Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill (Eighth sitting)

Robert Goodwill Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 8th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 18th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

Thank you very much and welcome back, Mr Stringer; it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again. It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North, who made a powerful and persuasive contribution earlier to reinforce the merits of new clause 41.

I rise to speak in favour of new clause 58, about which we feel strongly and which is not dissimilar to new clause 41. As things stand, it is currently the responsibility of local authorities to make an application to the European Union settlement scheme for children under 18 who will be eligible to apply but who are currently in the care of the local authority. The Committee heard evidence on that from the Children’s Society, and I noted the Minister’s scepticism about aspects of that approach. I will seek, with genuine sincerity, to persuade him of the merits of taking an alternative approach.

Children are taken into care only if they have had the worst possible start in life. The cohort of children who would be affected by the new clause have the fateful combination of absent parents and precarious migration status. If we do any good with the Bill, it should be by giving those kids some stability on just one those fronts, in the hope that they can go on to a much brighter future.

In answer to a written parliamentary question, the Home Office said that it estimates—as we have already heard—that around 5,000 looked-after children and 4,000 care leavers in the UK would need to apply to the EU settlement scheme, but the exact numbers are unknown. Any further investigations undertaken by the Home Office to better understand those numbers have not been published, so, like my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North, I wonder whether the Minister is in a position to update the Committee on those estimates.

My hon. Friend referred to the incredibly informative survey work of the Children’s Society on this matter, in the absence of any further official data. It conducted its own research, sending freedom of information requests to every local authority or children’s services provider in the UK. That totalled 211 providers, 153 of which responded to the FOI requests by January this year. Those local authorities identified just 3,612 European economic area or Swiss looked-after children and care leavers, which is only 40% of Home Office estimates. Of those 3,612 children and young people, only 730 had so far applied to the EU settlement scheme. Of those, only 404 were in receipt of status—282 had settled status and 122 had pre-settled status—meaning that, of those identified by local authorities, only 20% have applied and only 11% have been granted status. Although the data represents 73% of local authorities or service providers, and as such is not fully representative, it offers a strong indication that there are serious and urgent concerns about identifying and settling the migration status of vulnerable children whose status and future will be significantly affected by the Bill.

The Minister might argue that as those figures relate to data gathered in January of this year, progress may since have been made. However, considering that we started to enter lockdown in mid-March, I suspect that not a great deal of progress has been made in the intervening weeks. The Minister might argue that because only 153 local authorities responded and 58 councils did not contribute data, the stats might actually be better than that sample suggests, but a number of those councils said they did not have that information and could not provide it to the Children’s Society. In fact, 32 local authorities said that they were unable to provide the data or that they did not hold the information in a reportable format.

Whether through the Government’s proposed approach, which means going through the full application, or through the streamlined alternative proposed in the new clause 58, for those children the local authority has responsibility for securing their status either way. If those very councils are saying that they do not know how many children in their care are eligible, we all ought to be incredibly concerned.

The Government have produced non-statutory guidance to local authorities on the EUSS regarding their roles and responsibilities in making or supporting applications for looked-after children and care leavers. However, in its oral evidence last week, the Children’s Society said that it had engaged with several councils that were still unaware of the existence of the guidance or their responsibilities as set out within it. Although the Children’s Society has attempted to address that by providing councillors with resources aimed at helping them in their accountability, overview and scrutiny roles, we clearly still have a number of barriers to overcome.

Even where local authorities are aware of their responsibilities, the young people in their care often have extremely complex cases that require considerable support and legal advice. Many require nationality advice, others have complex family arrangements, and most simply do not have the required documentation. Social workers are consequently spending months navigating advice and acquiring the necessary documents from European embassies. Social workers are by no means specialists in that area of work, and do we really want them to be acting as immigration caseworkers when we know the incredible case loads that they face?

All those factors were in play before they were compounded by the coronavirus. Local authorities are in the fight of their lives to keep communities going. The resources are, and will continue to be, spread incredibly thinly, diverting efforts to the frontline of fighting the virus for the foreseeable future. We have vulnerable children at home without day-to-day interaction with services. Although those children can still attend school we know that, disappointingly and worryingly, numbers are still low.

The challenges presented for children’s services are enormous. Identifying and assisting children in care to apply for an immigration status that is seemingly non-urgent has inevitably been de-prioritised. The most recent EUSS statistics show that applications fell by 46% in April this year, and anecdotal evidence from practitioners indicates that the number of applications and referrals of EU children in care or care leavers has been low, as we would expect during this time.

Even when applications have been made, the Children’s Society research found that in its sample only 404 EU national children in care or care leavers were in receipt of status through the EUSS, out of an estimated 9,000. In just over a nine-month period, only 11% of the vulnerable children identified through the survey, which is just 4% of the Home Office estimate of 9,000, were able to settle their status, compared with 79% of the overall official estimate of 3.4 million EEA citizens over the same nine-month period.

If those trends continue, thousands of European children either currently in the care system or who have recently left care will fall through the gaps, becoming undocumented and left without immigration status—rubbing salt into the wounds of what has already been a troubled start in life. The Home Office previously stated in answer to a written question that children who

“do not apply because their parent or guardian did not submit an application on their behalf can submit a late application. This includes children in care and care leavers.”

That is welcome, but both local and national Government must work to ensure that no child in the care of the state becomes undocumented, and we can do that with the new clause.

Having discussed some of the practicalities on the matter at length with my local director of children’s services, Julie Jenkins, for whose assistance I put my gratitude on the record, we propose that local authorities, on a declaratory basis, provide a list of names to the Home Office of the children and young people who would be eligible. In responding to reservations raised by the Minister at last week’s evidence session, the Home Office would then grant those young people settled status, as they would for a person who had made an application.

The Minister asked the Children’s Society how these young people prove their status. To answer his question: in the same way any other person with settled status would. We have been unable, sadly, to convince the Minister of the merits of physical proof, so they would have confirmation through an e-visa. On the issue of pre-settled and settled status, of the 404 children in the sample that we are talking about who are in receipt of status, 282 were granted settled status and 122 were granted pre-settled status.

Given everything that those kids have been through, why are we giving them pre-settled status? Let us just give them settled status. Let us not simply sign them up for yet more years of paperwork and burdens of proof; let us just take all that uncertainty off the table for them in this instance by giving them both settled status and proof of it.

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

On burden of proof, is it not the case that the Government have made it clear that alternative types of documentation might be available for children who cannot get access to birth certificates or other documents because they are estranged from their parents?

[Holly Lynch]

I would welcome that in the event that there is no alternative and that some of the more regular items of documentation are not available. In taking that route, however, we are still asking children to go away and gather a potentially enormous amount of information and documentation. When we know that such children are eligible, why can we not just deal with this issue in a streamlined way through local authorities and the Home Office?

I hope I have satisfied the Minister’s reservations about this approach. We are talking about a cohort of children and young people who are our responsibility; we the state are acting as their legal guardians. Let us do the best we can for them and at least give them confidence in their immigration status, in the hope that they can go on to overcome all their challenges and build happy lives here in the UK.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kevin Foster]

It is probably worth saying that, as of today, we cannot publish a final list of all who will be eligible under the EU settlement scheme because the transition period extends to 31 December this year. Therefore, people may yet arrive in the country who would be eligible to apply under the scheme. As part of the quarterly statistics publication—not the monthly one—we publish the number of applications from children. A large amount of work is going on, but it would be impossible today to have a definitive number of all who will finally be eligible, because eligibility, along with freedom-of-movement rights, runs up to 31 December.

[Mr Goodwill]

Is it not also the case that there may be children claiming to be EEA citizens who may turn out to be, for example, from Albania, so publishing a figure based on what people claim would not be the true figure?

[Kevin Foster]

I thank my right hon. Friend for that intervention. Yes, there is always that possibility. For example, one of the reasons why we will not look to accept EEA identity cards in the long term at the border and internally for certain right-to-work checks is that some EEA identity cards are very prone to abuse, unlike secure passports. There are always going to be such claims, but certainly there is strong work going on. However, as we touched on, the core reason is that we cannot produce today a final list of who will be eligible, but we are working closely with local councils. Of course, each day children come into care, sadly, so again, snapshots do not reflect the work that needs to be done.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. In tabling new clauses 45 and 56, my party wants to set out our opposition to how the no recourse to public funds regime is working, both in general and specifically during the current covid crisis. We think it is having some drastic effects, and therefore refuse to extend it to EEA nationals during the current public health crisis, or indeed more generally. Of course, we urge the Government to go further by also disapplying NRPF rules in relation to other migrants.

Because of this Bill, any EEA migrants coming to the UK under the new system will face the same problems as those coming from outside the EEA. They will be prohibited from accessing public funds until they are granted permanent residence, something that will take five years for some migrants and 10 for others, if it is granted at all. No recourse to public funds conditions will be applied to the family members of UK citizens and settled persons, as well as those to whom we have extended an invitation to come on a work visa. That means that individuals, families and children are prevented from accessing most in-work and out-of-work benefits, including child benefit, tax credits, universal credit, income-related employment support allowance, income support, local welfare assistance schemes, housing benefit and social security.

[Mr Goodwill]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the term “no recourse to public funds” is slightly misleading, because there are a number of benefits that people are entitled to, including the furlough scheme, should they be entitled to that?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It is welcome that the furlough scheme is extended to these individuals, but it is nowhere near enough. I will come to specific problems in relation to covid later in my short speech.

In short, if these new clauses are not agreed, many thousands more people who are here because they are family members or because they are wanted for their work will be put at risk of poverty and insecurity.

Those who come here with limited leave visas certainly do not expect to have to rely on public funds, but as we have seen all too well in recent months, unforeseeable events that are completely beyond their control can have a dramatic impact on their capacity to sustain themselves and their family. I am talking about coronavirus, but the ability of individuals to support themselves can be affected for reasons that are many and varied. It could be economics, illness within the family, relationship breakdown, accidents or the death of a loved one.

We have allowed and welcomed people who come to work here or to join their families. There is no reason or justification for denying them the safety net and security that we regard as essential for everybody else.

Included in those impacted by the NRPF rules are parents who are working hard in roles that are absolutely crucial at this time, including care workers, NHS staff, cleaners and people involved in food preparation. Some are working extraordinarily long hours but still cannot access even limited top-up benefits to help them meet the needs of their children.

Thanks to the Children’s Society, we know that many of the families detrimentally impacted by the rules are headed by single mothers, often from black, Asian and minority ethnic backgrounds. There are also significant numbers of families that include children with special educational needs who require additional help from supporting agencies.

It is also important to note that many of the children who will be victims of the NRPF rules will have been born and brought up here. I link back to my amendment on fees for registering British citizens; some of these children would be entitled to British citizenship, but cannot access it, either because they are not aware of it or because they are priced out of it. There will even be British citizens among those children, who are being punished because their parents’ immigration status prevents them from accessing support.

The disastrous impacts of all the rules are well established. People who are prohibited from accessing public funds are clearly at risk of destitution, with no access to the social safety net. The impact on children can be particularly devastating, in so far as deprivation is clearly detrimental to their long-term growth and development. As the Children’s Society points out, living in poverty even for short periods of time has significant detrimental effects on children’s outcomes, both in childhood and in later life, affecting their school attainment, cognitive and behavioural development, and physical and mental health.

Recently, the High Court found no recourse to public funds policies to be unlawful, holding that the relevant immigration rules and casework instructions did not adequately account for human rights obligations. That case was brought by an eight-year-old boy whose mother was subject to NRPF conditions and on the 10-year route to settlement. She was a carer for mentally disabled clients, before the imposition of the NRPF conditions led her and her son to experience periods of destitution. They moved house repeatedly, with the boy having been moved five times before the age of eight, and at one point they were street homeless. The court found that the Home Secretary must not impose or should lift NRPF conditions when it is clear that a person is at risk of imminent destitution in the absence of public funds, rather than waiting for that destitution to take place. As legislators, we should be doing better than that; we should avoid families being at risk of destitution at all. We invite families and individuals to come to undertake vital work here, and we should extend the safety net that we enjoy ourselves.

As in other areas, the Home Office sometimes attempts to pass the buck to local authorities and argues that support under legislation relating to children should mean a safety net of sorts is provided, but the number able to access such support is extremely limited, and the support is also incredibly restricted—sometimes as little as £3 per day per child. As I understand it, children are not even allowed to access free school meals.

The Home Office will also point out that, on application, NRPF conditions can be lifted, but those on the frontline say that such applications are incredibly difficult to have success with and have to be repeated multiple times. Those who apply who are currently on five-year routes to settlement will instead be placed on a 10-year route to settlement, with none of their residence to date being counted towards that target. The price of access to that safety net is insecurity.

[Mr Goodwill]

Does the hon. Gentleman not accept that benefits that people are entitled to by virtue of their paying national insurance contributions are able to be paid, including important ones such as contribution-based jobseeker’s allowance, incapacity benefit and, of course, retirement pension?

--- Later in debate ---

New clause 56 would enable EU citizens already resident to continue to access public funds in the future on the same basis as they currently can. I understand the sentiment behind the proposal from the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, but I cannot agree to it, as we have now left the European Union. The Government have given clear and firm commitments to protect the entitlements of EEA citizens resident in the UK before the end of the transition period. We have delivered those protections through the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, and by establishing the EU settlement scheme, about which we have talked regularly in Committee.

[Mr Goodwill]

Does my hon. Friend know whether any other EU countries have extended to UK citizens living in the European Union the type of benefits proposed by the new clauses?

[Kevin Foster]

It is probably worth saying that many European welfare schemes are based on slightly different premises—for example, social insurance schemes. As we reflected on when we talked about healthcare costs, people accessing healthcare services in other European countries may be required to pay for things that the NHS provides free at the point of need to UK nationals. It is hard to give different examples, but there are protections in the withdrawal agreement for UK citizens living in the EU before the end of the transition period. To be fair, many countries have been good in wanting proactively to support UK citizens living in their nation. I cannot give a list of each countries’ individual migration system off the top of my head, but it is probably safe to say that it is relatively common around the world for those who have newly arrived in a country to be unlikely to be able to access and qualify for a range of welfare provisions.

EEA citizens who apply under the EU settlement scheme secure their rights in UK law, so they can access benefits and services on at least the same basis as before they were granted that status. The Government have provided guidance for local authorities to enable them to support vulnerable EEA citizens in making an application under the scheme. The Government have also made available to local authorities and charities a further £8 million, in addition to the £9 million announced last year, to help them to assist vulnerable EEA citizens in making applications.

New clause 56 would risk impacting the Government’s ability to make regulations under the power in clause 4, the importance of which I have set out previously in Committee: to ensure that our laws operate coherently once free movement ends; to align the immigration treatment of newly arriving EEA citizens and non-EEA citizens from 1 January 2021; and to make relevant savings and transitional provisions for resident EEA citizens that cannot be made under powers in the 2020 Act.

New clause 59 would require the Government to publish a report on the impact of the no recourse to public funds condition on certain groups of EEA nationals. This is not necessary; the Government are already required to consider the impact of policies on all those to whom they apply, not just certain groups.

On new clause 62, I share the interest of the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North in ensuring the wellbeing of children, but I do not believe the new clause is necessary. Immigration law already provides that local authorities may intervene where required, regardless of the immigration status or nationality of the child or parent. The safeguards in place for the vulnerable will be retained, but it is only right that the future immigration system continues to play a part in ensuring that taxpayers’ funds are protected for the residents of the UK, whose money it is, and in assuring them that immigration continues to benefit the country as a whole and is not based on creating new costs and burdens for public resources.

I understand and appreciate the intentions behind new clause 62, but it would provide EEA citizens with greater access to benefits in the UK than they currently have under UK law. Generally speaking, under EU free movement law, EEA citizens may currently access benefits when they exercise a qualifying EU treaty right—for example, through employment or self-employment, or when they have become permanent residents. The new clause would remove that qualification and provide that any EEA citizen in this country with a child, for whatever period and in whatever capacity, may qualify for welfare benefits.

We believe that a general qualifying threshold of five years for access to benefits in immigration procedures is the right one, as it reflects the strength of a person’s connection to the United Kingdom and the principle that people should come to the UK to contribute, rather than to take advantage of, and place pressures on, taxpayer-funded services and welfare payments. Non-EEA migrants who come to live in the UK are currently expected to provide for any children they have without recourse to public funds. There can be no reasonable justification for adopting a different principle for EEA citizens arriving in the UK when the new immigration system is introduced, given that we have now left the European Union.

Finally, new clauses 59 and 62 incorrectly reference the immigration health surcharge. The immigration health surcharge is not a public fund. It is a contribution made by temporary migrants towards the costs of the NHS services they can access from day one. These new clauses would undermine the intention to establish a unified immigration system that builds public confidence in its operation, and therefore the Government cannot accept them.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill (Seventh sitting)

Robert Goodwill Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 18th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Good morning, Sir Edward. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again. New clause 24 is in very much the same spirit as new clause 21, which would require the Government to commission a report on the Bill’s impact on the health and social care sectors. New clause 24 would require them to take the same approach to the agriculture sector and food security.

Significant numbers of EEA nationals are employed on a permanent and seasonal basis, making them an instrumental consideration for the agriculture sector. As things stand, it would not function without them. The coronavirus pandemic has shone a light on certain sectors that we have often taken for granted but are absolutely essential. Food security has been a focus for people as never before. It is another area that brings recognition that food production is essential to life. Its workers have been classed as key workers for the purposes of the pandemic, yet so many of those who have worked incredibly hard to keep fruit and veg, in particular, on our tables throughout the pandemic are paid less than £25,600.

The Government’s February policy statement on their future points-based immigration system simply states:

“We will end free movement and not implement a route for lower-skilled workers.”

Members who served on the Committee that considered the Bill presented during the 2017-19 Parliament may remember that James Porter of the National Farmers Union of Scotland gave evidence. I spoke to Mr Porter about the Bill and about the issue of “low-skilled” workers. He was keen to stress that, although some of his workers may not have qualifications or letters after their names, being an agricultural worker and picker of soft fruits and vegetables is their profession. It requires skill and they take great pride in it.

Mr Porter said that most of his seasonal workers have been coming back to his farm for 10 or 15 years. He went on to explain that the exceptional circumstances of this year meant that attempts to redirect people traditionally from different lines of work and professions into agriculture from the local labour pool had brought out the likes of lawyers, electricians and teachers to pick fruit on his farm. That was welcome, but he made the point that although they were educated and highly skilled in their own field, they were not skilled fruit pickers. They took longer and their yield was not comparable with that of people who specialise in that line of work.

The Government’s February policy paper goes on to say:

“UK businesses will need to adapt and adjust to the end of free movement, and we will not seek to recreate the outcomes from free movement within the points-based system. As such, it is important that employers move away from a reliance on the UK’s immigration system as an alternative to investment in staff retention, productivity, and wider investment in technology and automation.”

I sought to make a point about this matter on Tuesday, during the discussion on the social care new clause. I completely accept the Minister’s point that social care and agriculture are very different sectors. He will look to the unemployment figures and say that we will fill labour shortages from the domestic workforce, but I gave the example of how attempts to channel those who are out of work into other sectors over the course of the pandemic had not exactly been an easy or straightforward process.

I cited the Pick for Britain scheme as an example. The Minister may have more up-to-date figures but, after overcoming some initial teething problems with the website, one of the organisations managing the scheme, Concordia, reported that it had 35,000 applications after the initial appeal for domestic workers. However, only 30% of applicants had farming experience—as was probably predictable—and only 16% of people opted to interview after their initial application, with even fewer actually making it on to a farm.

Some of the pressures have been alleviated thanks to specially chartered flights from EU countries such as Romania, which have provided us with the skilled workers we need, but they have been a warning of what is to come. When we have problems in the sector, we will say with absolute certainty that the writing was on the wall.

The seasonal agriculture workers pilot scheme needs to be much improved if it is to sustain the levels of migrant work needed after the end of the transition period. The pilot allows for 10,000 visas, when actually 70,000 would be much closer to the agreed number of people required. The cost of permits is too high and farms simply do not have the administrative capacity needed to process the bureaucracy that accompanies each individual application.

FLEX, the Focus on Labour Exploitation group, has also repeatedly raised concerns about the potential for worker exploitation in the scheme, citing the issue of tied visas, where the worker is tied to one specific employer and prohibited from changing employer while in the UK under that visa. Debt bondage, where the worker’s wages go towards paying off costs of entering the scheme, such as visa charges and flight costs, alongside recruitment fees paid to labour brokers, is another worrying trend that will need to be addressed in any future scheme.

Right across the sector there are problems. The Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs took evidence on this in May, with Ian Wright, the chief executive of the Food and Drink Federation, telling the Committee that the crisis had shown how vital the food industry was. He said:

“If you can’t feed a country, you don’t have a country. That has been borne out in this crisis in massive order.”

He went on to explicitly say:

“We don’t think the current Immigration Bill addresses the sort of country we want to be. I think it is surprising that, given the lessons of the last eight or nine weeks, the Immigration Bill is back in parliament unchanged, given what we have learned about the people working in food and drink, in distribution centres and the care sectors.”

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

The hon. Lady is right to identify some of the exploitation that can occur. Does she agree that the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004 addressed many of those problems and that the situation is much better than it was because of legislation passed by the Conservative-led Government?

[Holly Lynch]

I am grateful for that intervention and I welcome the point made by the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby—

[Holly Lynch]

Further to my hon. Friend’s correction, James Porter was keen to stress that that has been a helpful intervention to improve standards for workers. I hope that the hon. Gentleman agrees that there is still much more to do to ensure that we are looking after these workers.

[Mr Goodwill]

May I correct the record? It was because of legislation passed by the last Labour Government, which I do not recall that we opposed.

[Holly Lynch]

That is one of the best interventions I have taken during the course of this Committee, and it was a welcome addition.

The Royal Association of British Dairy Farmers has estimated that in the UK, 56% of dairy farmers have employed workers from the EU; 60%––around 22,800 EU migrants––make up the workforce in poultry farming. According to the NFU, the UK’s horticulture sector is completely reliant upon seasonal migrant workers to collect crop yields: 99% of all harvesters in the UK come from Europe. All these working relationships have been forged over time due largely to the flexibility granted by freedom of movement.

The British Poultry Council has warned that the new immigration plans are likely to have a crippling impact on UK food businesses. A report of the kind outlined in new clause 24 is therefore necessary to safeguard the UK’s agriculture industry, during a time of much upheaval. As both the National Farmers Union and National Farmers Union of Scotland have stressed, fruit and vegetable picking requires a high level of manual skills, and farms can only operate efficiently when they recruit workers with this skillset.

This is the one sector where we can say that we have just been through a trial for the ending of free movement, brought about by lockdown. Migrant labour dried up due to lockdown and the Government tried to recruit from the domestic labour force. Nowhere near the required numbers joined up, fruit and veg started to rot in the fields and we were forced to very quickly get migrant labour from Europe back in on chartered flights. It is vital that the Government learn from our experiences during the crisis and develop a proactive and pragmatic agricultural policy for implementation after the transition period. New clause 24 would give us the information required to do this.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill (Fifth sitting)

Robert Goodwill Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 16th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)]

Good morning, Sir Edward. It is a pleasure once again to serve under your chairmanship. Social security arrangements set out in EU regulation 883 of 2004 and elsewhere are currently directly applicable in the UK. They cover the co-ordination of social security, healthcare and pension provision for people who are publicly insured who move from one EU state to another.

The regulations ensure that individuals who move to another EEA are covered by the social security legislation of only one country at a time and are, therefore, liable only to make contributions in one country; that a person has the rights and obligations of the member state where they are covered; that periods of insurance, employment or residence in other member states can be taken into account when determining a person’s eligibility for benefits; and that a person can receive benefits that they are entitled to from one member state, even if they are resident in another.

The co-ordination regulations cover only those social security benefits that provide cover against certain categories of social risk, such as sickness, maternity, paternity, unemployment and old age. Some non-contributory benefits fall within the regulations but cannot be exported, and benefits that are social and medical assistance are not covered at all. Universal credit, for example, is excluded.

As we heard from Jeremy Morgan of British in Europe in his oral evidence to the Committee last week, most UK nationals resident in the EU are of working age. It is important to note that the number of people claiming the working-age benefits that are covered by the regulations—jobseeker’s allowance or employment and support allowance—has declined sharply since the introduction of universal credit. We might therefore expect social security co-ordination arrangements to apply to a declining number of working-age adults. The regulations will, however, still be of importance for a sizeable number of individuals, and not least for pensioners.

The co-ordination regulations also confer a right on those with a European health insurance card to access medically necessary state-provided healthcare during a temporary state in another EEA state. The home member state is normally required to reimburse the host country for the cost of the treatment. Under the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, protection of healthcare entitlements is linked to entitlement to cash benefits.

Clause 5(1) provides an appropriate authority with the power to modify the co-ordination regulations by secondary legislation. The power is very broad, placing no limits on the modifications that appropriate authorities are able to make to the co-ordination regulations. By virtue of subsection (3), the power explicitly

“includes power—

(a) to make different provision for different categories of person to whom they apply…

(b) otherwise to make different provision for different purposes;

(c) to make supplementary…consequential, transitional, transitory or saving provision;

(d) to provide for a person to exercise a discretion in dealing with any matter.”

The power is further enhanced by subsection (4), which provides for the ability to amend or repeal

“primary legislation passed before, or in the same Session as, this Act”

and other retained direct EU legislation.

Since the UK left the EU at the end of January this year, the relevant EU regulations pertaining to social security, pensions and healthcare have been retained in UK law by section 3 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. I accept that the Government need to be able to amend co-ordination regulations to remedy deficiencies in them resulting from the UK’s exit from the EU, but the 2018 Act already contains a power in section 8 to modify direct retained EU law. Indeed, the Government have already exercised this power for four of the co-ordination regulations. Any changes that do not fall within the scope of the power in section 8 of the 2018 Act must necessarily, therefore, not relate to any ability for the law to operate efficiently or to remedy defects, but be intended to achieve wider policy objectives. I think the Minister acknowledged as much in his opening comments.

I was, however, surprised that the Minister said that only the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 provided such powers. My reading of the legislation is that the Secretary of State has further powers as regards social security, healthcare and pension rights for those who are protected by the withdrawal agreement under the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020. Section 5 of that Act inserts new section 7A into the 2018 Act so as to secure withdrawal agreement rights in domestic law, and that protection is buttressed by section 13 of the 2020 Act, which confers a power to make regulations in respect of social security co-ordination rights protected by the withdrawal agreement. Given the powers that already exist under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act and the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act, as well as the fact that those powers have already been used by the Government, why does the Minister feel they are inadequate?

Paragraph 30 of the delegated powers memorandum is instructive. It states that the Government want to use the power in clause 5 to

“respond flexibly to the outcome of negotiations on the future framework and make changes to the retained social security co-ordination rules.”

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

Does the hon. Lady agree that, given the proliferation of judicial reviews and the test cases that often come forward, it is better to adopt a belt-and-braces approach so that we underline the Government’s intention in both the Bill and the withdrawal Act?

[Kate Green]

The issue is the mission creep and scope creep involved in using secondary legislation to amend primary legislation and retained EU rights, particularly a mission creep that now encompasses the ability to make significant policy changes.

As we heard in oral evidence from our witnesses last week, it is important to recognise the considerable importance of policy and legislation in relation to social security co-ordination. It is vital to labour mobility, and to protect the rights of EEA nationals who come to live in the UK and UK nationals who go to live in EEA member states. Policy in this area has the potential to impact the lives of millions, affecting their right to receive benefits to which they are entitled through national insurance contributions over periods of residency, and which they have a legitimate expectation that they will receive. Changes to policy in these important areas should, I submit, be given effect in primary legislation.

In response to the evidence that the Committee took from British in Europe last week, the Minister said that the Secretary of State could not make regulations that would breach an international treaty, and he offered some reassurances this morning to those who fall within the scope of the withdrawal agreement. However, as British in Europe pointed out last week, the powers in clause 5 mean that Parliament will not be able to properly scrutinise regulations that might breach our international treaty obligations—if not deliberately, then inadvertently.

The Minister also referred to the need to be able to reflect the ongoing negotiations with the European Union, and we heard from Adrian Berry of the Immigration Law Practitioners Association last week about the UK’s draft social security treaty, which is an annex to the Government’s proposed future trade agreement. Mr Berry highlighted the Government’s intention to continue the protection of the European health insurance card scheme for short-term travel and the uprating of old-age pensions, but noted that disability pensions and healthcare attached to pension rights are missing from the draft treaty. He also highlighted the limitations of the new EHIC, which would require those with long-term health needs to get prior authorisation from the UK Government, and that there would be no S2 cover, which enables people to obtain healthcare in the EU that they cannot get on the NHS in the UK. Will the Minister put on the record whether such changes could be introduced using clause 5, and can he confirm which classes of person they can be applied to?

The Government have argued that the use of the powers in clause 5 will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny, through the use of the affirmative procedure. Will the Social Security Advisory Committee have a role in scrutinising regulations introduced under this measure? Does he not in fact accept that changes in this important area require full debate and scrutiny in Parliament, and that the principles of any future policy should be set out in primary legislation?

Finally, clause 5(5) states that EU-derived rights cease to apply if they are “inconsistent” with any regulation made under the section, but the Government are under no obligation to specify where and when such inconsistencies arise. This creates considerable uncertainty for individuals who are affected, for their advisers, and indeed for politicians and the wider public. As we discussed last week on clause 4, such an approach is inimical to good lawmaking. The Government should spell out which parts of retained EU law might be affected by these provisions, and I hope that the Minister will do so in his response.

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[Stuart C. McDonald]

Clause 7 sets out the extent of the Bill, so here we come to how it impacts Scotland and the other devolved nations. Amendment 17 would disapply provisions ending free movement to Scotland. The new clause simply calls for the Government to consult on, and to review, establishing a differentiated set of immigration rules focused on Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, and lists a set of issues that we want the UK Government to consult upon. The Government would then report and lay that report before Parliament. There is little here that is too onerous. It is a perfectly reasonable request of the UK Government.

We heard plenty of concern about the implications of the Bill during evidence last Tuesday. It is fair to say that that concern is felt acutely in Scotland and Northern Ireland, but also in Wales and some regions of England. Scotland needs in-migration, and free movement of people has been a significant benefit to that country. The Government’s own risk assessments indicate a huge impact on the number of EEA workers who would qualify under the proposed new salary and skills requirements of the new regime. That is before we take into account the visa fees and the red tape, which I regard as ludicrous, that businesses will be bound up in. That has profound implications for Scotland’s economy, demographics, public finances and devolved public services.

Scotland’s economy relies significantly on small and medium-sized enterprises, which, as we heard last Tuesday, will find the tier 2 system very difficult. Small tourism or food and drink businesses, for example, that have regularly relied on the EU labour market are finding it well-nigh impossible to fill posts domestically. Instead of being able to interview a Portuguese food-processing worker or a Polish hotel worker, there is a significant chance that they will not be able to employ them at all. If they are able to employ them somehow, processes will be very different indeed.

The worker will have to seek entry clearance from their home country, so recruitment practice will have to change. Business will have to shell out for a sponsor licence and possibly on legal advice on how to do all that. The worker will have to pay visa fees plus upfront NHS health surcharges, not just for the main applicant but for the whole family. A skills charge will also be levied. As we heard last week, that could take the costs to the applicant to many thousands of pounds.

[Mr Goodwill]

I understand the point the hon. Gentleman is trying to make, but would it not attract more people to stay and work in Scotland if it was not the highest-taxed part of the United Kingdom?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

That is factually not true, so that is the end to that point. If the right hon. Gentleman is referring to the changes to the rate of income tax that we have made in recent years, there is no evidence that they have made a blind bit of difference. In fact, there are more people in Scotland paying less income tax, and that is before taking into account council tax and various other matters, so that point does not arise at all.

It seems that a huge proportion of the burden of all these fees falls to be paid by the individual worker. Realistically, however, why would a Portuguese food-processing worker or a Polish hotel worker pay £10,000 for the privilege of working in Scotland when they face no charge to work anywhere else in the European Union? The lower income tax that we pay in Scotland would be attractive, but it does not outweigh the £10,000-plus they would have to pay just to turn up.

Scotland has become a country of regular net in-migration, largely thanks to the free movement of people. But for in-migration, our population would have again been in decline since 2015—something that is projected into the future, with more deaths than births. Ending free movement risks pushing Scotland back to a future of population decline. Like other countries, our population of older people is increasing. That is not unique to us, but unlike other countries, in the UK in particular, our working-age population will rise only fractionally in the years ahead, according to various projections.

That brings us to the issue of public finances and devolved public services. There has been a welcome devolution of tax-raising powers in recent years, to which the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby referred. However, with those tax powers now in place, the problem is that we are suddenly seeing the tax base shrunk by immigration policies. That has a direct impact on income tax receipts and also on the economic growth and tax revenue that companies’ VAT.

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[Stuart C. McDonald]

I have no problem in outlining the paper. This point was got up on Twitter, as if it was a gotcha for the SNP. In that White Paper we advocated a points-based immigration system for those coming from outside the EEA, but we also advocated for the free movement of people. [Interruption.] The Minister looks as if I have been caught in some sort of trap. I am perfectly happy to support a points-based system for Scotland for people coming from outside the EEA. That is not a problem at all. But there are points-based systems and there are points-based systems. [Interruption.] People are chuckling away as if I am talking nonsense, but the Canadian points-based system is significantly different from the points-based system in Australia. The system proposed by the UK Government is barely a points system, and if hon. Members speak to anyone who knows the first thing about immigration law policy, they will say that there is barely a resemblance. Despite all the rhetoric, there is a tiny resemblance between what the UK Government are proposing and what the Australian points-based system is proposing.

On the issue of flexibility and regionality, the Australian points system includes some variation to take account of the different needs of different provinces. If the Australian points-based system is so wonderful, why has it not been replicated in any meaningful sense by the UK Government, including in respect of regional flexibility? Yes, the 2014 White Paper did refer to a points-based system for people from outside the EU—one that would be tailored for Scotland’s circumstances, not one that is completely inappropriate for it.

Ian Robinson and Fragomen, leading international practitioners, looked at the example of Canada, Australia, Switzerland and New Zealand and put forward a whole host of possible options. As they said last week, one of those options would be simply to allow the free movement rules to continue to apply in Scotland. If a hotel in the highlands of Perthshire is recruiting, it can continue to recruit from the EEA just as it does now.

However, there is a huge range of possibilities, from more radical suggestions, such as retaining free movement, all the way down to tailoring the points-based system to suit Scotland’s needs. That brings me to a very modest suggestion that I am bound to bring up; it is a suggestion from my hon. Friend the Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Angus Brendan MacNeil) that I think he may have raised directly with the Minister. It is simply to ensure that points are awarded in this system for Gaelic language skills as well as for English.

This is not just about Scotland, however. The challenges in Northern Ireland will also be unbelievably acute and perhaps even more so, given the land border that it shares with a country not only where businesses benefit from free movement of people, but that runs a completely independent immigration system, tailored to meet its own needs, while still being part of the common travel area. Business in Northern Ireland may face thousands of pounds in immigration fees just to try to attract the very same people who, a few miles down the road, could take up the position totally free of cost and bureaucracy. Merely saying that this system will work for all of the UK does nothing to address that problem.

Even if the Government do not want to properly engage in debate and discussion with SNP MPs or Ministers in the Scottish Government, I urge the Minister to listen to and engage with other voices who are speaking out on this issue. Businesses, business groups, think-tanks, civic society, universities and public sector organisations are all hugely concerned about it. The Minister just needs to do a Google search for commentary in Scotland and Northern Ireland in particular on their response to the Government’s most recent proposals.

[Mr Goodwill]

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that figures released only this morning show that the unemployment rate in Scotland is now the highest in the United Kingdom, at 4.6%, compared with a UK rate of 3%? That means that unemployment has risen by 30,000 to 127,000. Does he not think that those are the sort of people we should be getting into jobs in Scotland and that we should not be looking to the EEA to provide the people?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The economic impact of coronavirus is of course a tragedy, and every lost job is an absolute tragedy as well. Yes, of course we will focus our efforts on ensuring that people are back in work as soon as we can do that, but we cannot design our immigration system for the next decades based on this calamity. If the only reason Conservative Members can come up with to support this system being implemented in Scotland is that we are going through a pandemic, that is pretty farcical, given that these proposals have been in existence for the last few months, so no, I do not accept that it is any reason for shying away from the points that I am making. The system will cause huge long-term damage to Scotland’s economy and Scotland’s public finances. It is not just me saying that; a whole host of organisations have real concerns.

Again, I am not expecting the Government to do a 180-degree U-turn today, but I do want at least some recognition that there are genuine issues that require more than just our being told that this system will somehow work for Scotland, Northern Ireland or any other devolved nation.

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[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 11, in clause 8, page 5, line 41, leave out subsection (5) and insert—

‘(5) This Part of the Act shall not come into effect until a Minister of the Crown has laid a report before each House of Parliament setting out the impact of this Act on faith communities in the UK.

(6) A report under subsection (5) must consider in particular the ability of members and representatives of faith communities from the EEA and Switzerland to enter the UK for purposes related to their faith.

(7) A Minister of the Crown must, not later than six months after the report has been laid before Parliament, make a motion in the House of Commons in relation to the report.

(8) In this section,

“faith communities” means a group of individuals united by a clear structure and system of religious or spiritual beliefs.”

This amendment requires the government to report to Parliament on the implications of this Bill for faith communities, including the ability of members of faith communities to come to the UK for reasons connected with their faith.

Some 18 months or so ago, the then Minister of State for Immigration issued a written statement announcing changes to immigration rules. Apparently, those changes were to ensure that ministers of religion could no longer apply for a tier 5 religious worker visa; instead, they would have to apply for a tier 2 minister of religion visa. As I understand it, that was done because of a fear at the Home Office that people were coming in under the tier 5 visa route and leading worship while not having the level of English that the Home Office decided would be necessary to perform such a function. The explanatory memorandum said:

“The Immigration Rules currently permit Tier 5 Religious Workers to fill roles which ‘may include preaching, pastoral work and non-pastoral work’. This allows a migrant to come to the UK and fill a role as a Minister of Religion without demonstrating an ability to speak English.”

For some reason, the Home Office also decided to introduce a cooling-off period. The explanatory memorandum said:

“The ‘cooling off’ period will ensure Tier 5 Religious workers and Charity Workers spend a minimum of 12 months outside the UK before returning in either category. This will prevent migrants from applying for consecutive visas, thereby using the routes to live in the UK for extended periods, so as to reflect the temporary purpose of the routes better.”

I have been in discussions with representatives of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference about migration to both Scotland and England. They tell me that most Catholic dioceses previously used tier 5 religious worker visas for priests to come here on supply placements while parish priests were away for short periods because of sickness, training or annual leave. Those supply placements were essential, as they allow Catholics to continue attending mass while keeping parish activities running smoothly. That allows the parish to continue to function while the parish priest is off through illness, going on a retreat or accompanying parish groups on outings, or even just taking a holiday.

A supply placement priest will lead the celebration of holy mass, including the celebration of the sacrament of marriage. He will lead funerals, including supporting bereaved family members, and visit the sick and elderly of the local community. In an age when social isolation and loneliness are increasing, the parish is a place where people can gather as a community to support one another and engage in friendship. It is not just about worship, but about the community hub that the church provides by offering spiritual and practical help and supporting the sick, the elderly, the needy and the vulnerable.

[Mr Goodwill]

In my own constituency there is a Coptic Christian community; it is a closed order, so they do not preach. The system already works very well for non-EEA residents. Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that, if we do not extend the scheme to the EEA, there will be barriers for people coming to the UK in the way that he describes?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I will come to that point in a minute. In short, the point made to me by the Catholic Church and other faith groups—we had a debate on this issue in Westminster Hall around the time of the changes—is that, actually, the system for non-EEA nationals used to work but does not work now, precisely because of the changes that the Home Office made 18 months or so ago.

The system is much more expensive now, and it is beyond most parishes’ ability to pay the fees for ministers to come in and lead worship. If they come in under tier 5, which is the much cheaper option, they are no longer allowed to lead worship or whatever else. They can perform a range of functions, but not the ones that are really needed, including leading worship.

The issue is already a problem now and it will be made infinitely worse, because at the moment parishes can still rely on priests or other leaders coming from the EEA. They do not have to pay for the expensive tier 2 visa; they can just come in under the free movement of people. When free movement comes to an end, the same regime will apply and parishes will have to pay all sorts of fees, even to have priests come in from France, Italy, Poland or wherever else. They are not looking forward to that prospect at all.

As I was saying, visiting clergy not only allow the local community to continue to function, but benefit and enrich the whole community, as the community gains from cultural exchange and from sharing the knowledge and experience of priests from other parts of the world. They educate new communities about life in their country, and they open up avenues for local parishes to support communities in need. What was most surprising about the changes was that, as far as the SNP was aware, there had been no problems with visas for the Catholic Church or any of the other faith organisations that made use of the tier 5 route. The new requirement introduced in 2019 for anyone preaching to use tier 2 minister of religion visas has instead more than doubled the costs incurred by parishes arranging supply cover. For some parishes that is unsustainable, compromising people’s opportunity to practise their faith.

Furthermore, they point out that seminaries conducting formation in English are not necessarily recognised by the Home Office as meeting the English requirement under the tier 2 route, meaning that many priests educated to postgraduate level in English are nevertheless required to take a language test, with the extra logistical and cost implications. The new arrangements more than double the costs, making supply cover essentially unaffordable. I have heard directly from religious leaders in my constituency that that is the impact of those arrangements. Unless reforms are made, the situation will be worsened by the end of free movement, as I said in response to the intervention from the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby (Robert Goodwill). I simply ask the Government to engage with faith communities about the challenges that this is causing them to face, and to see if we might be able to come to a solution that makes these sorts of arrangements continue to function in the years ahead.

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Last year, we changed the rules to provide that those who come as ministers of religion should be required to use the tier 2 route. I accept that the fees are higher for tier 2 than for tier 5; that is because tier 2 migrants can stay for longer, with the potential eventually to settle here, as many inspiring faith leaders have done and as I hope they will continue to do. I am sure we can all think of examples in our own constituencies.

[Mr Goodwill]

Will the Minister pay tribute to John Sentamu, the recently retired Archbishop of York, who came from Uganda during the time of Idi Amin and has made a fantastic contribution to religious and general life in our country?

[Kevin Foster]

I am only too happy to do so and to put the Government’s thanks to him on the record. He provided an inspiration and a ministry that will be remembered for a very long time, and he broke the mould of what people expect from someone in such a senior position in the Anglican communion. Such contributions are very welcome and we want them to continue. We want to see that sort of person, particularly from the worldwide Anglican communion, as well as from the See of Rome—we have seen some amazing people come and be part of that community here in the United Kingdom. It is well worth paying tribute to such an example of someone who has achieved amazing things and revealed what he saw as God’s purpose for him as Archbishop of York. I am sure that we all wish him a very long retirement—not from holy orders, of course, which are a calling for life, but from his duties as archbishop.

I have heard the concerns expressed today about those who come to the UK for a very short term to provide cover while the incumbent minister is on holiday. It is worth pointing out our visitor rules, which will extend to EEA nationals as they currently extend to non-visa nationals, as I indicated earlier. In the immigration rules, the list of permitted activities specifically states that visitors may

“preach or do pastoral work.”

That allows many faith communities to hear inspiring preachers or hear about their faith’s work in other countries, especially in support of overseas aid and development work. Visitors are permitted to lead services on an ad hoc basis, which may provide a solution for communities that wish to invite visiting clergy to cover short-term absences, although they may not be paid for it—in many religious communities, that would not necessarily be a bar to providing a period of short-term cover.

It is worth my reminding the Committee that we have confirmed that EU citizens, who are the focus of the Bill, and EEA citizens more widely can continue to come to the UK as visitors without a visa, without prior approval, and use e-gates, where available, on arrival in the United Kingdom.

I hope that the SNP will consider its position on amendment 11. I say gently that we all need to reflect on whether it is appropriate to have faith communities led by those without a command of English adequate for the task—not least at a time when we need to come together more, not be separated by barriers of language. I therefore believe that the review that the amendment would put in place is not necessary. I invite the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to withdraw the amendment, but I am always more than happy to discuss further how we can ensure that our faith communities are supported and that there is clarity on the three routes that I have outlined for ministers and those involved in faith communities to come to the United Kingdom and play the role that many have done in an inspiring way over many years.

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[Stuart C. McDonald]

With new clause 9, which stands principally in the names of my hon. Friends in Plaid Cymru, we turn to the central matter of the Bill: what will happen to EEA and Swiss nationals who are already here? The new clause simply calls on the Government to report on what the implications for EEA and Swiss nationals will be. That includes reporting on the impact of no recourse to public funds, NHS charging, the granting of citizenship to all EEA and Swiss health and social care workers working in the UK during covid-19, and certain fees. It also includes—we will probably not discuss this in great detail—the merits of the devolution of powers over immigration from the EEA and Switzerland to different parts of the United Kingdom. Those are all perfectly reasonable requests.

I want to focus on new clauses 10 and 11, which bring us back to the settlement scheme. We touched on that on Thursday, when Opposition Members made the case for a declaratory system, meaning that people would have their rights automatically enshrined in law. It would still apply to the settlement scheme so that they could prove their status and navigate employment, social security and other rights. I regret that the Government and the Committee rejected that proposal, but I have taken that on the chin and moved on. However, that puts the Government under a greater obligation to spell out what should happen to eligible individuals who do not apply for the settlement scheme by 30 June 2021. I have tried on a huge number of occasions to get them to reveal what work they have done to estimate how many people might not apply, even in broad-brush terms, and how they would respond.

As we heard in evidence, it is blindingly obvious that, even with all the good work that is going on, the Government will struggle to get above 90% of the target population. Getting above 90% would be a great success, given the international comparison. If the Government fall just 5%, 6% or 7% short of the target, hundreds of thousands of people will suddenly be without status and will lose any right to be in this country on 1 July 2021. By all accounts, this is a huge issue and we need to push the Home Office further to set out how it will address it. So far, all we have been told is that it will take a reasonable approach. That is fine, but it is not enough. We need much more detail, and new clauses 10 and 11 are designed to push the Government on that.

[Mr Goodwill]

Does the hon. Gentleman share my concern that extending the deadline by six months would encourage those who have been putting it off to put it off for another six months?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Not really. People still have every incentive to apply for the scheme. On 1 July next year the deadline will have passed. People might put it off for six months, but I would far rather that than subject tens and probably hundreds of thousands of people to not having any rights at all. It is much the lesser of two evils. As I say, there are different ways in which we can do this. New clause 11 would allow people to apply after the deadline. I will turn to that in a moment. I want to set out exactly what new clauses 10 and 11 are designed to do.

New clause 10 would ensure that the EU settlement scheme was not closed to new applications until Parliament had approved its closure. We want to see what the plans are and scrutinise how the situation will be handled. Until we are satisfied, we will keep extending the scheme in order to protect people from the loss of their rights and from the hostile environment and the threat of removal. Why on earth should MPs give the Home Office a blank cheque to deal with this as it pleases? We will have that debate and the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby can make his point that it will lead to a delay in people making applications, but I am firmly of the view that that is much the lesser of two evils.

On the closure of the settlement scheme, people who have not applied for a status will have no legal basis to remain in the UK after the grace period, no matter how long they have lived in the UK. They will be liable to removal and will face the hostile environment. After the grace period, a huge group of people will still not have applied. No similar scheme has ever reached 100% of its target audience. New clause 11 would bring back control of the situation to Parliament and allow us to be fully informed as to where the settlement scheme has got and what the Government’s plans are for dealing with this huge issue before we sign off on closure of the scheme. It is a modest proposal, but hugely important.

New clause 11 would ensure that late applications to the EU settlement scheme would still be considered unless reasons of public policy, public security or public health apply. In tabling the new clause, we are asking the Minister who he thinks does not deserve a second chance after 30 June next year. Who does not deserve the reasonable response that he has spoken about in the past? Under the new clause, applications made after the deadline could be ignored for restricted reasons relating to public policy, public security or public health. However, we want to know who, on top of that, the Minister thinks should be deprived of their rights and the ability to remedy the situation in which they find themselves. People will be unable to live in this country and they will be liable to removal. We need to know much more about the grounds on which people will be able to make a late application. What are the reasonable grounds that the Home Office will accept? They have yet to be defined. As far as we can tell, they will comprise only a very narrow list of exemptions, including, for example, for those with a physical or mental incapacity, and for children whose parents have failed to apply on their behalf.

As I have said many times, the deadline will be missed by many people for good reasons beyond those that I have just outlined. People will simply not be aware of the need to apply, and people with pre-settled status might forget to reapply for full settled status. I have set out a million times why people will not understand that the settlement scheme applies to them. Rules on nationality and immigration status in this country are hugely complicated. There will undoubtedly be people from all walks of life who think that they are British citizens and who already have a right of residence in this country. They will not appreciate that, in fact, they need to apply to the scheme. The consequences of making such a mistake can be dreadful. If we simply leave the Bill as it is, people will lose the right to be in this country and will be removed and subject to the hostile environment. Alternatively, we could at least leave open to them the option of being able to apply to the scheme after the deadline has passed. They would still have every incentive to apply, because they would need to evidence the rights that they access through the settled status process.

I ask the Government to look positively on these new clauses, and at the very least to provide much more information and assurance about how they are going to approach this issue. Up to this point, there has been barely a flicker of recognition that this is something that needs to be addressed, but we are talking about tens, possibly hundreds, of thousands of people being left in an appalling situation.

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[Mr Goodwill]

I very much sympathise with what the hon. Member for Halifax has just said. There is real concern that EEA nationals who have been working here, contributing not least to our health service, may find themselves missing the deadline. However, I do not agree that the way to address that is through new clause 10, as I made clear to the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East. Some like myself would always wait until the deadline before submitting an essay or article. By extending the period by six months, we might well just encourage people to put off the chore—as they see it—of applying.

I ask the Minister to reassure us that, as we approach the deadline, the Government will engage in a communications exercise and advertising campaign, particularly in some of the main EU languages, so that people are aware of the deadline and can submit their applications in good time for them to be processed.

[Kate Green]

That is an important point, in particular in relation to those communities, such as the Roma community, that have been hard to reach with information about the scheme. The Government have made some funding available for community organisations to reach such communities, but it would be extremely welcome to follow the suggestion that a particular push be made to communicate with those more remote communities as the deadline approaches

[Mr Goodwill]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. Indeed, while many EU migrants have made a real effort to integrate and to speak English in their homes, encouraging their children to speak English, others have not assimilated as well and are still speaking their native language, as is their right. It is important that we communicate in those languages.

Perhaps we should also look at how we communicate through schools, because the children of some families who have come from the EU speak very good English, although their parents struggle with it. The children’s secondary schools may be another good way to get through to such families. I hope that the Minister will pick up that point and reassure us that the Government will be making the effort to communicate with the general population, to ensure that we can help our work mates and so on.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill (Sixth sitting)

Robert Goodwill Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 16th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

I call on the Minister to support the new clause, honour its commitments and let us show our gratitude for the hard work that health workers and care workers continue to do for us in the fight against the coronavirus.

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

I thank the hon. Member for Halifax for making the point about the contribution that overseas workers make to our health service and the way the Government have responded to that by suspending the immigration health charge. However, I have some concerns about new clause 12 and its discriminatory nature.

For example, it would extend an exemption to Poland, which has a 0.1% black and minority ethnic population, but not to other countries, particularly Commonwealth countries, which have very close links to the UK. If one looks at the European Union as a whole, its record on inclusivity is not good. For example, all 28 commissioners are white. Following the departure of the UK from the European Union, the number of Members of the European Parliament dropped by 20% as our MEPs left Strasbourg and Brussels, and only 24 of the 705 MEPs are from black and minority ethnic groups.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The simple problem that I face here—again—is the scope of the Bill. I would love to abolish the immigration health surcharge altogether. If that is the only problem that the right hon. Gentleman has, I urge him to get in behind the new clause and we can work to scrap it for everybody else as well.

[The Chair]

Before the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby resumes, I refer him to what the new clause says. He is beginning to stray a little.

[Mr Goodwill]

Thank you, Mr Stringer. The point that I was working up to was that by having an exemption only for EU citizens, we are discriminating against a large number of people who would wish to come and work in the UK from around the world. The ethnic mix of those particular groups would indicate that allowing the new clause would give a land bloc where the majority of people are white an unfair advantage over the rest of the world. I understand the aspiration to abolish the charge completely globally, but if we were to agree the new clause, we would end up in a situation where black and minority ethnic people from around the world would be at a great disadvantage to predominantly white people coming in from the European Union, EEA countries and Switzerland.

[Kevin Foster]

I thank the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East for tabling new clause 12 and the hon. Member for Halifax for tabling new clause 42, both of which relate to the immigration health charge, and for the opportunity they provide to debate this issue.

The background, for members of the Committee, is that the immigration health charge ensures that temporary migrants who come to the UK for more than six months make a fair contribution to the NHS services available to them during their stay. Income from the charge contributes to the long-term sustainability of our fantastic health service across our Union, although certain groups are exempt from the requirement to pay the charge and others benefit from a discounted rate.

The health charge is designed to help support the NHS services that we rely on throughout our lives. It raised approximately £900 million in much-needed income for the NHS from its introduction in 2015 to the end of the 2018-19 financial year—income that, I will be clear, has been shared between the four devolved health administrations in line with the Barnett formula, helping to fund the NHS across our United Kingdom.

Turning to the future, all migrants will be treated the same under our new points-based immigration system. The expectation is therefore that all nationals applying, including EEA citizens, will pay the charge if staying for temporary periods of longer than six months, unless an exemption applies. Of course, EEA citizens who are resident in the UK before the end of the transition period on 31 December 2020 are not subject to the immigration health charge. That was agreed as part of negotiations on the withdrawal agreement with the EU, which also protects the rights of UK nationals in the EU.

To touch on the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Scarborough and Whitby, now we have left the European Union, it would be rather hard to defend having an exemption for EEA nationals alone, given that we no longer have freedom of movement in place and will no longer members of the EU, and then applying this to the rest of the world. I respect the SNP’s point—they have made it regularly and I am sure they will make it again at regular intervals—and their principled view on this issue overall, but it would not make sense to have an exemption for one group applying under the points-based system rather than another, based on nationality alone. I appreciate the point and it will be interesting to hear what conclusions the hon. Member for Halifax comes to as part of her review.

The Government believe that new clause 42 is unnecessary. As has already been said, hon. Members will be aware that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has asked the Home Office and the Department of Health and Social Care to exempt NHS and social care staff from the charge. The exemption will apply to the relevant applications regardless of nationality—as I say, we are moving to a global points-based system—once that system is in place.

Officials are currently working through the detail of the exemptions; sadly, I will have to disappoint the hon. Member for Halifax and say that I cannot go into the full details today of where it will be, but hon. Members will appreciate that that is because we want to get this right and are working with our colleagues in the DHSC to do that.

There was a point made about renewals for doctors currently in the NHS. It is worth pointing out that those who are currently working in the NHS as doctors, nurses or in a number of health professions, are subject to automatic extension for a year. If they get an automatic extension for a year, that also waives the immigration health charge. It is not just the visa fee that goes, but the immigration health charge. Someone currently working for the NHS whose visa is due for renewal is getting a free year, and certainly by this time next year we will have the detailed guidance out there for them. I hope that provides some reassurance about the position as we stand here today.

I recognise the concerns about the financial impact of the health charge on people migrating here, including those who contribute to the NHS through tax and national insurance payments. The health charge provides comprehensive access to NHS services regardless of the amount of care needed during a person’s time in the UK, and includes treatment for pre-existing conditions.

The IHS not only represents excellent value when compared with the alternatives, but ensures that individuals do not need to worry about insurance or how they will pay for unexpected treatment while they are here. It compares favourably with the type of health insurance or other health care costs that those migrating to other countries might well face in order to get the same level of services that our NHS provides to all at point of need, free of charge, here.

As I said earlier, the Government is exempting NHS and care workers from the charge in recognition of the enormous contribution they make to the NHS directly. It is, however, only fair to expect people arriving in the UK to work in non-health-related roles to contribute to the range of NHS services available to them, given that they will not have the history of making contributions towards it that most long-term UK residents will have. It is also worth remembering that those who receive indefinite leave to remain—that is, settlement—are exempted from the IHS, in recognition of the long-term commitment to our United Kingdom this represents.

Finally, the Government are in the process of negotiating reciprocal healthcare arrangements with the EU, and it is important that we do not undermine the integrity of those negotiations through this Bill. I therefore invite the Members from the Scottish National party to withdraw the motion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kevin Foster]

I am once again grateful to the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, and to others, for providing a further opportunity to discuss parliamentary scrutiny of the immigration rules and the powers to make them. Parliamentary scrutiny is an important issue, and one that I am aware members of the Committee are rightly very interested in. I will therefore take each new clause in turn.

I will first address new clause 31—I think I can respond pretty swiftly to this one. The UK Government work on the basis of collective responsibility. All policies are collectively agreed and reflect the views of all parts of Government. I may be the Minister for Future Borders and Immigration, and I have the good fortune to speak for the Government on matters connected with our new immigration arrangements, but I can assure the Committee that the policies I put forward are the policies of the entire Government, which were endorsed in December’s general election by the British people. No other Minister standing in this spot would advocate any different policies.

The notion of collective agreement and collective responsibility has long been a feature of the way this country is governed, which is why legislation confers powers on “the Secretary of State” generically. Incidentally, this approach also has the benefit of future-proofing our legislation in the event of machinery of Government changes.

I have the utmost respect for my right hon. Friends the Secretaries of State for Education and for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy; both are doing excellent work in their posts and we are lucky to have them. But let me be very clear: were they to make immigration rules, they would be no different from those that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary will be making, because this is a single united Government with a clear policy on these matters.

Our policies were put before and endorsed by the electorate, more detail was set out in a policy statement endorsed by the entire Government, and they represent the settled view of the Government as a whole. New clause 31 would therefore add nothing to the Bill. Having heard the explanation of how the Government system works, I hope the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East will withdraw it.

New clause 16 would require the Home Secretary to establish an immigration rules advisory committee to provide advice and assistance on any immigration rules relating to EEA citizens once free movement to the UK has ended as a result of this Bill. I have said previously that our new points-based system will be set out in the immigration rules. Those rules will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny in the usual way. The new clause seeks to add an additional layer of scrutiny, and will prevent the Home Secretary from making any immigration rules before an advisory committee is established by regulation. There is no justification for establishing a statutory advisory body to advise specifically on the rights of EEA citizens, who will be treated as other EEA citizens under the future immigration system.

[Mr Goodwill]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the Migration Advisory Committee carries out much of the work already? New clause 32 is specifically covered by the MAC.

[Kevin Foster]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention. I will come on to new clause 32, which is about an annual report on the labour market, in a moment. We are freeing up the MAC to consider matters of interest to it and to provide recommendations on policies, although I expect it will be more nuanced when we come to reports on the labour market overall. That is more to do with the Department for Work and Pensions. We want a coherent strategy where migration is a part of that. We did not want to set it out purely in relation to EEA nationals.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kevin Foster]

It is a pleasure to talk about the new clause and to hear that my shadow agrees with me on some issues, but we slightly disagree on how best to evidence things. I accept that the new clause is well intentioned, but it may help if I explain first that we email everyone granted status under the scheme a PDF document, which they can print and retain for their own records as confirmation of their status and for future reference, as they may wish.

Like many other countries, we are moving away from issuing physical documents to be used as evidence of a person’s immigration status and their entitlement to work and access benefits and services, and towards a system that enables direct checks through online sharing of status by the individual or via system-to-system checks. Our border and immigration system will become digital by default for all migrants, and we intend over time to replace physical and paper-based products with secure online access to immigration status information, which the migrant can share with prospective employers, landlords and service providers.

New clause 19 is unnecessary, as we are already legally required to issue everyone granted status under the EU settlement scheme with a formal written notification of their immigration status in the United Kingdom. The notification also includes information about how they can access and share their immigration status information online, and about where they can find help to do so if needed. However, it is important that we do not return to relying on insecure paper documents, which can be lost, damaged or stolen, to evidence immigration status and entitlements.

The use of digital technology is now a well-established mechanism that people use when banking and shopping. Employers, landlords and service providers are likely to be concerned by any decision to issue what is specified as an insecure physical document, such as a paper certificate. They would also see it as an undesirable retrograde step that places additional administrative burdens on them to ensure that their staff are aware of the characteristics of a certificate, which might be some years old, and what it means. It would also be very susceptible to forgery and being tampered with, which could actually make it more difficult for EEA citizens, employers and others to determine genuine entitlement. We cannot allow that to happen.

[Mr Goodwill]

Does the Minister agree that some of the identity documents issued in places such as Greece and Italy are very insecure because they do not contain biometric data? That is an example of why a paper document would not be secure.

[Kevin Foster]

My right hon. Friend hits the nail on the head, and that is particularly true in an era of modern computing, scanning and high-quality printers available at home. We used to rely on paper documents as standard across society—for example, driving licences. To be fair, the previous Labour Administration moved away from having a paper driving licence that nowadays could probably be easily printed on most printers at home, and towards a plastic version. As we now move on, most people do checks digitally—for example, how many of us have a physical MOT certificate? It is done via an online system, which allows people to check easily. It is even possible to check online whether a car has an MOT before buying it, rather than having to look for a paper certificate.

We all know about the issues there used to be with paper MOT certificates, with blank books being quite valuable. That is why we have started to move towards digital status, which is more secure. It is, of course, retained by the Home Office for many years and allows that access. Again, we touch on some of the lessons learned from the Windrush review. Part of this is about having up-to-date and easier ways to access information, rather than relying on people to recognise documents that could have been issued some decades before. It is better that we have secure digital status that can be easily shared as technology advances and people move forward. That is right, but we are still already obliged to send a PDF confirmation so that if someone wants to print something out and keep it for their records, they can.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill (First sitting)

Robert Goodwill Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 9th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Holly Lynch]

Q An open question to both of you: if you could change one thing about the Bill to make it work for your members, what would it be?

Richard Burge: It would be quite complex. It would be a move away from worrying about what people are paid to worrying about their skills. Skills are not necessarily measured by qualifications, so we welcome the reduction down to A-level standard. However, for instance, you could look at a small coffee shop, where you pay with your credit card. No accountant, bookkeeper or partner in an audit company is physically involved in your paying your money and it appearing in the annual accounts of that company, but you still need a barista to serve your coffee, so the question is: what matters now—is it skills and competence, or is it qualifications and what you happen to be paid? I would like to see that change.

Martin McTague: The biggest thing for us is the bureaucracy of this system. We estimate that a typical business with fewer than 50 employees will probably have to spend about £3,000 per employee to get through this tier 2 process. That is made up of a whole series of different costs. The biggest obstacles to recruiting somebody through this system are simply the cost and the time required to do it. Many businesses that traditionally recruit on the open market and have never gone anywhere near this kind of tier 2 system will find it very off-putting, and may just constrain their ambitions and avoid doing it completely.

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

Q When the Bill was being formulated and opinion was being sought, the UK jobs market was entirely different from the one we shall see from the summer onwards, with many skills in very short supply—particularly for things like engineering, or even for people working in care homes or picking fruit. Do you not think that we shall see a situation in which a lot more British workers come into the jobs market, and that some of the concerns expressed in the past about the bureaucratic hurdles that might need to be coped with will actually not be such a great problem, because we will have a lot of very well-qualified and well-skilled British people? Is it right that the costs that we have just heard of from the Federation of Small Businesses will be a real incentive for companies to employ British people who are now, sadly, in many cases being thrown back on to the jobs market, in a situation in which we do not have, in effect, full employment? I think the FSB should be the first to answer that.

Martin McTague: I can see that there will be more incentive to look for indigenous employees, but the reality is that a lot of the shake-out, or the potential shake-out, that we are hearing is likely to happen will be among the least-skilled people. Companies are going to enormous lengths to try to hang on to the rare skills that they have. If they have managed to recruit somebody from, say, the European Union, they are going to enormous lengths to try to get them to apply for settled status and to reassure them about the covid situation. I do not think that a new influx of unemployed people, many of whom will have poor skills, will solve a lot of the problems for these companies.

Richard Burge: From a London point of view, I think the jury is out, literally. I do not think we really know what to expect as we come out of covid-19. The critical thing for London, and probably for all metropolitan areas, is the mobility of people, and the willingness of people to be physically mobile to go and find new work, possibly earning less than they were earning before. However, it is also about emotional mobility, too. Are people emotionally prepared to go and do new work, taking completely new tangents in their lives and probably earning less? That will be a real challenge. I think there will be greater opportunities, but not necessarily in a career path that people might have been expecting.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

Q May I go first to the London Chamber of Commerce and then to the FSB? You have both spoken eloquently about the new challenges and red tape that the system will impose upon businesses. Looking at the other side of the coin, is there also not an extent to which this process puts some red tape and expense on potential employees from the European Union? It risks making coming to the UK to work less attractive. For example, I am from Germany and I have a job offer in London or I have a job offer in Dublin. Going to Dublin does not involve any charge or bureaucracy; going to London involves a visa, a health surcharge, and so on and so forth. Is there a danger that we are going to make this country much less attractive for skilled workers to come to?

Richard Burge: I think it is inevitable that it is going to be more difficult for people from the European Union; that is the consequence of leaving the European Union and not having an immigration policy for people from there. It is no longer an internal market; it is now a normal external market.

I think what we need to do is to make the red tape manageable. I think part of that is umbrella licensing. Part of that will be border clearance that is rapid and smooth, so it needs to be digitised and there needs to be e-clearance, and that also means that it cannot get cluttered up with tourism. We hope that everyone from the European Union will be able to come without a visa and not get caught in that process. Part of this process is the mechanism, and I think that one of the big challenges for the Home Office is to ensure that, while there may be more bureaucracy, it tries to make that process as smooth and as digitised as possible, and that is going to be a big ask before 1 January.

Martin McTague: I am really sorry; I can barely hear the conversation. Is there anybody closer to the microphone who could just repeat the essence of that question for me?

--- Later in debate ---

[Kate Green]

Thank you.

[Mr Goodwill]

Q My question is for Richard Burge in particular and concerns international companies in London that might well have existing employees based in Japan, Singapore or the United States who wish to come to London to work as part of their company’s operation. There are also companies that might be based in the European Union whose employees have habitually come to work in London but, under the new regime, will be in the same category as those first workers. My question to Mr Burge is, under the new regime, how will that system function? Will it be an equivalent situation, something that companies can work with easily, or will there be problems for international workers coming to the UK within a company that might even be based in London, but certainly an international one?

Richard Burge: The answer is that I don’t really know. A lot of companies that are already established in places such as Japan will find it easier; for the ones that have operations elsewhere in Europe, this will be a new world. This also comes down to the Home Office being flexible and agile in terms of making sure that we assume positive intent on the part of companies—that they are not getting people into Britain secretly to do full-time work, but that they are in fact part of the transferable market within their company.

We need to address that. It will be complicated, but there are precedents in companies outside the EU, so I think we will use that as an example. It will be more difficult for smaller companies. Increasingly, we find that international companies in London are actually quite small; they are not huge operations. You can find yourself to be an international company in London by dint of the first order put on your website, whereas in the old days you would have spent 20 years developing a domestic market and then you would move internationally. Smaller companies might find themselves potentially hostage to this without realising it. So yes, complex.

[The Chair]

I remind hon. Members of the scope of the Bill, which is EEA nationals, EU nationals and Swiss nationals, not the rest of the globe.

[Mr Goodwill]

Q Thank you for that guidance, Mr Stringer. Of course, EU nationals will be in the same category as non-EU nationals were. Does the Bill provide the equivalence of the posted workers directive? Under EU regulation, under that directive, people can work in other EU member states. Will there be equivalence in this to cover that particular situation, where some workers—particularly people such as lorry drivers but other sectors too—may use that regulation to enable them to work?

Richard Burge: I don’t know. We will look at that and provide you with some written advice on it.

[Dame Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)]

I wanted to ask a follow-up to the question of the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax, about the income threshold. In some answers, we have heard about the effect that that might have on particular sectors, such as the care sector. Will you both say more about the regional impact of the provisions of the Bill? Do you have particular concerns for the regions? I understand that Richard Burge is speaking for the London Chamber of Commerce, but I am interested in what other chambers of commerce around the country might be thinking.

Martin McTague: We have made it clear that we think—if I heard the question correctly—that the care sector is a special case and should have a separate visa arrangement, because it does not fit neatly into any of the categories that we might like to define under normal immigration rules. It is clear from the experience that we have had over the last few months that this sector is under massive pressure. Any major changes would be disastrous.

Richard Burge: I would agree to the extent that I think that the care sector is a special case, but we need to make sure that the definition of the care sector—in terms of immigration—runs alongside what I hope is emerging in the Department of Health, which is a much closer definition of what care is, bringing it in. Certainly, the Health Secretary has been trying to say that care is as important as the NHS, so I think that it needs much more careful definition.

In terms of the regional perspective, we are a country of many parts. For instance, on the lower wage threshold, I am deeply worried that, particularly in essential services—care being among them, but also things such as porterage in hospitals—in many parts of the country this is not a sufficiently low level of wage to enable us to get people in who technically have lower skills but are in high demand. There needs to be a more nuanced approach to this in order to respond to the different economic circumstances in different parts of the country. My colleagues in other chambers think that I am quite fortunate being in London, where this wage level will get us through most of our problems but will not get them through theirs.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Order. No, sorry. Robert Goodwill, very briefly.

[Mr Goodwill]

Q Many of the concerns about being able to get skilled workers such as engineers were expressed before the current covid crisis. Do you think that, in the new situation that we will be in, there will be lots of British workers with these skills looking for work? Therefore, if it is slightly more difficult to get in an EU worker, it might actually benefit British workers looking for jobs in your sector.

Tim Thomas: I understand the point that you are making, but our issue is with the type of skills that we need. I mentioned green skills, and we also need digital skills. We need a range of skills that are not available in the UK labour market. We are training domestic UK workers for them, but in the meantime there is a skills mismatch between what employers need and what is available in the UK labour market. There may be some mitigation, but I would say that we are still going to need non-UK workers for the foreseeable future, until we develop those skills in the domestic labour market.

[The Chair]

Mr Thomas, thank you very much for the full evidence that you have given. It is valuable and I am sorry about the technical difficulties that we had in getting through to you.

Tim Thomas: Not at all. Thank you for your time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Holly Lynch]

Q I am very mindful that you are from the Migration Advisory Committee. Given what you have just said about analysing and reforming the shortage occupation list, do you also think that, having identified the gaps, there should be a role in informing domestic skills policy as well as migration policy?

Brian Bell: Absolutely. If we identify an occupation that we think is in shortage, I consider that essentially a failure. You might not think it is a failure if there has been a big increase in demand for that sector, so the sector suddenly sees a large increase in the demand for its product. In the short run, there might be a shortage in terms of getting the appropriate labour for that—that is fine and makes sense—but often the shortage occupation list identifies a failure of the British education system to provide the people who are needed. A classic example of that is nurses. Nurses have been on the shortage occupation list since I can remember ever hearing of it. Every time they are put on the list, we hear statements along the lines of, “Yes, we know that they are in shortage, and we have a plan to increase the number of nurses who go through training so that we deal with the shortage in the long run.” They are still on the shortage occupation list. We should be using the shortage occupation list to signal both to Government and to employers that there are training needs that need to be fulfilled.

[Mr Goodwill]

Q Professor Bell, you referred to the care sector, but another sector that I am sure regularly makes representations to the MAC is the agricultural sector. We often read stories about crops rotting in the fields if we cannot get enough people to work there. Indeed, the Government have a seasonal agricultural workers scheme for non-EU workers. Do you feel that the provisions in the Bill will accommodate the needs of agriculture, or will the sector continue to need special exemptions to allow that to happen?

Brian Bell: The seasonal agricultural workers scheme is probably the only sectoral scheme that the MAC has recommended as a good idea. That is because it is truly unique. I think the statistic is that 99% of seasonal workers in agriculture are not from the UK, which makes sense. As it is directly seasonal, the job does not fit with people who live in the UK and who want a year-round job to make a living. Most countries have some type of seasonal workers scheme, and I would be surprised if there was any argument for why we would get rid of that. It is in a pilot at the moment; as I understand it, the pilot is going well.

[Mr Goodwill]

Q So you think that the current scheme should be extended to include EU workers. Can they come under the provisions in the Bill?

Brian Bell: Actually, that is a good question. It would be a question for Government. If there is a seasonal workers scheme, and we have removed the special entitlement of European Union workers in terms of access, there is no reason why the seasonal workers scheme should not be open to people of any nationality, but that is a question for Government.

[Mr Goodwill]

Q Finally, do you carry out any analysis of the economic impact of workers who come here, put down their roots, bring up their children and pay their taxes and of workers who may well see their time in the UK as being short, who send a lot of the money back to their families, and whose children are in education in other countries? Do you carry out any analysis of the impact on the UK economy of that type of immigration?

Brian Bell: One thing that we have done, which is particularly important for public finances, is think about different types of immigrants, such as a migrant who comes to the UK and then makes their home here. We often highlight how migrants in general are positive for public finances. When we see them before they get permanent leave to remain, they are often not bringing their family or they are only just forming a family unit, so they are not using public resources but they are paying in taxes. Once they have permanent leave to remain and either become British citizens or stay here permanently, they begin to cost the Exchequer because they tend to start using schools and the health service. From a purely public finance perspective, you would like migrants who just come, pay their taxes, do not use any of the resources and then leave. We have done that kind of analysis. We have done less analysis in thinking about the broader questions on what the benefits are to British society more generally of having migrants who come to the UK and stay for a long time.

[Mr Goodwill]

Q Is it more likely that EU workers will come and stay? If they are deterred from doing so, we might have more workers from outside the EU, who might not stay so long.

Brian Bell: I certainly have not seen any evidence of that. It is a difficult one, because there has been a different rule up until this point in time. I have not seen any evidence that suggests European Union workers are more or less likely to stay on a long-term basis than non-EU workers. The data are not very good on that kind of thing, but it would be an interesting thing to look at.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Professor Bell, may I take you back to what the Minister asked you about regional variations? It is important to be precise about exactly what the MAC recommended. The Minister suggested that the report recommended against regional variations, but you were very careful to say that your report addressed regional variations and salary thresholds. The MAC was not looking at the broader issue of regional visas or devolution of immigration control.

Brian Bell: That is correct. Immigration is a reserved matter, so we were asked to report just on that.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill (Second sitting)

Robert Goodwill Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 9th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Kate Green]

Q Professor Ryan, in relation to British-born children of Irish nationals, are there any particular concerns that we ought to be aware of in relation to this legislation?

Professor Bernard Ryan: Thank you very much for bringing that up. One of the issues at present is that not only is there a lack of clarity about immigration status, but also it feeds into the lack of clarity as regards acquisition of nationality in two scenarios. One is British-born children—children born to Irish parents, and also Irish citizens wishing to naturalise. Because it is very often not clear on what basis Irish citizens are here, to the extent that it is not clear the question arises, “Are they without time limits and have they ever been in breach of immigration laws?” It is necessary also, from the perspective of the smooth working of British citizenship law, to absolutely tie down and clarify that Irish citizens are here, and on what basis. And yes, it will remove any possible question as regards children of Irish parents being British citizens and as regards access to naturalisation by Irish citizens who want it.

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

Q The Dublin regulations deal with a situation where, for example, an economic migrant or an asylum seeker who present themselves in the UK can be repatriated to the country where they first claimed asylum, and indeed deal with family reunion. Professor Ryan, will this Bill have any implications for the operation of the Dublin arrangements? Could the Bill be improved to enshrine some of its obligations on that statute book, or is that completely unnecessary?

Professor Bernard Ryan: I think you are bringing us into the question of the common travel area as such and its operation. That would be my interpretation of your question. One of the things I would expect to see in the future would be, if the United Kingdom does not stay within the Dublin system with the EU, that there will be an arrangement with the Irish Republic as regards asylum seekers, because of the open border. It would be logical to do that. I personally would prefer it if the common travel area, conceived as immigration control and co-operation between the two states, were on a more transparent, and maybe more statutory, footing—but that is a much bigger question. That is to some extent a different one from the status of Irish citizens, which is what the clause deals with. So, yes, in the end I would like to see the common travel area framed more transparently than it is at present.

[Mr Goodwill]

Q I have a question for British in Europe. You talked about inequalities. Is it not the case that there is currently an inequality whereby EU or EEA citizens living in the UK have better rights than British citizens in terms of bringing spouses into the country, because the £18,600 income rule does not apply? Indeed, if a British citizen can determine that they are resident in the EU under the so-called Surinder Singh case, they can apply to have that rule addressed. Would you say that by addressing that inequality, we are ensuring that British citizens would have the same rights as everyone else, rather than the current unusual situation in which it is easier for an EU citizen to bring a spouse into the UK?

Jeremy Morgan: I did not understand the beginning of the question. I think the question was: would this equalise the rights between EU citizens living in the UK and UK citizens living in the EU? The answer is yes.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Professor Ryan, while we have the opportunity, I want to ask you further about the third group of issues you addressed in your briefing paper—the provisions of the Good Friday agreement. It seems from your paper that the issue is that, in order to assert certain rights—protection against deportation, for example, or perhaps access to some family rights—people would have to assert their British citizenship, which, reading between the lines, you say is not really consistent with the Belfast agreement. Your solution is to put some sort of equivalence in the Bill for all persons of Northern Ireland. Is that a fair summary?

Professor Bernard Ryan: Yes. Actually, I am borrowing that idea to some extent from Alison Harvey, from whom I believe you are hearing evidence later on. She has written a paper for the two human rights commissions in Ireland on the birthright provisions in the Belfast agreement, and her eventual solution is that people of Northern Ireland should be granted the right of abode—the status given to British citizens—which takes away their need to identify as British in order to get the equivalent outcomes. Both the things I raised—family sponsorship and deportation/exclusion—would be addressed by that route. I come at it from thinking about Irish citizens or people identifying as Irish citizens and how they should be protected, so I would say that an alternative route is to focus on that and somehow put in additional protections for the people of Northern Ireland to address the Irish citizens within them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Mr Goodhart, should we all be doing more to have a strategy for integration, for citizenship?

David Goodhart: Yes. That is something I have been interested in for a very long time. We should almost have an immigration and integration Department. The problem is, integration is very easy to talk about but, in a liberal society, it is very difficult to tell people where to live or to send their children to school. There are parts of the country where integration is a real problem; there are other parts of the country where it is not at all. You mentioned Canada, but it is a slightly special case; compared with comparable European countries, we do not do too badly.

The thing that I worry about at the moment is schools. Integration in schools is going backwards in most parts of England. In other words, schools are becoming less well integrated. In any given town, you are more likely to have a school that is overwhelmingly one ethnic minority, or ethnic minorities in general, and then another, almost entirely white school. That problem is getting worse, not better. That is something that is in our power to do something about.

We have ways of counting this, of measuring it. We have where people live and where they go to school, and we can measure that by different ethnic group. We can tell which areas are getting better, and which worse. It would be a really helpful thing, not necessarily every year, but every two or three years, to publish some kind of list of what has been happening in different places—some kind of integration/segregation list of local authorities. That would be a huge incentive for all the most segregated local authorities not to be right at the bottom—not to be the most segregated local authority in the country. There are things you can do, and I think we should focus attention on schools, because it is possible to play with boundaries and nudge people into a better school mix.

[Mr Goodwill]

Q Thank you very much, everyone. This session so far has been useful in exploring what factors influence public opinion on immigration, which of course becomes a very political issue in a referendum or a general election; in fact, that was Stuart’s line of questioning. How much does the media affect that, and how much is an altruistic wish to do the best thing for the UK economy?

Jill, I note that you are a co-author of a document published in September 2018, “The National Conversation on Immigration”. I wonder how much that document reflected some of the feeling in the north of England and parts of the country that maybe do not see immigration as allowing somebody to make your coffee in the morning, clean your house or work as your au pair; those that, as we heard this morning, see it more as a limitless supply of Romanians and Bulgarians who can fill your job if you want a pay rise. Do we have a north-south divide on attitudes to immigration, and do you think that was a factor in the fall of red wall seats at the last general election?

Jill Rutter: It is not so much a north-south divide as an inner city-town divide, or a city-town divide. There are some differences in attitudes between the more diverse cities and the less diverse towns, and that can be partly put down to social contact, but there are other factors. In some of those so-called red wall towns, people have relatively little social contact with migrants, and where they do, people have perhaps come to do specific jobs in specific industries. For example, the distribution sector is heavily reliant on a migrant workforce, and poor management of some of those local issues has perhaps impacted on public concerns.

In England, we have the controlling migration fund, which is quite a successful way of dealing with those local impacts: I think its money has been well spent. However, that funding will end, and no successor to that fund has yet been announced. It is vital that that fund is continued, and that its funding is increased if we can manage to do so.

David Goodhart: One of the problems with free movement was that it was so difficult to plan infrastructure: you had huge waves of immigration, and then it fell. We had that experience in 2011-12, when immigration came right down—I seem to remember that the Government almost hit their 100,000 target; net immigration was about 130,000 or 140,000—and then went whizzing up again when the impact of the eurozone crisis hit. That may not be a huge amount when spread across the whole country or lots of big urban centres, but it makes it very difficult to plan your doctors’ surgeries, your school intakes and so on at a micro level. That has been one of the really big problems with free movement, and I think it ought to be more manageable in the future. That has been one of the really big problems with free movement, and I think it ought to be more manageable in the future.

[Mr Goodwill]

Q Will the Bill give us the power to do that more?

David Goodhart: It will make flows more predictable, because they will be under our control. If, as I was saying right at the beginning, it turns out that the system is, in a sense, too liberal, it can be made less liberal and the numbers can be brought down, because people coming in need to have a visa; they are not coming in willy-nilly.

This also has an impact on the integration story. If your immigration going forward is overwhelmingly skilled workers and students—there will still be areas like asylum where this does not count—you are talking about mainly highly skilled people who will, at the very least, speak English well, which is a pretty important thing when it comes to integration.

[Taiwo Owatemi (Coventry North West) (Lab)]

Q My first question is to British Future. You said earlier that the public’s biggest concern in immigration is ensuring that they are treated fairly. Do you believe that the Bill will allow EU citizens to be treated fairly?

Jill Rutter: This is very much a skeleton Bill, and most immigration policy is determined in immigration rules. It is an issue in itself in that there have been thousands and thousands of immigration rule changes since 2010. The rules are presented to Parliament, which can only accept or reject them. No MP—even those well versed in immigration policy—can keep up with all the changes in the rules. We need to think about root-and branch-immigration reform. I do not think the current commission on simplifying the immigration rules will come up with the answer.

Perhaps we should look at what social security does. Social security is another complex area where most policy is determined in secondary legislation. There is the Social Security Advisory Committee—independent experts who scrutinise the law and make recommendations in plain English to Parliament—but we need a proper system of scrutiny. I cannot really answer your question about the Bill itself, because most of what will happen will be determined in either the rules or the operation of immigration law in the Home Office.

The last thing to say is that you cannot have an efficient immigration system on the cheap. Britain does very well in the speed at which it processes visas and citizenship cases compared with many other countries, but it performs badly when it comes to asylum cases. We need a properly resourced Home Office and for staff to be trained and supported, too.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kevin Foster]

No.

Bella Sankey: But it is all there on the public record. As I say, the law as it stands has applied in a blunt and discriminatory way against the black community, and this Bill now proposes to extend those harsh provisions to all EU citizens.

I spoke only recently to a woman who was actually removed to Poland on 30 April, leaving behind an 11-year-old child here. She felt that the system had already become unbearable. She was taken into detention following a conviction for theft, and when she was in Yarl’s Wood, without legal aid and without help and assistance, she decided that it would be easier for her and less traumatic for her 11-year-old son if she just went back to Poland. This Bill is going to bring about thousands more Sandras, thousands more family separations, in completely unjust circumstances.

[Mr Goodwill]

Q We have heard already that we need better law, and obviously this will be an opportunity to have better law. It is interesting to note that when the Home Office director general of immigration enforcement left his post and went public in January, he made the point that our immigration system largely fails to deal with those who are here illegally, and he pointed out that over 75% of judicial review applications made to the administrative court were for asylum and immigration matters. According to the most recent figures that he could get, only 54 of the 8,649 applications actually succeeded.

If, at the moment, the law is being used to actually frustrate the legal process of removing people who have no right to be in the UK, do we need to improve the law to make that work better? I am sure you would agree that it is not unreasonable to expect people who have committed serious criminal offences and have no right to be in the UK to be removed under the law of the land.

Adrian Berry: I believe in the rule of law. I think it is a good thing if we have judicial scrutiny of executive decisions, including deportation, removal and detention decisions, in order to ensure that they are lawful and consistent with the values that we have embedded in our Human Rights Act provisions and in our civil liberties provisions and statutes.

To answer your question directly, a lot of judicial reviews are settled on issuing, because the Home Office realises that it has made a mistake and it compromises on them. The second stage at which they are settled is when permission to apply for judicial review is granted and the Home Office realises that it has made a mistake and it compromises; it settles and pays the costs, on a polluter-pays principle. Very few judicial reviews go the distance to a substantive hearing, so you have to be very, very careful in measuring the data between the number of claims lodged and the number of claims that are determined at a final hearing.

What we do know is that judges routinely grant injunctions against removals, on the basis that they see a point in holding the ring in order to determine the true and lawful position in the situation. Whatever someone has done, all their interests—including the public policy interest in their expulsion and, on occasion, the public policy interest in their retention—are to be weighed up before a lawful decision is made. Judicial review is one check on it, in the absence of a proper full range of appeals, that allows that to take place.

[Mr Goodwill]

Q Thank you. Bella, do you want to comment on that one?

Bella Sankey: The thing that is striking about this Bill is that it is being brought forward following two previous Immigration Bills, in 2014 and 2016, that implemented the hostile environment. Since those Bills came on to the statute book, of course, the Windrush scandal has come to national attention, yet in spite of that, every single aspect of the hostile environment remains in place, and there is nothing in this Bill to address that. Worse still, the Bill now extends the hostile environment to EU citizens. The hostile environment has been found in terms, in the Court of Appeal earlier this year, to lead directly to racial discrimination. Yet, as I say, there is no effort in the Bill to deal with the fact that, as things stand, we have imported immigration control into the country—employers, bank managers and landlords are all expected to be immigration officers—and we have made this country a much less pleasant place to live if you do not look British, if you do not sound British, or if you do not have a British name.

It is quite shocking that, following the Windrush scandal, this new piece of immigration legislation has been brought to Parliament without any attempt to deal with the very clear problems in the existing immigration regime.

[Mr Goodwill]

Q Do you not agree, though, that the current EU regime that we operate in is actually very discriminatory against black people, given that the majority of people in the European Union are white people? We are going to extend the same rights to people from African countries, India, Pakistan and the developing world. At the moment, do you not agree that it is a very discriminatory system, giving rights to people from EU countries, or EEA countries, that are not extended in the same way to those from other countries, where predominantly people may have different coloured skin?

Bella Sankey: I welcome the sentiment to use this moment to level up protections for people in the UK regardless of their skin colour. Unfortunately, though, what the Bill does is level down protections. As things stand, EU citizens have protections against deportation that have not been transferred into the Bill, so will no longer apply to EU citizens and will not apply to non-EEA nationals—predominantly black and brown people.

Similarly in our immigration detention system, there is nothing in the Bill to provide the kind of safeguards that EU citizens currently have against detention. We know that the system discriminates. If you are Australian and you are detained, 90% of Australians will be released before 28 days. If you are Jamaican and you are detained, only 40% of Jamaicans will be released before 28 days. You are right: there is direct racial discrimination hardwired into our immigration system at present, but nothing in the Bill actually deals with that. It only downgrades the rights of non-British citizens in this country.

[Dame Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)]

Q I wanted to ask about the advice and assistance that is available to people who want to apply under the EU settled status scheme, and in particular the fact that there is not a right of appeal in the Bill. Does that offend against the rules of natural justice when decisions are taken? Also, would the two witnesses like to comment on the recommendation from the Home Affairs Committee to have a declaratory system for granting settled status? Might that help to head off some of the problems that we have been identifying this afternoon?

Adrian Berry: On the right of appeal, you will be aware that in section 11 of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 there was a provision for making a right of appeal by way of statutory instrument, and that that was exercised in the Immigration (Citizens’ Rights Appeals) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020.

Covid-19: UK Border Health Measures

Robert Goodwill Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd June 2020 Commons Chamber

[Priti Patel]

The hon. Gentleman is right to raise the matter of economics. This issue has been discussed in various economic Committees at government level. I have also been speaking about it with the Chancellor and working across Government with my colleagues. It is important to reflect on the fact that we have had those discussions and that impact assessments have been undertaken by Government Departments in the right kind of way.

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

Three hundred people are working safely today, constructing the £4 billion Anglo-American Sirius mine in North Yorkshire. The driving of the one-mile deep shaft and the 23-mile-long tunnel to Teesport does require a small number of specialist engineers from places such as Germany and Austria living in specialist accommodation away from their families. Can my right hon. Friend give me an assurance that workers such as these will be part of the exemption from the quarantine?

[Priti Patel]

I understand the case that my hon. Friend makes. We do, of course, have an extensive exemption list for specialist skills and individuals that are required for key projects and key work. I will take away the full details of the case and raise them with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy.

Oral Answers to Questions

Robert Goodwill Excerpts

Monday 29th October 2018 Commons Chamber

[Caroline Nokes]

The Government have been repeatedly clear that immigration policy remains a reserved matter. Four years ago the people of Scotland confirmed in a referendum that they wanted to remain part of the United Kingdom and we will deliver an immigration policy for every part of the UK.

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

There are 115,000 people looking for work in Scotland. Does the Minister think it would be a good idea if the Scottish Government did more to help those people to acquire the skills they need to get into the workplace and build the Scottish economy, rather than just ship in more people from beyond our shores?

[Caroline Nokes]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his question. It is crucial that we work across the whole of government—through our modern industrial strategy, the Department for Education, local government and the devolved Administrations—to make sure that we provide the opportunities for young people across the whole economy so that they can find work.

Oral Answers to Questions

Robert Goodwill Excerpts

Monday 4th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

Through both the Joint Fraud Taskforce and broader cyber-security meetings in the Home Office, we work with the industry to produce a common cyber aware campaign, to make sure that everyone is reading from the same hymn sheet and advice is consistent across government. We also work hand in hand with the National Cyber Security Centre to make sure that advice is given both to small businesses and the charitable sector, so that they are not made vulnerable. By investing £1.9 billion in the national cyber-capability programme, we can invest in the capability to see this off.

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend join me in paying tribute to the personnel at GCHQ Scarborough, which is known locally as “Wireless station”? Together with their colleagues in Cheltenham, they work day and night to keep us safe from cyber-attacks and cyber-crime.

[Mr Wallace]

The workforce at GCHQ do a tremendous job of keeping us safe from our enemies, and have done since all the way back to GCHQ’s history in Bletchley Park. I was delighted that some new GCHQ jobs were recently announced in my region, the north-west, which shows that it is not just a Cheltenham-based organisation, with sites in Yorkshire, Cornwall and now Manchester.

--- Later in debate ---

[Victoria Atkins]

May I record our thanks to Mr Hyland for the invaluable work that he did as the commissioner? The whole point of the role of the commissioner is that it is independent, so we very much look forward to filling the position with a similarly robust and independent person in due course.

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

T1. If he will make a statement on his departmental responsibilities.

[The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Sajid Javid)]

Yesterday we marked a year since the appalling attack at London Bridge and Borough Market, and less than two weeks ago we remembered those lost at Manchester Arena. Those sobering occasions remind us that the first duty of the Government, and my highest priority as Home Secretary, is to protect the public. Therefore, I today launch the Government’s new counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, following the comprehensive review of our counter-terrorism approach announced by the Prime Minister a year ago. The strategy sets out how the Government will continue to tackle the serious and evolving threat from terrorism.

[Mr Goodwill]

Will my right hon. Friend reassure me that an increased ability for MI5 and other public bodies to share information will not only deliver a more effective and joined-up response to the fast-changing nature of potential terrorism, but will also come with the right safeguards to protect the use of that information?

[Sajid Javid]

I can give my right hon. Friend that assurance. One of the lessons learned from the 2017 attacks was that MI5 could share some of its information on a wider basis—not just with counter-terrorism police, but perhaps with elements of local government and neighbourhood police. That will happen in the pilots to which the Minister for Security and Economic Crime referred earlier. I assure my right hon. Friend that the information will be declassified and that there will be certain safeguards in place.

Draft Passport (Fees) Regulations 2018

Robert Goodwill Excerpts

Wednesday 28th February 2018 General Committees

[The Minister for Immigration (Caroline Nokes)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Passport (Fees) Regulations 2018.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship in this slightly chilly Committee Room, Ms McDonagh. The regulations would, for the first time, set passport fees under the primary charging powers in the Immigration Act 2016.

In 2017, Her Majesty’s Passport Office issued nearly 7 million passports worldwide. It continues to provide excellent customer service: over the past year, the average turnaround for the vast majority of passport applications was approximately seven days. Its excellent performance has resulted in high levels of customer satisfaction; in a recent customer satisfaction index survey by the Institute of Customer Service, HM Passport Office ranked once again as the best-performing public service organisation. It has improved its customer satisfaction index scores over each of the past five years and has now appeared for the first time among the top 50 high-scoring organisations in the survey.

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

By way of evidence, I renewed my passport very recently indeed and it came back in five days. Under the new system, in which applicants can upload their photograph from an iPhone, the application took 10 minutes. What a fantastic service!

[Caroline Nokes]

I am delighted to hear that feedback from my hon. Friend, the former Immigration Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Goodwill]

I personally do not consider the cost of a passport to be exorbitant. It is a 10-year passport, so for less than £8 per year a person can have a red passport—in future, I hope they will have a blue passport with gold lettering.

I have used the online process, and it is very good, but it is not all online: people have to return their old passport in the post. Indeed, many people consider a passport so valuable a commodity that they return it by recorded delivery, with all the costs involved in that. The Passport Office will then clip off the corner and send it back. When I was in the Home Office, we looked at whether it was necessary for the person to send the passport back, only to have it sent back to them. I wonder if the Minister will consider whether it would be cheaper for the Passport Office, and for us applicants, if it was no longer necessary for the old passport to be sent in merely to have its corner cut off, given that all the information the Passport Office needs is now held electronically on its system.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alison Thewliss]

It may be possible for random constituents in his constituency to stroll into schools and go on to the computers, but that is not the case in Glasgow. There are many computers in Glasgow’s libraries, and they are very much used by the population, including those who are trying to apply for universal credit online. There are lots of pressures on library services, precisely because the Government are moving things online, while many people do not have the facilities to access them: they cannot afford broadband, if it is even available, or a computer, and unfortunately still do not have the digital skills to access them. It is unacceptable that the Government are making people in poorer communities pay a premium for something to which we should all have a right.

[Mr Goodwill]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Alison Thewliss]

I want to move on, if the hon. Gentleman does not mind. I am concerned: the Government talk about more modern processes and things becoming cheaper and more efficient, but that is not reflected in the fees, which are going up. If the service is becoming more efficient and cheaper to run, because things are going online, members of the public should see a decrease in their passport fees. It is ridiculous that they are actually seeing an increase; whether for an online application or not, the price continues to go up.

I asked the Library to prepare figures on this for me. It had some difficulty in finding the range of figures over time, but I have the passport application fees for 32-page passports for adults and children. In 2001, the fee was £30 for an adult and £16 for a child. That will go up to £75.50 for an adult and £49 for a child if the application is made online, or £85 for an adult and £58.50 per child by post.

The online change since 2001 is a 151.7% increase for an adult and a 206.3% increase for a child. That is absolutely unacceptable, particularly when we consider that child passports last for only five years. By the time a child reaches the age of 16, they could have had three different passports. That is an unacceptable burden on families, particularly at a time when all other prices are also going up and household incomes are being squeezed by Tory austerity every single day.

Could the Minister tell us about her full cost recovery plan for paper applications? That indicates to me that there will be a further increase next year. It is a significant cost for people, particularly if they do not drive and so do not have a driving licence, because the passport will be the only way of having validated and accessible identification. The hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton, mentioned that that is becoming a requirement for many more people, to get a rental agreement or financial agreement, and in life. It will also be a requirement should Tory plans to ask for ID at voting stations go ahead. People will find themselves disenfranchised if they do not have the £85, £75.5 and £49.50 to pay those exorbitant fees. If the Government want to propose ID cards, they can do so, but doing this by the back door and charging people an absolute fortune for it is utterly unacceptable.

The Minister mentioned that, to deal with vulnerable groups who cannot use online resources, the Government will work to improve the accessibility of systems and support arrangements to help people to access services online and minimise the impact on protected groups. I would be very interested to know what consultation they have done with groups that are considered vulnerable. What have they done to engage with all those groups? Will they publish any of that consultation process? I have not seen any of that information out there. The draft regulations are coming through a Delegated Legislation Committee and will come into force at the end of March, and there is very little time for people to have any kind of say on this matter before then. I would be very concerned if vulnerable groups had not been consulted formally.