Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Rosie Winterton Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 25th January 2022 Commons Chamber

[Relevant document: Tenth Report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, “Legislative Scrutiny: Judicial Review and Courts Bill”, HC 884/HL 120.]

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

When the shadow Minister stands up to move new clause 4, I will be grateful if others stand up to indicate whether they wish to participate in the debate on the first group of amendments.

New Clause 4

Publicly funded legal representation for bereaved people at inquests

“(1) Section 10 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1), after ‘(4)’ insert ‘or (7).’

(3) After subsection (6), insert—

‘(7) This subsection is satisfied where—

(a) the services consist of advocacy at an inquest where the individual is an Interested Person pursuant to section 47(2)(a), (b), or (m) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 because of their relationship to the deceased; and

(b) one or more public authorities are Interested Persons in relation to the inquest pursuant to section 47(2) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 or are likely to be designated as such.

(8) For the purposes of this section “public authority” has the meaning given by section 6(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998.’.”.—(Andy Slaughter.)

This new clause would ensure that bereaved people (such as family members) are entitled to publicly funded legal representation in inquests where public bodies (such as the police or a hospital trust) are legally represented.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 5—Removal of the means test for legal help prior to inquest hearing—

“(1) Schedule 1 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 is amended as follows.

(2) In paragraph 41, after sub-paragraph (3), insert—

‘(4) For the purposes of this paragraph, the “Financial resources” provisions at section 21 (and in The Civil Legal Aid (Financial Resources and Payment for Services) Regulations 2013 do not apply.’.”

This new clause would remove the means test for legal aid applications for legal help for bereaved people at inquests.

New clause 6—Eligibility for bereaved people to access legal aid under existing provisions—

“(1) Section 10 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (4)(a), after ‘family’, insert ‘or where the individual is an Interested Person pursuant to section 47(2)(m) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 because of their relationship with the deceased’.

(3) In subsection (6), after paragraph (c), insert—

‘(d) or they fall within any of the groups named at section 47 (2)(a), (b) or (m) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.’

(4) Schedule 1 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 is amended as follows.

(5) In paragraph 41, after sub-paragraph (3)(c), insert—

‘(d) or they fall within any of the groups named at section 47 (2)(a), (b) or (m) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.’.”

This new clause would bring the Legal, Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 into line with the definition of family used in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.

New clause 8—Exclusion of review of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal—

“(1) Section 67 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 is amended as follows.

(2) Leave out subsection (8) and insert—

‘(8) Subject to section 67A and subsections (9) and (10), determinations, awards, orders and other decisions of the Tribunal (including decisions as to whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction and purported determinations, awards, orders and other decisions) shall be final and shall not be subject to appeal or be liable to be questioned in any court.

(9) In particular—

(a) the Tribunal is not to be regarded as having exceeded its powers by reason of any error of fact or law made in reaching any decision; and

(b) the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts does not extend to, and no application or petition for judicial review may be made or brought in relation to, any decision of the Tribunal.

(10) Subsections (8) and (9) do not apply so far as the decision involves or gives rise to any question as to whether the Tribunal—

(a) has a valid case before it;

(b) is or was properly constituted for the purpose of dealing with the case;

(c) is acting or has acted in bad faith, with actual bias or corruption or in some other way that constitutes a fundamental procedural defect.

(11) No error of fact or law made by the Tribunal in reaching any decision is to be construed as relevant to the question.’

(3) The amendment made by subsection (2) applies to determinations, awards, orders and other decisions of the Tribunal (including purported determinations, awards, orders and other decisions) made before the day on which this section comes into force.”

New clause 9—Evidence in judicial review proceedings—

“(1) Unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary, no court shall—

(a) permit oral evidence to be elicited in judicial review proceedings; or

(b) order public bodies or any person exercising or entitled to exercise public authority to disclose evidence in anticipation of or in the course of judicial review proceedings.

(2) In relation to any judicial review proceedings, or in anticipation of any judicial review proceedings, in which a public body or a person exercising or entitled to exercise public authority argues, or indicates its intention to argue, that—

(a) the proceedings concern a matter that is non-justiciable, or

(b) that an enactment excludes or limits judicial review, no evidential duty arises on that body or person until a court determines that the matter is justiciable and that no enactment excludes or limits judicial review.

(3) In subsection (2), ‘evidential duty’ means any principle of law or rule of court touching the identification of relevant facts or reasoning underlying the measure or other matter in respect of which judicial review is sought, or any order of the court to adduce oral or other evidence.

(4) Nothing in subsection (2) or (3) affects an evidential duty that may arise in relation to judicial review proceedings other than in relation to a measure or other matter that is argued to be non-justiciable or to be excluded from judicial review by legislation.”

Amendment 23, page 1, line 3, leave out clause 1.

This amendment would remove clause 1 of the Bill continuing the status quo removing the provision to make quashing orders suspended and prospective-only.

Amendment 1, in clause 1, page 1, line 8, leave out from “order” to end of line 9.

This amendment would remove the provision for making quashing orders prospective-only.

Amendment 24, page 1, line 9, at end insert—

“(1A) Provision under subsection (1) may only be made if the court is satisfied that it is in the interest of justice to do so.”

The insertion of this subsection would limit the use of any new remedies issued under clause one to where in the court’s view it is in the interests of justice.

Amendment 31, page 1, leave out lines 10 and 11.

This amendment removes the ability to make a suspended or prospective-only quashing order subject to conditions.

Amendment 2, page 1, leave out lines 15 to 18.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 1, which removes the provision for making quashing orders prospective-only.

Amendment 3, page 2, line 2, leave out “or (4)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 1, which removes the provision for making quashing orders prospective-only.

Amendment 26, page 2, line 4, at end insert—

“(5A) Where the impugned act consists in the making or laying of delegated legislation (the impugned legislation), subsections (3) or (4) do not prevent any person charged with an offence under or by virtue of any provision of the impugned legislation raising the validity of the impugned legislation as a defence in criminal proceedings.

(5B) Subsections (3) or (4) does not prevent a court or tribunal awarding damages, restitution or other compensation for loss.”

This amendment would protect collateral challenges by ensuring that if a prospective only or suspended quashing order is made, the illegality of the delegated legislation can be relied on as a defence in criminal proceedings.

Amendment 27, page 2, line 12, leave out “must” and insert “may”.

This amendment would make clear that the factors which the court considers before making a modified quashing order are a matter for the court’s discretion.

Amendment 33, page 2, leave out lines 14 and 15.

This amendment removes one of the factors to be considered by the courts when deciding whether to award a suspended quashing order or quashing order with limited or no retrospective effect. This is intended to rebalance the factors to be given consideration so as not to disadvantage the claimant unfairly.

Amendment 34, page 2, line 17, at end insert

“including, but not limited to, the interests and expectations of a claimant in receiving a timely remedy”.

This amendment would make it clear that the provision of a timely remedy to the claimant is a factor to be given consideration by the courts when deciding whether to award a suspended quashing order or quashing order with limited or no retrospective effect.

Amendment 35, page 2, line 19, at end insert

“which are to be identified by the defendant”.

This amendment would require the defendant to identify what the interests and expectations of persons who have relied on the impugned act are and to explain these to the court.

Amendment 28, page 2, line 21, leave out

“or proposed to be taken”.

This amendment would remove the requirement to take account of actions which the public body proposes or intends to take but has not yet taken.

Amendment 37, page 2, leave out line 23 and insert—

“(f) the Convention rights of any person who would be affected by the decision to exercise or fail to exercise the power;

(g) the right to an effective remedy for a violation of a Convention right under Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights; and

(h) any other matter that appears to the court to be relevant.”

This amendment would ensure that the courts would take into account the ECHR rights of those affected, including the right to an effective remedy, before exercising the new power to suspend a quashing order or give it prospective-only effects.

Amendment 29, page 2, line 23, at end insert—

“(8A) In deciding whether there is a detriment to good administration under subsection (8)(b), a court must have regard to the principle that good administration is administration which is lawful.”

This amendment clarifies that the principle of good administration includes the need for administration to be lawful.

Amendment 25, page 2, leave out lines 24 to 32 and insert—

“(9) Provision may only be made under subsection (1) if and to the extent that the court considers that an order making such provision would, as a matter of substance, offer an effective remedy to the claimant and any other person materially affected by the impugned act in relation to the relevant defect.”

This amendment would remove the presumption and make it a precondition of the court’s exercise of the new remedial powers that they should offer an effective remedy to the claimant and any other person materially affected by the impugned act.

Amendment 4, page 2, leave out lines 24 to 32.

This amendment would protect the discretion of the court by removing the presumption in favour of issuing suspended, prospective-only quashing orders.

Amendment 38, page 2, line 29, leave out from “court” to end of line 30 and insert

“may exercise the powers in that subsection accordingly”.

This amendment would remove the requirement for a court to issue a suspended or prospective quashing order when the provisions of section 1(9)(b) apply.

Amendment 32, page 2, leave out lines 31 and 32.

This amendment removes the extra weight which would otherwise be given to subsection 8(e) by the courts when applying the test created in subsection 9(b) to establish whether the statutory presumption is applicable.

Amendment 30, page 3, line 13, at end insert—

“(5) After section 31A of the Senior Courts Act 1981 insert—

‘31B Constitutional importance of judicial review

It is recognised that judicial review is of fundamental constitutional importance to the rule of law, the accountability of public bodies and the government in particular, access to justice and the protection of human rights and that limitations on access to judicial review should only be imposed where strictly necessary and proportionate.’”

This amendment would highlight the importance of judicial review in the UK’s constitutional principles.

Amendment 5, page 3, line 14, leave out clause 2.

This amendment would preserve the ability of claimants to seek judicial review of a decision by the Upper Tribunal to refuse permission to appeal a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (also known as “Cart judicial review”).

Government amendment 6.

Amendment 42, in clause 2, page 4, line 16, leave out from “Ireland” to the end of line 17.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 43.

Amendment 43, page 4, line 19, at end insert—

“(8) This section does not extend to Scotland.”

This amendment would ensure that the exclusion of review of Upper Tribunal’s permission-to-appeal decisions did not extend to Scotland.

[Andy Slaughter]

It is a pleasure to open the debate and speak to the new clauses and amendments that stand in my name and those of my right hon. and hon. Friends. I am grateful to the Government for their co-operation on the programme motion, and to the Minister and his colleagues for the civilised way in which we have debated the Bill thus far. Unfortunately, they were not persuaded by our arguments in Committee, so if there is no movement today, the Opposition will vote against the Bill on Third Reading, as we did on Second Reading. We have issues with part 2 of the Bill, which will mainly be dealt with by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham) in the debate on the second group of amendments, although I will deal in this group with our concerns about chapter 4 on coroners and our proposed new clauses 4 to 6.

I start with amendments to part 1 of the Bill, which are the most numerous and most needed to try to redeem the Bill. There is a strong clue to the Opposition’s approach in amendment 23, which we tabled to leave out clause 1 in its entirety. I have also signed amendment 5, tabled by the Liberal Democrats’ spokesperson, the hon. Member for Bath (Wera Hobhouse), which would leave out clause 2. In short, we see no merit at all in part 1 of the Bill and would strike it out.

The purpose of judicial review is to determine whether public bodies have made lawful decisions and to provide remedies where they have not. The conceit of the Government’s approach, which would be taken further by new clauses 8 and 9, tabled by the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes), is that the courts are trespassing on the rights of Parliament, substituting their views for ours and, in some ways, entering the realm of politics. We read that the Justice Secretary and the Prime Minister think that the Bill, which was introduced by the previous Lord Chancellor, the right hon. and learned Member for South Swindon (Sir Robert Buckland), does not go far enough in clipping the judges’ wings. They seek to remedy that through repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 and its replacement by a so-called new Bill of Rights and an interpretation Act: an annual audit by Parliament of which judicial decisions it likes and which it seeks to overturn. The Opposition think that that is constitutionally wrong and a provocation.

A better way to look at the role of the courts was set out by the late Lord Bingham in A. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department who, in rejecting submissions from the then Attorney General in that case, said:

“I do not in particular accept the distinction which he drew between democratic institutions and the courts. It is of course true that the judges in this country are not elected and are not answerable to Parliament. It is also of course true…that Parliament, the executive and the courts have different functions. But the function of independent judges charged to interpret and apply the law is universally recognised as a cardinal feature of the modern democratic state, a cornerstone of the rule of law itself. The Attorney General is fully entitled to insist on the proper limits of judicial authority, but he is wrong to stigmatise judicial decision-making as in some way undemocratic.”

We celebrate the role that judicial review plays in our constitution in amendment 30, which says that

“judicial review is of fundamental constitutional importance to the rule of law, the accountability of public bodies and the government in particular, access to justice and the protection of human rights and that limitations on access to judicial review should only be imposed where strictly necessary and proportionate.”

Should the Government prefer that wording to that of the clause, that would be welcome. Failing that, we have tabled 11 further amendments that cumulatively or, in the alternative, seek to mitigate the worst effects of clause 1.

The clause introduces suspended or prospective-only quashing orders and cements them with a presumption that they will employed by the courts in most cases. The Government-appointed independent review of administrative law, which was supposed to lay the groundwork for the Bill, did not recommend prospective-only orders and specifically disapproved any presumption as to their use. Prospective-only orders could deprive claimants of a proper chance of redress and will certainly create a chilling effect. What is the incentive to pursue judicial review if the claimant has no prospect of having the wrong righted?

The presumption is the clearest but not the only way in which the clause seeks to fetter judicial discretion. The Opposition’s remaining amendments seek to restore that discretion and attack the most prescriptive parts of the clause. Amendment 24 provides that modified quashing orders will be applied only where, in the court’s view, it is in the interests of justice, and that they ought to be confined to those rare cases where a quashing order might cause, for example, significant disadvantage to third parties. Amendment 31 recognises that suspended quashing orders may be beneficial in some cases but seeks clarity from the Government on their intentions and what conditions they feel should be met when using the provision.

Amendment 26 looks to preserve collateral challenge in the event that such modified quashing orders are used. Let us say that delegated legislation made during the coronavirus crisis that created imprisonable criminal offences was declared illegal by a court. If a court granted a prospective-only quashing order under the Bill, that would make imprisonment legal before the remedy. A person accused could not argue before the criminal courts that the statutory instrument was invalid, because the measure requires a judge to act as if it were valid. The amendment seeks to protect a person’s right to use the court’s decision as a defence in criminal proceedings.

Amendment 27 clarifies any factors that the court considers are a matter for its own judgment. The current use of “must” instead of “may” directs the judge’s reasoning and interferes with judicial independence and discretion. That is especially obnoxious as judicial review is discretionary and involves taking account of all the factors before the court. The court must be able to do justice on the facts, not be nudged to decide cases favourably to the Executive.

Amendments 33 to 35, 28 and 32 deal with the list of factors the Bill requires the courts to consider when applying a quashing order. For example, amendment 33 will remove a factor that would unfairly disadvantage the claimant. Amendment 34 recognises that a suspended or prospective-only quashing order can leave a claimant waiting for justice, so it asks the court to be mindful of a timely remedy. Amendment 28 would remove the requirement to take account of actions that the public body proposes to take. For example, if a public body tells a court that it intends to carry out certain measures to fix a problem, the court may suspend the quashing order, but if the public body goes away and changes its mind on the actions that it will take, the claimant, again, is left without a timely remedy. Amendment 28 would ensure that the court does not have to take account of the proposals made by a public body, and so a quicker remedy for the claimant ensues. Taken together, the amendments rebalance the proposal in clause 1 to protect the rights of claimants.

Amendment 29 clarifies that the principle of good administration includes the need for administration to be lawful. Let me finally, in addressing clause 1, turn to amendment 25, which would remove the presumption that suspended or prospective-only quashing orders should be used, and, instead, favours an effective remedy being offered to the claimant so that justice is preserved. The presumption set out in clause 1(9) undermines the independence and discretion of the court. The presumption acts on a one-size-fits-all approach to justice and does not respect the judge’s ability to assess the facts laid out in front of them in their courtroom and decide on a suitable conclusion. Amendment 25 also has a further protective factor that, if clause 1 is kept within the Bill and suspended and prospective-only quashing orders are to be used, there will be a pre-condition that there will be an effective remedy. If a single step could improve this part of the Bill, save abandoning it entirely, it is the removal of the presumption. For that reason, we wish to test the House on amendment 25 this afternoon and put it to a vote at the end of the debate.

Clause 2 ousts the jurisdiction of the High Court in relation to what are called Cart judicial reviews and removes the supervisory jurisdiction of the court over the tribunal system in those cases—for example, where the upper tribunal has refused the claimant the right to challenge the decision made in the first-tier tribunal not to allow and appeal the earlier decision.

In Committee, we objected to clause 2 both because of the nature of the cases subject to the Cart jurisdiction, which are primarily, but not exclusively, immigration and asylum cases, and because, on the Government’s own admission, it is designed to set a precedent for future employment of ouster clauses, which they clearly intend to become a more common feature of legislation. That is another attempt to subvert the authority of the courts. Unlike with clause 1, there is little that could be done to improve clause 2—you either like it or you don’t. Therefore, most commentators who are concerned by it think that the only solution is to strike it down. That was also the view of both Opposition parties in Committee, and we see from amendment 5 that it is also the view of the Liberal Democrats whose amendment to leave out clause 2 I have signed.

Contrary to the Government’s narrative that Cart judicial reviews are profligate, they are only allowed to proceed where there is an arguable case that has a reasonable prospect of success that both the decision of the upper tribunal refusing permission to appeal and the decision of the first-tier tribunal against which permission to appeal was sought are wrong in law. The claim either raises an important point of principle or practice, or there is some other compelling reason to hear it. Again, this is a mechanism to right a wrong. In the instance of Cart judicial review, it is to be used when there has been a serious error of law in the first-tier tribunal and stops deserving cases slipping through the net.

--- Later in debate ---

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

In view of the shortness of time, I will have to impose, to start with, an eight-minute time limit. It may very well have to be reduced later.

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

I rise to speak on new clauses 8 and 9, which stand in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Tom Hunt).

Those who served on the Bill Committee will not be unfamiliar with the arguments I intend to address, as we rehearsed them at considerable length in Committee. The Minister knows well my general concerns about the Bill: while it is a good start in dealing with the pressing issue of judicial review and how that has been distorted by recent judicial practice, it is only a start. We need much more wide-ranging reform of judicial review and, indeed, much more wide-ranging reform of the relationship between this House and the judiciary, as set out in the Attorney General’s recent speech in Cambridge on judicial activism.

New clause 8 addresses the courts’ role in curtailing the use of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, and especially in circumventing the role of the investigatory powers tribunal. I take a particular interest in that, having been the Minister at the Home Office who introduced the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which deals with the necessary precautions and safeguards associated with the storage and retrieval of electronic data. Indeed, the Bill I took through the House introduced the double lock: all warrants, as well as being dealt with by the Home Secretary, are, as an additional safeguard, dealt with by a judicial commissioner. That safeguard was to ensure the core principles of proportionality and necessity, which lay at the heart of all considerations of that kind.

The problem is that the courts have taken it upon themselves to become involved in matters that should be the exclusive preserve of this House. It is very important to see the Bill in context. The supremacy of Parliament is fundamental to protecting the interests of the people. Parliament’s role in our constitutional settlement is not—as was suggested in an evidence session with Aidan O’Neill QC—a matter of neutrality.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)]

Much of this Bill has no impact on Scotland or our separate courts and legal system, so our amendments and my comments are focused on the parts that do, which primarily deal with judicial review. The parts of the Bill I will address today are not just bad; they are unnecessary and dangerous, and they lay the groundwork for the Government to insulate themselves and future Governments from proper scrutiny and accountability. I am sure that is on their personal wish list given current events, but we ought to make policy for generations, for everyone and not for one iteration of one political party.

I sat through 11 sittings of the Public Bill Committee and waited for the Government to persuade me that, for example, removing Cart JR was necessary, but instead I heard odds and sods of anecdotal evidence, lots of legal jargon and the phrase “three bites of the cherry” a total of 62 times, with the implication that somehow those using Cart JR had greater access to justice—that simply is not true. Cart JR is not about saying, “I don’t like the decision you've come to, let’s try again for a different judgement.” It is about looking at the situation where, first, a serious error of law may have been committed in the first-tier tribunal, and then the upper tribunal has failed to recognise and correct the error. It could be that the first-tier tribunal failed to consider or misinterpreted the evidence, or that the facts are inconsistent with the decision, but the point is: it happens, mistakes are made and Cart JRs provide a vital safeguard to correct these errors in cases where the stakes can be incredibly high. Rather than this being a “third bite of the cherry”, the reality is that the first bite was not even a slither—a mistake was made. Mistakes do not just affect the person in question; the ramifications are wider. Similarly, Cart JRs not only give one person who has appealed the opportunity to have their case considered properly, but they catch out errors and injustices, benefiting the system as a whole. Cart JRs have been used to ensure that disabled people are given the right benefit entitlement; they have stopped people being made homeless; and they have prevented the deportation of people to countries where they faced certain death. I am currently waiting to attend a first-tier tribunal on behalf of a family member. Given my knowledge of her and of the social security system, I am 100% certain of her entitlement and equally certain it will only fail if a mistake is made when considering the evidence. If that happens, surely my family member deserves the right to have it rectified—surely everybody has that right.

The thing is: the Government know that the impact will be far greater on those who are most vulnerable. In their own impact statement for this Bill, they admit that abolishing Cart would mean that

“those who do lose out…are more likely to have particular protected characteristics, for example in respect of race and/or religion or belief.”

So anyone voting for this ought to be aware and be honest with their constituents that they are consciously voting to the detriment of their constituents with protected characteristics. It is estimated that this will save only £364,000 to £402,000 a year. That is the cost of protecting the rights of some of the most vulnerable people. It is not much to ask for, is it? Let us not pretend that this is about being prudent with the public purse after writing off £4.3 billion of fraudulent covid claims last year.

We will vote against this terrible Bill, but if it does go ahead, our amendments 42 and 43 would protect the Scottish courts and tribunals from clause 2. We in Scotland do not want it, the legal profession does not want it, the Scottish Government do not want it, and I guarantee that the people of Scotland do not want it. This Government are trying very hard to demonstrate their alleged respect for Scotland—in words if not in actions—as the Scottish Government lay the groundwork for an independence referendum; some would say, because of the independence referendum. Well, now is their chance. Now is the chance for all the parties in this place to show Scotland just how much respect they have for our separate and distinct legal system and our right to protect it, and ourselves, from this legislation.

My final thoughts on clause 2 relate to the way in which the Government intend to make this happen—the legal framework. The Government say that the use of an ouster clause will set a precedent for removing certain cases or areas out of the scope of judicial review, but what does that mean? It means that in future they intend to cherry-pick areas that they would rather not see judicially reviewed, which sounds every bit as dangerous as it is. The rule of law and the separation of powers are hallmarks of an effective democracy; we cannot allow the Government to pick and choose where and how they face judicial scrutiny. As Liberty reminds us in its briefing, this Bill is passing through Parliament at the same time as the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, the Nationality and Borders Bill and the Elections Bill, to name but a few. Now more than ever, we need the ability and deserve the right to hold the Government and public bodies to account.

Clause 1, on suspended quashing orders and prospective-only remedies, does not extend to Scottish courts and will not apply directly, but it will affect UK-wide legislation to which we are all subject. It will also mean that many more people across these islands may choose Scottish courts, and while I am always happy to promote Scotland and our separate legal system, there may be a capacity issue that has not been discussed or even considered.

Along with others, I have raised the landmark Unison judicial review of 2017 a number of times. The Supreme Court agreed that the fees for access to justice via employment tribunals were unlawful, so everyone who had paid them was refunded, and the Government were no longer allowed to charge the fees from the moment of that judgment. Let us consider what would happen if the Bill were passed and if, instead of seeking a judicial review in 2017, Unison did so this year and, crucially, secured the same decision: the decision that the workers were right, and that what the Government were doing was unlawful. The difference is that if this Bill is enacted, no one initiating a judicial review will have their fees refunded and no one who has already been forced to pay up to £1,200 for an employment tribunal will be refunded either, despite the court’s agreeing that they have been subject to something unlawful. Anyone subsequently requiring an employment tribunal will still have to pay the unlawful fees, and in the meantime the Government will be able to tweak the legislation and make the unlawful lawful. Who would or could go to the expense and trouble of seeking a judicial review given the prospect of no remedy, no justice, and no change in their or anyone else’s situation?

The delaying of a quashing order is, in certain circumstances, the appropriate path to follow, and that is why the courts already have that option. The issue is that it is currently an option, and the clause seeks to make it a presumption. The Independent Review of Administrative Law, which has been largely ignored in respect of its recommendations for judicial review, suggested that “giving courts the option” was enough, but here we see the Government determined to fetter judicial discretion and tie the hands of judges. Our amendment would ensure that it would once more be the case that judges “may” rather than “must” use such delays, and if the Government continue to argue that they are not trying to tie the hands of the judges, they will surely support it tonight.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I call Helen Morgan to make her maiden speech.

[Helen Morgan (North Shropshire) (LD)]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am humbled today to be standing in this historic Chamber representing the people of North Shropshire. Those of you who have visited will know that it is a large and beautiful landscape populated with pretty market towns and villages and with a long and fascinating history.

I would like to start by thanking my predecessor, Owen Paterson, for almost a quarter of a century of service to the people of North Shropshire and, in particular, for his recent campaign and charitable work for suicide prevention.

It is impossible to visit North Shropshire without being taken back in time. An iron-age fort at Oswestry starts the story, as the first settlers here pioneered the farming industry that underpins the local economy to this day. In Welsh, the site is known as Caer Ogyrfan, meaning “City of Gogyrfan”, the father of Guinevere in Arthurian legend. The intertwined story of North Shropshire and British politics may have begun there.

The next step in our history is at Whitchurch, an important staging post on the Roman road to Chester. It takes its modern name from St Alkmund’s church, originally built with white sandstone quarried in the south of the constituency at Grinshill. And here the association continues—this fine white sandstone was also used to make the lintels and door surround of No. 10 Downing Street. I am sure the Prime Minister will be reminded of the beautiful constituency of North Shropshire each time he passes through that iconic entrance.

In the medieval period, Ellesmere’s great castle was taken by Llywelyn the Great, not to be reclaimed by the English until after his death. Its remains are now largely confined to the earthworks they were built on, but luckily, the fortifications at Whittington and Moreton Corbet still bear testament to the turbulence of life in the marches of the medieval kingdom.

Internal strife has played its part as well—in the early stages of the wars of the roses, the Yorkist army thundered past Market Drayton and through North Shropshire, eager to link up with reinforcements in Ludlow after its victory at nearby Blore Heath.

In the civil war, the residents of Wem, the town closest to my home, proved that the communities of North Shropshire are not just decent and resilient, but occasionally radical. It was the first town in Shropshire to declare for the parliamentarians in the civil war. The troops garrisoned in the town had not completed their wooden defences and had only 40 musketeers to hold their position in 1643 when the royalist army approached. The royalists, complacent and confident of victory, approached from Soulton to the east, but legend has it that the women of Wem rallied to the parliamentarian cause and the garrison held. So it seems that while I am the first woman to represent this area in Parliament, I am continuing a fine tradition of women in North Shropshire defending our democracy.

I am reminded of the brave women of Wem when I consider the impact of this Bill. I am sure that colleagues on both sides of this House would agree that our democracy, which has evolved over hundreds of years, and since the 17th century largely peacefully, should be protected at all costs. Fundamental to that democracy is that the rule of law is upheld without fear or favour, but this Bill seeks to undermine that principle. It will limit the ability of ordinary people to hold this Government to account through the courts.

Judicial review is working well. It is a powerful tool for individuals to enforce their rights and stop Governments from overstepping their powers. Abolishing Cart judicial review, for example, would remove a safeguard when tribunals make mistakes in cases where the stakes are often extremely high for the people involved. It is completely unjustified and a backward step. That is why my Liberal Democrat colleagues and I are supporting amendment 5 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bath (Wera Hobhouse).

Threatening to weaken the people’s ability to challenge the Government because the courts sometimes rule against you is the act of dictators and despots, not democrats. The best way for a Government to avoid that situation is to ensure that they act lawfully in the first place, not legislate to ensure that there is one rule for the citizens of this country and another for its leaders. The circumstances of my election suggest that the majority of voters in North Shropshire would agree.

As their representative on these green Benches and in the home of democracy, I will always defend their democratic rights and listen to their concerns, regardless of the candidate for whom their vote was cast. I will not give up on the fight for the issues that matter most to them: better access to health and ambulance services, a fair deal for our farming community, and proper provision of infrastructure and public services in rural areas. I very much look forward to working with my colleagues on both sides of this House to achieve that.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I congratulate the hon. Lady on her maiden speech; she is clearly going to be a very lively contributor to our debates.

In order to ensure that we fit everybody in, I will have to reduce the time limit to six minutes. I call Paula Barker.

[Paula Barker (Liverpool, Wavertree) (Lab)]

I would like to congratulate the hon. Member for North Shropshire (Helen Morgan) on her wonderful maiden speech and welcome her to her seat in this place. She talked about this historic Chamber, but of course she herself has made history by being the first Lib Dem and the first female MP in that seat. I wish her all the very best in her endeavours to represent her constituents.

--- Later in debate ---

[Janet Daby (Lewisham East) (Lab)]

There has been a lot of turmoil on the Government Benches over the past few weeks—partygate, allegations of blackmail and now Islamophobia. But one thing remains consistent and there is one thing we can count on: the Government have their eyes set on authoritarian rule.

Just look at the recent legislation brought before this House. The Nationality and Borders Bill grants the Government power to strip citizenship without notice. The Elections Bill imposes mandatory voter ID, discriminating against deprived and disadvantaged communities. The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill gives the Government the ability to suppress protest that they deem too noisy.

The Government’s own manifesto promised to protect the individual from an overbearing state, yet this Bill does the opposite, fortifying the Government’s power grab. Judicial review enables individuals to challenge the legality of decisions made by public bodies. It ensures that decisions are made in the right way. When honoured, it is a vital process in checking the power of the Government and it is often the sole key to justice for the most vulnerable.

Without judicial review as it stands, EU citizens would have been deported for rough sleeping, innocent NHS staff would have lost their pensions and a child’s cardiac surgery clinic would have been unlawfully shut down. But instead of strengthening judicial review, this Bill strangles it.

Clause 1 incentivises the use of prospective-only quashing orders. That would mean that when a judge overturned a decision that they deemed illegal, justice would be available only for subsequent claims going forward. The judgment would no longer be retrospective. Past victims hurt by illegal decisions would receive no compensation. That does not sound fair or right to me. This measure hollows out the power of judicial review and inevitably means that more justice will be left unaddressed. In fact, as the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) said, the proposals

“tip the scales of law in favour of the powerful.”

Is that not the story of this Government—more money for the wealthy and powerful and an absent hand for those who need it the most? The whole point of a democracy is that the state should not be able to steamroll its citizens, particularly the most vulnerable.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

Just a little reminder: it is important to refer to the amendments as well as the clauses in the Bill, as we are at that stage of the proceedings.

[Wera Hobhouse (Bath) (LD)]

I take this opportunity to welcome my new colleague, my hon. Friend the Member for North Shropshire (Helen Morgan), to these Benches. I congratulate her on the excellent speech she made today.

I rise to speak to the Liberal Democrat amendments 1 to 5. The Government claim that the Bill will ensure that judicial review is available to protect the rights of individuals against an overbearing state, but it will have quite the opposite effect. As Amnesty International and others have pointed out, the Bill will tie the hands of the judiciary in respect of what remedies they can order when public authorities act unlawfully. It will weaken the courts’ ability to ensure that justice is done and that human rights violations are remedied.