Subsidy Control Bill

Seema Malhotra Excerpts

3rd reading
Monday 13th December 2021 Commons Chamber

[Sarah Olney]

I absolutely do, which is why it is so important to get this level of oversight at the much smaller threshold that the hon. Gentleman is proposing. Potentially, within the gap between the £500 that he is proposing and the £500,000 that the Government are proposing, there will be a great deal of market-distorting subsidy, and it will be up to competitors who have been disadvantaged to challenge or to bring their own court cases against those subsidies. If they do not have knowledge about how they are personally being disadvantaged, what can they possibly do about it? That is why that point is so important.

My new clause 2 is about climate change. I welcome the comments made by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman) about the importance of this matter in her excellent opening speech. There are the seven principles against which the subsidies will be assessed, and also the nine energy and environmental principles. What I am disappointed about is that they do not add up to a broader commitment to using public money to fight climate change. I can only amplify what the hon. Lady said about it being our key public challenge at this time, covid notwithstanding.

The Liberal Democrats would have welcomed the opportunity to put the transition to net zero at the heart of the UK’s subsidy regime, and for the Government to have used every tool at their disposal to make the transition as swiftly and painlessly as possible, and we can see how public subsidies can help to achieve that.

New clause 2 provides for an annual report to Parliament detailing the climate change impacts of subsidies granted that year. This would have been an important mechanism for reviewing the extent to which subsidies are being used to stimulate or to de-risk investment in the green economy. We look to the private sector to drive much of the innovation that we need to see and to create the consumer markets for our net zero future, but the Government must do all they can to encourage the private sector to prioritise reducing emissions alongside creating economic value.

Public subsidies are an important part of the levers available, and taxpayers need to see that they are being used effectively. Let us take, for example, the nine environmental and energy principles. In the past few months, we have seen a tremendous concern about our energy sector, and it is easy to imagine a scenario where subsidies are being granted to improve energy resilience and energy supply. Such goals might make sense in the short term as they are in line with the principles, but when we are making short-term decisions about subsidy use, it is really important that we step back and look at the longer-term impact of some of those decisions. We need to take the opportunity every year to make sure that, regardless of the short-term decisions that sometimes need to be made, we are nevertheless continuing along the path towards net zero—the challenge that the Government have set for themselves. To have that separate net zero/climate change consideration of the total use of all of our subsidies would be an important check for the Government to make sure that they are progressing towards net zero in the way that they should

In short, this Bill would have been much improved by enabling greater scrutiny of the subsidies granted. I regret that the Government are not doing more to enable that.

[Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to follow some powerful speeches on Report tonight. I share the frustration of the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman) that we could well have moved forward with some of the issues we debated in Committee with some amendments brought forward by the Government. Some of the robust debate we had in Committee led to looking at how we could address those issues more quickly. I acknowledge the contributions from the hon. Members for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose) and for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake). I will be talking about their amendments later in my speech, but we have discussed at length transparency and the ways in which we need to reform this regime in order for it to be the most effective it can be. I wish to make a brief remark about new clause 1 before carrying on further. I hear the concerns raised by the hon. Members for Aberdeen North and for Edinburgh North and Leith (Deidre Brock), and the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Liz Saville Roberts), because they are important, particularly in relation to legacy subsidies in agriculture, as well as future subsidies. The Minister will need to make sure that he can respond clearly to the concerns that have been raised, and we will certainly be listening closely on that.

It is a pleasure to speak to our amendments—new clause 3, on post-award referrals, and amendments 15 to 27. I will also speak in support of similar and, in some cases, identical amendments to those tabled by Labour in Committee, which I was pleased to see have been influential in colleagues’ consideration of the Bill. I refer in particular to amendments 1 to 8, which were tabled by the hon. Members for Weston-super-Mare and for Thirsk and Malton, and amendments 10 and 12, which were tabled by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North. There are only slight differences from our position in Committee, and I am sure that today’s debate will also help consideration of the Bill in the other place. Amendments 13 and 14 are similar to amendments 2 and 7, and are consistent with our significant concerns on transparency and accountability, which we raised in Committee. New clause 2, tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney), is also consistent with the position on net zero leadership that we set out on Second Reading and in Committee. We are not actively supporting two amendments—we are more neutral on them: amendment 11, which has similar intentions and principles but is slightly weaker than our amendment 16 and which runs the risk of being unclear for local authorities to implement; and amendment 9, where we understand the intention to broaden what the Competition and Markets Authority reports on. However, arguably it would not have the information on all subsidies, as most would not be notified to it, so this provision could be impractical and create a significant burden. However, in Committee we also provided suggestions on how the CMA’s annual report could be strengthened and what areas it could report on. We had a considerable debate on that, including in respect of the CMA reporting on where it had identified non-compliance with the principles and examining the geographical spread of subsidies that had been notified to it.

Labour recognises the need for this legislation, which establishes the framework for the UK’s post-Brexit subsidy control regime. It indeed allows for quicker subsidies to be granted to businesses, which we support. We recognise that a system of subsidy control is important to ensure that public funds are made available to businesses, but with appropriate safeguards in place. Where we departed from the Scottish National party in Committee is that we also believe that the Bill is necessary to protect the UK’s internal market. We are speaking to our amendments today on two main strategic areas: the purpose of subsidies; and the way in which the new regime will operate. I will deal first with the purpose and the use of subsidies. Subsidies and their controls should be an integral part of a strong, long-term industrial strategy, promoting growth and supporting industry, jobs and prosperity across the country. We want to see our foundation industries such as steel supported, and we want to see a plan for how we can buy, make and sell more in Britain.

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

It was an honour and pleasure to serve with my hon. Friend on the Bill Committee. Does she agree that the strategic purpose of a Bill such as this must be about supporting areas of greater economic deprivation and that therefore there is a glaring hole at the middle of this Bill, which is that it does not have that clear, proactive strategic purpose?

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank my hon. Friend for his contributions in Committee and for that very important point, which I will come on to. We know that the assisted areas map is not part of the UK’s regime, but there has to be a way to deal with the principle of that, which is how to ensure resources are targeted to the areas where they are most needed.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Penrose]

I am listening carefully to the hon. Lady. I am sure everybody here would agree with the principle of trying to level up, particularly in parts of the UK outside London and the south-east, but can she address the point I was making about politicians having a long and really pretty awful record in picking losers? How does she think that, under her proposal, things are going to be different this time?

[Seema Malhotra]

I do not think it is about us picking losers or winners at all. This is about us using the data, understanding where there are areas of greatest need and having that as part of a data-led levelling-up agenda. Given that the Government have created a specific Department for levelling up, Labour is surprised that that mandate is not clear and that the hon. Gentleman does not have the answers he needs to have a framework that gives confidence that we are applying resources to areas of greatest need. To be frank, the Government’s record on that is not very strong. The Bill should be explicit that supporting areas of deprivation should fall squarely within the subsidy control principles.

On improving the way the new regime will operate, there is a serious lack of transparency in the Bill on how public money is spent and how value for money can be assessed.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Does the hon. Lady not agree that the problem with amendment 16—the net zero amendment —is judging what is consistent with the net zero commitments? I have a Westminster Hall debate tomorrow —at 4 o’clock if anybody has nothing better to do and wants to tune in. On greenwashing, for example, it is incredibly difficult to ascertain what complies with net zero when there is so much noise around this. We need to improve in that area. Is this not really a charter for lawyers to take these subsidies to court time and again? Is not that the problem with her amendment?

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. We have agreed with many of his amendments. What he has just said actually lends even greater weight to wanting to make sure that that is a consideration and that we have the resources to support that. Perhaps he will talk to those on his own Treasury Bench about this, because we would have hoped that by now there would be a clearer road map for how the country is supposed to move forward to achieving our net zero commitments. He will know as well as I do that many small businesses have been crying out for a road map to net zero to know what can make the most difference, how to assess it and how to look at whether they have a decarbonisation strategy that is fit for purpose. So I think he is lending weight to our argument that we need something in the legislation to help drive the processes behind that. People want answers and want to know they are doing the right thing and making the right investments on our road map to net zero.

I was referring to the serious lack of transparency in the Bill around how public money is spent and value for money can be assessed. There is no requirement to report subsidies below £315,000 over three years. An unlimited number—an unlimited number—of subsidies up to £500,000 could be made under a scheme and not one would need to be reported, as long as the scheme itself apparently is reported. That is not good enough. The argument that this is in order to be consistent with the EU fall because the thresholds in the EU state aid regime were in the context of a very different regime; they were in the context of a scheme of pre-notification, where scrutiny took place before the allocation of the subsidy, not a permissive regime that challenges subsidies after they have been granted. In that context, we must think differently about what we seek to import; we are not importing the whole environment around how those decisions were made in the past.

The Minister has previously stated that we are in a position to be able to change those thresholds—it is not a matter of can’t; it is a matter of won’t. The hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose) said very cleverly: if this is so obvious and the Minister agrees with transparency, why are we not doing it?

During covid, we have seen Ministers wasting money on crony personal protective equipment contracts. I could spend my entire speech talking about this, but my main point is that that would have remained hidden from the public and from Parliament without ongoing freedom of information requests. Transparency on public expenditure—who is paying out, how much is being given, who it is going to and what it is being used for— are basic questions that we should know answers to as a matter of routine on subsidies being paid by our Governments, local authorities or other public authorities. Greater transparency, not less, should underpin the system of self-assessment by public authorities that sits at the heart of the Bill and our responsibility to the taxpayer.

The Centre for Public Data has made it clear that greater transparency would help ensure the honesty, consistency and efficiency of the system. It is also essential that interested parties—be they competitors, other public authorities or groups acting in the public interest—are able to challenge subsidies that they believe are distortive or unfair.

On the subsidy database, we support amendments 1 to 8 on transparency and reducing the threshold for the requirement to report on the database. This includes subsidies made under a scheme referred to in amendment 1. As the Bill stands, subsidies made under a scheme with a value of less than £500,000 do not have to be entered on to the database. There is no convincing reason for that, and it is in the public interest that all subsidies under a scheme be published. Worse still, a scheme can be registered with little information so that there will be no overall transparency for a scheme under which millions of pounds of taxpayers’ money could be spent without scrutiny.

Amendment 8 in the names of the hon. Members for Weston-super-Mare and for Thirsk and Malton amends clause 70, which currently provides that, where a subsidy is made under a scheme, the decision to grant an individual subsidy cannot be reviewed. The amendment suggests that the response given by the Minister in Committee was not reassuring enough.

This set of amendments also reduces the timeframes in which subsidies must be entered on to the transparency database and the timeframes in which any modifications must be uploaded. Members will be aware that the Bill currently requires subsidies or schemes to be entered on to the database within six months of being made or within one year in the case of a tax measure. We argued in Committee that there was a need to reduce those timeframes. Having longer makes it more likely to result in an incomplete or inaccurate entry, because officials may leave or records may be lost. We heard evidence from Jonathan Branton, a legal expert in the area, who said,

“I have yet to hear a…persuasive case for why you need that long to publish…an award.”––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 58, Q79.]

Amendments 21 and 22 were intended to bring all services of public economic interest subsidies with a value of more than £500 into the scope of transparency requirements. We do not understand why such subsidies—those up to £14.5 million or all those in the case of hospital care, adult social care and certain public transportation services—should be excluded from transparency requirements. With respect to amendment 6, we firmly support the need for the date of the subsidy to be entered on to the database. There should be no ambiguity about the day that the clock starts to tick for the period in which a challenge can be brought.

If the Minister wants to try to argue that greater transparency would lead to higher costs and more red tape for public authorities, that does not hold up to scrutiny either, because they have that information and they are used to reporting their expenditure above £500. That point was made on Second Reading as well by the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare. When giving evidence in Committee, Dr Roger Barker of the Institute of Directors said that

“there should be transparency at every level of subsidy”.––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 37, Q48.]

A transparent system is important, but so is the quality of the data contained in it. That is why we tabled amendment 20, which would require the Secretary of State to ensure that the subsidy database is subject to routine audit to verify the accuracy and completeness of entries. That would incentivise complete and accurate reporting and provide a mechanism for putting errors right.

In Committee, we heard clear evidence that the database in its current form contains significant inaccuracies and gaps in the data entered. Expert witnesses suggested that not all subsidies were being entered, as just 501 subsidies were recorded in the best part of 10 months. Of those entries that had been recorded, more than half had a zero or nil value, so either the database is not fit for purpose or the entry of data by public authorities has not been up to scratch—or both.

If the database is not subject to any oversight or control, and if inaccurate or incomplete information entered on to it is not checked, poor-quality information is likely to lead to misguided legal challenges or to harmful subsidies failing to be addressed. We want to be constructive on this point, which is why the amendment is drafted in a way that permits the Secretary of State to decide who should undertake the audits and how they can be done most effectively.

On devolution, this is not a fair four-nations Bill. As it stands, regulations and guidance can be developed without seeking the consent of the devolved Administrations; only the Secretary of State can call for subsidies to be assessed by the CMA; and there are no requirements for the devolved Administrations to be represented on the CMA’s new subsidy advice unit. That is important because we need a system that commands the confidence of all four nations.

The devolved Administrations should be given a genuine voice in developing and implementing the new regime. The Minister’s response in Committee to our concerns and those of the devolved Administrations was that he had had a number of meetings with the devolved Administrations and would keep talking to them. I would be grateful if he could provide an update on those discussions.



Amendments 23 to 25 would provide Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish Ministers with the power to call in subsidies or schemes under clause 55. Currently, only the Secretary of State has the power to issue a call-in direction, triggering a report to the CMA. On that basis, the CMA’s reports are not binding on a public authority. The harm of extending the call-in power to the devolved nations is not clear to us. Why is the Secretary of State empowered to call in Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish subsidies that may damage economic interests in England but the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish leaders cannot call in subsidies that they believe can cause economic harm in their nations?

Commercial Rent (Coronavirus) Bill (Third sitting)

Seema Malhotra Excerpts

Thursday 9th December 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Paul Scully)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Murray.

Many businesses are still on the long road to recovery following the pandemic, particularly in the sectors that have been hit hardest, such as hospitality and retail. The most recent data indicates that rent collections for this year’s third quarter are much higher than they were for last year’s third quarter, but they are still not at pre-pandemic levels. An estimated total of just under £7 billion of rent was deferred over the pandemic.

Although we have provided an unprecedented package of support to businesses, we have also been clear that we expect landlords and tenants to come together and negotiate. Agreements have been reached for many businesses, but for others negotiations have stalled, leaving rent arrears to build up, which could threaten many of the valued jobs that those businesses provide.

The statutory arbitration process that the Bill introduces should be used as a last resort, where landlords and tenants have been unable to reach their own agreements. For those tenancies, the Bill will ring-fence rent debt accrued during the pandemic by businesses required to close, and set out a process of binding arbitration that will resolve rent disputes and help the market return to business as usual. The Bill will temporarily restrict remedies available to landlords in relation to rent debt built up during the pandemic. To respect the primacy of the landlord-tenant relationship wherever possible, the arbitration process will not be available where legal agreements are reached between landlords and tenants over the payment of a protected rent debt.

I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship today, Mrs Murray.

I am grateful to the Minister for his opening remarks, in which he set out why the Bill is needed. Indeed, some of the estimates of the deferred rent debt that has been built up are around £7 billion, with some as high as £9 billion. That is why we called for action earlier this year, so that there was clarity about how some rent disputes would be resolved, and resolved fairly, because we know that the impact of the pandemic is ongoing.

I have concerns that may be outside the scope of the Bill, unless we decide to accept some amendments on Tuesday. In the light of the announcements yesterday and the guidance coming out today, there may need to be a review if there is a risk of further rent arrears if income drops for businesses in the period ahead. So I hope that there will be ways in which we can keep matters under review, in the light of recent developments.

Clause 1 indeed provides an overview of the Bill, and it is in part 1 of the first three short parts. Part 1 is about “Introductory Provisions”, including important definitions; part 2 provides the framework for statutory arbitration between landlords and tenants; and part 3 provides for the ongoing restrictions on “Certain remedies and insolvency arrangements” in relation to protected rent debt.

Importantly, clause 1 also confirms that nothing in the legislation affects the ability of parties to a business tenancy to reach a negotiated settlement outside the arbitration process. That is important because the arbitration process is a backstop; it is a last resort. It is preferable—in terms of time, cost and the relationship between the parties—that they can be supported to reach a negotiated settlement without the need to resort to arbitration.

Labour will continue to encourage landlords and tenants to negotiate settlements, and it is good to see that most of them have already done so; indeed, that was an important part of the feedback from witnesses this week. It is a sign that most commercial landlords and tenants have worked closely together to get through the crisis, and I pay tribute to them for doing that, because it is a recognition that we have all been in this together and that everybody needs to play their part in bringing flexibility where it is needed.

UK Hospitality estimated that around 60% of its members reached agreement with their landlords on any outstanding debt, but there is an estimate that around one in five have yet to reach a negotiated settlement. Perhaps some settlement discussions are still in progress.

We support clause 1 and we will vote for it to stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

“Rent” and “business tenancy”

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

The clause provides clarity with regard to which payments owed by a business tenant to their landlord under their tenancy contract will be considered to be rent for the purpose of the Bill. Rent includes contractual payments owed by the tenant to the landlord for occupation and use of the property, as well as payments collectively described as service charges and interest on any unpaid amount. Including both service charges and interest on any unpaid amount within the definition of rent will allow the arbitrator to consider a broad range of arrears that may be owed by the tenant to the landlord, rather than only the payments for occupation and use. The arbitrator will then consider whether relief should be awarded in respect of some or all of the amount owed.

The definition of business tenancy in the Bill is broadly consistent with the definition of business tenancy under section 82 of the Coronavirus Act 2020, which served to temporarily prevent landlords from evicting tenants. However, the Bill focuses on business tenants and their immediate landlords.

I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his opening comments on the clause.

Clause 2 defines the key terms that are central to the operation of this legislation, notably rent and business tenancy. Rent is stated to include the cost of using the premises and service charges, as well as interest on unpaid amounts relating to either, with VAT included. We have no concerns about this definition; it seems sensible and we hope that it is widely accepted.

Business tenancy means a tenancy to which part 2 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 applies. That Act applies to any tenancy where property is or includes premises that are occupied for the purposes of business. The Minister will have heard the concerns of the British Retail Consortium, raised on Tuesday, about the definition of the business tenancy. It has concerns that any tenancy contracted out of the 1954 Act would fall outside the scope of these protections. Will the Minister confirm the assurances that he gave the British Retail Consortium on that point?

As Kate Nicholls of UK Hospitality said in her evidence, also on Tuesday:

“It is important that this piece of legislation sits within the existing canon of property law”––[Official Report, Commercial Rent (Coronavirus) Public Bill Committee, 7 December 2021; c. 5, Q3.]

and that definitions are consistent with that existing canon. Subject to meeting the BRC’s concern about business tenancies, the definitions in clause 2 would in our view meet that test. I look forward to the Minister’s response. We support the definitions and will support the clause.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Scully]

The clause defines “protected rent debt”, a key concept of the Bill, so that landlords and tenants have certainty about what is in the scope of arbitration. The definition for protected rent includes rent that is owed to the landlord under the tenancy if the tenancy was adversely affected by coronavirus, and excludes rent that the tenant owed to the landlord either before the pandemic or after businesses were allowed to open for business. That is in line with the Government’s expectation that the market should now return to normal, with the contractual arrangements once again adhered to.

The clause also states that if all or part of the protected rent debt was satisfied by the landlord by drawing down from the tenancy deposit, the sum that was paid for the deposit should be considered protected rent debt and should still be considered unpaid.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his opening comments on clause 3, which defines “protected rent debt”. Rent is protected if the tenant was adversely affected by coronavirus within the meaning of clause 4 and the rent is attributable to a period that is protected within the meaning of clause 5.

Subsection (3) states that rent consisting of interest due on an unpaid amount is

“attributable to the same period of occupation…as that unpaid amount.”

That means that if a tenant is paying interest on rent due, the interest is also considered to be from the same period of occupancy as the rent. Subsection (5) sets out that if rent due is only partly attributable to a period of occupation, only the rent due that is attributable to that period qualifies as protected rent. That means that if there is rent due that is attributable to occupation by the tenant both outside and within the protected rent period, only that which was within the protected period is regarded as protected rent. It is likely there will be some confusion around that. Perhaps the Minister intends to have clear examples and guidance so that those who use the legislation will be clear about how they need to do their calculations.

Clause 3 does clarify what is meant by protected rent debt. We support the definition and will vote for the clause.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Scully]

Clause 4 is essential. It establishes which businesses can access arbitration, the Bill’s temporary moratorium, and other measures. We appreciate that the pandemic has been difficult across the economy, but we are seeking to target this measure at those businesses most directly affected so that we can resolve cases quickly, providing businesses with certainty while protecting jobs in our most vulnerable sectors, such as hospitality, retail and leisure. That is important not only for eligible businesses, but for the individuals who contribute to them.

Clause 4 provides that a business that was adversely affected by coronavirus and its rent may be in scope if it was required by regulations to close all or part of its business or premises for any of the time while closure requirements were in place: from 21 March 2020 until 18 July 2021 for England, or until 7 August 2021 for Wales. If a business was subject to a closure requirement for any period within those times, it meets the test, regardless of whether it was allowed to carry out other limited activities such as takeaways. Without that targeted approach, we could see rent issues from the pandemic unresolved for a significant amount of time, so I urge the Committee to support the clause.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his remarks. As he described, clause 4 clarifies what is meant by businesses “adversely affected by coronavirus”. It states that a business can be categorised as adversely affected if part or all of it was obliged to close due to coronavirus restrictions during the relevant period. It also states that any specific limited activities that the business was able to take part in during its forced closure can be disregarded as immaterial for the purposes of the Bill. We think that is very important, otherwise we will have situations in which one side or the other says that a business is not eligible for the scheme for the purposes of arbitration, so we support having that clarity in the Bill.

The clause also defines the relevant period as 21 March 2020 to 18 July 2021 for businesses in England, and 21 March 2020 to 7 August 2021 for businesses in Wales. We do not object to those dates—there are clear reasons why they have been chosen, given that Government policy changed around those times. My only concern is that the tail end of recovery has been slower in some sectors, such as aviation, travel and tourism, than in others. The dates on which some businesses were able to reopen and start to do much better did not apply in the same way to all businesses in all sectors.

Although we have not tabled any amendments to those dates and we support clause 4, it will be important for the Minister to keep this Bill under review, bearing in mind that there has not been an equal recovery for businesses. If concerns are raised with him about businesses that may or may not be eligible, but have been impacted by coronavirus closures or consequences, it is important that some amendments could be made in due course, should they be required.

[Paul Scully]

I think we all acknowledge the fact that this is not a perfect science: some businesses that were suffering through the lockdown will continue to have a slow recovery. This is a focused Bill dealing with a particular kind of ring-fenced debt, and we want to make sure that we encapsulate this issue, so that we do not make the Bill and the process of arbitration too big in a way that benefits nobody. I think the Bill is proportionate, and will have the right effect.

In terms of a long tail of recovery, we obviously need to look at the support from a holistic point of view, and at the additional measures that we have put in place to support businesses, including the sectors that the hon. Lady mentioned. Importantly, we will continue to flex. I have been on calls today, and over the past few days—especially with plan B being announced—with representative organisations, and people from hospitality in particular, which is hard pressed. We will continue to listen and respond.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5

“Protected period”

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his remarks. Clause 5 defines what is meant by the protected period and specific coronavirus restrictions for the purposes of the Bill. He has outlined the dates for the protected period, and that a specific coronavirus restriction means any requirement other than a closure requirement that regulated any aspect of the way that a business was to be carried on. Requirements to provide information on premises, or requirements that applied more generally to businesses, are not included under the specific coronavirus restrictions.

Clearly, as we have discussed, many businesses continued to experience significant covid impacts beyond the end of the protected period. However, we recognise the need to strike the right balance between the interests of landlords and tenants, and therefore the need to limit the protected period to one that is clear about how arbitrators will look at and assess claims and that is clearly aligned with policy. I hope that the Minister will have heard the reflections of stakeholders, including Andrew Goodacre from the British Independent Retailers Association, that businesses that were not forced to close—essential businesses—may still have suffered significant economic consequences.

We want to ensure that there is fairness, and that all viable businesses that suffered an impact will be supported to continue through the ongoing recovery. Overall, we support the measures and definitions in clause 5, and will support it standing part.

[Paul Scully]

The hon. Lady is right: this is a focused Bill, looking at the first period of the pandemic. However, as I have said, we will continue to listen to various sectors and work with them to ensure that we can recover equally.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

“The matter of relief from payment”

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

The clause sets out the two questions that the arbitrator must decide before considering what, if any, relief should be given to the tenant. That is important because it ensures that arbitration capacity and relief are targeted at those who need it most, namely those whose rent has been impacted by closures and restrictions within the ring-fenced period. The first question is whether there is any protected rent debt. The second is whether the tenant should be given any relief in respect of the payment of that debt and, if so, what type of relief.

The clause also sets out clearly the types of relief that an arbitrator can award in respect of protected rent debt: writing off part of or all of the debt; giving more time to repay the debt; or reducing or writing off any interest on the debt. Setting those clear boundaries will help arbitrators to reach awards quickly and provide adversely impacted businesses with the certainty they need to recover from the pandemic.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his opening remarks. Clause 6 clarifies references to the matter of relief from payment—that is, the subject to be dealt with by an arbitrator under the legislation. It relates to whether there is protected rent debt and, if so, whether the tenant should be given relief from the payment of that debt. The Minister has outlined what that means but, to summarise again, it is the writing off of the whole or part of the debt, giving time to pay the whole or part of the debt, and reducing any interest payable on the debt. It is right that arbitrators are given the flexibility to provide for a form of relief that is appropriate for the specific circumstances of a case. Indeed, one or more forms of the relief may be appropriate depending on the circumstances of the landlord and the tenant. We support these measures and clause 6 standing part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Approval of arbitration bodies

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

The arbitration scheme will be delivered by independent arbitration bodies. The clause gives the Secretary of State the power to approve arbitration bodies for that purpose. Arbitration bodies will have to demonstrate that they are suitable before being approved. Further information on what constitutes “suitable” and how to become an approved body will be published on gov.uk.

The Secretary of State can also withdraw approval status if the body is no longer suitable to deliver arbitration services. The Secretary of State must notify the body if that is the case, and the body will have an opportunity to make representations. Under the clause, a list of approved arbitration bodies must be maintained and published by the Secretary of State, enabling parties to a dispute to know to whom an application for an arbitration may be made. The clause is therefore crucial to enable a high-quality, independent and accessible service to be delivered to landlords and tenants.

Commercial Rent (Coronavirus) Bill (First sitting)

Seema Malhotra Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 7th December 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Thank you very much. In that case, I will open up the floor to questions. Seema Malhotra.

[Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)]

Q Thank you very much. We really appreciate you both coming to give evidence today. I will ask Ms Nicholls a question first, if I may. Do you feel that the Government have engaged sufficiently with stakeholders on introducing the Bill, and are there specific changes that you feel may be important in order for it to better achieve its intended outcomes?

Kate Nicholls: I will begin by saying that we have had unprecedented engagement in terms of the preparation for the Bill and all the way through the coronavirus crisis. In terms of when we first started talking to Ministers in the various Departments about the impact on rent and rent debt and the ability of businesses that were forced to close to pay rent debt, the engagement began in March of last year and has continued throughout the process. Certainly over the course of the summer since the intention to legislate was announced, we have had extensive dialogue and consultation meetings with Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy officials.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Have you had any concerns at all about any definitions in the Bill—for example, the definition of “tenant”, which is slightly narrower than definitions in other parts of coronavirus-related legislation? Given your experience in the hospitality sector, what can you share about areas where there may have been difficulties with landlords and tenants achieving an agreement between them?

Kate Nicholls: I do not have any concerns about the definition of tenant in this legislation. I think it is important that this piece of legislation sits within the existing canon of property law. There are some very clearly defined terms and references there, so the definitions do not cause us any degree of concern. An area that we may have wanted greater clarity on—we would hope that that would come forward in the guidance to arbitrators—is around the importance of sharing the burden of outstanding rent debt for those businesses that are covered by the ongoing moratorium and the mandatory arbitration process. It is also important to make sure that we have clarity around affordability and the affordability tests, but that could come through in guidance to arbitrators.

In terms of the challenges that businesses have faced over the course of the pandemic, I have to say that in large part landlords and tenants have worked very closely together to try to get through the crisis and, over the period of time that has been affected, about half to two thirds of landlords and tenants have been able to reach agreement on the treatment of rent debt and ongoing rent liabilities during that period, before the Government introduced legislation. The decision and the announcement of the intention to legislate gave a further nudge to those parties that had outstanding rent debt or which refused to negotiate or come to the table over that period. At that point, about a third of our businesses in hospitality had not got a negotiated settlement. The announcement of legislation pushed that towards resolution, and we have more businesses undergoing negotiations now. It is not all resolved. About 60% of our members say that all their outstanding rent debt is resolved and they have agreement as to how it will be treated, but that still leaves around one in five who have not got any form of negotiated settlement yet, the balance of the two being those that are in the process of negotiating while this legislation is introduced.

We see a small number of businesses that have been directly affected and continue to be directly affected. That is why this legislation is important—because without it, we would see an unsustainable rent debt that would be borne by a small number of tenants and would undoubtedly result in damage to their business and their businesses becoming unviable, or an impact on jobs, growth and investment going forward. The legislation remains vital to be able to provide the extended protection and to provide a negotiated solution for the remaining businesses that are unable to negotiate that themselves.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q I have one final, small question. Do you have any views about the fee structure that may be brought in? Clearly, we want the scheme to be affordable and accessible. Have you been involved in any discussions about whether there should be a cap on the fees or what kind of fee structure there should be for the arbitration process?

Kate Nicholls: That remains an ongoing discussion with officials and Ministers. Clearly, there is an indicative fee level that is set out for an application to the arbitration process, which is consistent with other arbitration schemes. It is reasonable and relatively small scale. Obviously, even if it is a paper process—let alone if it goes to a hearing—there will be considerable additional arbitration costs. We would welcome a cap on that and direction to arbitrators about the treatment of costs that are incurred as part of an arbitration process. Particularly where there is one party who is being deliberately obstructive or who has not co-operated, it would be helpful to have an ability to award costs.

As we go forward and understand in more detail what the arbitration process will look like, and as the guidance to arbitrators comes out, we as the trade association will work to make sure that we have got template systems in place to allow small independent lessees in particular to have access to the resources—the burdens of proof and the benchmarking data—that would help them to make their case at arbitration, so that we can try to keep the costs as low as possible and avoid the need for small businesses in the sector to require professional advice and support. That is where the costs will ratchet up, rather than the entry point costs to arbitration—where people feel they need to have expert witnesses and expert support to be able to build a case. We will work to make sure that we can do whatever we can to help businesses access that in a cost-effective way.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Mr Curran, do you have any additional comments to make on those areas, and do you feel confident that the scheme as outlined will work in practice?

Dominic Curran: The British Retail Consortium, in the call for evidence that the Government published last spring, did call for a scheme that extended the moratorium to a future date and ringfenced the protection of the arrears that arose during the process, and it called for a process of compulsory arbitration. At least at headline level and in terms of the core principles of the Bill, this is what we have called for and what our members want. We do welcome it.

We have a slight concern about the definition of a business tenancy. The Bill appears to suggest that it is only a tenancy that is not contracted out of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. We have been assured by officials in separate meetings that that is not the intention of the Bill and that actually the Bill covers any tenancy that would be within the scope of the 1954 Act, whether it is contracted out or not, which does give us some comfort. That might be an area you would want to clarify in the course of scrutiny of the Bill.

Engagement with officials and Ministers has been fantastic, actually, throughout the pandemic and through the drafting of the Bill. We have a similar concern to UK Hospitality about the approach that will be taken on viability. Some of the definitions that the Government have said they do not want to enshrine in legislation—which is, I suppose, understandable—will be left to guidance for arbitrators. More than ever, the devil will be in the detail on that. We would want to see what that guidance is as soon as possible to give as much clarity as possible to businesses that might be thinking about using this route.

We would want to make sure that that guidance also directed arbitrators to take as broad a concept of viability and affordability as possible, so that there is enough understanding of a business’s circumstances that they could build in an allowance for the uncertainty of future cash flow and turnover, not least because there will be tax rises coming from April onwards when this process will effectively kick in—both higher businesses rates liabilities for many businesses and further tax increases on Business Network International contributions. We would want to see as much certainty in advance as possible and as much understanding of the need for businesses to have a buffer to enable them to trade while all these adverse headwinds are hitting them. We certainly share some of the concerns of UK Hospitality. I think the approach taken on fees is exactly right, as Kate outlined. While there may be a nominal, reasonable amount to enter the arbitration process, we would want the process to be as straightforward as possible, particularly for smaller businesses, which will not have access to in-house or agency consultants to support them through the process, so that it really is open to all and seen as fair and equitable.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Paul Scully)]

Q Can you give us an idea from the retail perspective of how significant the problem of rent arrears still is?

Dominic Curran: I think it is less of a problem than it is for UK Hospitality. That is not to say that it is not a problem, but I think retail rent collection levels are higher than hospitality, as you would expect, given that the retail sector includes businesses that were allowed to open throughout the pandemic, particularly grocery and pharmacy businesses, so turnover has probably been higher proportionately in retail than it has been for hospitality.

I think it affects a smaller proportion of our sector in terms of the quantum of rent arrears, but it is still significant. It is estimated that there are still several billions of outstanding rent arrears in the retail sector during the pandemic period that the Bill covers, as far as we know. Some of that surveying does not take account of agreements that will have been reached off the books, as it were, or outside the formal rent collection dates, so it is an uncertain figure. When we have spoken to members, and this is an informed guesstimate rather than a thorough survey, it feels like we are at about 80% to 90% of rent having been collected and deals having been done, so it is a very small proportion of the outstanding rent liabilities that is left to be resolved. With each extension of the moratorium every three months, as we have seen over the past year and a half, and particularly with the announcement of this Bill and the process that it proposes, we have seen that percentage chipped away. Ever more landlords and tenants are reaching agreements. While it is a significant problem, it is probably less of a problem than it is for UK Hospitality, but it is still really important that even if businesses do not take advantage of the arbitration process, that process is there—if for no other reason than to help chivvy both landlords and tenants into making new arrangements.

--- Later in debate ---

[Peter Dowd (Bootle) (Lab)]

Q An early-day motion tabled on 27 April 2020 expressed concern—I will not go into the details—about some large pub companies charging rents. You can have a look at it after the meeting. Partly in relation to that, I just want to get a feel of the differences you may have seen between small and large tenant and landlord businesses and how they have handled rent arrears. Have you seen any differences at all?

Kate Nicholls: If you look at the pub-owning businesses and the tied pub companies, there has been a far greater degree of forgiveness of rent among those businesses. It might not be 100% for all of them, but significant rent concessions have been granted throughout the periods of closure, and immediately granted. There has also been a greater willingness to defer rent, allowing rent debt to be accrued and rescheduled over a longer period of time.

If you look at the commercial sector, there has been a variety of different approaches, and there is not anything that really reflects the size of landlord or of tenant businesses in terms of a willingness to negotiate and to reach agreement. Some very small landlord companies have been very willing to give rent holidays, concessions and deferments, and some large commercial companies have been very difficult and intransigent in coming to the table and negotiating, and are taking further enforcement action. It is less to do with the size; it is more the nature of the landlord that has caused the biggest challenges, and the ones that we have found taking enforcement action tend to have been the larger commercial landlords, who have taken a more robust line.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Could I ask your views—perhaps I will start with Mr Curran—about the 10 November cut-off? We have had some evidence suggesting that there are landlords who are choosing not to engage and are ignoring the code, and who have applied for court order judgments for full arrears to be paid. Do you have a view about whether the Bill should treat all claims equally, whether they were issued pre or post 10 November, and have you seen in practice behaviour that could end up getting around the protections that the legislation is intended to bring in?

Dominic Curran: Thank you very much for asking that. That is a really important issue for our members. We have been asking for action on county court judgments and High Court judgments since October last year. We are very pleased that the Government listened and took account of our concerns to the extent that it was announced alongside the Bill that there would be no ability for landlords to pursue court processes for rent arrears after 10 November, when the Bill was introduced. Unfortunately, that means that any landlord who started those proceedings before 10 November is now in a more advantageous position than any landlord who was perhaps negotiating in line with the code and taking a more reasonable approach with their tenants.

We have the slightly perverse situation that the “more aggressive” landlords are actually better off now than those who might have been taking a longer, more reasonable and more timely approach. I do not see why it should be impossible for there to be a direction to courts to stay any court hearing—county court or High Court—for rent arrears pending the outcome of any arbitration process, or the period in which you could make an arbitration process after the Bill gets Royal Assent. I do not see why it is right that those landlords who have been more aggressive are able to carry on their approach.

We saw that problem early on in the process. The Government rightly and laudably made it effectively impossible in England for landlords to take properties back, to seize goods to the value of the debt, and to effectively start the process of winding up a tenant. That was the rent protection moratorium, which was very welcome and was extended, but it left, as we have been saying since October last year, a gap in the ringfence that unfortunately some landlords sought to exploit very early on. Landlords’ lawyers were sending tenants letters demanding rent arrears, and they could effectively impose the costs of that process on to the tenant.

The tenant was therefore liable for not only the rent arrears and any interest due but their landlords’ lawyers costs, which some suggested might have been slightly inflated, as well as their own legal costs in defending themselves. One member said to me, “It’s a bit like a water running downhill; it will always find a way.” That was the situation with CCJs. While it is fantastic that there has been recognition of that loophole, unfortunately it applies only from 10 November. Any CCJ that had not reached a final decision but was in train in the courts should be stayed pending the outcome of the arbitration process.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Ms Nicholls, have you had similar concerns? I would also be very interested to know whether this has been a subject of discussion in the consultations that you may have had with Government, and what the outcome of that was.

Kate Nicholls: I would echo everything that Dominic has said. CCJs have remained a cause for concern throughout this process, and we have been flagging it as a potential loophole that some landlords are exploiting. The key point about a CCJ is that it seeks to establish that the rent—a debt—is due in full, and the confirmatory judgment that it is due in full cuts across the arbitration process, which talks about a fair sharing, a fair split or fair dealing with the rent debt, so you are pre-empting that discussion. There are significant effects for the business that has a CCJ against it, in terms of credit rating, so there is an onus on a business to try to resolve the matter and prevent it from being heard in court. So this has always been a major source of concern. What we have seen is landlords—even after the date of the ministerial statement that the Government intended to legislate and about the intent on the code of practice and the arbitration process—tabling and starting CCJ processes. That is a particular cause for concern when the intention and the direction of travel are quite clear.

So I agree with Dominic. The concern is that you have this cut-off date of 10 November, which is when the legislation was published, but we would want to see direction to courts to stay all those proceedings, to avoid unnecessary costs to businesses in having to defend cases that should not be being brought and should be set to one side. I think it would be helpful if that was taken forward. Yes, we have raised that as part of the consultation process and we have raised that repeatedly with Ministers and officials over the course of the last year. As Dominic says, we have been highlighting CCJs since October of last year, but, more importantly, highlighting the continued use of them since spring of this year, when the intention was announced. I understand the challenges of legislating retrospectively, but I think it would be helpful to give direction to the courts, and clarity and certainty around that.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Thank you for the clarity on that. It certainly seems extraordinary that litigious landlords should in the end be doing better than those who may have acted fairly. That seems to go against all the principles and intentions of the Bill as well. I am sure the Minister has also heard the comments today. Could I ask, then, a specific question? I think you have alluded to this. Would you be supportive of arbitrators being able to also award adverse costs where one side or the other has made the process of reaching agreement more difficult?

Kate Nicholls: Yes, I think that would be helpful to take into account, in terms of both arbitration fees and more general costs, if people are having to incur costs to go to arbitration because of a refusal to negotiate. I think that would be a sensible, pragmatic principle to put into the guidance to arbitrators in order for them to be able to take that into account.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Mr Curran, you made very helpful comments in relation to the skills and experience that you would expect to see from arbitrators. Have you had the opportunity to share that with officials previously, and has there been any discussion about, perhaps, a small discussion or consultation with you about what the skills and experience should be? It is clear that the arbitrators will be making some critical decisions about the viability of businesses. Do you think this is something that should have some more specific definition and expectations from the Secretary of State prior to the panel and the appointment of arbitrators?

Dominic Curran: We certainly have been making representations to officials since it was clear that this was the direction of travel the Government wanted to go in, and I am sure they have heard loud and clear the points that we have made, which will have been made by UK Hospitality and others. I think they completely understand and appreciate that.

It would probably be helpful, as I think I said earlier, for the Government to set out as far in advance as possible, or as early as possible, who they are thinking of as eligible bodies that could undertake the arbitration process, or whose members could undertake the arbitration process, and perhaps some of the principles that they would like to see for arbitrators—as I said earlier, making sure that there is a strong understanding of accountancy issues, rather than property dispute issues. I am sure that there will be an announcement as soon as the Bill allows the Government the freedom to make that announcement. It will be all set out in secondary legislation. We want people with a strong understanding of the financial issues, rather than property issues.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Finally, you alluded to the question of viability and how it should be determined. As you mentioned, from April next year the new national insurance hike, or jobs tax, and other increased costs to businesses will come in. How should those extra costs for businesses be considered when determining viability? Some sectors may well recover but will have a slower tail of recovery, particularly with the ongoing uncertainty around covid and covid variants. What is your view of how viability should be assessed, and within that context, the impact of the extra costs to businesses that are coming?

Dominic Curran: The Government were right not to put in a clear definition of viability, because I think it will be different for every business, let alone every sector. However, at the same time, there needs to be reflected in the guidance to arbitrators as broad a definition of viability as possible, or as broad a set of criteria as possible to be taken into account when assessing viability. Not only will there be the known knowns, if you like, of higher business rates and tax costs, but there will still be a great deal of uncertainty. Who knows where we will be in March and April, but consumer confidence still has not returned to the levels we saw pre-pandemic. While in retail, particularly, there were reasonably good sales figures for October and November, those are perhaps reflective of people spreading out their December purchases and so are not necessarily reflective of a higher level of consumer spending in the economy generally. In that context, I think it is wise to build in as much of a buffer as possible within the assessment of viability and affordability, because we are still dealing with a hugely uncertain situation, in terms of the ability of businesses to trade.

[Seema Malhotra]

I ask Ms Nicholls the same question.

Kate Nicholls: The questions that you raise on issues pertinent to future trading, future recovery and the costs coming down the line are more relevant to a discussion about affordability, rather than viability. Go back to the principles and the ministerial foreword to the legislation and the call for evidence, which talk about making sure that businesses that would otherwise be viable, had it not been for covid, are able to continue trading through the covid recovery period. That means that you need a longer timeline. I think it is helpful to look at, in our case, the hospitality strategy and the tourism recovery plan, which talk about the length of time it will take our businesses to recover. The domestic and international tourism recovery will be in 2023 to 2024, so you need to look at businesses that will be viable over that longer period and will return to a level of viability that they enjoyed previously.

The questions you ask are much more related to ability to pay and affordability, and the key thing we need there is that longer timeline that looks at the sustainability of making this rent debt payment, either in full or in part, at an immediate point or over a longer period. Those are the questions that the arbitrators will look at. For the tenants’ businesses, it is about making sure that you can factor in all those costs that are coming through and the recovery. That is where I go back to the templates and the benchmarking that business organisations and trade associations are able to provide, so you can look at what happens to the margin.

What we know has happened over the course of covid and over the course of the recovery period since reopening—the point at which the rent debt is fixed; it is 19 July, in our case—is a significant increase in the costs of doing business. Revenues have not tracked upwards to the same level, and we are not back at 2019 levels, and therefore the margin of profitability has been squeezed quite dramatically. It takes more sales to make a profit and to break even at this point in time, when you are looking at cost-price inflation of about 13% in hospitality businesses and revenues that are still around 75% to 80% of 2019 levels. Those are the factors, and that is why it is so important that the arbitrators who are making those judgments about affordability and ability to pay can take account of and understand all of those issues and plug in the future changes.

As Dominic alluded to, you have got the business rates, which need to be looked at site by site, as well as on a business basis. You have got changes in the VAT rate that are plugged in for hospitality. The VAT rate will change from 12.5% to 20%, so there will be a significant cost increase in tax that will be passed on to consumers. Therefore, you need to be able to look at what that will do to the end-point pricing, the affordability and the ability of those businesses to pay if we are not going to have inflation.

[The Chair]

Order. I am sorry to cut across you in full flow, but I am afraid we are at the end of the time allocated for these questions. I thank the witnesses very much indeed. We will now prepare for the next panel.

Examination of witnesses

Melanie Leech and Astrid Cruickshank gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Thank you very much. Seema Malhotra?

[Seema Malhotra]

Q I want to start by asking Ms Leech some questions in relation to the very helpful briefing note that was sent through to the Committee. I would be keen to understand your view about the scale of the challenge, if you like, in terms of the difficulties in achieving agreement between tenants and landlords. What does your recent survey and research show about the scale of the challenge? Do you feel that all parties are generally acting in good faith?

Melanie Leech: We have surveyed our members at various points over the pandemic, and our latest survey, which represents around 16,000 leases across the whole of the UK and within our membership, shows that around 86% to 87% of those leases are now covered by some form of agreement. We believe that the challenge that is left for the arbitration scheme to solve and tackle is a very small part of the total market.

I must caveat that by saying that one of the challenges in all of this for Government, as much as for anybody trying to work to create solutions and outcomes, is that we do not really know how many commercial leases there are in the UK or in the retail and hospitality sector, which is the hardest hit part of the whole market by the pandemic. Business rates data from the valuation office suggests that there are about 620,000, but they vary immensely from very large property owners and very large tenants to individuals who may not be incorporated but who may have invested their savings or their pension pot in a single property and, similarly, sole traders who may be their tenants.

In any of the data that will be shared with you, it is quite hard to get a handle on what that represents in terms of the totality. There will always be a long tail outside any of the data that we present to you. What I can say is that, from the data that I have seen and that is available to me, we think that the vast majority of leases that we surveyed are now covered by agreements.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Thank you. To understand more about where they are not covered by agreements and what some of the concerns and behaviours of those involved might be, have you come across examples where the code has been ignored or people have not acted in good faith? What are some of the behaviours that you are seeing?

Melanie Leech: In most cases, we have seen people behaving well and coming together—not always immediately, but over time. Increasingly, there is a recognition that the relationship between a property owner and a tenant is an economic partnership and that the two partners need to work together and navigate a way through together. As I say, that has happened as time has gone on and everyone has seen that this is not a short-term hit, but a long-term challenge and problem that needs to be approached in that way.

We have seen a number of examples that have been quite widely reported of tenants who can afford to pay their rent but choose not to do so or to engage in any way, shape or form with their property owners. How do we know that they can afford to pay? Because we can see the backing that they have. We can see that, increasingly, they are now starting to pay dividends and bonuses to senior management and they are starting to invest in new properties. Our view is that if they can afford to do those things, it is a clear indicator that they are not in such distress that they need support with their rent. When they are not even talking to their property owners, they cannot have that conversation.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Can I ask a slightly different question about the discussion we had with the previous witnesses? I will put the question to you first, Ms Cruickshank. There needs to be confidence in the arbitration process. What is your view about the skills and experience that the arbitrators should have, and do you have a view about how they should be appointed?

Astrid Cruickshank: For me, the absolute key is that they have good, sound financial knowledge; they are able to look at a set of accounts—both filed and management accounts—really understand them and work out from them how the underlying business is performing.

One of the things that helped me enormously in my negotiations was doing a compare and contrast of my landlord companies, because each of my properties is in a different one. I looked at my net assets and my cash balance, and at my tenants’ net assets and their cash balance, and then I used that, where I had a much larger tenant, as a way to explain to them our respective positions. I think it is critical that the arbitrators can understand the financial positions of both parties and the financial impact that their decision could have.

For us, insolvency was a major concern, and it has been throughout, because if you have a company that owns just one property and it has bank debt, and that tenant stops paying, you are insolvent. All you can then do is inject additional cash. As I said, my joint venture partners are all private and have their own businesses that were also affected, so it is a difficult thing for me to then send them a note saying, “Please send me £10,000 by Friday,” when I know that their main business is hospitality, for example, and they are struggling themselves.

Melanie Leech: I largely agree with Ms Cruickshank. The key decisions that need to be made are about viability and affordability, which require a financial understanding rather than a particular understanding of property contracts and property leases, so I agree.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Could I follow up with you, Ms Leech, on the issue of confidence in the system? In your evidence to the Committee you alluded to the Government’s impact assessment of arbitration, which suggests that there are some key uncertainties that could threaten how the system will work in practice. You referenced the costs associated with arbitration, the number of cases that might enter, and suitably qualified arbitrators. Could you elaborate on that, and on why there could be scepticism that the system will work effectively in practice?

Melanie Leech: My understanding is that the Government want as few cases as possible to reach the arbitration process, and we share that ambition. We agree that that is right. For us, it is quite hard to see how the same scheme will be accessible both to very small landlords—including private individuals, either themselves or through syndicates and so on, and small companies—and to small tenants, as well as dealing with the very complex nature of the relationship between very large property owners and very large multinational tenant businesses.

The aim is for simplicity and a relatively straightforward and speedy system. I think that is more naturally likely to be able to deal with relatively simple relationships and relatively small-scale sets of books. It is much harder for us to see how larger players will be able to enter the scheme, particularly in a situation where there is either one tenant with multiple landlords, and you are trying to deal with multiple different relationships, or the reverse: multiple tenants with a single landlord. It is really hard to envisage how, in practice, the scheme will be able to cope with those kinds of relationships.

I suspect that it is the Government’s intention that those kinds of cases should not come to the arbitration scheme so that it can be kept simple. In that case, such things as accessibility and the cost structure, and people’s ability to go into it unsupported by ranks of advisers that they cannot afford to pay for, become much more critical. Ms Cruickshank can probably speak more to that.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q It might be helpful to hear from you both on whether there could be modifications to the scheme, or whether there might need to be a sliding fee structure, or some other clearer ways in which the system could work for smaller as well as for larger and more complex businesses. It would be helpful to understand what modifications to the scheme could allow it to be more flexible, in terms of being accessible and affordable for businesses that might need it.

Astrid Cruickshank: I am pretty pleased with the scheme as it has come forward for landlords of my size. I take on Melanie’s points about larger landlords—going back 20 years, I was a fund manager, and it is a completely different situation—but for me, I think the scheme works well. I like the fact that it includes references to ensuring that the landlord remains solvent, which was critical to me. In terms of fees, a sliding scale that is somehow related to the rent seems the easiest way to keep it affordable. I appreciate that there will have to be a minimum, but if it could be somehow linked to the sum in question that could work for us.

[The Chair]

We have a sound issue, Ms Leech. Hold on one second.

Melanie Leech: Can you hear me now? I will abandon the headphones. Apologies. Our view is that for the larger, more complex relationships, this scheme should not be the way forward. They should be taken as they would have been before the pandemic. Outside the confines of the ringfencing of this scheme, that will be through the courts. These are, ultimately, legal relationships, and the courts are there to resolve legal disputes. I think the scheme can work well for smaller businesses and less complex relationships, but for those larger, more complex relationships, redress should be through the courts, as it always was and will be again outside the confines of the scheme.

--- Later in debate ---

[Peter Dowd]

Q We all know of circumstances in which tenants and landlords may have played the game; frankly, it would be naive to believe otherwise. In that regard, we are in exceptional circumstances. Members here today are supposed to be wearing masks, for example; we have rules in the House, but people ignore them. We are all trying to play the game in this sort of situation. We are all trying to be responsible.

There is an issue about landlords. I think you accepted that landlords agree with the principle that both landlords and tenants might have to share the burden of rent arrears that built up during the period of coronavirus restrictions, in the light of the examination of evidence. Do you accept the principle that there may have to be a sharing of the loss for both the tenant and the landlord? Unlike Government Members, I do not think that this is a laughing matter.

Astrid Cruickshank: May I answer that? Our tenants have had varying experiences throughout the pandemic, and some have made more profit during covid than they did the year before, which is down to their ingenuity—pivoting their business and moving more online. I have had at least five tenants file accounts with Companies House that show a higher profit in the first year of covid than the year before. In such a case, there is no loss to share.

Our tenants in hospitality and the gyms that we own have clearly made losses. We have restructured the leases in all such cases. We have put more money into our entities so that we could give them some rent free to help them through the lockdown. We extended the lease, got a break dropped or got some kind of quid pro quo.

Melanie Leech: In my experience, most larger landlords have been working to a sort of grid. They have tried to look at each of their tenants and see the position they are in, and they have prioritised support to help the most needy. The most support has been given to smaller business, independent businesses and businesses that do not have strong financial backing; it has been given overwhelmingly to the hospitality sector, because everyone has recognised that the majority of those businesses do not have the kind of alternative routes that Ms Cruickshank was just talking about. Millions of pounds have been given in rent write-offs already, as reflected in the data that I referenced at the start.

Forgive me if I was not clear in what I said; let me come back to my point. We believe that those tenants who can afford to pay their rent or who cannot demonstrate need should pay their rent in full. Tenants who can demonstrate significant impact on their businesses and have no way of paying should get support from landlords who can afford to give it. We absolutely believe in that principle, because we believe that property owners and their tenants are economic partners and they should be working together.

It is not, by the way, in a property owner’s interest to either evict a tenant or have a tenant go bust if they believe they are a viable tenant, because an empty building is generating no rent at all—whether it is a debt or whether it is being paid. It becomes a business rates liability that the property owner then has to pay. It becomes a dead building. When a month’s footfall goes from an area, it does not come back. If you have empty buildings, people leave that area and they forget what took them there in the first place. That has an impact on both immediate rent and on the value of the property. It is not in a property owner’s interest not to keep tenants in place wherever it is possible to do so.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q I want to ask you specifically about the definition of “business tenancy” in the Bill. There has been some feedback that the definition is different from and narrower than that of the relevant business tenancy in coronavirus legislation. Do you have any views about the definition and, therefore, what could come within the scope of the Bill?

Melanie Leech: I have not had any concerns about that raised with me by my members.

Astrid Cruickshank: I do not have any concerns about that either.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Thank you. May I ask for your view on whether the hearings should be in public or potentially in private and what the guidance around the arbitration process should be on that?

Astrid Cruickshank: Personally, I would like to see them be in private if I were to take part in one, because I would be disclosing confidential financial information to make the point about my solvency and what I can and cannot offer. Potentially, that would even go as far as who is behind you, who the actual owners are and their ability to inject money or not. I am pleased to see that the Bill says that you would not be required to restructure, so that is good. I feel that in order to make my case properly, I would want to share confidential information. Therefore, I would like it to be private.

Melanie Leech: I would agree with that. By the nature of this, there is going to be a lot of confidential information that is going to be disclosed.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Both of you say that there might need to be some private hearings. Would that be something you would want to see the arbitrators have some discretion over? How do you see that?

Melanie Leech: I think there are precedents already in the legal system for dealing with sensitive information. The principle is well understood. I am assuming that the Government will look at those precedents to shape how the scheme will work in practice. There are parts that will not be sensitive, and there are parts that will be. Whether it is better to have the whole thing protected or whether it is possible to split the evidence and have it dealt with in two parts, I am not sure.

The other point to make is that some of this may not be heard, as it were. It may well be a paper process at a desk, in which case it does not seem to me that there is any particular need to do anything other than give the documents to the arbitrator in confidence and for them to deal with it. I assume that there will need to be some kind of public statement on the outcome, because I assume that arbitrators will want to see precedents emerging and a pattern of what is happening, particularly if there are multiple situations of different cases with the same tenant or landlord. As I say, I am sure the Government are well aware of these kinds of issues.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Could I ask one final question? Do you have any views about how the fee system structure should be put in place in order to make the arbitration affordable and accessible? Do you have any views about how that should implemented and whether there should be a cap on arbitration costs? Secondly, where one side might be making the process more difficult, do you think there should be the power to award adverse costs to either party?

Melanie Leech: We have worked quite a lot with various small property owners, although they are not in our membership, over the last 18 months. What I have heard from them is that unless there is a cap at a relatively modest level, the scheme will not be accessible to them. Clearly it is a different matter for larger companies. As for poor behaviour, yes, we absolutely think that if parties do not go into or act through this process in good faith, the arbitrators should be able to award costs against them as part of the outcome.

Astrid Cruickshank: I would agree with that. If the example that I gave you—three tenants just refusing to acknowledge any attempt to communicate with them—ended up in arbitration, it would seem entirely unfair that I should be picking up the costs, when I was prepared to make them an offer but they were not willing to even acknowledge that I had made it or respond in any way.

[Mark Eastwood]

Q Melanie, you mentioned in your introduction that you represent commercial agents, who as you know offer property management services and rent collections. Have you had any feedback from commercial agents or property management sector, or any consultation with them? Are they fairly agreeable to the Bill?

Melanie Leech: We have a lot of the larger ones as part of our membership, so yes, I think so. They act for both property owners and tenants, so I have been able to draw on their advice about what is happening in the market—what the relationships are—as well as some of the data that is published. The remit data in particular is drawn from the evidence that they collect. The one thing that they would say, and that I would say, is that we were disappointed that service charges were brought within the ringfence and the protection, because that is money that has already been spent by property owners and agents in maintaining buildings. The tenants might not be able to use them for their primary business purpose while they have been shut, but the buildings still need to be maintained and kept safe, and those costs have increased in some cases.

I know that some on the tenants’ side have suggested that those costs should be reduced because the buildings cannot be occupied. Where we can see that service charges have been reduced, that reduction absolutely should be passed on to tenants—I am not for a minute arguing against that—but where those costs have been incurred, we think that they should be paid and that they should not have been able to benefit from the protection of the ringfencing in the Bill, because that is money that has already been spent by property owners. That is debt that has already been incurred, so we were disappointed by that, and I think the agents would echo that point of view. Beyond that, I think they are supportive of this Bill, as we are.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Q We will now hear oral evidence from Lewis Johnston, assistant director of policy and external affairs at the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, who is appearing in person. We have till 11.25 am on this session. Mr Johnston, could you please introduce yourself for the record? As with the previous witnesses, if you have any brief introductory remarks, please make them now.

Lewis Johnston: Thank you, Chair. My name is Lewis Johnston and I am assistant director for policy and external affairs at the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators. We are a professional body for all forms of alternative dispute resolution. We have 18,000 members across the world, operating across all forms of ADR—arbitration, adjudication and mediation—and we have 6,000 members here in the UK. I will keep my introduction as brief as possible, following the previous witnesses.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Thank you, Mr Johnston, for coming to give evidence today. In relation to the scheme being set up and the assessments that will be made, what key skills and experience will those who participate in the scheme as arbitrators need to have?

Lewis Johnston: In common with some of the previous witnesses, I suggest that financial and accounting expertise will be quite crucial. Obviously, the Bill makes provision for some quite detailed assessments of viability and affordability. There are provisions about the kind of evidence that would have to be given regard to in reaching some of those decisions and making the award, and one of the impressions we got from digesting the Bill was that some of that analysis might require some reasonably in-depth expertise. Within the arbitration profession, there are experts across lots of different fields: there are surveyors, there are property experts who have already acted in property dispute schemes, and there are also financial experts, accountants and so on, but I would say that financing and accounting are probably near the top of the list, given the nature of the decision-making process.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q There has been some discussion about fee structures and the fact that the Secretary of State may be able to make regulations in this area. What would be an appropriate way to have a fee structure that is affordable and accessible?

Lewis Johnston: The essence of this choice is about the balance between prioritising the scheme’s affordability and accessibility—obviously, it is meant to be a simple, low-cost way of obtaining redress and getting a resolution—and the need to ensure an adequate supply of suitably qualified arbitrators. As you mentioned in your previous question, some of the required skillsets would be quite specialised, and may be at premium. There are precedent models for this kind of thing. One example, which is not a direct parallel, is the business arbitration service run by the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, which is designed for relatively low-value disputes—between £5,000 and £100,000. The costs are fixed at £1,250 plus VAT per party, and that includes the appointment fee and the fee for the arbitrator. It may differ in this regard, but there would need to be certainty and transparency, certainly for the parties involved, and one of the benefits of the business arbitration scheme is that there is no chance of the costs spiralling out of control.

The other thing to mention, which may be a pertinent lesson from the business arbitration scheme, is that it is designed to be a documents-only, very simple, quite streamlined process, which will not require representation for either party, because representation can take up quite a good proportion of the costs. It is done with an assumption against having an oral hearing. Obviously, there is always the option of having an oral hearing if the parties require it; that is in the Bill. I think it is correct that that is open to them, but I suggest that the default assumption should be against that and for it being a documents-only process. Given the simplicity of the kind of cases that are intended to go to the scheme, that would be a good way of managing the costs. I note that the Secretary of State will have the power to introduce either a cap or a sliding scale, and again I emphasise the need for really forthright clarity. It needs to be very simple so people understand how it would apply to different levels of dispute.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Thank you for that. I want to pick up on a point you made about the number of those who may be qualified and have the relevant skills and experience, which may come forward in further discussions on the detail of the scheme. In your experience, is there sufficient interest for arbitrators to be involved in the scheme? One of the critical success factors will be that enough are involved so that there is not a backlog in dealing with some of the rent arrears cases. What is your view about the level of interest and the sufficiency of supply of arbitrators?

Lewis Johnston: There is a degree of uncertainty around that, based purely on the pipeline of cases. As the previous witnesses alluded to, most of these cases, most of these disputes over the ring-fenced rent, will be or already have been settled through negotiation, so you are talking about a relatively small proportion, although it is still going to be quite a high number. There is a margin of error to take into account. On the supply side, in terms of the level of interest, there are lots of very well qualified arbitrators out there who would be forthcoming to handle cases like this. As I say, there is quite a strong precedent of arbitrators with the requisite level of skills and experience taking on fixed-fee or low-fee cases like this, but again I point out that the low fee would still have to take account of and cover the fact that a certain skillset and investment of time would be required. It is important that quality is not compromised. I think, overall, there is a good level of interest and there would be a healthy pipeline of arbitrators to take these cases.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q What is your view on how arbitrators should be guided in going through the process? What needs to be in place, in terms of guidance or otherwise, to make their role clear, so that there is some consistency? I imagine that confidence will come with clarity and consistency. Do you have any concerns or any message for us about what you want to see in place—what kind of guidance needs to be brought forward? Could I extend that to how assessments might need to be made of viability and ability to pay, with other costs—business rates and other costs, like the jobs tax—that might be coming on stream for businesses as well?

Lewis Johnston: Certainly. I was pleased to see, in clause 21 of the Bill, that guidance will be provided. There are several areas in which guidance might be necessary. The first is something that I know will be coming when applications open for approved bodies to appoint arbitrators, and that is around the precise skillsets needed. We have a reasonably good idea of what that would entail, but a bit more detail would be helpful. For the arbitrators themselves, I think the crux point is around viability and affordability. The Bill and the code of practice go into a bit of detail about the kind of evidence that could be assessed as part of that. I think there should be clarity over exactly how much power the arbitrator will have to be inquisitorial as part of the process, the extent to which they can order discovery and so on, and the kind of evidence they can ask for from the parties.

The Bill is very clear about its intention to balance the interests of tenants and landlords and to maintain the viability of otherwise viable businesses, while also having regard to the solvency of the landlords. There may need to be more guidance, and I appreciate that that might come when cases start to go through the system, about balancing the request of the tenant on what is viable for them with what is consistent with maintaining the solvency of the landlord, when those are at odds. Exactly how that could be decided is a bit of a moot point at this stage.

[Peter Dowd]

Q Partly linked to this one is clause 7(2) and (3). Subsection (2) sets out the requirement for the Secretary of State to approve those bodies suitable to become approved arbitration bodies to carry out the functions under section 8. The disapproval of arbitration bodies is in subsection (3). Have you had any conversations with the Department about the parameters of approved arbitration bodies—who they should be associated with, registration and all the rest—given that there may well be substantial amounts of arbitration going through the process?

Lewis Johnston: That is a good question, and the discussions we have had with the BEIS team initially focused on the question of capacity, because obviously we are talking about quite a large number of cases. The decision to go for more of a market-based approach, with a list of approved bodies rather than a single monolithic provider, was probably the right one. I appreciate that the Bill is taking more of a principles-based approach than saying that the arbitrators have to be accredited in a certain way. It is more about having the competency and impartiality.

Each of the bodies, if they are to be approved, will have to meet the criteria in one way or another. Speaking just for the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, all our members are bound by our code of ethical and professional conduct, which covers issues such as integrity and fairness, disclosing conflicts of interest, ensuring that you are competent to take on the appointments you are given, trust and confidence in the process, and transparency around fees. That would address a lot of things.

Also, anyone that we were to appoint—should we become one of those approved suppliers—would have to make clear and sign a declaration at the outset, which disclosed any potential conflicts of interests or anything that might be perceived as such, as well as declaring they were competent and had the capacity to take on these cases. That would mitigate the risk of them having to resign or of delays in processing the case.

Commercial Rent (Coronavirus) Bill (Second sitting)

Seema Malhotra Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 7th December 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Mick Whitley]

Q Do other witnesses have anything to add?

Jack Shakespeare: Absolutely. I would echo that. The extension and the timescale seem about right; that is the message we are getting from our members. Each sector has its own characteristics. Our sector has a unique recovery curve, in that it is largely subscription focused. Recovery does not cover the cost of service straight away. That impacts recovery. The extended period of time is welcome. I am sure that we will come back to it today, but a guiding principle that needs to sit at the heart of this process is the message of sharing the burden. This is clearly a collective problem that needs a collective solution.

Martin McTague: I think it was about right when we first started discussing this, but omicron has changed all that. It is clear that we are now into a lot more uncertainty. It would be nice to have the flexibility to be able to move that date to respond to what seems to be an ever-changing virus.

[Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)]

Q Thank you for coming in to give evidence. Perhaps I could start with Mr McTague. On the 10 November cut-off date, we have had some evidence of concerns about landlords who have not engaged with their tenants, and who may have ignored the code and started to apply for court judgments to pay the full rental arrears. Those who started proceedings before 10 November could be in a more advantageous position than those who played it fair. Have you come across that at all through the FSB, and what is your view about whether there should be a retrospective change to the 10 November date?

Martin McTague: Around the beginning of November, most landlord-tenant arrangements—probably close to 90%—had settled, but the hard-core 10% had got into an acrimonious stand-off. We engaged with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy to try to find a way in which those more acrimonious relationships could be dealt with. As for the cut-off date, I realise that it will leave some people on the wrong side of it, but I think that it was about right when it was chosen.

Andrew Goodacre: On the cut-off date, you have to choose a date. There is never a good time, from that point of view. It comes back to an understanding of what negotiations were taking place beforehand, and how they were being managed. Martin referred to a hard-core 10%—we are probably hearing about 15% to 20%. There is a hard core of people on both sides who seem unwilling to reach a negotiation. It would be good to include at the arbitration point an insight into what negotiations and actions were taking place beforehand, and whether those actions were reasonable in the circumstances.

The arbitrator has to decide how to resolve the debt issue. We have heard stories of landlords seeking side agreements or even being willing to write off a level of debt if the tenant gave up their secured tenancy. That kind of negotiation is going on as well. Is that fair? I do not know, because the security may be worth a lot more than half the rental debt, but it is not explained properly. If evidence of what was being said before the ninth can be put forward as part of the arbitration process, that may be a happy halfway house.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q That is interesting, because some other witnesses have suggested that they would want to go further and see a greater incentive to use the scheme and to be treated more fairly within it. The more litigious landlords seem to do better for acting less fairly.

Andrew Goodacre: Most of our members deal with smaller landlords, who are possibly not quite so difficult.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q You may not have come across the same ones. Mr Shakespeare?

Jack Shakespeare: I would support that notion. I think this comes in two parts. I think it comes back to that notion of sharing the burden, and we think the process of county court judgments does not chime with the spirit of the initial code of practice and, obviously, the revised one. I also think that a ringfence should be just that and should not have holes in it. It feels like CCJs are a hole in the ringfence. I would—we would—support the notion that the CCJs process prior to 10 November should be looked at and should be included in protection.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Do you have any concerns or suggestions about what the skills and experience of arbitrators should be? That is a slightly open question at the moment. What perspectives do you have? What experience do you think they would need to have in order to carry out the function effectively?

Andrew Goodacre: Looking at what their task is, I would expect arbitrators to have knowledge of leases and the legality around that side, but the biggest judgment that they probably have to make is one before the process starts: is the business viable? So they would need to have a good insight into business. Not all retail businesses operate on the same business model and the same margins and with the same overheads. If the first crunch question is whether the business is viable, because only viable businesses can go to arbitration, they really need to understand business knowledge and business expectations and profitabilities.

Martin McTague: I would endorse that. I think, in this particular form of arbitration, what you are looking for is to protect the interests of both parties, and clearly, if it is not a viable business, that undermines the position and enhances or makes the risk worse for the landlord, but I think most arbitrators are able to take evidence on that kind of issue anyway.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q That is helpful. Mr Shakespeare, I wonder whether you could come back on that point. I would also be interested in your view about how much arbitrators should be able to charge and what would be a fair, accessible and affordable system, perhaps for those whom you have experience of and their situations.

Jack Shakespeare: To go back to the first question, I would endorse the responses from my fellow panellists. For the first question, around viability, that business sense is utterly crucial. The first arbitration case is very important, because it is going potentially to set a precedent, so of course it is incredibly important that these people are chosen correctly.

With regard to cost, I think my answer would be “low”, for understandable reasons. Just because of the wide scope and the differences in size of the businesses that are included in the scope, I think the cost needs to be low. I think that there needs to be an opportunity or option for fees to be re-awarded in the face of bad practice or ineffective decision making. So my answer would be “low”, but of course the affordability of it is down to each business.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Was that alluding to adverse costs as well in cases of making it difficult?

Jack Shakespeare: Yes.

Andrew Goodacre: On the cost side, I agree with what Jack is saying: the lower the better. If it is too high, it becomes a barrier to the business, the tenant initiating the action, because it is payable on initiating the arbitration, as I understand it. If a landlord thinks that it is prohibitive to the tenant, the landlord could well play the long game and keep waiting and waiting, because if you do not get the application within six months of the Act being passed, you have missed the opportunity for arbitration. It could well be that if it is too much of a barrier and too high for the individual tenant, they miss that opportunity, so it needs to be kept as low as possible.

Martin McTague: The reason why we are trying to avoid legal action is that when there is an asymmetry of power, when the landlord can use the muscle that they have to try to bully their tenant, you get unfair solutions. I think the principle must be that the cost is as low as possible. I would not want to put a number on that, but I think it needs to be as low as possible.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q I have a final, very quick question. Do you have any concerns that any part of the scheme would make it less likely to work, not in theory but in practice?

Martin McTague: My biggest concern is the cut-off date. Given that we are now entering another period of uncertainty, if we ended up with squeeze, where cases were being brushed or pressure being put on because we were getting close to that cut-off date, that could lead to some unfair outcomes.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q Do you mean the six months after the start?

Martin McTague: Yes. In other words, that is a hard cut-off. We all know that the current situation is changing rapidly.

[Seema Malhotra]

Q I think it is important—in the context of increased business costs next April, whether from business rates or the jobs tax—that your view is that those six months may not be long enough to have the scheme in place.

Martin McTague: We are seeing a lot of retail businesses hanging on by their fingernails, hoping for the best in this last quarter, and trying to get through the Christmas period, which is often make or break for them. If they get even a partial success, and start creeping towards a solution at the end of spring next year, it would be disastrous to try to drive those businesses under when they have survived all the trials and tribulations of covid so far.

Andrew Goodacre: I think the way the code of practice and the Bill have been put together is not bad, and they really try to cover all eventualities. The cost element of arbitration is a barrier to businesses, and puts the legislation at risk. The viability question—how you determine viability, and the clarity and transparency around that—needs to be addressed early on.

I know that we have asked this question and been given the answer, but there needs to be absolute clarity that the Bill applies to all businesses in scope, including those that are contracted out of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985. That was one of the earlier questions that came back from some members, and we were told that it does include all those contracted-out businesses, but we need to be clear on that, because we do not want to end up with an unnecessarily ambiguous area that leads to legal argument.

There are also tenancy-at-will situations. When negotiations on a new lease are ongoing but have not been resolved during the closure period—the protected period—the tenant is operating on a tenancy at will. Arguably, there is no guarantee that that tenancy at will is covered by the Bill. Again, that will need clarity and understanding.

Martin McTague: There is another point that I should have raised. A lot of supply-chain businesses supply those that are directly affected and covered by the scope of the Bill—they have been seriously affected by what has gone on so far. If you take a retailer, for example, virtually everybody who is supplying that retailer has gone through the same sort of trauma as the retailer, but none of them will be protected in the same way.

Jack Shakespeare: I echo and endorse Martin’s point: one of the prospective risks is the uncertainty around the next few months. It feels like a bit of a “hold your breath” moment. You could talk about it being make or break for our sector and for different characteristics across sectors. A make or break part of the year for the gyms, pools and leisure centres sector is January to March. That is a hugely important quarter of the year, and it rolls into that time period. I would just echo that: the uncertainty of the next few months is a major risk.

[Peter Dowd (Bootle) (Lab)]

Q I want to tease out a little bit more on the extent of the impact on the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. How wide is it? How many businesses are we talking about?

Andrew Goodacre: Contracted out?

Copyright (Rights and Remuneration of Musicians, etc.) Bill

Seema Malhotra Excerpts

Friday 3rd December 2021 Commons Chamber

[Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to speak in this debate with the Minister in his place.

I start by congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff West (Kevin Brennan) on his campaign and his very effective speech, which highlighted his deep expertise on this issue. It is important that we pay tribute to his talent, as seen in his solo work and in MP4, of which there are several members here today and which has brought much entertainment both inside and outside the House. It is great to see the talent of Members of Parliament on display in different ways, connecting with the challenges that many of our constituents also face.

We have heard some excellent contributions from both sides of the House, and I will build on the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central (Julie Elliott), the hon. Members for Watford (Dean Russell) and for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart) and the right hon. Members for Maldon (Mr Whittingdale) and for Tatton (Esther McVey), who illustrated how, although there are many complexities in the debate, there is a common thread and the House recognises the depths of the issues. The question is how we move forward, not whether we move forward.

The UK has a special and unique place in the history of popular music. Our music industry is globally renowned and is an important part of our cultural offering to the world. To support the industry, from new artists to global artists, we must ensure they are part of a fair system and that they have equal bargaining power to enable them to flourish and to make sure we support a new generation of British talent to come forward and create new music.

British music has taken its inspiration from jazz, blues, gospel, rock and rap from Asia, Africa, Latin America, the USA and around the world, and it has given it a distinctly British twist to give new types of music to the world. The Beatles, the Kinks, Oasis, Blur, Adele and many more provide the soundtrack to our lives and the defining songs of our popular culture. Whether it is ska, Afrobeat or bhangra, music has benefited from immigration into the UK.

Down the decades, the music industry has contributed billions of pounds to the Exchequer, both in domestic sales and in exports, yet the industry has a dark side, a history of exploiting artists and ripping off the musical talent on which the whole industry’s success relies. The 1960s gave us some of the greatest bands, but they also gave us the sharp managers who invented new ways to rip off talented and often working-class youngsters.

Bands such as Small Faces powered the swinging ’60s, but they never saw the money they had earned. The recoupment deal was born when artists were working to pay the music companies, not the other way around. Of course musicians, often young and ambitious, might quickly sign away their future for the sake of a record deal. It is a form of exploitation, it is about imbalances in power and it is unfair.

I pay tribute to Tom Gray and the #BrokenRecord campaign. He is a talented musician and composer, and a worthy recipient of the Mercury music prize with the band Gomez. He has deployed his organisational and persuasive skills to help highlight the issue of performers’ rights and remuneration. Tom has worked so hard along with the Musician’s Union, the Ivors Academy, my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff West and others to highlight the broken music market.

Labour supports the Second Reading of the Bill, which aims to address the unfairness in how the remuneration system treats musicians for their work on streaming platforms. In April, the campaign that is the backdrop to the Bill saw more than 150 musicians, artists and songwriters write to the Prime Minister to ask him to fix streaming and put the value of music back where it belongs: in the hands of music makers. The Bill would do that by placing the treatment of revenues gained from music streaming services on a common footing with revenues gained from other sources such as physical music sales.

As hon. Members have said, over the last 18 months musicians’ livelihoods have been shattered by their inability to perform live at gigs, concerts, festivals and shows—or even in the recording studio. We have also seen the disappearance of licensing income for artists as pubs, clubs, restaurants, hairdressers and so on have been forced to close. There has also been real destitution for session musicians, stage hands and the many trades associated with the music industry.

The Musicians’ Union is right to say that the last 18 months have highlighted the importance of streaming as a way for musicians to earn a living. As my hon. Friend highlighted, streaming has created huge opportunities for musicians. Let us be clear, however, that a fair income for musicians was a deep problem before the pandemic. It is also a classic example of technology outstripping our legal framework and of how it works to profit a few and exploit the many. It is the House’s duty to modernise the law to reflect the reality of the music industry and challenge the status quo whereby most streaming income—an estimated 55% of it—ends up in the pockets of record labels, streaming platforms and digital giants while 15% goes to artists and publishers. That is compounded by the imbalance, highlighted by the right hon. Member for Tatton, in the speed of payments.

The Bill would give effect to certain recommendations in the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee’s July report, “Economics of music streaming.” I pay tribute to the Committee for its forensic work on this issue. The Bill would update the law on performer, composer and songwriter rights to reflect the changing landscape. My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff West laid out clearly why that is needed. When an original music work—or lyrics accompanying music—is created, the composer or composers of that work have rights under the 1988 Act to control exploitation of that work. Composers and performers may transfer the administration of those rights to a collecting society, which addresses the exploitation of members’ works on a collective basis and charges those who use their works. Composers and performers may transfer their rights to receive revenue from the exercise of making available rights to third parties such as record companies and publishing companies. Their entitlement to receive a share of that revenue is determined contractually.

With the change in consumption patterns, music streaming now accounts for the predominant part of the UK music industry’s revenue. However, it is suggested that about eight out of 10 performers earn less than £200 a year from music streaming. Performers have a right to authorise and control the making available of a work on which they have performed to the public via radio or television, for example, or music streaming. However, while performers are entitled to equitable remuneration for performances for radio, television and other channels, they are not in respect of music streaming due to the exceptions set out in the 1988 Act. The predominant part of income therefore typically remains with the person or persons to whom the performer has transferred their rights.

Composers and performers also do not have a general right to receive information on how their music has been used and on the revenue that it has generated from persons other than collecting societies. Further, composers and performers often enter into contractual arrangements for their work to be exploited at a very early stage in their careers, often without the benefit of legal or other advice. Such arrangements can be long term, and can result in the transfer of rights to those seeking exploitation. The Bill seeks to address those inequalities in bargaining power and rights.

Labour recognises that music streaming saved the recording industry over a decade ago, when piracy threatened the fundamental basis of copyright. Those issues were alluded to by the right hon. Member for Maldon. As with other areas of technology, the streaming market has little or no competition, which allows oligopolistic behaviour from platforms such as Spotify. The inquiry by the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee exposed the inequity at the heart of the new global market in music streaming. We support Second Reading, but we know that the chance of that leading to meaningful change is slim unless the Government give the Bill parliamentary time. I believe that the Minister is listening, and I look forward to hearing what he says about how we can move forward.

We attach great value to the CMA market inquiry, which has been alluded to by hon. and right hon. Members, into the industry. We look forward to reading the report when it is published next year, and I echo calls from the right hon. Member for Tatton for an update from the Minister about when we can expect those findings.

The Bill’s proposals are an important step forward in this debate. There is cross-party support for change, as the Select Committee report showed. The Government have promised to act, but I worry that the response to the report did not go far enough. It concluded that the issues were complex, and needed to be better understood—indeed, that is the case, and is reflected in conversations that I have had with Sony Music and others—and the Government rightly committed to assess different models, including equitable remuneration, to explore how they might affect different parts of the music industry. We need a way to address unfairness without causing unintended consequences, which is why further inquiry is required and why the Bill should go into Committee. In my view, that is the right way forward. The Government proposed to explore the issues through engagement with the music industry contact group and to provide an update on progress.

We need to move forward. As has been highlighted, a report in November showed that Lucian Grainge, chief executive officer and chair of Universal Music Group, earned more this year than composers and lyricists earned in total in 2019 from streaming downloads and sales in the UK. Once again, that brings the issue into sharp relief. I do not agree, the right hon. Member for Maldon will not be surprised to hear, with everything that he said, as there is a fundamental inequity in how the system works. That is at the heart of what we are addressing today.

The status quo cannot continue. Indeed, we want Britain to be the best place in the world to be a musician and work in the music industry, and it should be a trailblazer for how the rest of the world can be. The issues that the Bill seeks to address and fix in streaming are vital if we are to secure the reforms to copyright law that will create a fairer system for musicians and new talent to know they will be rewarded fairly. We firmly support Second Reading and I hope, given the consensus across the House that action is needed, that the Government support the Bill and keep their promise to address this injustice. If otherwise, we expect the Minister to pledge urgently to introduce Government legislation. Let this be a day on which everyone in the House sings from the same song sheet, and backs our musicians through a commitment to reform the music industry to leave it fit for purpose for the future.

--- Later in debate ---

[George Freeman]

I am delighted to give that assurance. I take the opportunity to thank my hon. Friend as a stalwart advocate of the Watford cluster and as someone who has been at the heart of music and online creativity. He is a tireless advocate for it in his constituency and in this House. The answer is absolutely yes.

I promised to give the House some details on the taskforces. We have commissioned multiple research pieces, including on equitable remuneration, rights reversion and the contract adjustment mechanism. We have established a music industry contact group, which I met this week. In addition, two industry working groups are being convened. One will look at a voluntary code of practice on contract transparency and the other will seek solutions to the data issues that the industry faces. The Government will assess the progress of those two groups.

I know that other hon. Members want to speak, so I will be brief. On the CMA market study, one of the first things I did as Minister was to write to the chief executive of the CMA. In that letter, I outlined my support for the Select Committee’s recommendation and asked the CMA to conduct a market study on streaming, which is under way. I am sure the House will appreciate that I cannot jeopardise its independence by saying here what conclusions it has reached. We will come back and report in due course.

We have also launched a market study into how other markets around the world are working and the lessons from those. In particular, we are looking at the independent advice from academics at the universities of Leeds, Middlesex and Ulster commissioned by the Intellectual Property Office, “Music Creators’ Earnings in the Digital Era”, which deals with a number of the issues that the Bill tackles.

Furthermore, in response to the Select Committee, we have asked the Intellectual Property Office to start gathering information on the potential impact of an equitable remuneration right. We have also commissioned a piece of work from the IPO on copyright reversion and a piece of research on the potential impact of introducing a contract adjustment mechanism, as proposed in the Bill.

I highlight that the EU directive on copyright in the digital single market, which we are not party to, having left the EU, will provide an interesting insight into whether and which measures are effective. Brexit gives us the freedom to learn from others and put in place the world’s best framework in the way that works best for our industry. I think I have made the point that we are deeply committed to stakeholder engagement, but I emphasise that over the coming weeks and months my officials and I want to move quickly, talking to everyone with an interest. I am determined to make that clear, and I ask anyone who is listening to the debate, or reading it, to contact me, and officials, if they have views that they want to be taken up.

We think that the Bill is well intentioned and speaks to a problem whose existence we recognise. Our instincts are to try to solve the problem through an industry-led package of measures that artists and musicians support, and we will be moving quickly to receive evidence and put proposals to the House, but I must make it clear that if we conclude that legislation is required, we will not hesitate to act.

I thank all Members who have spoken today. The debate has been a powerful demonstration of the level of interest across the House, across all parties and in all parts of the country.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for spending so much time outlining what the Government will do. He mentioned an industry-led solution. What does he consider to be within the scope of the term “industry-led”, and how much of that package would be musician-led and artist-led?

[George Freeman]

By “industry” I meant the whole industry, including the musicians who are key to it. The hon. Lady can rest assured that we will not just be talking to the record labels or the streaming companies; we will be listening to artists and musicians as well. We are keen to hear from people who have profited from the existing system, and from those who have not. We recognise what my right hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr Whittingdale) referred to as the value gap. We want to hear from everyone who is affected by this issue, across the music spectrum, not just the bands that we have heard about but singers, session musicians, and all the other individuals who are affected.

I know that others want to speak—

Commercial Rent (Coronavirus) Bill

Seema Malhotra Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 24th November 2021 Commons Chamber

[Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to wind up this debate, although I am sorry that the Minister has both had to open and close.

I want to recognise some of the contributions to this debate. My hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr Perkins) and the hon. Member for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney) raised the important definition of viability and the considerations around it. My hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham East (Janet Daby) mentioned how we need to make sure that all our businesses are supported through the pandemic and into the recovery, which will continue at different paces for many businesses. My hon. Friend the Member for Reading East (Matt Rodda) also talked about the wider context and about supporting and championing businesses, which Small Business Saturday will be doing in the run-up to 4 December. It was eye-opening to be out with them in Southampton earlier this week. This is important in the context of what we are discussing today.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Brentford and Isleworth (Ruth Cadbury) said at the beginning of the debate, Labour supports this important Bill, although we are surprised it has taken this long to introduce it following the announcement in the summer. We need to talk about the context because the growing cost of business will have an impact on how businesses pay back their rent. We have had an important set of contributions on the urgent need for reform of business rates, which the Labour party has also called for, and for it to be considered alongside a much fairer taxation system to bring in a much more level playing field between online businesses and businesses in our communities.

We are having this debate in an important week, as we know that business needs the Government to be on its side—perhaps the Minister will not be able to say anything about that. That is an incredibly important part of how we go forward and work towards the recovery—we are just at the beginning of that. The Prime Minister’s embarrassing speech to the CBI at the start of the week was an issue because confidence in the Government is knocked when the Prime Minister does not give a speech that suggests they understand the challenges businesses are facing and the crucial nature of getting the recovery right to make sure that it is sustainable.

The Bill will legislate for a binding arbitration process to be used where business landlords and tenants cannot agree on how to deal with outstanding rent arrears. It also expands on existing restrictions on enforcing business rent arrears to ensure that they cannot also undermine the arbitration process, which will be in place for six months from Royal Assent. As we have heard from hon. Members, the covid pandemic has hit businesses hard, affecting disproportionately those at the frontline in our high streets and communities, which have been forced to close or restrict trading from March last year.

Labour recognises the need for a fair arbitration process to deal with commercial rent arrears. That is why we will scrutinise the legislation in detail in Committee, having raised some of those broader concerns today, to ensure that the proposals are effective and accessible, and fairly balance the interests of relevant parties. Our principle is that no otherwise viable business should face the significant burden from rent arrears without due arbitration and a burden-sharing process. The guiding principle must also be focused on fairness and on the long-term interests we have in British businesses and supporting them to provide much-needed employment across the country.

Labour has also called for the Government to help ease the covid debt burden faced by firms across the country by creating a British business recovery agency. The reason why we would want to convert the bounce back loan scheme into a student loan-style arrangement is so that businesses would have to start repayments to the British Business Bank only when they are making money. It is important that we have an integrated set of policies on business recovery so that we do not deal with one aspect while there are crises in other areas of life for businesses.

[Janet Daby]

My hon. Friend is closing this debate brilliantly. Does she agree that this week we have been reminded of how much businesses need a responsible Government, who take speeches to the CBI very seriously?

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank my hon. Friend for her contribution. I had referenced that and she makes the point powerfully; it is important that we have a Government taking their responsibility to business seriously and showing the nation that they are doing that. The Prime Minister’s speech did more for the sales of Peppa Pig than for supporting business recovery across our country.

Rent debt is a heavy burden for landlords and commercial tenants, and we need a solution that will be in the interests of both. This is a big issue and although we do not know its full scale, the Bill’s impact assessment—the Treasury analysis—notes that the total amount of deferred rent liabilities could be about £9 billion by March next year. That is why we need a policy solution that is fair, fast, trusted, affordable and accessible, so I hope that the Minister will be able to tell us how confident we can be that the system will be in place and what the next steps will be to ensure that.

Labour also called for action on rent debt and the wider business costs in the summer. The Minister will know that before then. I had met UKHospitality, the British Beauty Council, the Federation of Small Business, the Night Time Industries Association and many of those stakeholders to discuss the ongoing commercial impact of covid. Those stories, which he and I still hear, showed the strain on and perseverance of those who have fought against the odds to keep going. As has been highlighted by the 3 million excluded campaign, far too many had been excluded from Government support and still struggle.

Luke Hersheson, a renowned hair stylist who is backing the “Save Our Salons” campaign, said earlier this year:

“In March this year my salons will have been closed for 260 days out of 365. Running a business for more than two thirds of a year with no income at all is incredibly challenging. When the tap is turned off salon businesses are still paying landlords, they’re still paying utility bills, insurance costs and subsidising furlough pay.”

That is a powerful statement about how businesses were struggling and yet were still wanting to do their bit in the community and support, at the frontline, our communities in getting through covid.

Ensuring that viable businesses are able to survive into the future is part of the responsibility of the Government. Members have discussed how small businesses are the backbone of our economy. We see that in all our constituencies—my constituency has more than 5,000 small businesses. We know that the almost 6 million small businesses across the country account for 99.9% of the business population, three fifths of employment and about half of the turnover in the private sector. As the Minister alluded to, many that will be affected and which may need to draw on the scheme in this Bill may well be women-led businesses and ethnic minority-led businesses. Perhaps he will tell us how he is going to make sure that the opportunities provided by this legislation will be known about by those who might need them. How is the ability to seek a reference for arbitration going to be made known to businesses at the frontline in our communities, so that they do not get to the end of six months of struggle and find that it is too late? It is crucial for our recovery to make sure that that is understood and we have that ongoing partnership between the Government and business large and small. We are going to need that to make sure that our economy starts to fire on all cylinders, which is what we want to see, in a recovery that is sustainable. We want to start to see a recovery that generates the profits and then the taxes to sustain our economy.

The challenge of dealing with rent debt that has accumulated is particularly acute because businesses are also having to deal with a wave of rising costs. Government incompetence led to Britain being harder hit than other countries by the supply chain crisis, ongoing issues and steep rises in energy prices. Those are huge blows to businesses as they approach Christmas, which should be the time when they are hoping to claw back profits in order to make up for stresses earlier in the year. The cost-of-living crisis has also seen consumer confidence knocked, as we know. Last month, it dropped to its lowest level since April, thus reducing consumer spending in all our communities. That has been compounded by the inexplicable decision by the Government to cut universal credit for 6 million families in October—returning just a small part of that was not good enough. In my constituency, this will take £18 million out of the local economy. The Government’s jobs tax, which the Opposition oppose, is also due to come in right at the time when debt protections ease and businesses are expected to pay back costs they could not afford during lockdown.

The Minister will be aware that all of those compounded pressures will cause a potential crisis for businesses come next April. We know that not all sectors of the economy will recover fast. That point was made by my hon. Friend the Member for Brentford and Isleworth. Aviation, travel and tourism, and parts of hospitality will recover at a slower pace. These measures are set to be in place for six months from Royal Assent. It will be helpful to know how Ministers plan to review whether an extension of a further six months will be required and how they will bring those considerations to the House.

The Bill strikes an important balance between the duties of tenants and of landlords and builds on the code of practice for commercial tenancies that was announced in the summer and revised most recently in November. Will the Minister respond to the points raised about how the viability of businesses is to be determined? A key task for arbitrators under the Bill will be to assess how viable businesses are. There are some relevant comments in the code of practice, but the Minister will understand the Opposition’s concern about what qualifications we can expect arbitrators to have so that they can make that assessment. How will the panel of arbitrators be pulled together? What will be the criteria for and what scrutiny will there be of their capabilities? What does the Minister really mean by “a viable business”? Over what time period will viability be assessed, given that different sectors will continue to recover at different rates? Has the Minister considered a simplified appeals system in case there are disagreements about arbitration decisions? Will he comment on the consistency of the arbitration framework? There is currently no great detail on it and there is a risk that different arbitration bodies and arbitrators will take different approaches to cases, resulting in inconsistent decisions.

Businesses are facing a difficult and now costly recovery from the pandemic, with rising costs coming downstream. I am sure the Minister will want to assure the House that he will make sure that the arbitration process is affordable. What plans do the Government have to make sure that the fees do not preclude access for those who need support?

The Bill is welcome, but it is narrow in respect of addressing the overall issues that businesses face and will continue to face as we recover from the pandemic. It will be a slower recovery for some sectors than for others. The Bill provides necessary support for businesses with their rent debt if agreement has not been reached, along with an arbitration process, which must be fair and implemented quickly. If the Conservatives really cared about business health, they would use this opportunity to go much further in the provision of support in respect of business rates reform and the other costs and supply-chain issues that are hitting businesses and consumers hard.

[Paul Scully]

With the leave of the House, I will speak a second time to sum up the debate. I appreciate and very much value the constructive nature of the debate and the comments and positive notes on the Bill’s purpose. I shall concentrate my remarks on the issues raised that relate directly to the Bill. I do not apologise for the fact that the Bill is narrow.

The hon. Member for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney) asked why legislation did not go through earlier; we extended the moratorium for several months, rather than for just a quarter so that we could get the Bill right. We spent that time working with the arbitration services to make sure that we have the capacity and expertise—on which I shall say a little more later—that we need. We have also worked with landlords and tenants, because we have to strike a really delicate balance: we are, in effect, intervening on a contractual arrangement between two private bodies. A lot of the other support that the Government have given has been in the form of relief on various taxes, including business rates and VAT; through direct grants; or through the guaranteeing of loans. The Bill is very much about the moratorium, and our unwinding from that involves our stepping into private contracts, which we would not do without due care and attention.

The hon. Member for Brentford and Isleworth (Ruth Cadbury) talked about the scope of the Bill and eligibility. By targeting the support, we can be sure to get the arbitration cases through quickly and resolved quickly. We clearly need a solution to the debt and do not want cases to drag on for years. If the scope of the Bill were too wide, capacity would start to be swamped, so in trying to help as many people as possible we would end up helping nobody. It is really delicately balanced.

Nevertheless, I appreciate the fact that over the past 19 months there have been significant difficulties for people we have not been able to support with the £352 billion-worth of financial support we provided as we wrapped our arms, as best we could, around the economy to protect jobs, livelihoods and businesses. By resolving the rent debt for a business within the Bill’s scope, we will help not only that business, but its immediate supply chain and all the individuals who contribute towards its success, by getting that business back on a level footing. I hope Members understand why we have targeted the legislation in the specific way we have and how it will deliver support where it is most needed.

The hon. Member for Brentford and Isleworth also talked about the availability of arbitrators, as did several other Members. I reassure Members that we have worked closely with the arbitration bodies and the market is ready to deliver. Our engagement with arbitration bodies has raised awareness of the proposals and we will continue to engage with interested bodies so that the system is up and running as soon as the Bill comes into force.

We put out a call in respect of arbitration earlier this month and there have been a number of respondents. The arbitration bodies that have demonstrated an interest in becoming approved bodies are already widely recognised and respected in the field of arbitration for the accreditation services they provide to their arbitrators. That accreditation acts as a quality-assurance service. There is a statutory duty on approved arbitration bodies to ensure that the lists they maintain contain only arbitrators who appear to an arbitration body to be suitable by virtue of their qualifications or experience. An approved arbitration body also has a duty to remove arbitrators from a case on any one of the grounds for removal specified in the Bill—for example, when

“the arbitrator does not possess the qualifications required for the arbitration”.

The Secretary of State also has the statutory power to withdraw approval from a body if it is no longer considered suitable to carry out the functions of an approved arbitration body.

The hon. Member for Feltham and Heston (Seema Malhotra) asked how we are going to communicate the changes. It is important that the parliamentary process has signalled the introduction of legislation and, along with continued conversations between the Government and the Opposition, that will raise its profile, but we will have to do more direct communication through business-representative organisations, banks and accountants—the kind of intermediaries that all businesses tend to have. There is lots of work to be done, but we want to make sure that we get it right on the front foot.

On how much arbitration will cost and whether it will be affordable, the party that puts forward the case for an arbitration will pay an application fee to the arbitral body. If both parties agree, the fee can be split between landlord and tenant at the point of application. When making the award, the arbitrator must require the other party to reimburse half the fees paid or to pay

“such other amount as the arbitrator considers appropriate”.

The price will be set by the arbitration bodies, although the Secretary of State retains delegated powers to set a cap on the fees charged. For similar schemes, there is a £1,250 application fee, with additional costs if the parties choose to progress to a hearing. Our preference—not just about cost, but about speed so that we get things resolved for both parties—is an online, documents-based process to keep costs to a minimum and to ensure that the process is available to all.

The hon. Member for Feltham and Heston also asked about demonstrating viability.

[Seema Malhotra]

The Minister has given a figure of just over £1,200 as a comparable amount. Given the Secretary of State’s power to introduce a cap, is the Minister signalling the Government’s intention to introduce a cap and the amount it might be set at? If so, what is the assessment of affordability for the context in which the Bill has been introduced?

[Paul Scully]

I do not want to pre-empt further consideration of the Bill, further discussions with the arbiter or, indeed, the Bill’s passage, but it is clear that tenant businesses will already be struggling financially, given the problem that we are trying to solve with the Bill.

We will make sure that, if we do introduce a cap, that is done at a limit that is consistent with the market, with the overall aim of not preventing small and medium-sized enterprises from accessing the scheme. The cap, though, will be variable. It will be on a sliding scale relative to the amount of protected rent debt that we used to determine the cap should it come in, and we will ensure that it is proportionate for each case. We do expect otherwise viable businesses to be able to afford the cost of arbitration.

On viability, there is no specific definition of what constitutes viability, because, clearly, business models vary hugely. In clause 16, there are factors that arbitrators should consider when assessing the viability of a tenant’s business. Within the wider code of practice, there is also a non-exhaustive list of evidence that could be considered when determining viability and affordability.

Hopefully, that has covered a number of the direct issues. I will not go too heavily into some of the other areas that extend around high streets. Suffice it to say that having put £352 billion-worth of support into the economy—including into those hard-pressed sectors, including retail, hospitality, leisure and personal services —we have 352 billion reasons to get the next bit right to make sure that we can have the Reading East that I remember. Probably some of those businesses have gone since I was at university 30-odd years ago, when I enjoyed far too much hospitality—the Purple Turtle, the After Dark Club, the Turk’s Head, and the Ye Babam Ye kebab shop, he says going down a Ricky Gervais memory lane in Reading East. Indeed, I have also had many a happy meal in Don Fernando’s in Richmond. We want to make sure that we can protect these hard-pressed sectors.

Subsidy Control Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Seema Malhotra Excerpts

Thursday 18th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Paul Scully)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, as ever, Ms Nokes. Clause 78 applies the provisions in the Bill to subsidies made by means of primary legislation, as set out in schedule 3. Because of the specific nature of the subsidies given by means of primary legislation, the obligations on those responsible for subsidies in primary legislation needs to be set out separately, rather than being included in the scope of the core clauses of the Bill.

The core purpose of schedule 3 is to apply the subsidy control requirements to subsidies in devolved primary legislation. The schedule makes the necessary technical provisions to that end, and ensures that subsidies in devolved primary legislation are not subject to mandatory referrals to the subsidy advice unit. The schedule provides that subsidies in Acts of Parliament are subject to the transparency requirements on voluntary referrals to the subsidy advice unit. The measures ensure that the subsidy control regime will be comprehensive and robust while taking into account the UK’s unique constitutional make-up.

Before I go into detail about clause 78, it will be helpful to explain what I mean when I refer to subsidies provided by primary legislation. Primary legislation in Westminster or the devolved legislatures can provide for granting subsidies in a number of ways. The most common is by conferring a discretion on Ministers or other public authorities to provide financial assistance, for example section 7 of the Industrial Development Act 1982 in respect of financial assistance in assisted areas. That provides the necessary statutory underpinning for financial assistance but does not mandate financial assistance to be given. The amount and conditions of any financial assistance are at the discretion of the public authority. A subsidy that is granted under a power conferred by a primary enactment is not a subsidy granted by primary legislation. For these purposes, therefore, a subsidy is granted by primary legislation only if the Act itself makes provision that directly amounts to a grant of a new subsidy, or requires a grant of a new subsidy by a public authority with no room for discretion on the part of that authority. Apart from taxation, that is very rare. The reference to the subsidy granted by primary legislation is in practice therefore usually concerned with the grant of a statutory entitlement to a specific tax relief or credit that amounts to a subsidy, for example a tax credit for small businesses to carry out research and development.

I will quickly set out in further detail why each paragraph was included in schedule 3, to which clause 78 relates. Paragraph 1 sets out the intention of the schedule, which I have explained. Paragraph 2 sets out the relevant definitions for the purposes of the schedule, and they are mainly self-explanatory. Paragraph 3 sets out how certain terms of the Bill should be read for the purposes of the schedule, so that the Bill applies to subsidies provided by means of primary legislation. Paragraph 4 provides for the distinction that I discussed before: that subsidies given under a duty imposed by primary legislation are covered by this schedule, but those given under a power in primary legislation are not.

Paragraph 5 confirms that references to a subsidy in schedule 3 should also be taken to refer to a subsidy scheme, as is the case in the rest of the Bill. Paragraphs 6 and 7 apply the subsidy control principles, prohibitions and other requirements, and exemptions in the Bill to subsidies granted or subsidy schemes made by means of devolved primary legislation. In any court proceedings, the provisions in schedule 3 require the courts to consider the views and considerations of the promoters of the Bill, that is, those introducing the Bill or Members of the devolved legislatures who lodge amendments amounting to subsidies, so that courts are not put in the constitutionally novel position of questioning the internal proceedings of the relevant legislature. Paragraph 8 applies the transparency requirements to subsidies in primary legislation, including Acts of Parliament and devolved legislation.

Paragraph 9 deals with the referrals of subsidies in primary legislation to the subsidy advice unit in the Competition and Markets Authority. Voluntary referrals may be made in respect of subsidies or schemes of interest, or subsidies or schemes of particular interest, made in devolved primary legislation or in Westminster Acts of Parliament. That means that the appropriate Ministers, Departments or the Member promoting the subsidy may refer to the SAU those subsidies that have a higher likelihood of distortion. This allows them to make a referral at their discretion, where they judge that the advice or transparency report would be beneficial. That provision does not require mandatory referrals, in view of the unique legislative position and procedure of those subsidies. That means there will be no procedural delays or disruption to primary legislation.

Finally, paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 make the necessary modifications to the enforcement provisions in part 5 of the Bill to apply them to subsidies in devolved primary legislation, which will allow subsidies given by the means of devolved primary legislation to be challenged by judicial review and will include the ability for courts to order devolved Ministers or a Northern Ireland Department to recover a non-compliant subsidy provided by means of devolved primary legislation. Given their expertise in the sensitive task of considering the lawfulness of provisions in devolved primary legislation, the appropriate courts to review such subsidies will be the Court of Session in Scotland, the High Court of England and Wales in respect of Wales, and the High Court in Northern Ireland.

[Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Nokes. There are a number of technical provisions here relating to how implementation will take place. I thank the Minister for his opening remarks. There are areas relating to the application of principles, transparency referrals and recovery orders that we have covered in other debates, and I do not propose to go over those arguments. There are points that the Minister is coming back to us on and we will also review the areas to take further ahead of the Bill moving to Report stage.

I have a couple of queries, which I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify. When subsidies are provided by the means of primary legislation, will he clarify whether there will be any differences on reporting, transparency and so on, or will they be expected to be subject to the same control arrangements?

Secondly, the application of principles in paragraph 6 of schedule 3 also

“applies to subsidies provided by means of devolved primary legislation”.

Are there any either unintended, or intended, effects on the competencies of the devolved Administrations? This issue was one that came up in evidence with the devolved Administrations. There was a concern from the Welsh Government about where there could be overlap, or unintended consequences, with policy decisions being made under devolved competencies, particularly on economic development—that there could be some interplay between the provisions in this Bill and existing competencies. I would be grateful if the Minister could respond on those points.

[Paul Scully]

Essentially, the subsidy control regime differentiates between the subsidies in devolved primary legislation and the subsidies in an Act of Parliament in a way that respects the devolved legislatures and reflects the UK constitution.

The devolved legislatures have a unique constitutional status. We have made sure that the requirements are proportionate and respectful of their status and processes, but it is important that the requirements apply comprehensively and we do not create exemptions. The distinctions in the Bill implement the trade and co-operation agreement, which recognises the sovereignty of Parliament; we would clearly not be compliant with our international requirements if we introduced further exemptions for the subsidies in devolved primary legislation. We will clearly have to ensure compliance within this, and the UK Government will make sure that we comply with our international obligations when giving any subsidies. We will also consider the effects of any subsidy advanced by means of an Act of Parliament during its normal impact analysis and considerations for managing public money.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 78 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 3

Subsidies provided by primary legislation

Question proposed, That the schedule be the Third schedule to the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

I think I covered schedule 3 in my opening remarks on clause 78.

[Seema Malhotra]

I think the Minister did cover schedule 3. We will reflect further on the Minister’s responses to points that we have made, and I will not raise any further issues now. We will support that the schedule stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 3 accordingly agreed to.

Clause 79

Guidance

[Seema Malhotra]

I beg to move amendment 80, in clause 79, page 45, line 9, leave out “may” and insert “must”.

This amendment, together with Amendment 81, would require the Secretary of State to issue guidance about the practical application of the areas listed under 79(1)(a), (b), and (c).

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 24, in clause 79, page 45, line 9, leave out “issue guidance” and insert

“by the affirmative procedure make regulations”.

This amendment ensures that the Secretary of State’s guidance is made by affirmative regulation in order that parliament can debate the matter before implementation.

Amendment 81, in clause 79, page 45, line 12, at end insert—

“(1A) The Secretary of State may issue guidance about the practical application of – ”.

This amendment, together with Amendment 80, would allow the Secretary of State to issue guidance about the practical application of the area listed under 79(1)(d), (e), (f) and (g).

[Seema Malhotra]

It is a pleasure to move amendment 80 and to speak to amendment 81. Clause 79 gives the Secretary of State the power to issue guidance on the new subsidy regime. We agree with the general principle of the clause, which is that the Secretary of State should be able to provide clarity and advice on the practical application of the regime, but we believe that clause 79 is lacking in significant ways and it is important that we look to strengthen it.

Clause 79 states that the Secretary of State “may issue guidance” on the areas listed under subsection (1). However, there are areas of the Bill where we think that guidance is not just beneficial, but necessary for the effective and fair running of the regime, and we should not leave that to chance. In particular, we believe that guidance must be issued for the subsidy control principles, the energy and environment principles and the control requirements laid out in part 2, chapter 3 and chapter 4.

Those areas are crucial to the regime. They will ensure that public authorities create subsidies that match the aims of this Bill; that British subsidies meet the requirements of the TCA; and that public authorities and interested parties are aware of the transparency and scrutiny expected of subsidies. That is why we believe it is vital that the Secretary of State provides information and clarity about what he—or she, in the future, or even the Minister, as we have discussed—expects around the principles and requirements of the new regime, how they should be interpreted and carried out by public authorities and interested parties, and the expectations of subsidy recipients. That is why we propose amendment 80, which would mandate the Secretary of State to issue guidance on the practical applications of subsection (1)(a), (b) and (c).

We want to draw the distinction that we are not being overly prescriptive, so amendment 81 would continue to allow the Secretary of State the option to issue guidance on subsection (1)(d) to (g). We hope that the Minister will appreciate the importance of guidance on the principles and requirements of this new regime, and why the Bill ought to state that they will be—not that they may be—issued for the practical application of those parts of the Bill. If the Minister does not believe that guidance on those areas should be mandated, could he tell us how he expects the Secretary of State to issue guidance on subsection (1)(a) to (c), and indeed (d) to (g), and what the timeframe for such guidance is expected to be?

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Scully]

It is incumbent on us to engage on any changes. How we engage and the timing of that will depend on the circumstances. However, if we are going to do this and make it work, clearly we need to engage as widely as possible to make sure that those changes are fit for purpose.

Amendment 24 would effectively remove the power to issue statutory guidance and replace it with one for the Secretary of State to make binding delegated legislation on the practical application of key elements of the domestic subsidy control regime. We do not believe that regulations are a suitable vehicle for setting out information and advice on the practical application of parts of the subsidy control regime. Regulations are restrictive in their content and must be drafted in a specific, technical way. Guidance, on the other hand, serves the purpose of explaining and clarifying the regime, in ordinary language, for the benefit of those who will need to use and understand the practical effect of the legislation. It can also be quickly updated should circumstances change.

I know that the right hon. Member for Aberdeen North—sorry, the hon. Member; that was another promotion for a colleague. I am sharing the love. I know that she wants to scrutinise future regulations made under the Bill, and it is right that there be additional parliamentary scrutiny of those regulations, as they impose new legal obligations that are additional to those in the Bill, but that is not true of any guidance that will need to be issued under clause 79. The guidance will need to be consistent with, and cannot change, the law to which it relates.

Amendments 80 and 81 would compel the Secretary of State to issue guidance under subsection 1(a) to (c)— that is, on the subsidy control requirements. I understand the intent behind the amendments, but in practice they are unnecessary. While the Secretary of State “may” issue such guidance, in practice he must do so for the regime to function effectively.

Going back to the Government response to the subsidy control public consultation, as we have consistently said, the foundation of the new regime is a clear, proportionate and transparent set of principles, supported by guidance that will ensure that public authorities fully understand their legal obligations and embed strong value-for-money and competition principles. The guidance will show how the assessment of compliance with the principles should be carried out, and how different benefits and distortive impacts should be assessed for different kinds of subsidies. I assure hon. Members that the Secretary of State certainly does not propose to commence the regime without first issuing clear guidance on the subsidy control requirements.

[Seema Malhotra]

It is heartening that the Minister has said that where the clause says “may”, he thinks it means “must”. From that we conclude that the Secretary of State will issue guidance. It would be helpful to know how soon we can expect that guidance. That was one of the questions. That will be very important in making sure that implementation is accelerated as much as possible, but that there is scrutiny, and time to review the guidance.

[Paul Scully]

I can commit to this: we want to share parts of the draft guidance as we develop it, because we want to make sure that the guidance is there as we go through this process. Officials from the Scottish Government and Welsh Senedd in particular told us, before we even introduced the Bill, that they wanted more involvement in drafting the guidance. We talked about getting the framework right in the Bill, and issuing the guidance once we knew what the framework looked like; that is the right way round. We consulted and engaged heavily on the framework. It is right that we do a similar job of engagement with parliamentarians, key stakeholders and public authorities as we develop the guidance. We want to make sure that it is put in place—and not just five minutes before commencement of the provisions next autumn. We want to make sure that public authorities have that understanding. We will try to share as much of the guidance as we can as we develop it, rather than having people wait until final publication.

The inclusion of clause 79 in the Bill clearly shows that the Government understand the need for, and importance of, guidance for public authorities on these elements of the regime. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston not to press amendments 80 and 81 to a vote.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his comments, and for his strengthened interpretation of “may” in the clause. I appreciate his saying that he hopes that guidance will be issued, perhaps in stages, so that there is time for scrutiny. I will not press the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Seema Malhotra]

I beg to move amendment 82, in clause 79, page 45, line 39, leave out subsection (5) and insert—

“(5) Before issuing guidance under this Section, the Secretary of State must seek the consent of the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers and the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland.

(5A) If consent to the making of the regulations is not given by any of those authorities within the period of one month beginning with the day on which it is sought from that authority, the Secretary of State may make the regulations without that consent.

(5B) If regulations are made in reliance on subsection (5B), the Secretary of State must publish a statement explaining why the Secretary of State decided to make the regulations without the consent of the authority or authorities concerned.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to gain the consent of the devolved administrations before issuing guidance under Clause 79.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 86, in clause 87, page 49, line 9, at end insert—

“(7A) Before making regulations under this Act, the Secretary of State must seek the consent of the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers and the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland.

(7B) If consent to the making of the regulations is not given by any of those authorities within the period of one month beginning with the day on which it is sought from that authority, the Secretary of State may make the regulations without that consent.

(7C) If regulations are made in reliance on subsection (7B), the Secretary of State must publish a statement explaining why the Secretary of State decided to make the regulations without the consent of the authority or authorities concerned”.

This amendment requires the Secretary of State to seek the consent of the devolved administrations before making regulations under this Act.

[Seema Malhotra]

This is again about devolution. There is some overlap with the debate we just had. I would have hoped that we were in a position where by the end of this Committee we were not having debates similar to the ones that I feel we had at the start. However, it is important to keep coming back to where engagement with the devolved Administrations matters in particular parts of the Bill, and to say why.

Devolution gives all nations of the UK the chance to make more decisions locally. We have respect for our devolved Administrations and their respective powers, and their input into our economic and social development and our UK-wide democracy. That is why we feel that, if there are ways in which that very important role in our constitutional settlement may be diminished by the way this legislation is crafted and then implemented, it is important for us to consider that issue and also what should be made more explicit in the Bill.

I believe, and I am sure that the Minister believes it too, that all four nations of the UK are stronger together. This Bill is an example of post-Brexit legislation and we are looking at elements of how what was done previously via our membership of the EU will be implemented in a way that will stand the test of time and retain the confidence of all the devolved Administrations. So we must consider how we act in line with those intentions to ensure the importance of devolution and the framework that we have, and how inevitably there will need to be some adjustment, as what happened through the EU is absorbed within our constitution. We must consider some of those roles, responsibilities and judgments about where there needs to be some tweaking of the way our constitution works, with the main principles of devolution—as they have been established and how they are working effectively—and the importance of ensuring that the voices of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are put into legislation that affects all of our nations, and the UK as a whole.

The devolved Administrations will have perspectives that are closer to their own nations. As we have seen, perspectives is a theme running through this legislation, which will be an integral part of how the UK works as a whole, and it will be a more effective regime if those voices are loudly heard.

We agree that Westminster is primary in the way that the legislation is implemented. However, we call on the Minister to consider amendments 82 and 86 seriously. Amendment 82 would mandate the Secretary of State to seek the consent of the devolved Administrations, with a fair backstop, before issuing guidance under clause 79. Amendment 86 stipulates that the Secretary of State must also seek the consent of the devolved Administrations before making the regulations under clause 87.

We have said throughout the debates on the Bill that we want to ensure that there is a settlement that will stand the test of time, that will be flexible in terms of how we all work together, and will be successful for the UK as a whole. It is not just the Labour party or indeed the SNP that thinks along those lines; we have heard evidence from a number of our witnesses alluding to it. I quote Dr Pazos-Vidal, who is head of the Brussels office at the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, who outlined that the Bill currently is,

“too general and not reflective of the territorial constitution of the UK as it stands. There should be a provision that the Secretary of State must consult the devolved Administrations in a dedicated system that should also involve local law. There should be a duty to make sure that different parts of the UK have full ownership of the final outcome—it is true that the Secretary of State will issue the guidance—but also the intelligence and the local know-how about these ideas.”––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 8, Q4.]

I ask the Minister, for the final time, to support amendments 82 and 86, which in our view give the devolved Administrations the role they should have and that is appropriate in the Bill. The guidance that the Secretary of State issues on the new regime and the regulations that will be put in place will have just as large an effect on Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland as on England. Therefore, guaranteeing that the devolved Administrations are involved in the decisions that affect them too will only improve the way in which the guidance is developed and confidence in how it will be implemented.

[Kirsty Blackman]

As I have said, I largely agree with everything the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston has said and I would be happy to back these amendments, should they be pushed to a vote, but I want to make it clear that I do not agree that the four nations are stronger together, and I look forward to the day—not that far off—when we will prove how much more successful we can be when we are out of this political Union.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Scully]

It is really important that we continue to engage with the devolved Administrations—with the Welsh Senedd, the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Assembly. The key issue we are talking about here, though, is that the consent mechanisms contained in the amendment may risk delay, and may change the dynamic of the fact that subsidy control is a reserved matter. None the less, as I say, it is really important that we continue to work closely with the Welsh Senedd, the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Assembly, because we have to make sure that this Bill works for the UK as a whole, and for every part of the UK as well.

Amendment 86, which has also been tabled by the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston, would, as I said, require the Secretary of State to seek the consent of each of the devolved Administrations before making regulations under the Bill. The amendment would not require the Secretary of State to obtain that consent before making regulations, but if it was not forthcoming, the Secretary of State would be required to make a statement to the House explaining why they chose to proceed with the regulations regardless. However, as I noted while addressing the previous amendment, since subsidy control is a reserved policy matter, it is right that the UK Government do not need to seek the formal consent of the devolved Administrations before making regulations creating streamlined subsidy schemes or issuing guidance.

However, again, I am absolutely clear about the importance of engaging with the devolved Administrations as the Bill progresses through Parliament, as well as the process towards implementation and beyond. That engagement will, and has to, continue as we develop guidance and draft regulations. Throughout, the Government will take into account the specific needs and concerns of authorities and other interested parties. Furthermore—we will discuss this issue further in relation to clause 91 and the commencement provisions of this Bill—we are committed to ensuring the timely passage of the necessary regulations to ensure commencement of the Bill as soon as possible. I therefore ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his comments, and I agree with his statement that this regime needs to work for the UK as a whole: I think that is something on which we all agree. I am not quite clear, though, on whether the Minister is saying that there is an incompatibility between the reserved competence and seeking consent, because I am not sure that there is. If there was, we would not have had evidence—including from Daniel Greenberg, parliamentary counsel—about how there could be some co-ordination mechanisms and consultations in and around how the Bill operates.

[Stephen Kinnock]

To fortify the argument that my hon. Friend is making, the Minister claimed that our amendment would force the UK Government to seek the formal consent of the devolved Administrations, but that is not the case. It would require consultation, but if consent is not given, the UK Government can go ahead with their original plan anyway. Just for the record, we are not saying that formal consent should be given: it is simply a requirement for consultation.

[Seema Malhotra]

My hon. Friend is correct, and that is the reason I wanted to make this point. I do not think that the arguments the Minister has made about risking delay and changing the dynamic are really arguments against this amendment, which clearly says that

“Before making regulations under this Act, the Secretary of State must seek the consent of the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers and the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland…If consent to the making of the regulations is not given by any of those authorities within the period of one month”—

so this is not an extensive delay—

“beginning with the day on which it is sought from that authority, the Secretary of State may make the regulations without that consent”,

but it will be on the record that consent was sought.

Thirdly, the amendment says that

“If regulations are made in reliance on subsection (7B), the Secretary of State must publish a statement explaining why the Secretary of State decided to make the regulations without the consent of the authority or authorities concerned”.

I cannot see anything in the amendment that is incompatible with the fact that this is an area of reserved competence. It simply seeks transparency on where there may be disagreements and why. In my view, that is part of how we have a mature relationship between Westminster and the devolved Administrations—not everyone is always going to agree, but they should be included and views on how the Bill is implemented should be respected. Being able to disagree on the record is, I think, part of how our democracy should be working.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

I wonder whether the Minister would commit to ensuring that there are links to the guidance on the subsidy control database. People who are interested in the database are likely to be interested in the guidance, particularly if they are considering making a challenge. Will he ensure that the links are on the website, so that people can find them more easily? That would be helpful.

[Seema Malhotra]

The Minister has outlined the details of the clause. Notwithstanding the points we have already made, we support clause stand part.

[Paul Scully]

In answer to the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, the guidance will be on the gov.uk website. I will reflect on how best to make it accessible. It is important that it is accessible to everybody.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 79 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 80

Disclosure of information

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

The clause ensures that the powers and duties contained in the Bill to disclose or use information will operate compatibly with existing data protection legislation. It also amends schedule 14 of the Enterprise Act 2002 to include the new subsidy control functions of the CMA. It will ensure that the information obtained by the CMA in its functions under the new subsidy control regime is subject to the same restrictions on disclosure that apply to existing functions. The clause further ensures that the CMA is protected from defamation law when providing advice or reports under the provisions in the Bill.

[Seema Malhotra]

As the Minister outlined, the clause establishes that any duty to disclose information under the powers in the Bill does not override provisions laid out in the data protection legislation. This is technical and important, and we support the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 80 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 81

Modifications to subsidies and schemes

[Seema Malhotra]

I beg to move amendment 83, in clause 81, page 46, line 39, leave out “of up to 25%” and insert

“up to the rate of inflation”.

This amendment would prevent modifications that increase subsidy budgets by up to 25% from being permitted, and would instead permit modifications that increased subsidy or scheme budgets by up to the rate of inflation.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 84, in clause 81, page 46, line 41, leave out “paragraph (g)”.

This amendment would prevent extensions of subsidy schemes from being permitted modifications.

Amendment 85, in clause 81, page 47, line 10, leave out “25%” and insert “inflation rate”.

This amendment relates to Amendment 83.

[Seema Malhotra]

It is a pleasure to move amendment 83 and to speak to amendments 84 and 85. The clause establishes that unless a modification of a subsidy or scheme is a “permitted modification” listed in subsection (3), including an uplift of up to 25% of the budget or an extension by up to six years, changes to a subsidy or scheme will be regarded as a new subsidy or scheme. Consequently, the public authority will have to comply with the subsidy control requirements. The clause outlines that most modifications to subsidies or schemes must result in said subsidies or schemes being treated as new. The issue is that it also outlines a list of permitted modifications that can be made without having to re-establish the subsidy.

Labour recognises the importance of allowing certain modifications to subsidies, especially under a regime that is intended to be quicker, where there is leave to support a subsidy’s outcomes in line with the control principles and the underlying goals and principles of the legislation. However, such permitted modifications must be reasonable; otherwise, they risk allowing subsidies to undermine the principles of the regulations set out in the legislation.

I wonder whether the Minister has considered in detail subsection (3)(f), which allows an increase in a subsidy’s budget by what seems to be a fairly high and fairly arbitrary 25%. I question whether that is a reasonable modification. There is also a question about subsection (3)(g), which allows the extension of a subsidy scheme by six years. That is longer than a parliamentary term. Again, I wonder whether detailed consideration was given to that. Perhaps the Minister can enlighten us on the basis for deciding to make a six-year extension and a 25% increase permitted modifications.

There is a risk that such modifications will have significant effects on subsidies and schemes. They could cause a previously finely-tuned subsidy to distort the market or become out of proportion. As such, we should question whether they should be allowed to occur without any checks or renewed transparency. Otherwise, there is a risk in increasing a subsidy, particularly a large subsidy, by up to 25%,and, indeed, in extending a subsidy scheme by six years—that is well beyond the period for which local authorities, devolved Administrations or almost anyone in any Administration is elected in this country—without it being subject to some renewal. There does not seem to be a clear explanation of why the clause is framed as it is.

We therefore also propose amendment 83, which would allow for subsidies to adapt to changing economic circumstances by allowing a subsidy’s budget to be increased by no more than the rate of inflation, rather than by a whole 25%. While allowing for adaptation to changing economic circumstances, the amendment would ensure that any significant changes to subsidy amounts were still subject to appropriate transparency.

Amendment 85 would scrap subsection (3)(g), because those long extensions could have significant consequences for the market, and the market could change in that period of time. Any extension of a scheme’s timetable should be subject to full transparency, and it should be treated as though a new subsidy was being created.

I would be grateful if the Minister could respond to our legitimate concerns and explain what underlies the decisions that led to subsections (3)(f) and (3)(g). If there is something that we have missed, we would be happy to reconsider, but in the interests of transparency, value for money and public confidence, we think these are two points that should be addressed.

[Paul Scully]

Clause 81 allows for limited amendments to be made to subsidies or schemes. A permitted modification will not be treated as a new subsidy or scheme as long as it meets the parameters set out in the clause. First, let me cover amendments 83 and 85. These amendments would remove from the list of permitted modifications an increase of up to 25% of the original budget of a subsidy or scheme. Instead, increases only up to the rate of inflation would be treated as permitted modifications. In doing so, the amendments would greatly reduce the flexibility afforded to public authorities to moderately increase the budget of a subsidy or scheme without facing additional administrative burdens.

The Government have committed to reducing administrative burdens on public authorities wherever possible. That includes giving them the flexibility to make limited amendments to a subsidy or scheme without having to jump through additional procedural hoops. An increase of up to 25% is appropriate, as this level of uplift is unlikely to greatly change the distortionary effects of a subsidy or scheme, which is what we are measuring.

[Paul Scully]

To avoid the bureaucratic burden I talked about, the clause allows for a limited degree of modification without reassessment. That creates the right balance, and public authorities would need to determine whether the change is just administrative or not.

Permitted modifications do not have to be reassessed, and therefore it would not need to be considered whether they bump into subsidies of interest or subsidies of particular interest, for example, because those criteria apply only to new schemes. The public authority will have already carried out an assessment of compliance with the principles and other requirements for all the subsidies and schemes, so the increase in value is unlikely to meaningfully alter that. Clearly, if a public authority was attempting to mislead or exploit that as a loophole, it could be subject to judicial review on general public law grounds.

[Seema Malhotra]

I may have said in my remarks that amendment 85 scrapped subsection (3)(g), but it was amendment 84, as the Minister has outlined. It is important for our deliberations that the point raised by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North is addressed in writing. It is a fundamental point, and there does seem to be a loophole. Surely, we would not want an inefficiency in the regime that could mean public money being pushed through that little loophole by design. An increase of 25% is significant and could result in the subsidy being pushed over a particular threshold against the requirements of the legislation. Surely, we should design out loopholes rather than designing them in. It would be important, for the purposes of our deliberations and to have confidence in the regime, if the Minister were able to address that point, in writing, for the Committee.

On the Minister’s point about “unlikely to”, surely we do not want to design a system based on things that are unlikely. The way the legislation is drafted could incentivise particular behaviours. We do not want a regime or legislation that make more likely things that we want to be unlikely. There is a small financial incentive for people to look at ways of working around the legislation.

[Paul Scully]

I am happy to formally write again to clarify the situation, if necessary, but I am pretty sure that I would be repeating what I have just said in response to the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, which will be in the Official Report.

The likelihood and unlikelihood point goes back to the fundamental issue of the regime being a permissive one. If we regimented everything, we would be recreating the EU state aid scheme, which is far more prescriptive.

On the comments about the increases in values and times, let me cover why we believe that the 25% increase is appropriate. Even the strictest subsidy control regime in the world provides for the types of permitted modifications that are included in the clause. The EU state aid regime allows for an increase of up to 20% in the original budget of an existing aid scheme before public authorities need to notify and seek approval from the EU Commission. As I have said, the regime in the legislation is a far lighter-touch regime. I do not mean to suggest that we should start benchmarking every aspect of our subsidy control framework against EU state aid rules, but it is worth noting that the amendments would make the UK’s rules on modifying subsidies far more restrictive than the previous bureaucratic rules. By providing for that level of budget uplift, clause 81 will help to reduce unnecessary processes and provide maximum certainty to public authorities and recipients of subsidies.

As I stated when addressing the preceding amendments, clause 81 allows for permitted modifications to be made for subsidies or schemes without them being treated as a new subsidy or scheme. Amendment 84 would remove from the list of permitted modifications the extension of a subsidy scheme by up to six years. Any extension to a scheme beyond the date on which it would otherwise have been terminated would therefore be treated as a new scheme.

There will be times when public authorities, in monitoring the outcomes of a subsidy scheme, decide it is beneficial to moderately prolong the length of the scheme. If a public authority incurs delays in rolling out the new scheme, for instance, it may wish to bridge the gap by extending the existing scheme. It is appropriate to provide public authorities with the ability to extend a scheme without requiring an assessment against the subsidy control requirements, as an extension of up to six years is unlikely to greatly increase any negative effects stemming from the scheme.

[Seema Malhotra]

It is important to recognise that if there are to be permitted modifications, they should be designed with transparency in mind, and with ways of tracking how and where they are used. The Minister has just said that the EU regime allows a 20% budget uplift and has an approvals process. The Government are proposing a 25% uplift, but there does not seem to be any clarity in the legislation about the publication of any decisions. Do the Government envisage that, in the event of a permitted modification—of over 5% or 10% of the budget, say—there will be public knowledge of that decision, and if so, where would that information be published?

[Paul Scully]

Other tools exist to provide the transparency in public authority spending, such as the data published by local authorities under the local government transparency code. The regime is not intended to replace other mechanisms for ensuring that we have transparency and good management of public money.

I do not want to compare and contrast every single element of the regime against the EU, but on timescales, the Committee may find it useful to know that the EU state aid regime also allows for prolongation of an existing scheme by up to six years. The amendment would therefore make the UK’s rules around the modification of subsidies and schemes much stricter than those under the EU without bringing any corresponding benefit. I therefore request that the amendment be withdrawn.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I appreciate the Minister’s attempt to explain the 25% and what would happen should the subsidy increase above a certain threshold. However, I would very much appreciate it if he would write to us about what is likely to happen should that threshold be hit.

Subsection (3)(g) specifically relates to the length of time for subsidy scheme extensions. An enterprise could conceivably not have existed during the original term of the subsidy scheme but be later affected by the extension of the scheme, with no ability to challenge that scheme because the extension gives no opportunity for it to be challenged. This is not only about the length of time. We discussed the way in which individual subsidies made within a scheme cannot be challenged. It is distinctly possible that that could inadvertently distort competition for new enterprises that pop up during the period of a scheme and so have no ability to challenge it and no recourse to make their concerns known, because a system just does not exist for them to do so if they are outwith the period of being able to challenge the original scheme. If a scheme is not classed as new but extended, there is a bit of a problem.

I understand what the Minister says about the EU, and I assume—although he did not say this—that six years was likely chosen because that is analogous with the length of time the EU gives. However, because of the differences between this scheme and the EU state aid scheme, lifting the same number of years does not work as well as it could, because individual subsidies cannot be challenged. Only the scheme can be challenged, and there will be no ability for new enterprises to challenge the schemes, even though they may have a major distortive effect on competition.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the hon. Lady for her comments. We are extremely concerned about the Government’s lines on this. I do not think there has been any clear explanation, nor any proper assessment of what this could mean and how it could create quite a significant loophole. We will push amendment 83 to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Scully]

The clause allows for limited amendments to be made to subsidies or schemes, referred to as permitted modifications. They can be made to subsidies made under the terms of the Bill or to legacy schemes and withdrawal agreement schemes. Modifications are also permitted to legacy and withdrawal agreement subsidies or schemes in accordance with their terms. They can involve an increase of up to 25% of the original budget or the extension of a subsidy scheme by up to six years.

[Seema Malhotra]

The holes in this clause are bigger than those in a big piece of Swiss cheese, and I am concerned about that. We will not be voting against it, but if we had an equivalent of abstain, we would be doing that.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 81 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 82

Gross cash and gross cash equivalent amount of financial assistance

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

The clause enables the Secretary of State to make secondary legislation to establish how gross cash and gross cash equivalent are to be determined when designing a subsidy or subsidy scheme. It is important to establish a common method for use by public authorities in calculating gross cash and gross cash equivalent values. The Government will set out a methodology to calculate gross cash and gross cash equivalent in regulations that are as clear and simple as possible and subject to the negative procedure.

[Seema Malhotra]

The clause is important and we support it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 82 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 83

Minor amendment to the Financial Services Act 2021

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

The clause makes consequential amendments to the Financial Services Act 2021, in relation to regulated activities in Gibraltar within the scope of the Act. In doing so, the clause ensures that the meanings of “insurance company”, “deposit taker” and “insurer” used in the Bill reflect definitions used in the 2021 Act.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his remarks. We will be supporting the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 83 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 84

Financial provision

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

The clause establishes that expenditure incurred under the terms of the Bill in connection with the subsidies database, established under clause 32, is to be paid out of money provided by Parliament. It also establishes that expenditure, as a result of the CMA carrying out its functions, under or by virtue of part 4 of the Bill, will be paid for out of money provided by Parliament.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for setting out how clause 84 will ensure that the costs incurred by the Bill will be met by Parliament. We support the clause.

Questions put and agreed to.

Clause 84 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 85

Crown application

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

The clause establishes a customary provision that the Bill applies in full to the Crown. As part of this customary provision, the Crown does not include Her Majesty in her private capacity, Her Majesty in right of the Duchy of Lancaster, or the Duke of Cornwall.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his remarks. We will be supporting the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 85 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 86

Power to make consequential provision

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

The clause provides for the Secretary of State to make regulations that amend, repeal, revoke or otherwise modify existing primary or secondary legislation, including retained direct EU legislation, where such changes are consequential on the functioning of the Bill. It is important to note that regulations that change primary legislation or retained direct principal EU legislation are subject to the affirmative procedure. While the Bill makes provisions for changes to existing legislation, it is possible that possible technical changes to existing legislation may be required as a result of the Bill.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his remarks. We have had various discussions over the course of the Bill about how regulations are to be made. Overall, we support the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 86 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 87

Regulations

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Scully]

The clause sets out the parliamentary procedures that apply in relation to powers to make regulations conferred on Ministers by the Bill. It sets out the procedure that applies where a power is exercisable by affirmative or negative resolution. It makes clear that any power to make regulations in this Bill is not intended to limit the general implementation regulation-making power in section 31 of the European Union (Future Relationship) Act 2020. Finally, the clause does not apply to clause 91 of the Bill. Clause 91 deals specifically with the commencement of the Bill, and it is normal practice that commencement regulations are not subject to either the negative or the affirmative procedure.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his remarks. Clause 87 sets out the procedures for when regulations are made under the Bill. We have expressed earlier our opposition to the lack of involvement given to the devolved Administrations; I will not repeat myself, but we continue to have those concerns. However, we will not vote against this clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 87 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 88

Directions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

The clause establishes that any directions made under the Bill must be made in writing, and also makes provision for a direction to be varied or revoked by a subsequent direction if required.

[Seema Malhotra]

We have no further comments on this clause, and will be supporting clause stand part.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 88 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 89

Interpretation

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

The clause establishes the definitions used for various terms within the Bill, whether those terms are defined elsewhere in the Bill or in external sources of law. It also explains how a trade and co-operation agreement or a supplementing agreement should be interpreted by a court or tribunal that is interpreting a provision of this Bill.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his remarks. Throughout some of our discussions, the fact that we have not had greater definition of some of the terms used in the Bill has been a challenge, but we will support clause stand part. I hope that some of the more detailed definitions will come forward as soon as possible.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 89 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 90

Extent

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

The clause establishes that, barring one exception, the Bill extends to England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The one exception is clause 48(3) of the Bill.

[Seema Malhotra]

We obviously agree with this clause. It is a shame that a four-nations approach has not come forward in the drafting of some of the Bill, but in any case, we are not opposing clause stand part.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 90 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 91

Commencement

[Seema Malhotra]

I beg to move amendment 87, in clause 91, page 50, line 26, at end insert

“which must be no later than six months following the day on which this Act is passed.”

This amendment would require that the Act comes into force no later than six months following Royal Assent.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 25, in clause 91, page 50, line 26, at end insert—

“(2A) The Secretary of State may not make regulations to bring the rest of this Act into force until—

(a) regulations under section 34 and section 52 of this Act have been made and been in force for at least three months; and

(b) guidance under section 79 of this Act has been issued and publicly available for at least three months.”

This amendment allows a period of three months after the issuing of regulations relating to the subsidy database and mandatory referrals, and the publication of guidance, before parts of the Act come into force.

[Seema Malhotra]

We broadly support clause 91, which sets out which parts of the Bill will come into effect and when. We recognise the need to establish when and how various parts of the Bill will come into force. However, at the same time, we want to ensure that this important new regime is not implemented unnecessarily slowly, because the implementation of legislation can sometimes get delayed when it is not at the forefront of Parliament’s attention. The Bill is fundamental to supporting the levelling-up agenda, which is of great concern to us all, and net zero implementation. That is still a disappointment—I am sure we will come back to the need for net zero to be more explicit in the principles. It is important that we move forward as quickly as possible to ensure certainty in the subsidy control regime, and that we support research and investment. All of those measures are necessary. In this low-growth environment, it is important to get investment, and the necessary incentives for it, as soon as possible.

An interim subsidy regime is in now place, but it does not provide the guidance or reassurance necessary for the long-term effectiveness of subsidies, nor does it take advantage of the potential opportunities provided by designing and scoping a new regime now that we have left the European Union. Amendment 87 would mandate that the Bill comes into force no later than six months following Royal Assent, reflecting the important need to make quick progress on introducing the regime, the guidance and the regulations. There should be no avoidable delays. It is important that the guidance is introduced in good time so as to ensure that the Bill receives proper scrutiny as it continues its passage through Parliament.

I expect that the hon. Member for Aberdeen North will speak to amendment 25. We want to make sure that the process moves more quickly, and there is a discussion to be had about the best way to make that happen. I would be grateful if the Minister could outline the Government’s planned timetable for bringing the Bill into force and the important and necessary steps they will take as part of that road map.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Very unusually, although we are discussing two Opposition amendments, we disagree with one of them. I cannot support amendment 87. As I have said on a number of occasions, I am concerned about ensuring compliance with the regime. There will be compliance only if people have a good understanding of the regime before it kicks in. I do not have a problem with the period following Royal Assent being more than six months, because I would rather that organisations such as public authorities had the time to digest the guidance and regulations in order to be able to adequately comply. We do not want people to accidentally not comply.

I understand the Opposition’s desire to push forward, given the current interim regime, but it is important to get this right. I do not think any of us are comforted that we will be able to judge whether there is a high level of compliance with the regime. The Minister expects that that will be the case, but the lack of transparency data means that it will not be terribly easy to judge the situation.

Under amendment 25, which we have tabled, the Secretary of State would not be able to make regulations to bring the rest of the Bill into force until regulations under clauses 34 and 52 had been made and been in force for at least three months. Those clauses relate to mandatory Competition and Markets Authority referrals and the operation of the subsidy database. It is really important that both those measures are well understood in advance of the rest of the provisions coming into force, which is why the amendment seeks a three-month time period, so that everyone is able to comply.

The second condition that the amendment would require, where I am asking that guidance be in place for three months, is about guidance under clause 79. We spoke at some length during the debate on clause 79 about our concerns. It was useful to have the Minister confirm that the Secretary of State will be making guidance on a number of those things, despite the fact that the word “may” is in there. That is a helpful clarification for us, but it is important that that guidance is published.

I am pleased that the Minister plans to ensure that there is significant consultation and that the asks that come forward are considered. If somebody asks for specific guidance about a specific area because they know it is something they are likely to be dealing with on a regular basis and they are a regular granter, or likely to be a regular granter, of subsidies under this regime, I would like the Minister to have the opportunity to consider that. However, I would also like to ensure that there is a period of time, in advance of people being expected to comply with the regulations and guidance put forward, for them to digest them.

That is particularly important when we look at the operation of the subsidy control database and the method of challenging things on that database. People have only a short period of time—one month—to make those challenges and ask for pre-action information to be brought forward. The Minister’s stated aim is to reduce the length of the period of uncertainty, but the likelihood of there being uncertainty or challenges is increased if organisations do not properly understand the guidance. We all know that lawyers take a significant amount of time to digest things and to give the necessary advice to organisations.

As was stated during the witness sessions, the legal profession will have to do a huge amount of work to ensure that they are giving appropriate advice to organisations that are looking either to grant or to challenge subsidies. I do not think it would be appropriate for the regime to begin in the autumn, as the Minister has stated that the Government hope it will, without there being that period of time in advance.

All the indications the Minister has given are that it is likely that there will be a period of time in advance—that he is hoping that there will be and that consultation will happen. I tabled this amendment to try to ensure that that will definitely happen in the specific areas that are important for organisations to be able to properly understand the guidance in advance. I am not trying to cause us problems or to make the Bill take longer to come into force; I am just trying to ensure that people are able to act in the way the Government would like them to act with this Bill and that anybody whose interests are affected by the giving of a subsidy is able and understands how to adequately challenge those subsidies.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his remarks. Amendment 87 is a probing amendment, and I hope he will be able to lay out a broad timetable as to what will happen after Royal Assent and what we can expect. I am sure that officials will be starting to map out the necessary activity. It would be helpful to know what may come out and in what order. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

Clause 91 establishes which parts of the Bill will come into effect and when. It provides the Secretary of State with a power to bring certain provisions of the Bill into force by commencement regulations. Any power to make regulations under part 2, 3 or 4 or chapter 1 and chapter 2 of part 6 come into force on the day of Royal Assent. The clause also provides a power for the Secretary of State to make transitional or saving provisions in regulations when the Act comes into force, if that is necessary.

[Seema Malhotra]

We support the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 91 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 92

Short title

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

The clause establishes a short title for the Act, which is the Subsidy Control Act 2021.

[Seema Malhotra]

It is an excellent title, and we support the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 92 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 1

Subsidy Control Principles: statement to Parliament

“(1) Within six months of the opening of a new Parliament, the Secretary of State must make a written statement to Parliament on the subsidy control principles.

(2) The statement must include details of—

(a) any legislation the Government intends to bring forward to change the Subsidy Control Principles; and

(b) any changes the Government intends to make to guidance under section 79 of this Act.”—(Kirsty Blackman.)

This new clause requires a new Government to make a statement to Parliament about any changes it intends to make to the subsidy control principles.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Does Seema Malhotra wish to move new clause 3?

[Seema Malhotra]

I do not wish to push new clause 3 to a vote today.

New Clause 4

“Secretary of State and Devolved Administrations: requirement to report

‘(1) The Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers, Welsh Ministers and Northern Ireland Department of Economy shall each report annually on subsidies and schemes which they have made.

(2) All reports made under subsection (1) shall be published.” .—(Seema Malhotra.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State and devolved Administrations to report annually on subsidies and schemes they make.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Seema Malhotra]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 4 would provide for greater transparency under the new regime by mandating the Secretary of State and each of the devolved Administrations to publish annual reports on the subsidies and schemes they have made during the previous year. In our view, that would ensure that interested parties and the public generally are made aware of how their ruling bodies are using public money through subsidies and for what purposes. I am sure that the Minister recognises that transparency is important and that he will agree with Professor Rickard, who said that through transparency we can get better compliance and better value for money, and we can help to ensure that subsidies that have been granted better meet the goals that we are setting out to achieve.

Over the past few weeks, the Minister will have seen all too much, I am sure, both in the Chamber and in the news, the concerns in relation to whether public funds have been used in the way they should be, how contracts have been allocated and so on. I am sure that there will be a keenness to prevent any perceived or potential misuse of public funds or lack of transparency and to ensure that there can be adequate reporting of decisions that are made, particularly on larger subsidies by Administrations.

We will not necessarily press the new clause to a vote today, partly because we think that the issues raised by it could be absorbed within the discussions that we had about the role of the CMA in its reporting and the discussions that we had about the Minister, I think, putting in writing what he would see and how the reporting cycle might work. There may be ways to deal with some of these concerns—depending on what the Minister says—in the rounds of those discussions that we have talked about.

I will just mention also the way we see the CMA having a role. I have not moved new clause 3 today because I think we will want to bring that back. There will be ways in which we look in the round at the role of the CMA and its powers on decision making, advice and reporting. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Paul Scully]

Transparency is absolutely an important part of the new subsidy control regime. It is right, therefore, that it has been a significant part of the discussion during Committee. It is key to the enforcement provisions in the Bill. We have thought carefully about the reporting requirements that we place on public authorities, to get the balance right. Other tools for general public authority financial transparency exist elsewhere already and are not limited to subsidies. We are trying to find the right balance between transparency and burdens on public authorities, as we have said. Although the subsidy database is still a relatively new tool, public authorities, including Departments and the devolved Administrations, are already using it and uploading information about the subsidies that they award. The database is a one-stop shop where both interested parties and the public can see the required subsidies awarded.

The new clause risks duplicating public authorities’ transparency obligations through the making of an unnecessary report on granted subsidies in a way that risks confusing interested parties and undermining the streamlining of subsidy transparency that our one-stop database provides. For the reasons that I have set out, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to include a statutory obligation for the Secretary of State and devolved Administrations to report annually on the subsidies and schemes that they make. Therefore, I request that the hon. Member withdraw the new clause.

[Seema Malhotra]

On the basis that there will be further discussion, that we do not want there to be administration that is more time-consuming than it needs to be and that we will revisit the way we can have a very efficient reporting regime, I will withdraw the motion. I am not sure whether I will be speaking again—I am not sure of these final few stages—but perhaps I can take this opportunity to echo the comments from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North by thanking you, Ms Nokes, and Mr Sharma, who also chaired the Committee; all hon. Members who have contributed and been part of our deliberations; and the Clerks, Hansard and so on for helping to make the process extremely efficient. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.

[Paul Scully]

I thank you, Ms Nokes, and Mr Sharma for your excellent chairmanship and getting us through this process efficiently and effectively. I also thank the witnesses and all members of the Committee, who have allowed us to go through significant scrutiny and to have significant discussions; the Clerks, the Hansard Reporters and the Doorkeepers for ensuring that we have been well looked after; of course my officials, who have done an incredible job to get us to this point efficiently; and of course the Whip—what an amazing Whip. Both Whips have been remarkable in getting us through this process.

[Seema Malhotra]

I echo the Minister’s thanks to our witnesses. They gave us very good evidence at very short notice. I also thank both the Whips. We have hugely appreciated how they have managed time well. I also thank our staff—on our side, in particular, Francesca Sellors and Dan Jones—who have helped to ensure that we have had everything in time for the Bill proceedings, because it has been a journey.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.

Subsidy Control Bill (Tenth sitting)

Seema Malhotra Excerpts

Tuesday 16th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Kirsty Blackman]

The Bill states:

“a person whose interests may be affected by the giving of the subsidy”.

The hon. Member’s interests would not be affected by the giving of the subsidy, his constituents’ interests would be. If the Minister, when he speaks, confirms that a Member’s interests cover all the interests of his constituents, can define the interests of the Scottish Government, Welsh Ministers and the Northern Ireland Department or can say absolutely that, for example, a Northern Ireland Department’s interests cover the interests of businesses and constituents within its jurisdiction, I will be delighted that the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton is correct. That is what I would like it to say but, as drafted, that is not what the Bill says.

There is therefore a gap, an issue with not enough people being able to make that challenge and in those democratic institutions not having that right. As the Minister said, it is not a foregone conclusion that such things would go through, that the CAT would look at the subsidy decision and say, “Oh, the Secretary of State has referred this, so they are definitely correct and the subsidy is definitely wrong.” That is not how it would work. The CAT is an independent organisation and it will be making those decisions.

On the specific point about people who have the ability to refer subsidy decisions, however, I think that those people with indirect interests on behalf of their constituents or the areas that they represent should have the right to make that referral—and for the CAT to make the decision after that. Again, that will not lead to a significant increase in the number of challenges to come forward, but if the Government are committed to levelling up and to the Subsidy Control Bill regime working as it is intended to work, changes have to be made to the clause. Amendment 23 was the best way that I could see of making the changes to ensure that those interested parties with indirect parties would be able to fulfil adequately their roles to work on behalf of the people who elected them.

[Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Nokes. I thank the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, who laid out some very strong arguments for amendment 23. I will speak briefly to amendment 71, which is very similar.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Scully]

The clause enables interested parties to apply to the Competition Appeal Tribunal, or the CAT, to challenge decisions by public authorities to give subsidies or make subsidy schemes. The CAT has the advantage of being a UK-wide tribunal with specialist expertise in competition and in hearing judicial reviews in the field of economic regulation. It is well regarded by practitioners and the Government’s consultation demonstrated strong support for its performing this role.

Any interested party who is aggrieved by a subsidy decision will be able to apply to the CAT to review that decision. The clause defines an interested party as any

“person whose interests may be affected”

by the decision in question. The Secretary of State is also explicitly defined as an interested party, which does not mean that the Government have the intention of challenging a large number of subsidy decisions by other public authorities. Instead, it provides a safety valve allowing the Secretary of State to challenge subsidy decisions that might harm competition and investment within the UK or cause concerns to be raised by one of the UK’s trading partners under the terms of our international agreements.

The clause provides that the CAT must apply judicial review principles when determining applications to review subsidy decisions, which means that the tribunal will determine whether the decision was lawful, including whether the requirements set out in the Bill have been met. The tribunal will not be capable of reviewing the merits or effectiveness of a subsidy or subsidy scheme.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his comments. We have no further comments on the clause beyond what we raised on the amendments. We support clause 70 standing part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 70 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 71

Time limits for applications under section 70

[Seema Malhotra]

I beg to move amendment 74, in clause 71, page 40, line 31, at beginning insert—

“Except where subsection (1A) applies,”.

This amendment is linked to Amendment 75.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 75, in clause 71, page 40, line 33, at end insert—

“(1A) Where a public authority has not complied with its duties under section 33(1), an application to the Tribunal under section 70 in respect of a subsidy decision must be made by sending a notice of appeal before the end of six months beginning with the date on which it is established that the section 33(1) duty has not been complied with.”

This amendment provides for an extended period of challenge where a public duty has not complied with its section 33 duties.

[Seema Malhotra]

The clause amends the Competition Appeal Tribunal rules to establish the time limits for making an application to the CAT for a review of a subsidy control decision. Interested parties must send their notice of appeal to the CAT within one month of the relevant date. The tribunal may not extend the one-month time limit unless there are exceptional circumstances.

As we have already stated, we believe very strongly that public authorities should have a clearer statutory duty to upload full and accurate information to the subsidy database. Where a public authority fails to comply with that duty, there should be consequences. The regime requires a better incentive for public authorities to upload accurately and fully. Evidence from DWF, which I will not repeat at length again, revealed how many of the entries currently uploaded to the database are far from complete or accurate.

Amendments 75 and 74 would provide a statutory consequence where a public authority has not complied with its duty to upload information to the database, as set out in clause 33(1): namely, an extended challenge period of six months from the date on which it is established that the clause 33 duty has not been complied with. In our view, that would create a strong incentive for public authorities to upload information to the database promptly, comprehensively and accurately. Transparency is central to the new regime, and protecting it is at the heart of the amendments.

[Paul Scully]

Clause 71 sets out the time limits for an interested party to apply to the CAT for a review of a decision to grant a subsidy or make a subsidy scheme. It is important to strike a balance between allowing sufficient time for a subsidy scheme or award to be challenged and giving confidence to the subsidy beneficiary that the subsidy decision can no longer be challenged, and that they can make use of that subsidy.

The Government believe that the appropriate balance is the one-month limitation period, generally counted from the date on which the subsidy or subsidy scheme is published on the database. The hon. Member for Feltham and Heston has tabled amendments to that general time limit, which we will discuss later. I understand that the amendments are intended to extend the period for challenging a subsidy when a public authority has not properly fulfilled its transparency obligations. It may be useful to begin by clarifying how the clause would work in cases where the transparency requirements are not met.

Clause 71 already provides a powerful incentive for public authorities to properly fulfil their transparency obligations. If they do not, there is no transparency date for the purpose of rule 98A subsection (2), so there is no limitation period for when an interested party can seek a review of the subsidy in the CAT. In other words, if there is a non-trivial failure to comply with the transparency obligations in clause 33, the subsidy or scheme could not just be challenged six months after it is made; it could potentially be challenged at any time.

--- Later in debate ---

There is no need to extend the challenge period for non-disclosure of a subsidy that ought to have been disclosed because that period is already potentially indefinite. An extended challenge period for a subsidy or scheme that has been uploaded late to the transparency database would add little to the existing strong incentives for a public authority to make a timely upload, and it would create an unreasonable amount of uncertainty for the subsidy beneficiary. It would undermine the balance that we have set between certainty and allowing interested parties to challenge potentially unlawful subsidies. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his comments—I think he picked up on some of the issues that we were raising. He gave the example of a public authority not acting in line with its duties, meaning that those in receipt of a subsidy could end up waiting for longer. That could be administrative error, and nothing to do with the subsidy, but we would not know.

I think it is fair to say that the amendment is not perfect, but we wanted to make a general point about time limits, which we want to look at in the round, and about how the whole regime can work fairly. On this occasion, I will not press the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Seema Malhotra]

I beg to move amendment 73, in clause 71, page 40, line 33, leave out “one month” and insert “three months”.

This amendment would extend the period for interested parties to submit an application for review of a subsidy to three months.

The amendment would extend to three months the period for interested parties to submit an application for review of a subsidy. We think that is extremely important, because as it stands, interested parties would have one month from the publication of a subsidy or scheme on the database, or from receiving requests for information from the public authority in respect of a subsidy or scheme, to bring a challenge before the CAT.

That is an extremely short timeframe. Uploads to the database could be made on July 22, for example, or on December 16, when we rise for recess. I do not want to suggest that there might be attempts to reduce opportunities for scrutiny and challenge by timing uploads to the database, but at the end of July, for example, there are school holidays, and even Parliament does not return until September. One month can be a very short time for scrutiny and challenge, especially at particular times of the year, and it is about what is chosen to be published and when.

Labour recognises the importance of giving subsidies legal certainty in this quicker, more flexible regime. However, given that public authorities will have six months or even a year to publish subsidies on the database, why will interested parties be given only one month to challenge them? Once the one-month period has elapsed, there will be no other routes for challenging subsidies and schemes. That means that if interested parties are not given the appropriate amount of time to consider new subsidies and schemes, damaging subsidies or schemes will face no risk of challenge. That seems extremely risky, and I hope the Minister recognises that.

Jonathan Branton, a lawyer at DWF, summarised this and said:

“I think one month is too short, because that requires people to be extremely alert about checking things.”––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 52, Q73.]

People can get busy and have other deadlines for two, three or four weeks. It seems to be an extraordinarily short time that may create inefficiencies in other areas, as people ask, “What subsidies have come out? How quickly should I be checking?” This is about making sure there is a fair, well-scrutinised and effective regime. We need to get the balance right between providing legal certainty and ensuring damaging subsidies can be effectively challenged. It feels as if the balance is not right at the moment in the context of this regime and how it is designed in the Bill.

We propose to correct the balance in amendment 73, which would give interested parties three months to bring a subsidy or scheme before the CAT. In doing so, there would be more time to consider subsidies and their effects. It would give interested parties and public authorities a fair chance to ensure a challenge can be brought, still within a limited amount of time, and the balance between that and legal certainty can be effective.

[Paul Scully]

The clause sets out the time limits in which the interested party must make an application to the CAT to challenge the subsidy. It is important to set that limit so that we can give legal certainty to public authorities and subsidy beneficiaries. Ongoing lack of legal certainty can be a strong disincentive for public authorities giving legitimate subsidies and for the enterprises agreeing to receive them.

For example, a subsidy could take the form of a loan guarantee for a capital investment, such as buying new machinery. Members will appreciate that a beneficiary would be naturally reluctant to go ahead with buying that machinery for as long as there is a possibility that the subsidy decision could be quashed and a recovery order made.

It is right that subsidies can be challenged and that interested parties have sufficient time limits to consider that challenge, but we must not create such prolonged uncertainty that it acts as a brake on legitimate subsidies. That is the balance that we have struck in the Bill with the limitation period, which is generally one month from the date the subsidy or scheme is uploaded on the transparency database.

It is also important to note that an interested party can make a pre-action information request to a public authority. The limitation period is then extended until one month after the public authority has responded. Since the pre-action information request gives the public authority up to 28 days to respond, in practice, the limitation period can run for two or three months after the publication of the subsidy or scheme on the database.

Clause 71 also makes it clear that in exceptional circumstances, the tribunal may extend the time limits for bringing a challenge, but this amendment would extend the general window for bringing a challenge from one month to three months. That is too long. It is longer than the challenge periods available in other areas where business decisions are dependent on the decisions of public bodies, such as procurement and planning decisions, where the limitation periods are 30 days and six weeks respectively. In those areas, the harmful effects of prolonged uncertainty have been recognised through the shorter challenge periods available. The same reasoning applies in the subsidy control context. If the general limitation period for challenging subsidy decisions were extended to three months, as the amendment proposes, public authorities and subsidy beneficiaries could, in practice, have to wait as long as five months before having reasonable legal certainty about a subsidy. That is far too long. It is important to allow sufficient time for those affected by subsidy decisions to submit their claim, while ensuring that public authorities and beneficiaries can proceed to implement subsidy decisions with certainty once they are made. The Government believe that the timings provided for in the clause strike an appropriate balance between those two objectives. I therefore request that the hon. Member withdraw the amendment.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his comments. I was intending to press the amendment to a vote, but there is a wider question about how we improve the balance regarding how this amount of time is used within the framework of the Bill. Should public authorities be given a shorter time in which to upload, to allow more time for a challenge to be brought? The same amount of time would have elapsed, but that could be a far better framework for the regime.

In the light of the comments made and the consideration that we need to look at this as a whole, I will not press the amendment to a vote today, but we intend to return to this. It will be important for the certainty that we want to see and the transparency we need. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I rise to speak to amendment 31 in clause 71, page 40, line 36, leave out ‘one month’ and insert ‘6 months’.

This amendment allows CAT referrals a longer period to be made.

This is a pretty similar amendment, as it is about extending the length of time in which a challenge can be brought before the CAT. I wholeheartedly agree with what the shadow Minister has just said. If the Minister’s greatest concern is ensuring that the period of uncertainty is not increased, there remains an issue about the balance. We could ensure that that level of uncertainty existed for the same length of time but the balance was correct, so public authorities could upload these things very quickly, making the total challenge period shorter. That balance needs to be changed.

On amendment 31, the Opposition have made pretty much all the arguments I was going to make, so I will not take up too much of the Committee’s time. More than one amendment has been tabled on the matter, as well as on the database and its timings, and a number of comments were made in the witness sessions about the balance in the Bill not being right. I hope that the Minister will take on board the strength of feeling and give consideration to changing that balance by reducing the amount of time available for people to put things on the database and increasing the amount of time allowed for organisations to challenge. I therefore have no wish to move the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

Notwithstanding our concerns that the right balance has not been struck, we will not vote against clause stand part.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 71 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 72

CAT powers on review: England and Wales and Northern Ireland

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

The clause gives the Competition Appeal Tribunal the ability to grant the same forms of relief as are available to the High Court on an application for judicial review in England and Wales and Northern Ireland. The tribunal must likewise apply the same principles as the High Court in deciding whether to grant relief, and the remedies granted by the CAT are, where relevant, the same as those currently available to the High Court.

It is important that these remedies are available to the tribunal when it determines that a decision to give a subsidy or make a subsidy scheme was unlawful. That will ensure that the subsidy control principles, prohibitions and other requirements can be effectively enforced through the tribunal and, in turn, incentivise compliance. It will also ensure that the UK meets its commitments under its international agreements.

The clause works intrinsically with the clauses that follow it. Clause 73 makes equivalent provision in relation to Scotland. That is necessary because Scotland is a separate jurisdiction and has a different set of remedies for applications to the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of Session, which is the judicial review equivalent. Clause 74 gives the CAT the power to award an additional form of relief—a recovery order. That will give the CAT the ability, should it deem it appropriate, to order a public authority to recover a subsidy, in part or in whole, to rectify any adverse impacts on competition and investment in the UK caused by its award.

[Seema Malhotra]

The Minister has outlined in some detail what the clause does. It grants the CAT power to give certain forms of relief, similarly to the High Court. The CAT may grant a mandatory order, a prohibiting order, a quashing order, a declaration or an injunction. We recognise the importance of these powers, so we will support the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 72 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 73

CAT powers on review: Scotland

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

The clause gives the CAT the power to grant equivalent forms of relief as are available to the Court of Session in an application to the supervisory jurisdiction of that Court. When reviewing a case in Scotland, the CAT will be required to apply the same principles as the Court of Session would in those cases.

It is necessary to make separate provision for when the CAT is reviewing an application in Scotland as compared to England, Wales or Northern Ireland because, as the Committee is already aware, Scotland has a separate legal jurisdiction and its own system of judicial review, which differs from that in England and Wales and Northern Ireland. The clause therefore ensures that the tribunal has appropriate and effective remedial powers when it is hearing Scottish cases.

[Seema Malhotra]

We have no further comments on the clause, which we support.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 73 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 74

Recovery orders

[Seema Malhotra]

I beg to move amendment 76, in clause 74, page 43, line 34, at end insert—

“(4A) The annual report prepared by the CMA under section 25(4) of, and paragraph 14 of Schedule 4 to, the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 must contain details of all recovery orders made in the relevant period including the names of the public authority and beneficiary and the amount to be recovered.”

This amendment provides for the CMA’s annual report to provide details of all recovery orders made the by the CAT in the relevant period.

[Seema Malhotra]

The clause confers a power on the CAT to make a recovery order if it has granted relief in respect of a subsidy decision and found that the decision was in contravention of the subsidy control requirements in chapters 1 and 2 of part 2 of the Bill. A recurring theme in the Bill is the lack of transparency baked into how the Government confer subsidies and the subsequent management and reporting of those subsidies, with subsidy referrals, exemptions for certain subsidies from the regulations, and the blocking, rather inexplicably, of transparency for smaller subsidies.

In our view, clause 74 represents the latest example of poor transparency. It confers a power on the CAT to make a recovery order if a subsidy is found to be in contravention of the control principles. A recovery order requires a public authority to recoup an amount of the subsidy from the beneficiary of the subsidy. This clause therefore creates a provision to allow any losses that the Government face when they mistakenly confer a subsidy on a business or industry that is in contravention of their own regulations to be recouped.

Does it not make sense, then, that parliamentarians and the public should be able to scrutinise subsidies that have been inadvertently conferred, to make sure that does not happen again? Indeed, as we seem to keep needing to remind Members, there should be adequate public oversight of the spending, or potentially mis-spending, of public money. Professor Rickard noted in her evidence to the Committee:

“The benefits of transparency, and more of it, outweigh the costs.”

She went on:

“I would encourage Members to think carefully about the ways in which we could further increase the transparency to ensure that the UK was a world leader in transparency in subsidies and so as to help to provide consistency and certainty for business and accountability to taxpayers”––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 19, Q22.]

Transparency, and more of it, is a good thing. Imagine for a moment that an individual in charge of awarding a subsidy has taken the decision to corruptly award a subsidy to a business or sector from which he or she may gain direct financial benefit. If we are lucky, which we would need to be without adequate transparency, perhaps someone internal to their organisation would discover the malpractice. Without a publicly available report or register where the public can scrutinise which subsidies have been recalled and for what reason, that individual would get away with it and that malpractice could be swept under the rug.

It was discovered, for example, that Andrew Mills, an adviser to the Board of Trade who miraculously secured a £250 million PPE contract despite never having produced PPE in his life, received a pay-out of £32 million in that deal. That is an extremely large amount of money, which was paid out of the public purse, but that figure was only recently uncovered because one individual leaked it to the press. Transparency is therefore vital. That is why we are proposing amendment 76, which would require the CMA’s annual report to provide the full details of all recovery orders made by the CAT in the relevant period. That is what transparency looks like, that is what ensuring value for public money looks like, and that is why we hope the Government will give due consideration to the amendment.

[Paul Scully]

In addition to the ordinary judicial review remedies available under clauses 72 and 73, clause 74 gives the CAT the power to make a recovery order. It may order recovery of some or all of a subsidy if it finds that a subsidy or scheme was made in breach of the subsidy control principles, prohibitions and other requirements. The effect of the order will be to require the relevant public authority to recover the subsidy from the beneficiary. The method of recovery, the amount to be recovered and the timeframe for recovery will be for the CAT to determine.

As we have heard, amendment 76 would make it compulsory for the CMA’s annual report to include details of all recovery orders made in that year, including the names of the public authority, the beneficiary and the amount to be recovered. I support the objective of ensuring that the process of reporting and managing recovery orders is transparent and accountable; however, this intent is already met by the process as it stands in the Bill. Recovery orders, by their nature, will be made public, and enforcement mechanisms exist to ensure that they are followed. Accordingly, there is no need to give the CMA this additional reporting duty.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Scully]

I will address that point, but if the tribunal decides to make a recovery order, the public authority in question must recover a subsidy from the beneficiary in accordance with the terms of the order. Recovery orders will be enforceable in the same way as an order made by the High Court or, in relation to Scotland, the Court of Session. The tribunal will hold public authorities accountable for the subsidies that they give. As the process is already transparent and holds public authorities accountable to the regime, it is not necessary to give the CMA a reporting obligation for recovery orders.

The CMA’s annual report would also not be the right place for that information to be collated. The requirement to produce a report under the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 relates to the CMA’s functions. The Competition Appeal Tribunal, not the CMA, is responsible for recovery orders. The CAT already has the reporting systems needed for recovery orders. I therefore request that the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston withdraw the amendment.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his comments. He is right that recovery orders are published alongside hearings, but they are not collated, and it is not possible to see them easily in one place in order to understand collectively what is going on. If we want to know where things are not going well and what is happening across the regime from an end-to-end point of view, it is important to have that information not just publicly available, but easily accessible.

[Kirsty Blackman]

Does the hon. Member agree that it is very difficult for us to know what is coming up in the CAT unless we are looking at its website on a regular basis, so the transparency that we need as parliamentarians to see that the Bill is working effectively is not adequately fulfilled by the CAT’s current reporting duties?

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the hon. Member for her comment, and she is right. When we develop legislation and introduce a regime, it has to stand the test of time and last beyond the time we spend in our individual roles. In five or 10 years, the Minister might have become Prime Minister.

[Paul Scully]

Not a chance, he says from a sedentary position.

[Seema Malhotra]

Others are starting their campaigns, so perhaps the Minister also will do so.

We need to think about making such information more easily accessible. We thought about whether the CMA should publish it simply because if we have data on the regime as a whole, it should not be too onerous to find a way of reporting some of it, perhaps in partnership with the Competition Appeal Tribunal. To enable us to see what is going on and where there are recovery orders, that would be useful alongside other information that we talked about, such as geographical information, so that we have an end-to-end view.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I have just one more thing to add on this. Clause 65 covered monitoring and reporting on subsidy control, and the five-year report that will be published. Does the hon. Member agree that if the annual report will not cover instances of recovery orders because they are not the responsibility of the CMA, the CMA’s review of the efficacy of the subsidy control regime would be an appropriate alternative place to report on them?

[Seema Malhotra]

The hon. Member makes a good point. I come back to our broader discussion about needing to have a clear view and how we can be efficient. Data collection and reporting requires thought and design about what will be most useful for coming forward into reporting and therefore fit for making decisions on. Nobody wants to collect the data for the sake of it; it is always for a purpose. How do we make it as streamlined, straightforward, accurate and quick as possible? It is worth coming back to this issue.

In the light of our earlier conversation about the Minister writing on what he expects to see in the annual report, that would also be an opportunity for us to revisit the issue and making sure that the reporting across the whole system is coherent and effective, as well as what would be annual and what would be in the more periodic reports. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

This clause gives the CAT the power to make a recovery order in addition to the standard judicial review remedies that will be available to the tribunal under clauses 72 and 73. As with the other remedies that will be available to the CAT, the power to order recovery will be at the CAT’s discretion. It will be for the tribunal to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the recovery of the subsidy is an appropriate remedy based on the facts in question. The CAT may decide a different remedy, or a combination of different remedies, is more appropriate depending on the facts in front of it.

The clause gives the tribunal flexibility in how the recovery order is framed to account for different types of subsidy that may need to be recovered. For example, the tribunal would have the power to decide how long a public authority should have to recover the subsidy and the means by which recovery is to be exercised. It will be for the tribunal to decide on a case-by-case basis the appropriate content of the recovery order. In many instances, it will be relatively clear which enterprises benefited from a subsidy that needs to be recovered, and relatively simple to require the public authority to recover the amount in question. However, there may be cases where the subsidy is complex in nature, with the tribunal concluding that it should be left to the public authority to calculate the exact amount to be repaid.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his remarks. We support the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 74 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 75

Appeals against decisions of the CAT

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

The Competition Appeal Tribunal will, in the first instance, determine reviews of subsidy decisions by public authorities. In the rare instances where there are legitimate disputes on the meaning of the law underpinning a decision, it is important there is an ability to seek permission to appeal to a court of appeal. Appeals cannot be made simply because one party to the litigation does not agree with the outcome. There will have to be a genuine ground of appeal citing an error in the application of the law. The clause provides the basis on which appeals can be made as appropriate to the Court of Appeal in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, or to the Court of Session in Scotland. Appeals may be made on any point of law with permission either from the tribunal or the relevant appellate court.

[Seema Malhotra]

As the Minister said, the clause allows appeals to be made to the Court of Appeal or the Court of Session on any points of law. We support it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 75 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 76

Duty to provide pre-action information

[Seema Malhotra]

I beg to move amendment 77, in clause 76, page 44, line 21, leave out

“such restrictions as it considers proportionate”

and insert

“the minimum restrictions that are necessary”.

This amendment provides that restrictions imposed to protect the specified categories of information should be the minimum necessary.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 78, in clause 76, page 44, line 27, at end insert—

“(5A) The Secretary of State must issue guidance on the restrictions that are necessary to protect the types of information described in subsection (5).”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to issue guidance on restrictions imposed under subsection (5).

Amendment 79, in clause 76, page 44, line 27, at end insert—

“(5B) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision enabling a person to appeal against a decision by a public authority to impose any restrictions under subsection (5).”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to make provision for an appeals process against restrictions imposed under subsection (5).

[Seema Malhotra]

Clause 76 imposes a duty on public authorities to provide certain information to interested parties about a subsidy or a subsidy scheme. An interested party may request the information for the purpose of deciding whether to apply to the CAT for a review of a subsidy or scheme on the grounds that it failed to comply with the relevant subsidy control requirements. A request must be made in writing and the interested party must state that they are considering applying for a review. The public authority must respond to the request within 28 days and it may impose restrictions that it considers proportionate to protect commercially sensitive or legally privileged information.

Amendment 77 would mean that restrictions should be the minimum necessary when imposed to protect commercially sensitive, confidential or legally privileged information or information whose disclosure would be contrary to the public interest. Let us compare that with the current wording of the Bill, which is that the public authority may impose restrictions that it considers proportionate. The original wording is very ambiguous, provides too little guidance for the public authority and provides little recourse to challenge if it is determined that the restrictions imposed were in fact disproportionate. The restrictions imposed by the public authority should not be overly excessive. It is important that information that should be made public is made public to allow maximum transparency. If we keep the original text, a public authority could choose unnecessarily to make public more than is proper, hampering adequate transparency measures.

Amendment 78 would provide a proper route for challenge if a public authority imposed restrictions under subsection (5) that were found to be excessive. On amendment 79, we consider it proper that where restrictions have been imposed on the release of information to interested parties on the basis of, for example, commercial or legal sensitivities, there is an appeals process to ensure that the decision made was the correct one. That is essential to ensure that a public authority is not able to abuse its powers in deciding which restrictions to impose, and encourages the public authority to choose the minimum restrictions necessary or possibly face an appeals process.

Overall, although we believe that our amendments would substantially improve clause 76, we recognise the clause’s importance in allowing interested parties to make a request for information.

[Paul Scully]

The purpose of clause 76 is to put a duty on public authorities to provide certain information, at the request of an interested party, about their decision to give a subsidy or make a subsidy scheme. That is so that the interested party can decide whether to apply for a review of that decision at the CAT. The pre-action information request will allow claims to proceed more efficiently, and help to avoid unmeritorious challenges. The public authority must respond to the request within 28 calendar days, but can impose proportionate restrictions, as set out in subsection (5), to protect certain types of sensitive, confidential, legally privileged or other information that should not be disclosed. It is important that a public authority is able to impose those restrictions, as that may be needed to avoid potential legal challenges—for example, if certain information is subject to a legal duty of confidentiality, and to avoid disclosing information contrary to the public interest. Where a pre-action information request has been made, it is very clearly in the interests of the relevant public authority to provide a full return and to use with some caution the restrictions on providing those types of information. For that reason, this trio of amendments is unnecessary.

If a public authority abuses the provisions in clause 76(5) and provides insufficient information to clarify whether its subsidy decision complied with the subsidy control requirements, it is all the more likely that the interested party will proceed to a full challenge. If they do, the public authority may be required to disclose further information in proceedings before the tribunal. The public authority will have gained nothing.

I am very reluctant to agree to produce guidance on what might be the minimum restrictions necessary, because that will depend on the facts of each case. The risk that public authorities misuse the discretion that clause 76(5) gives them seems small and, as I have said, it is not in their interests to do so. That risk is smaller than the risk of producing unhelpful guidance that does not allow public authorities to disclose the right information in the context of each case. The amendments propose taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Ultimately, I am confident that, helped by the guidance, there will be a high degree of compliance with the regime and very few occasions when there are grounds for a challenge.

[Seema Malhotra]

The Minister may be coming to this point, but will he clarify the process he envisages in a case where there is suspicion that, rather than information being commercially sensitive, there is another reason for not disclosing it? Is there a way to challenge that or to appeal? We want to understand this; that is why we tabled the amendments.

[Paul Scully]

Yes, I will come to that.

I am similarly reluctant to agree that the Government should create a special route of appeal against public authorities’ decisions on what information to provide. There is only a remote chance that such a route would ever be needed, but there is already a route to challenge a public authority’s decision under the clause. Depending on the facts, the general right to judicial review in the High Court or the Court of Session may be available. As I said, however, we can be confident that there will be a high level of compliance, and I am even more confident that public authorities will not act against their own interests and those of subsidy beneficiaries by withholding information unnecessarily in a pre-action information request. It would be excessive to create a special route to challenge the way public authorities comply with these requests.

The Bill makes it firmly in a public authority’s interests to provide a full response to a pre-action information request and to take a sincere and serious approach to imposing restrictions on what information it provides. Inadequate disclosure would increase the chances of a full challenge, and with it the likelihood of further information needing to be disclosed in proceedings before the tribunal. Setting up an apparatus of guidance, regulations and special routes of appeal around the pre-action information request would be wholly disproportionate to the risks that the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston set out. I ask her to withdraw the amendment.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his remarks. I am not entirely sure that he has identified an alternative route. On the basis that he thinks there could be a route, and to allow time to review and test that, I will not press the amendments today, but I would be grateful if he replied in writing on one specific point. If an interested party makes a request and, under subsection (5), the public authority imposes restrictions that it has reason to believe are spurious, for example, the Minister says that JR may be available. The question is whether JR is available. I would like him to state where and how there is the equivalent of an appeal mechanism. If he does that, I would be happy to say that we feel that that important issue has been dealt with.

The Minister also says that only in a small number of cases—I forget his exact words—might the provision be misused, but sometimes the point of having law is to make sure that it is there for such occasions. We cannot predict how many times a mechanism for appeal and challenge may be required, but one day, when he is, perhaps not the Prime Minister, but the Secretary of State, he might have reason as an interested party to use it. For the purpose of ensuring that there is a robust regime, it is important that we cover off this point. If such a mechanism is in the Bill, as he hopes it is, it would be good to have clarification in writing.

[Paul Scully]

I am happy to go again. The public authorities have a statutory duty. They understand their legal position and the legal duties. That is why I believe the number of such cases will be minimal. If public authorities do not provide the correct information, the interested party can go straight to the CAT for a full challenge, but judicial review is available in those circumstances. With three avenues, we do not feel it is necessary to create a specific one for this set of circumstances, but I will put clarification in writing.

[Seema Malhotra]

On the basis that I expect a letter from the Minister, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

The clause imposes a duty on public authorities to provide certain information to interested parties about a subsidy or subsidy scheme. An interested party may request the information for the purpose of deciding whether to challenge the subsidy or subsidy scheme on the ground that the public authority failed to comply with the principles, prohibitions and other requirements in the Bill. To avoid being timed out on bringing a challenge, a request should be made before the expiration of the one-month challenge period, in writing, and the interested party musts state that they are making the request for purpose of deciding whether to review a subsidy or subsidy scheme decision. The public authority must respond to the request within 28 calendar days, but can impose proportionate restrictions to protect certain types of sensitive, confidential, legally privileged information or other information that should not be disclosed because that would not be in the public interest. The purpose of the duty is to ensure that interested parties can make a well-informed decision on whether to commence a challenge against a subsidy decision.

[Seema Malhotra]

Having explained how we believe our amendments would have improved the clause, we acknowledge its importance in allowing interested parties to request information and therefore support its standing part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 76 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 77

Misuse of subsidies

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Scully]

I will come to that in a second.

It is good practice for the contractual arrangements to contain a mechanism allowing public authorities to recover a subsidy if the terms and conditions are breached, including whether the subsidy is misused. However, not all subsidies are given through contractual arrangements, and those may not have a mechanism to recover the subsidy if it is used for a different purpose. Public authorities may have other private law rights that enable them to recover the subsidies in those circumstances. The clause is designed to avoid any uncertainty by conferring on public authorities a right to recover subsidies used for a purpose other than that for which they were given. The new right to recover is enforceable as if it were a contractual right and does not affect any other remedies that might be available to the public authority with respect to the award of the subsidy in question.

[Seema Malhotra]

I am grateful to the Minister for his comments and to the hon. Member for Aberdeen North for her question, which is important.

As the Minister outlined, the clause gives public authorities the power to recover subsidies used for purposes other than the purpose for which they were given. That is an extremely important stipulation. Subsidies should be used only as intended, in line with the subsidy control requirements, and as agreed between the public authority and the recipient. We will support the clause standing part of the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

May I write to the hon. Member for Aberdeen North on her question? I am not sure whether the clause will apply, but I will write to her.

Oral Answers to Questions

Seema Malhotra Excerpts

Tuesday 16th November 2021 Commons Chamber

[Lee Rowley]

I caution against the hon. Gentleman’s comparison. We have a similar ambition to countries such as Germany on things like hydrogen, and we have already published our hydrogen strategy. I have had extensive engagement with the steel sector in my two months as Minister for steel, including another visit yesterday, and we continue to want to support the industry on its decarbonisation journey. We know it is challenging, but there are already examples and we will continue to work with the industry to ensure it happens.

[Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)]

Years of Tory neglect and inaction mean the UK is falling further behind in the race to win the future of green steel production. Governments around the world are committing to their steel industries with long-term investment, but the Minister, the Budget and, indeed, the hydrogen strategy have failed to deliver any timetable for how the Clean Steel Fund will be implemented. There appears to be no urgency and no plan.

Will the Secretary of State tell us today whether he will back Labour’s plan for a £3 billion steel renewal fund to achieve near-zero-emissions steel production by 2035 to secure UK steel’s future? If not, why is he so content to see British industries lose out, more British businesses go under and more British jobs lost?

[Lee Rowley]

That is neither an accurate reflection of the situation nor an accurate reflection of the historical support that has been given to the steel industry. Since 2013, there has been £600 million-worth of support for electricity price relief. The industrial energy transformation fund was opened last year and steel companies had the opportunity to apply for it, and we have published the steel procurement pipeline and the steel safeguards. We will continue to work with this important sector to ensure that it can decarbonise and has long-term support for its future.

Subsidy Control Bill (Ninth sitting)

Seema Malhotra Excerpts

Tuesday 16th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Kirsty Blackman]

Thank you, Mr Sharma, for your dedication in chairing the Committee, no matter how much we talk. It is appreciated that you continue to show up.

Amendment 29 would work in conjunction with amendment 30 on Competition and Markets Authority monitoring. The measures on subsidy control are new, and we do not know how they are going to work. We do not know how well subsidy control is going to work. It is therefore really important that the CMA reports on a regular basis.

I have had various arguments with Treasury Ministers about tax measures. Treasury Ministers have generally made it clear to me that tax measures are reviewed on a regular basis. Unfortunately, it is impossible to find what “regular” means. It is impossible to pin it down. It is impossible to work out when tax measures are actually reviewed and to see, in any sensible way, any evidence of that. I have previously asked Ministers on Delegated Legislation Committees, for example, to commit to writing to the members of a Committee in the future, when the tax measure under discussion is reviewed, but the Government continue to fail to do so.

I am concerned that the Government’s ability to be transparent on subsidy control measures needs to be in the Bill. The amendment addresses the CMA monitoring report, rather than the Government report, but the CMA will deal with the monitoring and reporting of subsidy control. I hope that the Government will also be reviewing measures, in addition to the CMA’s monitoring and reporting, and will be checking to see how subsidy control is working and whether the Bill is working as intended. As we have previously said though, we have significant concerns about the lack of data that will be provided and the fact that we cannot effectively monitor all the subsidies that are given because of the lack of requirement for granting authorities to register all of those subsidies, or even subsidies over a sensible threshold—the threshold as set is too high.

Amendment 29 would ensure that the CMA’s first report occurs two years, rather than five years, after subsidy control begins. Given the newness of the regime—it is being created and implemented for the first time in autumn next year—we need to know how things are going and we need to know that more quickly than in two or even three Parliaments, depending on how quickly elections are called. Five years is about three parliamentary terms, if we go by recent times. Some people would even say that five years is a generation.

Five years is too long for the initial report. Following that, five years for the subsequent report is also too long. Amendment 30 suggests that the report should be pulled together annually, rather than every five years. That would greatly improve transparency. The Government have been clear that this is a permissive structure that will encourage people to act in the best interests of economic development and improving their areas. I do not think we can properly assess that if we get a report on this from the CMA only every five years rather than more regularly. The Opposition’s amendments to the clause would similarly reduce the length of time between reports; they have been slightly more flexible than I have, but I support the aim of their amendments—to reduce the term from five years.

[Seema Malhotra (Feltham and Heston) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Sharma. I thank you for continuing to turn up to our ongoing and extensive deliberations. I thank the hon. Member for Aberdeen North for her comments. She is right that we have tabled a coincidentally similar amendment to hers. I support all the arguments she made. She is right that the Opposition amendment suggested slightly greater flexibility than the SNP amendment, partly because of our thinking on how long it might take to actually get the information to be able to add more meaningful assessments and recommendations to the monitoring of and reporting on subsidy control.

The clause rightly requires the CMA to undertake a periodic review of the effectiveness of the Bill’s operation and its impact on competition and investment in the UK. The Secretary of State may also direct the CMA to prepare a report in respect of a specified period. I am not fully sure whether that allows for some flexibility if issues are identified; perhaps the Minister can respond to that point. However, the review is important because the new regime contains many significant differences from the EU state aid rules in the processes that we will follow. Those processes, which I think have the support of the House, require safeguards to be in place, because they are not in place in a system in which some of the review and scrutiny is done up front. We cannot embark on this without making sure that there are safeguards on the use of public funds, adequate scrutiny measures and a system for learning what works well and what may not. For example, there may be a learning curve for public authorities, businesses and the Government alike, so it is important that the regime is subject to this regular review. It is good practice and it is important for value for money, for accountability to the taxpayer and to assess the effectiveness of the regime and make any necessary changes.

It is important that the regime is subject to regular review. I think we are joined here in the view that five years is not regular enough, particularly given the very good example of having three elections in five years. Politics is not always certain, yet we want that certainty to be in place. We want the learning to be fast cycle; it is good practice to learn in a more fast-cycle way. Perhaps the Minister could clarify why this time period was selected. Five years would effectively provide for one report per Parliament, assuming that we have a five-year Parliament.

What is more, five years is a significant amount of time to have passed before the first review of the effectiveness of the operation of the regime. There could be significant inefficiencies that cause substantive negative effects within that timeframe, and Parliament would be none the wiser without that informed view and assessment from the CMA. Labour tabled amendments 61 and 62 to reduce the reporting period laid out in clause 65 to every three years, which would allow for enough data to come through and for a cycle of meaningful reports that could take into account recommendations for change and assess how effectively the intended outcomes had been delivered. As a minimum, that is a more appropriate timeframe for reviewing the new regime. I would be grateful to know whether deciding on five years followed discussions with the CMA. If those discussions did happen, what was the CMA’s feedback? Engaging with the CMA is important, and there may be the need for challenge if Parliament has a different view.

As well as giving Governments more opportunity to make changes to the regime, including legislative changes and process improvements, any problems with the regime would be resolved considerably earlier because, let’s face it, if we have five years to do something, it may be left until the last minute. We want to ensure that Parliament is also responsive to any changes and plays its part in ensuring that the regime, and any changes, can be reviewed effectively every three years.

I hope the Minister recognises why five years is too long a reporting period, takes on board the comments of the hon. Member for Aberdeen North and her party and those from Labour, and perhaps offers some feedback to the Committee on why five years was suggested. Does the Minister recognise our arguments, and would he be prepared to include a review in the later stages of the Bill?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Paul Scully)]

It is a pleasure, as always, to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Sharma. As we have heard, clause 65 requires the CMA to produce a report on the overall effectiveness of the regime and its impact on competition and investment within the UK. The monitoring report is to be produced in relation to the first five years following the Bill’s commencement and for every subsequent five-year period. That interval was chosen specifically as an appropriate length of time over which to consider the wider impacts of the regime as a whole and to evaluate its overall effectiveness during a period in which a sizeable number of subsidies would be given, so that the medium-term effects could be properly considered and evaluated.

The period is consistent with the maximum length of a parliamentary term, as we have heard, ensuring that there is a regime-wide assessment of the regime at least every normal parliamentary term. Producing such a report is a significant undertaking, requiring a good amount of time to gather and analyse the evidence. Five years strikes the right balance between the time needed to observe how the new regime is working and the benefit of timely analysis and evaluation.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for giving way, and I appreciate his comments. However, he has not explained whether periods of time other than five years were assessed, and has not yet explained—perhaps he will—whether the CMA was involved in the discussions. Given the work of the subsidy advice unit and all the other work going on, producing a report every three years will not be too onerous if it is part of business as usual. What consideration has been given to other time periods?

Perhaps the Minister can also clarify something. Does he see that if a report arrives in year four of a Parliament and some legislative changes are required and then we have an election, that would not be a sensible way of running a regime that requires some interplay between Parliament and the devolved Administrations? More frequent reporting at three years, which is not too onerous—it is as long as it takes to complete a common degree—would make a difference and allow for changes to be brought through.

[Paul Scully]

To be fair, I had only just started making my remarks. However, whether it is butting up against elections or not, that could equally be the case in three years as well as five years. However, five years was chosen, as I said, basically to correspond roughly with the standard parliamentary term; it gives a good amount of time for good and meaningful data to be collected and analysed; and it is also consistent with the monitoring reports of other bodies, such as the Office for the Internal Market.

Clearly, we work with the CMA on this issue and other issues. The CMA will work on the subsidy control regime in the future; we work with it very closely. In the evidence session, Rachel Merelie talked about the fact that there may be merit in the CMA providing advice more frequently at the request of the Secretary of State, and that is exactly what is set out in the Bill, so that the frequency of reporting can be changed, which I will come on to shortly.

We have heard that the various amendments will reduce the key periods, down to either two years or three years, depending on the particular amendment. I will cover the amendments in turn.

First of all, amendment 29 would require the initial monitoring report to be produced within two years of the Bill gaining Royal Assent, as opposed to within five years. Well, I have talked about the fact that five years would normally be the appropriate timeframe, so that the wider evidence and the consequences can be properly considered. I agree that circumstances might arise that could make it beneficial for any monitoring report on the new control regime to be produced within a shorter timeframe. That is why clause 65(4) says:

“The Secretary of State may direct the CMA to prepare a report in relation to a specified period.”

And the Secretary of State will provide the means for an earlier report if it should be considered necessary. Therefore, I believe that amendment 29 is unnecessary.

Amendment 30 relates to the reporting frequency. Again, I understand the desire of the hon. Member for Aberdeen North for more frequent reporting. However, reducing the interval between the reports by the subsidy advice unit to one year is not necessary and could divert resource from other important activities.

Equating more frequent monitoring reports with improved scrutiny and transparency might seem attractive, but in reality it could well have an effect opposite to that intended by the hon. Member, resulting in more superficial reports, which would be less useful in assessing the overall effectiveness of the subsidy regime.

Clause 66 already requires the subsidy advice unit to provide annual reports to Parliament, in order to provide transparency in referral cases that it has handled throughout the year. The monitoring reports set out in clause 65 go beyond that, covering the functioning of the whole regime and not just the specific role of the subsidy advice unit. By necessity, those reports take longer to produce, so that there is sufficient quality data for the subsidy advice unit to consider.

--- Later in debate ---

Division 21

Ayes: 5

---

Labour: 4
Scottish National Party: 1

Noes: 10

---

Conservative: 10

[Seema Malhotra]

I beg to move amendment 63, in clause 65, page 37, line 16, at end insert—

“(4A) In preparing any report under this section, the CMA must consult—

(a) the Secretary of State;

(b) the Scottish Ministers;

(c) the Welsh Ministers; and

(d) the Department of Economy in Northern Ireland.”

This amendment would require the CMA to consult with the Secretary of State and Devolved Administrations before preparing any report under this section.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 64, in clause 65, page 37, line 27, at end insert—

“(7A) The CMA must arrange for a copy of a report prepared under this section to be laid before the Scottish Parliament, Senedd Cymru and the Northern Ireland Assembly.”

This amendment would require the CMA to lay a copy of its reports before the devolved parliaments and assemblies.

[Seema Malhotra]

We return to a familiar theme, which is the absence of any clear role for the devolved Administrations and the failure to recognise the need for a truly four-nation approach. Yet again, the clause fails to provide a role for the devolved Administrations in the CMA consultations and report.

The Government seem not to have quite grasped the fact that the new subsidy regime will affect not just England, but Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. All nations should contribute to the review of the effectiveness of the regime and its impact on competition and investment within the UK, as all four nations will be affected. In fact, given that Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland will have to implement not just what is in the Bill, but the many future regulations to be made by the Secretary of State, it is equally important that all voices are heard. Already, the devolved Administrations will not be included in defining many regulations; will not be able to call in subsidies or make post-award referrals; will not have automatic standing to challenge subsidies before the Competition Appeal Tribunal; and may not even be represented on the body that oversees the new regime—unless the Government are enlightened by discussion in Committee and the main Chamber, and with what is happening with the Office for the Internal Market.

Will the Minister explain what role he sees the devolved Administrations playing in the new regime and in the monitoring and review? Daniel Greenberg, Parliamentary Counsel for Domestic Legislation, said in the evidence session that

“when you are dealing with international obligations of the UK, that has to be dealt with by central Government but, again, doesn’t that have to be done in consultation with the devolved Administrations? Of course it does. With co-ordination with the devolved Administrations? Of course it does. With mechanisms for encoding that co-ordination and consultation into the way the Bill operates? Of course.”––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 61, Q80.]

The Labour party agrees completely with that, which is why we have consistently sought to amend the Bill to increase the role and voice of the devolved Administrations.

There have been fewer occasions on which Labour has wanted to increase the voice of the Secretary of State under the legislation, but clause 65 is one place where we think that might be important. The amendment would therefore require the CMA to consult both the Secretary of State and the devolved Administrations before issuing a periodic review of the regime. In particular, the CMA would find the inclusion of their voices helpful as it deliberates the impact of the regime on competition and investment across the UK.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I thank the hon. Member for her indulgence. There is no need for me to speak to the amendments, but I wholeheartedly support them. The Scottish National party will back them should they be pressed to a vote.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the hon. Member for her support.

Speaking to amendment 64, once the CMA has prepared its report, clause 65(7) requires the CMA to arrange for a copy of it to be laid before Parliament. We welcome the opportunity that that will provide for the UK Parliament to scrutinise the reports. Given the impact of the regime on the devolved Administrations, however, why will the report not also be laid before the devolved Administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, thereby giving them the opportunity to undertake detailed scrutiny? There might be a technical reason for that, but certainly the feedback that we have received is that laying reports before the Administrations would enable more formal scrutiny of them. I would be grateful for the Minister’s comments on that.

Amendment 64 would require the CMA to put a copy of its report before the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Senedd and the Northern Ireland Assembly, which would provide each of the legislatures with a clear ability to scrutinise the CMA report and therefore the effectiveness and impact of the regime.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Scully]

As an awarding body, I fully expect the CMA and subsidy advice unit to speak to all the devolved nations as well as public authorities. That does not specifically need to be in the Bill, for the reasons I have given about excluding others. Given that subsidy control is and will remain a reserved policy matter, it is right that the UK Parliament considers and scrutinises the report. I therefore request that the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston withdraw the amendment.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his comments. The devolved Administrations are distinct from other institutions because they are democratic institutions. For a regime that has to be accountable, it is important that the voice of those bodies and of Ministers, and others who may well have a view, are consulted. It is important to distinguish democratic institutions from others. The Minister is right that there will be a whole range of people who may want to contribute their views, and I am sure that the CMA will find a mechanism for seeking views.

I want to push amendment 63 to a vote because if this is something that should be done anyway, we want to ensure that it is done. Making sure at key stages that the voice of the devolved Administrations, and indeed of the Secretary of State, are formally heard will add significant insight to what will be in that report. We want that report to be the best it can be.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Division 22

Ayes: 5

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Labour: 4
Scottish National Party: 1

Noes: 10

---

Conservative: 10

[Seema Malhotra]

I beg to move amendment 65, in clause 65, page 37, line 27, at end insert—

“(7A) Within 30 working days of a report being laid under subsection (7), the Secretary of State must make a statement to the House of Commons explaining what action will be taken to remedy any deficiencies in the effectiveness of the operation of the Act or impact of the operation of the Act on competition and investment within the United Kingdom identified by the CMA.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to make a statement to the House of Commons on the CMA’s findings and any remedial action required.

I will keep my comments brief. This amendment would require the Secretary of State to make a statement to the House of Commons on the CMA’s findings and any remedial action required. It does not take a genius to recognise that reviews alone are not enough; they need to be acted on. Yet there are no provisions in the Bill that we have seen that require the Secretary of State to act in response to the findings of the CMA’s reports, or even to consider whether action is necessary to remediate any deficiencies in the regime identified by the CMA. Does the Minister agree that this seems to be a significant gap?

If the report and reviews under clause 65 do not trigger at the very least an obligation for the Secretary of State to consider and have due regard to its findings, are we not missing quite an important step in the overall process of review and improvement of the regime? That is why we have tabled amendment 65, which states that within 30 days of the report being laid under clause 65, the Secretary of State must make a statement to the House explaining what their response is and what action may be taken to address any deficiencies highlighted in the report. That would ensure that any issues with the new regime were not only raised, but actively considered. As the regulation currently stands, problems identified by the CMA may continue undebated and unaddressed.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I have a couple of other comments and suggestions. The laying before Parliament is, as has been said, a limited way in which parliamentarians can interact with the report. It is great that it is being laid before Parliament, but a ministerial statement, whether written or oral, would help in not just raising the profile of the report published by the CMA, but making clear what the Government intend to do about any deficiencies that have been created. Alternatively, there could be a requirement in the legislation—I might think about this for Report—for the report to go before the Public Accounts Committee or the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, whichever would be more relevant, in order that it could scrutinise the report and ensure that it was taking evidence and creating a report with recommendations to the Government on what needs to be changed.

If the reporting period is to be only every five years, I assume that there will not be immediate—as soon as the report comes through—change happening and that it is likely that there will be a mulling-over period once the report comes in, so that, as the Minister said, the medium-term changes and so on can be assessed and any changes can be made to the legislation. In that case, a written statement or an oral statement being made, whereby we could ask any questions that we needed to, or a more in-depth report by one of the parliamentary Select Committees, would mean that Parliament had a stake, Parliament was invested, and Parliament was assisting in making the changes that the CMA required or in suggesting how to make the changes.

I am sure that the Minister would be the first to admit that the Government do not have every one of the answers. They may have a lot of the answers, in his view, but they do not have every one of the answers, and that is why consultation is hugely important with external organisations but also with those of us who are elected to scrutinise legislation, to scrutinise what the Government are doing, and to try to make the most appropriate changes so that things work, in the interest of spending public money appropriately but also in the interests of our constituents and the people of the UK.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his comments. On the basis of some of the discussion, and the suggestion about what role Select Committees might play, issues with the report are perhaps something we can review and discuss offline with the Minister. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

The clause requires the subsidy advice unit periodically to review and report on the effectiveness of the operation of the subsidy control regime and its impact on competition and investment. This report should be prepared every five years, or more frequently if requested by the Secretary of State. This review mechanism will ensure that the new subsidy control regime continues to operate effectively, based on experience of how it is working in practice and the impact it is having on competition and investment. The report will be published by the SAU and laid before Parliament.

[Seema Malhotra]

This is an important clause and we support its standing part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 65 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 66

CMA Annual Report

[Seema Malhotra]

I beg to move amendment 66, in clause 66, page 37, line 40, at end insert—

“(d) the proportion of subsidies and schemes in each of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) in relation to which the CMA found that the public authority’s assessment under section 52(2)(d) or 56(2)(d) required improvement;

(e) the proportion of subsidies and schemes in each of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) in relation to which the CMA identified a risk of negative effects on competition or investment within the United Kingdom;

(f) information on the geographical allocation of subsidies, including the total value of subsidies subject to mandatory and voluntary notification in the preceding 12 months that have been awarded to enterprises in each nation, region and local authority within the United Kingdom;

(g) the number of extensions to the reporting period made under section 53(6) at the request of the CMA and the average number of days of those extensions;

(h) the number of voluntary referrals made under section 56(1);and

(i) the number of those voluntary referrals in relation to which the CMA has given notice under section 57(2) that it has decided not to prepare a report.”.

This amendment would require the CMA to include the additional specified information in its annual report.

Clause 66 sets out the information that the CMA must include in its annual reports. It is connected in some regards to the debate that we have just had. Although we support the mandating of specific information to be included in the annual reports, the information required feels too high-level and not sufficiently detailed or useful. The clause envisages the CMA simply listing the subsidies and schemes in relation to which it has prepared reports. The Minister may explain what he expects in the annual report.

We believe that, first, the annual report should include information on the number of subsidies and schemes in relation to which the CMA found that public authority assessments required improvements. In doing so, the review would provide an assessment of how successfully public authorities are meeting their statutory obligations under the legislation.

Secondly, the report should include information on the subsidies and schemes that the CMA reviewed and found risked having a negative effect on competition and investment within the UK’s internal market. That would ensure that not only the House but the taxpayer and the devolved Administrations are made aware of what, where and how subsidies are putting pressure on the UK’s internal market, if that is happening.

Thirdly, the report should include information on the geographical spread of subsidies that the CMA considered in the last reporting period, as well as information on the value of subsidies that have been awarded to enterprises in each region, nation and local authority in the UK. We are used to statistics and information being available at a fairly granular level. This is important and significant, given that, despite our best attempts, the Bill currently provides no information or regulation on how subsidies and schemes will work to reduce economic inequality across the United Kingdom.

If the Government really believe in levelling up, they need to take action to match what they say. The new regime, and subsidies generally, can provide an important opportunity for channelling resources to deprived areas and reducing regional and intra-regional inequality. As the Bill currently stands, however, there are no regulations in place that actively allow for that. As Professor Fothergill, the national director of the Industrial Communities Alliance, explained:

“In certain places, if we really are serious about levelling up, we have to put more resources into that effort, and we have to use state aid as one of the tools for delivering new jobs.”––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 11, Q7.]

Does the Minister recognise that the contents of the Bill do not currently match up with the levelling-up rhetoric? Does he agree that subsidies can be used and could make a significant impact by supporting and aiding deprived areas? Including information on the geographical spread of subsidies could be quite an effective and efficient way of providing some insight about whether the resources under the regime are working to reduce inequality, which would surely be of help to the Government in achieving their stated goals.

We believe that the CMA’s annual report should include information that would allow the CMA’s resourcing, capacity and effectiveness to be evaluated. We have proposed that the annual report should set out

“the number of extensions to the reporting period”

for mandatory notifications that the CMA has made, the duration of those extensions,

“the number of voluntary referrals made”,

and how many of those the CMA has and has not prepared a report on. The CMA has a key role in ensuring that subsidies and schemes meet the principles and do not distort the market. If it is unable to carry out its responsibilities effectively, there will be a real risk that damaging subsidies continue without challenge or review.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I have just a couple of points to make. We have already raised a number of concerns about the limitations of the transparency that will be provided, particularly on the subsidies that will be on the database and our inability to get any meaningful information from it, because so many of the subsidies that will be made will be excluded from being on the website by merit of their being below the de minimis threshold. We continue to have concerns about that.

The amendment simply asks for transparency data and for the CMA to produce in its annual report data that it has already. These are data that the CMA will have within its local key performance indicators—stuff that it will be considering anyway. It will know the number of extensions and voluntary referrals that have been made. This is not an additional piece of work that the CMA will need to do. It is simply ensuring that such information is added to the annual report, rather than putting an additional burden on the CMA. It is stuff that the CMA will be measuring anyway—if it is not doing so, it is not a public organisation that is working sensibly. This is basic, bread-and-butter stuff, and it means that we would be able to scrutinise properly and have an idea of what is happening.

The points made by the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston, particularly in relation to the resourcing of the CMA, are incredibly important. We want the CMA to be adequately resourced so that it can carry out its functions effectively, because the system does not work if the CMA is not adequately resourced. We will struggle to know whether the CMA has adequate resource if it is not producing data on the number of extensions that it has required. As I say, the amendment is eminently sensible, and I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say in response to the speech made by the Opposition spokesperson.

[Paul Scully]

The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 requires the CMA to prepare an annual report of its activities and performance during the year. Clause 66 requires the CMA to include details within its annual report of any subsidies and schemes that have been referred to the subsidy advice unit in the previous year, including both mandatory and voluntary referrals. The purpose of including that information is to provide transparency on the number and types of cases being referred to the SAU each year.

Amendment 66 adds to the information that the CMA would be required to append to its annual report in ways that we believe are overly prescriptive. It would limit the CMA’s flexibility to determine what information to include in its annual report and the most effective way to deliver that. Some of the information that the amendment mandates would not be accessible or consistently available. For example, the requirement that the CMA publish the proportion of cases where the SAU found that a public authority’s assessment required improvement, or where it identified a risk to competition and investment, misunderstands the role of the SAU.

The SAU will evaluate the public authority’s assessment of whether the subsidy or scheme complies with the Bill’s requirements. It will also evaluate whether there are any effects of the subsidy or scheme on competition or investment in the UK. The SAU may include advice about how the public authority’s statement might be improved or modified to ensure compliance with the requirements of the Bill, but the SAU is not a regulator. It will not make its own independent assessment of potential risks to competition and investment, or make definitive judgements on the extent of them.

Other requirements of the amendment are similarly unnecessary, including the requirement to publish the number of requests made by the SAU under clause 53(6) to extend the reporting period for a mandatory referral. Clause 53(7) already requires that such requests are published. In addition, the low number of mandatory referrals that we estimate in any given year will mean that calculating the average number of days for extension is unlikely to offer much additional insight into the subsidy control regime. It therefore need not be mandated for inclusion in the annual report.

The amendment would also require the CMA to publish geographical allocations of all subsidies subject to mandatory and voluntary referrals. That would be a burdensome task for the CMA, and would be difficult to comply with consistently. First, the amendment asks for information to which the CMA would not have ready access, since not all subsidies eligible for voluntary referral will be referred to the SAU. Secondly, if a public authority referred a scheme instead of an individual subsidy to the SAU, it would not be possible for the CMA to determine the expected geographic allocation of subsidies not yet awarded under that scheme. The same issue may apply to the beneficiary of a single subsidy that operates in more than one location.

The right approach is to provide the CMA with a degree of flexibility to determine what information about subsidies and schemes referred to the SAU is presented in its annual report. For the reasons that I have provided, I request that the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston withdraw the amendment.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister and the hon. Member for Aberdeen North for their comments. I intended to press the amendment to a vote, but on the basis of some of the discussion I will not do so. However, I will challenge a couple of things the Minister said. We are all aware of where there could be burdens for the CMA or others in producing reports, but it is important to ensure that we have an X-ray view that provides insight into what is happening across the system as a whole. Where the CMA should have information that would be relevant, it may be useful to include it in the annual report.

The Minister talked about eligibility for voluntary referral, about which the CMA would not have information. We did not intend to include any wording around eligibility, and I do not think that we did. We talked about the number of voluntary referrals, and those for which the CMA decided not to prepare a report. It is important to ensure that our proposals are understood. I take on board what he said, I think in the debate on clause 65: that he would welcome suggestions from the Opposition, and perhaps from his own side, about what information would be useful. We all want to ensure that there is an effective and efficient regime. None of us wants to see unnecessary costs incurred, but we need transparency and the right information to inform the right decisions and the best response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

I am a bit confused by the Minister’s comments on paragraph (d). He seemed to suggest that the CMA’s report may not talk about where local authorities’ assessments require improvement. That is slightly concerning because, if a local authority is making an assessment on a subsidy and the assessment requires improvement, who is going to tell it? Who is going to say the assessment requires improvement if the CMA does not have the ability to say, “Excuse me. You have done this a bit wrong. Could you do it better?”

It would be helpful if the Minister contacted us, by letter if possible, to say what he expects will be in the CMA’s reports. At the moment, I do not understand what will be in those reports, specifically in relation to the mandatory referrals. What will be in the CMA’s report on the mandatory referrals that come forward? What does the Minister expect will be in the report? It does not have to be prescriptive; it could be ideas of the kind of things that would be in there, because at the moment I do not understand what that report is going to be.

[Seema Malhotra]

It would be helpful, in the light of our conversation, if we could start with the Minister’s expectation. He may well have reflected on the discussion we have had today. That may a good and efficient way for us to come back with suggestions of what else might occur, or perhaps there will be full, total agreement on what we want to see in the CMA’s annual report; we do not know. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

In accordance with the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, after the end of each financial year, the Competition and Markets Authority must prepare and send to the Secretary of State an annual report of its activities and performance during the year. The clause requires that the CMA include details within its annual report of any subsidies and schemes that have been referred to the subsidy advice unit in the previous year, including referrals made on both a mandatory and a voluntary basis. That will help to provide transparency on the number and types of subsidies and schemes that have been reported on by the subsidy advice unit.

[Seema Malhotra]

Notwithstanding the comments we have made in the ongoing discussion, we support the clause stand part.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 66 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 67

information-gathering powers

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

The clause gives the subsidy advice unit—the SAU—information-gathering powers to assist with its monitoring and reporting functions under clause 65. It does so by applying, with modifications, the information-gathering powers that the CMA has under sections 41 to 43 of the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020.

Those powers enable the SAU to require that persons produce specified documents and that businesses provide estimates, forecasts, returns and other information that may be specified. The SAU will be able to require that the information be provided for the purpose of assisting it to review and report on the operation of the Bill, and on its impact on competition and investment within the United Kingdom. The SAU will have the power to impose financial penalties, where a person fails to provide information as required, or intentionally obstructs or delays the SAU when it is exercising those powers.

The Secretary of State is given the power to make necessary modifications to the powers, so that they work when applied for those purposes. Such modifications cannot alter the maximum financial penalties that may be imposed by the SAU. It is important that the SAU can obtain credible and comprehensive information, so that it can monitor and report on the subsidy control regime effectively. The ability to impose financial penalties for non-compliance provides a powerful incentive for persons to provide that information to the SAU and is consistent with the CMA’s existing statutory functions.

[Seema Malhotra]

The clause applies sections 41 to 43 of the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020 for the purpose of assisting the CMA in carrying out its functions on subsidy control. The clause means that the CMA will be able to give an information notice or require the production of a document by an individual, business, or public authority. We recognise the importance of allowing the CMA to give an information notice, so that it can monitor the subsidy regime effectively. We therefore support the clause standing part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 67 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 68

Subsidy Advice Unit

[Seema Malhotra]

I beg to move amendment 67, in clause 68, page 38, line 39, at end insert—

“(3A) The Chair of the CMA Board may appoint up to three non-executive members to the Subsidy Advice Unit established under subsection (1) in order to ensure that the Unit includes least one person with relevant experience in relation to each of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.”

This amendment would allow the CMA Chair to appoint up to three non-executive members to ensure that the Unit includes at least one person with experience in relation to each of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 68, in clause 68, page 38, line 41, at end insert—

“or persons appointed under subsection (3A).”

This amendment is linked to Amendment 67.

Amendment 69, in clause 68, page 38, line 41, at end insert—

“(4A) Before making an appointment to the Subsidy Advice Unit, the CMA must seek the consent of the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers and the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland.”

This amendment would require the CMA to seek the consent of the devolved administrations before making an appointment to the Subsidy Advice Unit.

[Seema Malhotra]

The clause establishes regulations for the CMA to establish a board called the subsidy advice unit, which will carry out the CMA’s duties under the new regime. We support the creation of the subsidy advice unit and the duties it gains under the Bill. However, yet again, the Government have failed to create a role for the devolved Administrations. The Minister might wonder whether I sound like a broken record, but the reason is that the theme continues to be a cause of concern throughout the Bill.

The subsidy advice unit will play an extremely important role in the new regime, consistently assessing all subsidies and schemes referred to the CMA, by public bodies and by the Secretary of State. Its reports and advice will influence the challenging and carrying out of subsidies and schemes, and will provide important guidance for public authorities. The demands on its time and expertise will be considerable, as it sets up and carries out that very important function.

Rightly, the unit ought to have all the right input. A diversity of input means that some of the best decisions will be made. It is important to ensure that the right advice and input will be there in the unit, in particular that representing all four nations of the UK. Its work will be applicable not just to England, but to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. However, the clause does not appear to ensure that all nations will be represented fairly in the subsidy advice unit. Why is that?

Does the Minister not feel that it is important for the devolved nations to be represented on this significant body? Doing so would enhance the Government’s reaching out and their ongoing connection with the devolved Administrations, ensuring genuine four-nation input in its work. As Dr Pazos-Vidal, head of the Brussels office for the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, said, the Bill

“is too general and not reflective of the territorial constitution of the UK as it stands.”––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 8, Q4.]

The lack of specific representation for the devolved Administrations on the advice unit is a stark example of that.

Labour proposes two amendments to change that lack of representation. They would ensure that the Bill works as well as we want it to, and as well as we need it to for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, as well as for England. Amendment 67 would allow the chair of the CMA board to appoint up to three non-executive members to the subsidy advice unit if the board felt that there was a gap. That would ensure that the CMA could include at least one person on the unit with specific, recent experience that was relevant to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Amendment 69 states that the CMA must seek the consent of the devolved Administrations before making an appointment to the subsidy advice unit.

The amendments would ensure that the guidance and reports issued by the CMA are not too England-focused, and take into account, in a more equal way, the views of all the UK regions. They seek to ensure that information and insights are considered in the round and together, and that the new regime is more effective across the whole of the UK.

It is not just Labour that recognises that representation is important. To choose just one comment that we heard in evidence, Thomas Pope, deputy chief economist at the Institute for Government, said:

“I certainly think that the CMA and/or the subsidy advice unit should have a membership and input reflecting its four-nation role in the UK”.––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 31, Q43.]

We think that that should be formalised as part of the structure, so that things are less likely to go wrong or be overlooked. If there is an intention to have such representation anyway, why not formalise it as part of the structure, and put it on the face of the Bill?

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

The Minister has said that having the voice of the devolved Administrations is unprecedented. Before I come back on whether we will press any of the amendments to a vote, can he clarify whether that is really unprecedented? He was involved in the Office for the Internal Market legislation in a way that I was not directly, so is there a difference in how the Office for the Internal Market is constituted in relation to the devolved Administrations?

[Paul Scully]

It is a different set-up. The Bill places a requirement on the CMA to establish a new committee of its board, to be referred to as the unit, which would consist of members of the CMA and staff. It does not have the same constitutional impact, not least because the subsidy advice unit will deal with the subsidy regime, which is reserved. In the same way as Ministers do not get involved in the day-to-day workings of the subsidy advice unit or the CMA to ensure their independence, it remains for the CMA to determine which staff it appoints to the unit.

--- Later in debate ---

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his comments. I do not think he fully answered the question, which is whether there is anything different about the representation of the devolved Administrations in relation to the Office for the Internal Market. Perhaps he can answer that specifically.

The Minister is right about allowing for independence, but it is independence to operate within a framework that I think is being set in the Bill. There is room for us to do this without challenging the independence of the CMA or the subsidy advice unit by simply laying out what Parliament would expect. Perhaps he can come back to me specifically on the point about the Office for the Internal Market and the voice of devolved Administrations in it.

[Paul Scully]

The Office for the Internal Market is a distinct set-up—it is a new set-up—whereas this is a committee within the board of the CMA. As I say, they are two distinct bodies. The OIM is overseen by the CMA, but it sits as a distinct body. The SAU sits within the CMA’s overall tree.

[Seema Malhotra]

And the devolved Administrations?

[Paul Scully]

The hon. Lady talks about the devolved position. The OIM sits as a distinct board specifically because of the constitutional impact of the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020. Because the SAU sits within the CMA’s board, it is very much an internal appointment. The OIM is not constituted in the same way. It is not for the CMA to make those internal appointments to the OIM directly.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for that, but I do not feel that he has been completely clear. These are not God-given institutions; we are talking about decisions made by the same Government. The question becomes whether there is a reason, and whether it would be helpful and effective in the way that the regime is set up and operates, to have independent expert voices that are from and work with the four nations of the UK. I do not feel that there has been a clear response to that important issue.

[Paul Scully]

The 2020 Act constitutes the Office for the Internal Market—we determined that—whereas the subsidy advice unit, being not a regulator but an organisation that offers advice, sits directly within the CMA. It is not setting up a discrete body; it is setting up a portion of the CMA. We have charged the CMA to set up the subsidy advice unit. Either the CMA is independent or it is not. The amendment charges us to get under the bonnet of the CMA’s internal appointments and direct it to make certain appointments, which risks undermining its independence.

[Seema Malhotra]

Perhaps the Minister and I will have to agree to differ on this point, because seeking to have particular areas of expertise reflected in the membership of the subsidy advice unit is not challenging its independence; it is setting out the expectation of Parliament. It is within the Minister’s gift to say that, and it could be contained in the Bill if we chose to do so.

[Paul Scully]

The SAU has the ability to bring in independent experts, including experts with interests in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. The staff clearly have that expertise as well, which is why they have offices in each of the cities I mentioned.

[Seema Malhotra]

I think we will come back to the point that the CMA is likely to do what is required by Parliament and Ministers. It is important to remember that distinction: we are the ones who are making decisions on legislation, so we are accountable to the public and the taxpayer for making legislation that will stand the test of time and operate in the interests of the four nations of the UK, as is intended. That is not for the CMA to make decisions on; it will be looking to the Minister to advise and help make decisions on that. I put it to the Minister that making sure that the subsidy advice unit contains expert voices from across our devolved Administrations is an important part of how we make sure it is constituted to have the inputs we need. After that, as I am sure we all agree, there needs to be independence in how the CMA operates. There will be no determination by Parliament of which specific people should be on those boards—we need to separate those issues.

On the basis of what the Minister has said, I do not think the Bill currently goes far enough, so we will press amendment 67 to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kirsty Blackman]

A couple of questions have been raised about this clause. I am not particularly happy with how it works: I think more could have been contained in it. The questions from the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston have shown that there is a lack of clarity on what the subsidy advice unit means and how it will differ from the Office for the Internal Market, for example. The Minister will probably laugh, but it would be incredibly helpful if we were provided with an organogram that explains the work of the CMA, the SAU sub-committee, and the Office for the Internal Market, so that we can understand how it all goes together.

The Minister has been clear that the SAU sub-committee of the CMA board is a different thing from the internal market one. I do not entirely understand how it all fits together. I know that the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 explains some of it, but all those pieces of legislation, in various different places, being mashed together still does not give a picture of how it will all work. If the Minister could agree to look at that, it would be incredibly helpful.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his comments. Notwithstanding the debate we have had, the Labour party supports clause stand part, but some areas need to be reflected on, including how the Office for the Internal Market is working, and what we can learn for the CMA and this regime. Clarity ahead of Report would be very helpful to settle some of those questions.

[Paul Scully]

I will happily supply an organogram. Effectively, the Office for the Internal Market sits as a specific panel, whereas the SAU is a committee of the CMA and will go down on the CMA board. Working that way was the CMA’s preferred approach because that gives it discretion on how to design the operational processes for fulfilling the SAU’s functions.

[Seema Malhotra]

I accept that the structures are different, but sometimes we can learn from principles. There is a difference between structures, functions and principles, and we are quite interested in the principles point.

[Paul Scully]

I appreciate that, but I was saying that the CMA preferred this way because it allows the CMA to draw on its board and staff members, as well as on existing members of the CMA panel, as it sees fit. That avoids creating any additional complexity in the governance arrangements—as we have seen with the Office for the Internal Market, we do not want that to keep expanding. That allows the CMA to draw on the expertise of CMA panel members with established backgrounds in state aid and subsidy control who were appointed in anticipation of the functions under the new regime.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 68 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 69

References to subsidy control groups

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Paul Scully]

The purpose of clause 69 is to enable the subsidy advice unit to make a reference to the CMA chair for the constitution of a CMA panel group under schedule 4 to the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013. The provision gives the CMA the ability to refer certain subsidy control functions to its expert independent panel members as it sees fit.

[Seema Malhotra]

As the Minister has said, clause 69 enables the subsidy advice unit to make reference to the chair of the CMA for the constitution of a CMA panel group. We have no issues with the clause and will support clause stand part.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 69 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 70

Review of subsidy decisions

[Seema Malhotra]

I beg to move amendment 72, in clause 70, page 39, line 30, leave out subsection (2).

This amendment would allow an application to be made to review a subsidy decision related to a subsidy given under a scheme.

The amendment would enable interested parties to apply to the Competition Appeal Tribunal for a review of the decision to give a subsidy or make a subsidy scheme. An interested party is defined in subsection (7) as

“a person whose interests may be affected by the giving of the subsidy or the making of the…scheme”

or the Secretary of State. Subsection (2) states that:

“Where an application for a review of a subsidy decision relates to a subsidy given under a subsidy scheme, the application must be made for a review of the decision to make the subsidy scheme”,

meaning that an application cannot be made in respect of a decision to give a subsidy under a scheme. The Bill is explicit on that matter.

The evidence from the law firm DWF is quite scathing about that aspect of clause 70:

“We also believe preventing challenges to awards made under a scheme runs contrary to the logic of the system, which seems to be to allow those affected to test the lawfulness of awards at the point they are affected.”

I would be grateful if the Minister could respond on that. Is it right that although an interested party may have suffered as a result of the awarding of a subsidy, if it is made under a scheme, they have no basis to bring a challenge? If that is right, can it be right?

Labour’s amendment reflects both our concern and a suggestion to remediate that deficiency, which is to leave out subsection (2). The result would be that an application to review a subsidy decision could also be made for a decision to award a subsidy made under a scheme. That seems to be one way to address the issue. I would be grateful for the Minister’s response, first, on the issue and, secondly, whether he thinks there is a better way to address it in legislation.

[Paul Scully]

Clause 70 sets out the terms under which an application for review of a subsidy decision may be made to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. The tribunal may review, on application by an interested party, a decision made by a public authority to give a subsidy or make a subsidy scheme.

As drafted, an interested party may not apply to the tribunal for a review of the decision to grant a subsidy under the terms of a scheme. An application may instead be made to review the making of the scheme itself. Before a scheme is made, the proposed terms must be assessed against the subsidy control principles; a scheme must not be made unless subsidies granted under it are consistent with those principles. Consequently, subsidies that comply with the terms of a scheme will comply with the principles and do not need a separate assessment.

Subsidy schemes have long been recognised as a convenient way to grant multiple subsidies—not least because of the administrative simplicity of making a single, scheme-wide assessment against the principles. It would significantly undercut the benefits of administrative efficiency of schemes if subsidies granted in line with the terms of a subsidy scheme were eligible for review by the tribunal.

I am not sure what harm the amendment is trying to remedy. Is it the risk that impermissible subsidies may be granted under a scheme? In such cases, either the scheme is non-compliant and can be challenged within the normal limitation periods, or the subsidy does not comply with the terms of the scheme it is granted under, in which case the non-compliant subsidy would be deemed a new individual subsidy, and could be challenged as such. I therefore request that the hon. Lady withdraw the amendment.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for giving way. Could he clarify—

[The Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty's Treasury (Michael Tomlinson)]

The Minister is not giving way. The hon. Lady is making a speech.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that. Will the Minister clarify that last point, as to how a subsidy under a scheme could be regarded—if I understood him correctly—as a new subsidy, and treated as a new subsidy for the purposes of a challenge?

[Paul Scully]

The scheme can essentially be challenged under the Competition Appeal Tribunal against the principles. If a subsidy granted under a scheme is consistent with those principles, it is part of the scheme, and it is the scheme that would need to be challenged. If a subsidy granted under a scheme is not consistent with the principles, it is therefore not consistent with the scheme, and it would sit outside that. It could therefore be challenged.

[Seema Malhotra]

I must say that I find that a little confusing. I am not fully clear on how a challenge can be brought to a subsidy under a scheme to even determine—what the Minister said in relation to it. Perhaps I am missing the point here, but it currently seems to be very explicit: it ends up being about the scheme rather than an individual subsidy under the scheme. Nine out of 10 subsidies under a scheme may have no challenges against them, with only one being challenged.

[Paul Scully]

The scheme itself must already be consistent with those principles, so if any particular subsidy is given within the scheme, and it is not consistent with the principles, then it clearly cannot sit within that scheme itself, because it is inconsistent with the scheme that it is purported to be part of. Therefore, that will then be set aside and will be approachable for the CAT.

[Seema Malhotra]

Who would make that decision? It does not seem to be in line with the wording of the legislation.

[Paul Scully]

That is when the interested parties can approach the CAT on that basis.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Scully]

Essentially, if the public authority has wrongly given the subsidy as part of a scheme, it will be for the CAT to decide.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank the Minister for his answer; I want to ensure that we correctly understand what he is trying to say. On the basis of what I think he is saying—that there may be a mechanism for challenging subsidies under a subsidy scheme—I will not press the amendment to a vote today, but I would like the Minister to explain, in writing, how he would see that scenario working, and where the power to bring a challenge sits.

I am still not clear where a determination—that a subsidy is to be treated as a subsidy, rather than a subsidy under a scheme—would come from. That does not feel clear, so let us get that clarified. If we could have that in writing, that would be extremely helpful. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Seema Malhotra]

I beg to move amendment 70, in clause 70, page 40, line 9, leave out

“whose interests may be affected by”

and insert

“who has sufficient interest in”

This amendment would alter the definition of interested party to make it consistent with clause 31(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

The purpose of clause 70 is to enable interested parties to challenge subsidies before the CAT. It defines an interested party as

“a person whose interests may be affected by the giving of the subsidy or the making of the subsidy scheme”

or “the Secretary of State”. We are concerned that the definition is too narrow and is deficient in two respects. The definition of interested parties—the test that establishes standing for the purposes of judicial review—applies a test at subsection (7)(a), which seems narrower than under the Senior Courts Act 1981. The test under subsection (7)(a) is

“a person whose interests may be affected”.

By contrast, the test under section 31(3) of the 1981 Act is a person who

“has a sufficient interest in”.

While it may not seem so different on one level, it could have important consequences.

George Peretz and others have suggested that the definition of interested parties under the Bill narrows the standard public law right and could be interpreted as limiting those who could bring a challenge to parties whose commercial or financial interests have been affected. What would that mean for the ability of those acting in the public interest and not in a private interest to challenge a subsidy?

Let us use an example: the Good Law Project has serious concerns about the awarding of a tax relief to a particular business and does not believe the subsidy is consistent with the subsidy control principles. It is not inconceivable that the business could be owned by a friend or relative of a Minister who is awarding the tax relief or being involved in some other way. In light of the current climate around sleaze, perhaps it would not be surprising at all. Can the Minister clarify what standing an independent challenger, such as the Good Law Project, would have under subsection (7)(a) to bring a challenge to such a tax relief, and if not why not?

Labour proposes amendment 70 to make the definition of interested party consistent with section 31(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. It should not only be those whose financial interests are or may be affected and the Secretary of State who can challenge subsidies.

As Professor Rickard, professor of political science at the London School of Economics, explained in October:

“Thinking about who has a particular interest in challenging those subsidies, there may be good reasons to expand the potential set of challengers to ensure that it includes not just competitors but maybe also employees, trade unions, taxpayers or interest groups. That would give us more eyes on the subsidies to ensure that they are complying with the principles, ensuring value for money and achieving the economic outcomes that they set out to achieve.”––[Official Report, Subsidy Control Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 23, Q25.]

Does the Minister recognise that the subsidy’s impact can extend beyond those who are more narrowly defined as interested parties? The amendment could bring the test for standing in line with judicial review. It would be helpful if the Minister could clarify whether there was an intention to subtly deviate from the definition in the Senior Courts Act. We hope the Government recognise that it could be a way of improving how the Bill operates as well.

[Paul Scully]

I will go into a bit more detail in a second, but an interested party is any person whose interests may be affected by the decision in question. We are setting out a new UK-specific subsidy regime with unique rules. In that context, we have set out an intentionally broad definition of what constitutes an interested party. That said, the Competition Appeal Tribunal can exercise its discretion. We want to ensure that in each case the right people are determined to be interested parties. By exercising that discretion, the Competition Appeal Tribunal can build up a jurisprudence that is specific to and optimally used for the subsidy control context. The Competition Appeal Tribunal is an expert body in competition matters and has the right knowledge to make appropriate decisions on these questions of standing.

As we have heard, the amendment would require the CAT to adopt the test in the Senior Courts Act 1981, which states that a person seeking review of the subsidy decision must have “sufficient interest”. I understand that the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston intends that the amendment would broaden the scope of who can bring a challenge, but given the breadth of the existing test in the Bill, I do not think that she could be confident that her amendment would have the desired effect. In any event, it would bring along a body of case law that may be unrelated to the new subsidy control regime and could prevent the CAT from exercising its full discretion in each case. As I have said, it is a new system, with standalone enforcement through the CAT. It is therefore appropriate that the tribunal can decide for itself who can seek reviews of subsidy decisions.

The clause does not exclude any party whose interests may genuinely be affected by a subsidy. As such, I cannot see the advantage in changing the test for who can challenge a subsidy, as proposed in the amendment. The hon. Member for Feltham and Heston talked specifically about someone without a financial interest. As I say, that is why the definition of “interested party” is broad. It covers any person whose interests may be affected by a subsidy, and it will be up to the CAT to determine. We are giving the expert body the appropriate discretion to get the answers right in each and every case, and I therefore ask the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment.

[Seema Malhotra]

This is an interesting and important discussion about who is included in the definition of “interested party”. I would like to reflect on the Minister’s comments and perhaps test them with expert advice and a detailed review of the definitions and explanatory notes for the Bill. On that basis, I will not press the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Michael Tomlinson.)