Budget Responsibility and National Audit Bill [Lords]

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Chris Leslie]

I would not want the hon. Gentleman to misunderstand the point of our amendment. It would, in essence, ensure that the charter for budget responsibility had a wide enough definition to give the new Office for Budget Responsibility, if it is indeed an independent body, more latitude to look across the wider set of economic indices and make its analysis and assessment of the impact of the Treasury’s policy on the ground—in the real world and the real economy—instead of looking merely at the desiccated issue of deficit reduction.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

I understand why the hon. Gentleman wants this provision, and I am not unsupportive. I am worried that he would conflate the work of the OBR with that of the Financial Policy Committee. We should remember that the FPC is charged with looking at the macro economy, which may well mean looking beyond monetary policy—the responsibility of the Monetary Policy Committee—and the macro-prudential. It might be able to look at the other aspects that he is expecting the OBR to look at, and that could muddy the waters even further. Does he see the potential for conflict between the OBR, with the role that he wants to set, and the FPC, with the role it is likely to have?

[Chris Leslie]

I understand where the hon. Gentleman is coming from. As I understand it, however, the Government, in creating the Financial Policy Committee at the Bank of England, propose to give it a particular responsibility for macro-prudential regulation. That is quite different from the role of the OBR, which, as an analytical and assessing independent body, will have a duty to provide comment and analysis on, and a degree of scrutiny of, the proposals of the Treasury and, more narrowly, the Treasury’s policy in relation to the accounting aspects of fiscal policy alone. If we are to have an Office for Budget Responsibility—or, as some hon. Members have suggested, the equivalent of the Congressional Budget Office, with some kind of parliamentary Budget office, which we will discuss later—it must be an independent body, so it must have the indisputable right to comment on the Treasury’s policies writ large on macro-economic and fiscal policy. I do not feel that there is necessarily a conflict with the Government proposals on changing financial services regulation, although we have not yet seen their proposals, and we do not really know what powers they intend to vest with the Bank of England on macro-prudential regulation. We will come to that another day.

I will explain why I think it is important that we focus on the concept of a growth mandate. It is not something that was just dreamed up by the Opposition. The Engineering Employers Federation has also called for a growth mandate to supplement the fiscal mandate in the charter for budget responsibility and in the Budget. It states that a growth mandate would

“send a powerful signal to business in the forthcoming Budget that government has a clear strategy to address the barriers to growth”

and calls for

“a Parliament long programme to deliver on it.”

Terry Scuoler, the chief executive of the EEF, has said that a growth mandate should be introduced to

“report on the progress at each Budget in the same way it does with the Fiscal Mandate.”

The EEF also states that

“like the Fiscal Mandate, the Growth Mandate should span the lifetime of a parliament with each subsequent Budget and policy announcement showing further incremental progress.”

The EEF makes a good point about the impact on the industries that it represents, which are in the real economy. Ultimately, that is what matters to our constituents.

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[Chris Leslie]

Possibly, but in a more tragic and important way that affects real lives and real people. It does not really matter what happens to the Liberal Democrat poll rating, but growth falling behind and diminishing as unemployment rises is a really important issue in the real world.

[Stewart Hosie]

May I bring the hon. Gentleman back to the amendment for a second? I am sure he is not suggesting that the OBR should have any role in setting the fiscal mandate. I understand why he wants the consideration of growth to be part of its mandate, but the Treasury Committee stated that the OBR’s commentary function

“should be one of informing public debate through disseminating better understanding of fiscal policy and long-term economic trends, identifying possible risks”

and so on. Those long-term trends would inevitably include growth. Although none of us would want the OBR to comment on individual policy measures, even the Government’s response—I certainly do not defend them—states that the OBR would be

“examining and reporting on…the long-term impact of the Government’s decisions.”

Again, that would include their impact on growth. Does the OBR not already have the ability that he is looking to give it?

[Chris Leslie]

I suspect that the Economic Secretary will make that point in her retort, when she eloquently resists all amendments, as is her usual pattern of behaviour. However, it is not clear enough that growth and employment are matters that the OBR can comment on and analyse. I absolutely would not want to give it the power to determine the mandate, but the Treasury should be big enough and ugly enough to withstand commentary from such an independent body.

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[Chris Leslie]

Indeed, and we should pay tribute to the previous Prime Minister for maintaining and establishing those freedoms and that independence. However, you would rule me out of order, Mr Speaker, if we departed too much from the amendments.

A growth mandate is necessary on the four principal components of growth. The Government’s strategy on consumer spending is falling apart by the day. The nationwide consumer confidence index published this week showed a record low among the general public. One reason consumers are losing confidence is the possibility of VAT going to 20%. Real disposal incomes are falling back to the 2008 level, and median income is falling more than at any time since the 1980s. John Lewis reported falls in sales last week, Debenhams is saying that trading conditions are tough, credit levels are contracting, and from April onwards, of course, some of the tax credit changes and other changes will take money out of the pockets of consumers. We know therefore that on the consumer spending components of growth the Government have already lost control of a decent growth strategy.

On business investment, banks are still slow to lend to high-growth businesses. More than 20% of commercial real estate loans are in default or in breach of their covenants, and the much-trumpeted national insurance holiday that Ministers offered to new start-up businesses has not been taken up to the extent predicted by Ministers, owing to the complexities they have imposed on the arrangements. The Government’s growth strategy currently seems to depend on a number of odd assumptions, including that it is the fault of employee rights, which need to be eroded to boost growth. That is the kernel of their growth strategy.

On planning law, the Government are sometimes localist and sometimes not; sometimes they devolve powers but sometimes they do not want to give certain powers to councils. Their approach on planning is confused. Will they relax Sunday trading laws? There is speculation all over the place. There is even confusion over business rates. The Minister’s colleagues in HMRC have issued 40 different consultations, discussion documents, updates and responses on tax changes since the previous Budget, which, as many businesses complain, brings uncertainty and confusion. And to cap it all, with the abolition of the regional development agencies, they have created these local enterprise partnerships, with no clarity about their role or budget. We will see tomorrow about the enterprise zones, but on business investment the growth strategy is very deficient.

The Government are relying totally on an export-driven miracle to be the salvation of their growth strategy, yet if the Treasury predictions are correct we would need the highest export growth every year for the next three years, which last occurred in 1974, I think. That means, for example, that our exports to the USA would have to triple or our exports to China would have to grow twentyfold. That is not a growth strategy, but a prayer for a miracle.

To cap it all, we know what is happening with public sector expenditure. The rush to reduce the deficit so deep and so fast is causing great harm to the growth prospects of the economy and taking out a number of posts, particularly in parts of the country that are least resilient.

Amendment 3 would add to the Office for Budget Responsibility’s duties the requirement to assess the impact of Treasury policy on jobs and economic growth. Defining responsibility as such a purist, accountancy-type concept is to take a slightly dry and aloof approach, which seems to us irresponsible, given the real-world impact on people, jobs and society. We need to ensure that the OBR is a more rounded organisation that is grounded in the real economy, not just a narrow, bean-counting institution that looks at statistics or just one aspect of economic policy. It needs to be strategic, predictive, competent and authoritative, and it can do that only by having a duty to analyse the Treasury’s impact across the board. That would be one way of creating longer-term sustainability for the Office for Budget Responsibility, beyond the Government’s current plans for deficit reduction.

Amendment 4 would give the OBR a duty to assess the impact of growth in our regions and nations. We know that the Government’s spending cuts are hitting less prosperous parts of the country disproportionately. The disparities in our economy are growing as a result of the Government’s policies, and clearly that is harmful. Indeed, we saw that in the unemployment statistics this week, for example, with 27,000 more people made redundant in the west midlands and 8% unemployment in my region of the east midlands.

[Stewart Hosie]

We have indeed seen unemployment statistics, which show unemployment in Scotland falling for three months in a row, employment rising for three months in a row and construction up massively, specifically because of decisions taken by the Scottish Government to re-profile capital expenditure. How would the OBR relate, for example, to the Scottish Government on the different routes that they had taken over the same period? How would that technically work?

[Chris Leslie]

If the OBR could explicitly comment on employment and growth policy, it would be able to look at the different tactics employed in the economic policies of the different regions and nations. If there were good or poor policies in different corners of the country, the OBR would be able to analyse and pass comment on them.

[Stewart Hosie]

The hon. Gentleman is being generous in giving way, but I am quite keen to probe on this issue. What he has said makes perfect logical sense, but at that point the OBR would be commenting not on UK policy, but on regional or national policy. If it were commenting on a micro-policy, rather than policy at the UK level, would that not put it in difficult political territory?

[Chris Leslie]

If a policy were having a significantly adverse effect on jobs, such as some of the policies pursued by the current, Tory-led Government, it would be useful to have an independent, authoritative budget office to comment on that and to flag it up—to put out a red alert, as it were—as something that parliamentarians ought to comment on. I would not have a problem with that level of commentary. We should be big enough to cope with that level of challenge, audit and scrutiny. We would not be giving the OBR any power to make decisions; the point is simply to shine a spotlight on Treasury and Government policies.

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[Ian Murray]

One would have thought that the three interventions I have taken were scripted across the Chamber, because the hon. Gentleman leads me to the second point in this part of my speech. I was talking about the deficit and the national debt, so let us dispel some of the propaganda in the OBR’s reports. He is welcome to read both them and the fantastic summary of performance indicators in the economy that the Library has produced. This point shows why it is incredibly important that the OBR should examine a wider set of figures, rather than just fiscal and national debt. Public sector net debt was down to 36.5% of gross domestic product in 2007-08, compared with the 42.5% that was inherited in 1996-97. Most of that borrowing was to do with financing capital investment, and not day-to-day expenditure as the Conservatives claim.

[Stewart Hosie]

Unfortunately that is not quite true, because the bulk of the capital expenditure took place through the private finance initiative. If memory serves, the outstanding balance on the credit card for that is £200 billion—of which, under the Labour Government, two thirds was off the balance sheet.

[Ian Murray]

The figures are there for people to see. I am delighted that we have had a contribution from the hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) on this subject, because in the past four years of Scottish National party government not one brick has been laid to build new infrastructure in Scotland. They have refused even to set up anything to do with building public infrastructure.

[Stewart Hosie]

rose—

[Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. We are not going to be drawn into the party politics of Scotland. Let us stick to the amendment.

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I have set out this rather crude point in the past, but I shall do so again. If there is the option of employing a 20-year-old Slovakian—or even a 21-year-old; perhaps a graduate—or a 57-year-old person who has not worked for 10 years, and therefore has no record of recent employment or testimony from recent employers, who will the rational employer be more likely to employ? The previous Labour Government failed to get their head fully around that conundrum, which was why there was an imbalance in the growth of the economy that caused London and the south-east to overheat. That overheating led to social consequences, not least in the housing market, and the public policy response was a demand that more public money should be thrown at those social consequences to try to adjust the housing market and build more housing. Such social policy was perfectly reasonable and rational, but it had implications for the public finances, which is why information about the precise nature of the jobs is critical not only to economic decision making, but to social policy making.

[Stewart Hosie]

The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point about the nature of employment, but I am not sure whether the growth mandate to which amendment 1 refers would help. There were years under Labour in which there was net growth, but the Labour Government still managed to lose 1 million manufacturing jobs in those years—this was before the recession—and I am not sure how the growth mandate would have helped to inform us that we had lost those jobs, given that net growth was being identified and, presumably, reported on, as it would be by the OBR.

[John Mann]

We, like other countries in the western world, are losing manufacturing jobs because of our refusal to deal with Chinese imports and the consumer myth of buying ever cheaper from China. The inherent trade imbalances and problems that accrue as a result will come back to haunt us, and while I know that the Government will want to allocate time to discuss that vital subject in the near future, it is slightly outside our present debate.

The hon. Gentleman is partly right and partly wrong. While it would be wrong to discuss policy issues relating to the economy now, if the statistics had been broken down at that time to allow his assessment to be made more accurately, it is rational to assume that the situation could have been debated more regularly and in a more informed way. That might have had a positive impact for Opposition Members such as him as well as Labour Back Benchers. Indeed, such information might also have informed the previous Government’s policy making, which explains why amendment 1 is in the Government’s favour.

We need to know about job creation and what jobs are available not only in London and the south-east, but in other parts of the United Kingdom. I have talked about immigration, but there is an equally vital factor for economic and social policy: the blurring, albeit for rational reasons, of retirement age. We have to consider early retirement, late retirement and the retirement age itself, as well as the vital question of pensions. Some employers in areas such as mine have deliberately targeted getting the over-60s back into employment. That is perfectly rational, and it is good for those people, for the social economy and, perhaps, for the economy overall. We need the information, however; not because that is a bad thing, but because we need to know whether the new jobs in our regions and constituencies are getting those people who are deemed to be retired into the labour market, as opposed to people who are not working—whether they want to work or not. If we are to crack the problem of those who choose not to work, or who are incapable of getting work—again, the rational employer goes for the person with work history—such understanding will be vital to our economic and social policy. I put it to hon. Members that the rational employer is far more likely to employ a 67-year-old with an excellent work history who is re-entering the labour market, perhaps in a part-time job, than a 57-year-old who has been unemployed for 10 years.

The decisions taken by employers and those individuals who wish to re-enter the labour market are not necessarily matters for us, but the consequences of their decisions are important to us, and especially to economic policy making. An understanding of the precise breakdown of new jobs and job losses is fundamental to economic policy making. Several of the economic assumptions that can be made about consumer behaviour, pensioners and wage demands flow from such analysis. That is why, as a slight aside, it would be foolhardy not to give the Treasury Committee a role in all five OBR appointments, because such a role would ensure that if a Chancellor were so foolish as to skew the appointment process towards people with a certain mindset or from a certain discipline in economics, as opposed to trying to achieve a balance, that Chancellor could be corrected through appropriate cross-party decision making. I am talking about any Chancellor—the present one, whoever replaces him in future reshuffles and our Chancellor, when we are in power. It is vital that there is an evidence base that stands independent of the Government so that we can all decide how to vote on the various measures that the Government bring forward. How can we possibly make an informed decision otherwise, except by political instinct, which is important but insufficient compared with having all the information?

I am therefore puzzled by why the Government are not leaping to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East for tabling the amendment. Labour Members might see the fact that his approach would help out such a Tory Government as somewhat treacherous, but this is clearly the new politics. It is coalition gone mad when a Labour Front Bencher is putting forward a proposal that would help Conservative Back Benchers, the handful—a tiny number—of Liberals who are anywhere near government and the Government themselves.

Let me give another example about policy making. Who knows what will be determined about petrol policy tomorrow, but that is a good example of something that should be covered by the OBR’s analysis. We need to know what has happened, including in the past, so that we can assess the impact of VAT on petrol, as well as on petrol duty, and the changes to petrol duty itself. The Chancellor might decide not to cut the price of petrol and yet not to increase it further, even though the price paid by drivers such as myself has gone up by ten quid since he became Chancellor. If he decides not to increase the price further, we will need to see a breakdown of the relevant information. We could go back through history, although I can guarantee that such a consideration will not be in the report that the OBR produces tomorrow. I could assist the office, however, because I have statistics that demonstrate that 70% of the existing tax on petrol was brought in by Conservative Chancellors since 1973. One might ask why Conservative Chancellors pick on the motorist to such an extent, but that is a debate for tomorrow rather than today, although I know that you, Mr Deputy Speaker, and others in the rural community will want to know why that is the case.

The point, in the context of the amendment, is that we must know precisely what is going on. I imagine that Conservative Back Benchers would be shocked to find out that Conservative Chancellors are responsible, as of today, for 70% of the tax on petrol. If the OBR had the mandate, however, those statistics could be laid out for us at every Budget and the pressure would be on. The pressure would, of course, be on Labour if the reverse had been the case and Labour Chancellors such as my right hon. Friends the Members for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown) and for Edinburgh South West (Mr Darling) had been responsible for the rise.

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[Geraint Davies]

Having complete discretion is useful, but the word discretion means that something remains a matter of discretion—these things do not have to be done. The OBR has the discretion to go around looking at whatever it likes, but the amendment is saying something different—that the centrepiece of our economic future is economic growth. That has belatedly been recognised by the Chancellor, as we will see in tomorrow’s Budget, when he will say, “I have done all the tax and spend, but, oh no, everything is going wrong because growth is going down the chute, so I had better belatedly do something about it.” The previous Government had sent us on a trajectory of positive growth, albeit that it was a fragile recovery after a financial crisis. The Chancellor has seen that we are going into negativity, so he has scratched his head and realised that growth has something to do with the public finances.

We have been lambasted by Conservative Members who say that the deficit is terrible and Labour left the cupboard bare. They conveniently forget that, as reported by all the economic forecasters, including the Institute for Fiscal Studies, two thirds of the £84 billion deficit came from the international financial crisis. That was not Labour’s fault. When Conservative Members suggest, “Oh, well, we should have had more regulation”, they seem to forget that when we created the Financial Services Authority to introduce more regulation, they said they wanted self-regulation and complained about red tape. In fact, it would have been much worse had it not been for the Labour Government. Furthermore, that regulatory hole in the armoury was commonplace across the globe. That is why Governments in Greece, America, Spain and elsewhere have had problems dealing with the financial deficits they inherited. Obviously, we were more vulnerable to sub-prime debt, as we know because the financial sector is larger in Britain.

Let us get away from the myths about why we have the deficit and deal with the challenge of how to get rid of it. We get rid of it by striking a proper balance between growth, making savings over time and ensuring that the bankers pay their fair share. It is convenient for the Conservatives to say that there is only one way of achieving the task. Instead of having a balanced approach to maximising growth, making the bankers pay their fair share and making credible savings that are realistic over time and would halve the deficit in four years, Conservative Members say, “No. We don’t want to halve the deficit in four years; we want to get rid of it in four years, and we do not want to use growth or involve the bankers. The bankers are our mates after all, so they can have some more money. What we will do is make the cuts twice as fast in just one way—through savaging public sector jobs and services.”

Then, remarkably, growth starts to recede so that the sums no longer add up, as there is obviously an interrelationship between private sector growth and public sector funding. Thus they suddenly realise that they have to do something about growth. The amendment is about recognising that the centrepiece of macro-economic planning and fiscal responsibility is growth. It is all very well for the Minister to say, “Oh well, the OBR will have absolute discretion; it can look at growth if it likes, but if it doesn’t want to, it doesn’t have to.” That is the problem; its eye is off the ball. We need to get the finances in proper balance without destroying communities, which is what Labour Members stand for.

[Stewart Hosie]

If I may take the hon. Gentleman back, he mentioned Greece and banking regulation. Can he explain to the House how the failure of Greek banking regulation had anything to do with the sovereign debt crisis, and what on earth the amendment, which is about a growth mandate, has to do with that?

[Geraint Davies]

I will try and speak more slowly. My point was that the international financial crisis affected all countries’ debt, not least that of Greece. Obviously, it has its own banking system, underneath the European Central Bank. There was a common cause for many of the deficit problems around the globe. It was not uniquely Labour’s fault, as the Government make out. The amendment seeks to clarify the factors that are generating the fiscal future, including growth.

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[Geraint Davies]

No, in Welsh. I was in Dusseldorf, talking on behalf of the Welsh Affairs Committee. This is relevant, Mr Deputy Speaker. UKTI had been marketing Britain, and various German companies had been saying, for example, “We want to invest in a food and drinks factory. We want these skills and this site, and ideally these grants and these communications.” That would have been put on a computer platform and pulled down by regional development agencies to encourage inward investment. I asked what was happening now, and was told, “All these bids are coming forward for creating jobs in the UK, and the RDAs are not pulling them down because they have been abolished.”

That is a simple example of how the cuts in administration and red tape are stopping quality jobs being created in Britain. The cuts undermine growth and are false economics. To answer the question about where we would cut the deficit, Labour would reduce the deficit by encouraging growth and jobs. I was talking to a business man last week in Swansea. He said, “I run a business. Why are the Government always talking about cuts? If I was making a loss and wanted to cut my costs, I would not sell my tools. Yes, I’d keep my costs down, but I’d invest in sales.” The Government’s position is like paying off the mortgage by selling the furniture, rather than getting a job. That is ludicrous.

That is why growth as the centrepiece of the Office for Budget Responsibility is so important. To release the entrepreneurial spirit and focus it on export-driven growth is the primary aim of Labour, but not of Government Members, who have let down business.

[Stewart Hosie]

I am trying to understand the amendment. To have a growth mandate in the OBR would have allowed it to explain precisely where the £57 billion of cuts every year under Labour from 2013-14 onwards would have come from. Is that correct? The growth mandate would have explained where the £57 billion of fiscal consolidation would have come from. Is that correct?

[Geraint Davies]

I really am speaking too fast, aren’t I?

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If we are in an era when the Office for Budget Responsibility is truly impartial and does not help one political party, or the governing party of the day, more than it would the Opposition, I am sure that we could come to some arrangement whereby the official Opposition would happily respect any market-sensitive data contained within the OBR reports—but we should have access to them at the same time. The Chancellor suggested, I think, during his interview with Andrew Marr at the weekend, that he knew what the OBR’s growth forecasts would be when it downgraded those forecasts. He has days and days to prepare his case and the Budget, but of course the rest of Parliament does not have that time. If the legislature is as important as the Executive—as I believe it is—there is a reasonable case to be made for the legislature to have access to the reports from the independent OBR simultaneously when the Treasury receives them. That is the essential point about amendment 6. The amendments embody two simple requests to help to improve transparency and access for Parliament.

[Stewart Hosie]

Amendment 2 calls for the OBR’s reports to be published. The Treasury Committee said:

“The OBR should have discretion in the models it uses in drawing up its forecasts. It is a matter for the organisation itself as to whether it is content to use is the Treasury models, or wishes to make changes. Whatever course the OBR takes, there would be benefits in it being as transparent as possible about the models it uses.”

I assume that that would also include the assumptions that underpin those models. The Government’s response was positive. They said that they would

“provide the OBR with full access to Treasury and other forecasting models, as well as support to scrutinise and develop these models.”

Again, I assume that that means the assumptions that underpin the Treasury models and whatever other modelling it wishes to undertake. The hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) said that the OBR could take those models and assumptions from the Treasury, and he is absolutely right about that.

The OBR currently publishes a number of assumptions. For example, the impact multipliers were included in the June 2010 report, showing the one-for-one impact of capital expenditure cuts. Reports at the time of the Labour Government published assumptions about oil prices, and North sea corporation tax and petroleum revenue tax was used to calculate those yields. Given that several such assumptions are already published, and that the OBR can take all those assumptions, models and changes and create new ones, does it have the discretion to publish what it sees fit? Would it not be better to have a guarantee from the Minister that it will not unnecessarily withhold assumptions where it is important for us all to have transparency? Instead of the Treasury putting the material in the Library, we should ensure that the OBR has the ability to do that, so that we have the information and can come to a proper, reasoned view on whether we believe its figures.

That is a simple question, and I am sure that the answer is yes; I certainly hope so. There is no reason why we should not have that transparency so that we can all guarantee the efficacy of the reports that the OBR produces.

[Justine Greening]

On amendment 2, the Government are committed to increasing transparency in public life. That transparency is essential to good fiscal policy, as the hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) said. In fact, the Government already provide the costing methods and assumptions for policy proposals. Those were made available in policy costings documents at the last Budget and spending review, and copies were made available to the House. That is a step change in transparency in fiscal policy making. Specifically in relation to the OBR, the additional transparency referred to in the amendment is already required by the statutory charter for budget responsibility, which says at paragraph 3.9:

“The Budget Report shall provide, at a minimum: an explanation and costing of the impact of all significant fiscal policy measures introduced by the Government since the last Budget and an explanation of the methodology used to cost the fiscal impact of each of those measures”.

In relation to the Bill, I draw the hon. Gentleman’s attention to clause 4(6), which explicitly refers to the OBR’s reports being clear in explaining the factors that it took into account when preparing the report—not only the assumptions that he mentioned but the main risks that it considered to be relevant. So there is a safeguard not only in the charter but in the Bill to ensure that there is transparency about how the official forecasts have been arrived at.

On amendment 6, the OBR is accountable to Parliament in order to enhance Parliament’s ability to hold the Government to account for fiscal policy. The OBR’s forecasts and analysis will be laid directly before the House. The budget responsibility committee will be appointed with the consent of the Treasury Committee, and will be available for scrutiny. There will be separate reporting to Parliament of the OBR’s expenditure, and, as many Members have already discovered, relevant written questions will be answered by the OBR. The OBR is also accountable to the Chancellor, reflecting its role in producing the official forecast, which will form the basis of the Chancellor’s Budget decisions.

Herein lies the challenge to Labour Members. The OBR will provide the Government with timely access to the information necessary to reach policy decisions ahead of fiscal policy events. The Treasury Committee recognised that in its report last year, when it said:

“Involvement In the Budget process necessarily involves close contact between the Treasury and the OBR”.

Close working also means that the OBR has access to all Government information to ensure that its conclusions reflect the most accurate and up-to-date information. It is therefore right that the OBR provides the Government with pre-release access to its forecast in order to ensure the accuracy of both it and the Budget documents, which are published simultaneously.

It is also right that there is transparency in the approach to the sharing of information. The OBR has chosen to follow the well-established pre-release practices put in place by the Office for National Statistics. I can assure the House that this arrangement does not compromise the OBR’s independence. It is an approach that has worked well for the ONS. The OBR has been transparent about when reports have been shared. It confirmed in its November “Economic and fiscal outlook”:

“We have come under no pressure from ministers, advisers or officials to change any of our conclusions.”

The OBR’s access to Government information distinguishes it from other UK forecasting organisations, and ensures that the Chancellor and Parliament are provided with the most up-to-date information regarding the latest UK economy and public finance figures.

I understand the rationale behind amendment 6. However, given the practicalities of the OBR’s accountability to the Chancellor and its role in producing the official forecasts, we feel that it is better for it to act on its own decision to follow the ONS pre-release guidelines. I will resist both amendments.