure that this issue is addressed in that letter, particularly so that the hon. Gentleman can see that information in its full context, given that he is unable to be here because of a constituency commitment.

The amendment is too broad in scope. It does not define what is meant by “arrived in” the UK. This could include anyone who visited the UK for a short period or who arrived here clandestinely, as well as those who have been lawfully resident here since the age of 10. It is technically deficient and, I argue, wrong in principle. I also refer hon. Members to the requirements under the UK Borders Act 2007, passed under the previous Labour Government. For these reasons, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

[Neil Coyle]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 8—Prisoners liable to removal from the United Kingdom.

[Tom Pursglove]

Clause 44 is one of the six clauses drafted as placeholder clauses at the Bill’s introduction. As indicated in the Bill’s explanatory notes and the memorandum for the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, it was drafted as such in the interests of transparency, to make clear our intention to bring forward substantive provisions on the early removal scheme. New clause 8 is intended to replace clause 44.

New clause 8 forms part of a package of measures that will enable the swift removal of those who have no right to be in the UK. By expanding the existing early removal scheme and increasing the removal window from nine months to 12 months, we will have greater opportunity to remove as many foreign national offenders from the UK as early as possible. However, to ensure that those sentenced by the courts are not simply let off their sentence, and to maintain public confidence in the justice system, removal under the scheme is subject to at least half of the custodial period of the sentence—the “requisite custodial period”—being served in prison. The knowledge that offenders will serve punishment for their crime in prison and will be removed from prison and the UK before they have an opportunity to be released on licence will provide comfort for victims.

The new clause will also mean that eligible foreign national offenders can be removed at any point in their sentence provided they have served the requisite custodial period and are within 12 months of their earliest release point. Presently, the scheme does not permit removal for those foreign national offenders who are serving a recall—FNOs who have been released into the community after serving their custodial sentence and subsequently recalled to custody for breaching that licence. The new clause brings them into scope.

The new clause also serves to deter foreign national offenders who have already been deported once from returning to the UK through the introduction of a stop-the-clock provision. Should a foreign national offender ever return to the UK after being removed, they will be liable to immediate arrest and return to custody to serve the remainder of the custodial period of their sentence. This is in addition to a maximum 5-year prison sentence that may be imposed for returning in breach of a deportation order.

[Bambos Charalambous]

The Government will disagree to clause 44 and replace it with new clause 8, although I understand that new clause 8 has fundamentally the same principle as the clause. Clause 44 and new clause 8 will extend the length of time a foreign national offender can be considered for early removal from the last nine months to the last 12 months of their sentence if they become eligible for the scheme. The Opposition have concerns that increasing that time limit will lead to unfairness in accessing justice for foreign national offenders as well as leaving them with inadequate time to obtain access to legal representation.

In our already overpopulated and overworked prison system, foreign national offenders have limited access to legal support and resources even when compared with people detained in immigration detention centres. They have no access to mobile phones or the internet. In the limited time that they do have access to a phone, the contacts they can call are vetted by the prison and this process can take many weeks. Thus, acquiring adequate legal representation becomes near impossible. Time is of the essence to these individuals and increasing this early removal widow will only lead to exacerbating these difficulties.

Bail for Immigration Detainees produced a report in 2017 on the lack of legal advice available to prisoners, which found that only five of the 86 prison detainees surveyed had received independent advice about their immigration case. They found that detainees in prison are routinely denied access to basic information that might help their immigration case. Cuts to legal aid have only made this situation worse. The High Court earlier this year held that detainees in prison have suffered discriminatory treatment due to obstacles in getting legal advice—in particular, exemptions from legal aid eligibility.

Despite what high-profile recent Home Office failings might imply, when it comes to deportations the already heavily stacked deck is stacked against the deportee. Not having proper legal representation means that the detainees will almost certainly be denied the fundamental right to a fair hearing. It would mean that they could be deported to countries in which they face persecution, or it would be in breach of their human rights. We should not undermine that right by extending the length of time they have for removal. Charities such as Bail for Immigration Detainees are already stretched to breaking point trying to support these vulnerable individuals. Instead of limiting access to justice, the Government should work on increasing its efficiency so that foreign national offenders who have committed serious crimes are dealt with swiftly and those who have claims to remain are given a fair hearing.

Question put and negatived.

Clause 44 disagreed to.

Clause 45

Matters relevant to decisions relating to immigration bail

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Tom Pursglove]

For too long, individuals with no right to remain in the UK, including foreign criminals, have been gaming the system in order to get released from detention and frustrate their removal. We have seen individuals making asylum claims while in detention, but then delaying the resolution of that claim through their own deliberate actions, such as refusing to be interviewed. The current system incentivises non-compliant behaviour. By creating obstacles, bail is more likely to be granted due to the time it will take to resolve the claim and any subsequent appeals. It is not right that a person’s non-compliance enables their release.

Similarly, an individual may refuse to provide fingerprints for a travel document or may lie about their true nationality, thereby obstructing the returns documentation process. This again makes the prospect of removal more remote and increases the likelihood that bail may be granted. From an operational perspective, non-compliance is difficult to tackle and becomes much harder to counter once individuals are released from detention into the community, where they have the ability to abscond or continue with non-compliance. Therefore, eliminating the risk and impact of non-compliance is a key benefit that arises from the use of immigration detention if appropriate in the individual case.

We must have an immigration system that encourages compliance. The purpose of clause 45 is to ensure that, so far as possible, appropriate weight is given to evidence that a person has not been co-operative with the immigration or returns processes without reasonable excuse when making immigration bail decisions. This is currently not explicitly referenced as one of the specific mandatory criteria for considering whether to grant immigration bail.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Minister did seem to accept that all those factors can be taken into account already if they are relevant to the question of whether the person is going to be removed in a reasonable time or whether they will abscond. Surely those are the only two questions. This is not necessary at all and seeks to use immigration detention as a form of punishment.

[Tom Pursglove]

I do not accept that depiction. We are requiring decision makers to take into account co-operation with removal proceedings and immigration processes when considering applications for immigration bail. We are mindful that non-compliance may already be considered, and that the tribunal takes such behaviour into account when deciding whether to grant bail. However, the intention behind the provision is that there be the same focus on evidence of non-compliant behaviour as there is on those factors already particularised and considered in every case. As we have always made clear, we do not detain indefinitely, and the clause will not mean that people will be detained solely due to non-compliance, as there must always be a realistic prospect of removal within a reasonable timescale.

[Bambos Charalambous]

We will oppose the clause. It makes it more difficult for individuals to get bail and leaves them stranded in immigration detention indefinitely.

The clause would require decision makers to consider previous failure “to cooperate with” certain immigration processes when considering whether to grant immigration bail. That is extremely vague and broad language. There is a risk of it being misconstrued and used to penalise those who use their legal rights to resist or appeal against immigration decisions made against them.

The Public Law Project has stated that if detainees are given the impression that any resistance to a decision of the Home Office may be held against them, it would increase unfairness and have a significant chilling effect on those bringing legitimate legal challenge. There is already an uneven playing field; the clause risks tipping things still further in the Home Office’s favour. The Home Office is expanding its powers of detention, while preventing independent judicial oversight of its decisions to detain.

Immigration detention is a harsh measure. It has no time limit and little judicial oversight, and should be used only when necessary and for the shortest time possible. The Government hold vulnerable people in prison-like immigration detention centres for periods ranging from days to several years. That includes people who have lived in the UK since childhood, people fleeing war and persecution, torture survivors and victims of human trafficking. Such vulnerabilities cannot be managed in detention and will no doubt be worsened by the prospect of bail being denied.

Since 2000, 49 people have died in immigration detention centres, and incidents of self-harm are now recorded at more than one a day. The Home Office’s immigration detention facilities are not fit for purpose, and narrowing the availability of immigration bail will only make the situation worse.

The uncertainty of indefinite detention is cruel not only for the detainee, but for family members waiting for them at home. Research by Bail for Immigration Detainees, which helps 3,500 detainees to apply for bail every year, shows that children of detainees are often British citizens, and suffer a range of physical and mental effects due to separation from their parent. Those are compounded by further, unexpected separation. For those children, cutting off the prospect of bail will lead to further mental ill health and suffering.

The majority of people in detention do not need to be there. More than 60% of people taken into detention are eventually released, their detention having served no purpose, at a cost of £76 million a year, according to Matrix Evidence research. BID has said that the Home Office repeatedly breaks the law and detains people unlawfully. In the past two years, the Home Office has paid out £15.1 million to 584 people whom it had detained unlawfully.

The clause will make it tougher for people to get bail and leave them trapped in detention for longer. The Government have committed to reducing detention, but this measure is counter to their own rhetoric. It means less justice for detainees, more harm for vulnerable refugees and more wasted costs for the taxpayer. That is why Labour opposes the clause.

--- Later in debate ---

The clause just strengthens the hand of the people who are trying to exploit and influence victims of trafficking. It will discourage disclosure and prevent the protection of the survivor. In turn, that prevents detection and prosecution of the exploiters. Our amendments could turn the clause into something genuinely constructive and useful. If the Government are concerned about abuse, they should implement the commissioner’s recommendations about training for first responders and single points of contact. They should not go off on this dangerous wild goose chase.

[Tom Pursglove]

Before turning to part 4, which deals with modern slavery, I would like to make a declaration of interest. In October, prior to my appointment as Minister, I ran the London marathon and raised funds for the Mintridge Foundation, which encourages young people to get into sport, and Justice and Care, a charity that works to tackle modern slavery. I make the declaration in the interests of complete transparency and for the information of the Committee.

I thank the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, and for Glasgow North East for the amendment. The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East raised important questions about the purpose of the slavery and risk trafficking notice.

The clause forms part of our approach to expanding the one-stop process to include modern slavery through the establishment of a new slavery and trafficking information notice. We have already debated the one-stop process, so I will not repeat that discussion, but the aim of the process is to identify possible victims as early as possible and ensure they receive the support they need. To best achieve that, we also need to discourage misuse of the system by stating our expectations and stipulating the consequences of non-compliance with the process.

That being said, let me reassure hon. Members that the clause has safeguards built in, and decision makers will consider each case on its grounds. To seek to remove the deadline stipulated by the slavery or trafficking information notice, as suggested by amendment 170, would go against the approach I have outlined. Without a deadline, the Government would be unable to seek the information up front that supports speedier decision making. Equally, changing a “specified” time to

“a reasonable period of time”

would provide less certainty to victims and decision makers on what is required. That would be detrimental to the victim identification process and goes against what we are trying to achieve in the Bill.

The ability to identify victims at the earliest opportunity is fundamental to our ability to support them. The clause is part of a wider process of much-needed change to the system to enable quicker decision making and reduce opportunities for misuse of the system, which takes valuable resources from victims. To deliver on that aim, it is right that we specify the time period in which information should be given, so that there is a connection to the consequences of late provision. As I have already set out, that does not mean that late claims will not be considered; any individual who brings a late claim for a good reason will be treated as if the claim were made in time. That will enable us to strike the right balance between preventing misuse and focusing resources on victims. For the reasons I have outlined, I respectfully invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

We share the same goal, which is identifying victims. Unfortunately, every single trafficking organisation that has got in touch with us has said that putting these hard and fast deadlines in the Bill will make that harder, rather than easier. We will probably end up voting against this clause, but in the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 172, in clause 46, page 41, line 42, at end insert—

“(2A) The requirement in subsection (2) does not apply in relation to anything that the slavery or trafficking information notice recipient has previously provided to the Secretary of State or any other competent authority.”

This amendment would ensure a recipient of a slavery or trafficking information notice does not need to provide information that has already been submitted to the Secretary of State or any other competent authority.

This amendment makes a short and simple, but important, point. Requesting the same information that has already been disclosed could be needlessly re-traumatising for a victim of modern slavery or trafficking, so the simple question is whether the Minister can assure us that that will not be made necessary under clause 46. The clause seems to envisage that trafficking information notices could be served on someone who has already had a positive reasonable grounds decision. Can the Minister confirm whether that is right, and if so, why that would be necessary? As it stands, the clause calls for “any” information that might be relevant for the purposes of making a decision on reasonable or conclusive grounds. Surely there will be no penalty if information already provided is not once again provided in response to the notice being served.

[Tom Pursglove]

Again, I thank the hon. Gentleman for tabling the amendment. I reassure Members that the clause already has safeguards built in, and it is clear that decision makers will consider each case on its grounds. I appreciate the consideration given to the provision of information, and the recommendation that the clause should stipulate that information provided previously to the competent authority should not be included. However, the amendment is not needed. Decision makers in the competent authority will consider all information provided to them. Credibility considerations connected to lateness will, by implication, apply only where information has not been provided within a specified time period and without good reasons, which will be made clear in guidance. For that reason, I respectfully invite the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the Minister for his response, which I will go away and consider. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 184, in clause 46, page 42, line 3, at end insert—

“(3A) Any slavery or trafficking information notice must be accompanied by information regarding the Secretary of State’s obligations to identify and support potential victims of modern slavery and trafficking.”

This amendment would ensure that potential victims are given information regarding their rights at the same time the notice is served.

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Ms McDonagh. I commend the Minister on having run the London marathon for Justice and Care, which does invaluable work.

We are supportive of the previous Scottish National party amendments to clause 46, which were outlined by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East. If we achieve nothing else this afternoon, I did promise the SNP spokesperson that I would work on being able to pronounce his constituency in time for our debates on the Bill, having managed to avoid doing so entirely during the passage of last year’s Immigration Act. I hope he will recognise those efforts.

With your permission, Chair, I will come back to clause 46 more broadly during the stand part debate. Our amendment follows a damning letter sent by 60 charities from across the human trafficking and modern slavery sector. They seeks to mitigate the effects of a Bill that they claim

“will have a disastrous impact on the UK’s response to modern slavery.”

In the light of the series of recommendations in that letter, amendment 184 would require any slavery or trafficking information notice to be

“accompanied by information regarding the Secretary of State’s obligations to identify and support potential victims of modern slavery and trafficking.”

We have serious concerns about both clauses 46 and 47, but these trafficking information notices are a new initiative, and should be accompanied by a full explanation of why the questions are being asked and what rights and support a potential victim of trafficking should be entitled to. The Government have placed significant emphasis on the need to reduce the time taken for victims to be identified, and on ensuring they receive the correct support package at the earliest opportunity. We strongly share that objective, so the requirement for information to be provided at the same time as the notice is served seeks to address any uncertainty and anxieties a potential victim may have.

Furthermore, it is critical that a trafficking notice is served with an assessment and awareness of risks and victims’ needs, as they can be incredibly wide-ranging, and that assessment and awareness can be essential for safeguarding purposes. Some victims will not have English as their first language, and some may have limited literacy skills. They will need access to the correct translator and there should be recognition of any special educational needs. That reinforces the need for each case to be evaluated sensitively.

We seek to ensure that the basic entitlement to information is met. It is important to recognise that in cases of modern slavery, many first responders and expert witnesses have found that victims interviewed often have so little knowledge of the national referral mechanism that they do not know if they are, or have been, in the NRM. Victims being unable to self-identify and limited awareness of how to navigate the NRM are consistent issues, and we will return to them under other clauses in part 4. Amendment 184 seeks to mitigate potential restrictions to the NRM, and is a sensible suggestion, and I hope that the Minister sees its merit.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate, and for Halifax, for tabling the amendment, and the hon. Member for Halifax for setting out the case for it. Clause 46 forms part of our expansion of the one-stop process to include modern slavery through the establishment of a new slavery and trafficking information notice.

Amendment 184 is not required, as the Government are providing mechanisms in the Bill to ensure that potential victims are fully aware of their rights and the Secretary of State’s obligations to them, including the right to free legal aid where appropriate. Information on the Secretary of State’s obligations to victims will be provided to individuals when a slavery or trafficking information notice is issued. These measures will ensure that potential victims better understand the national referral mechanism and their support entitlements.

In combination with clause 46, clauses 54 and 55 seek to ensure that individuals are provided with advice on the national referral mechanism when they receive advice on asylum and immigration matters. That will enable more victims of modern slavery to be referred, identified and properly supported.

Primary legislation on the process of providing information to possible victims is not required, and while I appreciate the sentiment behind the amendment, it would duplicate what happens through clauses 46, 54 and 55. In the light of that explanation, I hope that the hon. Member for Halifax is content to withdraw the amendment. We have had a pretty good debate on clause 46, so I hope that it can stand part of the Bill.

[Holly Lynch]

I am somewhat reassured by the Minister’s remarks. I hope that he will inform Committee members when the draft notices have been finalised; we will continue to keep a close eye on that matter. We will not push the amendment to a vote, but given what the Minister said about the clause, I might move on now to my speech on clause stand part.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I will be brief, given what I said in support of the amendment. All the anti-trafficking organisations that got in touch with us—60 or so—said that this clause could cause huge problems. I am not clear at all what issue the Government think it will resolve. What is the problem they are striving to tackle? It has not been outlined at all. All hon. Members agree that we need to identify more victims, but as the hon. Member for Halifax said, this will do the opposite and make it harder, not easier.

[Tom Pursglove]

It might assist the Committee if I say a little more. I am not concerned about covering ground that we may have already covered if it helps to clarify matters further and to put beyond any doubt the Government’s undertaking.

The purpose of clause 46 is to ensure that genuine victims of modern slavery are identified at the earliest possible opportunity, so that they can get the support they need to recover from their exploitation. The clause is part of the measures that seek to expand the current one-stop process to include modern slavery through the establishment of the new slavery and trafficking information notice, which can be issued alongside the new evidence notice introduced by clause 16.

Asylum and human rights claimants will need to provide relevant information relating to being a victim of modern slavery or trafficking within a specified period and, if providing information outside that period, set out a statement of their reasons for doing so. The slavery and trafficking notice aims to help identify possible victims at the earliest opportunity, to ensure that they receive appropriate support. It also aims to ensure that those who are not genuine victims are identified at the earliest possible stage.

The clause is underpinned by access to legal advice to help individuals understand whether they are a potential victim of modern slavery or human trafficking, and to support a referral into the national referral mechanism if that is the case. The clause works in tandem with clause 47, which sets out the impact of not providing information in good time without a good reason, such as the effects of trauma. Individuals will also be made aware from the start that if they fail to disclose information, save for good reason, their credibility may be damaged. We will set out our approach in guidance, giving decision makers the tools to recognise the impact of exploitation and trauma, and ensuring any changes to processes resulting from those measures are designed to take full account of the impact of trauma on victims of modern slavery. We intend to work with the sector to develop the guidance around that. I hope that will give Members confidence that the views and experiences of those groups will be taken into account when developing the guidance.

[Neil Coyle]

Perhaps the Minister could name one of the expert organisations that support the inclusion of clause 46 or 47. As it stands, the vast majority of organisations in the sector oppose the inclusion of those measures. It is all very well the Minister saying he will impose a requirement on the sector to work with the Government on that guidance, but they are saying categorically that they do not want the clauses.

[Tom Pursglove]

I think the hon. Gentleman may have misunderstood my point. I was not saying there was any intention to impose a requirement on the sector to work with Government to develop the guidance, but undoubtedly we would welcome the input of the sector, which has a lot of experience and knowledge. We think there is a genuine issue that we need to address. The point I have made several times is that we want people to access the help they need when they need it as quickly as possible.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The sector would have preferred to have been consulted on the clause. The key problem it has is what happens if someone has gone past that deadline. This scheme puts real pressure on that person not to disclose at all, because they will fear that the regime will lead to their being disbelieved. That is a fundamental problem. Consulting after the clause is already on the statute book will not fix that.

[Tom Pursglove]

I disagree with the hon. Gentleman’s broader interpretation of the situation. We want to identify and help genuine victims as quickly as possible. I would expect cases to be looked at appropriately and individually to ensure that is exactly what happens. There was also a question of whether victims will receive a slavery and trafficking information notice before getting a reasonable grounds decision? Yes, we want to identify victims as soon as possible.

[Holly Lynch]

Will the Minister take an intervention?

[Tom Pursglove]

I will, although I think I had finished my sentence.

[Holly Lynch]

The Minister had, and I am eternally grateful to him for giving way.

It does worry me somewhat that, as I understand it, those decision makers at the Home Office would ordinarily make reasonable grounds decisions very quickly in order to facilitate a swift entry into the NRM. If that will no longer be the case and we will be issuing notices, bearing in mind what we have discussed about trauma and victims taking time to disclose it, that could introduce significant delays for a victim entering the NRM. That really worries me. Could the Minister say any more to assure us that we will not be preventing victims from accessing the support they need by introducing that additional process?

[Tom Pursglove]

I would expect cases to be looked at on an appropriate case-by-case basis that properly takes into account all of the relevant circumstances. It might be advantageous if, in my note to the Committee, I include some commentary on how we expect the process to work, to set that out for Members in more detail and make sure there is no confusion.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

That is far from being a trauma-informed approach, which is why we share the Children’s Society’s serious concerns about this clause. We feel that amendment 190 is entirely necessary if we are to safeguard children from trafficking, by removing them from the burden of trafficking information notices and the consequences of late disclosure.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank the hon. Members for Halifax and for Enfield, Southgate for setting out their case, and for tabling this amendment. I appreciate their consideration of this clause and their concern for a vulnerable group of individuals. Ensuring that clause 47 enables decision makers to take account of individuals’ vulnerabilities is fundamental to our approach. That is why we have included the condition of good reasons, and we will ensure decision makers have the flexibility and discretion to appropriately consider them without prejudicing what that should cover.

What constitutes “good reasons” has purposely not been defined in the Bill. The detail on how to apply good reasons will be set out in guidance for decision makers. This will give decision makers the tools, for instance, to recognise that the age at which traumatic events took place may affect an individual’s ability to accurately recall, share or recognise such events, while maintaining a case-by-case approach. Doing so in guidance will ensure that we also have the flexibility to update and add to the range of considerations undertaken by a decision maker in exercising discretion. To create a carve-out for one group of individuals, as amendment 190 seeks to do, would undermine this approach and create a two-tiered system based on the age at which exploitation may have taken place.

I am sure that this is not the intention of the hon. Member for Halifax, but this amendment could also incentivise individuals to put forward falsified referrals regarding the timing of exploitation to delay removal action. Our approach avoids this potential avenue for misuse, but still allows for important considerations regarding the age of the victim to be looked at. Indeed, reasonable grounds decision making already takes account of the specific vulnerabilities of children by, for instance, not requiring there to be any means of exploitation when establishing whether an individual is a victim.

We believe that the right approach is to provide more detail in guidance on the varied and complicated reasons that may constitute good reasons. These will include the age when the exploitation took place, but a wider range of potential reasons and indicators will also be considered to avoid focusing specifically on one victim cohort. This approach will allow decision makers to consider each case on its merits, whilst considering all the information relevant to their case without prejudging it. To do otherwise would not be appropriate or fair to all victims. Again, I hope that the sector will work with Government to shape those guidelines and ensure that they are right. For these reasons, I respectfully invite the hon. Member to withdraw her amendment.

[Holly Lynch]

I am concerned by some of the Minister’s response. He says that children, and the age of the victim, will be a consideration within good reasons. However, once again we have not got that guidance; it has not been nailed down, so we have no assurances of how the detail will look. He also says that it would not be appropriate to have a different approach for victims based on their age. However, I think that would be entirely responsible and appropriate, and we look to do so throughout a whole range of legislation and legislative approaches. I think it would be a responsible requirement to place on the Government. With that in mind, I will press amendment 190 to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 173, in clause 47, page 42, line 21, leave out—

“or a conclusive grounds decision”

This amendment would disapply this section when a conclusive grounds decision is being made (i.e. when a reasonable grounds decision will already have been made).

The amendment is designed to allow us to question how the new process will interplay with the NRM process, and to establish how long the notice period in the new process will be, so it is another short but important point. The amendment would disapply the section on credibility if a reasonable grounds decision is made. It is even less clear what sensible case can be made for the use of a trafficking information notice if sufficient information has already been provided to justify such a reasonable grounds decision.

Depending on how the system operates, and given the huge delays in making conclusive grounds decisions, the following scenario could play out. A person receives a reasonable grounds decision and is referred to the NRM process. That person makes a claim for protection, and the Secretary of State then serves them with a trafficking information notice. Full disclosure takes time because of their circumstances. The person is better placed to disclose much more information after the deadline for the trafficking information notice has passed but before a conclusive grounds decision is reached. It would surely be very strange, then, for the conclusive grounds decision to take account of late provision of information, but the clause appears to envisage that that could happen. Has that all been appropriately thought through? It would be useful to hear an explanation of how those two processes will interact.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and for Glasgow North East for their amendments. I am pleased to see from the amendments that they acknowledge the benefits of a system that brings forward at the earliest opportunity all information related to modern slavery, enabling us to provide support and protection quickly to those who need it.

To that end, clause 47 covers information raised at the reasonable grounds and conclusive grounds stages, which are the two crucial decision-making stages in the national referral mechanism, and which both confer different rights on possible and confirmed victims. Although there are different standards of proof at those two stages, it is critical that the decision maker at both points can review all information to take decisions. Those decisions should include consideration of whether information has been provided late and whether there are good reasons for that. By removing that consideration at the conclusive grounds stage, amendment 173 would remove the consequence of providing late information when the decision-making threshold is higher. That could perversely incentivise misuse of the system at the later stage.

We are clear that that approach should be taken across both decision points to ensure that we meet the clause’s aim of identifying victims as early as possible and reducing opportunities for misuse.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am confused. I cannot see the benefit of late disclosure if the conclusive grounds process is ongoing. What does the amendment incentivise?

[Tom Pursglove]

Again, I simply make the point that decisions are made case by case. We maintain that we need all the information at both decision points to reach the right decisions in individual cases. For those reasons, I respectfully invite the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

We will go away and study what the Minister has said. I am still confused about the interaction between the two processes. The amendment was designed to seek an explanation, and I suspect that we will not be satisfied with it, but in the meantime I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 174, in clause 47, page 42, line 23, leave out “or on behalf of”.

This amendment would exclude statements made on behalf of a slavery or trafficking information notice recipient (as opposed to statements made directly by them) from this subsection.

This is a very short point, but another important one. The amendment is designed to try to get further information from the Minister. I am sorry to have to test him on all the detail of the clause, but it is important. What we are asking here is why statements made on behalf of a trafficking information notice recipient should be impacted by the clause because of late provision of evidence. What does this cover? Is a medical report, for example, to be impacted by the clause so that its credibility is doubted because the recipient gave information late? Is analysis of the truth of what a social worker or a counsellor has said on behalf of the trafficking survivor to be impacted by the clause as well? We are really just asking this. What does it mean? What is the scope of the fact that this scheme applies to statements made on behalf of the trafficking information notice recipient and not just by the recipient himself or herself?

[Tom Pursglove]

Again, I am grateful to the hon. Member for setting out his case for the amendment. We know that, given the nature of modern slavery and human trafficking, many individuals often struggle to provide information relating to their abuse. That is why these measures are supported by the provision of legal aid to support possible victims in understanding the process and the national referral mechanism. It is also for that reason that the clause is specifically drafted to capture information provided by the victim or on their behalf.

All relevant information should be considered, whoever provides it, when decision makers are taking into account the provision of late information. Not to do so would create an artificial divide between different cohorts of individuals, depending on who provides the information for consideration. That could inadvertently encourage misuse of the system by leaving it open for individuals to seek to use others to provide all information late, knowing that its late disclosure will not be part of the consideration of credibility, when they could provide it themselves. That could delay disclosure and therefore our ability to identify and support individuals at the earliest opportunity as well as reducing opportunities for misuse. To give a practical example, I am confident that if someone else failed to press “Send”, the individual affected would not be impacted negatively by that.

For the reasons that I have outlined, I respectfully encourage the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Again, I am grateful to the Minister for his answer and we will consider it. I am still not absolutely clear on precisely what the scope of the provision is and whether, for example,

“a statement…on behalf of the person”

would include a medical statement—a medical report—so that its credibility would be damaged just because the person who underwent the medical report disclosed information late. We will go away and think about that. I think the Home Office may need to give it some consideration as well, but in the meantime I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Holly Lynch]

We very much support the SNP’s amendment 175, which, as we heard, seeks to strike “as damaging” from the clause and hand that discretion back to the Home Office decision maker, as the Minister has already gone to some lengths to assure Members will be the case.

I will also speak to our amendment 163. We seek to mitigate the Government’s refusal to spell out what, if anything, would constitute a good reason for late disclosure. In Committee on Tuesday, the SNP spokesperson, the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, argued for a similar approach during our debates on part 2. The Minister responded that

“the situation will be set out clearly in guidance. We think that is the better approach, because it allows greater flexibility on the sorts of factors that might be relevant to the disclosure of late information, and obviously on matters that are relevant to individuals circumstances.”––[Official Report, Nationality and Borders Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 333.]

I understand the points that the Minister made, but he will appreciate that for the Opposition, it is feels although he is somewhat putting the cart before the horse. We are being asked to consider the clauses in blind faith without the guidance, and one way he could address that is by including something in the Bill. As the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East said earlier, we can debate only what is in front of us.

I expect one thing we can agree on is that no list can ever be exhaustive. I suspect that, as we have heard, the most convincing reasons for late disclosure are ones that we cannot comprehend. It would be nonsense to think that any list would be exhaustive, but without having in front of us any indication of what good reasons might be, we are being asked to take a leap of faith too far. The reasons in amendment 163 include, but are not limited to, a person’s fear of reprisals against them, experiencing pressures related to bonded debt, and being unable to recognise themselves as a victim.

In discussing part 2, again, the Minister went on to say that

“the Home Office will have discretion over who is served an evidence notice and the extent to which credibility is damaged by late evidence”,

and that

“claimants who raise matters late will have the opportunity to provide reasons for that lateness—and where those reasons are good, credibility will not be damaged. Decision makers will have the discretion to determine the extent to which credibility should be damaged, and that determination need not by itself be determinative of a claim”––[Official Report, Nationality and Borders Public Bill Committee, Tuesday 26 October 2021; c. 333.]

I felt that the Minister was very much talking up the discretion that the competent authority decision makers would have, in order to offer us assurances, but that is not reflected in the primary legislation in clause 47. I would be grateful if he could confirm that “good reasons” will be set out within the guidance for NRM decision making, as was the commitment for asylum decision making in part 2.

I would be grateful if the Minister also confirmed when that guidance will be published, and when the training, which he described as being necessary in accompanying the guidance, will begin. I hope he will recognise that amendment 163 is measured and sensible and that he will agree to adopt it.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank hon. Members for their genuine interest in these matters and for bringing forward their amendments. By introducing a statutory requirement to provide information before a specified date, victims of modern slavery will be identified at the earliest opportunity, ensuring that those who need protection are afforded it quickly. This measure is supported by the provision of legal aid to ensure that possible victims feel able to share information in a safe and supported manner.

It is important to state that the requirement to bring forward information related to being a victim of modern slavery does not mean that referrals brought late will not be considered; all claims of modern slavery will be considered, irrespective of when they are raised. We have purposefully not defined “good reasons” in the Bill, and the detail on how to apply “good reasons” will be set out in guidance for decision makers. That is the appropriate place, giving the Government the flexibility to respond to our ever-increasing understanding of modern slavery victims.

We will of course work carefully with stakeholders as we operationalise guidance to ensure that decision makers have the tools to recognise the effect that traumatic events can have on people’s ability to accurately recall, share, or recognise such events in some instances, while not seeking to prejudge their decision making by placing this detail in legislation. However, as has been recognised, we cannot legislate for every instance where someone may have “good reasons” for providing late information. To attempt to do so would be impractical. It would also limit the discretion and flexibility of decision makers, who are best placed to consider all factors on a case-by-case basis.

Amendment 163 would have the perverse impact of individuals facing different requirements simply because their situation is excluded from the amendment. It also ignores the possibility that a person may identify as one of the listed categories, but their information may be late for unrelated reasons. It would therefore create a blanket acceptance for late information in specific prescribed circumstances, while a vulnerable individual who did not fall within the specified categories would face a different test on whether they had good reason for providing late information. That would be unfair.

As I have set out, it is important that we are clear on the consequence of late disclosure of information in order to provide clarity for decision makers and victims, and to deter possible misuse of the system. Removing the reference to impacting credibility, as amendment 175 seeks to do, would remove our ability to require the provision of information up front. A duty to provide information requires a consequence and I think we are all agreed that seeking information on modern slavery issues up front is of benefit to all. The clause already includes mitigations to the possible consequence of damaged credibility, providing clear safeguards while still addressing the issue of potential misuse. The solution is not to stifle the clause of any robustness.

As I stated, more detail on good reasons and the credibility considerations will be set out in guidance. We will work to ensure that this takes account of vulnerabilities related to an individual’s exploitation. However, as I have outlined, we believe that removing the consideration of credibility as damaging would impede the ability to reduce potential misuse and reduce the impetus to identify victims as early as possible. As a result, that would perpetuate the issues that these clauses are designed to address, to the detriment of victims.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am still not sure that the Minister has addressed a fundamental point here. The worry is that if somebody genuinely is a victim of trafficking—I hate even having to describe people in that way—and misses that deadline, the fact that there are possible consequences of that, even if they might have a good reason, means that all they know is that they have missed the deadline. It is a huge disincentive for them to then come forward with other information. That is the whole point, and I still do not think that has been addressed by the Government.

[Tom Pursglove]

I recognise the sincerity of the hon. Gentleman’s concern about this. What I would say to him, as I have now said many times, is that I expect appropriate decisions to be taken on a case-by-case basis, taking proper account of all the circumstances, mitigations and issues that people bring forward in relation to good reasons. I am confident that that process can be properly developed and delivered in a way that is responsive to those sorts of issues. That is why—to address the point made by the hon. Member for Halifax—it is difficult to put a precise time on when that guidance will be put in place, for the simple reason that we want to engage properly with the sector in the way that I have outlined. I want that to be a thorough process and for the guidance to be put in place in an appropriate manner that is as exhaustive as possible, but does not lack common sense and means that proper consideration is given to the many varied reasons that people may have for providing information late, for example.

[Anne McLaughlin]

I have a couple of points to make. My hon. Friend the Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East made the point that once people get past the deadline, they will be terrified to come forward. What will the Minister do about those people—

[Tom Pursglove]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Anne McLaughlin]

I had not quite finished, but okay.

[Tom Pursglove]

I apologise for interrupting the hon. Lady in mid-flow. I just want to provide some clarity on this point. If there are reasonable grounds to believe that someone is a victim, they will get positive identification even if the information is provided late. I want to be clear about that and place it on the record.

[Anne McLaughlin]

But the Government are refusing to accept amendment 163, which would put in the Bill what some of the good reasons could be. The Minister says that he will allow decision makers to have discretion, but what he is actually doing is allowing them to have discretion not to accept some perfectly valid reasons—including trauma, as we have covered. I would love to press the amendment to a vote, but we have to pick our battles in this place, so I reluctantly beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil Coyle]

I have always wanted to be a dame—[Laughter.]

I thank Tom Farr of CEASE and Kat Banyard of UK Feminista for assisting in the drafting of the amendments and for their valuable work. Before I address each amendment in turn, I want to quickly highlight the concern that we have seen online in response to today’s discussions about some of the language that the Minister has used, specifically the issue of “genuine cases”. It is my understanding that nine out of 10 “reasonable and conclusive grounds” decisions were positive last year, and I gently urge the Minister to consider the impact of his words, especially when it comes to more people coming forward in the future. He said that he will listen to the sector. I hope that is a genuine offer, given that the sector does not feel that it was listened to. The consultation period was very brief and unexpected and has left the sector very unhappy.

Amendment 181 would help ensure that the credibility of victims of human trafficking for sexual exploitation would not be called into question by a late disclosure of being trafficked, which clause 47 would do. If a person discloses that they have been a victim of human trafficking for sexual services, the lateness of the claim should not matter.

As we are all aware, the treatment of trafficked women and children subjected to sexual exploitation is unimaginable. It is widely understood to severely impact on their ability to escape from the situation they find themselves in. For many, it impacts on their ability even to understand or admit what has happened to them, for reasons of denial and other issues that my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax raised in the debate on clause 46.

There is a bureaucracy behind the Government’s plans. Many individuals who have been sexually exploited are wholly unaware of the process of having to declare themselves as a victim of sexual exploitation. Many are likely to be suspicious of any involvement with the authorities. There may be a very good reason why a person feels that way, including that they have not been in control of their activities and are unaware that they have committed specific immigration offences or other criminal offences that they have been forced to engage in under duress, such as soliciting.

Clause 47, in practice, means that if trafficking status is disclosed at a late stage, that will have a devastating impact on credibility. That simply cannot be justified. As my hon. Friend argued, victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation must not be precluded from legal protections simply because they are too frightened or traumatised—we have previously discussed post-traumatic stress disorder—to disclose information as soon as they come to the attention of the authorities. To encourage disclosure can very often take time and sensitivity, something that the Home Office does not always currently allow for, and which the proposals in this Bill will affect to an even greater level. The amendment would make sure some of the most vulnerable people who have been trafficked continue to be protected under the law.

Amendment 187 supports amendment 181. It details how a person making a late disclosure of trafficking for sexual exploitation might better be identified by any relevant authority. A person may be considered a victim of trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation in a number of ways: first, if there is evidence they have been transported from one place to another for the purpose of sexual exploitation; secondly, if a person has signs of physical abuse, including but not limited to branding, bruising, scarring, burns or tattoos; thirdly, if a person has no access to their own earnings—for example, a person who does not have access to a bank account—fourthly, if a person has limited or no English language skills, could not cope on their own and has been managed previously; fifthly, if a person lives at the same address as anyone who meets any of these criteria; and finally, if they sleep in the same place they have been or were exploited.

Although authorities may have the best interests of an exploited individual at heart when investigating any trafficking-related crime, they may not even be aware of how to recognise such an individual, given the distinct and specific treatment that they have been subjected to. Putting these comprehensive but by no means exhaustive guiding factors into the Bill aims to ensure that authorities have a deeper understanding of the factors they should be aware of and how to identify and help victims.

It is important to note that it is often only when the authorities make wider arrests of criminal gangs that exploited individuals are discovered, usually in brothels or closely-controlled transient places of residence. In a situation of criminality, it may be difficult for authorities to discern who may ultimately be responsible for such criminality.

Acknowledging that exploitation often manifests in ways such as physical and mental trauma, as well as a total lack of autonomy over their own lives, will improve the current legal situation in two tangible ways. First, it may deter lengthy and expensive prosecutions of victims of exploitation, who may otherwise fall between the cracks and be prosecuted for an offence they committed under duress. Secondly, it will put into law current Crown Prosecution Service policy, which is to treat these individuals as victims as and where they are discovered. That is not happening now—we see the prosecution rate for sex crimes in this country at a historic and terrible low.

Amendment 187 would allow the UK to further build its status as the world leader it wants to be when it comes to a toolkit to combat human trafficking and sexual exploitation. These individuals must be viewed as victims of crime and not criminals requiring punishment.

Amendment 182 is an alternative probing amendment that would require the Secretary of State to issue guidance on the specific factors that may indicate that somebody is a victim of trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation. I hope the Minister will give an indication of whether that is the direction of travel for the Government.

The amendment would also provide greater clarity for the relevant authorities. As already said, it would prevent the prosecution of individuals who may have been compelled to commit offences while being sexually exploited, as well as providing a framework for authorities to refer to when trying to discern exactly the type of exploitation that has taken place. I hope that the aim behind these amendments will be welcomed by the Minister today, even if they are not accepted.

New clause 42 would put into law a specific offence of trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation. The clause makes it an offence to arrange or enable the travel of another person for the purpose of sexual exploitation, regardless of whether the person consented to travel. Arranging or enabling travel can be done in numerous ways: by recruiting a person, by moving or carrying a person, by holding or receiving a person, or by transferring or exchanging control of a person.

Trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation means planning to sexually exploit a person during or after travel to the UK, or knowing another person is planning to sexually exploit a person during or after travel to the United Kingdom. Travel means arriving in the UK or leaving any country outside of the UK if the destination is the United Kingdom. A UK national commits the offence regardless of where the facilitating, arranging or travelling takes place. A non-UK national commits the offence by facilitating, arranging or travelling into and out of the UK. Committing the offence carries up to life in imprisonment if tried in a Crown court and would be a welcome step forward.

New clause 42 is necessary because while the Modern Slavery Act 2015 covers exploitation more broadly, the issue of sexual exploitation, specifically within the commercial sex industry, now merits being recognised as a distinct offence due to the catastrophically high numbers of trafficking victims brought into the commercial sex industry in the UK, organised by serious organised crime outfits.

The link between trafficking and commercial sexual exploitation—industrial-level prostitution—is undeniable, and the problem is getting worse. During the covid pandemic there was a 280% increase in the advertising of sexual services online in the west midlands, with the women being predominantly of eastern European origin. A 2010 report suggested that at least 10,000 women involved in off-street prostitution were victims of trafficking or non-UK nationals who were highly vulnerable. These statistics are shocking. We are not seeing provisions in current legislation to match the scale of the problem in the country.

Introducing new clause 42 would ensure that authorities and the Government recognise these intrinsic links and would aid in all our efforts to combat the scourge that is human trafficking and broader violence against women and girls. The benefits of the clause would include, firstly, requiring authorities to dig deeper to examine whether human trafficking has taken place when investigating any prostitution-related offence. Second, it would protect victims of sexual exploitation who have been trafficked. If an individual is being investigated for a prostitution-related offence, it is wholly unacceptable that they should be prosecuted for acts committed under duress or threat of violence from exploitative traffickers.

Placing this specific offence in law would encourage authorities to think more carefully about whether individuals who may initially be viewed as criminals are, in fact, victims of trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation. It would further allow for the specific prosecution of those who traffic people for the purposes of sexual exploitation, and the full scale of what is going on would perhaps become clearer. Amendments 181, 187 and 182 and new clause 42 would ameliorate and offer some specific protection to women trafficked into the UK for sexual exploitation. I hope the Government will look favourably on these probing proposals.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank the hon. Members for setting out, through the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark, their case and for putting forward their amendments. I appreciate their consideration of these clauses and their concern for a vulnerable group of individuals. They have raised important issues around identifying victims who have faced the most heinous crimes.

Ensuring that clause 47 enables decision makers to take account of individuals’ vulnerabilities is fundamental to our approach. That is why we have included the condition of good reasons, and ensured that decision makers have the flexibility and discretion to appropriately consider those without prejudging what that should cover. What constitutes good reasons has purposefully not been defined in the Bill: the detail on how to apply good reasons will be set out in guidance for decision makers, as we have already discussed. That will give decision makers the tools to, for instance, recognise the effect that traumatic events may have on individuals’ ability to accurately recall, share or recognise such events, while maintaining a case-by-case approach. Doing so in guidance will also ensure that we have the flexibility to update and add to the range of considerations undertaken by a decision maker in exercising discretion.

To create a carve-out for one group of individuals, as amendments 181 and 187 seek to do, would undermine this approach and create a two-tiered system based on the type of exploitation faced. I am sure this is not the intention of the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark, but amendment 181 could also incentivise individuals to put forward falsified referrals regarding the specific forms of exploitation, or delay removal action. We believe that the right approach is to provide more detail on the varied and complicated reasons that may constitute good reasons in guidance, where these can be explored in more detail and where we can be more flexible as our understanding of exploitation develops.

[Neil Coyle]

The Minister has said that the intention is to address some of the issues and concerns raised by organisations and by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East in the guidance. Can I request that the Minister meets those organisations and the hon. Member before Report, to make sure that any guidance plans take those concerns fully into account their concerns?

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I have made this point several times now, but it is certainly worth repeating: there is a real willingness and desire to engage thoroughly in relation to the development of the guidance. I would of course be very happy to consider any meeting requests that come in the usual way, but I assure the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark that there is a firm commitment here, which I have made several times. As I have said, the hon. Member is a canny parliamentarian, and will take every possible opportunity to hold Ministers to account on that commitment to engage constructively with the shaping of the guidance.

[Neil Coyle]

There is a real test here, because the Minister is saying that he wants to listen to the sector. The sector is saying that it does not feel particularly listened to up to this point. It is a simple request to meet before Report, and the Minister has not quite said yes.

[Tom Pursglove]

What I would say to the hon. Member is that if he makes contact with my office in the usual way, with information about who he would like me to meet alongside him, I will absolutely consider that appropriately.

Decision makers’ considerations will include the indicators highlighted in the amendment, but they will also consider a wider range of potential reasons and indicators to avoid focusing specifically on one victim cohort. This approach will allow decision makers to consider each case on its merits while considering all the information relevant to that case without prejudice. To do otherwise would not be appropriate or fair to all victims.

Amendment 182 seeks to insert a specific reference to human trafficking for sexual services into clause 48. We are agreed that this provision must enable decision makers to identify the most vulnerable victims, including victims of trafficking for sexual services. However, to set out a particular purpose of trafficking on the face of the Bill would fragment the types of exploitation victims have faced.

Exploitation for the purpose of human trafficking is defined under section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, and that definition includes sexual exploitation. This is supported by the modern slavery statutory guidance in section 49 of the Act, which sets out considerations that may indicate that a person is a victim of human trafficking for sexual services. The existing guidance provides detail on indicators of specific types of modern slavery, including indicators that apply specifically to victims who have suffered from sexual exploitation. I am certain that hon. Members agree that there should be no grading of exploitation, and it is correct that exploitation for any one purpose should be considered with the same severity as exploitation for other purposes. We believe that to set out one particular purpose for exploitation on the face of the Bill would create fragmentation. Our guidance already provides detail on indicators of several types of modern slavery.

I will now turn to new clause 42. As I have already stated, I agree with hon. Members that the abhorrent crime of trafficking in individuals for the purposes of sexual exploitation should be treated with the utmost seriousness. That is why section 2 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 already accounts for human trafficking offences, and makes specific reference to sexual exploitation in section 3. In fact, the Modern Slavery Act allows for a wider provision of the offence. Section 2 makes human trafficking an offence in any part of the world, which includes trafficking to the UK but also trafficking within the UK, which the amendment does not.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil Coyle]

I think the sector has a concern that the proposal in this legislation undermines the Modern Slavery Act and measures to encourage and support victims who have come forward. I hope that the Minister will hold that meeting before Report, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Tom Pursglove]

Clause 47 sets out the consequence if an individual who has been served with a slavery or trafficking information notice as discussed under clause 46 provides information relating to being a victim of modern slavery after the specified time period. The clause aims to ensure that possible victims are identified as early as possible to receive appropriate support and to reduce potential misuse of the national referral mechanism system from referrals intended to delay removal action. Under clause 47, the decision maker must decide whether information provided through the one-stop process is outside the specified time limit and therefore is late. This consideration will take into account whether there was a good reason for the late information, such as the impact of trauma, but where there are no good reasons, an individual’s credibility is damaged due to the provision of late information.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Minister referred to abusing the process but he has not said much about what evidence there is for this problem. What is the scale of it? Much like statelessness, perhaps he could write to us with the evidence of what it is that the Government are trying to get at here. The big problem is the three-year delay for making decisions. Is not that the problem rather than anything that the Minister has referred to?

[Tom Pursglove]

I recognise the invitation to write with more detail around this and I am happy to do that. That would be advantageous to the Committee. Given that time is getting on and we want to continue to make progress, I am very happy to take that request back to the Department. I will provide that information.

The Government will ensure that any changes to processes as a result of these measures are designed in a way that accounts for the impact of trauma. This includes ensuring that individuals working in the system are aware of the factors that can affect the task of obtaining information such as the effects traumatic events can have on people’s ability to accurately recall such events. This assessment will be set out in guidance for decision makers and we will engage stakeholders as we develop it. We will continue to consider all referrals on a case-by-case basis to ensure that support is tailored to the needs of genuine victims.

[Holly Lynch]

We intend to vote against clause 47. It is closely linked to clause 46 and I will try to avoid repetition as we are returning to elements that have been well discussed under part 2 on Tuesday.

The number of survivors able to receive support through the national referral mechanism will be reduced as a result of clause 47.

As the Human Trafficking Foundation outlined in written evidence:

“Introducing a trafficking information notice and so converging immigration with human trafficking risks creating another layer of bureaucracy and so would likely increase the length of time survivors must wait in the NRM.”

If we are to ensure that victims with complex psychological and physical needs are not punished by the system or left in limbo while their claims are processed, the clause cannot stand part of the Bill.

As other hon. Members have said, the Home Office’s own statutory guidance states:

“Victims’ early accounts may be affected by the impact of trauma. This can result in delayed disclosure, difficulty recalling facts, or symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder… It is also vital for decision makers to have an understanding of the mitigating reasons why a potential victim of modern slavery is incoherent, inconsistent or delays giving details of material facts… Throughout this process it is important to remember that victims of modern slavery have been through trauma”.

The clause runs completely contrary to that guidance.

The VITA Network explained in its consultation response to the new plan for immigration that:

“Psychological trauma causes profound disturbances to normal brain function and memory, including memory loss and inconsistencies”

in recollection. We know that a high proportion of trafficked people experience violence prior to and during trafficking. Long after they have escaped exploitation, many still fear that harm will come to them and their families if they disclose information about their experiences. It is often those who are most in need of protection who will find it the hardest to disclose such information.

In 2015, the PROTECT programme was established. It was an independent piece of research, commissioned and funded by the Department of Health and Social Care’s policy research programme, and led by King’s College London and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. The programme aimed to develop evidence to inform the NHS response to human trafficking, and it was comprised of surveys and qualitative research, including interviews with trafficked people and with NHS and non-NHS professionals. It found that psychological distress was highly prevalent: four fifths of women in contact with shelter services screened positive for anxiety, depression or post-traumatic stress disorder at interview.

My hon. Friend the shadow Minister told the harrowing story of Gloria in his contribution on Tuesday, and demonstrated why the clause will be damaging to those who have been subject to trauma. The clause flies in the face of best practice and runs contrary to all we heard from witnesses in oral evidence. Earlier this week, my hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark made excellent points about how PTSD is just one reason why the approach in the clause will be unworkable and unconscionable for those who really need our help. We do not seek to punish or discredit other victims for late disclosure, so why are the Government seeking to do so in this case? The clause highlights the inconsistencies and the unjust nature of the Government’s approach.

It is also deeply worrying that the Government have offered no clarity in subsection (2) on the timescales within which individuals would have to provide that information. Will it be days, weeks, months? I would be grateful if the Minister gave us an indication of his thinking on that. As things stand, the clause will put barriers between victims and the support that they need to recover and secure prosecutions against the real criminals, who we all want to see brough to justice. On that basis, we cannot support clause 47.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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[Tom Pursglove]

I thank hon. Members for their interest and valuable contributions to the debate. They have raised important issues around identifying victims who have faced the most heinous crimes. Under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings—ECAT—to which the UK is a signatory, certain obligations flow if there are

“reasonable grounds to believe that a person has been a victim of trafficking”.

The amendment seeks to leave the reasonable grounds threshold as it stands, which is where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person may be a victim of trafficking.

It is crucial that decision makers are able to quickly and appropriately identify possible victims. That is why we have proposed this minor change to the reasonable grounds threshold to closer align with our international obligations under ECAT and with the devolved Administrations. To not make that change would undermine the clarity on decision making. Additionally, as the amendment relates specifically to the provision of assistance and support to persons, it would create a different threshold from that applied when determining whether a person is a victim of slavery or human trafficking. That would create significant ambiguity around the reasonable grounds threshold and create further separation from our international obligations. For those reasons, I respectfully ask the hon. Member for Halifax to withdraw her amendment.

[Holly Lynch]

I am not entirely satisfied with that response, so I will press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Ninth sitting)

Tom Pursglove Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 26th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

That is, plainly, nonsense. The reality of clause 14 is that no such agreements will materialise. Instead, the clause will lead at best to more backlogs in a sclerotic system and at worst to very real harm to already vulnerable people, breaches of international law and a further erosion of civilised values in the UK. We reject the clause and will vote against it standing part.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Tom Pursglove)]

I thank hon. Members for tabling their amendments. I have listened carefully to the arguments that they have put forward.

Amendments 18 to 26 and amendment 56 seek to amend the Bill provisions relating to the inadmissibility of asylum claimants with a connection to a safe third country. This Government are clear that people should seek asylum in the first safe country they reach rather than make dangerous journeys to the UK to claim asylum here. Inadmissibility is a longstanding process designed to prevent secondary movements across Europe, and these measures are being introduced to support that. The amendments seek to significantly weaken our ability to treat these individuals as inadmissible, and therefore weaken our ability to focus our resources on those most in need of our help. I make no apologies for prioritising the protection of the individuals most in need of help over those who could have claimed asylum elsewhere.

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

Will the Minister indicate where in international law there is a requirement on an individual to make such a claim in the first safe country they reach? Or is the UK seeking to impose its domestic law on the international community?

[Tom Pursglove]

It is fair to say that the Committee had an extensive debate about this issue last week in relation to earlier clauses. I would refer the hon. Member to the comments read out in the Committee from a previous Bill Committee under the last Labour Government, where the principles we are talking about here were very firmly established and endorsed. They have underpinned the approach that has been taken on these matters under successive Governments in this country, and we continue to believe that they are applicable.

I wholeheartedly agree with the importance of the UK continuing to meet its obligations under the refugee convention, including through the rights that we provide to refugees in the UK. I understand the spirit of amendment 56 in defining a safe third state in a way that ensures that an individual removed to that country is provided with adequate protection and their individual rights as a recognised refugee under the refugee convention. However, the definition of a safe third state as set out in clause 14 already ensures that the principles of the refugee convention should be met if we are to remove an individual to that country.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The term “the principles of the refugee convention” is vague. What do the Government mean by that?

[Tom Pursglove]

As we have repeatedly made very clear during the passage of the clauses we have already debated, our obligations are being properly upheld through the provisions of this Bill. We believe that the Bill is fully compliant, and I maintain that that remains the case. The approach is not new; it has been part of our previous legislation on safe countries. We will only ever return inadmissible claimants to countries that are safe, so I do not agree that the amendment is necessary.

[Neil Coyle]

Defining what is safe is very important. It is not adequately set out in the Bill. Does the Minister believe that Afghanistan is a safe country?

[Tom Pursglove]

I refer the hon. Member to our earlier exchanges during the passage of the clauses we debated previously. In relation to Afghanistan, as that situation has evolved, the approach that we have taken has also evolved, and quite rightly so. No one is being returned to Afghanistan at the moment. That fully reflects the in-country situation in Afghanistan, of which we are incredibly mindful, as the hon. Member and people of this country would quite rightly expect.

[Neil Coyle]

The Home Office has published updated guidance that suggests that it is open to question as to whether there continues to be a situation of international or internal armed conflict in Afghanistan, and that should indiscriminate violence be taking place, it is only in some areas and to a far lesser extent following the Taliban takeover. Therefore, the Home Office is saying that Afghanistan is becoming safer because the Taliban are now in control. Does the Minister accept that position?

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I will repeat this point again: we are not returning individuals to Afghanistan at the present time. I believe that is the right decision and I believe it fully takes into account the circumstances within the country at the moment. That is an approach that Members across this House can support.

[Mr Goodwill]

Does the Minister agree that situations in different countries can change? I have a constituent who was granted asylum from Iran, but subsequently has gone on a package holiday to Turkey and visited his family in Iran. As far as he is concerned, the situation in Iran has obviously improved.

[Tom Pursglove]

It is of course the case that situations in countries change. That is why the approach we take is flexible and means that we keep under constant review the circumstances in individual countries. We then make judgments on the approach that we take in response.

[Neil Coyle]

The Government’s resettlement scheme for citizens of Afghanistan is not even open and they are paving the way for Afghanistan to be redetermined as a safe country. Based on the previous example, if an Afghan asylum seeker ever gets to come through the scheme in this country and then goes back to visit Pakistan to see relatives—probably in one of the refugee camps there—they may be deemed to be okay to go back to Afghanistan.

[Tom Pursglove]

I can only the refer the hon. Gentleman to the point that I have now made several times about Afghanistan.

[Neil Coyle]

Have you got a more convincing argument?

[Tom Pursglove]

The hon. Gentleman says from a sedentary position that it is not a convincing argument. The bottom line is that we are not removing people to Afghanistan based on the current circumstances. I think that is the right approach.

The ability to return an individual declared inadmissible to any safe country, and not just the safe third country they have a connection to, has formed a part of our inadmissibility process since the changes to our immigration rules in December 2020. In seeking to remove that ability, amendment 19 would remove a provision that Parliament has already been provided an opportunity to scrutinise.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

We all know that there is no scrutiny with these things in any real sense, but that is not a justification for the change. On what possible grounds can a connection with a country A justify removal to country B? What is the point?

[Tom Pursglove]

Again, we have had extensive debates in Committee about the approach that the Government are seeking to take on these matters. We have to stop these dangerous, unacceptable crossings of the channel. We believe that the deterrent effect is very important.

Amendments 18 and 22 to 25, taken together, seek to narrow the meaning of whether we consider an individual to have a connection to a safe third country, and therefore whether it is appropriate to consider them inadmissible. If individuals have travelled via or have connections to safe countries where it is reasonable to expect them to have claimed asylum, they should do so, rather than making dangerous and unnecessary onward journeys to the UK.

We already have in place a well-established process, should it become clear that an individual cannot be returned to a safe country or if after a reasonable period no return agreement has been possible. Where that is the case, the individual’s asylum claim will be considered in the UK. The Bill provisions will not change that. Therefore, I do not agree that amendments 20 and 21 are required.

Agreements by a safe third country to accept an asylum seeker may not always be via a reciprocal arrangement. I believe it is right to also seek returns on a case-by-case basis where appropriate.

[Neil Coyle]

Will the Minister set out how many reciprocal arrangements we have at the moment? Will there be more detail in the Bill documents about what those arrangements might be?

[Tom Pursglove]

As I have said, there are case-by-case agreements that are reached in relation to returns. The Government are ambitious about the approach we want to take through the Bill. We want to try and forge fresh returns agreements with countries. The hon. Gentleman will note that this year we reached a returns agreement with Albania. That is a positive and welcome development. I will not give a running commentary on the negotiations we might be having with countries to forge returns agreements, and he would not expect me to do that.

[Mr Goodwill]

We certainly have a returns agreement with Nigeria, where we have biometric evidence that the person concerned is indeed the person who came to the UK. I know that because I signed it myself.

[Tom Pursglove]

It is fair to say that my right hon. Friend was a proactive Immigration Minister. That was a significant achievement during his tenure.

[Neil Coyle]

While we are celebrating this one reciprocal arrangement that can be used, and having trashed the Dublin Accord and all that it provided, can I just remind the Minister that Albania provided, in the last full year we have stats, the second highest number of successful asylum claims to the UK? The Albanian Foreign Minister has described the Government’s approach to negotiations on offshoring with Albania as “fake news”.

[Tom Pursglove]

As I said, I am not going to get into a running commentary about negotiations that the Government may or may not be having with individual countries. What I would say more generally on returns arrangements is that we are seeking to negotiate readmission arrangements with key EU member states. Where we do not have broad return agreements, we will seek returns on a case-by-case basis—a long-established process that we will continue to follow.

[Mr Goodwill]

I note the point made by the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark, but is it not the case that Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey are in negotiation with the European Union, under article 49 of the 1992 Maastricht treaty? That means that they will have to meet the 1993 Copenhagen criteria on human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities. If they meet those criteria regarding accession to the EU, they must meet the criteria for returns.

[Tom Pursglove]

The simple reality is that we will not return people to countries where to do so would put them in danger, or where their rights would not be respected and upheld. That is a perfectly correct approach to take, and entirely in line with what people would expect.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

rose—

[Tom Pursglove]

I will give way, but I am very conscious that I want to make some progress.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I absolutely accept that that is the Minister’s intention. He is not going to remove people; he is going to do all he can not to remove people to unsafe countries. The problem is: what about the next Minister responsible for immigration? As drafted, this definition of safe third state allows his successor to remove somebody to a place where they are at risk of serious human rights abuses, albeit falling short of a threat to life and liberty—it could be torture or whatever else, just as long as it is not a convention ground. I accept that the Minister is going to do the right thing, but we need a Bill that has proper constraints on the next Minister to come along, and that is not clear.

[Tom Pursglove]

The provisions, as drafted, define safe countries as states where people would not be at risk of persecution or a breach of their article 3 ECHR rights. The provisions are considered and consistent with our obligations under the refugee convention. An individual will have an opportunity to raise specific ECHR claims against removal under schedule 3 provisions.

I am confident that the measures in place are appropriate and sufficiently robust. We know it may not always be appropriate to apply inadmissibility to all claimants. Any oral or written representations from a claimant about why inadmissibility processes should not be applied in their case, including any connections they may have to the UK, will be considered ahead of any removal to a safe third country. However, if an individual has family in the UK, there are family reunion routes available. These amendments should not be used to circumnavigate those provisions. For those reasons, I do not support the suggested addition of proposed new section 80D in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, under amendment 26, and I invite hon. Members not to press it to a Division.

Turning to the clause overall, an increasing number of people are risking their lives to get to the UK, using unseaworthy vessels, putting at risk not only their lives but those of the UK Border Force and rescue services. Those routes are often facilitated by criminal gangs, seeking to arrange those dangerous journeys for profit. We are determined to make the use of small boats to cross the channel an unviable option for reaching the UK. We are determined to send a clear signal that it is unacceptable for individuals to travel through multiple safe countries to then claim asylum in the UK.

To stop people risking their lives on those dangerous crossings, reduce the unsustainable pressure on the asylum system and protect those most in need, we must be clear that many of those coming to the UK by irregular means will not be admitted into our asylum system. Inadmissibility is a long-standing process, designed to prevent secondary movements across Europe, and these measures are being introduced to support that. People should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach, rather than make dangerous journeys to the UK to claim asylum here.

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

What consideration has the Minister given to the impact on the system of international protection for those fleeing conflict and persecution if the entire world adopted that principle, so that the responsibility only ever fell on the countries on the frontline of conflict and persecution?

[Tom Pursglove]

I have heard the point that the hon. Gentleman has raised. I would make the point that this country has and will continue to make a significant contribution to the global effort to tackle the challenges that we face around displacement. We would argue that that must be achieved through safe and legal routes. That is the cornerstone of our policy, and I think that is the right approach. We must render these dangerous channel crossings unviable.

[Paul Blomfield]

I thank the Minister for giving way again. I want to press the issue, because it is helpful to have an answer that reflects the question. The question did not ask him to reiterate his belief, but to articulate what the Government feel would be the consequences for the international protection system if every country adopted the same approach.

[Tom Pursglove]

The point that I would make is that we need to establish a clear principle that people should come to this country through safe and legal routes. We would argue that the best and most effective contribution that we can make as part of the global effort is to establish those safe and legal routes—there are many past and current examples. We think that is the right approach; we cannot in any way support or endorse people making dangerous and unacceptable crossings.

As a result, we strongly believe that the approach that we are taking in the Bill is right and builds on our proud traditions in this country of providing sanctuary to those who require it. That gets to the heart of the hon. Gentleman’s question. It is not about this country refusing to participate in the global effort, but about establishing clear expectations around how we intend to do that. We will continue to build on the proud traditions that we have in this country.

[Neil Coyle]

I am finding the Minister’s answers increasingly disappointing. Could he come back to the specific legal question from my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate about article 33 of the refugee convention and the principle of non-refoulement?

[Tom Pursglove]

Again, I refer back to the point that has been raised, which is that we will not return individuals to countries where they would be unsafe as a consequence. Of course we would look at cases on an individual basis and at the concerns that have been raised. If there are concerns, it is important that they are properly taken into account. I am confident that the approach we are taking addresses that issue.

We know, however, that it may not always be appropriate to apply inadmissibility to all claimants. For example, we will not apply those procedures to unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. The introduction of the clauses on inadmissibility aims to strengthen our position on inadmissibility, further disincentivise people from making those dangerous journeys, and encourage them to claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. Those who fear persecution should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. Parliament has already had an opportunity to scrutinise the measures when they were placed in the immigration rules in December 2020.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I just do not think that the significant legal questions that have been asked have been answered appropriately, and there are all sorts of questions about the safeguards around the description of a safe third state, so I want to press amendment 56 to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Before I invite the Minister to respond, I need to clarify something. At the start of his remarks, the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark indicated that there had been a lack of time to consider the Bill. I cannot recall whether he was a member of the Programming Sub-Committee, which I chaired, but the programme motion was agreed by its members, from both sides of the House. The motion was then put to the whole Committee at the start of the first evidence session, and was again agreed without dispute. I am sure that no criticism of the Chair was intended, but I think it is necessary to clarify that.

Let me also make it absolutely plain that this Chair, and I am sure Ms McDonagh, is at the service of the Committee, as are the Officers of the House. It may be unpalatable, inconvenient or undesirable, but if it is necessary for the Committee to sit late into the evening, or even into the night, and that is what the Committee desires, then we are at your disposal. Clearly, we have to expedite the business, and believe me that this Chair, at least, understands the difference between a filibuster and a contribution, and I will say so, but no Member on either side of the Committee should feel constrained by time. We have an important job to do, and it is vital that we do it thoroughly. I hope that is absolutely clear.

[Tom Pursglove]

Thank you for that clarification, Sir Roger. I thank hon. Members for raising these important issues. I will start by addressing amendments 36 and 37.

We all recognise that young or particularly vulnerable claimants, sufferers of trauma such as sexual violence or ill treatment on account of their sexual orientation or gender identity, and survivors of modern slavery or trafficking need to be treated with care, dignity and sensitivity. It is important that they are able to fully participate in the asylum process so that, in the case of a genuine applicant, their claim for protection can be recognised and their status settled at the earliest opportunity. That is in the best interests of the claimant and the overall functioning of the asylum system.

At the same time, we recognise that it may be harder for some people to engage in the process. That may be because of their past experiences, a lack of trust in the authorities, or because of the sensitive and personal nature of their claim. That is why clauses 16, 17 and 23 provide for good reasons why evidence might be provided late. What constitutes “good reasons” has not been defined in the Bill, as that would limit the discretion and flexibility of decision makers to take factors into account on a case-by-case basis. It would be impractical to legislate for every case type where someone may have good reasons for not previously disclosing evidence in relation to their protection claim.

Good reasons may include objective factors such as practical difficulties in obtaining evidence. That may be where the evidence was not previously available or there was a lack of availability for an expert report. Good reasons may also include subjective factors, such as a claimant’s particular vulnerabilities relating to their age, sexual orientation, gender identity or mental health. Decision makers, including the judiciary, will be better placed to identify and assess those factors on an individual and case-by-case basis.

Rather than facilitate engagement in the process, amendments 36 and 37 would exclude claimants from it. They would artificially limit the circumstances in which the evidence notice would apply, favouring certain groups above others, who may have genuinely good reasons for providing late evidence. The amendment could create a perverse outcome, whereby it takes longer for the particulars of a genuine claim to be surfaced and to receive favourable consideration. Furthermore, this would create a situation in which unscrupulous claimants could cynically abuse the process by falsely claiming to be within one of those categories. That would tie the hands of decision makers, who are able to look at the facts of a case in detail and make an appropriate decision based on the facts before them. That would perpetuate the issues that the clauses are designed to address, to the detriment of genuine claimants.

[Neil Coyle]

I did point out earlier that 23% of these applications come from children. Is the Minister suggesting that they are making bogus claims and are cynical? Those are the words he is using. I urge him to distinguish more carefully between children and adults, and would make the case again that children should be exempt, specifically because of their age.

[Tom Pursglove]

I will develop my remarks a little further. I will come back to some of the points raised in the debate, but to start with I want to get through the rationale behind our thinking on the various amendments before the Committee.

Amendment 37 also fails to fully understand the remit of clause 16. The evidence notice applies solely to evidence in support of protection and human rights claims. The new slavery and trafficking information notice, covered in clause 46, will require a person to provide any information relevant to their status as a victim of modern slavery or trafficking.

On amendment 153, the Government take their responsibility towards those seeking international protection seriously. We recognise that particularly vulnerable claimants and survivors of modern slavery need to be treated with care, dignity and sensitivity. Individuals may be particularly vulnerable as a result of their age, their health, the experiences they have lived through or a range of other factors. It is because these factors can be so wide ranging that I am resisting this amendment.

Clause 16 and the new evidence notice will require those who make a protection or human rights claim to provide evidence in support of their claim before the date specified in the evidence notice. This clause works in parallel with clauses 17 and 23. Where evidence is provided late, claimants will be required to provide reasons for that. Where there are no good reasons for the late provision of evidence, this should result in damage to the claimant’s credibility, and decision makers must have regard to the principle that little weight should be given to that evidence.

By introducing a statutory requirement to provide evidence before a specified date, clause 16 will contribute to the swift resolution of protection and human rights claims, enabling decision makers to consider all the evidence up front and, where appropriate, grant leave. However, we recognise that it may be harder for some people to engage in the process. That may be as a result of trauma they have experienced, a lack of trust in the authorities, or because of the sensitive and personal nature of their claim. That is why clause 16, together with clauses 17 and 23, allows for good reasons why evidence might be provided late. As I say, what constitutes good reasons has not been defined in the Bill. It would be impractical to legislate for every case type where someone may have good reasons for not previously disclosing evidence in relation to their protection claim.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Nobody is arguing for an exhaustive list, but if we are all agreed that these are examples of good reasons, why not include them as a non-exhaustive list, just to make sure that these people are protected?

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[Tom Pursglove]

Of course, the situation will be set out clearly in guidance. We think that is the better approach, because it allows greater flexibility on the sorts of factors that might be relevant to the disclosure of late information, and obviously on matters that are relevant to individuals circumstances.

We tend to think that taking a less prescriptive approach than what the hon. Member is suggesting is the best way to address that, because we want to focus on individual cases and on ensuring proper consideration on a case-by-case basis, which is very difficult to capture in the circumstances being suggested here or by adopting the approach necessary to achieve that. That is why clause 16, together with clauses 17 and 23, allows for good reasons why evidence might be provided late.

As per the amendments directly commented on, rather than facilitate engagement in the process, amendment 153 would exclude claimants from it. This would have the perverse impact of some vulnerable claimants facing different evidential requirements simply because their particular vulnerability was not included in the list of exceptions. In addition, the amendment could create a situation where individuals who do not fall into one of the categories identified by the amendment were able to abuse the process by falsely claiming that they did. This would perpetuate the issues these clauses are designed to address to the detriment of genuine claimants, undermining their usefulness.

I am mindful that a number of detailed points were raised during the debate that I want to come to. The issue of deviation from the Home Office’s existing policy was raised by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central. I would not accept that depiction. I would say that the Home Office will have discretion over who is served an evidence notice and the extent to which credibility is damaged by late evidence. Where there are good reasons for late evidence, credibility will not be damaged. There is nothing automatic about this. Credibility is also not by itself determinative.

Building on that point, there are various safeguards in the clauses that mitigate a decision that could lead to removal in breach of the rights afforded by the conventions. First, claimants who raise matters late will have the opportunity to provide reasons for that lateness—and where those reasons are good, credibility will not be damaged. Decision makers will have the discretion to determine the extent to which credibility should be damaged, and that determination need not by itself be determinative of a claim, as I have already said.

The point was raised, understandably and quite rightly, about how we intend to deal with potential victims of trauma. Of course, how decision makers reach decisions is important in all this, and they should treat claims from vulnerable people in accordance with the guidance that we will set out. Extensive training will of course be put in place alongside that. Decision makers are already accustomed to ensuring that complex factors relating to trauma are properly considered.

[Neil Coyle]

How will this training operate in practice, given the points already made about how long it can take for PTSD symptoms and impact to emerge? No training on the planet can force those symptoms to emerge sooner, unless the Home Office is developing a particularly pernicious system.

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[Tom Pursglove]

I do not accept the hon. Gentleman’s latter point. I would expect there to be extensive training for decision makers on guidance when it is issued. Again, I make the point that the approach we are adopting is intended to be responsive to individual circumstances, and cases should be considered on a case-by-case basis. That is the entire approach we are taking here.

The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate, raised the issue of refoulement, and I just want to be clear on this point. Again, individuals will not be removed if there is a risk of refoulement, and the provisions are drafted to ensure this.

On the point made by the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark about legal aid, it is generally not available to individuals who are seeking advice or assistance with citizenship applications or on nationality matters. That is because it is not an issue within scope of the legal aid scheme—in other words, it is not an issue that Parliament has expressly provided for in statute as something for which legal aid can be provided.

For any issue where legal aid is not available, individuals can apply for exceptional case funding. The test for this is whether, without legal aid, an individual’s human rights might be breached. The only group of people who can routinely receive advice on nationality and citizenship are separated migrant children, as that is provided for in statute. We will come on to later clauses in which the legal aid provisions in this Bill, which relate to priority removal notices, will no doubt be debated as part of our consideration.

The hon. Gentleman also asked me whether a child rights impact assessment has been carried out on clauses 16 to 23. As part of our obligations under the public sector equality duty, equality impact assessments have been completed in respect of these clauses, and those assessments incorporate a consideration of the impacts on children.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Having looked at the amendments, I think amendment 153 is more substantive than my amendments 36 and 37. On the understanding that the spokesperson for the Scottish National party, the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, will be pressing amendment 153 to a vote, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

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[The Chair]

The Chair has no desire to curtail comment, particularly from the Front Benches, but we do have to remain within the scope of the matter under discussion. I am conscious that that is difficult when there are related clauses, but the hon. Gentleman has strayed into referring to clauses 20 and 23. The Chair will bear that in mind when we come to those debates; I would not expect repetition on the subject.

[Tom Pursglove]

Amendment 39 would render clause 17 inoperable. Clause 17 introduces two new behaviours into section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. That section provides that a decision maker shall take account, as damaging the claimant’s credibility, of the behaviour to which the section applies. Without the consequent amendment to section 8, which amendment 39 seeks to remove, there is no penalty for late evidence or not acting in good faith, which would make such a measure inappropriate for primary legislation and would also render it pointless.

Clause 17 is not prescriptive as to how decision makers, within both the Home Office and the judiciary, determine credibility or the claim itself. It has always been the case that decision makers must consider egregious conduct by the claimant. It is then open to the Home Office or the courts to decide the extent to which credibility should subsequently be damaged. Amendment 39 simply seeks to do away with that well established principle.

Let me build on the point about the judiciary and the point that was raised by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East. He asked, “Aren’t judges best placed to determine the credibility that evidence should have? Why be prescriptive?” The point that I will make in response is that clause 17 is not prescriptive as to how judges determine credibility or the claim itself. It adds two new behaviours to the existing section 8 of the 2004 Act. That section provides that a decision maker shall take account, as damaging the claimant’s credibility, of the behaviour to which the section applies. I think it is important to clarify this. It should be noted that clause 17 applies to all decision makers. That includes Home Office staff who make the initial decision on protection and human rights claims. Clause 17 adds new behaviours to the existing behaviours that should already be taken into account as damaging to credibility under section 8 of the 2004 Act. The concept that certain conduct should be damaging to credibility is nothing new. It has always been the case that decision makers must consider egregious conduct by the claimant. It is then open to the Home Office or the courts to decide the extent to which credibility should subsequently be damaged.

Clause 17 will also not be determinative of a claim. Decision makers will still be required to consider the claimant’s credibility in the round, as they would currently as part of their decision-making processes.

[Neil Coyle]

Clause 17 further compounds the damage potentially arising from clause 16. When answering the question about a child rights impact assessment, the Minister seemed to talk about an equality impact assessment. I wonder again whether a child rights impact assessment, as developed by his colleagues in the Department for Education for schools, would benefit the Government, to prevent them from imposing conditions that fall foul of other Government legislation—

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[The Chair]

I will allow the question.

[Tom Pursglove]

Thank you, Sir Roger. I want to pick up on a couple of other points that were raised in responding to amendment 39. I should clarify that clauses 17 and 23 do not apply to consideration of modern slavery referrals. Claims are considered holistically, and credibility is not by itself determinative of a claim. It is important to emphasise that point. The hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate raised the case of Gloria. Obviously, I am mindful of talking about individual cases because of the difficulties associated with that, as I am sure that he will appreciate, but clauses 17 and 23 do not prevent someone from providing late evidence. Late evidence will still be considered in full. Where there are good reason for lateness, a person’s credibility will not be damaged and clause 23 will not apply. I wanted to provide clarity on that point. With that, I ask that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East withdraw amendment 39, and that the Committee agree that clause 17 stand part of the Bill.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

As a point of principle, I object to Parliament telling decision makers what to think, but having made my point I am happy to leave it there for now, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, That clause 17 stand part of the Bill.

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Priority removal notices

[Tom Pursglove]

I beg to move amendment 60, in clause 18, page 22, line 26, leave out “10(1) or (2)” and insert “10”.

This amendment is consequential on clause 43 of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendment 61.

Clause stand part.

[Tom Pursglove]

It is often the case that those facing removal or deportation from the UK raise late protection or human rights claims that could have been provided at an earlier juncture. That causes unnecessary delay and expense to the taxpayer. The clause strengthens the existing one-stop process by establishing a priority removal notice, or PRN, which may be issued to a person who is liable to removal or deportation from the UK. The PRN will require a person to raise any new or additional grounds for why they should remain in the UK before the date specified in the notice. That includes information relevant to whether the person is a victim of modern slavery or trafficking. Any supporting evidence must be provided at the same time. That will ensure that all claims can be considered sufficiently in advance of the person’s removal, reducing the extent to which removal can be frustrated, and allowing those in need of international protection to be identified and supported as early as possible.

Factors that may lead to a person being issued with a priority removal notice will be set out in guidance and will include, for example, where a person has previously made a protection or human rights claim. Where information or evidence is provided on or after the PRN cut-off date and without good reason, it should be damaging to the person’s credibility. Those reforms will drive efficiencies across the system, decreasing the cost of unnecessary litigation and failed removal attempts, while maintaining fairness, ensuring access to justice and upholding the rule of law.

Amendments 60 and 61 are minor amendments to reflect a change to clause 43 and to remove a superfluous paragraph in subsection (7) of the clause that has no material impact.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Tenth sitting)

Tom Pursglove Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 26th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Government amendment 61.

Clause stand part.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Tom Pursglove)]

I was about to conclude by saying that paragraphs (a) and (c) of subsection (7) suffice to capture every scenario. Removing paragraph (b) does not affect how the clause operates or who it impacts. I commend the amendments and the clause to the Committee.

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

We intend to oppose the clause standing part of the Bill. The clause is an entirely new provision. Its stated aim is to reduce the extent to which people may frustrate removals through sequential or unmeritorious claims, appeals or legal action. It does so by providing for a priority removal notice, or PRN, to be served on anyone who is liable for removal or for deportation. Factors might include where a person has previously made a human rights or protection claim.

According to the explanatory notes, subsection (3) defines a PRN. It states that the notice imposes a duty on the claimant to provide a statement setting out the reasons for wishing to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, any grounds on which they should be permitted to do so, and any grounds on which they should not be removed or required to leave the United Kingdom. The notice also requires them to provide any information relating to being a victim of slavery or human trafficking as defined by clause 46.

The notice also requires them to provide any evidence in support of any reasons, grounds or information. The statement, grounds, information and evidence must be provided before the PRN cut-off date included within the notice. Intended as a warning to the person that they are being prioritised for removal, the notice gives them a period of time—the cut-off period—within which to access legal advice and to inform the Home Office of any grounds or evidence that they want to provide in support of a claim to be allowed to remain in the UK.

The clause and the introduction of priority removal notices are part of wider proposals to fast-track claims and appeals, and to create a one-stop process for claims to asylum to be brought and considered together in a single assessment up front. The consequences of the clauses related to priority removal notices will make it harder for people to bring evidence after making an initial asylum claim and penalise delayed disclosure. Indeed, if anything required by the PRN is provided after the specified cut-off date, a decision maker—when determining a protection or human rights claim, or making a decision as to whether the person is a potential or actual victim of trafficking—will treat it with scepticism and it will be considered damaging to the person’s credibility and their claim.

The requirements related to the PRN are extensive. It requires all manner of claims and evidence to be provided, covering all grounds for resisting removal and all evidence in support. When implemented, that could have incredibly damaging consequences for people seeking asylum, as it requires them to provide extensive supporting evidence by a specified date. For example, it will seriously disadvantage vulnerable people and victims, such as those who suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, or those who have been trafficked, as well as those who are LGBTQ, as I have mentioned previously.

The introduction of priority removal notices fails to acknowledge the reality of situations that people seeking asylum may encounter. There are many reasons that evidence may be provided late but in earnest, as we have explored already, for example with traumatised victims. The ultimate consequence of people not being able properly to present evidence relating to their claim, or being deemed to lack credibility as a result of failing to present such evidence on time, is that claims may be rejected and people may be wrongly subject to removal. The Opposition are very concerned that these measures may give rise to a significant risk of refoulement and will consequently abandon the UK’s obligations under international law.

In short, the proposals are unacceptable. They form a package of measures that seek to create a one-stop process for asylum claims and fail to do so in a fair or humane way. They are widely condemned by the sector. The Opposition are vehemently opposed to the introduction of priority removal notices and, when they are taken in conjunction with the series of clauses in part 2, are incredibly concerned about these measures. Its potentially strict application risks having a severe impact on asylum seekers and refugees, in terms of both procedural fairness and ensuring that people are protected by the refugee convention. We therefore oppose the clause.

Amendment 60 agreed to.

Amendment made: 61, in clause 18, page 22, line 28, leave out paragraph (b).—(Tom Pursglove.)

This amendment removes a superfluous paragraph (any person within paragraph (b) would in any event fall within either paragraph (a) or (c)).

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

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Priority removal notices: supplementary

[Tom Pursglove]

I beg to move amendment 62, in clause 19, page 22, line 43, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert—

“(a) the PRN cut-off date, or

(b) if later, the day on which any appeal rights of the PRN recipient in respect of a relevant claim are exhausted.”.

This amendment and Amendments 63 and 64 provide that a priority removal notice will remain in force for 12 months after a PRN recipient’s appeal rights are exhausted in relation to any protection or human rights claim brought while the notice is in force.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 63 to 66.

Clause stand part.

[Tom Pursglove]

This clause is supplementary to clause 18, which we have just discussed. It makes provision for the validity and effect of a priority removal notice. A priority removal notice imposes requirements to provide any reason and supporting evidence as to why a person should be allowed to remain in the UK. This will reduce the extent to which removal can be frustrated.

Where a priority removal notice has been issued, it will remain in force for a period of 12 months after either the cut-off date specified in the notice or after the recipient has exhausted their appeal rights. A period of 12 months will provide sufficient time for the person’s removal to be enforced. Following the service of a priority removal notice, any previous evidence notice, slavery or trafficking information notice, or notice under section 120 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, will cease to take effect. Any appeal right arising from a protection or human rights claim received after the cut-off date will be subject to the expedited process as provided for by clause 21, unless the claimant provides good reasons for late disclosure.

The amendments are minor and technical and are intended to ensure that the new priority removal notice will work as effectively as possible. Amendments 62 to 64 provide for a priority removal notice to remain in force for a period of 12 months after the recipient’s appeal rights are exhausted. Amendments 65 and 66 clarify that a priority removal notice will remain in force where the recipient is no longer liable to removal or deportation from the UK. This makes it clear that where the recipient of a priority removal notice makes an application to the EU settlement scheme that is later refused, they will remain subject to the priority removal notice.

[Bambos Charalambous]

The Opposition will oppose the clause standing part of the Bill. It forms part of the Bill’s new PRN regime, as initially set out in clause 18, and states that the PRN will remain in force until 12 months after the cut-off date or the person’s appeal rights become exhausted, whichever comes last. The Opposition believe that preventing people from being able to bring further evidence for 12 months after they have been issued with a PRN is wrong. It is unfair and it fails to consider the reasons for delayed disclosure, which range from psychological and cultural barriers to the crucial fact that those who are seeking asylum have fled their homes and may not have access to evidence immediately.

When applied narrowly and in conjunction with other clauses in part 2, the proposed provisions potentially risk significant breaches of the refugee convention and the principle of non-refoulement. For those reasons, and reasons discussed in the debate on clause 18, we will be voting against clause 19.

Amendment 62 agreed to.

Amendments made: 63, in clause 19, page 23, line 3, at end insert—

“(1A) In subsection (1) ‘relevant claim’ means a protection claim or a human rights claim brought by the PRN recipient while the priority removal notice is in force.”

See the explanatory statement to Amendment 62.

Amendment 64, in clause 19, page 23, line 4, after “rights” insert

“in respect of a claim”.

See the explanatory statement to Amendment 62.

Amendment 65, in clause 19, page 23, line 11, at end insert—

“(2A) A priority removal notice remains in force until the end of the period mentioned in subsection (1) even if the PRN recipient ceases to be liable to removal or deportation from the United Kingdom during that period.”

This amendment clarifies that although a priority removal notice can only be served on a person if they are liable to removal or deportation, the fact that the person ceases to be so liable does not mean that the notice will cease to have effect.

Amendment 66, in clause 19, page 23, line 23, leave out subsection (6) and insert—

“(6) Expressions used in this section that are defined for the purposes of section 18 have the same meaning in this section as in that section.”—(Tom Pursglove.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 65.

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bambos Charalambous]

Priority removal notices will apply to all people to whom they apply. If they qualify, they will qualify under that regime. I do not think people can be distinguished on the basis on their offences.

Clause 20 and the wider proposals around priority removal notices will penalise the most vulnerable and those who have been failed by the system by reducing the significance of any evidence submitted after the applicant has been through the one-stop process. That could include independent expert medical evidence, such as medico-legal reports, which often prove determinative in asylum appeals.

Ultimately, the provision around late compliance risks people not being given protection even though they deserve it and are in need of it. For the reasons I have specified, we will oppose clause 20 standing part of the Bill.

[Tom Pursglove]

By introducing the statutory requirement to provide information or evidence before a specified date, clauses 16 and 18 will contribute to the swift resolution of protection and human rights claims, enabling decision makers to consider all the evidence up front and, where appropriate, grant leave. It is right that where evidence or information is provided late, that should impact on a person’s credibility, and that the decision maker must consider whether to apply the minimal weight principle, unless there are good reasons why it was brought late.

Clauses 20 and 23 both recognise that it may be harder for some people to engage in the process and provide evidence before a specified date. That may be the result of trauma they have experienced, a lack of trust in the authorities or the sensitive and personal nature of their claim. Amendment 41 removes the possible credibility implications stemming from late evidence in response to a priority removal notice. It is right that where evidence or information is provided late, that should impact on a person’s credibility, unless there are good reasons why it was brought late. Where there are good reasons that information or evidence was provided late, the penalties in clauses 20 and 23 will not apply.

Clause 20 recognises that there may be good reasons that evidence was provided late. Where there are good reasons, the associated credibility provisions in clauses 20 and 23 will not apply. Therefore, amendment 41 is unnecessary, as the clause already meets its aim that late evidence should not necessarily be damaging to the claimant’s credibility. As with amendment 39, by removing the possible credibility implications stemming from late provision of evidence, amendment 41 would make such a measure inappropriate for primary legislation and render it pointless. Amendment 154 places a statutory obligation on decision makers to accept that there are good reasons for late evidence where an individual’s claim is based on certain factors, or the individual falls into a particular category. That would apply to Home Office decision makers and, under amendment 154, the competent authority as well as the judiciary.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

This comes back to the point that we were discussing this morning about PTSD. The Minister seems to be saying that if PTSD were on the list and someone could not prove that they had it that would advantage those who could prove that the condition had been diagnosed while disadvantaging those who had not had a diagnosis. However, they would not get a diagnosis within the timeframe specified in the legislation. Perhaps a means to address that anomaly is the Government providing their own list of good reasons that could be used to distinguish between cases—on a case-by-case basis—based on how long someone has been in the process and whether they are undergoing assessment for PTSD. That could be a way to resolve that predicament. As it stands, the Minister seems to be saying that he cannot accept the amendment because it would advantage those whom the Government’s plans disadvantage.

[Tom Pursglove]

Our intention is to publish guidance to help operationalise the measures in the Bill that will set this out in more detail. We would expect, as I have said in relation to several amendments and clauses, that caseworkers will consider those factors properly when reaching judgments about individual cases.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Blomfield]

rose—

[Tom Pursglove]

I will take an intervention from the hon. Member for Sheffield Central.

[Paul Blomfield]

I am trying to explore the contradiction in what the Minister has just said. He said that the Government intended to produce guidance that set out what good reasons were subsequent to the legislation, but he cautioned against requiring good reasons, because that would exclude some people from justice. Would he square that circle for me?

[Tom Pursglove]

We think that the appropriate place to be clear about these matters is in the guidance, rather than the Bill. As I say, I would expect decision makers to take into account all the relevant factors at play in an individual case when making decisions relating to it. Rather as we have discussed in relation to other clauses and amendments, there is flexibility in certain circumstances, where good reasons can be shown as to why evidence would not be produced sooner. We recognise that people may be in difficult circumstances and that issues arise in their lives. We want the system to be responsive to that and to take proper account of it, which is why we are proposing to proceed as we are doing.

To return to the point that I was making on amendment 139, it would perpetuate the issues that the clauses are designed to address to the detriment of genuine claimants, undermining their usefulness. Amendment 139 would also introduce a requirement to publish guidance on good reasons within 30 days of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. That is an arbitrary deadline and it is not necessary to include it on the face of the Bill. As I have indicated, good reasons will be set out in published guidance for decision makers and will be made available when the measures come into force.

[Neil Coyle]

Will the Minister give way?

[Tom Pursglove]

Very briefly.

[Neil Coyle]

It is a brief intervention. I am reminded of what the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby said about being cautioned by the police. Will the good reasons clauses cover children specifically? We need to know, given that they represent almost a quarter of asylum claims, and given the issue of age and maturity.

Moreover, what evidence would a gay man trying to escape Iran or another oppressive have to provide in order to prove his circumstances? What would the threshold be, given how hard it has been to provide proof in multiple cases under the existing system?

[Tom Pursglove]

I can confirm that it will refer to children. To conclude my remarks, I respectfully invite the hon. Member for Sheffield Central to withdraw the amendment.

On clause 20, the unnecessary provision of late evidence, statements and information delays justice for those with genuine claims, and wastes valuable resources. Clause 20 will work in parallel with clauses 18 and 19 to support the new priority removal notice. Its focus is on encouraging persons liable to removal or deportation to provide at the earliest opportunity any information or evidence in support of their protection or human rights claim, or, for potential victims of modern slavery, in relation to a decision by the competent authority. Where information or evidence is provided on or after the cut-off date, as set out in the priority removal notice and without good reason, it is right that that should be taken into account as damaging to the person’s credibility. I hope that the Committee will agree to the clause standing part of the Bill.

[Paul Blomfield]

I am afraid that I am unconvinced by the Minister’s response, so I wish to press amendment 139 to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 155, in clause 21, page 24, line 21, at end insert—

“(2A) The Secretary of State must accept that there are good reasons for P making the claim on or after the cut-off date where—

(a) the PRN recipient’s protection or human rights claim is based on sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics;

(b) the PRN recipient is suffering from a mental health condition or impairment;

(c) the PRN recipient has been a victim of torture;

(d) the PRN recipient has been a victim of sexual or gender based violence;

(e) the PRN recipient has been a victim of human trafficking or modern slavery;

(f) the PRN recipient is suffering from a serious physical disability;

(g) the PRN recipient is suffering from other serious physical health conditions or illnesses.”

This amendment defines ”good reasons” for the purposes of section 82A(2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (as inserted by this Bill).

If someone makes a protection claim after the PRN cut-off, then unless the Secretary of State is satisfied there are good reasons, she must certify the appeal right and it will be subjected to an expedited appeal straight to the upper tribunal. Tribunal procedure rules, then, must make provision for this. If it is in the interests of justice for an appeal not to be expedited, the tribunal may order that it is no longer subject to that process. This, too, prevents any onward appeal.

In the next debate I will set out our opposition to the clause as a whole, but amendment 155 sets out a situation where the Secretary of State must accept there has been a reasonable excuse, similar to before. It would surely be wrong to subject survivors of human trafficking, or gender-based violence or torture—to use but three examples—to an accelerated appeal, simply on the grounds that they were late making a claim in response to a PRN. We have heard very powerful reasons already today, including in Home Office guidance, why that can be an incredibly difficult process.

I suspect the Minister will again reject this amendment on the same grounds as before, but it is at least useful for him to state on record that these are the types of claimant that he envisages should not be pushed through any accelerated appeal process. I will listen carefully to what he has to say in that regard.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for tabling amendment 155, which seeks to define good reasons for the purposes of proposed new section 82A(2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. I appreciate the concerns this amendment is attempting to address but the Government must oppose it. The amendment would result in all individuals who meet any of the descriptors listed being exempt from the expedited appeal process, even where their reason for lateness may be completely unrelated and make redundant any need to submit a claim by the date specified in the PRN.

I acknowledge that the experiences and circumstances listed in the amendment can inform why a person has made an application late. However, the duty on the Secretary of State will see all and any reasons for lateness being considered. Guidance for decision makers will be published and made available when these measures come into force. For that reason, I invite the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I beg to move amendment 67, in clause 21, page 24, line 27, after “are” insert “brought and”.

This amendment and Amendment 68 clarify that the Tribunal Procedure Rules establishing the new expedited appeals process must aim to ensure that both the bringing of an appeal and its determination are expedited.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 68 and 69.

Amendment 42, in clause 21, page 24, line 37, leave out subsection (2).

This amendment would protect the right to an onward appeal from an expedited appeal decision by the Upper Tribunal in certain cases.

Clause stand part.

That schedule 2 be the Second schedule to the Bill.

[Tom Pursglove]

The Government propose three amendments to clause 21. Two amendments relate to the timeframe for bringing an expedited appeal. Accordingly, they clarify that the tribunal procedure rules must provide that an expedited appeal is brought more quickly than a standard appeal. That will ensure that individuals bring appeals promptly. The third amendment provides that, where the upper tribunal exercises its discretion to order that an expedited appeal should not be treated as such, the appeal will be transferred to the first-tier tribunal. This amendment provides an important clarification about the impact of the upper tribunal’s discretion to remove a case from the expedited appeal route. I therefore urge the hon. Members to support the Government amendments.

I thank the hon. Members for tabling amendment 42, which concerns the finality of decisions by the upper tribunal in expedited appeals. However, the Government oppose the amendment. The expedited appeal process provides effective access to justice while protecting the appeals system from abuse by individuals who deliberately act to prolong their case, thereby delaying a final decision.

We believe that where recipients of a priority removal notice who have received an offer of enhanced legal advice bring a late human rights or protection claim without good reason, any subsequent appeal should be dealt with expeditiously by experienced senior judges, and that their decision should be final. We believe that that strikes a balance, ensuring that appellants have access to justice, while protecting the appeals system from abuse. Section 13 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 provides for various upper tribunal decisions to be excluded from onward appeal. It is appropriate that expedited appeals are included within the list of excluded decisions that are not appealable.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Tom Pursglove]

Clause 22 provides for legally aided advice to be available to all individuals who have received a priority removal notice. The priority removal notice is designed to give advance notice to individuals who are being prioritised for removal from the UK, and requires them to raise any reasons why they should not be removed. It is essential that individuals have access to free and impartial legal advice upon receipt of a priority removal notice. Those individuals need to understand what the notice is and what it is asking them to do, and they need the opportunity to go through their individual circumstances with a qualified lawyer and confirm whether there are any reasons why they should not be removed from the UK, and how to raise those reasons. Access to this legal advice will be free to the individual, with the only criterion for the advice being receipt of the priority removal notice.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Blomfield]

Similarly, I want to ask a couple of questions of the Minister on why the opportunity has not been taken to go beyond the provisions in the clause, because there is a real problem with access to legal aid. Research by Refugee Action has shown that, since the changes introduced in 2012, it has been much more difficult to secure legal aid. There is also a vast difference in provision across the country, with provision concentrated in metropolitan areas such as London and Birmingham, and not in dispersal areas, where it is particularly difficult to access legal aid. Refugee Action’s report recommended that the Government should commit to ensuring that everybody in the asylum system who is eligible for legal aid representation has access to it. What are the Government proposing in respect of that?

If the clause is about ensuring that issues are resolved at the appropriate stage, why are the Government not extending legal aid to all stages of the process? If cases are successfully resolved at an earlier stage, surely it is to everybody’s benefit.

[Tom Pursglove]

I will try to respond to the various points that have been raised as best as I am able. I will, of course, happily feed through the views that have been expressed to Ministry of Justice colleagues who have direct responsibility for legal aid within their portfolio.

On the initial point about the seven hours, it is worth saying that the power we are proposing will allow the Lord Chancellor to amend the number of hours of advice available under the clause. The Lord Chancellor will have to lay affirmative legislation to ensure that Members of this House and the other place have full sight of the proposed changes. That power is necessary because the priority removal notice is a new process and, as with all new operational processes, it will take time to bed in. We must be able to change the number of hours to ensure that the purpose of the clause works how we intend in practice. Providing individuals with access to free legal advice ahead of their potential removal from the UK is clearly important. That is why we are making that commitment in the Bill.

I was asked what this extension of legal aid will cost. The estimates are in the region of £4 million to £6 million, so it is a significant increase to meet the need resulting from the new measures we are introducing. If, at the end of the seven hours, more advice is needed—and there are circumstances which dictate that—there is legal advice available for asylum claims and appeals.

[Neil Coyle]

Is that £4 million to £6 million just for the civil legal services under clause 22 for people under priority removal notices?

[Tom Pursglove]

Yes. That provision is made precisely for those in receipt of a PRN. I was making a point about the extension. It is worth making the point that, if people find that they require further advice at the end of the seven hours, any individual needing more legal advice on an immigration matter can apply for in-scope legal aid, such as for asylum advice or through the exceptional case funding scheme, subject to passing the relevant means and merits tests. I will make sure that colleagues in the Ministry of Justice are aware of the points raised today on legal aid more generally within the immigration and asylum system.

There was a question about access to justice in dispersal areas. The hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark asked where information about legal aid provision is provided. My understanding is that it is published online, so it is readily accessible to people. As hon. Members would expect on the issue of dispersal areas, the MOJ monitors the market capacity and works with the Home Office to ensure supply in dispersal areas. If the hon. Member for Sheffield Central wants to write to me with specific concerns on that matter in his community, I would be glad to look at those and make sure that they are considered by Ministers appropriately.

[Paul Blomfield]

I will take the Minister up on his offer, but I want to press him on another point. He talks about legal aid being made available for the new provision for a priority removal notice. However, the Home Secretary has the opportunity to issue a priority removal notice, but is not required to do so—it might not be done in all cases. There will potentially be people who are served with a notice of removal who have never received a priority removal notice. They will not have the opportunity to access the seven hours of free legal aid. What is the justification for that?

[Tom Pursglove]

The hon. Member is seeking to extend the provision we are proposing in the Bill. We are very clear that the clause makes the legal advice available to those who have been served with priority removal notices. We do not propose to extend the offer beyond that. However, I will make sure that his concerns are flagged with ministerial colleagues in the Ministry of Justice.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23

Late provision of evidence in asylum or human rights claim: weight

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 43, in clause 23, page 26, line 38, leave out subsection (2) and insert—

“(2) Where subsection (1) applies, the deciding authority must have regard to the fact of the evidence being provided late and any reasons why it was provided late in considering it and determining the claim or appeal.”

This amendment would remove the provision which states that “minimal weight” should be given to any evidence provided late.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank hon. Members for raising these important issues. We all recognise that young or particularly vulnerable claimants, sufferers of trauma such as sexual violence or ill-treatment on account of their sexual orientation or gender identity, and survivors of modern slavery or trafficking need to be treated with care, dignity and sensitivity. It is important that they are able to participate fully in the asylum process so that, in the case of a genuine applicant, their claim for protection can be recognised and their status settled at the earliest opportunity. That is in the best interests of the claimant and the overall functioning of the asylum system.

At the same time, we recognise that it may be harder for some people to engage in the process. That may be because of their past experiences, because of a lack of trust in the authorities or because of the sensitive and personal nature of their claim. That is why clause 16, together with clauses 17 and 23, provides for good reasons why evidence might be provided late. What constitutes “good reasons” has not been defined in the Bill, because to do so would limit the discretion and flexibility of decision makers to take factors into account on a case-by-case basis. It would be impractical to legislate for every case type where someone may have good reasons for not previously disclosing evidence in relation to their protection claim.

Good reasons may include objective factors such as practical difficulties in obtaining evidence—that may be where the evidence was not previously available, or where an expert report is not available. Good reasons may also include subjective factors, such as a claimant’s particular vulnerabilities relating to their age, sexual orientation, gender identity or mental health. Decision makers, including the judiciary, will be better placed to identify and assess those factors on an individual and case-by-case basis.

Amendment 43 would effectively remove the minimal weight principle; it would disapply the requirement for a decision maker to have regard to the principle that minimal weight should be given to late evidence for two categories of people. The amendments fail to take into account the fact that decision makers will have discretion in how they apply the principle that minimal weight should be given to late evidence, and that they may choose not to apply the principle in any given case. Clause 23 does not create a provision whereby decision makers are required to give late evidence minimal weight; they are required only to have regard to the principle, which they can choose to disregard.

Amendment 131 would place a statutory obligation on decision makers to accept that there are good reasons for late evidence where an individual’s claim is based on certain factors, or the individual falls into a particular category. That would apply to Home Office decision makers as well as the judiciary. Compelling a judge to accept good reasons for late evidence based solely on the grounds of the person’s claim raises significant issues and interferes with their fact-finding role. It also ignores the possibility that a claim may fall within a particular category or a person may identify as one of the listed categories, but their evidence may be late for unrelated reasons. The amendment would therefore create a blanket acceptance of late evidence in specific prescribed circumstances, and yet a vulnerable individual who did not fall within the specified groups might have late evidence and face a different test for whether or not they have good reasons. We feel that is unfair.

On amendment 44, this country has a proud history of welcoming with open arms those who require its protection. That includes circumstances where, as in Afghanistan, a significant change in circumstances means a sudden shift in a country’s security situation. Where evidence is brought late on account of such a change, that is clearly capable of falling within the “good reasons” consideration, so there is no need to make specific provision in relation to a fear of the Taliban.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

But what would happen in the hypothetical example I gave, where there was not good reason? The guy was a bit stubborn and did not think he should have to go through this process; he thought he should have had some automatic leave. I am still at a loss to understand what it means for the decision maker to have regard to the principle that minimal weight should be given to the evidence. I do not understand the expression. How does that work in the context of the hypothetical example I gave?

[Tom Pursglove]

I will come back to that point and try to give the hon. Gentleman some further clarity, which I hope will be helpful. I will make the point again that, in the current circumstances that we find ourselves in regarding Afghanistan, people are not being removed there.

Of course, all the relevant information is taken into consideration when reaching decisions on individual cases. For example, if there is an assessment that a particular country is safe but for a particular individual there are grounds whereby it is not safe for them in their circumstances, that is reflected in the decisions that are taken.

To finish the point about amendment 44, it would create a system where those with a fear of the Taliban were treated differently from all other asylum seekers, no matter the risks they faced or the vulnerabilities of the individuals involved, simply on the basis of where they were from. That is discriminatory and cannot be right.

On the point about how decision makers can be told that they must apply minimal weight to evidence, clause 23 does not create a requirement for Home Office decision makers or the judiciary to give late evidence, following the receipt of an evidence notice or a priority removal notice, minimal weight. In protection and human rights claims, decision makers must have regard to the principle that minimal weight will be given to any late evidence, but they can consider the principle and determine that it should not be applied in a particular case.

[Neil Coyle]

rose—

[Tom Pursglove]

I have made that point previously and I have reiterated it now for the record. I will give way to the hon. Gentleman, but I have made the point pretty clear.

[Neil Coyle]

The Minister suggests there is clarity where no clarity exists. If the clause is not to reduce the weight that the evidence is given, what exactly is it there for? Is he suggesting that he will withdraw it?

[Tom Pursglove]

No, that is not for a moment what I am suggesting. The point that I am making is that, as I have alluded to on many occasions in relation to the clauses that we have considered, we want decision makers to have the appropriate discretion within the framework that we are establishing through the Bill. We think that is the right approach to reach the right decisions in individual cases, taking into account all the relevant circumstances and all the relevant information that is provided. We think that is the right way to proceed. More detail will of course be set out in the guidance.

The hon. Gentleman earlier alluded to very difficult circumstances that a particular individual has found challenging to talk about and disclose. I repeat that caseworkers are trained to be sympathetic to circumstances. The burden of proof, as he described it, will be set out in the guidance that follows. Again, I want to see proper discretion and proper consideration of cases on a case-by-case basis. That is the right and proper way to address such matters.

All individuals should be treated with respect by having proper consideration given to their case. As I said, the detail will be established in the guidance. There will also be training for decision makers, but there is already training for decision makers to ensure that they are sympathetic to the sorts of issues that the hon. Gentleman has raised.

[Neil Coyle]

With the best will in the world, no amount of training will change the fact that, even if someone has come out in the UK, the Bill makes it harder for gay men in particular from certain countries. What do they need to provide to prove that they would face homophobic persecution if they went back? What do they need to show or do? I want a practical example of how it will work in practice. I cannot believe that one even exists at the moment.

[Tom Pursglove]

I am sure the hon. Gentleman will understand why it is difficult to set out in the Bill all the circumstances that would capture all the situations that individuals face in relation to such matters. It is just not possible to do that, which is why we are saying that we will establish that in the guidance that will be published if and when the Bill becomes law, as I hope it will. The guidance will set out the circumstances and the way that cases will be considered. Again, that discretion, flexibility and consideration will be shown to individual cases.

[Neil Coyle]

rose—

[Tom Pursglove]

I am conscious that we are going over this ground repeatedly, but I will give the hon. Gentleman the opportunity to intervene again.

[Neil Coyle]

Is the Minister saying that the guidance will set out what a gay man needs to provide in order to prove that they will face persecution? I think and hope that is what he is saying, and I hope that he will say why the Home Office has not published the review it has already undertaken of the existing process and when it will be published.

[Tom Pursglove]

I am not familiar with the review to which he refers, but the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that I have been in this role only for the past four weeks. However, I will go away and look into that.

I can only repeat the point that we will set out in guidance the relevant factors that will be taken into consideration when cases are determined. I would expect there to be sympathetic consideration of people’s individual circumstances. I have also made that point at the Dispatch Box when we have talked about the operationalisation of the policy. Of course, it is right that that information is established in full. With that, I encourage the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to withdraw his amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the Minister for his answer. At points, he did sound almost reassuring, but the problem is that he sounds reassuring when he says, essentially, “This clause will not have any effect,” suggesting that decision makers will be able just to have regard to all the circumstances on a case-by-case basis. That is what decision makers do anyway without the need for this myriad of statute provisions telling them what to think about a, b, c and the weight to be applied to evidence here, there and everywhere. While I take at face value his intention—I think we probably intend the same thing—that my Afghan example would not end up with conclusive evidence being disregarded because the man was stubborn or behaved in a stupid way because he was at risk, I still find the wording in the clause troubling. I hope the Home Office will think again.

In the meantime, we have pressed similar amendments to a vote, so I do not need to do so again. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 131, in clause 23, page 26, after line 40, insert—

“(2A) The deciding authority must accept that there are good reasons why the evidence was provided late where—

(a) the claimant’s claim is based on sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics;

(b) the claimant was under 18 years of age at the time of their arrival in the United Kingdom;

(c) the claimant’s claim is based on gender-based violence;

(d) the claimant has experienced sexual violence;

(e) the claimant is a victim of modern slavery or trafficking;

(f) the claimant is suffering from a mental health condition or impairment;

(g) the claimant has been a victim of torture;

(h) the claimant is suffering from a serious physical disability;

save-line2(i) the claimant is suffering from other serious physical health conditions or illnesses.”—(Bambos Charalambous.)

This amendment sets out the circumstances where the deciding authority must accept that there were good reasons for providing evidence late.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bambos Charalambous]

We oppose the clause. It seeks the return of the detained fast-track system and to recreate it in primary legislation. The clause imposes a duty on the tribunal procedure rules committee to make rules for an accelerated timeframe for certain appeals made from detention that are considered suitable for consideration within that timeframe.

In the explanatory notes, an accelerated detained appeal is defined as being

“an appeal brought by an appellant who…received a refusal of their asylum claim while in detention…remains in detention under a relevant detention provision…is appealing a decision which was certified by the Secretary of State as suitable for an accelerated detained appeal”.

That system previously existed but was found to be illegal by the High Court in a landmark case brought by Detention Action. The system was found to be unfair as asylum and human rights appeals were disposed of too quickly to be fair. The Court of Appeal described the timetable for such appeals as

“so tight that it is inevitable that a significant number of appellants will be denied a fair opportunity to present their cases”.

It also emphasised, perhaps instructively for this Committee, that speed and efficiency must not trump justice and fairness—something of a feature of part 2 of the Bill. Indeed, hundreds if not thousands of cases have had to be reconsidered by the Home Office or the tribunal because they were unfairly rushed through the process that the Government now seek to recreate. Those cases include survivors of trafficking and torture and other individuals who, on the basis of a rushed and unfair procedure, will have been removed to places where they fear persecution or are separated from their families. There was no adequate system for ensuring that such people were removed from the fast track and given a fair opportunity to present their claims.

Despite that background, the Bill aims to create this unjust and ineffective procedure by reintroducing the detained fast-track process through this clause. It will put that same system, which was deemed unlawful in 2015, on a statutory footing, which will insulate it against future legal challenges.

The clause provides for the Secretary of State to certify a decision if she considers that an appeal would be disposed of expeditiously. It requires the tribunal procedure committee to introduce the following time limits: a notice of appeal must be lodged no later than five working days after the decision was received; the tribunal must make a decision no later than 25 days after the appeal date; and an application for permission to appeal to the upper tribunal must be determined by the first-tier tribunal not later than 20 working days after the applicant was given notice of the tribunal’s decision.

The clause would deny access to justice. First, five days is insufficient to prepare an appeal against a negative decision, particularly where the individual is detained and where their access to legal advice is poor and an individual’s wellbeing may be affected by their detention. For those detained in prison, the situation is even worse. For example, in a case in February of this year, the High Court declared the lack of legal aid immigration advice for people held under immigration powers to be unlawful. More widely, Home Office decision making is frequently incorrect or unlawful. As we know, half of all appeals against immigration decisions were successful in the year leading up to June 2019. It is therefore vital that people are able to effectively challenge decisions through the courts.

The detained fast track is unjust. It is also unnecessary. As the Public Law Project and Justice have pointed out, the tribunal has adequate case management powers to deal with appeals expeditiously in appropriate cases and already prioritises detained cases. The Home Secretary should not be trying to force the hand of the independent tribunal procedures committee to stack the cards in her favour in appeals against her decisions. The Bill does not learn the lessons of the past and seeks to resurrect an unworkable system of accelerated detained appeals. The clause proposes that the appeals process be fast-tracked. I am very worried that provisions in part 2 of the Bill will therefore disadvantage the most vulnerable.

By allowing the Home Secretary to accelerate appeals when she thinks they would be disposed of expeditiously, the clause is clearly unjust. Once again, it also seems to violate the refugee convention. As my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) said on Second Reading:

“It is more than regrettable that the convention appears now to be held in such little regard by this Government.”—[Official Report, 19 July 2021; Vol. 699, c. 769.]

For those reasons, we will oppose that the clause stand part.

[Tom Pursglove]

I understand the motivation behind amendment 45. However, the Government oppose the amendment, as it is contrary to our policy intention and would undermine the effective working of the accelerated detained appeals process.

The period of five working days strikes the right balance, achieving both speed and fairness. The detained fast-track rules put in place in 2003 and 2005 allowed only two days to appeal. The 2014 rules set the same time limit. The current procedure rules allow a non-detained migrant 14 days to lodge their appeal against a refusal decision.

On amendment 46, I can assure hon. Members that it is not necessary, as the Bill already achieves the objective sought. The Government’s aim is to ensure that cases only remain in the ADA where it is in the interests of justice for them to do so. The consideration of what is in the interests of justice is a matter of judicial discretion. Where a judge decides that it is not in the interests of justice to keep a case in the ADA process, we would expect that they would use their discretion to remove the case. The current wording of the Bill—“may” rather than “must”—is consistent with the drafting of the rules that govern all appeals considered in the immigration and asylum chamber.

For these reasons, I invite the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate to withdraw the amendments. On the detained fast track and wider points about the Government’s intentions, although the courts upheld the principle of an accelerated process for appeals made in detention, we have considered the legal challenges to the detained fast track carefully. We are confident that the new accelerated detained appeals route will ensure fairness as well as improving speed. All Home Office decisions to detain are made in accordance with the adults at risk in detention policy and reviewed by the independent detention gatekeeper. Changes made to the screening process, drawing on lessons learned, will enable us to identify appellants who are unsuitable for the accelerated detained appeals route at the earliest opportunity. Suitability will be reviewed on an ongoing basis and the tribunal will have the power to transfer a case out of the accelerated route if it considers that that is in the interests of justice to do so.

The timescales proposed for the accelerated route are longer than under the previous detained fast track. Appellants will have more time to seek legal advice and prepare their case. We are confident that the new route will provide sufficient opportunity to access legal advice. I am also conscious that Members are interested in what happens in the eventuality that a migrant misses the deadline to appeal a refusal decision. Provided that there are no other barriers to return, removal will be arranged. It is open to a migrant and/or their legal representatives to submit an appeal after the deadline and ask a judge to extend the time and admit the appeal late.

On new clause 7, the Government are committed to making the asylum appeals system faster, while maintaining fairness, ensuring access to justice and upholding the rule of law. In particular, it is right that appeals made from detention should be dealt with quickly, so that people are not deprived of their liberty for longer than is necessary. New clause 7 sets out a duty on the tribunal procedure committee to make rules for the provision of an accelerated detained appeals route. That will establish a fixed maximum timeframe for determining specific appeals brought while an individual is detained.

Currently, all immigration and asylum appeals are subject to the same procedure rules. Appeals involving detained appellants are prioritised by Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service but there are no set timeframes. It often takes months for detained appeals to be determined, resulting in people being released from detention before their appeals are concluded.

Changes to procedure rules are subject to the tribunal procedure committee’s statutory consultation requirements and procedures. However, the Government’s intent is to ensure that straightforward appeals from detention are determined more quickly. Under a detained accelerated process all appellants will benefit from a quicker final determination of their immigration status, spending less time in limbo, and getting the certainty they need to move forward with their lives sooner.

Those whose appeals are successful will have their leave to remain confirmed earlier than if the standard procedure rules had been followed. Meanwhile those with no right to remain will be removed more quickly, as they can be detained throughout the process, which reduces the risk of absconding.

The courts have been clear in upholding the principle that an accelerated process for asylum seekers while detained, operated within certain safeguards, is entirely legal. I made that point earlier. We have considered the legal challenges to the previous detained fast track carefully and we are confident that the new accelerated detained appeals route will ensure fairness as well as improving speed. We will ensure, through regulations and guidance, that only suitable cases will be allocated to the accelerated route. Cases will be assessed for whether they are likely to be able to be decided fairly within the shorter timeframe, and individuals will be screened for vulnerability and other factors that may impact their ability to engage fairly with an accelerated process.

As an additional safeguard, the clause makes it clear that the tribunal can decide to remove cases from the accelerated route if it considers it is in the interests of justice to do so. The new accelerated detained appeals route will contribute significantly to the timeliness with which appeals are decided for those in immigration detention. It will allow us to swiftly remove from the country people found not to need protection, while those with valid claims can be released from detention more quickly.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the Minister for his response. I still have serious concerns about the provisions in the clause, particularly the short timeframe of five days to launch an appeal, and particularly when it could be the Secretary of State who has decided somebody has to go through that process. If she gets that decision wrong, by the time there is any ability to apply to the tribunal to move away from the fast-track process, it could be too late. In that case, a removal attempt will have been made, and a vulnerable person who was unable to contact a solicitor in time is completely without any chance of rectifying what the Secretary of State has done.

I maintain my opposition to what is proposed. I think that the safeguards fall way short, but I do not see any point in putting my amendment to a vote, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

As Chair, I do not wish to stop you voting as you wish to. I understand that the Government have indicated that they would vote to leave out the clause.

[Tom Pursglove]

To be clear, we are seeking to remove clause 24 and replace it with new clause 7.

[The Chair]

If that is the Government’s intention, far be it from me to tell them what to do.

Clause 24 disagreed to.

Clause 25

Claims certified as clearly unfounded: removal of right of appeal

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Tom Pursglove]

Protection or human rights claims that are certified as clearly unfounded are those so clearly without substance that they are bound to fail. The refusal of such claims can currently be appealed after the person has left the UK. By contrast, there is no right of appeal against the rejection of further submissions received after a protection or human rights claim has previously been refused, where those submissions do not create a realistic prospect of success. That approach is right: there should be no right of appeal unless there is something of real substance for the tribunal to consider.

The clause removes the out-of-country right of appeal under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 for those whose protection or human rights claims are certified as clearly unfounded and bound to fail, bringing them into line with how we treat further submissions that have no realistic prospect of success. It will apply only to claims that are certified after the clause comes into effect. I would like to be clear that removing the right of appeal for certified claims does not prevent a person from applying for a judicial review to challenge a certification decision. It provides a necessary and effective safeguard in the event that a claim is incorrectly certified as clearly unfounded.

[Bambos Charalambous]

It is ironic that we are debating this clause as the Judicial Review and Courts Bill is receiving its Second Reading. We oppose the clause. We have heard time and again that the Government are aiming to make it harder for a person in the UK to establish their refugee status and entitlement to asylum. Clause 25 further restricts appeal rights for people seeking asylum. This clause removes the in-country and out-of-country rights of appeal for human rights and protection claims certified as clearly unfounded. It is concerning as, once again, it seeks to limit the rights of individuals, while failing to increase efficiency in the system and in turn decreasing fairness, with regrettable consequences for individuals. In respect of articles 6 and 8 of the ECHR, it represents a clear breach and will give rise to legal challenge. That was seen in the case of Kiarie and Byndloss v. the Home Secretary in 2017. At present, where the Home Secretary certifies a case as clearly unfounded, any appeal may be brought only after removal from the UK. In cases concerning protection claims or article 3 human rights claims, such appeals are incapable of providing an effective remedy, because the feared harm will have eventuated before the appeal can be heard.

As the explanatory notes to the Bill acknowledge, the right of appeal is rarely exercised; instead, challenges are brought by way of judicial review. This provision therefore contributes to the general trend in immigration and asylum law away from rights of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal and towards unappealable decisions, which are amenable to judicial review.

For the reasons specified in my speech, we will oppose clause 25 standing part of the Bill.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 159, in schedule 3, page 62, line 39, at end insert—

“(2D) Notwithstanding subsection (2A), a person who is particularly vulnerable to harm must not be removed to, or required to leave to go to, a State falling within subsection (2B) or any state to which Part 2, 3 or 4 of Schedule 3 to the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 for the time being applies.

(2E) For the purposes of subsection (2D), a person is particularly vulnerable to harm if they—

(a) are suffering from a mental health condition or impairment;

(b) have been a victim of torture;

(c) have been a victim of sexual or gender-based violence;

(d) have been a victim of human trafficking or modern slavery;

(e) are pregnant;

(f) are suffering from a serious physical disability;

(g) are suffering from other serious physical health conditions or illnesses;

(h) are aged under 18 or 70 or over;

(i) are gay, lesbian or bisexual;

(j) are a trans or intersex person.”

This amendment would prevent persons who are particularly vulnerable to harm from being removed to, or required to leave to go to, a state falling within subsection (2B).

That schedule 3 be the Third schedule to the Bill.

New clause 18—Removal of asylum seeker to safe country—

“Schedule N makes amendments to section 77 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (no removal while claim for asylum pending).”

This new clause introduces the proposed NS2.

New schedule 2—Removal of asylum seeker to safe country—

“In section 77 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (no removal while claim for asylum pending), after subsection (2) insert—

‘(2A) This section does not prevent a person being removed to, or being required to leave to go to, a third State if all of the following conditions are met—

(a) the removal is pursuant to a formal, legally binding and public readmission agreement between the United Kingdom and the third State;

(b) the State meets the definition of a safe third State set out at section 14 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2021, as shown by reliable, objective and up-to-date information;

(c) the person has been found inadmissible under section 80B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002;

(d) the third State in question is the State with which the person was found to have a connection under Section 80B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002;

(e) taking into account the person’s individual circumstances, it is reasonable for them to go to that State; and

(f) the person is not a national of that State.’”

This new schedule modifies the circumstances in which a person can be removed to, or required to leave to go to, a safe third State.

[Tom Pursglove]

This Government have been clear that claiming asylum in the first safe country reached is the fastest route to safety. We must dissuade all those considering making dangerous journeys to the UK in order to claim asylum. We are working closely with international partners to fix our broken asylum system and discussing how we could work together in the future.

Clause 26 introduces schedule 3, which aims to reduce the draw of the UK by working to make it easier to remove someone to a safe country, where their claim will then be processed. It amends existing legal frameworks in order to support our future objective to transfer some asylum claims to a safe third country for processing.

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

What my hon. Friend the Minister is saying about deterring these dangerous journeys is even more poignant given the rescue operation that took place today off Harwich, where I understand five Somalis were in a small inflatable boat. As I understand it, two have been rescued, but three are feared drowned. That brings starkly into all our minds the need to deter these dangerous journeys and the desperate people who face these terrible things. I am sure the condolences of the whole Committee go to all those involved—not only those actually in the boat, but the rescue services, which must have had a fairly tough time.

[Tom Pursglove]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his intervention. It is fair to say that I am very mindful of the enormous risks that we are finding people taking in trying to cross the channel at the moment. We have debated the matter extensively in this Committee up to this point, and no doubt that debate will continue. I am very concerned to hear about the situation that he has described. I have asked to be updated, and to be kept updated as to the progress of the operation to try to find the individuals who, it would seem, have been lost at sea. Of course, we send our thoughts and best wishes to those who are caught up in that terrible tragedy, and we hope for the best for them. This absolutely and without question underlines the gravity of the risks that people are taking by getting into small boats and trying to cross the English channel to get to the United Kingdom.

The Bill contains a suite of measures designed to protect those in genuine need while breaking the business model of criminal gangs who profit from people trafficking and exploit vulnerable people for their own gain. Our aim is to disincentivise people from seeking to enter the UK by dangerous means, facilitated by those criminal smugglers, with a clear message that those who arrive via an irregular route may be eligible to be transferred to and processed in another safe country not of their choosing.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Is schedule 3 confined to applicants who arrive via irregular and dangerous routes, or could it be applied, in theory, to pretty much anyone who is claiming asylum?

[Tom Pursglove]

If I may, I will set out the detail that underpins schedule 3 in the course of my remarks.

Clause 26 is designed to be part of a whole-system deterrent effect to prevent illegal migration. Access to the UK’s asylum system should be based on need, and not driven by the actions of criminal enterprise. Under current policy, it is too easy for removals of individuals with no right to remain in the UK to be delayed as a result of speculative and, in some cases, unfounded article 3 human rights claims.

Consequently, schedule 3 will also introduce a presumption that specified countries are safe, because of their compliance with obligations under article 3 of the European convention of human rights.

[Neil Coyle]

Earlier today, the Minister mentioned that Albania, from where we accept many asylum cases, could be considered a safe country. Can he tell us about other safe countries? Gibraltar, which was touted by the Government, has said categorically that it will not be a safe country for these purposes. Ghana and Rwanda have ruled themselves out, despite being touted by the Government. Morocco and Moldova have appeared in the press as potential examples, but the FCDO has said:

“No north African country, Morocco included, has a fully functioning asylum system”.

The Foreign Office stated that Moldova has “endemic” corruption, and that

“If an asylum centre depended on reliable, transparent, credible cooperation from the host country justice system we would not be able to rely on this”

in Moldova. Can the Minister tell us which safe country he is talking about?

[Tom Pursglove]

One thing I will say is that the measures are not about opening camps on overseas territories. I will not get into a running commentary about the negotiations or discussions that may or may not be taking place with individual countries.

Claimants will be required to present strong evidence to overturn this presumption to prevent removal. That will support the aim of swiftly removing individuals who have no basis to remain in the UK by preventing unnecessary delays where speculative article 3 claims are made prior to removal to safe countries. Adding to the existing removal power, schedule 3 will also provide the Secretary of State with a power to add countries to the safe list. That will ensure that the list of safe countries remains accurate.

Schedule 3 also ensures that rights of appeal are not afforded either to asylum seekers on the basis of removal to safe countries, or to clearly unfounded human rights claims, thus preventing unnecessary appeals for unsubstantiated claims.

[Neil Coyle]

The Minister says that he does not want to get into a running dialogue—that is fine—but can we have just a rough idea of how many countries are currently in bilateral negotiations with the Home Office? That may be useful. I think it is only right and proper that the Committee has an idea of the costs involved, because they will vary massively depending on the country—or indeed the continent, given some of the ludicrous examples that have been touted by people as high up as the Home Secretary. How many countries are in those negotiations, and how much can the public expect to pay for this particular part of this ridiculous Bill?

[Tom Pursglove]

The hon. Gentleman is a crafty parliamentarian who will, I have no doubt, try to elicit that information from me, but I am afraid that he will be unsuccessful in that endeavour, however hard he tries. The bottom line is that I am not going to get into a running commentary in this Committee about discussions that may or may not be taking place with countries around the world in relation to this policy.

[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Tom Pursglove]

I will give way, but the hon. Lady will get the same response if she is trying to extract the same information from me.

[Holly Lynch]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He might remember that I asked previously whether he had any examples of returns to third countries. He responded in writing with an update this morning. He updates Committee members that

“4,561 ‘notices of intent’ were served to individuals, informing them that inadmissibility action was being considered in their cases.”

So we are not discussing hypotheticals here. The wheels are in motion for individuals. Can he understand that we have got to do our due diligence in pushing for the details, because the consequences for these people who have had notices of intent are very real? That is why we need to put those questions to him.

[Tom Pursglove]

I would make a few points in response. Obviously, removals and deportations generally have been much more difficult to organise during the last 18 months, as a direct consequence of covid-19. That is not unsurprising, and of course it is reflected in the fact that we have seen fewer removals and deportations than we would have expected. It is not the Government’s intention to apply retrospectively the inadmissability measures we are talking about. That is an important point in providing clarity for the Committee.

We are committed to upholding our international obligations including under the 1951 refugee convention, and that will not change. While people are endangering lives making perilous journeys, we must fix the system to prevent abuse of that system and the criminality associated with it. Our aim is that the suite of measures in the Bill, including those in clause 26 and schedule 3, will disincentivise people from making dangerous journeys across Europe to the UK, and encourage people to claim asylum in the first safe country they reach.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Minister has scuttled over the idea that the Government are keen to abide by their international obligations. The UNHCR is absolutely clear that the clause rides a coach and horses—I paraphrase slightly—through the convention. Can he say a little bit more about how he possibly believes that this is consistent with what the refugee convention provides?

[Tom Pursglove]

I am actually meeting the UNHCR tomorrow, and I am obviously looking forward to that meeting. No doubt we will cover a range of topics during that discussion and engagement, which I most certainly value. I repeat to the hon. Gentleman the point that I have now made several times in relation to the provisions in the Bill: we believe that they are compliant with our international obligations. I have made that point previously and will continue to make it.

[Mr Goodwill]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the principle of a safe country is well established? When we were members of the European Union, removals to EU countries were permitted because of that particular situation. Does he further agree that countries that seek to be candidates to join the European Union will have to bring their standards up to those equivalent to the European Union, so there is a list of countries, particularly in the Balkans and elsewhere, that may well meet those criteria before they join the European Union?

[Tom Pursglove]

My right hon. Friend raises various points on the back of his experience covering at least part of the role that I now cover. I would build on that by making the point that we do not remove people to countries where they would be unsafe. Of course, we are also talking here about countries that are compliant with the obligations set out under the refugee convention. That is an important point to re-make.

I thank those who drafted amendment 159 for their contribution to the debate thus far. Let me begin by being clear that this Government are wholly committed to ensuring that removals of individuals are done in accordance with our international obligations, and that the safety of those transferred is at the forefront of our actions. However, we simply cannot support any amendment that seeks to limit our ability to remove individuals to safe third countries. I assure the Committee again that we would only ever remove an individual to a country that we are satisfied is safe for them. However, the amendment is overly restrictive and therefore could not be used flexibly to consider the circumstances in the country in question. By way of illustration, the amendment would mean that we could not remove someone who is gay, lesbian or bisexual to France or Italy.

Committee members can be assured that the amendment is superfluous given the safeguards already in the Bill. Indeed, we will only ever send individuals to countries where we know that their removal will be compliant with the UK’s international legal obligations, including those that pertain to potential victims of modern slavery. Even where we are assured that a particular state is safe, changes made by the Bill make it clear that every individual in scope for removal to that state will be able to rely on the protection of article 3 of the ECHR to demonstrate why that state may not be safe in their unique circumstances. That is to prevent any individual from being transferred to a country where they would genuinely be at risk of inhumane and degrading treatment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Minister keeps referring to safeguards in the Bill and consideration of individual applicants’ safety, but none of that is in schedule 3, which does not require a finding of inadmissibility or a connection with the state. There is no consideration of the reasonableness of the transfer. The country might not even be a signatory to the refugee convention or offer refugee protection or the chance to secure the full rights that refugees are entitled to. Will he talk us through the safeguards?

[Tom Pursglove]

I would argue that I have already set out those safeguards.

The Government are clear that we must consider all options to break the business model of people smugglers and prevent people from putting their lives at risk by making perilous journeys from safe countries. Changes in schedule 3 are a key component of the wholescale system reform that we are committed to undertaking to prevent irregular migration. For those reasons, I ask hon. Members not to press amendment 159.

On schedule 3, the Government have been clear that the fastest route to safety is to claim asylum in the first safe country reached. We must dissuade all those considering making dangerous journeys to the UK to claim asylum. We are working closely with international partners to fix our broken asylum system and are discussing how we could work together in the future.

[Neil Coyle]

Will the Minister give way?

[Tom Pursglove]

I have been generous to the hon. Gentleman, but I will give way one more time.

[Neil Coyle]

I thank the Minister—he is being generous. On the first safe country, the Government might have more standing and the public more confidence in them had they not abandoned their obligations. Pakistan, for example, is seeing a cut of £62 million in aid from the UK to help manage the refugee crisis spilling over the border from the Taliban. Turkey is seeing a cut of £16 million in aid from the UK, Lebanon is seeing a cut of £71.5 million and Syria is seeing a drop of £105 million. If the Government were serious about people being able to stay nearer to their home country, those cuts, which certainly were not in their manifesto at the last election, would not be happening.

[Tom Pursglove]

In recent years, UK aid in crisis circumstances has made a significant difference in relation to properly caring for and ensuring—

[Neil Coyle]

If so, why cut it?

[Tom Pursglove]

Let me finish the point. We have regularly made additional aid available in crisis circumstances to help relieve particular pressures that have arisen, and UK aid has been essential as part of the global effort. I have been proud of the crisis measures we have put in place in relation to those circumstances as they have arisen. No doubt we will continue to have a commitment to that going forward.

[Neil Coyle]

Will the Minister give way on that point?

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

No, I am going to make some progress because I am conscious that we have still got some way to go.

Schedule 3 aims to reduce the draw of the UK by working to make it easier to remove someone to a safe country where their claim will be processed. It amends existing legal frameworks to support our future objective to transfer some asylum claims to a safe third country for processing. The Bill contains a suite of measures designed to protect those in genuine need while breaking the business model of criminal gangs who profit from people trafficking and exploit vulnerable people for their own gain. We aim to disincentivise people from seeking to enter the UK by dangerous means facilitated by these criminal smugglers with a clear message that those arriving via an irregular route may be eligible to be transferred to another safe country not of their choosing to be processed.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I just do not understand why the Minister tries to suggest that the provision will apply only to people who are not in genuine need. The Government do not know that because they are not looking at the cases before removing them to a third country. How is he circumscribing those who will be subject to this procedure, which we utterly oppose? How can he keep on saying that it will apply only to those who do not have genuine need?

[Tom Pursglove]

Schedule 3 is designed to be part of a whole system deterrent effect to prevent illegal migration. Access to the UK’s asylum system should be based on need, and not driven by the actions of criminal enterprise. Under current policy, it is too easy for removals of individuals with no right to remain in the UK to be delayed as a result of speculative, and in some cases unfounded, article 3 human rights claims. Consequently, schedule 3 will also introduce a presumption that specified countries are safe, due to them being compliant with their obligations under article 3 of the ECHR. Claimants will be required to present strong evidence to overturn that presumption to prevent removal. This will support the aim to swiftly remove individuals who have no basis to remain in the UK by preventing unnecessary delays where speculative article 3 claims are made prior to removal to safe countries.

Schedule 3 will also provide the Secretary of State with a power to add countries to the safe list—that is in addition to the already held removal power. This will ensure that the list of safe countries remains accurate. The schedule also ensures that rights of appeal are not afforded to asylum seekers on the basis of removal to safe countries nor to clearly unfounded human rights claims, thus preventing unnecessary appeals for unsubstantiated claims.

We are committed to upholding our international obligations, including under the 1951 refugee convention. That will not change. While people are endangering lives making perilous journeys, we must fix the system to prevent abuse of the asylum system and the criminality associated with it. Our aim is that the suite of measures contained within this Bill, including those within schedule 3, will disincentivise people from making dangerous journeys across Europe to the UK and encourage people to claim asylum in the first safe country they reach.

I thank the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East for proposing new clause 18, which introduces new schedule 2. I agree wholeheartedly with the importance of ensuring the safety of those who are removed from the UK to third countries. However, we cannot support the proposals, which seek to limit our ability to remove individuals to a safe country. This Government have made our position clear throughout today’s debate: people should claim asylum in the first safe country that they reach. That is the fastest route to safety. I would like the Committee to consider each of the conditions in new schedule 2 in turn.

[Neil Coyle]

This comes back to the first safe country. The Minister makes the point that we both agree on—we are proud of the UK’s contribution to humanitarian support and of military interventions that prevented refugees from being created in the past. The Conservative manifesto said that the Army would not be cut and aid would not cut, but voters have been betrayed by the Government’s actions since. They have reneged on those manifesto promises. And asylum seekers have been betrayed by those same cuts. The Bill does nothing but compound that betrayal.

[Tom Pursglove]

On 3 September, we announced £30 million of life-saving aid to Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries to help those who choose to leave Afghanistan. That is part of the Government’s efforts to support regional stability. The hon. Gentleman spoke earlier about resources being made available to help in-region. Yet again, this country has demonstrated that commitment to try to help provide stability as far as possible, and to help to ensure that as much support as possible can be provided in the vicinity of where crises arise. I think that—

[Neil Coyle]

Will the Minister give way?

[Tom Pursglove]

I will not take another intervention from the hon. Gentleman on that point.

[Neil Coyle]

Frit.

[Tom Pursglove]

I have been very generous to the hon. Gentleman. I think that aside was a little bit unfair on his part, given the number of interventions that I have taken. I know that it was not meant in an unpleasant spirit, so I will move on.

I invite the Committee to consider each of the conditions in new schedule 2. Regarding the form of a transfer arrangement, we are currently in discussions with our international partners to consider the shared challenge of irregular migration. I do not wish to pre-empt the form or content of future arrangements as that could tie the hands of our negotiators, but I can assure the Committee that the Government will act in accordance with our international obligations, considering both the content and form of any arrangement reached. Furthermore, that condition would have the perhaps unintended consequence of preventing the removal of individuals in ad hoc cases, which has been a long-standing process within our asylum system to which I have alluded in response to earlier questions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bambos Charalambous]

The Labour party will oppose clause stand part. Clause 26 opens the door to offshoring by permitting the removal of asylum seekers from the UK while their claim is being determined or while the UK decides whether to take responsibility for the claim.

The clause introduces schedule 3, which allows the Government to remove people who are seeking asylum to countries outside the UK, and hold them in detention there while their asylum claims are being processed—in other words, offshoring. It is our strong belief that the clause should be deleted, and we will vote against clause stand part and against schedule 3. We believe that, through the clause, the Government are seeking to emulate the Australian system as a model. It has been reported that the Home Office is in talks with Denmark to share costs on an offshore detention centre in Rwanda, and a number of other places have also been mentioned.

It is worth examining the available empirical evidence on the ideas underpinning the clause. In 2015, a United Nations report found that Australia’s offshore detention regime was systematically violating the international convention against torture. In addition, in 2020, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court said the regime was “cruel, inhuman or degrading”, and unlawful under international law.

We are deeply concerned that the Government’s plan appears to emulate a failed system that has been widely condemned for its human rights abuses. When we look in more detail at the Australian model that the Government seem to want to emulate, we find more causes for concern. In 1992, the Australian Government introduced mandatory indefinite detention for asylum seekers who arrive by boat—that policy remains in place. In 2001, they introduced the Pacific solution, whereby boats were intercepted by the navy and taken to processing centres on Manus and Nauru. In 2008, the Australian Labour Government ended that practice, branding it an “abject policy failure”, only to reintroduce offshore detention in the early 2010s. Approximately 4,180 people were transferred offshore between 2012 and 2014, at which point the transfers stopped.

Conditions and events inside the centres were secretive; journalists and legal representatives were generally banned from entering. That created the conditions for the systematic abuse of asylum seekers by those running the facilities. In 2016, The Guardian released records of more than 2,000 incident reports from Nauru—known as the Nauru files—documenting widespread abuse and neglect in offshore detention. That included systematic physical and sexual assault on children and adults, the use of blackmail by guards, and attacks and harassment by people on Nauru or Manus Island. At least 12 people are reported to have died in the camps, with the causes of death including medical neglect, suicide and murder by centre guards.

Aside from the immeasurable human cost, this failed system has been dismantled by its own architects. A recent research report by the Kaldor Centre found that there is no evidence that the policy achieved the stated aim of “stopping the boats” and that since 2014 the Government have been trying to distance themselves from the policy. Thanks to the powerful stories of the people affected, it has been increasingly rejected by the Australian public. It has cost billions of Australian dollars. The policy has clearly failed disastrously, and we are deeply concerned that this Government are seeking in this clause to bring the policy to the UK.

The impact of offshore detention on mental health cannot be overstated. In the Australian example, conditions in offshore detention centres have been inhumane and unfit for human habitation. The mental and physical health impact of offshore detention has been colossal. In 2014, the Australian Human Rights Commission found that 34% of children in detention suffered from mental health disorders of a seriousness that would require psychiatric referral if the children were in the Australian population, and paediatricians reported that the children transferred to Nauru were among the most traumatised they had ever seen. Medical experts working with the UNHCR found rates of mental illness in people in offshore detention to be among the highest recorded in any surveyed population. Médecins Sans Frontières reported that the suffering on Nauru was some of the worst that it had ever encountered. There is absolutely no way, in our view, that the UK Government should be risking huge harm against children in terms of their mental health by emulating that failed policy.

Furthermore, the financial cost of the Australian system is astronomical and regularly more than $1 billion a year. The Refugee Council of Australia compiled a detailed breakdown of offshoring costs and found that it had cost the Australian Government $8.3 billion between 2014 and 2020. The annual cost per person of holding someone offshore in Nauru or Papua New Guinea has been estimated to be $3.4 million—per person. Again, we are deeply concerned that the UK Government are seeking to emulate a policy that is extremely likely to have extortionate costs in financial terms. The financial impact of this policy will be huge. That all these increased costs go simply to stopping boats, as a deterrent, which the Minister alluded to, shows that it is a failed policy. This is fiscal incompetence from the Government: in their own prediction of what the policy costs, they have estimated exceeding that every year. It will be a budget impossible to predict, based on the number of people whom they propose to offshore. We have the Budget tomorrow, so I will be interested to see what provision the Chancellor of the Exchequer has made in relation to that and the comprehensive spending review.

Let us look in more detail at what the Government are risking with this policy in terms of the human cost. There are countless stories of the lives destroyed by the policy of offshoring. Loghman Sawari, whose story was covered by The Guardian, is still detained, despite having been accepted by Australia as a refugee in 2014. Eight years after the initial detention, he told The Guardian that the days have begun to run one into another and his memory is failing. The Maghames family arrived in Australia by boat in 2013 and were detained on Christmas Island before being transferred to Nauru in March 2014. Hajar Maghames, along with her parents and younger brother, has been in detention ever since, despite being granted refugee status in 2019. In 2020, they were transferred to Australia so that her father could receive medical care, and they are now in cabins at the back of Darwin airport. They are now the only people held there.

I would be grateful if the Minister clarified whether people being processed wherever they are offshored will, if their claim is successful, be brought back to the UK, and what estimate he has made of the cost of that.

To continue with my examples, Reza Barati, who, like the family to whom I just referred, had fled Iran, is one of the 18 people to have died in offshore detention. He was beaten to death by guards and other workers on Manus Island after a protest turned violent and the centre was attacked. He died four days after his 24th birthday. His family are suing the Australian Government and G4S for negligence. During the same incident over two days in February 2014, 70 refugees and asylum seekers were injured. One lost his right eye. Another was shot in the buttocks. One man was attacked from behind by a G4S guard who slashed his neck, causing a 10 to 12 cm horizontal slit across his throat. There have been many others, including the high-profile cases of author Behrouz Boochani or the Tamil family from Biloela, whose harrowing stories have ultimately helped to turn public opinion against this policy.

Offshoring in large accommodation centres poses particular risks to LGBT+ people seeking asylum because of their particular vulnerability. Organisations such as Rainbow Migration and Stonewall have raised concerns that housing people in such centres outside the UK will result in systemic verbal, violent and sexual abuse of LGBT+ people who are in need of protection and who have higher rates of self-harm and suicide.

There is much evidence that LGBT+ people already experience systemic abuse and harassment in the UK’s current accommodation and detention system, led by staff and others with whom they are housed or detained alongside. The problems tend to continue, even when people are moved to a new property. Documented examples provided by organisations that deal with victims have included unwanted sexual advances, threats, invasions of privacy, verbal abuse, being prevented from sleeping, pranks and sexual assault.

It is therefore deeply worrying that offshore processing centres are likely to escalate the homophobic, biphobic and transphobic abuse that LGBT+ people experience in existing asylum accommodation and detention centres. It is even more shocking when one considers that many refugees in the LGBT+ community have fled their home countries specifically because of abuses and persecution that they have experienced there.

Offshoring also presents a significant risk of harm to women who have survived rape and sexual exploitation. It is difficult to see how women who have survived such atrocities would be exempt from offshoring because it is clear that the Government’s key objective for offshore detention is deterrence. According to the Government’s logic, there can be no exceptions to this policy, because otherwise the objective of deterrence is undermined.

This was seen when offshore detention was reintroduced by the Australian Government in 2012. All people seeking asylum who arrived by boat were liable for removal to the islands of Nauru or Manus

“even if they...had characteristics warranting special consideration, such as being an unaccompanied minor, a survivor of torture and trauma, or a victim of trafficking”.

It is clear that the UK Government, by introducing such provision for offshoring, must be willing to subject children, pregnant women, survivors of trafficking and other vulnerable people to offshore detention.

[Tom Pursglove]

I hope that I can help the hon. Gentleman somewhat by making it very clear that children will not be transferred overseas for their claims to be processed.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I am grateful to the Minister for clarifying that point, but there are still others with vulnerable characteristics, including pregnant women and survivors of trafficking who will be subject to offshore detention.

I hardly need to outline the inhumanity of this policy as it applies to women victims of rape and sexual violence. I am deeply concerned about the conditions in which women will be held, and particularly the risk to them of further sexual violence and abuse. In detention centres in the UK, where there are a range of safeguarding mechanisms in place, it has not been enough to protect people in detention from abuse. The 2015 Lampard report on Yarl’s Wood, which until last year was the main detention centre for women in the UK, highlighted that between 2007 and 2015, 10 members of staff had been dismissed for incidents involving “sexual impropriety” towards women held there. Such “impropriety” included the repeated sexual harassment and abuse of a 29-year-old woman by a male healthcare worker.

When it comes to offshoring, the UK Government will have even less control over the treatment of detainees in offshore detention centres. The risk to women of sexual violence and abuse in such centres will be increased. The sexual harassment and violence to which women detained offshore by the Australian Government were subjected has been well documented.

There is no empirical evidence to support the effectiveness of offshoring as a deterrent strategy in respect of those fleeing persecution. A recent report by the Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law highlights that in the year following the Australian Government’s reintroduction of offshore detention

“more than 24,000 asylum seekers arrived in Australia by boat. This number was considerably more than at any other time since the 1970s, when boats of asylum seekers were first recorded in Australia. Moreover, as the months passed, and news of the policy presumably reached some of those who were contemplating travelling by sea to Australia, there was no noticeable change in the rate of arrivals, with boats of varying numbers of people (from two to more than 200) continuing to arrive on average several times per week.”

That brings us back to the fundamental fact, discussed earlier in reference to other clauses, such as clauses 10 and 11, that policy measures that rely on deterrence assume that people have a choice in the decisions they make. People who are forced to flee their countries because of violence and persecution have no such choice. Therefore, deterrent measures will not stop them making the journey to find safety. The likelihood is that offshoring will be completely ineffective in its aims, as well as deeply inhumane.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I will speak briefly in support of amendment 159, new clause 18 and new schedule 2.

I echo everything the shadow Minister said. This is a terrible clause. I echo in particular all that he said about Australia. I take a tiny crumb of comfort from the fact that the Minister, despite the Home Office’s having adduced evidence in relation to the Australian example, did not mention it during his speech. Perhaps the Home Office is learning that it should run a million miles from the Australian offshoring scheme, because it was awful.

I did not recognise the clause from what the Minister said. He kept referring to safeguards and asserting that it was absolutely consistent with our international obligations. My reading of schedule 3 and clause 26 is the polar opposite. Schedule 3 drives a coach and horses through the principle that people cannot be removed while they have a claim outstanding. It allows removal to anywhere if some very basic safeguards are met. The person might have no link to the country to which they are removed—they might have been nowhere near it. It is clearly nothing to do with responsibility sharing between states. Like clause 14, it is just about offloading responsibility.

We are not saying that no one can ever be removed to have a decision made on their claim elsewhere. While not perfect, the Dublin scheme allowed for the transfer of a claim and the removal of a claimant in appropriate circumstances and with appropriate safeguards. We have set out the criteria that would put in place similar safeguards in new clause 18 and new schedule 2. They include a formal, legally binding and public readmission agreement with the state; a requirement that the person has a connection with the country in question; that it is reasonable in the circumstances for the person’s case to be considered there; and that all the requirements and safeguards that we said should have been in place around clause 14 are present, such as the proper implementation of the full refugee convention, protection against harm, access to fair and efficient asylum processes, and so on.

Again, all those protections are informed by the UNHCR’s public commentary on and critique of the Bill. I appreciate that the Minister expressed sympathy for what we are trying to achieve, but I suspect that when he has his discussions with the UNHCR, it will urge him to go further and to adopt some of these safeguards.

There are huge differences between what we propose in new schedule 2 and what appears in schedule 3. The absence of so many crucial safeguards in the latter shows why the clause should not form part of the Bill. Schedule 3 does not even require a finding of inadmissibility or a connection with the state. There is no consideration of the reasonableness of the transfer. The country might not even be a signatory to the refugee convention, offer refugee protection, or offer the chance to secure the full rights to which refugees are entitled under the convention.

To use the UNHCR’s own words:

“Transferring asylum-seekers or recognised refugees to territories with which they have no prior connection and without an individualised consideration of safety, access to fair and efficient asylum procedures and to international protection, or reasonableness is at odds with international practice and risks denying them the right to seek and enjoy asylum, exposing them to human rights abuses and other harm, delaying durable solutions to forced displacement, and encouraging onward movement. To transfer asylum-seekers and refugees to countries that are not parties to the Refugee Convention, and without any expectation, let alone commitment, that they will provide a fair asylum procedure and treatment in line with the Refugee Convention would be an abdication of the United Kingdom’s responsibilities under international law towards refugees and asylum-seekers under its jurisdiction.”

That is the UNHCR’s commentary on schedule 3. That is why we have tabled our new schedule, new clause and amendment, and I hope that the Minister will—not today, obviously—give that further thought.

We know that this is essentially about offshoring. We oppose the clause and the schedule because we are completely and utterly opposed to that concept. It is unlawful, unethical and, as the experience in Australia shows, it does not work. As the shadow Minister highlighted, it did not discourage arrivals by boat. The Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law went into great detail on that in its submission to the Committee, which is absolutely spot on. It highlighted the humongous cost and, more than anything else, the humanitarian disgrace that those camps represent. Doctors Without Borders has talked about

“some of the worst mental health suffering we have ever encountered in our 50 years of existence, including in projects that provide care for torture survivors.”

Finally, on amendment 159, it is good that the Minister has said that children would not be subject to that procedure. However, as the shadow Minister said, there are still various categories of vulnerable people who must be removed from the scope of the clause and schedule. If the Home Office insists on taking that terrible step, surely to goodness it will not subject pregnant women, disabled or sick people, torture victims, victims of trafficking or gender-based violence, LGBT people or the young and old to that procedure. Perhaps the Minister could accept that amendment, just to give us a tiny crumb of comfort.

[Tom Pursglove]

I will briefly pick up on a few points that have been raised during the debate on clause 26. The Government argue that the suite of measures are intended to have a deterrent effect. The measures under the clause are just one part of system-wide reforms that make clear our position that individuals must claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. I recognise that there are fundamental differences of opinion in the Committee about some matters, but we argue that that is the fastest route to safety.

I want to clarify the situation. Although we are, of course, working with our international partners to meet our joint challenges, I assure Committee members that we are not working with Denmark to open an offshore detention centre. It is important to be clear on that point.

[Neil Coyle]

Will the Minister give way on that issue?

[Tom Pursglove]

I will give way, although I gave quite a bit of clarity in what I just said.

[Neil Coyle]

The Minister has given some clarity by saying that the Government are not working with Denmark, but, as he has already said today, he cannot tell us which countries the Government are working with. We know that Albania, Ghana, Rwanda and Gibraltar have all said, “No, thanks”, and that, frankly, we look like we have fewer friends than North Korea on this issue. However, the Minister cannot tell us which countries the Government are negotiating with or how much the measures will cost. When we are supposed to be going through a very costly and controversial set of plans in line- by-line scrutiny, I think that is a dereliction of duty.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I reject the hon. Gentleman’s characterisation of the situation. The truth is that a very particular point was raised about the United Kingdom establishing an offshore detention centre with Denmark, which is not the case. It is important to be clear about that on the record.

A number of issues were raised about vulnerabilities. Again, I want to make it very clear that we will only ever act in line with our international commitments and legal obligations, including the ECHR. Any particular vulnerabilities will be taken into account. Flexibility is already built into the system to ensure that individual circumstances are properly taken into account, and that will continue to be the case.

To conclude, the shadow Minister sought further clarification on the Government’s intentions on clause 26. Changes in the Bill are not about housing people offshore while their asylum claims are considered under the UK’s asylum system. The measures in the Bill support our future objective of removing someone to a safe third country where we intend their claims to be admitted and processed under the third country’s asylum system. I am very happy to provide the clarification he sought.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am not aware of the evidence of that, so I cannot comment. At the end of the day we are talking about people who are at risk. We are not talking about a road traffic case, a minor bump or the small claims court. We are talking about people whose lives are at risk, or they are at risk of serious harm and persecution. That is why we have to be very, very careful about requiring evidence beyond the standard that is internationally accepted.

Let us say that a decision maker is certain that LGBT people in general are at risk of persecution on return to a particular country. Even though the decision maker thinks there is a reasonable likelihood that a particular applicant is LGBT, that will not be enough to secure refugee status. The decision maker could be 49% certain that the applicant is LGBT and 100% certain that an LGBT person returned to a particular country will be tortured and killed, but that 1%—that tiny little bit of doubt—means that the balance of probabilities threshold will not be met, and that case will be rejected. The implications are huge.

Amendment 152 seeks to maintain the status quo. Let us not mess with a long-established principle, and let us be very, very careful that we are not denying refugee status to people who we know should be awarded it.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank hon. Members for tabling the amendments. I agree about the importance of the UK carefully assessing whether asylum seekers have a well-founded fear of persecution, as required under article 1A(2) of the refugee convention. However, we do not agree with the amendments, which, when considered together, will leave decision makers with a lack of clarity on how to consider whether a claimant has a well-founded fear of persecution.

Clause 29 is currently drafted to introduce a clear, step-by-step process for decision makers considering whether an asylum seeker has a well-founded fear of persecution. Currently, there is no clearly outlined test as such. While there is case law, policy and guidance, the current approach leads to a number of different elements being considered as part of one overall decision. The reforms that the Government want to introduce create distinct stages that a decision maker must go through, with clearly articulated standards of proof for each. I am confident that hon. Members will agree that that will lead to clearer and more consistent decisions. That is desirable for all involved.

The amendments include what is already in subsection (4) of clause 29, and it is unclear how they are proposed to fit with subsections (3) and (5). That therefore creates a lack of clarity and defeats the clarificatory purpose of the clause. As identified by hon. Members, clause 29 also raises the standard of proof for one element of the test to the balance of probabilities. Whether an asylum seeker has a characteristic that causes them to fear persecution, also referred to as a convention reason, will be tested to the balance of probabilities.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

There is one further issue that I did not raise earlier. The Minister has spoken about whether an appellant has a convention characteristic. How does the clause deal with imputed characteristics—that is, when a person is not LGBT but is perceived to be, or a person who does not have a political opinion but is treated and thought of as having such an opinion? That is quite an important concept and it seems to be absent.

[Tom Pursglove]

Obviously, we are clear that our proposal is entirely consistent with our obligations under the convention. However, I will happily write to the hon. Member with further detail on that point. It is important to give clarity, and I am keen to do so.

At the clause’s core, we are asking claimants to establish that they are who they say they are and fear what they say they fear, to a balance of probabilities standard. That is the ordinary civil standard of proof for establishing facts—namely, more likely than not. Surelyit is reasonable that claimants who are asking the UK for protection are able to answer those questions.

We have looked carefully at the difficult situations from which many claimants come and the impact on the kinds of tangible evidence they may be able to provide as a result of that. We consider that our holistic approach to making decisions, which includes a detailed and sensitive approach to interviewing as well as referring to expert country guidance, allows all genuine claimants an opportunity to explain their story and satisfy the test. The raising of the standard of proof for this distinct element of the test is appropriate to ensure that only those who qualify for protection under the refugee convention are afforded protection in the United Kingdom.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

On the hypothetical example that I gave, if a decision maker is 49% certain that somebody is LGBT or that their membership of a political party meant that they would definitely be persecuted on return, is the Minister not uncomfortable that that small shortfall from 50% would mean that their whole claim would be rejected, given the consequences?

[Tom Pursglove]

On the concerns around LGBTQ+ individuals, we have acknowledged that it may be more difficult to prove such claims compared with individuals making applications based on other convention reasons. We already have specific asylum policy instruction on considering such claims, which sets out in detail how caseworkers should fully investigate the key issues through a focused, professional and sensitive approach to questioning. As part of the operationalisation of the programme, we will seek to update the training and guidance provided to decision makers. That will concentrate on interviews, to ensure that they are sufficiently detailed to enable claimants to meet the standard. I hope that gives the hon. Member some reassurance. I will of course write to him on his earlier point.

The second element of the test—whether the claimant would be persecuted if returned to their country of origin or their country of former habitual residence—remains at the reasonable degree of likelihood standard of proof. The subjective element—the future fear—is naturally harder for the claimant to demonstrate. Consequently, a lower standard of proof is appropriate.

Responses to the public consultation as well as recent reports from non-governmental organisations have warned of the effects that the clause will have on those with certain protected characteristics, including those with LGBT+ claims. The Committee should be assured that we have considered that carefully, and there are several ways in which we will ensure that such individuals are not disadvantaged by the change. It is worth reflecting on the points I made and the explanation I set out in response to the hon. Member’s intervention. In the light of those points, I hope he will agree to withdraw the amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful for the offer of a letter, but I am not remotely reassured about the new higher standard, which will lead to marginal cases being sent away to persecution, torture and all sorts of terrible consequences. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 49, in clause 30, page 31, line 47, leave out “both” and insert “either”.

This amendment would mean that – in order to be defined as a particular social group for the purposes of the Refugee Convention – a group would only have to meet one (not both) of the conditions set out in subsections 3 and 4.

I have a short but important point to make. The clause concerns the definition of a particular social group, which is an important concept in refugee law and has been crucial to its ongoing relevance across many decades. The clause is controversial because it makes an important change to how a particular social group is defined. In the House of Lords case of the Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Fornah, a long-standing argument about whether the tests in subsection (3) of the clause should be cumulative or alternative was addressed and it was decided that there was no need to meet both of those conditions; one or the other would suffice. However, in the Bill, the Government have decided to change that approach. It now demands that both conditions are met, and that seems to contradict established case law in this country. I simply ask the Government to explain why they have taken a more restrictive approach.

[Tom Pursglove]

Clause 30 aims to clarify an area where there has been a degree of contradiction and confusion. There is a clear mismatch between how the concept of “particular social group” is set out in current legislation, Government policy and in some tribunal judgments, against the interpretation taken in some case law. That is unhelpful for all those working in and engaging with the asylum system, and who most of all want clarity and consistency. Defining how key elements of the convention should be interpreted and applied is vital in creating a robust system that can generate consistency and certainty, which ultimately will drive efficiency. I trust that members of the Committee will agree with that principle. The historical confusion demonstrates perfectly why what we are doing in this clause is so important and is a desirable law reform.

I cannot agree to the change proposed by the hon. Gentleman. First, it is important to state that the conditions set out in the clause reflect current Government policy; it is not a change. The amendment would mean that a group need only meet one of the conditions to be considered as a particular social group. That significantly broadens the scope of who may be covered by the convention. It would erode the concept that people deserve and need protection based on fundamental characteristics that go to the core of who they are, such as their faith or sexuality. It proposes instead to broaden the definition to cover potentially transient factors that can perhaps be changed, but that fundamentally misunderstands the very basis of what it means to be a refugee, as envisaged by the refugee convention, and why we have a system to offer protection. I hope my explanation has reassured colleagues across the Committee, and I urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

The hon. Gentleman has mentioned established case law on the correct definition of “particular social group”, so I will say something briefly about that. As with many of the key concepts of the refugee convention, case law has developed over the years on how to apply the term “particular social group” for the purpose of considering whether a claimant has a convention reason. Despite significant judicial interest in the interpretation of “particular social group” in case law, there is no established case law on the point. There is, however, conflicting tribunal-level case law and obiter comments by the House of Lords in the case of Fornah. Consequently, the clause seeks to provide clarity on the UK’s interpretation of a particular social group, to ensure that it is applied consistently among decision makers.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I agree with the Minister that we need clarity, but there are two different ways of providing clarity: we can either combine the requirements or use them as alternatives. I say that we should provide clarity by using them as alternatives. That is how the House of Lords interpreted the convention in the case of Fornah, and that is what the tribunal did recently as well, so I wish to press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The clause relates to article 31 of the convention, which provides refugees with immunity from certain penalties. It is an important protection that the Government are seeking to limit by, in my view, reinterpreting and undermining article 31, and setting out expectations of where and when individuals should claim that go beyond the letter and spirit of the convention.

The amendments take us back to this morning’s discussion about why it was especially inappropriate to place these requirements and expectations on particular groups, including victims of trafficking, sexual violence and torture. They are designed to pose a question to the Minister: why is he seeking to strip such groups of their immunity from penalties that the refugee convention provides?

[Tom Pursglove]

Again, I thank the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and for Glasgow North East for all their hard work in this area and in producing these amendments. As they will know, the provisions they are seeking to amend are crucial to the Government’s intention to uphold the first safe country of asylum principle. In this respect, these clauses are designed to deter dangerous journeys across Europe by no longer treating migrants who come directly to the UK and claim without delay in the same way as those who do not. I am sure they will agree that we must do everything in our power to stop people putting their lives in the hands of smugglers and making extremely perilous journeys across the channel.

Amendments 157 and 158 would apply to clause 34, which is closely related to clause 10 in that it sets out the UK’s interpretation of certain criteria within article 31(1) of the refugee convention. The criteria in article 31 provide the basis for the legal framework we are using to differentiate within clause 10. The intention of the amendments is to seek statutory carve-outs from differentiation for a wide range of cohorts.

I absolutely understand where this is coming from. I would like to reassure hon. Members that the powers in clause 10 do not compel the Secretary of State to act in a certain way, and leave discretion to impose or not impose conditions as appropriate, depending on the individual circumstances. We will of course set out our policy in immigration rules and guidance in due course. The policy will be exercised with full respect to our international obligations and will most certainly be sensitive to certain types, some of which are referenced in the amendment, such as having been trafficked.

I would note that blanket carve-outs are an attractive option to ensure protection of the most vulnerable, but ultimately I do not believe it would appropriate to do this in the way amendments 157 and 158 seek. In reality, blanket carve-outs would simply encourage people coming by small boat to claim they belonged to an exempted cohort. Most importantly, this would of course prevent us from protecting those people who do genuinely have those characteristics. By creating this perverse incentive, it would also undercut the entire purpose of the policy to serve as a deterrent. Indeed, people could then simply continue to make dangerous journeys to the UK and not claim in the first safe country because they know they can avoid group 2 refugee status simply by saying that they are LGBT+ or have a mental health condition.

For all these reasons, I invite the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and for Glasgow North East not to press their amendments.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Obviously, we maintain a fundamental opposition to the whole scheme proposed by this clause and clause 10. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 50, in clause 34, page 34, line 1, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—

“(b) in subsection (3), after (b), insert—

“(ba) entry in breach of a deportation order, entry without leave, remaining in the United Kingdom without leave, or arriving in the United Kingdom without entry clearance under section 24 of the 1971 Act”;

(c) in subsection (4), after (c), insert—

“(ca) entry in breach of a deportation order, entry without leave, remaining in the United Kingdom without leave, or arriving in the United Kingdom without entry clearance under section 24 of the 1971 Act””.

This amendment would mean that individuals who committed these offences (and the other offences set out in section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999) would be able to use the defence set out in section 31 of that Act, even if the offence was committed in the course of an attempt to leave the UK.

Again, I want to prompt the Government—perhaps optimistically—for their thinking on the compatibility of these provisions with the convention. The amendment would mean that individuals charged with certain offences could still rely on defences provided by the convention, even if the offence was committed in the course of an attempt to leave the UK. It is important that the Government explain clearly why they think that removing that possibility is consistent with the convention. To be honest, I am struggling to understand the Government’s reasoning.

[Tom Pursglove]

Amendment 50 is extensive. I thank the hon. Member for the considerable thought he has put into the amendment, which would list the illegal entry, arrival without clearance and remaining in the UK without leave offences as subject to the statutory defence against prosecution. However, the express statutory defence under section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 has never applied to the existing offences referred to in amendment 50. We do not consider the new arrivals without entry clearance offence needs to be referred to expressly for the same reason. Where relevant in a particular case, the Crown Prosecution Service will take into account the UK’s obligations under article 31 of the refugee convention.

Another effect of amendment 50 would be to reverse our clause 34(4) and reintroduce a defence from prosecution for those transiting through the UK having entered illegally and intending to go and claim asylum elsewhere, such as Canada or the USA. I disagree that the statutory defence should extend to those who have tried to exit the UK without first seeking asylum, but I reassure hon. Members that that does not mean that every asylum seeker who tries to exit the UK will be prosecuted. We are targeting for prosecution those migrants where there are aggravating factors involved—for example, causing danger to themselves or others, including rescuers; causing severe disruption to services such as shipping routes or closure of the channel tunnel; or where they are persons who have previously been removed from the UK as failed asylum seekers.

We have of course been very clear that people seeking protection must claim in the first safe country they reach. That is the fastest route to safety. In the same way that we will not tolerate smugglers exploiting vulnerable people to come to the UK when a claim could easily be made in another safe country, we will also not tolerate those migrants who transit through the UK, having previously travelled through European countries, to reach other places. They must claim in the first safe country they reach. For those reasons, I invite the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It is useful to have that on the record. I will go away and give it some further thought. We maintain our fundamental opposition to the whole scheme, but, in the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 34 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 35

Article 33(2): particularly serious crime

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I am afraid that we simply cannot agree to amendments that would allow individuals to remain in the United Kingdom despite being convicted of offences that are even more serious than those described under the current legislative framework. This Government cannot support provisions that allow dangerous foreign national offenders to remain in the United Kingdom, and if it means putting the public at risk.

This Government are committed to continuing to meet our international obligations, in particular those under the refugee convention and European convention on human rights. A key principle of the refugee convention is non-refoulement, also referred to as removal, of refugees to a place or territory where there is a real risk that their life or freedoms would be threatened. But the convention itself recognises that there have to be exceptions to this. Article 33(2) of the convention allows refugees to be returned when they have committed a particularly serious crime and as a result, constitute a danger to the community, or are a danger to the security of the UK.

The aim of clause 35 is to redefine a “particularly serious crime”. I would like to reassure Committee members that we have looked carefully at the type of offending that may be caught by a new lower threshold. It is that that has contributed to the Government’s position that offences with 12 months’ custody or more should be considered as being particularly serious.

It is worth taking a moment to consider some of those offences for which the Sentencing Council’s guidelines indicate that a year’s custody is the starting point. They include causing a child to watch sexual activity, inciting a child to engage in sexual activity and carrying a firearm in a public place, in certain circumstances. Hon. Members surely agree with me that they and the public would consider those crimes as particularly serious. Clause 35 as drafted, like all clauses in the Bill, is fully compliant with our obligations under the refugee convention.

I turn specifically to amendments 51 and 52. They seek to make the first limb of the article 33(2) assessment, that is whether an individual has committed a particularly serious crime, rebuttable. That would mean that an individual who had been sentenced to 12 months or more in prison could argue that their crime was not in fact serious. That is despite a court of law, based on all the facts in the case, taking into account mitigating and aggravating factors, determining that the offending was so serious that an individual should be deprived of their liberty for 12 months or more.

If we are agreed that a year’s imprisonment means someone has committed a crime that society clearly considers serious, this amendment seemingly gives offenders a second bite of the cherry to disagree with the ruling of the criminal courts in the UK—some of the most respected legal bodies in the world. The Government propose in clause 35 that a crime which has been punished by 12 months or more imprisonment is an appropriate definition, ensuring that all particularly serious crimes are captured. Such a sentence, which limits the freedom of an individual for a considerable period, would be inappropriate if the crime was not particularly serious.

I also stress that there is a safeguard in the process. If an individual commits a particularly serious crime, the bar on refoulement is not automatically lifted. The individual has an opportunity to rebut the presumption that they are a danger to the community in the UK. Only individuals who are unable to rebut the presumption will be considered for removal. I also flag the UK’s other international obligations, in particular those under the European convention on human rights. An individual would not be removed from the UK if doing so would breach our obligations under the convention. Instead, they would be granted shorter, more restricted forms of leave to remain, and would be removed at the earliest opportunity, when it is safe to do so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Goodwill]

Is the Minister aware that in the Representation of the People Act 1981 the same 12-month sentence would disqualify a Member of Parliament—so what is sauce for the goose, I guess?

[Tom Pursglove]

My right hon. Friend puts the matter in a way that only he can. To raise the definition to a level that captures only crimes that have resulted in a sentence of four years or more imprisonment would be reckless, and would undermine the aims of the new plan for immigration to build a fair but firm immigration system. It would clearly send the wrong, and dangerous, message that the UK welcomes and rewards serious offenders. I do not believe that the people of the UK want that. The amendments would mean that individuals who commit some of the most serious crimes would continue to receive the generous benefits of refugee status in the United Kingdom. Their continued presence in the UK could also lead to avoidable reoffending. The Government would not be upholding their responsibility to protect the public of the United Kingdom by supporting the amendments.

The hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate queried the process for a person who has been trafficked. I can confirm that such a person will be tested under the second limb for whether they amount to a danger to the community. With regard to offences committed overseas, section 72(3)(c) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 contains a provision to ensure that any convictions abroad would result in a sentence of 12 months or above in the UK for a similar offence.

In the light of those points, I hope that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East will withdraw the amendment, and that the Committee agree that the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It is useful to have that on the record. I do not think that all the points were addressed, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 35 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 36

Interpretation of Part 2

--- Later in debate ---

[Bambos Charalambous]

In order to save time—I know that we have had a very long day—I will bear in mind that the wording of amendment 135 is almost identical to that of the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East. He did it justice when speaking to it, and we will support it.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank hon. Members for tabling the amendments. I have listened carefully to the arguments that they have put forward. I agree about the importance of the United Kingdom continuing to meet its obligations under the refugee convention, including through the rights that we provide to refugees. The amendments to clause 36 relate to the inadmissibility provisions set out in clause 14. I understand the spirit of the amendments in wishing to define protection in accordance with the refugee convention where we may seek to remove an individual to a safe country. However, clause 14 as drafted ensures that the principles of the refugee convention should be met if we are to remove an individual to that country.

If individuals have travelled via, or have connections to, safe countries where it is reasonable to expect them to have claimed asylum, they should do so. They should not make unnecessary and often dangerous onward journeys to the UK; however, if they do, we will seek to remove them to a safe country. We will only ever return inadmissible claimants to countries that are safe and where the principles of the refugee convention are met. For those reasons, I cannot support the amendments, and I ask that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East withdraw amendment 55.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Again, it is useful to have that on the record. The Minister defends the clause as it is by referencing the protection that clause 14 provides on the principles of the refugee convention, but when I asked him what that meant earlier I was not remotely satisfied by the answer. It is another clause that is completely undefined, so I wish to press amendment 55 to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Seventh sitting)

Tom Pursglove Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 21st October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Tom Pursglove)]

I thank the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and for Glasgow North East for all their hard work in this area, and for their engaging speeches. I do not doubt for a moment the sincerity of their contributions. Nobody should be in any doubt about the sincerity of the deeply felt views expressed by all Members of this House, who I genuinely believe want to see appropriate action to tackle dangerous channel crossings. I wanted to make that point at the outset, because it is important to remember that in the context of today’s debate.

As hon. Members will know, the clauses that they seek to amend are crucial to the Government’s intention to uphold the first safe country of asylum principle. In that respect, the clauses are designed to deter dangerous journeys across Europe by no longer treating migrants who come directly to the UK and claim without delay in the same way as those who do not. I am sure that hon. Members will agree that we must do everything in our power to stop people putting their lives in the hands of smugglers and making extremely perilous journeys across the channel.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I echo what the Minister says: everybody present wants to see an end to such crossings. He used the word “migrants” a couple of times, but as the Bill reflects we are talking about people who have gone through the refugee process. They are refugees, and it is very important that in this debate we speak about the fact that this is happening to refugees—hence the term “group 2 refugee”.

[Tom Pursglove]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention.

I will take amendments 88 to 95 in one go, as they individually seek to remove key constituent parts of clause 10 in order to prevent the exercise of the powers to differentiate. That is not the effect of the amendments as drafted, but I shall none the less assume that the intent is as I just set out. Hon. Members are no doubt familiar by now with the way in which the policy is proposed to operate. For the avoidance of doubt, though, clause 10 provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of where differential treatment may be applied to group 2 refugees—in other words, those who do not meet the requirements set out in clause 10, which are based on criteria set out in article 31 of the refugee convention. That includes in relation to the length of leave issued, requirements to achieve settlement, recourse to public funds and family reunion rights.

As mentioned, the clause is extremely important because it acts on our commitment to do everything that we can to deter people from making dangerous journeys to the UK at the hands of smugglers, when they could claim asylum in a safe third country. I will pick up on a number of important points that were made, as it is right to provide clarification on them.

First, the question was raised of how the Secretary of State intends to use these powers. As we talked about in relation to the earlier provisions in the Bill, this will be set out in the normal way in the immigration rules and guidance in due course.

--- Later in debate ---

[Neil Coyle]

The Minister is seeking to reintroduce a system that the UK has used before. In the 1930s, German Jews who had reached these shores were, in some cases, sent back if they had been through other countries. Famously, in one case, Jewish brothers who were deported back to Belgium went on to be murdered by the Nazis. Why are the Government seeking to turn back the clock with such potentially disastrous consequences? Why is the Minister not more proud of the British tradition and of the British contribution to creating the refugee convention?

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. What I am proud of is this country’s long-standing tradition of doing right by those fleeing persecution from around the world. That is a proud tradition in this country, and something that I think Members on both sides of this House can agree on. It is something that this Government remain absolutely committed to. We are very clear that people should come here utilising safe and legal routes. That is the right way to come into this country.

[Neil Coyle]

rose—

[Tom Pursglove]

Let me just make this point, because I am conscious of the comparisons that the hon. Member sought to draw to the 1930s. We are, again, very clear—I say this for the record—that we do not return people to countries where they would be in danger.

[Neil Coyle]

The Minister simply must give way on this.

[Tom Pursglove]

I have not accepted the intervention. I would like to finish the point that I was making. We are very clear that we do not return people to countries where their return would put them in danger. Of course, we also look at cases on a case-by-case basis.

[Neil Coyle]

Will the Minister give way?

[Tom Pursglove]

I will give way, but I have made this point, and I am very clear about it.

[Neil Coyle]

The Minister can say it as clearly as he wants. The reality is that I have constituents whose casework—correspondence from the Home Office—tells me that it was safe for them to be sent back to Afghanistan in June, when the Taliban were marching across Afghanistan and beginning to take over the country! There is a big difference between the nonsense and rhetoric we get and the reality—the dangers and risk that this Government are putting people in.

[Tom Pursglove]

In response to the specifics that the hon. Member is raising on Afghanistan, I would make the point that returns to Afghanistan have been ceased, given the current circumstances, given the circumstances there at the moment. That takes into full account the considerations around the circumstances on the ground at any given point in time, and the Government have rightly been responsive to that ever-changing situation. I am not able to comment on the detail of the individual cases that the hon. Member is referencing, but I would ask him to please write to me with that detail so that I can take that away and look at it.

[Neil Coyle]

I think Members will be somewhat sceptical of the invitation to write, given that we were writing about hundreds of cases in Afghanistan in emails that were not even opened by the Foreign Office, the Home Office or the Ministry of Defence. I will write. I will take that opportunity. I still have hundreds of cases, including four Brits who are still in Afghanistan because they were abandoned by this Government. The Minister says he is proud of our tradition and proud that we offer safe and legal routes, but where in this Bill do we extend the ability to access safe and legal routes that avoid the need to use human traffickers and people smugglers?

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that further contribution. I look forward to receiving the correspondence from him—it was a genuine offer made in the right spirit and I look forward to him taking it up.

As I say, this Government have a strong track record of providing safe and legal routes. This country has a proud record of providing safe and legal routes. It does not escape me that overall since 2015 we have settled more than any EU member state. That is something this country can be incredibly proud of. Various examples of safe and legal routes that people may avail themselves of include the UK resettlement scheme, the mandate resettlement scheme and the community sponsorship scheme. I am keen for communities to participate in that sponsorship scheme.

[Neil Coyle]

Will the Minister give way?

[Tom Pursglove]

I have been generous, but I will give way once more.

[Neil Coyle]

I welcome the Minister’s generosity and I am grateful for it, as I am sure Afghans will be if he can tell us when the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme will actually open, given that it has been two months since Kabul fell.

[Tom Pursglove]

The hon. Gentleman will appreciate some of the genuine difficulties for people in trying to leave Afghanistan—[Interruption]—and doing so in the safest way possible—[Interruption.] He keeps interrupting from a sedentary position. Will he let me finish the point that I am trying to make?

The bottom line is that we are firmly committed to that resettlement scheme. We will announce details of it as quickly as possible, having taken proper account of the very real difficulties that exist in getting people safely, as far as that is possible, out of Afghanistan. Ministers and officials are working tirelessly to work that up in an appropriate manner.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

rose—

[Tom Pursglove]

I will give way to the hon. Gentleman as well, because I want to be generous and to hear what he has to say.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Minister is being generous. I want to push things back to some of the questions—

[Tom Pursglove]

I have some answers on those to come.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Great, because the purpose of the amendments is to probe exactly how these very broad powers will be used. It will be useful if he could talk about some of what the Government intend.

[Tom Pursglove]

I am keen to do just that. I have made the point about safe and legal routes. There are many examples in the past and that are still active.

[Paul Blomfield]

Will the Minister give way?

[Tom Pursglove]

I will give way, but I am keen to move on to answer some of the questions.

[Paul Blomfield]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He talked again about the UK’s leading role in accepting refugees. Does he not accept that the most recent data from the UNHCR on refugees in Europe—from 2019—has Germany resettling more than three times as many refugees as the UK, or 9,640 compared with 3,507? Also, smaller countries such as Sweden and Norway accepted more than the UK.

[Tom Pursglove]

I refer the hon. Gentleman to my earlier point.

I want to move on to the points made by various members of the Committee about a number of areas related to the amendments. In answer to the question about section 95 asylum support, those who are already in receipt of such support will not face any condition restricting access to public funds. The power to differentiate in respect of public funds is flexible and there is no obligation to use it in inappropriate cases. Again, detail will be set out in the guidance and rules to follow. The House will have the opportunity to scrutinise those in the normal way.

A number of points were made about family reunion. It is wrong to say that the Bill will remove family reunion rights. Family reunion will be protected in line with article 8 of the European convention on human rights. The Bill will allow us to take steps to disincentivise people from taking risky, life-threatening journeys. There is, I suppose, a philosophical debate about this: I think we all agree that we need to end those dangerous journeys, but how we achieve that is the area of dispute.

[Paul Blomfield]

The Minister is right to say that we all agree on the objective and that the dispute is about the effectiveness of the Government strategy. Is he not even a little unsettled by the fact that the Government’s own impact assessment states that their strategy is unlikely to work? It states that

“evidence supporting the effectiveness of this approach is limited.”

[Tom Pursglove]

It is right that we break the business model of these evil criminal gangs and take steps that help to achieve that endeavour. The point the hon. Gentleman has made, which runs through the Bill, is that people should come here by safe and legal routes and that we should take steps as appropriate to break that business model. I am confident that the steps we are taking in the Bill will achieve exactly that.

[Paul Blomfield]

So the Minister is saying that the Government’s impact assessment is wrong.

[Tom Pursglove]

I genuinely believe that the policy we are pursuing through the Bill will make a significant difference in deterring dangerous channel crossings, where people pay evil people smugglers to try and get to the United Kingdom. It is right that we prioritise safe and legal routes and make it very clear that they are the way to arrive in this country, and that we deter people from making those very dangerous, irregular journeys. I am confident that the Bill will make a significant difference in tackling that challenge.

[Mr Goodwill]

When I was in Nigeria I heard from the Nigerian Home Secretary that the system often contributed to family break-up rather than reunion. The people smugglers perpetuated the lie that people who could get a teenage child to the UK would be able to follow. In fact, it has always been the principle of family reunion that children must travel to where their families are and not the other way round.

[Tom Pursglove]

In terms of the deceit and the appalling treatment of so many people, I have heard heartbreaking stories of the way that individuals have been treated by these evil people smugglers. That has only redoubled my determination to render their business model redundant.

This point goes to the heart of the intervention a moment ago from the hon. Member for Sheffield Central: the measures in the Bill do not just stand alone—it is not just about these measures. Tackling the problem requires a strong and co-ordinated response that also involves our international partners. For example, the collaboration through the arrangement we have with the French is very important contextually in tackling this issue. Clearly, supporting French law enforcement to try and stop some of the crossings happening in the first place is crucial, and the evidence is clear that that support is having a positive effect in achieving that goal.

Our international diplomacy is also important, because we want to send out a clear message that human rights must be respected and upheld across the world. The measures in the Bill, as important as they are, are not the only element in responding to these huge challenges. That international collaboration is very important as well, as is our diplomatic work.

[Neil Coyle]

I thank the Minister for giving way; he has been very generous. It is extraordinary to hear a Minister trash their own department’s equality impact assessment and point out its inadequacies.

[Tom Pursglove]

indicated dissent.

[Neil Coyle]

That is exactly what the Minister did. However, my question is around family reunion visas, which he mentioned. The number of family reunion visas granted in the UK fell by nearly 10% in the last year for which numbers were available. Will he agree to a review of the system to look at some of the issues around entitlements for those other than dependants or spouses?

[Tom Pursglove]

I will take that away to look at it. I refer the hon. Gentleman to my previous point in trying to address the matter of family reunion. I am conscious that in his earlier remarks he raised the particular case of an Afghan family. I will also go away and speak about that to the Minister for Afghan Resettlement, who is the Minister responsible for Operation Warm Welcome and our refugee policy in relation to Afghanistan. I undertake to take that point away and ensure that my hon. Friend is aware of it. It is very important and I will do that. It is crucial that that happens. I ask that the hon. Gentleman leave that with me, and that will happen later today.

To finish on this point, the powers under clause 10 enable the Secretary of State to differentiate in respect of family reunion. It is important to recognise that the power is flexible and will not be used where a refusal of family reunion would breach our international obligations. The policy will be set out, again, in guidance and in rules, but I thought it was important to get that point on the record. Suffice it to say that of course this Government will always act in accordance with our international obligations and the law.

With all that in mind, I ask the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to withdraw the amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am slightly frustrated—actually, pretty frustrated—that we have not managed to tease out more about what the Government intend. We will no doubt come back to the point about article 31 justifying the provision.

We are being asked to hand hugely significant and broad powers to the Home Secretary, and we are being told, “Well, everything will be set out in immigration rules and guidance,” when we all know that scrutiny and opportunities to amend such provisions are incredibly limited. Let me ask the Minister this: what more do I know now about the Government’s intentions than I knew before half-past 11 this morning? Not very much. I am not sure I even understand the answer in relation to no recourse to public funds. I do not see how a person who is a refugee would still be on section 95 support; having been recognised as a refugee, such a person would obviously move on. At least I get the sense that there would be some sort of automatic decision not to put an NRPF condition on them, but I am none the wiser about how some of the other powers will be used.

[Tom Pursglove]

As I have said previously, I am very keen to be helpful to the Committee, so if I may, I will study Hansard to look back at the questions that the hon. Gentleman posed on this matter. I will gladly write to him to clarify the position and try to provide further detail.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It would be hugely helpful for Members of this House, ahead of Report, and for Members of the other place, who will be wanting to scrutinise the Government’s intentions, to be told more about that support and about precisely how the clauses on family reunion can be consistent with article 8, and the answers to my questions about leave. That was the purpose of tabling the amendments, so if the Minister undertakes to do that, there is no reason to put anything to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 15, in clause 10, page 13, line 34, at end insert—

“(7A) An Afghan national who is a refugee because they face a risk of persecution by the Taliban is not to be treated as a Group 2 refugee and in particular—

(a) must not face a restriction on their leave to enter compared to group 1 refugees;

(b) must have access to indefinite leave to remain on the same basis as group 1 refugees;

(c) must not have no recourse to public funds conditions attached to any leave to enter or remain given to them; and

(d) must have access to family reunion on the same basis as group 1 refugees.”

This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from treating Afghan refugees at risk of persecution by the Taliban as Group 2 refugees.

I can be brief, because a lot of the territory in relation to Afghanistan was covered in the previous debate. Again, Members across this House have been forceful, powerful advocates. Whatever our views on the manner of the withdrawal, its timing and so on, I do not doubt for a minute that every Member of the House intended to ensure the UK did what could be done to assist the people of Afghanistan. The problem with this Bill, as far as I can see, is that that generosity of spirit, that determination to help, seems to come to a shuddering halt should a person from Afghanistan end up claiming asylum in this country.

The amendment confronts hon. Members with, to use a Home Office expression, a face behind the case. We are talking about creating an exemption where the Home Office has assessed a person’s case and accepted that they are at risk of persecution from the Taliban in Afghanistan, such that it will not be permissible for the Secretary of State to discriminate against them—to make them subject to no recourse to public funds, to deny them family reunion, to refuse to give them settlement after five years and to perpetrate all the other discriminations that the clause allows. In a sense, it would be nonsensical to create an exception only for such people, but the amendment is designed simply to confront hon. Members with the fact that that is who we are talking about. Those discriminations will apply to these people, whom we have all been championing, just as they would to any other asylum seeker. I do not need to say any more than that, but I will press the amendment to a Division.

[Tom Pursglove]

I do not think it would be appropriate for clause 10 to include an exemption from group 2 refugee conditions for Afghan national refugees. Although I have great sympathy for the plight of Afghan citizens who are fleeing the brutal reign of the Taliban, a blanket exemption for Afghan citizens who are recognised as refugees would be inappropriate for two reasons.

First, we cannot exempt any particular nationality, because situations of conflict and repression are fluid. There may come a time when that country is no longer unsafe and those from it who claim asylum are no longer genuinely in need of protection; I am sure that is something that we all wish to see. If there were still an exemption for them in primary legislation, it would serve as a huge pull factor to the UK for migrants seeking to claim asylum in order to work or otherwise make a new life in the UK.

Secondly, any blanket exemption would inevitably lead to people posing as Afghans in an attempt to benefit from the hon. Gentleman’s very principled generosity. That would, perversely, prevent us from protecting Afghans who were genuinely in need. I am sure hon. Members agree that that would be in no one’s interest.

[Anne McLaughlin]

I wonder whether the Minister agrees or disagrees with the Conservative former Immigration Minister, the right hon. Member for Ashford (Damian Green), who said in August:

“There are times and places where we should be strict with asylum applications. Afghanistan today is the exact opposite. We should take anyone who can make a case”.

[Tom Pursglove]

I simply cannot in all conscience support anyone of any nationality putting their lives in the hands of evil people-smuggling gangs, and I think that that would be the unintended consequence of what the hon. Lady is trying to achieve. I do not doubt the generosity of spirit behind the amendment, but I do not think that putting it into the Bill is the right thing to do. It is right that we continue to develop the safe and legal route as quickly as possible, and make sure that people are able to come here. I cannot, in all good conscience, support an amendment that would simply afford opportunity to evil criminal gangs. With that, I ask the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to withdraw it.

[Bambos Charalambous]

The Afghan resettlement scheme would have a cap of 5,000 per year. If that 5,000 limit had been met, anyone who came here via other routes would be deemed to be in one of the group 2 categories, and they would have fewer protections. On guidance, which my hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark mentioned, the issue around how they would be treated would certainly be in play. They would be treated as group 2, and we must bear in mind that the guidance would say that they could not return to Afghanistan. Does the Minister have any comments on that?

[Tom Pursglove]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for the intervention. I think there is a timing issue here. We are debating this Bill in Committee today and we have several more weeks of Committee, and then Report and Third Reading in the Commons, followed by Lords consideration in full, and consideration of any amendments that those in the other place wish to send to us. As a result, we are some way away from this Bill becoming law. By that time, I fully expect that the safe and legal route will have been established and people will be able to avail themselves of it. The overriding point is that all cases are considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into proper account all the relevant considerations.

[Anne McLaughlin]

The Minister says that he hopes that, by the time the Bill is enacted, the safe and legal route will be up and running. We are talking about Afghanistan. Does he mean that, by the time it is enacted, all the safe and legal routes that are required in different parts of the world where people need to flee to seek protection will be and up and running, or just the Afghan route?

[Tom Pursglove]

Amendment 15 is very specifically about Afghanistan. I would not wish to invoke your wrath, Ms McDonagh, by going wider than that, so I must keep my remarks to Afghanistan. The point that I have made stands, and I reiterate that cases are considered on a case-by-case basis, as the hon. Lady would rightly expect.

[Neil Coyle]

The Minister has been very generous in giving way. I am particularly concerned about this. He is suggesting that a safe route is available, when the Government guidance currently says not to make applications for family reunion for Afghanistan cases. Perhaps he can explore that issue in more detail with his hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins), who is the Minister for Afghan Resettlement, and get back to us—certainly before Report.

[Tom Pursglove]

I am very happy to reflect the sentiment in my conversations with my ministerial colleague. As I was about to say before I took the intervention from the shadow spokesperson, I urge SNP Members to withdraw their amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

For the reasons given by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central in particular, I do not accept the argument about creating incentives. All we are asking is for Afghan asylum seekers to be treated in a few months’ time precisely in the same way as they are treated now, to be given a fair hearing, and, once they are recognised as refugees, to be treated in the same way as other refugees.

I have a second quick point before I conclude. Towards the end of his speech, the Minister referred a couple of times to things being looked at on a case-by-case basis. It is very important that, when we get to the clause stand part debate, he expands on what exactly he means by that. From what I heard from the Home Secretary, my understanding was that clause 10 would apply to Afghans in precisely the same way as it would to everybody else. The Minister’s reference to a case-by-case basis seems to suggest some sort of discretion, whether between nationalities or between individual cases. He has opened up a whole series of questions about how exactly the scheme is going to operate. Perhaps we can revisit that during the clause stand part debate.

I agree with the Minister that it does not make sense for legislation to carve out a particular nationality. However, what makes even less sense, as I said at the outset, is for all of us to be champions of Afghans so long as they are—

[Tom Pursglove]

I am keen to clarify that point. The point that I was making was exactly as I alluded to earlier: that, for example, we would not return someone to a country that is fundamentally unsafe.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful for that clarification. I had thought that the Minister was saying that the powers in clause 10 would be applied on a case-by-case basis depending on individual circumstances, rather than what seems to be suggested by the clause: depending on their mode of arrival. He has clarified that what the Home Secretary said was correct: it will apply to Afghans, Uyghurs and everybody else in the same way.

Amendment 15 is not the most perfect or wonderful amendment, but even less perfect are the provisions in the Bill that would see Afghan asylum seekers stripped of public funds, stripped of family reunion rights and treated, frankly, abysmally. I would therefore like to put amendment 15 to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I will take the amendments in reverse order. To go back to part of Tuesday’s debate about Parliament, rather than the Executive, taking back control, nobody—regardless of whether they were for or against anything else I have said this morning— could deny that these are sweeping powers, with next to no limits or constraints on how they may be used. In theory, the Secretary of State could put everyone up in palaces or prisons, expand or restrict family reunion rights, and give 50 years’ leave or 50 days’ leave. Because it can all be done by changes to the immigration rules, there might as well be no oversight at all.

The process is even weaker than the negative procedure that we use for some statutory instruments. Not since 2008 has a statement of changes to the rules been properly debated by MPs. Although the other place has a better record of holding debates, 87 changes to the immigration rules have been made since 2008 without the procedure being fully invoked. Even if either House disapproves the changes within 40 days, all that means is that the Home Secretary has to lay further rules, making any changes that she thinks appropriate. In short, these are massive powers that could fundamentally change the asylum system in the UK. More important, they will have a profound impact on hundreds of thousands of people. The powers need proper oversight, which is essentially what amendment 97 supplies.

Amendment 96 is designed to retrieve a sliver of hope from an otherwise horrendous clause. Even if the Government are hellbent on proceeding down this road, by their own logic they surely cannot apply these changes and disincentives retrospectively to somebody who has already claimed asylum. The Minister says that the Bill is about disincentives to stop people crossing, or coming by other dangerous routes. I do not think that that will work, or that it is right, appropriate or ethical to do that. Although the Government take the opposite view, they cannot possible argue that we can disincentivise someone who is already here.

There are 70,000 people in the asylum system, many of whom claimed for refugee status many months ago. It is a source of stress and anxiety, according to organisations that work with refugees, such as the British Red Cross, that the threat of being put into limbo, and of family separation and destitution—all the things that we have just spoken about—will hang over them if the provisions of the Bill apply to them.

[Tom Pursglove]

I hope that I can give the hon. Gentleman the reassurance he seeks in relation to amendment 96. It has never been our intention to apply differentiation retrospectively.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

That is a hugely welcome assurance, which many people will be very pleased to hear. The Minister can say in his response why he objects to that going in the Bill, but, as I say, it will make a profound difference to 70,000 lives, and to family members further afield.

[Tom Pursglove]

I reassure the Committee that amendment 96, which seeks to ensure that only asylum claims made after commencement are considered under clause 10, is not needed. For many good reasons, not least for purposes of practicality, we have always intended to apply clause 10 only to asylum claims made after commencement. The position is similar in respect of amendment 97, which seeks to ensure that any regulations required to implement the policy should be subject to the affirmative procedure in Parliament. Clause 10(8) is not a regulation-making power; rather, it is a power to make immigration rules. In any event, the amendment is not needed since the rules are subject to their own parliamentary procedure, set out in section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971. Parliamentarians may pray against them within a 40-day period. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to withdraw his amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the Minister for his response. After a day and a half of debate, I feel I have achieved one small positive, which is reassurance in relation to retrospective application of clause 10. That is welcome. I have moved millions of amendments to Bills over the years in relation to scrutiny and oversight of immigration legislation, and they have all been rejected, so I am not going to press this to a vote. However, I make the point that if we parliamentarians are serious about scrutinising legislation and profound changes that have an impact on people’s lives, we have to come up with better ways of scrutinising what goes on in the immigration system. I shall leave that debate for another day. Having made my point, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Eighth sitting)

Tom Pursglove Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 21st October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate on his comprehensive critique of clause 10. I want to add only a few points on what is clearly at the heart of the Government’s approach in this Bill: seeking to create a hostile environment for refugees and splitting them into the two groups of which my hon. Friend spoke.

I was interested to hear the Minister talk earlier about the Bill as just one part of a multifaceted approach to tackling the problem, of which international diplomacy was at the core. I would welcome his reflections, when he comes to make his remarks, on how far he thinks our position in international diplomacy is strengthened by a Bill that the UNHCR, the guardian of the 1951 convention, denounces in clear terms as

“The creation of an unlawful two-tier system in which most refugees are denied rights guaranteed by the Refugee Convention and essential to their integration”.

I think that our position in terms of how we play our cards in international diplomacy will be weakened by setting ourselves against the international community. This proposal appals all organisations that have worked with those coming to our country to flee war, terror and persecution, and Labour shares their view. However, I appreciate that this Government, in contrast with previous Conservative Administrations, revel in setting themselves against the international consensus and are happy tearing up treaties to which they have been signatories.



We should examine the clause in the context of the Government’s own objectives. They say it is part of a deterrent to break the business model of people smugglers by dissuading those seeking asylum from taking what the Government consider to be irregular routes. We are all agreed on the objective of breaking the appalling business model of people smuggling and we all agree that we want to end the situation that leads people to take the most desperate journeys across the channel. As I said earlier, and clearly the Minister struggled to respond to that point, even the Government’s own impact assessment says,

“evidence supporting the effectiveness of this approach is limited.”

I know that he had a problem with evidence when we were talking about clause 9 under part 1.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Tom Pursglove)]

The hon. Gentleman will get a very nice long letter.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jonathan Gullis]

The issue is that we inherited a ruinous backlog from the Labour Government, and we have gone through a multitude of challenges recently—covid, for example, which brought the very challenging situation of working from home. I understand—I am a constituency MP like everyone else. We all do our bit and write to the Home Office. We get frustrated by the time that certain cases can take to process, but ultimately, we are trying to fix the system. That is one strand, and there are other parts of the Bill that we will examine, such as offshoring, which I support. There are other methods to help to deal with the backlog and speed up the processing of asylum claims.

I am more than happy to welcome genuine asylum seekers; what I am unhappy about is the illegal economic migrants continually crossing our channel, coming to our shores and costing millions of pounds to the British taxpayer, and the lawyers obsessed with taking money out of the British purse to stop people being deported. Let us not forget, there are convicted criminals dragged off the plane at the last minute, leaving the UK taxpayer to pick up the tab. They are criminals who should not be here and rightly should be deported. Sadly, I see too many Labour Members celebrating those lawyers’ work to prevent those people from being deported from our country. It is a very sad state of affairs to see those letters written to the Home Secretary. I hope clause 10 will stay as is and will be a part of a wider strategy to deter.

[Tom Pursglove]

First, I will deal with the two amendments that we have debated. Amendment 87 seeks to make implementation of the differentiated asylum system contingent on issuing a report on its impact on local authorities and devolved Administrations. The report must also be passed by both Houses. Clearly, immigration is a reserved matter, so it is for Westminster to set policy in that regard. Local authorities and devolved Administrations have not only taken part in the public consultation, where they have shared substantive views, but have been included in targeted, ongoing engagement with the Home Office to discuss issues and implementation. I am afraid I do not see what further value such a report could offer, other than to delay the implementation of this important policy.

Amendment 161 seeks to ensure that nothing in the Bill or this particular section authorises any treatment or action that is inconsistent with the UK’s obligations under the refugee convention. This amendment is unnecessary because we are already under an obligation to meet our international obligations and, as I have continually set out, intend to do so in the Bill. Furthermore, section 2 of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 prevents us, in implementing this policy, from doing anything in the immigration rules that is contrary to the refugee convention. If we were to include such a provision in the Bill, the effect may be to suggest that in any other legislation where it is not included, the intention is not to comply with such obligations. I am certain hon. Members will agree that is neither desirable nor intended.

[Neil Coyle]

The Minister has rather blithely dismissed our concern about the potential illegality of the measure. What is it that the Minister knows that UNHCR, Amnesty International, British Red Cross, UN Refugee Agency, Salvation Army, Refugee Council, Children’s Society, Law Society, RAMP or the Refugee, Asylum and Migration Policy project, We Belong, Families Together Coalition, Refugee Law Initiative, British Overseas Territories Citizenship Campaign, Human Trafficking Foundation, Reprieve, Women for Refugee Women, British Association of Social Workers, Trades Union Congress, Mermaids, Stand with Hong Kong, One Strong Voice, Rights Lab, Public Law Project, Greater Manchester Immigration Aid Unit, Migrant Voice, Every Child Protected Against Trafficking or ECPAT UK, Justice and Peace, Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens, Statewatch, Say it Loud Club, Logistics UK, Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, European Network on Statelessness, National Justice Project, Asylum Seekers Advocacy Group, Helen Bamber Foundation, Modern Slavery Policy Unit, Centre for Social Justice, and Justice do not? They all say it is unlawful—what do they not know? Why does the Minister think they are all wrong?

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for intervening again. I will come on to his point substantively when I speak to clause stand part. Meanwhile, I invite the Opposition Members to withdraw the amendments.

I do not intend to give a long stand part speech, because we have had a wide-ranging and substantive debate on the clause. It is fair to say that many views have been expressed. I do not remotely doubt their sincerity, but I hope that that acknowledgement of sincerity is extended to all Members, regardless of their views on the matter. When Members come to this House, at the forefront of their minds is wanting to do what they believe to be right. Members on the Government side have equally strongly and sincerely held views on the matters that we are debating, and we believe that the approach we are advocating is the right one.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am quite happy to say that all Members are doing what we think is right, though of course we might think each other misguided. I am concerned that the Minister is not going to go into detail about the issues—

[Tom Pursglove]

I am.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I thought the Minister was suggesting that the debate would no longer go on.

[Tom Pursglove]

That is precisely the point that I wanted to focus on before concluding deliberation of the clause. Views have been expressed about differentiation in the way that we are proposing and about its compatibility with our international obligations. I do not agree with the assessment expressed by various Opposition Members: I argue that the differentiation policy is in line with our international obligations, including the refugee convention and the European convention on human rights. Of course, it is for Parliament to determine precisely what is meant by our international obligations, subject only to the principles of treaty interpretation in the Vienna convention. That is precisely what we are doing in the Bill.

I want to say something briefly about people seeking asylum in the first safe country that they reach, the importance of that principle and its relevance in the international context, because there has been a lot of debate on the issue. It is self-evident that those in need of protection should claim in the first safe country that they reach. That is without question the fastest route to safety. The first-safe-country principle is widely recognised internationally, and has been for many years, as my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley South alluded to in his intervention on the shadow Minister, who slightly surprised me by being so willing to condemn the approach taken by the last Labour Government on that principle. It is a long-established principle, which successive Governments have had at the forefront of their minds when looking at and legislating on such matters.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Where does the Minister find this principle and what is it derived from? The overwhelming majority of refugees do claim asylum in the first safe country that they come to. Where exactly is he deriving the principle from?

[Tom Pursglove]

One thing that occurred to me throughout the debate was why any Member of this House would feel that it was necessary for anyone to get into a small boat on the French coastline in order to come to the United Kingdom. France is without doubt a safe country, and I like to think that we could recognise that across the House. Those journeys are completely unnecessary against that backdrop. I am staggered that that point is not recognised more widely. Based on some of the remarks we have heard, one might think that that was not the case. In my mind and those of my colleagues, there is absolutely no need for anyone to get into a small boat to try and cross the English channel or to take irregular journeys.

On the point about what this relates to, the principle is fundamental in the common European asylum system. Without enforcement of it, we simply encourage criminal gangs and smugglers to continue to exploit vulnerable people, and I make no apology for my determination, and that of the Home Secretary and the Government as a whole, to bring these evil criminal gangs to justice and to stop the dangerous channel crossings. We have to stop them, for the reasons that my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent North alluded to. We have a moral obligation to do that, and that is what the measures in the Bill, and the wider package of measures that we talk about very often in the House, are seeking to achieve.

[Bambos Charalambous]

The clause does no such thing. It actually encourages people to make unsafe journeys and to contact criminal gangs, because there are no safe routes. That is the crux of it. If safe routes were available, fewer people would make the journeys, but nothing that the Government have said creates any safe routes. Since Dublin III ended, there are no safe routes for people to come to the UK to claim asylum.

[Tom Pursglove]

I am afraid that I just do not accept that characterisation. As I have said on several occasions in Committee, we continue to resettle genuine refugees directly from regions of conflict and instability, which has protected 25,000 people in the last six years—more than any other European country. It is central to our policy that we advocate safe and legal routes and put them at the heart of our policy making. I have talked about several of them. Of course, this is something that we keep under constant review as the international situation evolves and as needs require. I have no doubt that that will continue to be the approach that we take—establishing routes that are appropriate to the circumstances that we find ourselves in.

[Anne McLaughlin]

Earlier today, I asked about safe and legal routes. The Minister said that by the time the Bill is enacted, a safe and legal route from Afghanistan will be up and running. I asked him about the other ones. Did he mean just the one route to which he referred, or did he mean routes across all countries where they might be needed? He said he could not answer at that time because the Chair would be annoyed, as we were talking only about the amendment on Afghanistan. Will he now take the opportunity to tell me whether those safe and legal routes will be available to anyone who requires them, to prevent them from making dangerous journeys, before the Bill is enacted?

[Tom Pursglove]

I respectfully say to the hon. Lady that there are routes in place that people can avail themselves of in order to seek sanctuary in this country.

[Anne McLaughlin]

Will the Minister give way?

[The Chair]

Order.

[Tom Pursglove]

We have now debated that with some regularity and in some detail. I do not intend to recover that ground, but of course we continue to offer family reunion, which has seen a further 29,000 people come to the UK over the past six years. As I say, the context in which we are debating these matters in Committee is that people are risking and losing their lives by making dangerous crossings of the channel. I argue that we need to do everything in our power to stop the criminal gangs and to break their business model.

Where people seek to join family or work in the UK, they should make an application via the appropriate safe and legal route. We are committed to safe and legal routes, which are the cornerstone of our immigration policy. They are one part of, but very central to, what we seek to achieve through the Bill, through our direct engagement with the French, and in our wider diplomatic programmes. With that in mind, I ask the Committee to agree that the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I would like to respond briefly to the debate, which has been wide-ranging. I have to express some frustration, because the Minister said he would address in detail the reasons he thought the provision is in compliance with the refugee convention. I do not think he said anything at all about that. I appreciate that he has already undertaken to write several letters. Could he write another that explains how article 23 of the refugee convention, which requires equal treatment with nationals in access to social security, can possibly be consistent with a clause allowing the Secretary of State to treat people unequally? All the points we have made about the lawfulness of the Bill have not been addressed. I would be grateful if the Minister would do so.

During the debate we lost sight a couple of times of what we are talking about, which is people who are refugees. Sometimes people refer to genuine refugees, and we are talking about genuine refugees, who, by definition, have been assessed by the Home Office as such. The clause enables the Secretary of State to essentially treat them like trash—to withdraw access to public funds, to leave them in limbo and keep them separate from their families. While we support all reasonable measures to stop the crossings, we draw the line at treating the victims of these people smugglers like trash.

In actual fact, the British public are with us. Public opinion polling shows that people are sympathetic to refugees, and I think they will be upset when they find out that this is how refugees will be treated. I ask the Minister to engage with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees on the legality of the measures. These are hugely important concerns for a number of reasons, so I hope he will engage with him.

[Tom Pursglove]

I have a meeting coming up with him in which I fully suspect we will talk about these measures.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I have no doubt about it. That is appreciated. On the effectiveness of these measures, reference has been made to how this would disincentivise crossings. Again, there is no Home Office analysis to show that that would be the case. In fact, Home Office analysis is to the contrary. Where is the analysis to show that disincentives will work? We need to see analysis of what the Home Office think the incentives that make people do this are. As we have said, it is things like family, a history with the United Kingdom or speaking the language. None of those will be changed by the Bill. The Secretary of State will not change the incentives that bring people here in the first place.

The numbers are challenging, but in the grand scheme of things the number of asylum seekers in the United Kingdom is tiny. Most folk do not claim asylum here. That is not the issue. Yes, we want to stop them making dangerous journeys, because none of us want to see lives put at risk, but what has been proposed here goes way beyond what is acceptable.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It is good to see you in the Chair again, Sir Roger. I rise to speak in support of amendment 98 and the other amendments in this group, but against the clause standing part of the Bill.

Clause 11 brings us to the question of how we accommodate asylum seekers, including, of course, the Uyghur, the persecuted Christian and the Syrian I keep referring to. Precisely how they are accommodated can have a profound impact on them. When I had the pleasure to be co-opted on to the Public Accounts Committee for a day back in October 2020 for an evidence session with the permanent secretary of the Home Office, I asked him whether there was a commitment at the Home Office to return to a reliance on community dispersal and a target to end hotel use by a certain date, and to end the use of military barracks as detention centres. He responded:

“There is not a target date, but we are obviously keen to do those things as soon as possible. Both those measures—the use of hotels and the use of other assets owned by the Government, including by the Ministry of Defence—are temporary, to take account of the surge in demand.”

He went on to outline various measures through which that would happen, including faster decisions and fairer distribution models. When he came before the Home Affairs Committee recently, he maintained that that was still the Department’s intention.

It would be reassuring to hear from the Minister today that he and the Secretary of State intend to commit to that model and that goal. Community dispersal is definitely the best system, although I accept that its current operation is far from ideal, as reports from the Home Affairs Committee have made clear. The system gives local authorities immense responsibilities, but few powers and even less by way of resources with which to fulfil those responsibilities. At the same time, significant problems with inappropriate and poor-quality accommodation have been identified.

We need a Bill that addresses those challenges. If this Bill did so, it would undoubtedly expand the capacity in dispersed accommodation. If it did that, the Bill would have our support and I would stop defending councils that did not participate in dispersal. To that end, amendment 17 calls for the Secretary of State to report each year on the types of institution in which asylum seekers are being housed and the steps that are being taken towards realising the goal of maximising the use of dispersal accommodation, including the financial support being offered to councils. Surely the Minister cannot find anything objectionable in that, if maximising the use of dispersal accommodation is genuinely the Government’s goal.

The problem is that the Bill tends to suggest, as does a lot of other evidence, that the Government are not pursuing that goal and are more interested in taking a different route. The Minister has to explain why this clause exists if the Government want to opt for dispersal accommodation as their central goal. The available evidence tells us that large-scale institutional accommodation centres are, by a distance, a disastrous alternative. That is putting it far too nicely when it comes to what happened at Napier Barracks, and yet correspondence from the Home Secretary to the chair of the Home Affairs Committee, and the explanatory memorandum to the special development order that extended Napier’s use, expressly suggests that Napier is supposed to be treated as a model or a pilot for the accommodation centres that feature in the Bill.

That is a truly terrifying path to go down, as the totally inappropriate nature of Napier Barracks is well documented in numerous reports and the High Court judgment, which was described as finding that

“the arrangements and conditions in which asylum seekers were held, posed significant risks that their physical and mental health would be harmed.”

According to the findings, Napier Barracks was overcrowded and felt like a prison. For residents, the environment was reminiscent of previous experiences of detention in places where they were tortured. Dormitory accommodation meant there was no privacy or quiet, and sleep was interrupted repeatedly. Cleaning was poor, and the inadequate shower facilities were frequently broken, unusable, dirty or unsanitary. They were also communal, which was particularly difficult for those with visible scarring from torture.

The all-party parliamentary group on immigration detention has highlighted extensive testimony that backs up the judgment of the High Court. The group has identified problems with poor Home Office identification and safeguarding of vulnerable people, and repeated instances of self-harm and attempted suicide on site —in short,

“profoundly negative impacts…on the mental health of residents, many of whom were already vulnerable.”

That all shows precisely why we should not go down this route, and why this clause should not stand part of the Bill.

Most of the remaining amendments in this group challenge the Minister to outline more about what the Home Office has in mind on how these centres will look and operate. Amendment 98 poses a question to the Minister. Can he tell us who will be placed in these accommodation centres? Will it be women and children? Will it be people with physical disabilities? Will it be individuals who are suspected to be survivors of modern slavery or trafficking? Will it be survivors of torture? Will it be LGBT people?

A Home Office policy document suggests that such groups should not be accommodated at Napier, so I hope it will not be difficult for the Government to agree to such an amendment. However, there is a challenge; as I alluded to earlier, there have been multiple examples of where that policy does not appear to have been appropriately adhered to, and we require reassurance that that will be done properly.

[Tom Pursglove]

I hope I can provide the hon. Gentleman with some clarification at this early juncture. We have no intention to accommodate children in accommodation centres. More broadly, decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis, as set out in policy, in relation to other individuals. I hope that gives him the assurance he seeks.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It gives me reassurance that children will not be housed in such accommodation, and I think all hon. Members will welcome that. However, we are again being asked, essentially, to legislate blind. As parliamentarians, we are repeatedly told that all sorts of important information will be set out in guidance and in immigration rules, but before we give the Government the power to go ahead, we must least be told what they intend to put in that guidance and those immigration rules.

All sorts of other questions that I have asked—about people with physical or mental health problems, and survivors of modern slavery and trafficking—have yet to be answered. How soon do the Government want to put these people in such accommodation? I want to hear the answers before the Committee is asked to vote on whether the Bill should contain the protection that we propose.

Amendment 103—it is probably redundant in light of the Minister’s welcome reassurance—enables us to ask how, if there were to be children in accommodation centres, those children would be educated. Section 36 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 means that most children in such centres cannot attend state schools. This amendment would remove that restriction, but I am pleased to hear that that question will not arise.

--- Later in debate ---

The statutory history behind amendment 100 is complicated. In a nutshell, earlier legislation provides for the accommodation of destitute asylum seekers with support under section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, or in emergency situations with section 98 support. Another power to accommodate asylum seekers under section 17 of the 2002 Act has never been commenced, but clause 11 amends it, and presumably it is going to be brought into force at some point. When section 17 of the 2002 Act was passed, it was intended that refusals of section 17 support would attract a right of appeal under section 53 of the 2002 Act, similar to the right of appeal in relation to section 95 support under the 1999 Act. The simple question for the Minister is this. If and when section 17 support is brought into force, will there be a right of appeal against refusal of that support?

[Tom Pursglove]

I would like to confirm that that is not relevant, as we are not proposing to accommodate anyone under section 17.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful, because that clarifies the issue. Amendment 104 is in the name of our Labour colleagues, but it has our full support. It makes the point that it is essential that accommodation centres are not de facto detention centres or prisons, in the way that Napier has been, with basic liberties and freedoms more theoretical than real. It raises a crucial question about how we can ensure that such places have accountability and oversight.

The Government will be using sections of the 2002 Act that are not yet in force to implement many of their policy goals, but there is still dubiety about precisely which ones. Section 33 of the Act would have created advisory groups for each accommodation centre, with powers to hear complaints from residents and report to the Home Office. Is that section to be commenced? If not, what alternatives do the Government propose to ensure that such centres are subject to appropriate oversight? I will leave it to the shadow Minister to flesh out that point.

Amendments 102 and 160 take us back to how the Home Office engages—or, rather, does not engage—with other tiers of Government. The Minister was perhaps asleep at the wheel earlier, because his answer was short on detail about engagement with local authorities, and in particular, the devolved Administrations. I accept that asylum is reserved, but these institutions touch on all sorts of powers and services that are the remit of devolved Governments and Parliaments or local authorities, including planning policy and the provision of health, social or other welfare services and education services. In particular, consistent with our championing of local government autonomy and the idea that local government should be seen as a partner rather than an assistant of the Home Office, amendment 102 demands that these centres not be built in a local authority’s territory without consent from that local authority.

The way in which local councils were treated in relation to both Napier and Penally was disgraceful. The Home Office did not even consult Folkestone & Hythe District Council and Kent County Council about the extension of planning permission at Napier because, it said, of urgency, and yet as the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee notes, it must have known for at least 12 months that planning permission would have expired. It had 12 months in which to carry out consultation, but that was still the excuse.

As I said at the outset, we pose all these questions with a view to ascertaining what precisely the Government intend and why there are not greater constraints in the Bill, but ultimately we believe that this is not the right direction of travel. We support community dispersal—improving that system, making it work better, and involving more councils. We hope that the Government come back to that view and make that system work instead.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bambos Charalambous]

That is deeply concerning and shows that the Government have not learned any lessons from Napier.

Before I come to the specifics of the amendment, I will first set out exactly why the Government’s record on Napier barracks, alongside the provisions in clause 11, sets such alarm bells ringing. In doing so, I will demonstrate why the amendment is so necessary.

Organisations from the refugee sector that have worked with people held in Napier have identified and documented the following conditions:

“A pattern of spiralling mental health among people placed at Napier. Many people arrive already struggling with self-harm and/ or suicidal ideation, so this is a profoundly harmful context for them.

Chronic sleep deprivation among residents at Napier.

Conditions that are cold and dirty and afford no opportunity for privacy or social distancing.

An isolated and prison-like setting.

A total lack of mental health support onsite; very minimal healthcare onsite, and problems for residents in accessing healthcare in the community.

A sense among residents, in line with HMIP’s observation, of being trapped on site.

Profound vulnerabilities and histories of trauma among residents at Napier are not always obvious on the surface and can be difficult for individuals to disclose in general. Napier is then a very poor context for disclosure, as the prison-like setting is not conducive to building trust. We are therefore concerned that it is not possible to create a screening mechanism for Napier that would pick up all relevant vulnerabilities.

There is very little communication with residents about their asylum case.

Additionally, it is very difficult for individuals to access adequate legal advice, and they frequently go ahead with asylum interviews without having consulted a legal adviser. Virtually no one placed at Napier is able to access face to face meetings with legal advisers, and this seriously obstructs identification and disclosure of trauma.”

Residents of Napier and Penally who have given evidence to the APPG on immigration detention have described the Napier and Penally sites as feeling “prison-like”. Prison conditions have a traumatising effect on people who are already vulnerable as a result of previous experiences that have forced them to seek protection. Ministers must surely be aware that there are bound to be serious concerns about the potential use of such draconian accommodation centres for asylum-seeking men.

[Tom Pursglove]

I might be able to help the hon. Gentleman. The accommodation centres that we are proposing are not detention centres. Individuals can leave the centres at any time—they may have obtained accommodation with friends or family, for example.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I welcome the Minister’s comments, but it would have been helpful if that information had been provided beforehand, because we are still in the dark about what the accommodation centres will be like.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

May I repeat the point that I made earlier about the policy approach that we intend to adopt in accommodation centres, which is that children will not be accommodated in them?

[Anne McLaughlin]

I was really glad to hear the Minister say that, but then my cynical friend the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark pointed out that this is not about the intention but about making it crystal clear in the legislation—and perhaps the way to do that is to accept amendment 98. I hear what the Minister says, and yet still we have babies accommodated in a mother and baby unit. I have been fighting since January to get them out and have been told, “Okay, we will take them out of there.” There is a fantastic campaign called Freedom to Crawl, which points out that the rooms are so tiny that the development of these tiny babies—some of them becoming toddlers—is stifled because they do not have the freedom or the room to crawl. The Minister can tell me that they are not going to house children in those centres, but that is what is currently happening. If he thinks that is wrong, I would be glad to have his support to put an end to it.

[Tom Pursglove]

I am talking very specifically about accommodation centres in relation to the clause. If the hon. Lady writes to me with the specifics of the mother and baby unit in her local area, I will take that away and look at it.

[Anne McLaughlin]

I know that we have said “another letter” a number of times today, but I appreciate that offer. I understand that the Minister might not have heard of the unit because it is in Glasgow—although his predecessor might have known about it—but I would be happy for him to look at it.

Along with Alf Dubs—Lord Dubs—I co-chair the all-party parliamentary group on refugees. We recently held a meeting to look at types of accommodation centres. We had a guest, a former politician from Belarus, who told us a story about why such accommodation does not work. He had to leave Belarus for political reasons in 2017. He had no choice. He was in serious fear of his and his wife’s safety. He said, “I am very grateful for the help and support that I have had, and I appreciate Britain taking me in.” He was really appreciative and not complaining, but he said now that he is settled he wants to make this point as much as he can so that other people do not go through what he went through when he initially got here.

They arrived in London and were put in shared accommodation in a hostel called Barry House, a big house full of, as he described it, “people like ourselves” who were seeking asylum. The people who lived in the house were from different backgrounds and cultures with different ideas about lots of issues. He said the staff did their best to make it comfortable, but it was not really possible to be comfortable. During the six months he was there, every day started and ended with some sort of scandal or argument. He described it as a powder keg, and we can understand why, because many of those people had post-traumatic stress disorder, and many of them spoke different languages, so we can imagine how stressful that would be. He said, “We tried to keep ourselves to ourselves—I couldn’t always tell what the arguments were about”, but he could feel the stress coming off other people. He said it was difficult for the staff to look after so many people; one thing he mentioned was everyone’s different dietary requirements, due to a number of things, including culture. He said the staff tried their best to provide a neutral menu, which meant that nobody was happy, but of course they did not feel they could complain, because they were grateful that they were no longer in their previous situation.

We have talked about not housing people with disabilities in that kind of accommodation, as mentioned in amendment 98. This gentleman had diabetes and is also a wheelchair user, and he said his health suffered because of the diabetes and he could not get access to the type of food he needs to maintain his insulin levels. He talked about using the toilets and said there was a limited number he could use, and because there were so many people in there, sometimes he had to wait for hours to use the few toilets he was able to get access to. He said it was like daily torture just trying to use the toilet, and a shower became a luxury for him.

This gentleman needed a specialist bed because of his mobility problems, but of course he could not get one because the rooms were so tiny he could not get one in. He said to me, “I knew I couldn’t go home. It wasn’t possible to go home. I thought I was safe, but I began to have suicidal thoughts at the centre. My life was at risk in Belarus, but it felt like my life was just disappearing in the UK.”

At the time, this gentleman said the stress and pressure was just enormous and that, had it not been for the Refugee Council in England, which provided a psychologist who gave him the belief he could get through it, he would not have survived. He said, “It was really difficult. I was a politician at home. I had what was considered a high standing in society, and I came here and I felt like absolutely nobody.” He said he was not underplaying everybody else’s problems; everybody else had serious problems, and when they are housed in accommodation together, the problems multiply. As I said, he described it as a powder keg and said that everybody had had negative experiences and everybody was scared of different things. Somebody is scared of noises, somebody is scared of something they see—people are all frightened, and that is the legacy of what they have been through. If they are put all together, it is extremely difficult.

I am strongly opposed to that type of accommodation, and the sooner people can get into community dispersal, the better. I know the Minister said he would ensure that the accommodation was not detention—or he said it would not be detention—but my question is whether it will feel like it. In the so-called mother and baby unit in Glasgow, for a time they were not allowed to leave without asking permission, and when they came back they were not allowed a key to the door. They had to wait, standing outside with their babies, until somebody came to let them in, which could be quite a while.

It is well documented how bad detention is for people seeking asylum who have mental health issues, which must be most asylum seekers after what they have been through. A lot of good work has been done by Professor Cornelius Katona and the Helen Bamber Foundation on mental health and detention. I am sure the Minister will be aware of the reports they have done.

I visited Dungavel detention centre in Scotland when I was a Member of the Scottish Parliament. I went in there and I felt like a criminal. They took my fingerprints and they walked about with big bunches of keys. Obviously, I was only there for a visit and I knew I was getting out again. The problem with detention is the indefinite nature of it.

The Minister said it is not indefinite accommodation, and if they can arrange other accommodation themselves they can get out, but I want to share the story of a mother and son I visited. The son was 10 years old. They were in detention, but I cannot help wondering whether we are going to find children in these accommodation centres feeling the same. At the age of 10, he said to his mum, “Mum, let’s not do this anymore. Please can we just find a way to let us die.” That is a 10-year-old boy. He is not dead now; things changed and their lives got a whole lot better, although he is very much impacted by his experience there. I am offering anecdotal evidence not to back up my claim, but to illustrate the detailed research that demonstrates that that child is not an isolated case. I know the Minister is saying that the intention is not for children to be placed in such accommodation—and certainly not in detention—but I want a guarantee that no children will be housed in these circumstances. I am sure he will agree with me that nobody wants to put children through what that child went through.

--- Later in debate ---

There is a great deal to be concerned about in the clause. Amendments 100, 104 and 130, alongside others in the group, seek to impose safeguards. The risks of infection outbreaks, of fire and of people in crisis with their mental health all became a reality at Napier barracks. The impact assessment and the continued use of barracks alongside the clause make it clear that the use of such accommodation is not borne out of necessity but is a political choice. I am deeply concerned that the measures in the clause will result in yet further disasters. That is why Labour’s amendments are so essential.

[Tom Pursglove]

We have had an extensive and wide-ranging debate covering a host of areas. I thank hon. Members for their contributions. I turn to amendments 16, 17, 98 to 104, 130 and 160.

Amendment 16 seeks to disapply a key part of the clause. As I set out, one of the clause’s aims is to enable wider flexibility so that individuals are supported in accommodation centres for as long as that form of housing and other on-site support and arrangements are appropriate for their individual circumstances. We need flexibility to increase the period of residence in a centre—the current maximum allowed by legislation is nine months—if experience shows it to be too short a period to provide consistent streamlined support. The amendment would prevent that. The Government take seriously our responsibilities to asylum seekers, and I reassure hon. Members that those accommodated in the centres will receive the necessary support to meet their essential living needs.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Will the Government not at least consider a maximum time limit on the duration of stay?

[Tom Pursglove]

There have been references during the debate to detention. As I set out in an intervention previously, the accommodation centres are not detention. It is very important to establish that again. I want to make the point clear: anyone in one of those accommodation centres is able to leave at any time. It is important to re-establish that.

[Neil Coyle]

On the point about transparency and accountability in the centres and all accommodation used by the Home Office, will the Minister tell us whether the Bishop of Durham and other members of RAMP will be able to visit the centres? Perhaps the Minister will encourage them to be more open to visits by parliamentarians. Perhaps he will visit some of the accommodation used in Southwark, where people were told they should be moving and were not provided with interpreters, which has caused problems for them and for the wider community. Furthermore, covid outbreaks at hotel and hostel accommodation have put those people and the wider community at risk and placed the NHS under greater stress.

[Tom Pursglove]

The hon. Gentleman will appreciate that I have not been in post for long—for just over a month—and the accommodation element of the Government’s work on immigration does not fall directly within my brief. However, I want to visit Napier, to see the situation myself and to understand the nature of the accommodation, and my officials are in the process of organising that. I might have done it sooner had we not had the Bill Committee proceedings over the next few weeks. I assure hon. Gentleman that that is something I very much want and intend to do, and I will certainly do it.

On the bishop visiting, I am not aware of any restrictions that would prevent that from happening. I hate to do this to the hon. Gentleman again, but if he furnishes me with the details of issues that have arisen, I will gladly ensure that that is looked at. As far as I can see, there is no good reason why those sorts of external visits cannot take place, but I would appreciate a little more detail.

[Paul Blomfield]

May I push the Minister a little further on the issue? He has been at pains to say that the Government’s plan is not for the centres to be where people are detained. Will he therefore put on the record that people are free to come and go as they wish, and to receive visitors as they wish in the centres?

[Tom Pursglove]

As I have said repeatedly now, my understanding is that people are under no obligation to remain within the accommodation facilities if they do not wish to do so. Of course, one of the reasons why people may be in an accommodation centre is that they are destitute. In such circumstances, we want to ensure that appropriate accommodation is in place for them to be accommodated and properly cared for in the centres. That is the intention behind the policy.

It is worth saying something about future oversight of accommodation centres, which has been alluded to. We will establish advisory groups for each centre. The group will visit the site, hear complaints and report any findings to the Secretary of State. I value the input that the advisory groups will have. It is important that we are responsive to the issues that arise and that where improvements can be made, they are made.

[Neil Coyle]

On the point about section 33 of the 2002 Act—the advisory groups—will the Minister tell us why such groups have not been established at other existing centres? It is all very well to make a promise about the future, but that section has not been used for existing examples.

[Tom Pursglove]

There has been a very clear undertaking in Committee to establish those advisory groups, which is welcome. The hon. Gentleman will be aware that various transparency and accountability measures are in place for accommodation within our immigration system more broadly. That is right and proper but, again, where that can be enhanced and where we can bring greater transparency and improvement, we should do that. That is why I welcome the Government’s commitment with regard to oversight over the accommodation centres to ensure that there is regular engagement and that a clear channel is established through which to raise and take account of any issues.

[Neil Coyle]

Who, specifically, will be responsible for bringing forward the advisory group for each centre? Where do the responsibility and duty lie?

[Tom Pursglove]

We are getting into very granular detail, as we would expect. I will need to take further advice on that specific point, which I will make clear to the Committee. However, our commitment to establish those advisory groups stands; those groups will play an important role in the oversight of the accommodation that we propose to bring about through the measures in the Bill. I give way to the hon. Gentleman again.

[Neil Coyle]

The Minister may regret that. He is asking us to accept on good will that the advisory groups will exist in the future, but he cannot tell us who will set them up, who will be on them, or why they have not been used in the past, despite being in the 2002 Act.

[Tom Pursglove]

The hon. Gentleman will be pleased to know that the people who organise my diary have confirmed that I am set to visit Napier in the not-too-distant future. I have been able to be responsive to that point pretty quickly. I will make some progress on his other point, and I hope to be able to visit it very shortly to provide him with the clarification he requires before concluding my remarks. That is my undertaking to him: I will, for the Committee’s benefit, establish the mechanism that will enact our commitment.

Contrary to what amendment 17 seems to imply, it is not the Government’s intention to maximise the number of supported asylum seekers accommodated in flats and houses in the community. I understand that SNP Members take a different view on the matter, so I appreciate that that will come as a disappointment to them. However, it may be more suitable to house certain cohorts of asylum seekers in accommodation centres, and that is why we are setting them up. Where, for example, their protection claims are likely to be found inadmissible and they can quickly be removed to the appropriate third country, it is likely to be much more efficient to place them in an accommodation centre so that the practical arrangements for facilitating their departure, such as dealing with the necessary travel documentation, can take place at the site. That efficiency benefits the individuals as well as the overall asylum system.

One point that has been overlooked during the debate is that the Government’s whole intention around the policy we are seeking to establish is to deal with cases in a much quicker, speedier and—I would argue—more humane way. I think being able to give people certainty sooner is a good thing, and I would like to think that, whatever the outcome of individual cases, spending less time in any form of temporary accommodation can only be a good thing. It is important to recognise that the whole intention of the policy we are trying to develop is to get on with adjudicating on cases sooner.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It is not the type of accommodation that has led waiting times to spiral out of control. Only three years ago, there was a regular six-month target time—that was all within the dispersal system as well. Putting folk in the accommodation centres has no real impact on decision times. On the contrary, the Minister will know that since January, when the inadmissibility procedures came into place, virtually nobody has ended up being removed. It has just added six months to the waiting time; it has not accelerated anything. It is just a six-month block—that is it—so I do not understand where he is coming from.

[Tom Pursglove]

In the context of the Bill and in the course of our debates, we will revisit the various challenges in our asylum system many times. My hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent North made the point earlier that the system is broken, and there is a wide acceptance of that. Undoubtedly, that means that people are left in a state of uncertainty around their circumstances for longer than any of us in this House wish to see.

I can provide clarity to the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark on his point about the duty to appoint the group. The answer is that section 33 of the 2002 Act requires the Secretary of State to establish advisory groups for accommodation centres. Napier has not been deemed an accommodation centre at the moment. It is contingency accommodation to manage the high demand for housing that we are undoubtably seeing as a result of the pressures in the system that are a direct consequence of the channel crossings. However, he has that certainty on that particular mechanism.

[Holly Lynch]

Given the merits of these advisory committees which the Minister has set out, and given that, in relation to Napier and Penally Barracks, the Home Office ignored advice from Public Health England in a pandemic, the weight that the advisory committee would carry really does matter. He said that Napier Barracks is still contingency accommodation rather than an accommodation centre. Would he consider setting up an advisory committee for Napier Barracks?

[Tom Pursglove]

I will certainly take away the hon. Lady’s suggestion and feed that through to the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay (Kevin Foster), who shares responsibility for immigration with me at the Home Office.

[Neil Coyle]

rose—

[Tom Pursglove]

He wants to come in again.

[Neil Coyle]

At what point is a centre of accommodation such as Napier deemed an accommodation centre by the Home Office in order to get an advisory group set up? How long will Napier be used before it is acknowledged that it is an accommodation centre?

[Tom Pursglove]

I dispute that interpretation of the situation at Napier, because Napier does not have the same wrap-around services that we envisage for accommodation centres. For example, the accommodation centres that we will seek to deliver will have significant caseworking functions built within them. That is a marked difference to Napier. Again, I am visiting Napier in a few weeks’ time and I will be interested to hear from the people there and to talk to the officials managing the accommodation to listen to their experiences. As I have said, and I think this is an important point, there is always a need to reflect on the appropriateness of the provisions in place and on whether governance and oversight arrangements remain adequate. That is something that we keep under constant review. I note with interest the suggestions that have been alluded to, and I will happily feed them back more broadly at the Home Office.

I want to make some progress, because I am conscious that time is marching on. The numbers of asylum seekers in different types of accommodation—if that is of interest to parliamentarians—can be obtained through existing channels, such as correspondence or parliamentary questions, so an annual report setting this information out is unnecessary. Amendment 98 is also unnecessary because there are no plans to place those with children in accommodation centres, and all other cases will only be placed in a centre following an individual assessment that the centre is suitable for them and that they will be safe.

Whether or not groups with the characteristics listed in the amendment are suitable to be supported at a particular accommodation centre will depend on a number of factors. These include their personal circumstances and vulnerabilities, and the facilities available at the particular site or in the particular area. It is not sensible to rule out large cohorts of cases from ever being placed in an accommodated centre in any circumstance, especially if their asylum case is more likely to be resolved quickly in a centre, which of course is in their best interests. I re-emphasise that our intention remains to get to a place where cases are processed quicker than they are at the moment, and that is something that we all should welcome.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Where is the evidence that doing this in accommodation centres speeds things up? We have had dispersal systems for years and on some recent occasions the waiting times have been absolutely outrageous, but a few years back they were perfectly acceptable. We can have fast decision making and we all support that, but that does not require these terrible accommodation centres to be set up.

[Tom Pursglove]

The hon. Member and I fundamentally disagree on this point. I think that there is value in having accommodation centres that provide accommodation but also ensure that caseworking facilities are available alongside. That aids in the processing of cases more quickly. That is a sensible step forward, and something that I endorse. I think it is the right thing to do in these circumstances.

Amendment 99 would also undermine a key objective that we are trying to achieve through setting up accommodation centres, which is to resolve asylum cases more quickly by putting casework and other services on site. This speaks to the point that I have been making; there is therefore no rationale for restricting the number of people who will benefit from these improvements to 100 individuals per site.

Additionally, there is no reason why unrelated asylum seekers cannot share sleeping quarters, provided that they are the same sex. This is already allowed for in the asylum accommodation system. Those in flats or houses, for example, may be required to share bedrooms. Some asylum seekers might require their own room—for example, the current policy provides that those receiving treatment from the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture should generally not share sleeping quarters with strangers—but that is because of their individual circumstances. I re-emphasise that appropriate decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis and, where circumstances require, appropriate arrangements should be made.

Amendment 100 seems to be based on a misunder-standing—I intervened on the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East on this point earlier. We are not proposing to accommodate anyone in the centres under the powers in section 17 of the 2002 Act. Asylum seekers will be accommodated in the centres under section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, or section 98 of the 1999 Act, pending consideration of an application for section 95 support. If the application is refused, there will be a right of appeal in the normal way.

Amendments 101 and 130 are both similar in theme to amendment 16. I disagree that the normal period of residence in an accommodation centre should be no more than three months. It may be that a three month period is appropriate in some cases, either because of the individual circumstances of the asylum seeker or the nature of the facilities at the site. However, as I have explained, we need the flexibility to increase the period of residence in a centre if experience shows this period is too short to provide consistent, streamlined support.

Amendment 102 would effectively give local authorities a veto on any proposals to set up accommodation centres in their areas. That is not appropriate. It is right, of course, that local authorities are fully consulted about such proposals and their views about local impacts and other matters given considerable weight.

[Anne McLaughlin]

I agree that it is right that local authorities are consulted, so the Minister will forgive me for being a little cynical that that will happen. When asylum seekers were put into a hotel in Falkirk a couple of weeks ago, Falkirk Council knew absolutely nothing about it and were not able to support them. He will forgive me for being a bit cynical about that pledge.

[Tom Pursglove]

I think it is absolutely essential that there is an open dialogue with local authorities about any measures that are proposed in their areas, and that those local views are properly taken into consideration and reflected in the decisions that are reached. That is a commitment that we make, and is already a feature of the current system.

[Neil Coyle]

On that point, the hon. Member for Glasgow North East says she is a little cynical. I am afraid that I am a lot cynical. In Southwark’s example, the local authority was given absolutely no notice of a total of—I think—more than 700 asylum seekers being placed in hotel and hostel accommodation. That was just in my constituency. There were others in other parts of Southwark. When I asked the Home Office what resources were being allocated to local authorities to ensure that they could manage such a significant number, it replied that it had provided some small resource to the clinical commissioning group.

[Tom Pursglove]

I take on board the point that the hon. Gentleman raises. However, as a general principle, I think it is right and proper—as I think all Members of this House would expect—for local authorities to be properly consulted.

[Mr Goodwill]

Let me reassure the Minister that when the Afghans came to Scarborough recently, not only was the local authority fully engaged with the process, but the local community was too.

[Tom Pursglove]

The interesting thing is that my right hon. Friend’s experience in Yorkshire accords with the experience that I think the local authorities in Northamptonshire, where I am proud to be a constituency MP, have had.

There has been that consultation in relation to the Afghan scheme and the Government’s intentions around delivery of that important work. Although not required to do so by legislation, our accommodation providers consult local authorities on any proposals to use accommodation that has not previously been used to house supported asylum seekers. But it is not realistic to assume that that consultation will always result in agreement.

Amendment 103 is unnecessary because asylum seekers with children will not be placed in accommodation centres at any stage of the asylum process and unaccompanied children are supported by local authorities under different arrangements. Both groups of children will therefore be educated under normal arrangements in the same way as a British child. As we are not proposing to use the power in section 36 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, there is no need to amend it.

Amendment 104 is unnecessary also. Individuals supported in accommodation centres will be expected to live at the centre as a condition of their support and be subject to a range of other conditions attached to the provision of their support that are set out in writing—for example, that they respect other residents and do not commit antisocial behaviour. This is already part of the normal process and applies whatever accommodation is provided to supported asylum seekers.

Those accommodated in the centres will also be able to receive visitors, to use communications equipment such as telephones or computers and to leave the site for personal reasons or because they have found alternative accommodation. I hope that that gives the hon. Member for Sheffield Central the reassurance that he sought. It builds on the earlier point that I made about the fact that people would be able to leave if that was what they wanted to do.

There is already a complaints procedure administered by Migrant Help, a voluntary sector organisation that also provides advice on individuals’ entitlements and how the immigration system works. Asylum seekers and failed asylum seekers are currently issued with written information about their bail conditions. They are also issued with an asylum registration card, which is used for identification purposes.

Amendment 160 is also unnecessary. Sections 40 to 42 of the 2002 Act already prevent the Government from making arrangements for the provision of accommodation centres in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, unless they have consulted Ministers in the devolved Administrations. That consultation would include discussion of any financial or other impacts of introducing accommodation centres.

There are a few points that I have picked up in my main remarks but about which I want to say a few words in response to the questions that were put. In relation to Napier specifically, there have been extensive improvements to Napier since the High Court judgment. For example, all residents are offered a covid vaccination. Free travel is in place for them to get to medical appointments. There is a commitment to the availability of sports and recreation. A programme of works to improve the infrastructure is under way; that is along with weekly meetings to identify and act on any concerns that arise. Again, it is important to be responsive to issues that arise and to ensure that improvements are put in place. What I have referred to demonstrates that some of the issues that were raised previously have been taken very seriously and improvements have been made.

The judgment on Napier was reached on the basis of the conditions on the site prior to the significant improvement works that have taken place. The High Court did not make any findings that accommodation centres were not suitable for providing support.

Generally speaking, in the course of the debate on clause 11, we have talked about the difference that we hope accommodation centres will provide. I just want to restate the policy, which is to increase accommodation capacity, to try to get away from using hotels, which has been very, very challenging—I think everybody would accept that—and to achieve casework efficiency, for the reasons that I have previously set out. We think that co-locating services will be helpful in that regard, to try to process cases more quickly and try to give people the certainty that they are seeking. That is particularly beneficial to genuine refugees. Our policy is grounded in that basis.

A question was also asked about conditions in hotels and full-board centres. Full support is provided to meet essential needs, which includes food, toiletries and the means to communicate. Also, asylum seekers in full-board accommodation have access to legal aid, which pays for reasonable travel costs to see their solicitors.

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[Holly Lynch]

Could the Minister update Members about how many people have been returned to safe third countries since those legal changes came into effect?

[Tom Pursglove]

I am afraid that I do not have those figures to hand, but I will take that request away—very gladly—and I will share that information with the Committee when I have it.

Clause 11 amends section 25 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, so that these periods of time may be changed, by order, to allow for longer or shorter periods. The clause will also provide the flexibility to ensure that individuals remain in accommodation centres for as long as that form of housing and the other support and arrangements on site are appropriate to their circumstances. I encourage the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to withdraw his amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

On this occasion, I certainly cannot complain that I have not had answers; I may absolutely despair about what those answers were, but the Minister has certainly provided the information.

I am genuinely sad that covid and the stress that it has put on the dispersal system means that the Home Office now appears to be abandoning that system altogether when it has not been justified that that is the correct option. I very much fear that in a few years’ time this will come back to cause the Government problems; more importantly, it will be devastating for lots of people who will be placed in this accommodation.

However, I have the answers, so I do not need to press the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 104, in clause 11, page 14, line 41, at end insert—

“(22B) Accommodation Centres, whether for supported asylum seekers or failed asylum seekers shall not allow for limitations upon a supported person’s right—

(a) to enter or to leave at any time;

(b) to receive visitors of their choice at any time; or

(c) to use communications equipment such as telephones, computers or video equipment.

(22C) Accommodation Centres shall provide supported persons with access to a complaints procedure and procedures for appealing any decisions that may restrict a supported person’s claim to freedoms not limited by their conditions of bail.

(22D) Persons supported in Accommodation Centres shall be informed of the conditions of their bail in writing, and shall be provided with means of identifying themselves are their place of residence.”—(Bambos Charalambous.)

This amendment aims to distinguish Accommodation Centres from places of detention by introducing rights to persons supported at these Centres, and to require persons in Accommodation Centres to be informed of their bail conditions and provided with means of identifying themselves.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Fifth sitting)

Tom Pursglove Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 19th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)]

I will be brief and echo what my hon. Friend has said. I welcome the Minister to his place and wish him well although I am sorry to say not with this Bill. I thank all the multiple organisations that are concerned by the Bill and supported the moves to make the changes that need to be made.

It might be a moot point but, as my hon. Friend said about amendments 29 and 84, we do not want to be in a situation in which parents are treated equally badly. I suspect that that is not what the clause is about and I hope that the Minister will say that it is fine and we will accept that. However, it is important that we acknowledge that mothers were treated unequally and wrongly. That is because, throughout the centuries, women have been treated systemically badly. Yes, of course things have improved—and this is an improvement—but we have to acknowledge it whenever there has been systemic bias against any group of people, and in this case we are talking about women and mothers. I do not think any member of the Committee would disagree that what has happened is extremely unfair but we must acknowledge it so that we can move forward. Acknowledging a problem draws attention to it. Let us not pretend that we have equality of the sexes and genders. We do not. Every time that that is acknowledged it enables us to move forward and think of other situations in which there is inequality.

We have helpfully been provided with photos of members of the Committee and been given their constituency names but when I saw the photo of the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby, I thought he was the right hon. Member for Con, Scarborough and Whitby. I thought, “Where is ‘Con’?” until I realised that it referred to the fact that he is a Conservative. I am learning something new every day.

The right hon. Gentleman was factually correct to say that it is easier for mothers rather than fathers to prove their parentage. That is why I wonder why on earth it was so difficult for women to pass on their nationality to their children. There is no question who the mother is in such cases. I hope the Minister will say that he will change the language to refer to mothers and that the Government will acknowledge the inequalities between men and women and mothers and fathers. Treating parents equally should not mean that they are treated equally badly. I suspect that he does not want to do that and I support most of the provisions in this part of the Bill. That is probably the last time I shall say that today.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Tom Pursglove)]

I start by thanking Opposition colleagues for their warm welcome to me in my new role. It is welcome that, in the early provisions of the Bill, there is broad agreement across the Committee about the need to correct the injustices and to put things right.

I thank the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate, for Halifax, for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and for Glasgow North East for tabling amendments 29 and 84. They both refer to clause 1, which I am pleased to introduce because it corrects a long-standing anomaly in British nationality law. I appreciate hon. Members’ attention to detail in seeking to make sure that the new provision is clear and in line with the parallel provision in the British Nationality Act 1981 for the children of British citizen mothers. However, I do not think an amendment is needed, as the proposed wording here achieves what is intended. In saying that this provision applies to someone who would have been a citizen had their parents been treated equally, we are talking about a situation where the law applied equally to mothers or fathers, women or men.

The term “parents” is consistent with the wording used in section 23 of the 1981 Act, which determined which citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies became British dependent territories citizens on commencement. One of the three conditions that a person needs to meet to qualify for registration under this clause is that they would have become a British dependent territories citizen under section 23(1)(b) or (c) of that Act. That section refers to a person’s “parent”.

I wish to point out that we will further clarify the points that have been made in the underpinning guidance. I trust that will afford greater comfort because it is clear that the Bill is technical, so plain language will be used in the guidance itself to achieve what members of the Committee seek to achieve.

[Neil Coyle]

I, too, congratulate the Minister on his new role. If the Minister is saying that this may require further explanation in the guidance, will he agree to review it in more depth before the Bill reaches the Lords if organisations are able to present examples of case studies where the current wording may not meet the Government’s intent?

[Tom Pursglove]

I will of course be delighted to receive any such examples. I genuinely think that, as with so many cases of immigration law, the underpinning guidance plays an important role in making it clear, in plain English that people can understand, precisely what various aspects of the law entail. I am satisfied with the current wording of the clause.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I understand what the Minister says about the wording doing a job in statute, but will he say whether he thinks that the wording used has any implications for British citizenship as opposed to British overseas territories citizenship? Was a problem with the wording recognised and is that the reason why it was not copied across? Or is this Bill a wee bit different and therefore uses different wording?

[Tom Pursglove]

The short answer, based on my understanding, is no. The connected provision in the Act talks about parents and not the mother and the father, so that is why we think this is the appropriate route to take for BOTCs. I am satisfied that the current wording does what is required so I ask hon. Members not to press their amendments.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I have heard what the Minister has said, but we could avoid going down the path of seeking to clarify the current wording if the same wording that was used in the 1981 Act were used here. We do not see what the problem would be. If the wording in the 1981 Act is adequate, why not just repeat it in the Bill? It would provide clarity and stop problems occurring in the future. Our belief is that everyone should be treated equally, and we should not have a separation, which the amendment tries to correct, between British overseas territory citizens and British citizens. Regrettably, we will press the amendment to a vote.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I am grateful to the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and for Glasgow North East for tabling amendments 8 to 12 and new clause 16, which provides the Committee with the opportunity to consider fees charged in respect of applications for British citizenship and British overseas territories citizenship.

Before I address the specific points in the proposed new measures, I want to provide some background information. Application fees for immigration and nationality applications have been charged for a number of years under powers set out under clause 68 of the Immigration Act 2014, and they play a vital role in our country’s ability to run a sustainable system, reducing the burden on taxpayers. Sitting beneath the 2014 Act are fees orders and fees regulations, which are scrutinised by both Houses before they come into effect; that is an important point. That ensures that there are checks and balances within the system and maintains the coherence of the fees framework. If we were to remove those fees during the passage of the Bill, as the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark suggests, it would undermine the existing legal framework without proper consideration of the sustainability and fairness to the UK taxpayer.

[Neil Coyle]

Will the Minister give way?

[Tom Pursglove]

I will, although I know that you wanted us to make good progress, Sir Roger.

[Neil Coyle]

I want to comment on the point about the burden on taxpayers. First, there is a very significant profit margin—86% profit for some of the processes of the Home Office—so there is no burden there. Secondly, it is quite offensive language to those that are living, working and paying tax here to say that they are a burden, even though they are already contributing economically through national insurance and tax contributions. I find the language unhealthy.

[The Chair]

Order. The Minister has indicated that we want to make progress, and that is true, but the Minister must not feel under any pressure not to respond to points that have been raised. This is a very important part of the Bill, so please, as a new Minister, feel able to take your time if you need to do so.

[Tom Pursglove]

Thank you, Sir Roger. I appreciate that. I also appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s strength of feeling on this matter. I was Parliamentary Private Secretary, several years ago, to my right hon. Friend the Member for Scarborough and Whitby who was Immigration Minister, and I learned a lot from him. He got to the nub of the issue of fees. The truth is that there is a level of fee that is set. There is constant parliamentary scrutiny of those fees, as I have described. There is a level of cost associated with that. Any fee level that is incurred over and above that is actually invested into the wider nationality and borders system and helps to pay for the services that are provided.

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

The Minister refers to the contribution of the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby. That was a challenge to give a commitment that fees should not be set at a level that does other than reflect cost. I hope the Minister will take advantage of that opportunity. As he is beginning to develop his argument, he is suggesting that fees are set at a higher level in order to reinvest in the Home Office. That is what other people have described and The Times reported in 2019 as profit of quite significant proportion.

[Tom Pursglove]

I will gladly take away the Committee’s feedback on fees. As I have said, fees are kept under constant review and are subject to parliamentary scrutiny. I have no doubt that members of the Committee, and indeed Members across the House, will want to scrutinise any fees orders and fees regulations that are brought forward, express views on them and, as they see fit, either support them or take issue with them.

To return to the focus of the amendments and the clause, removing these fees during the passage of the Bill would undermine the existing legal framework without proper consideration of sustainability and fairness for the UK taxpayer. It would also reduce clarity in the fees structure by creating an alternative mechanism for controlling fees.

Beginning with amendments 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, the aim of which is to limit the Secretary of State’s power to charge a fee for applying for British overseas territories citizenship, I can reassure the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East that I am sympathetic to the view that a fee should not be charged in cases where a person missed out on becoming a British citizen automatically due to historical anomalies. The provisions in the Bill are about righting historical wrongs, and I can give the Committee my assurance that we will look carefully at where fees should be waived via the fees regulations. However, as I have outlined, that is not a matter for this Bill and it should be remedied through secondary legislation, in line with other changes to immigration and nationality fees.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

My understanding, from the briefing I was given at the weekend, is that in July the Home Office sent a letter to nationality experts stating that the intention was not to charge a fee, but the Minister seems to be saying something different; that there will be fee waivers, rather than no fees at all. We are talking about historical injustices here, so can he be a little more clear? Is the intention not to charge a fee for the applications to which amendments 8 to 11 refer?

[Tom Pursglove]

The hon. Member is always on point in asking pertinent questions. I reiterate the point that the Home Office tends not to charge fees in instances where unfairness or injustice have occurred, and it remains our intention to continue to adopt that approach in relation to the provisions that we are enacting through the Bill. I hope that gives him the reassurance he is seeking.

[Neil Coyle]

I thank the Minister for giving way. Yesterday we saw Parliament at its finest, and I genuinely think that he is a decent man, but what he is saying today is not what was indicated previously and it does not address what the Court of Appeal has required the Home Office to do. If he is saying that there will be secondary legislation at some point, when is it coming, because we have an opportunity here to address the issue? The Court of Appeal found that the Home Office had failed to assess the best interests of children in setting the fee. To fail to do so again in this legislation will have only one outcome, which is the Government being back in court.

Also, I forgot to mention the case that I was speaking about earlier, so for reference it is R (The Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens) v. the Secretary of State for the Home Department.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank the hon. Member for that further intervention. Let me just set out the position on the point about child citizenship fees that he raises. I understand the concerns expressed about child citizenship fees. However, this is currently subject to legal challenge in the Supreme Court and the position will be reviewed after the judgments have been received.

[Neil Coyle]

So when the Government said in February that the issue was being reviewed, was it not being reviewed then? It is extraordinary that many months down the line the Minister is telling us that there will be a review only if they lose the case in the Supreme Court, which will incur further costs of millions of pounds for the taxpayer simply to go through the legal process.

[Tom Pursglove]

The hon. Member would be surprised if we did not want to review the situation and take into account fully the judgment of the Supreme Court in due course. I think that it is entirely proper that we take a view on this and that the situation should be reviewed in the light of any judicial ruling handed down. This exchange has been very useful, as it has allowed me to address many of the points that I would have picked up at the end of my remarks.

I turn now to subsection (1) of new clause 16, the aim of which is to limit the Secretary of State’s power to charge a fee for applying for British citizenship and British overseas territories citizenship to the cost to the Secretary of State of processing the application. As I have already outlined, imposing such a requirement would cut across the funding and coherence of the whole system and is not a matter for the Bill.

Subsection (2) would prevent the Secretary of State from charging a fee to register as a British citizen or British overseas territories citizen if the child is being looked after by a local authority. It is important to remember that any child, irrespective of nationality, who is looked after by their local authority can apply for both limited and indefinite leave to remain without being required to pay application fees.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Minister is being generous with his time, but I regret that the Home Office appears to have dusted down the same old briefing and he is making the same points that have been made before. He cannot possibly argue that limited leave is some sort of alternative to British citizenship. None of us would accept that; why should these kids?

[Tom Pursglove]

We would argue that the provision ensures no child in local authority care is unable to access leave. We remain of the view that citizenship is not necessary for any individual to work, live, study or access services within the UK. Subsection (3) would prevent the Secretary of State from charging a fee to be registered as a British citizen or British overseas territories citizen that the child or the child’s parent, guardian or carer is unable to afford. That raises similar points to subsection (1) in that imposing such a requirement would cut across the funding and coherence of the whole system and is not a matter for the Bill. Subsection (4) would require the Secretary of State to take steps to raise awareness of rights under the British Nationality Act 1981.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I have a quick question on the fee waiver. Why is registration for citizenship just about the only thing where there is no fee waiver scheme at all? There is a fee waiver sometimes for the 10-year route to settlement—as ludicrous a system as that is. Why is there no fee waiver system at all even for folk who cannot remotely afford that?

[Tom Pursglove]

I am conscious that I want to get through my remarks on this. I will write to the hon. Member on that point.

[Neil Coyle]

The Minister is being very generous in giving way. Perhaps he will be able to tell us how many applications for a fee waiver were denied by the Home Office in each of the last few years, or perhaps he could furnish us with that detail in another way. My understanding is that it is about 90%.

[Tom Pursglove]

Again, I do not have the figure to hand, but I will happily take that away and see if I can provide him with a written answer on that point. Information about becoming a British citizen is made available in published guidance on gov.uk and we are committed to ensuring information of this nature is fully accessible for all. I am conscious that we have had quite an extensive debate around fees in general, but I hope what I have said around the provisions in the Bill and the Government’s intentions for handling fees in relation to the nationality measures we are seeking to enact gives comfort to the Committee, and that the hon. Members will feel able to withdraw their amendments.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to all Members for taking part and the Minister for his response. There have been two separate issues. First, on the new registration provision in the Bill, he has provided some assurance that because it is correcting historic injustices the broad intention will be hopefully to avoid a fee. We will hold the Government to that and watch very carefully.

I hear what the Minister says about the fact there is a system of statutory instruments being laid—we all come here and say our piece and then the Government sets a fee pretty much regardless. In theory, that is fine. However, the lesson we learned about the citizenship registration of kids is that in 1981 the then Government and Parliament as a whole made it absolutely clear that profits should not be made on that registration, and that was fine for 20 or 25 years. But then along came successive Governments that decided to ramp it up.

On a principle as fundamental as this, I still think there is a strong case for putting it in the Bill. If a new Government want to change the approach in the future, they can do so, but they will first have to introduce primary legislation to do that. I do insist on amendment 8. I will insist even more strongly on new clause 16.

--- Later in debate ---

I do not know how many hon. Members have kids, but if the Home Office said to them, “Because we are giving your kids British citizenship, we expect you to pay us 1,000 quid, and we are going to use some of that money to do other stuff as well,” they would be outraged. They should be outraged that the Home Office is doing this. It is a different kettle of fish, and I hope the Minister will take that away and push back with officials.

[Tom Pursglove]

The hon. Gentleman asked specifically about fee waivers in relation to nationality, and I have just reflected on that point. My understanding is that, for most people, nationality is a choice and is not needed specifically to live in the UK. That is why we do not tend to offer fee waivers, typically, unless it is to correct a historical injustice. I just wanted to make that point clear.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bambos Charalambous]

I have some remarks, which I will try and keep as brief as possible. As outlined in the Committee, opening clauses 1 to 5 seek to close the important loopholes in British nationality law. As we have already heard, British nationality law has discriminated against women and that will be corrected by clause 1 and the Opposition amendments. Clause 2 deals with children born out of wedlock, who have been prevented from deriving nationality from a British father if unmarried. That is another historical injustice and I am glad it is being considered in the Bill.

As Committee members know, before 1 July 2006, children born to British unmarried fathers could not acquire British nationality through their father. Registration provisions have since been introduced to rectify that issue for the children of British citizens through sections 4E and 4I of the British Nationality Act 1981, but that was not changed for children of British overseas territory citizens. Let us pause for a moment to reflect on the impact of the inconsistency: a child has no control over its parents’ choices, yet British overseas territories children, now adults, have been discriminated against because their parents were unmarried. Due to a loophole in British nationality law, those children would not automatically acquire British overseas territory citizenship as the law failed to provide unmarried fathers with the ability to transmit citizenship. Therefore, through no fault of their own and without knowing why, that group of British overseas territories children did not acquire rights as British overseas territories citizens—rights they deserved and should have been entitled to, including, for example, holding a British passport or gaining consular assistance from the UK.

As we know, injustices that relate to nationality and citizenship span generations, and it is right the Government seek through clause 2 to correct the historical inability of unmarried fathers to transmit citizenship. The clause will insert new sections 17B and 17G to the British Nationality Act to provide for registration as British overseas territories citizens for persons born before 1 July 2006 to British overseas territories citizen fathers, where the parents were unmarried at the time of their birth. The provisions provide an entitlement to be registered for those who would have become British overseas territories citizens automatically had their parents been married at the time of their birth and for those who would currently have an entitlement to registration were it not for the fact that their parents were not married at the time of their birth. As the clause creates a registration route for the adult children of unmarried British overseas territories citizen fathers to acquire British overseas territories citizenship, the Opposition welcome and support clause 2. It shows that the adults who have slipped through the cracks in UK nationality law over many years are no longer punished and, instead, are finally placed on an equal footing with mainland UK children born under the same circumstances.

[Tom Pursglove]

Following clause 1, this clause also seeks to rectify a historical anomaly in British nationality law for people who would have become British overseas territories citizens. The purpose of the clause is to insert a new registration provision for people who, first, would have become BOTCs automatically had their parents been married and, secondly, would currently have an entitlement to registration as a BOTC but for the fact that their parents are not married. That has long been awaited. We are aware of people who would have become British had their parents been married and see citizenship as their birthright.