Judicial Review and Courts Bill Debate

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Rosie Winterton Portrait Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
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In view of the shortness of time, I will have to impose, to start with, an eight-minute time limit. It may very well have to be reduced later.

John Hayes Portrait Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)
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I rise to speak on new clauses 8 and 9, which stand in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Tom Hunt).

Those who served on the Bill Committee will not be unfamiliar with the arguments I intend to address, as we rehearsed them at considerable length in Committee. The Minister knows well my general concerns about the Bill: while it is a good start in dealing with the pressing issue of judicial review and how that has been distorted by recent judicial practice, it is only a start. We need much more wide-ranging reform of judicial review and, indeed, much more wide-ranging reform of the relationship between this House and the judiciary, as set out in the Attorney General’s recent speech in Cambridge on judicial activism.

New clause 8 addresses the courts’ role in curtailing the use of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, and especially in circumventing the role of the investigatory powers tribunal. I take a particular interest in that, having been the Minister at the Home Office who introduced the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which deals with the necessary precautions and safeguards associated with the storage and retrieval of electronic data. Indeed, the Bill I took through the House introduced the double lock: all warrants, as well as being dealt with by the Home Secretary, are, as an additional safeguard, dealt with by a judicial commissioner. That safeguard was to ensure the core principles of proportionality and necessity, which lay at the heart of all considerations of that kind.

The problem is that the courts have taken it upon themselves to become involved in matters that should be the exclusive preserve of this House. It is very important to see the Bill in context. The supremacy of Parliament is fundamental to protecting the interests of the people. Parliament’s role in our constitutional settlement is not—as was suggested in an evidence session with Aidan O’Neill QC—a matter of neutrality.

Marco Longhi Portrait Marco Longhi (Dudley North) (Con)
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Does my right hon. Friend agree that the events of Brexit showed the vivid importance of always maintaining the sovereignty of this place and respecting the will of the people?

John Hayes Portrait Sir John Hayes
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Absolutely. The separation of powers does not deal with neutrality. It deals with different powers, which are, by constitutional arrangement, held by the courts and this place. The relationship between the two is critical. It is critical to our considerations today and more critical still to our constitution. A. V. Dicey argued that the separation of powers confers on Parliament a dominant characteristic. Parliament consists of Her Majesty the Queen, the House of Lords and the House of Commons acting together. Therefore, as Dicey says:

“The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than this, that Parliament… has… the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.”

That is precisely the point that my hon. Friend makes.

We need to reaffirm that principle in general and the Bill is an opportunity to do so. Any Parliament that makes a new law or repeals a law will be obeyed by the courts. That is fundamental to the role of this place. All of us who represent the people, as my hon. Friend says, have a duty, not just a mission, to reflect the will of the people.

Stuart C McDonald Portrait Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)
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Is not the point of judicial review to make sure the Government comply with the rules and restrictions set by Parliament? Restrictions on judicial review allow the Government to ride roughshod over Parliament’s views.

John Hayes Portrait Sir John Hayes
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That is, of course, true, and it is why judicial review exists. The hon. Gentleman is right that there need to be checks and balances, but it is wrong to use judicial review to perpetuate matters of high politics or to perpetuate debates that have been settled in the country and in this place.

What we heard from the Minister when we debated these issues at considerable length is that, in effect, people are having several bites of the cherry. Debates were settled and then people came back to reopen them and revisit subjects that had already been agreed. That is not the role of the judicial process and it is certainly not the role of judicial review. The Bill goes some way to addressing that.

The purpose of my new clauses is to probe and press the Government to do more. I strongly urge the Minister to accept them with enthusiasm and alacrity because to involve the courts in matters of investigatory powers, as I said, is quite wrong. The landmark Privacy International case of May 2019 illustrates how wrong it can be. I will not go into detail because time does not permit, but other hon. Members will be familiar with the case and its legal ramifications. I recommend the Attorney General’s speech, which I have mentioned already, to those who want to find out more.

Professor Richard Ekins gave evidence to the Public Bill Committee, and he wrote an excellent paper on these subjects for Policy Exchange. He describes the Supreme Court’s judgment in respect of the Privacy International case as

“a very serious attack on some fundamentals of the constitution.”––[Official Report, Judicial Review and Courts Public Bill Committee, 2 November 2021; c. 15.]

For a very long time, it was not accepted that the courts should become involved in matters of investigatory powers, and particularly the tribunal. There was no possibility of judicial review for 19 years after the 2000 Act was passed.

Sally-Ann Hart Portrait Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)
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Will my right hon. Friend confirm that these new clauses would, in effect, stop judicial review departing from a narrow focus on a particular public Act and becoming a free-ranging inquiry into Government decision making?

John Hayes Portrait Sir John Hayes
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My hon. Friend makes the point more eloquently than I ever could, partly due to her expertise. The real point is that these cases have created the possibility of a much more wide-ranging rebalancing and reappraisal of the relationship between the courts and Parliament, without public consent—indeed, the public have not been consulted. That is not good for the courts. We want to maintain the integrity of the judicial process by affirming the characteristics they have long enjoyed that underpin the separation of powers. New clause 8 would not only do a great service to the cause my hon. Friend highlights, but improve the Bill and be in the courts’ own interest.

It is important to understand that new clause 9 has two parts. Subsection (1) aims to limit the extent to which judicial review proceedings involve the testing of evidence or resolving and disputing questions of fact. The traditional view is that judicial review proceedings are an inappropriate forum in which to solicit or test evidence because they are a supervisory jurisdiction that should focus on questions of law rather than questions of fact. Once again, what has occurred over time is that the courts have strayed into debates and inquiries about matters of fact rather than matters of law. That status quo prevailed for a very long time, but the role of the courts has altered. Furthermore, there has been a change in the application of judicial review in respect of evidence. The courts ought to be focused on the legality of a decision, as the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald) said, and whether it stands up to appropriate levels of scrutiny—that is the business of a judicial review. Judicial review is supposed to be a backstop, a check, of the kind he described in his intervention—

Alistair Carmichael Portrait Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)
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The difficulty I have with the right hon. Gentleman’s argument is this: where facts are in dispute, how can a court be expected to rule on a point of law without hearing evidence?

John Hayes Portrait Sir John Hayes
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The court can take evidence, but what it should not be doing is fishing for further information, of a wider variety, which opens up consideration of the original process, rather than checking whether that process was right and proper; it is a subtle difference but a fundamental one in terms of the change in the way courts have gone about their business.

Our new clause addresses this issue, as the Minister will know. Jonathan Sumption is the judge who perhaps more than any other has set out the proper functions of the courts in relation to Parliament. In his Reith lecture, he said:

“It is the proper function of the Courts to stop governments exceeding or abusing their legal powers.”

That is absolutely what JR should be, but I fear that it is being compromised by the changes that are taking place as a result of judicial activism. So, mindful of the Attorney General’s advice on this and of the fact that the Government clearly are in tune with that advice—otherwise, they would not have introduced this Bill in the first place—I urge them to accept the amendments, in order to make this Bill be as good as it can be. Rather than waiting for another bus to come along, we should get on this one and get to the destination we all seek.

Anne McLaughlin Portrait Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)
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Much of this Bill has no impact on Scotland or our separate courts and legal system, so our amendments and my comments are focused on the parts that do, which primarily deal with judicial review. The parts of the Bill I will address today are not just bad; they are unnecessary and dangerous, and they lay the groundwork for the Government to insulate themselves and future Governments from proper scrutiny and accountability. I am sure that is on their personal wish list given current events, but we ought to make policy for generations, for everyone and not for one iteration of one political party.

I sat through 11 sittings of the Public Bill Committee and waited for the Government to persuade me that, for example, removing Cart JR was necessary, but instead I heard odds and sods of anecdotal evidence, lots of legal jargon and the phrase “three bites of the cherry” a total of 62 times, with the implication that somehow those using Cart JR had greater access to justice—that simply is not true. Cart JR is not about saying, “I don’t like the decision you've come to, let’s try again for a different judgement.” It is about looking at the situation where, first, a serious error of law may have been committed in the first-tier tribunal, and then the upper tribunal has failed to recognise and correct the error. It could be that the first-tier tribunal failed to consider or misinterpreted the evidence, or that the facts are inconsistent with the decision, but the point is: it happens, mistakes are made and Cart JRs provide a vital safeguard to correct these errors in cases where the stakes can be incredibly high. Rather than this being a “third bite of the cherry”, the reality is that the first bite was not even a slither—a mistake was made. Mistakes do not just affect the person in question; the ramifications are wider. Similarly, Cart JRs not only give one person who has appealed the opportunity to have their case considered properly, but they catch out errors and injustices, benefiting the system as a whole. Cart JRs have been used to ensure that disabled people are given the right benefit entitlement; they have stopped people being made homeless; and they have prevented the deportation of people to countries where they faced certain death. I am currently waiting to attend a first-tier tribunal on behalf of a family member. Given my knowledge of her and of the social security system, I am 100% certain of her entitlement and equally certain it will only fail if a mistake is made when considering the evidence. If that happens, surely my family member deserves the right to have it rectified—surely everybody has that right.

The thing is: the Government know that the impact will be far greater on those who are most vulnerable. In their own impact statement for this Bill, they admit that abolishing Cart would mean that

“those who do lose out…are more likely to have particular protected characteristics, for example in respect of race and/or religion or belief.”

So anyone voting for this ought to be aware and be honest with their constituents that they are consciously voting to the detriment of their constituents with protected characteristics. It is estimated that this will save only £364,000 to £402,000 a year. That is the cost of protecting the rights of some of the most vulnerable people. It is not much to ask for, is it? Let us not pretend that this is about being prudent with the public purse after writing off £4.3 billion of fraudulent covid claims last year.

We will vote against this terrible Bill, but if it does go ahead, our amendments 42 and 43 would protect the Scottish courts and tribunals from clause 2. We in Scotland do not want it, the legal profession does not want it, the Scottish Government do not want it, and I guarantee that the people of Scotland do not want it. This Government are trying very hard to demonstrate their alleged respect for Scotland—in words if not in actions—as the Scottish Government lay the groundwork for an independence referendum; some would say, because of the independence referendum. Well, now is their chance. Now is the chance for all the parties in this place to show Scotland just how much respect they have for our separate and distinct legal system and our right to protect it, and ourselves, from this legislation.

My final thoughts on clause 2 relate to the way in which the Government intend to make this happen—the legal framework. The Government say that the use of an ouster clause will set a precedent for removing certain cases or areas out of the scope of judicial review, but what does that mean? It means that in future they intend to cherry-pick areas that they would rather not see judicially reviewed, which sounds every bit as dangerous as it is. The rule of law and the separation of powers are hallmarks of an effective democracy; we cannot allow the Government to pick and choose where and how they face judicial scrutiny. As Liberty reminds us in its briefing, this Bill is passing through Parliament at the same time as the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, the Nationality and Borders Bill and the Elections Bill, to name but a few. Now more than ever, we need the ability and deserve the right to hold the Government and public bodies to account.

Clause 1, on suspended quashing orders and prospective-only remedies, does not extend to Scottish courts and will not apply directly, but it will affect UK-wide legislation to which we are all subject. It will also mean that many more people across these islands may choose Scottish courts, and while I am always happy to promote Scotland and our separate legal system, there may be a capacity issue that has not been discussed or even considered.

Along with others, I have raised the landmark Unison judicial review of 2017 a number of times. The Supreme Court agreed that the fees for access to justice via employment tribunals were unlawful, so everyone who had paid them was refunded, and the Government were no longer allowed to charge the fees from the moment of that judgment. Let us consider what would happen if the Bill were passed and if, instead of seeking a judicial review in 2017, Unison did so this year and, crucially, secured the same decision: the decision that the workers were right, and that what the Government were doing was unlawful. The difference is that if this Bill is enacted, no one initiating a judicial review will have their fees refunded and no one who has already been forced to pay up to £1,200 for an employment tribunal will be refunded either, despite the court’s agreeing that they have been subject to something unlawful. Anyone subsequently requiring an employment tribunal will still have to pay the unlawful fees, and in the meantime the Government will be able to tweak the legislation and make the unlawful lawful. Who would or could go to the expense and trouble of seeking a judicial review given the prospect of no remedy, no justice, and no change in their or anyone else’s situation?

The delaying of a quashing order is, in certain circumstances, the appropriate path to follow, and that is why the courts already have that option. The issue is that it is currently an option, and the clause seeks to make it a presumption. The Independent Review of Administrative Law, which has been largely ignored in respect of its recommendations for judicial review, suggested that “giving courts the option” was enough, but here we see the Government determined to fetter judicial discretion and tie the hands of judges. Our amendment would ensure that it would once more be the case that judges “may” rather than “must” use such delays, and if the Government continue to argue that they are not trying to tie the hands of the judges, they will surely support it tonight.

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James Cartlidge Portrait James Cartlidge
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The point is that these matters are entirely for our independent judiciary. The judiciary will make the judgment on whether the powers in the Bill should be used. I would not want to speculate on whether they would have been used in individual cases; that is not my role as a Minister. We have to have faith in how the judiciary will deploy what are, after all, new flexibilities—as we say, new tools in the judicial toolbox.

Let me move on to the new clauses tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes). New clause 8 seeks to re-establish the ouster clause, in response to a 2019 Supreme Court judgment that asserted that certain decisions of the investigatory powers tribunal would not be subject to judicial review by the High Court. My right hon. Friend knows that we are sympathetic to and see merit in what he says, but we think this is not the right Bill or time, given the complexity involved. We want to look into the matter further, though. I was pleased to discuss it with my right hon. Friend in Committee and would be pleased to meet him further.

John Hayes Portrait Sir John Hayes
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There are two new clauses, and I am sure the Minister is going to deal with the second one, but the issue of evidence is particularly important, as he will know. Allowing cross-examination on the introduction of new material that was not pertinent to the original decision is not about checking matters of law, but about rehearsing matters of fact and perhaps even going on a fishing expedition for new facts. On investigatory powers, he knows how important it is that the tradition maintained for 19 years is maintained and that the courts simply do not get involved in those matters.