Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Robert Buckland Excerpts

Committee of the whole House
Wednesday 17th January 2024 Commons Chamber

[Sir Robert Neill]

I think my hon. Friend needs to bear in mind that the application that was made to Strasbourg was also about the circumstances of an individual case, so that is no different.

There is a legitimate criticism—one that I have voiced in the past—about the procedure adopted in Strasbourg for these applications in two areas: first, the anonymity of the judge, and secondly, the failure to state reasons. From our point of view, that would not be acceptable, but the answer is not to throw out the whole of the judicial and treaty baby with the bathwater. Thanks to the Brighton declaration that was signed by my noble and learned Friend Lord Clarke of Nottingham, it is possible to make reforms following dialogue between member states, the Council of Ministers and the judiciary of the Court. I am pleased to say that after pressure from the United Kingdom—perfectly properly—the Court itself has indicated that it will to consult on reforms to its procedure, which can only be a good thing. That is what I think the balanced position is on that issue.

[Sir Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)]

In fact, further than that, there are already proposed reforms to the interim procedure, which will come into place this year and crucially will remove the anonymity provisions and allow contracting parties such as the UK to make the argument, as I believe applies in this case, that there is not an imminent risk of irreparable damage. We can fly people back from Rwanda, and that is the argument we need to keep making.

[Sir Robert Neill]

My right hon. and learned Friend is entirely correct, and he and I would probably have very happily argued the UK’s case in Strasbourg on those grounds, so let us be realistic about what we are fighting against. With respect, a bit of an Aunt Sally has been set up because steps are already being taken to deal with the objectionable matters relating to rule 39s, but the principle of them is not itself objectionable.

Secondly, with respect, the characterisation of a “foreign court” is not helpful in these circumstances, because it implies something alien, which it is not the case for international law as a concept or for the Court itself. The fact that it happens to meet in a different place from the UK is inevitable because it has to meet somewhere. We should bear in mind that not only was the UK one of the driving powers behind the creation of the convention in the first place, behind the Court itself and behind much of the jurisprudence of the Court, but the UK does actually have shared ownership of the Court, along with all the other member states.

That is demonstrated not just in the treaty, but in practical ways. For example, the British members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe—Members of this House and the other place—have a role in the appointment of the judges of the Court. My right hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) and I served at one time on the sub-committee of the Assembly that dealt with that process, and I like to think that we did so diligently, so there is involvement in that process. A British judge always sits on the Court and is a member of the Court. Judge Tim Eicke, the current judge, is a very distinguished international lawyer, and we are very lucky to have him. Two of the recent registrars of the Court, who run its administration, have been British lawyers, and British lawyers appear regularly in cases before the Court.

This is not an alien body; it is a Court of which we have joint ownership. It is our Court, along with that of all the other member states of the convention, and it is wrong to mischaracterise it as something alien. Certainly, in all international matters, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam said, it operates on a different plane, but the tone of comments about its alienness is, with respect, both inaccurate and somewhat offensive. It is also unnecessary for the purposes of this Bill anyway, and that is the point I want to come on to in relation to rule 39.

The amendments tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark are otiose. They are unnecessary and, frankly, would make a difficult situation worse. As a matter of law, an interim measure under rule 39 is an indication made to the Government of the member state. It is not made to the courts of the member state; it is conveyed to the Government of the member state concerned. Therefore, it is for the members of the Government of the member state—the Ministers—to decide what to do about it.

I personally take the view that we should be very loth indeed to ignore the findings of the Court on an interim matter. As the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West rightly said, it runs the risk of putting us in breach of our international law obligation in that regard. However, the truth is that it is a political decision that the Ministers can take. So what the Bill in its current formulation states is actually no more than a statement of the law as it stands, and we probably do not need clause 5 in the Bill. I am not going to die in a ditch over that, because it is simply stating what the law is already, but, equally, there is absolutely no need for the amendments from my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark to put bells and whistles on otioseness, if I can put it that way.

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[Gavin Robinson]

The hon. Lady is entirely right in the quote that she shares. It is fair to say that the Government won that case. We therefore did not see the Government—indeed, they did not have any rationale to do so—taking forward an appeal to defend some of the points that they may well have chosen to defend, but she highlights a frailty in the position, if the Home Office is not accepting a position that it has defended in other cases by saying that the rights chapter is not engaged. That is a frailty of the Government’s position, and that is why, in fairness, the hon. Lady has tabled her own amendment. It is not as fatal as our new clause 3, in terms of the notwithstanding provisions, but it is at least asking the Government not to proceed with the Bill until they are in the firm position to publish a position. This House has agreed that that is the basis upon which we should proceed.

I have been in this place for almost nine years. There are many occasions when this House has agreed to proceed in the face of what I believe to be well-grounded, politically supported and principled decisions. It is not an amendment I take comfort from, but I very much look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say, given the day that this is and the potential for Third Reading this evening.

[Sir Robert Buckland]

I spoke yesterday to the amendments that stand in my name and are potentially subject to Division later, so I will not trouble the Committee on that. My amendment 58 would amend clause 7 to preserve a small element of clause 1—namely, the definition of a safe country. I listened carefully to the reasoned arguments of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), whose position is similar to mine, except that he takes exception to parts of clause 1 that I want to retain. I would rather get rid of the rest of clause 1, because it is bad lawmaking, but I will come back to that in a moment.

I might have an answer to my right hon. and learned Friend’s sensible question of why the definition of a safe country in clause 1(5)(b)(ii) contains reference to the other country’s “obligations under international law.” It is simple: that has to flow, because unlike many people’s understanding of this scheme, it is not about the offshoring of UK processing, but the wholesale handing to another country of the determination of applications. That is why the measure is in the Bill. I hope that gives him some satisfaction. It is why, in considering my amendments, I decided to retain the entirety of subparagraph (ii) by moving it to the interpretive clauses towards the back end of the Bill. It was the only part of clause 1 that I could see had any function whatsoever.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I understand the argument that my right hon. and learned Friend is making, and I will not be dogmatic about the approach that I set out earlier. Is there not a danger, if we retain the language that he is referring to, that we open up another channel of legal challenge, which is exactly what the Government are seeking to avoid? If the question becomes, “Is Rwanda in compliance with its international law responsibilities?”, that is something else that someone may choose to argue if they wish to resist their transfer to Rwanda.

[Sir Robert Buckland]

My right hon. and learned Friend is absolutely right. I think I have said outside the Chamber that, when it comes to the passage of statute, the principle of “less is more” is not only fundamentally Conservative, but fundamental to good lawmaking. Although the Bill does not weigh in at a heavy number of clauses—it has a mere 10—we as parliamentarians have a continuing duty to demonstrate economy. Any clause—in this case, clause 1—that is titled “Introduction” should give us all pause for thought, if not breaking out into a cold sweat.

It seems to me that the language in clauses 1 to 6 would belong better in a White Paper or an accompanying policy document. We know what the purpose of the Bill is. We have read the treaty, and most of us will have read the policy document that accompanied the Bill’s publication—that is where such language belongs, not in a Bill. That is not just because I have a tidy and ordered mind—well, I try—but because of the very point made by my right hon. and learned Friend: the more words we put into legislation, the more opportunity we give for their litigation and justiciability, and the arguments that will then go before the court about fundamental issues at a high level that, in my view, really should not be the province of litigation.

It is for the contracting parties to a treaty to agree its terms and sign the document, and then either directly, as in the case of Rwanda or, in our dualist system, via the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010—the CRaG procedure that is ongoing—the treaty will come into force. So, to use one of my favourite wartime adages, I must ask my hon. and learned Friend the Minister, for whom I have great esteem: why is our journey really necessary?

In my view, clause 1 needs to go, save for the retention of clause 5. Although we will have a stand-part vote anyway, I tabled amendment 27 just to emphasise my extreme distaste for clause 1. It is a distaste based on the fear that this somehow becomes the norm and we start to see legislation of this nature proliferate. Let us start with clause 2, because that is what the Bill is all about: the safety of the Republic of Rwanda. That is where it should begin. What clause 2 says is clear, and I spoke to it yesterday.

I turn now to clause 3, which throws up a series of interesting questions. I am not a particular fan of section 3 of the Human Rights Act, because I never liked the read-down provisions, which draw the justices—the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in particular—into a province where they are acting almost as a constitutional court. We have seen it happen: the read-down provisions where judges in effect pass and reinterpret the will of Parliament. It is a sticky and dangerous place for the Court to go, and I do not like it. If I had had the opportunity and we had done what we said we would do in the manifesto, which I helped to write, we would have updated the Human Rights Act by now. We could have got rid of section 3, so we would not have needed to refer to it in this ad hoc way in the Bill. It was a horrible echo of that Bill of Rights, which happily never saw the light of day—it did not even have a Second Reading, thank goodness—and perhaps some of what I am saying in the context of these amendments and the stand part debates is an echo of my deep distaste for aspects of that failed legislation.

Why have we got clause 3 in the Bill? I can see what the Government want to do—they want to avoid arguments relating to the Human Rights Act—but I am afraid that they cannot get out of jail. As people have an individual right to petition to Strasbourg anyway—I entirely agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) that we helped to set up that Court and have direct ownership of it—we are in effect sending the arguments to that so-called foreign Court. Of course, the danger in allowing petitions to go to Strasbourg without any airing of the arguments in domestic courts is that we do not really get that margin of appreciation evidence that is so crucial for the Strasbourg Court.

I do get frustrated by inelegant, inaccurate comparisons between the Luxembourg Court—the Court of Justice of the European Union—and the Strasbourg Court, which is a very different place. We have a much wider margin of appreciation, much bigger discretion and much more room in which to make arguments of interpretation and context—indeed, political context as well—about the way in which we do things in this country. Perhaps it is no coincidence that the number of times the United Kingdom is found to be in breach of the convention is vanishingly small.

We have heard about prisoner rights—more cases, anybody? We might remember the Abu Qatada case, which is on all fours with what we are dealing with here. We solved the problem by making sure that Jordan had a fair trial system. If I am right, I think Abu Qatada was tried and acquitted in Jordan, but the point was made. That is the point on all fours with this Bill: if we are to rely on the processes of another country, getting them right in order to be compliant seems to be the best way forward. That is why the Government’s treaty approach is to be commended. So, no, I do not see the need for clause 3—get rid of it. We will end up with these arguments whether we like it or not.

I turn to clause 5, which is another clause that, in the words of my hon. Friends, is just unnecessary. I do not see how interim measures equate in any way to the binding nature of final judgments, which article 46 of the convention draws us to, or indeed anything different from the approach that we take to interim injunctions in domestic cases that High Court judges, county court judges—judges of all shapes and sizes—will be enjoined to create or refuse on ex parte or inter partes applications.

In the context of the debate about interim measures, it is important to pray in aid the work done in the plenary sessions of the European Court of Human Rights last year. The rules will be changed, with that coming into effect in 2024. May I ask my hon. and learned Friend the Minister to work with colleagues in the Attorney General’s Office—his former Department—and indeed the Lord Chancellor, to ensure that the Council of Europe and the plenary sessions of the Court get on with implementing these changes? The changes to interim measures are really important.

First, the limiting of the granting of interim measures to “exceptional circumstances”—those words do not currently exist in the definition of rule 39—will change the ball game at a stroke. Secondly, there is the end to anonymity for judges, which is a proposal that will be enacted. Finally, and importantly, there is the opportunity for parties to the proceedings to request the court to reconsider its decision. So the United Kingdom will have an opportunity to say, “No, there is no imminent risk of irreparable damage here. We can fly people back from Rwanda if there is a problem.” In any event, because of the measures that we are taking in the Bill, we will not be sending people who are vulnerable or at risk—those who might be terminally ill, pregnant or have some serious condition, whatever it might be—to Rwanda in the first place. We have got the arguments to deal with rule 39 and we should have the self-confidence and the ability to make our case. I think that the reforms to rule 39 will be significant.

I am delighted to have followed the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson), who made a thoughtful contribution. He and I have had some differences of opinion about things in recent days, but he always couches his arguments in a respectful way, and for that I thank him.

[Sir William Cash]

First, does my right hon. and learned Friend understand that there are those who argue that the rule 39 indications are being used by the Strasbourg Court in a way that is not binding? Has he heard that argument, and does he agree with it? Secondly, with regard to how people react to the manner in which the proposed reforms are being done, can he speak with authority—not that he does not have his own authority—by quoting to us any specific document that demonstrates that the whole thing is now more or less sewn up?

[Sir Robert Buckland]

I have sources that I was looking at to research this speech. I will send my hon. Friend the links that I have to the European Court web pages that deal with several meetings held in the summer and November last year where the proposals were agreed. Now, the question is implementation in 2024. The Court has not been specific about precisely when these reforms will be brought in. Therefore, now is our opportunity not just as a Parliament but as a Government, together with other member states, to say, “Look, these are welcome. Can you please bring them in?” Hopefully, it will bring them in a way that dovetails with the eventual coming into force of these provisions. My hon. Friend makes an important point, and I will send that information to him.

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[Gavin Robinson]

I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Member for his contribution. He would accept that the arguments around the particularities of Northern Ireland, should an application come from Northern Ireland, were not considered by the Supreme Court in detail. I am not saying that I am right, but for as long as we have an undetermined position of the Government on one hand juxtaposed with some advocates in Northern Ireland on the other, we need to get it settled. We need to be sure about the position. That is my point.

[Sir Robert Buckland]

The hon. Gentleman makes a powerful point. I hope that is taken up in the other place as well. As Chair of the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, I want to discuss that further with him and with Ministers in the Home Office or the Northern Ireland Office—directly with the Home Office would probably be the best way forward.

That opens up the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) about the interaction of Scots law with all this. She is not wrong to remind us that Scots law looks at parliamentary sovereignty differently from the law of England and Wales. We cannot get around that. However, I would qualify her remarks by saying that that is overcome by having a United Kingdom Supreme Court, which has at the moment two very distinguished Scots lawyers, in the form of the president and vice-president, who understand these principles deeply. At any time, the composition of that Court will include senior Scots lawyers, and it also has a senior judge from Northern Ireland, Lord Stephens.

The whole function of the Supreme Court is to bring together the slightly differing concepts of constitutional law that undoubtedly exist in our jurisdictions and strike the right balance, based on restraint—we come back to that word again. I will not labour the point I made yesterday, but my hon. and learned Friend the Minister knows that he is walking a tightrope to get this legislation right. Anything that smacks of a lack of restraint, such as the amendments tabled by hon. Friends—I said obliging things yesterday and I will repeat them today—does not follow that sense of restraint and balance.

It is about the risk of an imbalance not just between the courts of England and Wales and this Parliament, but between the differing jurisdictions of the United Kingdom. That should give us all pause for thought, particularly those of us deeply committed to our Union and who believe in this United Kingdom. I am not saying that my hon. Friends are deliberately trying to undermine that, but I am sounding a word of warning about treading too heavily down this path of exceptionalism and going too far in normalising what were the exceptional circumstances of withdrawal from the EU. I should know about that because I sat on that Front Bench making the case for many of the provisions in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act that are cited by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) and others. Those were exceptional times.

I know that this is an exceptional global challenge, but before I conclude my remarks, I will simply say that we need to tread carefully. If we do not do so, in trying to deal with an external problem we will create internal, constitutional and legal problems of our own. I do not think that any self-respecting Conservative Government would want to do that, and no self-respecting Parliament would want to follow that. For those reasons, I urge right hon. and hon. Members to reject many of the amendments that complicate the Bill, and to follow the maxim that less is more.

[Stella Creasy]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. and learned Member for South Swindon (Sir Robert Buckland) and many of the colleagues sat next to him who have brought an immense level of legal expertise to their concerns about the Bill. Let me try to offer something different, as somebody who is not legally qualified: a lay person’s view or perspective on what the Bill is doing, in particular why I tabled and will speak to amendment 9, and why I support the amendments in the name of my Front Bench colleagues.

This is not about the R of refugees or even the R of Rwanda; it is about the R of rights—the rights we enjoy that protect those freedoms and liberties that so many of us fight for, are passionate about, and believe are intrinsic to a good life. The Government state that the Bill is:

“a clear statement of Parliament’s view that Rwanda is safe, ‘notwithstanding’ all specified domestic legislation and the common law, and any alternative interpretation of international law including customary international law”.

For those of us who are not qualified, the word “notwithstanding” is doing an awful lot of work to justify the diminution of rights for people in our country and the concept that somehow international law does not protect us.

So much of the anger we have heard about the idea of a foreign court has come from it being about the European Court of Human Rights: that it is an affront to our democracy that that organisation is part of protecting those rights, liberties and freedoms on which we depend. How dare Winston Churchill sign us up to such a thing? How dare he believe that working with other countries was the way to protect those rights? As he said:

“In the centre of our movement stands the idea of a Charter of Human Rights, guarded by freedom and sustained by law.”

The scoundrel. What sort of rights was he trying to protect? What sort of abuses by the state did he dare to think we might need a court to uphold for us? The right to family life? A travesty, surely. The right to privacy? I mean, goodness me, what a terrible thing to be concerned about. The right to freedom from torture or the right to liberty, or even the right to freedom of thought? Well, no wonder we need to look at all this again. How terrible those things must sound to those of us who are not legally qualified and who cannot see the rub there.

Let me to try think through a real world example of why those rights might be upheld by a third party. One could think of somebody, perhaps a Member of this House who did not have the respect and courtesy for other people speaking in this debate to even stay and listen to them shortly after he had spoken; somebody who thought that the rules did not apply to him, that the treatment of others was not something that mattered and who perhaps was far too busy worrying about his social media account. The Chair would want to hold him to account, and rightly so. Goodness, many of us would think he might need legal representation for what could happen next. He would want his day in court. He might not want to be in the Chamber when we were talking about those very issues. He might be concerned about the idea of a judge and jury existing in the same person. The very principles that led to setting up the European Court of Human Rights are ones that we all feel every single day, because it does not just defend those basic things like a right to family life or the right to privacy, it also defends a process by which those rights are upheld. Even if the Chair wanted to take somebody to task for not following the rules in this place, they might at least be entitled to a fair hearing or a fair trial for what they had done.

Yet what the Bill does is remove that concept of a fair hearing from those people in our country who are often some of the most vulnerable: people fleeing torture and persecution. They want to uphold Government Ministers as judge and jury, and it does not even align with their own data on how many people they were granting asylum to when their cases were heard. Nevertheless the point about the ECHR is the point that was understood by Churchill and, I believe, by many of us in the Chamber: we withdraw at our peril the opportunity for that freedom to be heard, that freedom for a fair trial and for somebody else to hear your case against an overbearing state.

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[Bob Seely]

My hon. Friend has made an excellent point. He is, of course, an eminent lawyer, and I, frankly am not. [Hon. Members: “There is still time!”] I am tempted to say, “I will stop digging.”

My hon. Friend is right in saying that we have had an influence, but I understand from what I have seen and read that there has also been the influence of a far more rationalist system on our own common law, and I do not consider the impact on EU law and casework on our system to have been entirely beneficial and entirely helpful.

[Sir Robert Buckland]

I am glad that my hon. Friend is making this point. I do not blame him because it is easy to elide the two now, but EU law and the operation of the Luxembourg Court is a very different discipline from what happens in Strasbourg. That Court is enjoined to interpret EU law, and what it says is gospel and we have to follow it. That is not the case with the Strasbourg Court. My hon. Friend has talked about case law. I will not put him on the spot too much, but can he name the cases that have posed a problem? Where are they?

I can help my hon. Friend. The judgment in the Hirst case, the prisoner voting case, was pretty poor. In fact, it was a bad judgment. Then there was the judgment about whole-life sentences, which we sorted out in the Court of Appeal: problem solved. The Abu Qatada case was a long saga, but we sorted that out too. Those are the only three problems we have had in 10 years, and that does not amount to a hill of beans.

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[Michael Tomlinson]

I am very grateful for that guidance.

May I start by turning to those who have contributed to this debate? I thank my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) for his powerful points, challenging, forensic and learned points. He once again questioned what solutions are being offered by the Labour party, and he was right to do so. Answer came there none.

May I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes)? As so often, he debated in poetry, and I will come back to some of his remarks in due course. I also thank the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Dame Diana Johnson). She was right to ensure that she did not make a Second Reading speech, but she did mention one or two amendments and other matters, and I shall turn to those in due course.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner (David Simmonds). He is always thoughtful, measured and so often right, and I am grateful to him for his contributions and also for his interventions during the latter stages of this debate. The hon. Member for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss) cited Robert Burns and asked what he would have to say to those on the Conservative Benches. My hon. Friend and neighbour, the hon. Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare), rather cheekily from a sedentary position suggested that Robert Burns might say to Conservative Members, “How can I join you?” That was not the gist or the thrust of her speech, but it was a cheeky intervention that I enjoyed none the less. I shall turn to her amendments in due course.

I listened to my hon. Friend the Member for Don Valley (Nick Fletcher), as I always do, and I hope to be able to turn to some of the points that he made and hopefully allay some of his fears. He said sometimes the Chamber empties, or is not as full, when he speaks. That sometimes happens to Ministers as well—that not everyone is back when they are responding to Members’ contributions. But my hon. Friend is here, and I am grateful to him for sitting through so much of this debate and for his characteristic courtesy.

My hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Tom Hunt) spoke with passion, as he always does, and I am grateful to him for his contribution. My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) spoke at some length, and I am grateful to him for that. He delved into the principles of the ECHR, and he was enticed by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Swindon (Sir Robert Buckland) to make some pronouncements on some of its judgements, which I thought was a little mean. None the less, my right hon. and learned Friend did proffer one suggestion, namely the case of Hirst, and I am grateful to him for that.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland (Jerome Mayhew) for his intervention and for being on duty not only in Westminster Hall, but also here in this Chamber.

The course of the debate has been constructive, on the whole. I agree that it has been broadly thoughtful and instructive. We have had exchanges on scripture, and as a lawyer, it was a joy indeed to hear the word “otiose” not once or twice, but several times. We once even heard “otiose with bells on” from my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), and I am grateful to him for that. I have not heard that expression before; it must be a legal reference that I brushed past in my youth.

We also heard about box sets from my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick) and the hon. Member for Glasgow North (Patrick Grady), and I will need to do a bit more research on that. We touched on ECHR membership, although my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark rightly said that this was not the place to have that full debate, but he set out some of the parameters for future debates that I am sure we will have.

Clause 1 sets out the rationale for the Bill. It sets out the legal obligations and how the treaty to which the Government of Rwanda have agreed addresses the concerns that were set out by the Supreme Court. Amendments 39, 40, 41 and 42, tabled and addressed today by the hon. Member for Glasgow Central (Alison Thewliss), and amendments 43 and 44, tabled by the hon. Member for Aberdeen South (Stephen Flynn), seek to exclude the core of those provisions. The hon. Member for Glasgow Central was clear about her intention in that regard. The treaty is binding in international law and, in accordance with Rwandan law, will become domestic law in Rwanda on ratification. That is set out in detail and confirmed in article 3(6) of the treaty. It rules out anyone relocated to Rwanda being removed from there, except to the United Kingdom. That is an important part of the treaty, set out in article 10(3), and that is regardless of whether the individual is found to be a refugee or to have another humanitarian protection need. That removes the risk of refoulement.

Everyone relocated to Rwanda will receive the same treatment. Those with refugee status, those with a humanitarian protection need and even those without that status will be able to stay in Rwanda and will receive the same rights and treatment. That addresses head on the concern that the Supreme Court set out. The asylum decision-making process is being significantly reformed. Annex B of the treaty—if I have time, I might turn to the details of that—contains strengthened monitoring arrangements, and there are also strengthened monitoring arrangements to ensure adherence to the obligations.

I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) for his engagement. I do not believe that his concerns are right. He said “offensive or otiose”. I would suggest that neither is right, and I hope to be able to reassure him, because clause 1 makes clear that Parliament is sovereign and that its Acts are valid notwithstanding any interpretation of international law. I will come back to that “notwithstanding” terminology, which has been so contentious, perhaps, in recent history. What it does not mean is that we are legislating away our international obligations. The purpose of the Bill is to say that, on the basis of the treaty and the evidence before it, Parliament believes that those obligations have been met. It does not mean that we do not care whether they have been met. He mentioned dualism and was right to do so.

The parts of the clause to which my right hon. and learned Friend’s amendments are directed do no more than make clear what we mean by a safe country, which is a key definition applied to Rwanda, namely that the United Kingdom can remove people to that country in compliance with its international obligations and that Rwanda will not remove anyone in breach of any international law. As a former Attorney General, he also mentioned the Law Officers convention. I was grateful to him for that, for so often in this Chamber it goes unnoticed. It is an important convention, and as a former Law Officer myself I abide by it very strictly, as I know he does, so I am grateful to him for reminding the House of it.

Turning to the amendments tabled by and the speech of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Swindon, I am grateful for his contributions not just today but yesterday. It is important that the will of Parliament is made clear and that, following the mammoth efforts between our Government and the Government of Rwanda, the obligations that we have agreed are fully set out. Clause 1 ensures that it is crystal clear that it is Parliament that has considered and concluded that Rwanda is a safe country. I know his concern about this sort of clause, but he will know that it is not unique and that it is not dissimilar to clause 1 of the Illegal Migration Act—[Interruption.] I suspect he is encouraging me not to pray that in aid, but it is a fact all the same that it is not unprecedented to have a clause such as clause 1 in a Bill.

I turn to clause 3. The United Kingdom has a long-standing tradition of ensuring that rights and liberties are protected domestically and of fulfilling our international human rights obligations. We remain committed to that position and will ensure that our laws continue to be fit for purpose and work for the people of the United Kingdom. Though some of the provisions in the Bill are novel, the Government are satisfied that the Bill can be implemented in line with the convention rights.

However, it has become clear that people will seek to frustrate their removal by any means. Therefore, this Bill goes further than the Illegal Migration Act, which was taken through by my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Fareham (Suella Braverman). As we have heard, that Act only disapplies section 3 of the Human Rights Act, whereas this Bill, and particularly clause 3, disapplies further elements of the Act. The effect is that the duty under section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act is disapplied for any public authority, including any court or tribunal, that is taking a decision based on the duty under clause 2 of the Bill to treat the Republic of Rwanda as safe.

I turn now directly to the amendments tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark, starting with his amendments 11 and 18. He is right that the Bill does not seek to disapply section 4 of the Human Rights Act; it does not, in fact, disapply the declaration of incompatibility provisions in section 4. That is the only substantive remedy against the conclusive presumption that Rwanda is safe. Retaining declarations of incompatibility is important, but of course the final say on this matter will rightly remain with Parliament and with the Government because of section 4(6) of the Human Rights Act, which makes it clear that a declaration cannot affect the operation or the validity of domestic legislation.

[Sir Robert Buckland]

My hon. and learned Friend makes an important point about the extent to which the courts should and can intervene on issues relating to the compatibility of primary legislation with the ECHR. The section 4 procedure allows the courts to express a view, but does not trespass directly upon the functions of this place in dealing with the problem. It simply gives Parliament an opportunity to rectify any situation—or not, frankly. Does he agree that section 4 is a much better mechanism for the courts to use than the clunky, inelegant and sometimes very problematic section 3 procedure?

[Michael Tomlinson]

I hear what my right hon. and learned Friend says about section 3 and I agree with him wholeheartedly. He is right to describe it as clunky, and it has been disapplied in this Bill as well as in the Illegal Migration Act.

If I may say so directly to my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark, I accept entirely his comments that he is here to help the Government and that he believes passionately in this policy. He has had several very frank, open and honest conversations with me about that, both in this Chamber and outside it, and I am grateful to him for putting his points so ably and so clearly, but the disapplication of those sections within the Bill significantly reduces the extent to which public authorities are bound to act as a consequence of the convention rights.

May I turn to clause 5 and the further amendments tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark? Clause 5 makes it clear that it is for a Minister of the Crown alone to determine whether to comply with an interim measure of the Strasbourg Court. It also makes it clear that the domestic courts may not have regard to the existence of any interim measure when considering any domestic application flowing from a decision to remove a person to Rwanda in accordance with the treaty.